STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

DOCTRINES & JURISPRUDENCE

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

I. CONSTITUTION, DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS

a. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government,
assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on
which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered.

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law
or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons
for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

b. Lopez v. De los Reyes 55 Phil. 186, 188, G.R. No. 34361, November 5, 1930

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE;

LEGISLATIVE POWER IN THE PHILIPPINES TO PUNISH NON-MEMBERS FOR CONTEMPT; "HABEAS
CORPUS." — Where no traverse to the return to the writ of habeas corpus was interposed, and where no
exception to the denial of the application for permission to offer evidence was made in the court below, no
question of fact is involved. Under such conditions, a strictly question of law, in other words of jurisdiction, is
presented for determination on habeas corpus.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Where the liberty of the citizen is concerned the legality of the action taken by the
legislative body in punishing for contempt is a proper subject for inquiry on habeas corpus.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The experience of Great Britain and the United States described and the cases on the
subject reviewed. The legislative power to punish for contempt arises by implication, is justified only by the right
of self-preservation, and is the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The Philippine Legislature could not divest itself, or either of its House, of the essential
and inherent power to punish for contempt, in cases to which the power of either House properly extended.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — A limited power to punish non-members for contempt resides in the House of
Representatives of the Philippine Legislature.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Imprisonment for a term not exceeding the session of the deliberative body in which the
contempt occurred is the limit of the authority to deal directly by way of contempt, without criminal prosecution.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — One, L, assaulted Representative D on October 23, 1929. The House of Representatives of
which Representative D was a member then adopted a resolution on November 6, 1929, requiring the Speaker to
order the arrest of L to be confined in Bilibid Prison for twenty-four hours. The House adjourned that session, the
second, at midnight on November 8, 1929, without the order of arrest having been served on L. A confirmatory
resolution was approved by the House on September 16, 1930, during the third session of the Philippine
Legislature. Shortly thereafter, a new warrant of arrest was issued by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
and L was taken into custody by a constabulary officer. The trial judge dismissed the petition for habeas corpus
and remanded the petitioner to the custody of the respondent for compliance with the order of the House of
Representatives. Held: Error is refusing to grant the writ of habeas corpus, and L ordered discharged from
custody.

Per JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

8. LEGISLATIVE BODIES; POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT; "HABEAS CORPUS." — The power of
legislative bodies to punish for contempt is inherent and a necessary power for their protection, orderly
deliberation and perpetuation. The power of the Legislature of the Philippine Islands to punish for contempt is
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 inherent and needs no statutory or constitutional authority for that purpose. An order punishing for contempt,
issued by a particular legislative entity, continues to have full force and effect until final adjournment — until that
particular legislative entity passes out of existence.

c. Alfredo M. de Leon v. Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987

POLITICAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; DATE OF RATIFICATION; RETROACTS ON THE DAY OF

THE PLEBISCITE. — The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took
effect on February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it took effect on
February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the
Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino. The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect
on the date its ratification shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or
reject it." This view was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was withdrawn by
its proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be effective on the very
day of the plebiscite." The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports
the Court's judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Commission in
unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is
the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation
of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the official
confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution
when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."

ID.; PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION; TENURE OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES; ONE YEAR

PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO DESIGNATE SUCCESSOR SHORTENED BY THE RATIFICATION AND
EFFECTIVITY ON FEBRUARY 2, 1987 OF THE CONSTITUTION. — The Court next holds as a consequence
of its declaration at bar that the Constitution took effect on the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on
February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution promulgated on March 25, 1986 must be deemed to have
been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date,
February 2, 1987, absent any saying clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer exercise the power to replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay
Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's
designation on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force and effect. While the
Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on March 25, 1987 within which the power of
replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by the ratification and effectivity on February 2, 1987
of the Constitution. Had the intention of the framers of the Constitution been otherwise, they would have so
provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed they provided for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six
sections of Article XVIII, e.g. extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to
noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections, the continued exercise of legislative powers
by the incumbent President until the convening of the first Congress, etc.

II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

a. Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259, G.R. No. 45859, September 28, 1938

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; ALIENATION OF NATURAL

RESOURCES; MINERAL LANDS. — The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect
to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be
given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. It is clear that section 1
of Article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines prohibits the alienation of natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land. It seems likewise clear that the term "natural resources", as used therein,
includes mineral lands of the public domain, but not mineral lands which at the time the provision took effect no
longer formed part of the public domain. The reason for this conclusion is found in the terms of the provision
itself. This prohibition is directed against the alienation of such natural resources as were declared to be the
property of the State. And as only "agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain" were declared
property of the State, it is fair to conclude that mineral lands which at the time the constitutional provision took
effect no longer formed part of the public domain, do not come within the prohibition.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION. — A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and
adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to
presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects
to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs.
Truax, 13 N. D., 131; 99 N. W., 769; 65 L. R. A., 762.)

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 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The location of the mining claim under consideration was perfected prior to November 15,
1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that
time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil., 749), a valid location
of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain.

4. ID.; ID.; ID. — The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the
public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor
upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. "Where there is a valid location of a mining
claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining &
Milling Co. vs. Montana Mining Co., 171 U. S., 650, 655; 43 Law. ed., 320, 322.)

5. ID.; ID.; ID. — As the mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public domain when the
provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come within the prohibition against the
alienation of natural resources and the petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms
and conditions prescribed by law.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANDAMUS. — Considering that the refusal of the respondents to act on the application for a
patent on its merits was due to their misinterpretation of a certain constitutional and statutory provisions,
following the precedent established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Wilbur vs. United States ex rel
Krushnic (280 U. S., 306; 74 Law. ed., 445), a writ of mandamus should issue directing the respondents to
dispose of the application for patent on its merits, unaffected by the prohibition against the alienation of natural
resources contained in section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution and in Commonwealth Act No. 137.

b. Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003

The three well-settled principles of constitutional construction are as follows:

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution
should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.

Third, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. It is a well-established rule in
constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be
so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should
be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. In
other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will
render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.

c. Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 (1987)

The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the Constitution because
the fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and
expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional
provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but
in accordance with what they say and provide. The 1987 Constitution, as already pointed out, the clear and
expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII.

III. AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

a. Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275 (1975)

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In an original petition for prohibition, petitioners seek to nullify Presidential Decrees Nos. 1366, 1366-A, calling
for a referendum on February 27, 1975, Presidential Decrees Nos. 629 and 630 appropriating funds therefor, and
Presidential Decrees Nos. 637 and 637-A specifying the referendum question, as well as other related presidential
decrees, orders and instructions. Petitioners contend that President Ferdinand E. Marcos does not hold any legal
office nor possess any lawful authority under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution and therefore has no
authority to issue the questioned proclamations, decrees and orders. In addition, petitioners argue that due to the
climate of fear generated by Martial Law there can be no true expression of the people's will and that the period
for free debate is too short. The Supreme Court ruled that President Ferdinand E. Marcos is the de jure President
of the Republic of the Philippines and that the questioned proclamations, decrees and orders are valid.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES; PETITION CHALLENGING TITLE OF

INCUMBENT PRESIDENT THERETO; QUO WARRANTO IN NATURE. — Where the petition for
prohibition challenges the title of the incumbent President to the office of the Presidency, such petition is in the
nature of a quo warranto proceeding, the appropriate action by which the title of a public officer can be questioned
before the courts.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS IN INSTANT CASE WITHOUT RIGHT TO FILE QUO WARRANTO
SUIT. — Only the Solicitor General or the person who asserts title to the same office can legally file a quo
warranto petition. Since petitioners do not claim such right to the office and not one of them is the incumbent
Solicitor General, they have no personality to file the suit.

3. ID.; PUBLIC OFFICIALS; COLLATERAL ATTACK ON APPOINTMENT OR ELECTION THEREOF

NOT ALLOWED. — It is established jurisprudence that the legality of the appointment or election of a public
officer cannot be questioned collaterally through a petition for prohibition assailing the validity of his official acts.

4. ID.; 1973 CONSTITUTIONAL OF THE PHILIPPINES; EFFECTIVITY UPHELD. — The Supreme Court
had already ruled in the Ratification Cases "that there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect. As stressed in the Habeas Corpus cases, the issue of its effectivity "has been laid to
rest by Our decision in Javellana vs. Executive Secretary (36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 141), and of
course by the existing political realities both in the conduct of national affairs and in our relations with other
countries" (Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile and 8 companion cases, L-35546, L-35538-40, L-35547, L-35556, L-35571 and
L-35573, Sept. 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183, 241).

5. ID.; MARTIAL LAW PROCLAMATION; VALIDITY AFFIRMED. — The Supreme Court had affirmed the
validity of Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 because there was no arbitrariness in its issuance pursuant to the
1935 Constitution; that the factual bases had not disappeared but had even been exacerbated; that the question of
its validity has been foreclosed by Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution; and that "any inquiry by
this Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of
Martial Law, has become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973"
(Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile, supra).

6. ID.; PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES; INCUMBENT PRESIDENT DULY REELECTED UNDER 1935
CONSTITUTION. — Under the 1935 Constitution, President Ferdinand E. Marcos was duly reelected by an
overwhelming vote of the sovereign people in the Presidential elections of 1969 (Osmeña vs. Marcos, Presidential
Election Contest No. 3, Jan. 8, 1973).

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE AFTER EXPIRATION OF THEM. — While the term of
office of President Ferdinand E. Marcos under the 1935 Constitution should have terminated on December 30,
1973, by the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign people expressly authorized him to continue
in office even beyond 1973 under the 1973 Constitution, and as this was the decision of the people, in whom
"sovereignty reside . . . and all government authority emanates . . .," it is therefore beyond the scope of judicial
inquiry (Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile, et al., supra).

8. ID.; 1973 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; TRANSITORY PROVISIONS; PRESIDENT

FERDINAND E MARCOS IS THE "INCUMBENT PRESIDENT" REFERRED TO. — Since President
Ferdinand E. Marcos was the only incumbent President of the Philippines at the time the new Constitution was
approved by the Constitutional Convention, the Constitutional Convention had nobody in mind except him who
shall initially convene the interim. Assembly. (Sec. 3, Art. XVII, Transitory Provisions). It was the incumbent
President Marcos alone who issued Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081, orders, decrees as well as instructions,
and performed others acts as president prior to the approval and ratification of the new Constitution.
Consequently, he was the incumbent President which the Constitutional Convention had in had in mind when it
provided in Section 3(2), Article XVII. "that all the proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts
promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain
valid, legal, binding and effective even after lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless
modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions or other acts of the
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incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly."
The same is true with the term incumbent President of the Philippines employed in Section 9 thereof.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCLUSION BUTTRESSED BY PROVISION OF INCUMBENT MEMBERS OF

JUDICIARY. — The foregoing conclusions is further buttressed by Section 10 of the same Article XVII which
provides that "the incumbent members of the Judiciary may continue in office until they reach the age of 70 years
unless sooner replaced in accordance with the preceding section hereof." The phrase "incumbent members of the
Judiciary" can only refer to those members of the Judiciary who were already Justices and Judges of the various
courts of the country at the time of the approval and ratification of the Constitution.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO CONTINUE EXERCISING POWERS UNDER BOTH CONSTITUTION. —
Because President Ferdinand E. Marcos is the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of the transitory
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, he can continue to exercise the powers and prerogatives under the 1935
Constitution and the powers vested in the President and Prime Minister under the new Constitution until he
convenes the interim National Assembly (Sec. 3(1), Article XVII, 1973 Constitution).

11. ID.; PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES; POWER TO PROCLAIM MARTIAL LAW. — Under the 1935
Constitution, the President is empowered to proclaim Martial Law. Under the 1973 Constitution, it is the Prime
Minister who is vested with such authority (Sec. 12, Art. IX, 1973 Constitution).

12. ID.; ID.; LAW-MAKING POWER DURING MARTIAL RULE. — As Commander-in-Chief and enforcer or
administrator of martial law, the incumbent President of the Philippines can promulgate proclamations, orders and
decrees during the period of Martial Law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense
of the political and social liberties of the people and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of
rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession,
inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations all nations including highly developed countries
(Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 1948 Ed., pp. 7, 303; see also Chief Justice Stone's Concurring Opinion in
Duncan vs. Kahanamoku, 327 US 304).

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER AFFIRMED UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION. — The legality of the law-making
authority of the President during the period of Martial Law is expressly affirmed under Section 3(2) of Article
XVII of the new Constitution. This particular provision is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of
such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law.

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO MODIFY REVOKE OR SUPERSEDE NOT LIMITED TO PROCLAMATIONS
PRIOR TO RATIFICATION OF NEW CONSTITUTION. — The power of the President under he second clause
of Section 3(2) to modify, revoke or supersede is not limited merely to his proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions or other acts promulgated, issued or done prior to the ratification of the 1973 Constitution. But even if
the scope of his legislative authority thereunder is to be limited to the subject matter of his previous
proclamations, orders, decrees or instructions or acts, the subject matter of the challenged proclamations is
analogous to the referenda of January, 1973 and July 27-28, 1973.

15. ID.; ID.; ID.; HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS. — The actions of the incumbent President are not without
historical precedents. The American Federal Constitution, unlike the 1935 or 1973 Constitution of the Philippines,
does not confer expressly on the American President the power to proclaim Martial Law or to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus. And yet President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, and President Roosevelt during the
Second World War, without express constitutional or statutory authority, created agencies and offices and
appropriated public funds therefor in connection with the prosecution of the war. Nobody opposed the same. In
the case of President Roosevelt, the theater of war was not in the United States, but in the continents of Europe
and America and in the Far East. In the Philippines, military engagements between the government forces and the
rebels and secessionists are going on, emphasizing the immediacy of the peril to the safety of the Republic itself.
There is therefore greater reason to affirm this law-making authority of the incumbent President during the period
of Martial Law.

16. ID.; 1973 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; INTERIM NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; EXISTENCE
DISTINGUISHED FROM ORGANIZATION. — There is distinction between the existence of the interim
Assembly and its organization as well as its functioning. The interim Assembly already existed from the time the
new Constitution was ratified; because Section 1 of Article XVII states that "there shall be an interim National
Assembly which shall exist immediately upon the ratification of this Constitution and shall continue until the
members of the regular National Assembly shall have been elected and shall have assumed office . . . " However,
it cannot function until it is convened and thereafter duly organized with the election of its interim speaker and
other officials. Such distinction was clearly delineated in Mejia, et al. vs. Balolong, et al. (81 Phil. 486).

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17. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVENING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF INCUMBENT PRESIDENT. — The
Constitutional Convention intended of the time when he shall initially convene the interim Assembly, consistent
with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country.

18. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFERMENT OF CONVOCATION SUPPORTED BY SOVEREIGN PEOPLE. — The
decision of President Marcos to defer the initial convocation of the interim National Assembly was supported by
the sovereign people at the referendum in January, 1973, when they voted to postponed the convening of the
interim National Assembly until after at least seven (7) years from the approval of the new Constitution.

19. ID.; REFERENDUM; MARTIAL LAW NOT AN OBSTACLE. — The objection that there can be no true
expression of the people's will in the referendum on February 27, 1975 due to the climate of fear generated by
Martial Law is not tenable. During the senatorial elections in 1951 and 1971, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus was suspended, yet the election was so free that a majority of the senatorial candidates of the opposition
party were elected and there was no reprisal against or harassment of any voter thereafter. The same third was true
in the referendum of July 27-28, 1973, which was done also through secret ballot.

20. ID.; ID.; BRIEF PERIOD FOR DEBATE ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT. — The objection that the two-
week period for free debate in the scheduled referendum is too short is addressed to the wisdom of the President
who may still amend the proclamation to extend the period of free discussion.

21. ID.; ID.; ID.; COUNTERPART OF BRIEF PERIOD IN PREVIOUS PLEBISCITES. — At any rate, such a
brief period of discussion has its counterpart in pervious plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Under the Old
Society. 15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the
women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No.
34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski Act of the US
Federal Congress to the 1935 Constitution was published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette
for 10 days prior to the scheduled amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the reelection of the
President and Vice-President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com. Act No. 317). And the Parity Amendment, an involved
constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the independence of the Republic was publicized in
three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Republic Act No. 73).

CASTRO, J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1973 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; TRANSITORY PROVISIONS;
"INCUMBENT PRESIDENT" REFERS TO THE PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS. — The Transitory
Provisions (Art. XVII) of the 1973 Constitution, more specifically Secs. 2, 3, 9, and 12 thereof, even if they do
not mention Ferdinand E. Marcos, clearly point to and recognize him as the constitutional and lawful President of
the Philippines.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOUBT DISSIPATED BY AFFIRMATIVE VOTE OF PEOPLE IN REFERENDUM. — If
there is any doubt at all that the Transitory Provisions refers to President Marcos as the "incumbent President,"
then such doubt should be considered as having been completely dissipated by the resounding affirmative vote of
the people on this question propounded in general referendum of July 27-28, 1973: "Under the '1973'
Constitution, the President, if he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want President Marcos to
continue beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under martial law?"

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF INCUMBENT PRESIDENT TO LEGISLATE. — On the matter of whether
President Marcos, at the present time, can constitutionally exercise legislative power, it need not be postulated
that he derives legislative power from the constraints of a regime of martial law. Pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 3 of the
Transitory Provisions are unequivocal authority for President Marcos to legislate. They constitute an
unmistakable constitutional warrant for the "incumbent President" (meaning President Marcos) to legislate (until,
at the very earliest, the interim National Assembly shall have been convoked.)

4. ID.; ID.; INTERIM NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; CONVENING THEREOF BY INCUMBENT PRESIDENT; A

MATTER OUTSIDE THE COMPETENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT. — The peripheral matter of whether
President Marcos should now or soon convene the interim National Assembly is completely outside the
competence of the Supreme Court to resolve, as it is a political question addressed principally, basically, and
exclusively to the President and the Filipino people.

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COURTS; JURISDICTION OVER POLITICAL QUESTIONS; INSTANT
CASE. — Respondent's assertion that the Supreme Court cannot entertain the instant petition for prohibition since
the questions raised are political and therefore left the political sovereign, not the courts, cannot stand the rigor of
analysis. It is elemental that constitutionalism implies restraint as well on the process by which lawful and valid
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state objective may be achieved. Since what is challenged are the actuations of the incumbent President for
alleged failure to comply with constitutional requisites, it is much too late in the day to assert that the petition is
not appropriate for the courts. This is not to venture into uncharted judicial territory. There are landmarks all
along the way. This is not then to trespass on forbidden ground. There is no disregard of the political question
concept.

2. ID.; SUIT AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS; CAPACITY OF PRIVATE CITIZENS TO SUE. — The standing
of petitioners to bring the prohibition suit cannot be attacked as vindicating at most a public right and not
protecting their rights as individuals. That would conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to
parties intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As so well put by Jaffe: "The
protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered
state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and public interest are, both in substantive and
procedural sense, aspects of the totality of legal order." Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown their
capacity to sue as taxpayer.

3. ID.; PROPOSED REFERENDUM; OPPORTUNITY FOR PEOPLE TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS. — Since
the opportunity of the people to give expression to their views is implicit in the fundamental principle that
sovereignty resides in them, there is no sufficient merit in the petition to call a halt to the scheduled referendum.
A different conclusion would be attended by deplorable consequences. For one thing, it would implies with the
stigma of illegality the viable procedure that under the stem realities of the present is the only one in the horizon
for ascertaining the desire of the people. Moreover, under a republican regime, even under normal times, their role
is limited to the choice of public officials, thereafter to be held to accountability through their informed, even
immoderate, criticism. Now with the proposed referendum, they will be sounded out on what they think and how
they feel on matters of significance.

4. ID.; ID.; A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. — Even assuming its consultative character, the scheduled
referendum remains at the very least a step in the right direction. It may not go far enough, but there is progress of
sorts that hopefully may eventually lead to the goal of complete civilian rule. When people are allowed to express
their wishes and voice their opinions, the concept of popular sovereignty, more so under crisis conditions,
becomes impressed with a meaning beyond that of lyric liturgy or acrimonious debate devoid illumination. Nor is
this discern new waves of hope that may ultimately dissolve in the sands of actuality. It is merely to manifest
fidelity to the fundamental principle of the Constitution.

5. ID.; PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY; WILL OF THE PEOPLE IS DECISIVE. — The will of the people if
given expression even in an official manner but accurately ascertained, is impressed with decisive significance. It
is more than just a foundation for societal or political development. Whenever appropriate, it determines what is
to be done. Its significance is vital, not merely formal. It is understandable then why in Javellana vs. The
Executive Secretary, L-36142, March 31, 1973, one of the issues passed upon by the Supreme Court is the effect
of acquiescence by the people to the present Constitution even on the assumption that it was not ratified in
accordance with the 1935 Charter.

6. ID.; PRESIDENTIAL DECREES IMPLEMENTING PROPOSED REFERENDUM; VALIDITY. — The

Presidential Decrees implementing the proposed referendum do no suffer from the corrosion of substantial
constitutional infractions. It, therefore, becomes unnecessary to inquire into the nature of the authority conferred
on the incumbent President under the Transitory Provisions, whether purely executive or both executive and
legislative. That question should be left for another day. What cannot be ignored is that with a National Assembly
in existence but not convened, it is only the Executive that can perform those essentials and indispensable
functions of dealing with the actual conduct of public affairs. To deny his power to issue decrees and to
appropriate public funds is thus to assure the paralyzation and impotence of government. Precisely then if a
referendum may lend itself to a reappraisal of the situation, by all means let it be conducted.

7. ID.; MARTIAL LAW; EFFECT OF PROPOSED REFERENDUM. — Petitioners submit that under martial
law, with people denied their basic freedoms, particularly their freedoms of expression and assembly, the
referendum cannot be validly held. There is still that feeling of insecurity as to what the morrow may bring, not
from high and responsible officials, of course, but from those much lower in the ranks, whether in the armed
forces or in the civilian competent. Abuses, in the nature of things, cannot be completely curbed. In that sense, my
misgiving are not unjustified. Nonetheless, I gain reassurance from the fact "the Philippine brand of martial law is
impressed with a mild character." There is by and large high degree of confidence in the capabilities and
moderation of those entrusted with its implementation.

8. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY; MUST BE ALLOWED FULL
OPERATION. — The constitutional rights to freedoms of expression and of assembly are once again enshrined in
our Bill of Rights — and in the very same language. If the Constitution is now fully in force, they must be
allowed full operation. I do not deny that they are not absolute in character, but the limitation is supplied by the
clear and present danger test. Nor do I deny that under emergency conditions, it is not unreasonable to enlarge the
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area of state authority, to seek national cohesiveness, and to discourage dissent. What I cannot sufficiently stress
through is that dissent, even during such periods of stress, is not disloyalty, much less subversion. Thus the
citizens can invoke in the exercise of the freedoms of expression and of assembly not the challenged decrees but
their constitutional rights. Moreover, as thus construed as they should be to avoid any taint invalidity, they may be
pulled back from the edge of the constitutional precipice. It would follow, and that would be to the credit of the
Executive, that even in those trying and parlous times, there is adherence to a tolerant, compassionate view of life.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; OLD LANDMARKS OF THE LAW AS GUIDES. — For me the old landmarks of the law are
still there to serve as guides, that precedents to serve as factors for continuity and stability not to be ignored but
also not to be slavishly obeyed. For the constitutional law more than in any other branch of juristic science, much
depends on the immediacy and reality of the specific problems to be faced. Hence it has been truly said in days of
crisis or emergency, to stand still is to lose ground. Nonetheless, one has always to reckon with the imponderables
and the intangibles, even so often elusive to our understanding and disheartening to our deeply-cherished
convictions. For he has no choice but to comply as best he can with the duty to decide in accordance with legal
forms with roots that go far deeper than his personal preferences and predilections.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

1. 1973 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; TRANSITORY PROVISIONS; "INCUMBENT
PRESIDENT" IS PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS. — President Ferdinand E. Marcos is the "incumbent
President" and head of government who is vested with authority under Article XVII, section 3(1) of the Transitory
Provisions of the 1973 Constitution to "continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the 1935
Constitution and the powers vested in the President and Prime Minister under this Constitution."

2. ID.; MOST IMPORTANT CHANGE EFFECTED THEREBY; PRESIDENTIAL TO PARLIAMENTARY

SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. — The single most important change effected by the 1973 Constitution is the
change of our system of government from presidential to parliamentary wherein the legislative power is vested in
a National Assembly and the Executive power is vested in the Prime Minister who "shall be elected by a majority
of all the members of the National Assembly from among themselves." The President who is likewise elected by a
majority vote of all members of the National Assembly from among themselves "shall be the symbolic head of
state."

3. ID.; MARTIAL LAW PROVISIONS; LIMIT ON MARTIAL LAW POWER. — There is constitutional basis
for the observation that the President's legislative and appropriation powers under martial law are confined to the
law of necessity of preservation of the state which gave rise to its proclamation (including appropriations for
operations of the government and its agencies and instrumentalities). Even from the declared Presidential
objective of using Martial Law powers to institutionalize reforms and to remove the causes of rebellion, such
powers by their very nature and from the plain language of the Constitution (Article IX, sec. 12, 1973
Constitution, Martial Law provision) are limited to such necessary measure as will safeguard the Republic and
suppress the rebellion (or invasion) and measures directly connected with removing the root causes thereof, such
as the tenant emancipation. The concept of martial law may not be expanded, as the main opinion does, to cover
the lesser threats of "worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations" in
derogation of the Constitution.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; WORDS SHOULD BE GIVEN

ORDINARY MEANING. — It is axiomatic that the primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
assure realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution and that the
courts may not inquire into the wisdom and efficacy of a constitutional or statutory mandate. Where the language
used is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation. "It is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain
that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood
in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say."

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRANSITORY PROVISIONS OF 1973 CONSTITUTION; CONVENING OF INTERIM

ASSEMBLY INDICATED THEREBY. — Section 3(1) of the Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution
indicate that after the coming into "immediate existence of the interim National Assembly upon the proclamation
of ratification of the Constitution," the "initial convening" thereof with the election of the interim Speaker and the
election of the interim President and the interim Prime Minister should have followed as a matter of course. The
mandate of section 1 of the Transitory Provisions that the interim National Assembly shall "exist immediately
upon the ratification of this Constitution" calls for its coming into existence "right away". Its members, as
provided in section 2, duly took their oath of office and qualified thereto upon the proclamation of ratification.
The clear import of section 3 in order to give meaning and effect to the creation and "immediate existence" of the
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interim National Assembly is that the incumbent President shall then proceed to "initially (i.e. 'in the first place: at
the beginning') convene" it and preside over its sessions until the election of the interim Speaker after which he
calls for the election of the interim President and the interim Prime Minister "who shall then exercise their
respective powers vested to this Constitution." (The "incumbent President" then bows out and is succeeded by the
Prime Minister who may of course be himself).

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEIVED PURPOSE OF CONVENING INTERIM ASSEMBLY. — The convening of
the interim National Assembly with its cross-section of knowledgeable representatives from all over the country
was obviously hopefully conceived to serve (more than consultative referendum) to apprise the President of the
people's and their constituencies' views as well as to assist him as mandated by the Constitution in the enactment
of priority measures to achieve fundamental and far-reaching reforms.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PEOPLE'S SENTIMENT AGAINST CONVENING OF THE INTERIM ASSEMBLY
CANNOT BE GIVEN LEGAL FORCE. — The sentiment expressed by the people in the Referendum of January,
1973 against the convening of the interim National Assembly for at least seven years, cannot be given any legal
force and effect in the light of the State's admission at the hearing that such referendums are merely consultative
and cannot amend the constitution or any provision or mandate thereof such as the Transitory Provisions which
call for the immediate existence" and "initial convening" of the interim National Assembly to "give priority to
measures for the orderly transition from the presidential to the parliamentary system" and the other urgent
measures enumerated in section 5 thereof. This seems self-evident for the sovereign people through their mutual
compact of a written constitution have themselves thereby — set bounds to their own power, as against the
sudden impulse of mere and fleeting majorities and hence have provided for strict adherence with the mandatory
requirements of the amending process through a fair and proper submission at a plebiscite, with sufficient
information and full debate to assure intelligent consent or rejection.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; "CONSULTATIVE REFERENDUM" NOT PROVIDED FOR IN 1973 CONSTITUTION;
PENAL SANCTIONS AGAINST THOSE WHO FAIL TO REGISTER AND VOTE QUESTIONABLE. — The
imposition of penal sanctions of imprisonment and fine upon the citizens who fail to register and vote in the
scheduled referendum is open to serious constitutional referendum question. It seem clear that the calling of
"consultative referendum" is not provided for nor envisaged in the Constitution as the appropriate vehicle therefor
is provided through the interim and regular National Assemblies. It should perhaps be reexamined whether the
mandate of the Constitution that "it shall be the obligation of every citizen qualified to vote to register and cast his
vote" (at elections of members of the National Assembly and elective local officials and at plebiscites, as therein
provided for) and the criminal penalties imposed in the questioned decrees should be deemed applicable to such
extra-constitutional consultative referendums wherein non-qualified voters (the 15-years old up to below 18) are
asked to participate.

BARREDO, J., concurring:

1. 1973 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; SECTION 3 (1), ARTICLE XVII; PRESIDENT MARCOS'
BEING PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENT, CONSTITUTIONALLY INDUBITABLE. — President Marcos'
authority to continue exercising the powers of the President under the 1935 Constitution and to exercise those of
President and Prime Minister under the 1973 Constitution is specifically provided for in Section 3 (1), Article
XVII of the 1973 Constitution. By virtue of these provisions, President Marcos' being the President of the
Philippines, is constitutionally indubitable.

2. ID.; NEW CHARTER VALID AS IF RATIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 1935 CONSTITUTION. — As

far as the Supreme Court is concerned, its holding in Javellana that" there is no more judicial obstacle to the New
Constitution being considered as in force and effect" should be understood as meaning that the charter is as valid
and binding for all purposes as if it had been ratified strictly in accordance with the 1935 Constitution.

3. ID.; TRANSITORY PROVISIONS; HISTORICAL FACTS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN

CONSTRUCTION THEREOF. — The transcendental historical facts that the New Constitution was formulated
and approved under abnormal and exceptional circumstances, that the country was then as it still is under martial
law, that normal process of government have not been in operation since its proclamation, and that President
Marcos had in fact assumed all the powers of government should taken into account in construing the Transitory
Provisions of the New Constitution. Given the choice between, on the one hand delaying the approval of a new
charter until after martial law shall have been lifted and, on the other, immediately enacting one which would
have to give due allowances to the exercise of martial law powers in the manner being done by President Marcos,
the convention opted for the latter. It is only from this point of view that one should read and try to understand the
peculiar and unusual features of the transitory provisions of the New Constitution.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISIONS INTENDED TO AVOID PUTTING HINDRANCE TO PRESIDENT'S

EXERCISE OF MARTIAL LAW POWERS. — It is logical to conclude that the reason why the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, granted the incumbent President the power to convene the interim Assembly, did
not fix the time when the incumbent President should initially convene it, and lodged in the incumbent President
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the authority to call for the election of the new President and the Prime Minister is to avoid putting any hindrance
or obstacle to the continued exercise by President Marcos of the powers he had assumed under his martial law
proclamation and his general orders subsequent thereto. If the Convention were differently minded, it could have
easily so worded the transitory provisions in the most unequivocal manner.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 3(2) OF ARTICLE XVII; PRESIDENT MUST EXERCISE LEGISLATIVE
POWERS DURING MARTIAL LAW. — Section 3(2) of Article XVII which makes all the proclamations,
decrees, orders and instructions of the incumbent President part of the law of the land, is the Convention's own
Contemporary construction that during martial law, the administrator thereof must of necessity exercise
legislative powers particularly those needed to carry out the objectives of the proclamation, with no evident
limitation except that no particular legislation not demanded by said objectives shall infringe Section 7 of Article
XVII which reserves to the regular National Assembly the power to amend, modify or repeal "all existing law not
inconsistent with his Constitution."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 3(1) AND (2) OF ARTICLE XVII; IMMEDIATE CONVENTION OF INTERIM
ASSEMBLY NOT INTENDED. — Neither paragraph (1) nor paragraph (2) of Section 3 of Article XVII would
have been necessary if the Convention had intended that the interim National Assembly would be immediately
convened and the new President and the Prime Minister would be forthwith elected. Indeed, it is implicit in the
said provisions that the delegates had in mind that there would be a considerable time gap between the going into
effect of the New Constitution and the election of the new President and the Prime Minister. And they could not
have been thinking merely of the possibility of protracted delay in the election of said officers because the
Assembly itself, once convened, could have readily provided in the exercise of its inherent powers for what might
be required in such a contingency.

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW; ALL GOVERNMENTAL POWERS

ASSUMED BY MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; ORDERS OF ADMINISTRATOR GIVEN FORCE OF
LAW. — It must be borne in mind that once martial law is proclaimed, all the powers of government are of
necessity assumed by the authority that administers the martial law and the operation of the regular government,
including its legislative and its judiciary, is subjected to its imperatives. Of course, the Constitution itself is not
ousted, but by the power that the Constitution itself vests in the Executive to issue the proclamation, it yields the
application and effects of some of its provisions to the demands of the situation, as the administrator may in his
bona fide judgment so determine. Otherwise stated, since laws and regulations would be needed to maintain the
government and to provide for the safety and security of the people, the orders of the administrator are given the
force of law. In that sense, the administrator legislates. If he can legislate, so also he can appropriate public funds.

8. ID.; PRINCIPLE THAT "SOVEREIGNTY RESIDES IN THE PEOPLE AND ALL GOVERNMENT
AUTHORITY EMANATES FROM THEM"; REFERENDUMS PROVIDE MEANS FOR ASSERTION BY
PEOPLE OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY. —If there is anything readily patent in the Constitution, it is that it has
been ordained to secure to the people the blessings of democracy and that its primordial declared principle is that
"sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." Of course, it establishes a
representative democracy, but surely, there is and there could be no prohibition in it against any practice or action
that would make our government approximate as much as possible a direct one which is the ideal. On the
contrary, it is self-evident that conditions and resources of the country permitting, any move along such a
direction should be welcome. In fact, at this time when there are fears about what some consider as an emerging
dictatorship, referendums in the manner contemplated in the impugned presidential decrees provide the means for
the most vigorous assertion by the people of their sovereignty, what with the participation therein of even the
fifteen-year olds and non-literates and the concrete efforts being exerted to insure the most adequate submission
and the utmost freedom of debate and consensus as the emergency situation would permit and to have the fairest
recording and tabulation of the votes. Granting the good faith of everyone concerned, and there is absolutely no
reason why it should be otherwise, a unique exercise of essential democratic rights may be expected, unorthodox
as the experience may be to those who cannot understand or who refuse to understand martial law Philippine
style. In principle, to oppose the holding of a referendum under these circumstances could yet be a disservice to
the nation.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; CALLING OF REFERENDUM; POLITICAL QUESTION. — Whether a referendum should be
called or not and what questions should be asked therein are purely political matters as to which it does not appear
to be proper and warranted for the Court too exert its judicial power in the premises. To be sure, the referendum in
question could be a waste of the people's money in the eyes of some concerned citizens, while it may be a
necessary and fruitful democratic exercise in the view of others, but what is certain is that considering its nature
and declared purposes and the public benefits to the derived from it, it is the better part of discretion, granted to it
by the Constitution for the Court to refrain from interfering with the decision of the President.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOTING IN REFERENDUM, SACRED CIVIC OBLIGATION. — Under the New
Constitution, every citizen is charged with the duty to vote. To vote in a referendum is no less a sacred civic
obligation than to vote in an election of officials or in a plebiscite. The impugned decrees cannot therefor be

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constitutionally faulted just because they provide penalties for those who fail to comply with their duty prescribed
in no uncertain terms by the fundamental law of the land.

ANTONIO, J., concurring:

1. 1973 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; TRANSITORY PROVISIONS; PROVISIONS MUST BE
READ IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT. — The only
rational way to ascertain the meaning and intent of paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 3 of Article XVII (transitory
provisions) of the New Constitution is to read its language in connection with the known conditions of affairs out
of which the occasion for its adoption has arisen, and then construe it, if there be any doubtful expression, not in a
narrow or technical sense, but liberally, giving effect to the whole Constitution, in order that it may accomplish
the objects of its establishment. For these provisions can never be isolated from the context of its economic,
political and social environment.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INCUMBENT PRESIDENT TO EXERCISE EXTRAORDINARY POWERS THEREUNDER.

— The New Constitution was framed and adopted at a time of national emergency when, as traditionally assumed
by democratic political theorists, there is a need to discharged for the time being the governmental process
prescribed for peacetime and to rely upon a generically different method of government — the exercise by the
Chief Executive of extraordinary or authoritarian powers, to preserve the State and the permanent freedom of its
citizens. It was with a view of the continuance of the exercise of these extraordinary powers that the Convention
provided in paragraph 1, Section 3, of Article XVII of the transitory provisions of the New Constitution that: "He
(the incumbent President) shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred
thirty-five Constitution . . . " and in paragraph 2 thereof provided that: "All proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land
and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after lifting of martial law or ratification of this
Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions,
or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MATTER OF CONVENING INTERIM ASSEMBLY WHOLLY CONFIDED BY
CONSTITUTION TO INCUMBENT PRESIDENT. — The impossibility for the Convention to determine a
priori, in view of the emergency situation, the time when conditions shall have sufficiently normalized to permit
the convening of the interim Assembly, precluded them from fixing in the transitory provisions of the
Constitution a definite period when the incumbent President shall initially convene that body. It was a matter
which was wholly confided by the Constitution to the incumbent President. Since the exercise of this power was
committed to the incumbent President in all the vicissitudes and conditions of the emergency, it has necessarily
given him ample scope for the exercise of his judgment and discretion. It was a political decision for which he is
directly responsible to the people to whom he is accountable and for whose welfare he is obliged to act.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXERCISE BY INCUMBENT PRESIDENT OF EXTRAORDINARY POWERS

REPRESENTS WILL OF SOVEREIGN PEOPLE; HOLDING OF REFERENDUM LOGICAL. — It cannot be
asserted that the exercise by the incumbent President of those extraordinary powers is necessarily inconsistent
with and an absolute contradiction to the existence of a democracy. When the exercise of such authoritarian
powers is expressly conferred upon him by the Constitution, it represents the will of the sovereign people as the
source of all political power. So long as the power is used to fulfill its true function in realizing the ethical
purposes of the community, which is to ensure the economic and social well-being of its citizens and to secure to
them justice, such power is employed for constructive and moral purposes. Its exercise is, therefore, legitimate as
it represents the collective will of the people themselves. It is, therefore, logical that the incumbent President
consult the people on issues vital to the public interest even through a consultative referendum. Such useful and
healthy contact between the government administrator and the citizenry is the more necessary in a period of
martial law, because the equal participation of the citizenry in the formulation of the will of the State and in its
fundamental political decisions ensures the unity of the people in their efforts to surmount the crisis.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT AND DUTY OF CITIZEN TO CONTRIBUTE TO FORMULATION OF
CONSENSUS ON MATTERS AFFECTING DEMOCRATIC POLITY. — Political democracy is essentially a
government of consensus. The citizen has "a right and a duty to judge his own concerns, his acts and their effects,
as they bear on the common good. If they entail the common acts of the community, he again has the duty and
right to contribute to the common deliberation by which the acts of community are decided. Common deliberation
or mutual persuasion occurs on all levels of society, and as a result thereof a common judgment or consensus is
formed on those matters which affect democratic polity. This is based on the premise that sovereignty in a
political democracy resides in the people and that their government is founded on their consent. It is in the
formulation of this consensus whether in an election, plebiscite, direct legislation or advisory referendum or
consultation, that the political community manifests its consent or dissent. The national leadership as the elected
representative of the national community has the duty to be responsive and responsible to his sovereign will. It
has been said that the President "speaks and acts as the people's agent. He lays claim to a mandate from them for
his acts. Authority descends upon him from the nation, not from the other organs of government."
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6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REFERENDUMS REQUIRES INVOLVEMENT OF EVERY FILIPINO. — In his
dual role as Chief Executive and Legislator under martial law, the incumbent President has a greater decree of
accountability to the political community. To discharge effectively that responsibility, he has to ascertain the
people's consensus or common judgment and to act in accordance therewith. Only then can it be said that his
actions represent the people's collective judgment and, therefore, entitled to their whole-hearted support. The
coming referendum is a national undertaking affecting the future of the country and the people. It, therefore,
requires the involvement of every Filipino. By participating in the national consultation or advisory referendum of
February 27, 1975, the Filipino people will prove to the rest of the world their maturity and capability as a people
to make major decisions.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HONEST CANVASS OF PEOPLE' SENTIMENTS NEEDED. — It is asserted that a
referendum had under present existing circumstances is of no far-reaching significance because it is being
undertaken in a climate of fear. The infirmity of such a priori judgment is evident from the fact that it is not based
on reality. It betrays a lack of awareness of the strength and character of our people. It is contradicted by past
experience. There has been a deliberate policy to lift gradually the strictures on freedom attendant to a regime of
martial law. Thus, State restrictions on press freedom had been removed, except over publications which, because
of their subversive or seditious character, are deemed incompatible with the public safety. Freedom of discussion
and of assembly are now encouraged. No less than the incumbent President on the Philippines has underscored
the need for an accurate and honest canvass of the people's sentiments. As the nation's leader, he is called upon to
make hold decisions in the face of the grave problems confronting the nation, but he is convinced that such
decisions cannot be effective unless rooted in the will and reflective of the true sentiments of the sovereign
people.

FERNANDEZ, J., concurring:

1. 1973 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; TRANSITORY PROVISIONS; DISCUSSION AND VOTES
THEREON IN PLENARY SESSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, WHAT ARE SHOWN
THEREBY. — The discussion of the Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution in the plenary session of the
Constitutional Convention on October 18, 19 and 20, 1972 and the votes thereon clearly show; (1) That the
determination of the date the interim National Assembly should be convened was left to the judgment of the
President, the country being, as it still is, under martial law; (2) That the incumbent President legally holds office
as such having been authorized to continue in office and to exercise not only the powers of the President under the
1935 Constitution but also those of the President and Prime Minister under the 1973 Constitution, from the time
the New Constitution was ratified on January 17, 1973 until the election of the interim President and interim
Prime Minister which up to now has not yet taken place; and (3) That included in the powers of the President
under the 1935 Constitution and the powers of the Prime Minister under the 1973 Constitution is the power to
declare martial law which in turn includes the power to make all needful rules and regulations with the force and
effect of law until the termination of the martial rule.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WISDOM OF CONVENTION'S DECISION TO GIVE PRESIDENT DISCRETION WHEN TO
CONVENE INTERIM ASSEMBLY PROVEN BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. — Subsequent events proved the
wisdom of the decision of the Convention to give the President a wide discretion when to convene the interim
National Assembly. (a) For although the peace and order condition of the country has improved, it suffered a
relapse. The rebellion had not been completely quelled. (b) The oil crises which brought about worldwide
inflation, recession and depression, created problems which, according to economic experts, can be solved
effectively only with the President exercising legislative powers. A National Assembly would take a longer period
of time to be able to pass the necessary legislation to cope with this worsening economic situation. (c) And what
is most important is that in addition to the criticisms levelled in the Convention against the membership of the
interim National Assembly, the people themselves expressed their disfavor against the interim Assembly by
voting against its immediate convening when they ratified the Constitution on January 10-15, 1973. In the July
24, 1973 referendum, the Barangays reiterated decision of January, 1973 to suspend the convening of the interim
National Assembly.

3. MARTIAL LAW; MODERN CONCEPT; PRESIDENT'S POWER TO REFORM SOCIETY INCLUDED. —

The legislative power of the President under martial law should not be limited to the legislative power under the
old classical concept of martial law rule. For the modern concept of martial law rule includes not only the power
to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion and imminent danger, but also to prevent their resurgence by the
removal of the causes which gave rise to them; in a word, the reform of our society.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1973 CONSTITUTION; TRANSITORY PROVISIONS; PRESIDENT
FERDINAND E. MARCOS IS THE "INCUMBENT PRESIDENT" REFERRED TO. — President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and no other is the person referred to as "incumbent President" in the Transitory provisions of the 1973
Constitution, because at the time the draft of the new Constitution was being prepared and when it was finally

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signed by the Constitutional Convention delegates, it was President Marcos who was holding the position
President of the Philippines.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE AS PRESIDENT DURING TRANSITION PERIOD. — As
such incumbent President, President Marcos was vested by Section 3(1) of the Transitory Provisions with
constitutional authority to continue as President of the Philippines during the transition period, that is, until the
interim President and the interim Prime Minister shall have been elected by the interim National Assembly who
shall then exercise their respective powers vested by the new Constitution, after which the office of the incumbent
President ceases.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTIVE POWERS DURING TRANSITION PERIOD. — During the transition period,
President Marcos was given extraordinary powers consisting of the powers and prerogatives of the President
under the 1935 Constitution, and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under the 1973
Constitution.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWERS. — Aside from his vast executive powers, the incumbent
President was granted under Section 3(2) of the same Transitory Provisions legislative powers, in the sense, that
all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts which were promulgated, issued, or done by him before
the ratification of the Constitution were declared part of the law of the land, to remain valid, legal, binding or
effective even after the lifting of martial law or the ratification of the Constitution, unless modified, revoked or
superseded by subsequent proclamation, etc., by him or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by
the regular National Assembly.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXISTENCE THEREOF AFTER RATIFICATION OF CONSTITUTION. — Whether
or not the unlimited legislative power of the President continues to exist even after the ratification of the
Constitution cannot be conceded at the moment, and is not essential in resolving the petition. Nonetheless, the
President is empowered to issue proclamations, orders, etc., to carry out and implement the objectives of the
proclamation of martial law be it under the 1935 or 1973 Constitution, and for orderly and efficient functioning of
the government, its instrumentalities, and agencies. This grant of legislative power is necessary to fill up a
vacuum during the transition period when the interim National Assembly is not yet convened and functioning, for
otherwise, there will be a disruption of official functions resulting in a collapse of the government and of the
existing social order.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERIM NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; INCUMBENT PRESIDENT NOT GRANTED
INDEFINITE TIME TO INITIALLY CONVENE SAME. — Because the grant of vast executive and legislative
powers to the incumbent President will necessarily result in what the petitioners call a one-man rule as there is a
concentration of power in one person, it could not have been the intent of the framers of the new Constitution to
grant to the incumbent President an indefinite period of time within which to initially convene the interim
National Assembly and to set in motion the formation of the Parliamentary from of government which was one of
the purposes of adopting a new Constitution.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTOMATIC EXISTENCE UPON RATIFICATION OF NEW CONSTITUTION. — The
interim National Assembly came automatically into existence upon the ratification of the 1973 Constitution. As a
matter of fact, from the submission of the Solicitor General, it appears that may if not all of those entitled to
become members of the interim National Assembly have opted to serve therein and have qualified thereto in
accordance with the requirements of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC PERIOD FOR PRESIDENT TO CONVENE NOT PLACING
MATTER AT HIS PLEASURE. — The absence of a specific period of time for the President to initially convene
the interim assembly cannot be reasonably construed as placing the matter at his sole pleasure and convenience
for to do so would enable the incumbent President to keep the interim National Assembly in suspended animation
and prevent it from becoming fully operational as long as he pleases. This would violate the very spirit and intent
of the 1973 Constitution more particularly its Transitory Provisions to institute a form of government, during the
transition period, based upon the fundamental principle of the "separation of powers," with its checks and
balances, by specifically providing that there shall exist immediately upon the ratification of the 1973
Constitution an interim National Assembly in which legislative power shall be vested, that there shall be the
incumbent President who shall exercise all the powers and prerogatives which are executive in character, and that
the judicial power shall continue to be vested in the Judiciary existing at the time of the coming into force and
effect of the 1973 Constitution. The situation would also render nugatory the provisions of Section 5 of the
Transitory Provisions which assign to the interim National Assembly a vital role to perform during the transition
period.

9. AD.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVENING THEREOF ADDRESSED TO DISCRETION OF PRESIDENT. — While
the convening of the interim National Assembly cannot be said to be simply at the pleasure and convenience of

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the President, however, the matter is one addressed to his sound discretion and judgment for which he is
answerable alone to his conscience, to the people he governs, to posterity, and to history.

10. ID.; REFERENDUM; CALLING THEREOF, A CONSULTATIVE ACT OF PRESIDENT. — The act of the
President in calling a referendum on February 27, 1975 is not really in the nature of a legislative act which
violates the present Constitution. There is no prohibition in the Constitution for the Chief Executive or the
President to consult the people on national issues which in his judgment are relevant and important. The word
"consult" is used because in effect the measure taken by the President is nothing more than consultative in
character and the mere fact that such measure or advice is called a referendum in the Presidential Decrees in
question will not affect nor change in any manner its true nature which is simply a means of assessing public
reaction to the given issues submitted to the people for their consideration. Calling the people to a consultation is
derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the President, and because this is so, it necessarily
follows that he has the authority to appropriate the necessary amount from public funds which are subject to his
executive control and disposition to accomplish the purpose.

11. ID.; ID.; NO FAR-REACHING SIGNIFICANCE IF HELD UNDER MARTIAL RULE. — A referendum
held under a regime of martial law can be of no far-reaching significance because it is being accomplished under
an atmosphere or climate of fear. There can be no valid comparison between a situation under martial rule and one
where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, because the former entails a wider area of
curtailment and infringement of individual rights, such as, human liberty, property rights, right of free expression
and assembly, protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, liberty of abode and of travel, etc.

12. ID.; ID.; CHANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT; RESULTS OF VOTES THEREON MAY BE IGNORED
BY PRESIDENT. — Whatever may be the totality of the answers given to the proposed referendum questions on
local government will be of no real value to the President because under Article XI, Section 2, 1973 Constitution,
it is the National Assembly which is empowered to enact a local government code, and any change in the existing
form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose, all of which cannot be complied with for the simple reason that for the present there is no
National Assembly. Moreover, any vote given on this matter cannot be truly intelligent considering the vagueness
of the question as drafted and the short period of time given to the citizenry to study the so-called manager or
commission type of local government being submitted to the voters.

b. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

In construing a Constitution, it should be bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and
the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the
history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is
to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that
reason and calculated to effect that purpose.

c. Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990)

The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose
of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution. Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution
begins with the language of the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the
courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of
the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was
preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was
meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way
toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it.

d. Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946), G.R. No. L-543, August 31, 1946

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS; MANDAMUS; LEGISLATIVE BODY NOT

COMPELLABLE BY, TO PERFORM LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS. — Mandamus will not lie against the
legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of purely legislative duties.

2. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT WITHOUT POWER TO REVISE LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS. — The
judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department,
or of either house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the
Constitution.

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3. ID.; ID.; POWER OF SUPREME COURT TO ANNUL LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT. — In proper cases
and with appropriate parties, this court may annul any legislative enactment that fails to observe the constitutional
limitations.

4. ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY NOT REPOSITORY OF REMEDIES FOR ALL POLITICAL OR SOCIAL WRONGS.
— The judiciary is not the repository of remedies for all political or social ills.

5. ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION; SCOPE OF. — Prohibition refers only to proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person, exercising functions judicial or ministerial. As the respondents exercise legislative functions, the
dispute falls beyond the scope of such special remedy.

6. ID.; ID.; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; AUTHORITY OF; FUNCTIONS OF ASSEMBLY ON ELECTION

AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS. — The Constitutional Convention circumscribed the authority of the
Electoral Tribunal to "contests" relating to the election, etc, and did not intend to give it all the functions of the
Assembly on the subject of election and qualifications of its members.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.;. — The House or Senata retains the authority to defer the oath-taking of any of its
members, pending an election contest.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.;. — Independently of constitutional or statutory grant, the Senate has, under
parliamentary practice, the power to inquire into the credentials of any member and the latter's right to participate
in its deliberations.

9. ID.; ID.; CONGRESS; EXTENT OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. — The legislative power of the Philippine
Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations, as are found in the Republic's Constitution.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; SENATE; POWER TO ADOPT RULES FOR ITS PROCEEDINGS. — The Senate, as a branch
of the legislative department, has the constitutional power to adopt rules for its proceedings, and by legislative
practice the power to promulgate such orders as may be necessary to maintain its prestige and to preserve its
dignity.

11. ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT JUSTICES DESIGNATED TO ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL NOT
DISQUALIFIED IN CASE AT BAR. — The designation of several justices to the electoral tribunals did not
disqualify them in this litigation.

12. ID.; ID.; LEGISLATURE; PRESUMPTION THAT IT ACTED WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS. —
It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers.

13. ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTION OF CONSTITUTION; WEIGHT OF PROCEEDINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION. — The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention are less conclusive of the proper
construction of the constitution than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute.

14. ID.; ID.; CONGRESS; DUTY OF PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES TO ASSUME OFFICE AND ATTEND
SESSION. — Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 725 is addressed to the individual member of Congress,
imposes on him the obligation to come to Manila, and join his colleagues in regular session, and does not imply
that if, for any reason, he is disqualified, the House is powerless to postpone his admission.

15. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMMUNITY OF MEMBERS FOR SPEECH OR DEBATE; GIVING OF VOTE OR
PRESENTATION OF RESOLUTION INCLUDED. — The constitutional provision that "for any speech or
debate" in Congress, Senators and Congressmen "shall not be questioned in any other place," includes the giving
of a vote or the presentation of a resolution.

PER PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

16. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; EXCLUSIVE POWER TO

JUDGE ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF SENATORS
AND REPRESENTATIVES. — The power to judge "all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications" of senators and representatives, is exclusively lodged in the respective Electoral Tribunal, the
exclusively being emphasized by the use of the word "sole" by the drafters of the Constitution.

17. ID.; CONSTITUTION; CO-AUTHORS IN BETTER POSITION TO CONSTRUE. — The co-authors of the
fundamental law are in a better position to construe the very document in which they have infused the ideas which
boiled in their minds, and grave a definite form to their own conviction and decisions.

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18. ID.; SENATE; "QUORUM" TO DO BUSINESS. — To do business, the Senate, being composed of 24
members, needs the presence of at least 13 senators. "A smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may
compel the attendance of absent members," but not in exercising any power, such as the adoption of the Pendatun
Resolution.

19. CRIMINAL LAW; FAILURE TO DISCHARGE ELECTIVE OFFICE; PENALTY. — If senators should fail
to discharge the duties of their respective offices, they will incur criminal responsibility and may be punished,
according to the Revised Penal Code, with arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos or both.

20. ID.; VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY; PENALTY. — No one may prevent senators from
performing the duties of their office, such as attending the meetings of the Senate or of any of any of its
committees or subcommittees, or from expressing their opinions or casting their votes, without being criminally
guilty of a violation of parliamentary immunity, a criminal offense punished by the Penal Code with prision
mayor.

21. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW; SENATE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;

CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS AND PROCLAMATION CONCLUSIVE AS TO RIGHT OF CANDIDATES
PROCLAIMED TO SEAT IN SENATE. — The petitioners' credentials consisting of the certificate of canvass
and proclamation of election issued by the Commission on Elections, are conclusive as to their right to their seats
in the Senate.

22. ID.; ELECTORAL COMMISSION; POWER OF; EXTENT. — The grant of power to the Electoral
Commission to judge all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercised of that power by
the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition
in the Constitution.

23. ID.; SEPARATION OF POWERS; VULGAR NOTION OF. — The vulgar notion of separation of powers
appears to be simple, redimentary and clear-cut. As a consequence, the principle of separation of powers creates
in the mind of the ignorant or uninitiated the images of the different departments of government as individual
units, each one existing independently, all alone by itself, completely disconnected from the remaining all others.
The picture in their mental panorama offers, in effect, the appearance of each department as a complete
government by itself. Each governmental department appears to be a veritable state in the general set up of the
Philippine state, like the autonomous kingdoms and princedoms of the maharajahs of India.

24. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTION OF. — The only acceptable conception of the principle of
separation of power within our democracy is the constitutional one. The separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government. It obtains not enough express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and
is supreme within its own sphere. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure co-ordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief
Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the
enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the
refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, by a vote of
two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to
convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly
operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is
necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential
to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court
shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the national Assembly
controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts
void if violative of the Constitution.

25. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHOLE GOVERNMENT AS A UNIT. — The idea of unity is fundamental in the Constitution.
The whole government must be viewed as a unit, and all departments and other government organs, agencies and
instrumentalities as parts of that unit in the same way as the head, the hands, and the heart are parts of a human
body. As a matter of fact, there is no government power vested exclusively in any authority, office, or government
agency. To understand well the true meaning of the principle of separation of powers, it is necessary to remember
and pay special attention to the fact that the idea of separation refers, not to departments, organs, or other
government agencies, but to powers exercised. The things separated are not the subject of the powers, but the
functions to be performed. It means division of functions, but not of officials or organs which will perform them.

Page | 16
It is analogous to the economic principle of division of labor practiced in a factory where multiple manufacturing
processes are performed to produce a finished article.

26. ID.; ID.; SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL POWER TO JUDGE ELECTORAL CONTESTS AND TO
SUSPEND IN RELATION THERETO CASE AT BAR. — From the facts of the case, it is evident that
respondents encroached upon, invaded, and usurped the ancillary power to suspend petitioners in relation to the
power to judge electoral contests concerning senators, a power which the Constitution specifically assigns to the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, exclusive of all other departments, agencies, or organs of government. The power of
suspension is accessory, adjective, complementary, and ancillary to the substantial power to judge said electoral
contests. The accessory must follow the principal; the adjective, the substantive; the complementary, the
complemented.

27. ID.; SENATE; POWER TO SUSPEND MEMBERS, LACK OF. — The Senate lacks the power of
suspension, not only as ancillary remedy in senatorial election contests, but even in the exercise of the Senate
Judicial power to punish its members for disorderly conduct.

28. ID; SEPARATION OF POWERS; SUPREME COURT, JURISDICTION TO DECIDE QUESTION OF

VALIDITY OR NULLITY OF SENATE RESOLUTION. — The principle of separation of powers can not be
invoked to deny the Supreme Court jurisdiction in this case, because to decide the question of validity or nullity
of the Pendatun Resolution, of whether petitioners are illegally deprived of their constitutional rights and
privileges as senators of the Philippines, of whether respondents must or must not be enjoined by injunction or
prohibition from illegally and unconstitutionally trampling upon the constitutional and legal rights of petitioners,
is a function judicial in nature and, not having been assigned by the Constitution to other department of
government, is logically within the province of courts of Justice, including the Supreme Court.

29. ID.; ID.; POWER TO DECLARE LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — If the law enacted is unconstitutional,
the Supreme Court has the power to declare it so and deny effect to the same.

30. ID.; ID.; ID.; ANGARA vs. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (63 Phil., 139) PARALLEL WITH CASE AT
BAR. — The facts and legal issues in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), are in exact parallel with
those in the case at bar. Since the decision in that case has been written, the question as to the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction to take cognizance and decide controversies such as the present one and to grant redress for or against
parties like those included in this litigation, has been unmistakably and definitely settled in this jurisdiction.

31. CONTEMPT; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO PUNISH SENATOR FOR CONTEMPT. — Should the
respondent senators disobey any order of the Supreme Court, they may be punished for contempt.

32. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; ELECTION CONTESTS; SCOPE UNDER
CONSTITUTION. — The election contests mentioned in section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution include
contests "relating to qualifications" of the respective members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.

33. ID., CONSTITUTION; CHARACTER OF. — The Constitution of the Philippines is both a grant and a
limitation of powers of Government decreed by our people, on whom sovereignty resides and from whom all
government authority emanates.

34. ID, CONGRESS; LEGISLATIVE POWER NOT VESTED IN ANY BRANCH ALONE. — The legislative
power is vested in Congress, composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and not in any of its
branches alone.

e. Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. v. Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596
(1957), G.R. No. L-8451, December 20, 1957

1. CORPORATIONS SOLE; COMPONENTS AND PURPOSE OF; POWER TO HOLD AND TRANSMIT
CHURCH PROPERTIES TO HIS SUCCESSOR IN OFFICE. — A corporation sole is a special form of
corporation usually associated with clergy . . . designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership of
the church which was regarded as the property owner (I Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682-683). It consists of one
person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in some particular, who are incorporated by
law in order to give them some legal advantages particularly that of perpetuity which in their natural persons they
could not have . . . (Reid vs. Barry, 93 Fla. 849 112 So. 846). Through this legal fiction, church properties
acquired by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by operation of law, upon his death not to his personal heirs
but to his successor in office. A corporation sole, therefore, is created not only to administer the temporalities of
the church or religious society where he belongs, but also to hold and transmit the same to his successor in said
office.

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2. ID.; PERSONALITY OF SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THAT OF ROMAN PONTIFF. — Although a
branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, every Roman Catholic Church in different countries,
if it exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in accordance with laws of the country where it is located,
is considered an entity or person with all the rights and privileges granted to such artificial being under laws of
that country, separate and distinct from the personality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to
its religious relations with the latter which are governed by the Common Law or their rules and regulations.

3. ID.; ID.; POWER AND QUALIFICATION TO PURCHASE IN ITS NAME PRIVATE LANDS; 60 PER
CENTUM REQUIREMENT NOT INTENDED TO CORPORATION SOLE. — Under the circumstances of the
present case, it is safe to state that even before the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and of the
Republic of the Philippines every corporation sole then organized and registered had by express provision of law
(Corporation Law, Public Act. 1459) the necessary power and qualification to purchase in its name private lands
located in the territory in which it exercised its functions or ministry and for which it was created, independently
of the nationality of its incumbent unique and single number and head, the bishop of the diocese. It can be also
maintained without fear of being gainsaid that the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines has no
nationality and that the frames of the Constitution did not have in mind the religious corporation sole when they
provided that 60 per centum of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino citizens. Thus, if this constitutional
provision were not intended for corporation sole, it is obvious that this could not be regulated or restricted by said
provision.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT LIMITED TO OWNERSHIP NOT TO CONTROL.
— But the Corporation Law and the Canon Law are explicit in their provisions that a corporation sole or
"ordinary" is not the owner of the properties that he may acquire but merely the administrator thereof and holds
the same in trust for the church to which the corporation is an organized and constituents part. Being mere
administrator of the temporalities or properties titled in his name, the constitutional provision requiring 60 per
centum Filipino ownership is not applicable. The said constitutional provision is limited by it terms to ownership
alone and does not extend to control unless the control over the property affected has been devised to circumvent
the real purpose of the constitution.

5. ID.; CORPORATION SOLE WITHOUT NATIONALITY; NATIONALITY OF CONSTITUENTS

DETERMINES WHETHER CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS IS APPLICABLE. — The corporation
sole by reason of their peculiar constitution and form of operation have no designed owner of its temporalities,
although by the terms of the law it can be safely implied that they ordinarily hold them in trust for the benefit of
the Roman Catholic faithful of their respective locality or diocese. They can not be considered as aliens because
they have no nationality at all. In determining, therefore, whether the constitutional provision requiring 60 per
centum Filipino capital is applicable to corporations sole, the nationality of the constituents of the diocese, and not
the nationality of the actual incumbent of the parish, must be taken into consideration. In the present case, even if
the question of nationality be considered, the aforesaid constitutional requirement is fully met and satisfied,
considering that the corporation sole in question is composed of an overwhelming majority of Filipinos.

f. Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL;

NATURE OF TRIBUNAL. — Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to
be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the letter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139; Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.)

2. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF "POLITICAL QUESTION"; CASE AT BAR. — The term "political question"
connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government
(16 C. J. S., 413). It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. In
the case at bar, the question for determination is whether the election of two senators, by the Senate, as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by another senator, who is a member and spokesman of the
party having the largest number of votes in the Senate, on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination *** of the party
having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political
question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations. It is clearly within the
legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceedings in connection
therewith. Hence, this Court has, not only jurisdiction, but, also the duty, to consider and determine the principal
issue raised by the parties herein.

3. ID.; ID.; MAIN OBJECTION IN PROVIDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS.

— The main objective of the framers of the Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral
Page | 18
Commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress was to insure the exercise of judicial
impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this
purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party
having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given
the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal so that they may realize that partisan
considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater
impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as each one of
said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal
with judicial temper.

4. ID.; ID.; MOST VITAL FEATURE OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS. — The most vital feature of the
Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of the parties having the largest and the second largest number of
votes in each House therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court
as members of said Tribunals.

5. ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED FOR SELECTION OF MEMBERS; COMPLIANCE WITH

PROCEDURE MANDATORY. — The framers of the Constitution intended to prevent the majority party from
controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the
majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justice of the Supreme Court, who are members of said
Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to
play. It constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts
performed in violation thereof are null and void.

6. ID.; ID.; PRESENT SITUATION NOT FORESEEN BY FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION; SPIRIT OF
THE LAW PREVAILS OVER ITS LETTER. — While it is true that the membership of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, in the case at bar, would in effect be limited to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members it must be
conceded that the present composition of the Senate, wherein twenty-three (23) of its members belong to one
party and one (1) member belongs to another, was not foreseen by the framers of the Constitution. Furthermore,
the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution,
for partisan considerations cannot be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court,
three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party
having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.

7. ID,; ID.; ID.; MODERATING ROLE OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT. — If the Nacionalista
Party would be allowed to nominate five (5) members to the Senate Electoral Tribunal instead of three (3), it
would have the absolute majority, since there would be one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three (3)
members of the Supreme Court, and hence, the philosophy underlying the Constitution would be entirely upset.
The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed, and, what is worse, the decisive
moderating role of the Justice of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be
thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests
pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall.

8. ID.; ID.; RELIANCE BY THE CONSTITUTION UPON THE METHOD OF SELECTION ESTABLISHED
THEREIN. — When the election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the
nomination of the political parties referred to in the Constitution, the latter thereby indicates its reliance upon the
method of selection thus established, regardless of the individual qualities of those chosen therefor. The delegates
to the Convention did not ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to giving general patterns or norms
of action. In connection, particularly with the composition of the Electorals, they believed that, even the most well
meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake of the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and
to resist the demands of political exigencies, the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree
of predominance of the party from which it comes.

9. ID.; ID,; ID.; WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INTENDED FOR ONE'S BENEFIT —
Although "an individual may waive constitutional provisions intended for his benefit," particularly those meant
for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending "to secure his personal liberty" the power to
waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371) The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization of the
Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of the commonweal, and it has been held that "where
a statute is founded on public policy, those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions" (82
C. J. S., 874).

10. ID.; ACTS OF CONGRESS; AUTHORITY OF COURTS TO PASS UPON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY.
— The provision in the Constitution vesting the legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines does not
detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of act of Congress. Since judicial power
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includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved
by the Executive there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses like that of any other
branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. In fact, whenever the conducting claims
of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or
of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so,
which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction.

11. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DOCTRINE OF CONTEMPORANEOUS OR PRACTICAL

CONSTRUCTION; WHEN APPLICABLE. — As a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and
ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any application. Where the meaning
of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to
no weight and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning. The reason is that the
application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of
constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory provisions, and that, except as to matters committed by
the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical construction is not
necessarily binding upon the courts even in a doubtful case. Hence if in the judgment of the court, such
construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount consideration of
public policy, it may be rejected (16 C. J. S., 71-72)

12. ID.; CONFLICT BETWEEN SPIRIT AND LETTER OF A STATUTE. — As a general rule of statutory
construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of
a statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, while that which is within the letter, but
not within the spirit of a statute, is not within the statute, but, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext
of pursuing its spirit. (82 C.J.S., 613)

g. Chiongbian v. De Leon, 82 Phil. 771, G.R. No. L-2007, January 31, 1949

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; HOLDING PUBLIC OFFICE THROUGH ELECTION BEFORE

ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION; LEGITIMATE MINOR CHILD. — Upon the adoption of the
Constitution, V. C., father of herein petitioner, having been elected to a public office in the Philippines before the
adoption of the Constitution, became a Filipino citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of the
Constitution. W. C., the herein petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a Filipino by reason of subsection 3
(Article IV) of the Constitution, his father having become a Filipino citizen upon the adoption of said
Constitution. This is also in conformity with the settled rule in our jurisprudence that a legitimate minor child
follows the citizenship of his father.

2. ID.; ID.; INTENTION OF FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION; NO PROVISION THEREIN WAS

INTENDED ONLY FOR BENEFIT OF ONE PERSON. — The members of the Constitutional Convention could
not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it
could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document. They adopted said provision fully cognizant of the transmissive essence of
citizenship as provided in subsection 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the transmission of citizenship in
such a particular case, they would have so clearly stated.

3. ID.; ID.; DELETIONS IN THE PRELIMINARY DRAFTS OF THE CONVENTION, EFFECT OF. —
Deletions in the preliminary drafts of the Convention are, at best, negative guides, which cannot prevail over the
positive provisions of the finally adopted Constitution.

4. CONTRACT OF SALE; HONEST ERROR COMMITTED IS NOT MISREPRESENTATION; CASE AT

BAR. — Respondent's allegation that the petitioner violated the contract of sale with the Philippine Shipping
Administration on the ground of misrepresentation, petitioner having alleged in said contract that his father was a
naturalized Filipino, is without merit. Held: That such was not a deliberate misrepresentation but an error which
any person not versed in the law is prone to commit. It is clear that petitioner merely meant that his father was a
Filipino citizen by operation of law and not by birth.

h. Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294, G.R. Nos. 71208-09, 71212-13, August 30, 1985

The aforequoted provision renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. As herein earlier
discussed, this exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions, whether made by a
witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense.

Any interpretation of a statute which will give it a meaning in conflict with the Constitution must be avoided. So
much so that if two or more constructions or interpretations could possibly be resorted to, then that one which will
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 avoid unconstitutionality must be adopted even though it may be necessary for this purpose to disregard the more
usual and apparent import of the language used. 34 To save the statute from a declaration of unconstitutionality it
must be given a reasonable construction that will bring it within the fundamental law. Apparent conflict between
two clauses should be harmonized.

Such threat of punishment for making a claim of the privilege leaves the witness no choice but to answer and
thereby forfeit the immunity purportedly granted by Sec. 5. The absurdity of such application is apparent — Sec.
5 requires a claim which it, however, forecloses under threat of contempt proceedings against anyone who makes
such claim. But the strong testimonial compulsion imposed by Section 5 of P.D. 1886 viewed in the light of the
sanctions provided in Section 4, infringes upon the witness' right against self-incrimination. As a rule, such
infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness
cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered. 37
Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be offered to the witness before he
can be required to answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has
already produced its desired results — the private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity. Their
constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to
construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent
sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies
compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity
granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which the
same law practically strips away from the witness.

IV. ORDINARY SENSE VS. TECHNICAL SENSE

a. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, February 18, 1970

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; EXPRESS OR IMPLIED

FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. — The power of judicial review is granted, if not
expressly, at least by clear implication from the relevant provisions of the Constitution. It is exercised when the
party adversely affected by either a legislative or executive act, or a municipal ordinance for that matter, files the
appropriate suit to test its validity.

2. ID.; ID.; FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION. — The words in which

constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. The Constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically, for the prescriptions therein contained,
to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form, but are organic
living institutions, the significance of which is vital nor formal. There must be an awareness, as with Justice
Brandeis, not only of what has been, but of what may be. The words employed by it are not to be construed to
yield fixed and rigid answers but as impressed with the necessary attributes of flexibility and accommodation to
enable them to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store. It is not, in brief, a printed finality but
a dynamic process.

3. ID.; ID.; EMINENT DOMAIN; CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO EXPROPRIATE LANDS FOR RESALE,
BROAD AND FAR FROM LIMITED. — It does not admit of doubt that the congressional power to expropriate
lands for resale conferred by the constitution is far from limited. It has been left to the legislative will to determine
what lands may be expropriated so that they could be subdivided for resale to those in need of them. Nor can it be
doubted either that as to when such authority may be exercised is purely for Congress to decide. Its discretion on
the matter is not to be interfered with. The language employed is not swathed in obscurity. The recognition of the
broad congressional competence is undeniable. The judiciary in the discharge of its task to enforce constitutional
commands and prohibitions is denied the prerogative of curtailing its well-nigh all-embracing sweep.

4. ID.; ID.; PERMANENCY OF CONSTITUTION, ITS DISTINGUISHING MARK. — The character of

permanency is the distinguishing mark of a constitution. It was the view of Pres. Manuel A. Roxas, one of the
chief architects of the fundamental law, that the constitution to be adopted by the Constitutional Convention of
1934 would "have an indefinite life, will be permanent, subject of course, to revisions, amendments and other
changes that may be adopted constitutionally." That would be an assurance that constitutional guarantees "will be
maintained, property rights will be safeguarded and individual rights maintained immaculate and sanctified. . . .."
Another prominent delegate, Gregorio Perfecto, later a member of this Tribunal, aptly noted that the transitory
character is essentially incompatible with the nature of laws, and necessarily so of a constitution, which is the
supreme law of a people and therefore must be impressed with such attribute of permanency, much more than
ordinary statutes passed under its authority. It could thus be said of our Constitution as of the U. S. Constitution,
to borrow from Chief Justice Marshall's pronouncement in M'Culloch v. Maryland (4 Wheat 316 [1819]), that it is
"intended to endure for ages to come and consequently, to be adapted to the various crisis of human affairs." In
the language of another American jurist, Chief Justice Stone, it is "a continuing instrument of government." Its
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framers were not visionaries, toying with speculations or theories, but men of affairs, at home in statecraft, laying
down the foundations of a government which can make effective and operative all the powers conferred or
assumed, with the corresponding restrictions to secure individual rights and, anticipating, subject to the limitations
of human foresight, the problems that events to come in the distant days ahead will bring. Thus a constitution, to
quote from Justice Cardozo, "states or ought to state not rules for the passing hour, but principles for an expanding
future."

5. ID.; ID.; EMINENT DOMAIN, FLEXIBLE CONCEPT APPLIED TO CASE AT BAR. — The conclusion is
difficult to resist that the text of the constitutional provision in question, its historical background as noted in
pronouncements in the Constitutional Convention and the inexonerable need for the Constitution to have the
capacity for growth and ever be adaptable to changing social and economic conditions all argue against its
restrictive construction. Such an approach was reflected succinctly in the dissenting opinion of Justice J.B.L
Reyes, concurred in by the present Chief Justice, in the Baylosis case which reads as follows: "The reasons set
forth by it against the validity of the proposed expropriation are arguments against the expropriation policies
adopted by the government rather than reasons against the existence and application of the condemnation power
in the present case. The propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain under Article XIII, section 4 of our
Constitution can not be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis. Not only does the constitutional
provision speak of lands instead of landed estates, but I see no cogent reason why the government, in its quest for
social justice and peace, should exclusively devote attention to conflicts of large proportions, involving a
considerable number of individuals, and eschew small controversies and wait until they grow into a major
problem before taking remedial action. The Constitution considered the small individual land tenure to be so
important to the maintenance of peace and order and to the promotion of progress and the general welfare that it
not only provided for the expropriation and subdivision of lands but also opened the way for the limitation of
private land holdings. It is not for this Court to judge the worth of these and other social and economic policies
expressed by the Constitution; our duty is to conform to such policies and not to block their realization."

6. ID.; ID.; POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN; NOT WITHOUT LIMIT; JUST COMPENSATION,
STANDARD. — There need be no fear that such constitutional grant of power to expropriate lands is without
limit. There is the explicit requirement of the payment of just compensation. It is well-settled that just
compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is
more, and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. The
market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the
market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing,
but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for such property.

7. ID.; ID.; EMINENT DOMAIN; TAKING MUST BE FOR PUBLIC USE. — Public use must be shown to
exist before such power may be validly exercised. In the language of Justice Tuason in the Guido decision, "the
assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another,
even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not promoted thereby, is claiming a despotic power, and
one inconsistent with every just principle and fundamental maxim of a free government."

8. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS, LIMITATION ON POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. — The requirement of due
process is likewise a limitation on the power of eminent domain. A landowner is covered by the mantle of its
protection. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any governmental act that
smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state power to act in an oppressive manner. It is, as had been stressed so
often, the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. In that sense, it stands as a guaranty of justice. That is the
standard that must be met by any governmental agency in the exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it.
As was so emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice, "acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive,
can deny due process only under pain of nullity, . . . ."

9. ID.; ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE LIKEWISE LIMITS POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. — The
equal protection guarantee must be satisfied for the exercise of eminent domain to be valid. The Constitution
requires that no person be denied "the equal protection of the laws." The assumption underlying such a guaranty is
that a legal norm, whether embodied in a rule, principle, or standard, constitutes a defense against one extreme
and tyranny at the other. Thereby, people living together in a community with its myriad and complex problems
can minimize the friction and reduce the conflicts, to assure, at the very least, a peaceful ordering of existence.
The ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its
coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and
impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. It suffices then that the laws operate equally
and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner,
the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every
person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in
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the group equally binding on the rest. With due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the
particular property to be taken and how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of
expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely
affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will not allow.

10. ID.; ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION; CONGRESS AUTHORIZED BY CONSTITUTION TO ESTABLISH A

SYSTEM OF PRIORITIES. — There is nothing to prevent Congress in view of the public funds at its disposal to
follow a system of priorities. It could thus determine what lands would first be the subject of expropriation. This it
did under the challenged legislative act. As already noted, Congress was moved to act in view of what it
considered a serious social and economic problem. The solution which for it was the most acceptable was the
authorization of the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate. So it provided under the statute in question. It was
confronted with a situation that called for correction, and the legislation that was the result of its deliberation
sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly attaining the cure of other analogous ills
certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction to the principle
underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding eminent domain, that "the
legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of 'all or none'."

11. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; ROLE OF THE COURTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIO-
ECONOMIC LEGISLATION. — In the appraisal of government measures with social and economic implications
the courts should test the validity of the challenged statute in the light of the broad congressional power so
apparent from the text of the constitutional provision, the historical background and the cardinal postulate
underlying constitutional construction that its provisions are not to be interpreted to preclude their being
responsive to future needs. In no other sphere of judicial activity are judges called upon to transcend personal
predilections and private notions of policy, lest legislation intended to bring to fruition the hope of a better life for
the great masses of our people, as embodied in the social justice principle of which this constitutional provision
under scrutiny is a manifestation, be unjustifiably stricken down.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FACTS THAT NEED BE ESTABLISHED TO BRING ACT WITHIN

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS. — Before the vital issues of: (a) necessity of the taking and (b) whether it is for
the public use, may be resolved, the factual questions regarding the area of the Tatalon Estate covered by the act
and the bona fide occupants of the property who shall be the beneficiaries thereof should first be determined to
bring the questioned Act within confines of constitutional limits.

2. ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO EXPROPRIATE, CONCEPTUALIZED, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS.

— Dissent is hereby made to the observation that the constitutional power of Congress to expropriate lands is well
nigh all embracing and forecloses the courts from inquiring into the necessity for the taking of the property. Does
not the need for a more serious scrutiny as to the power of Congress to single out a particular piece of property for
expropriation, acknowledged in the main opinion, call for judicial scrutiny, with all the facts in, as to the need for
the expropriation for full opportunity to dispute the legislative appraisal of the matter? Who should bear the
burden of demonstrating that the equal protection guarantee had been observed, the State or the owner whose
property has been singled out?

3. ID.; CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS RECONCILED WITH POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. — The main
opinion acknowledges that existing contractual rights that have been acquired by vendor and purchasers of
subdivided lots of the property shall be accorded the appropriate constitutional protection of non-impairment at
the expropriation proceedings. In view of the cardinal principle of eminent domain that just compensation of the
market value of the land must be paid as well as of the constitutional limitation that the land be conveyed at cost
to the individuals concerned, respondents may well consider that the objectives of the Act may be accomplished
more expeditiously by a direct purchase of the available unsold lots for resale at cost to the remaining bona fide
occupants in accordance with the Act's provisions or by extending financial assistance to enable them to purchase
directly the unsold lots from petitioner. Nothing can be gained by respondents from the institution of
expropriation proceedings, when petitioner-owner is actually selling the property in subdivided lots.

BARREDO, J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO EXPROPRIATE

LANDS FOR RESALE, UNLIMITED; JUST COMPENSATION, A PART OF THE POWER GRANTED TO
CONGRESS. — The power granted to Congress by the Constitution to "authorize, upon payment of just
compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals" is
unlimited by any other provision of said Constitution. Just compensation is in reality a part of the power granted
rather than a limitation thereto, just as just compensation is of the essence in any exercise of the power of eminent
domain, as, otherwise, it would be plain commandeering.

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2. ID.; ID.; INHERENT POWER OF GOVERNMENT. — The power of eminent domain, in general, is an
inherent power of any government, as, otherwise, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the
government to adequately respond to the demands of public need and interest.

3. ID.; ID.; CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO EXPROPRIATE LANDS FOR RESALE; PUBLIC USE;
GOVERNMENT NOT REQUIRED TO PRESENT PROOF OF PUBLIC USE. — As a statement of principle, it
is right to reiterate as the main opinion does, that "for the valid exercise of such (the) congressional power, (to
expropriate lands for the purpose indicated) that the taking be for public use", but it is entirely a different matter to
imply that in the judicial proceeding instituted towards such end, the Government is still required to present
evidence of such public use as a fact.

b. Ordillo v. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100, G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:

"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common
and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."

The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up
of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This
is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative
purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part
of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it
must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant
characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case. llcd

The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as much as possible
should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be applied in this case.

Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the
petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only one province.

Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered
by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. It further
provides that:

"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the
proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili
within the Autonomous Region . . ."

From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the
autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set
of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over
exactly the same small area.

Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly whose
members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the cities composing
the Autonomous Region.

c. Marcos v. Chief of Staff, 89 Phil. 246, G.R. No. L-4663, L-4671, May 30, 1951

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COURT-MARTIAL; ATTORNEY-AT-LAW; MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

NOT ALLOWED TO APPEAR AS COUNSEL IN COURT-MARTIAL. — The provisions of section 17, Article
VI of the Constitution prohibiting Senator or member of the House of Representatives to appear as counsel for the
accused in "any court" includes the General Court-Martial. A court-martial case is a criminal case within the
meaning of this section of the Constitution. The words "any court" used in prohibiting members of Congress to
appear as counsel "in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an

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offense committed in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a Military court of a Court-
Martial.

2. ID.; CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; RESTRICTED AND GENERAL MEANING OF

WORDS. — In construing a Constitution, it must be taken as established that where words are used which have
both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the
subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended.

3. ID.; COURTS; COURT-MARTIAL; CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; WORDS "INFERIOR

COURTS" USED IN CONNECTION WITH APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT. — The
words inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "review on
appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article
VIII of the Constitution, do not refer to Courts- Martial or Military Courts. (Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the
Philippine Army, 43 Off. Gaz., 855).

4. ID.; COURT-MARTIAL; ATTORNEY-AT-LAW; TRIAL; RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO BE REPRESENTED

BY COUNSEL IN A COURT-MARTIAL. — A constitutional provision extending to the accused the right to be
represented by counsel in any trial court whatever, applies to a court-martial and gives the accused the undeniable
right to defend by counsel, and a court-martial has no power to refuse an attorney the right to appear before it if he
is properly licensed to practice in the courts of the country.

5. ID.; ID; COURT; COURT-MARTIAL AS A COURT. — The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of
acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved by the reviewing authority before it can be executed
(Article of War 46), does not change or affect the character of a court-martial as a court.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROSECUTION OF ACCUSED BEFORE COURT-MARTIAL. — A

court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal not an administrative case, and
therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the defendant for the same offense,
because the latter would place the accused in double jeopardy.

d. Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875, G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946

1. WAR; MILITARY OCCUPATION OF PHILIPPINES; STATUS OF OFFICERS AND MEN OF

PHILIPPINE ARMY. — By the occupation of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men of the
Philippine Army did not cease to be fully in the service, though, in a measure, only in a measure, they were not
subject to the military jurisdiction, if they were not in active duty. In the latter case, like officers and soldiers on
leave of absence or held as prisoners of war, they could not be held guilty of a breach of the discipline of the
command or of a neglect of duty, or disobedience of orders, or mutiny or subject to a military trial therefor; but
for an act unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, or an act which constitutes an offense of the class specified in
the 95th Article of War, they may in general be legally held subject to military jurisdiction and trial.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUSPENSION OF LAWS OF POLITICAL NATURE DURING MILITARY OCCUPATION,
EXTENT OF. — The rule that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered superseded or
in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied
territory. It is not intended for and does not bind the enemies in arms.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONS SUBJECT TO MILITARY LAW; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners come within the
general application of the clause in sub- paragraph (a) of Article 2 of the 2d Article of War; "and all other persons
lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are
required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same." By their acceptance of appointments as officers
in the Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became members of the
Philippine Army amenable to the Articles of War. The Bolo Area received supplies and funds for the salaries of
its officers and men from the Southwest Pacific Command. As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military
District, the petitioners operated under the orders of duly established and duly appointed commanders of the
United States Army.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 93D ARTICLE OF WAR, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF; ABSENCE OF

APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT FROM JUDGMENTS OF COURTS MARTIAL IMPOSING DEATH OR
LIFE IMPRISONMENT; COURT MARTIAL, NATURE OF. — The 93d Article of War which fails to allow a
review by the Supreme Court of judgments of courts martial imposing death or life imprisonment does not violate
Article VIII, section 2, paragraph 4, of the Constitution which provides that "the National Assembly may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment." Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for the

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ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as
Commander in Chief, independently of legislation." Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary.

e. Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461, G.R. No. L-630, November 15, 1947

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL POLICY; CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION SHOULD BE

AVOIDED IF POSSIBLE. — The rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its decision
may be made to rest upon other grounds, does not mean that to avoid a constitutional question, the court may
decline to decide the case upon the merits. In the instant case, the only issue is a constitutional question which is
unavoidable if the case is to be decided upon the merits. And the court cannot avoid rendering its decision simply
because it has to avoid the constitutional question. It cannot, for instance, grant appellant's motion withdrawing
his appeal only because the constitutional issue should be avoided. Whether that motion should be, or should not
be, granted, is a question involving different considerations.

2. ID.; APPEAL; WITHDRAWAL OF APPEAL DISCRETIONARY UPON THE COURT AFTER BRIEFS
ARE PRESENTED. — Withdrawal of appeal after briefs are presented, may or may not be granted in the
discretion of the court, according to the rules. In the instant case, withdrawal was denied because under the
circumstances, particularly the circular of the Department of Justice issued while this case was pending before this
Court and ordering all registers of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens, together
with the circumstance that probably a similar question may never come up again before this Court, the effect of
the withdrawal would be offensive to the opinion reached by a majority of the members of the Court after long
and exhaustive deliberations on the constitutional question. To allow the withdrawal under such circumstances is
equivalent to tolerating an offense to the constitution, offense which may be permanent.

3. CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. — When

section 1, Article XIII, of the Constitution, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only
agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it undoubtedly means that all lands of the public domain are classified into
said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the
circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the
public laws and judicial decision in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said
classification has always been construed as referring to those lands that were neither timber nor mineral, and as
including residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional
Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical
meaning then prevailing.

There seems to be no question among members of this Court that the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing
in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution includes residential lands. And this is in conformity with a
legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the
Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a
legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." Soon after the Constitution was
adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and
sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or
corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are
considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.

Furthermore, prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public
agricultural lands used for industrial or residential purposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out,
undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57
of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold
or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may
only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the
purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional
limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land
for residence purposes.

The legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive Department of the
Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos rendered an opinion holding that under the
Constitution, the phrase "public agricultural lands" includes residential lands.

4. PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LANDS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. — Under section 2 of Article XIII of
the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and
with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional
purpose of conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the
Filipino citizens themselves who may transfer their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this
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 result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, which reads: "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain the Philippines." This constitutional provision closes the only
remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to
prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is
intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. both sections must, therefore, be read
together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against
whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. And the subject matter of both sections is the same,
namely, the non-transferability of agricultural land to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes
residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land" under section 5. It is a rule of
statutory construction that a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the
statute, unless a different intention appears. The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 1 and
"agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter, private. But such difference refers to
ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the
national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by
the State or by its citizens.

If, as conceded by all the members of this Court, residential lands of the public domain should be considered as
agricultural lands to be protected as part of the national patrimony, there can be no reason why residential lands of
private ownership should not deserve the same consideration and protection. There is absolutely no difference in
nature, character, value or importance to the nation between a residential land of the public domain and a
residential land of private ownership, and, therefore, both should equally be considered as agricultural lands to be
protected as part of the national patrimony. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the
alienation of public residential lots may become superfluous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to
private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more
important, for time will come when, in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor private
individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential
lands.

The constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an Act of the National Assembly
passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to
the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 provisions contained in section 120 and 121 thereof
which granted to aliens the right to acquire private agricultural lands only by way of reciprocity. Then came the
Constitution, and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed containing sections 122 and 123 which strike out
completely the right of reciprocity granted to aliens. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy
contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution, which, in prohibiting the alienation of private
agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity.

5. EFFECT UPON THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF NOT CONSIDERING RESIDENTIAL

LANDS AS AGRICULTURAL LANDS. — If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not
including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that aliens may freely acquire and
possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities,
and that they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial
plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and
a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural. That this is obnoxious to
the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.

V. SELF-EXECUTING VS. NON-SELF-EXECUTING

a. Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017

No, The SC ruled that there was no law prohibiting the construction of the project. It was not even considered as
contrary to morals, customs and public order. The project was way well from the Park where the monument was
located. The SC ruled further that a mandamus did not lie against the City of Manila. It is categorically clear that
“a mandamus is issued when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be
compelled to perform an act, and the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such
act.” In the case at bar, such factors were wanting. Nowhere was it found in the ordinance, or in any Law or rule
that the construction of such building outside the Rizal Park was prohibited if the building was within the
background sightline or vision of the Rizal Monument. Thus, the petition was lacking of merit and, thus
dismissed.

Even the KOR could not point to any law that respondent City of Manila had violated and could only point to
declarations of policies by the NHCP and the Venice Charter which do not constitute clear legal bases for the
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issuance of a writ of mandamus. The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the
preservation and restoration of ancient monuments, sites, and buildings. It brings together principles in the field of
historical conservation and restoration that have been developed, agreed upon, and and laid down by experts over
the years. Each country, however, remains “responsible for applying the plan within the framework of its own
culture and traditions.” The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable as law. The
Philippines is not legally bound to follow its directive, as in fact, these are not directives but mere guidelines- a
set of the best practices and techniques that have been proven over the years to be the most effective in preserving
and restoring historical monuments, sites and buildings.

b. Grace Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016

GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that
only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which are
typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there
is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical
parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the
Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of
the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are
being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

The presumption of a natural-born citizenship of the foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are
nationals of the Philippines. Adopting the legal principles of international laws from 1930 Hague Convention and
the 1961 Convention on stateliness is rational and reasonable and consistent in the Philippine Constitution’s
regime of Jus saguinis. Moreover, the SC clearly stated that the COMELEC cannot reverse the judicial precedent
as it was reserved to the court. In line with this, the Supreme Court ruled that Poe is qualified to be a candidate for
President on May 2016. The court likewise stated that Poe-Llamanzares, being a foundling is a natural-born
citizen based on 1. Circumstantial evidence, 2. Legislation and 3. Generally Accepted principle of other laws.

c. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997.

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; DEFINED. — A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the
governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the
authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.It
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.

2. ID.; ID.; DEEMED WRITTEN IN EVERY STATUTE AND CONTRACT. — Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes
is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Adhering to the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding
rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a
basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the
land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.

3. ID.; ID.; CONSIDERED SELF-EXECUTING RATHER THAN NON-SELF-EXECUTING. — In case of

doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . Unless the contrary
is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law,1993 ed.,pp. 8-10)

4. ID.; ID.; SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS; LEGISLATURE NOT PRECLUDED FROM ENACTING

LAWS ENFORCING PROVISIONS. — Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a
way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the
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legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without the self-
executing nature of constitutional provisions. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a
remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that
the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

5. ID.;ID.;ID.;A PROVISION MAY BE SELF-EXECUTING IN ONE PART AND NON-SELF-EXECUTING

IN ANOTHER. — Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par.,of Art. XII is
implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-
executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still
to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first
paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within
its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori,by the same logic, the second paragraph can only
be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

6. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PROVISION ON PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, SELF-

EXECUTING. — Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se
judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that
— qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation
on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUDES THE NATIONAL RESOURCES AND CULTURAL HERITAGE. — When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources,but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

8. ID.;ID.;ID.;MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, EMBRACED THEREIN; FILIPINO FIRST POLICY

PROVISION, APPLICABLE IN SALES OF HOTEL STOCKS. — For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel
has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the
equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the
hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands.

9. ID.;STATE; SALE BY THE GSIS OF 51% OF ITS SHARE IN MANILA HOTEL CORP.,A STATE
ACTION, SUBJECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND. — In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a " public function",(2) when the government is so-significantly involved with the private
actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or
authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC
comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction, although
entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional
command.

10. ID.; CONSTITUTION; WHEN THE CONSTITUTION ADDRESSES THE STATE, IT REFERS TO BOTH
PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT. — When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but
also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power
— legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is
correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a
government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
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11. ID.;ID.;NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; SALE OF STOCKS OF
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION BY THE GSIS; FILIPINOS ALLOWED TO MATCH THE BID OF
FOREIGN ENTITY. — In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of
the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For,
while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be imply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

12. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FOREIGN BIDDERS WITHOUT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST GSIS
BEFORE ACCEPTANCE OF BID. — The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could
participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But
foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the
highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the
inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by
Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier
bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS
of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.

13. ID.;SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION, CERTIORARI; FAILURE OF THE GSIS TO EXECUTE

CORRESPONDING DOCUMENTS WHERE PETITIONER HAD MATCHED THE BID PRICE BY FOREIGN
BIDDER, A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered
by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

14. ID.; SUPREME COURT; DUTY BOUND TO MAKE SURE THAT CONTRACTS DO NOT VIOLATE
THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAWS. — While it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the
kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make
sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by
winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper
governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself
beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.

d. Tanada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL, SUBJECT TO WAIVER. — The matter of estoppel will not be
taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively, waived it by not pursuing it in any
of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not cause the petition's
dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel.

2. ID.; ID.; PARTIES; LOCUS STANDI; SUBJECT TO WAIVER. — During its deliberations on the case, the
Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to
have waived the benefit of such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of
public funds and serious international commitments of the nation are involved here, and that transcendental public
interest requires that the substantive issues be met head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or
deflected by procedural matters.

3. ID.; ID.; PETITION SEEKING TO NULLIFY ACT OF SENATE ON GROUND THAT IT CONTRAVENES
THE CONSTITUTION, A JUSTICIABLE QUESTION. — In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate
on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a
"controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in
the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide."

4. ID.; SUPREME COURT; JUDICIAL POWER; SCOPE. — The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the
matters raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, as follows: "Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
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enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality, of the government." The foregoing text
emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality, of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. As explained
by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously, as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature." As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized
in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution
in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer,
agency, instrumentality or department of the government.

5. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS; APPROPRIATE

REMEDIES TO REVIEW ACTS OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS. — Certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.

6. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; AIDS

OR GUIDES IN THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS. — By its very title, Article II
of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The counterpart of this article in the 1935
Constitution is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article
II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the
judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment
of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of
which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional
rights but guidelines for legislation."

7. ID.; ID.; THOUGH IT MANDATES A BIAS IN FAVOR OF FILIPINO GOODS, SERVICES, LABOR AND
ENTERPRISES, IT RECOGNIZES THE NEED FOR BUSINESS EXCHANGE WITH THE REST OF THE
WORLD. — While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases
of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not
shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it
does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only
on foreign competition that is unfair.

8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; JOINING THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, NOT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — The basic principles underlying the WTO
Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development." GATT has provided built-in protection from
unfair foreign competition and trade practices including anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and
safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the
Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement that under the WTO,
local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of control of the economy.
Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been taken into account;
thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their discretion.
True, they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic
liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion simply because we
disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in
taking jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an
economic policy. It will only, perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave
abuse of discretion.

9. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES;

POLICY OF "SELF-RELIANT AND INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ECONOMY" DOES NOT RULE OUT
ENTRY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, GOODS AND SERVICES. — The constitutional policy of a "self-
reliant and independent national economy" does not necessarily rule out the entry, of foreign investments, goods
and services. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community."

10. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; WORLD TRADE LAW ORGANIZATION/GENERAL

AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE; RELIANCE ON "MOST FAVORED NATIONS",
CONSTITUTIONAL. — The WTO reliance on "most favored nation", "national treatment", and "trade without
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discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity, that
apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and reciprocal", the
fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby
demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual
development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers
and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade
environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow
and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

11. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; QUESTIONS INVOLVING "JUDGMENT CALLS", NOT SUBJECT TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW. — Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to
reality? Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos' general welfare because it will — as promised by
its promoters — expand the country's exports and generate more employment? Will it bring more prosperity,
employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most reasonable rates to the Filipino public? The
responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for which they are answerable to our
people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial
pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.

12. POLITICAL LAW; SOVEREIGNTY; SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO BY THE STATE; CASE AT BAR. — While sovereignty has traditionally been
deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations
voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. In its
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity, with all nations." By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of
the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must
be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — When the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it
consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation." Under Article 2 of
the UN Charter, "(a)ll members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance
with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is
taking preventive or enforcement action." Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other
international pacts — both bilateral and multilateral — that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty the
Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and
police power. The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment
of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its
citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT. The point is that, as
shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based
on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations."

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION; PARAGRAPH 1, ARTICLE 34 OF THE GENERAL
PROVISIONS AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS); DOES NOT INTRUDE ON THE POWER OF THE
SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES ON PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES. —
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 (Process Patents: Burden of Proof) of the General Provisions and
Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) intrudes on
the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. A WTO
Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note the words "in the absence of proof to the contrary")
presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with the use of a patented process shall be
deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product obtained by
the patented product is new, or (2) where there is "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made with
the use of the said patented process but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used in
obtaining such identical product. Hence, the "burden of proof" contemplated by Article 34 should actually be
understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly
understood, actually refers to the "burden of evidence" (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the
identical (or fake) product to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process. The
foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of proof" since, regardless of the presumption
provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence of the
alleged identical product, the fact that it is "identical" to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the
fact of "newness" of the genuine product was made by the patented process. Moreover, it should be noted that the

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requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by the
patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process
and the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of
these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing
the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes. By and large, the arguments adduced in
connection with our disposition of the third issue — derogation of a legislative power — will apply to this fourth
issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists.
Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept
of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system. So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most
international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the adjustments in legislation and rules of
procedure will not be substantial.

15. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MINISTERIAL DECLARATION AND DECISIONS AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON
COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES, NOT SUBJECT TO CONCURRENCE BY THE SENATE. —
"A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the
proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions,
recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference." It is
not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken
place over several years. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final
Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. The Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were approved by the
ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members can meet "to
give effect to those provision of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to
facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement." The Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27
Members which "have indicated in their respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of
monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free
transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing systems
and refinancing available in the normal course of business."

16. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; RESORT THERETO ON GROUND OF
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AVAILABLE ONLY WHERE THERE IS NO PLAIN, SPEEDY AND
ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW. — Procedurally. a writ of certiorari
grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is
amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

17. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CONSTRUED. — By grave abuse of discretion is meant
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty, enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law. Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the
petition.

18. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCURRENCE BY THE SENATE IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, NOT A
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate,
whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its
actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and
done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such
presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of
grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senate's processes, this Court cannot find any
cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate's exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO
Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. That the Senate, after deliberation and voting,
voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it "a part of the law of
the land" is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross" arbitrariness or
despotism "by reason of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this
Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the
national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our
own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether
such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter
between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march
toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing
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their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political
desire of a member.

e. Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO A

BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY, CONSTRUED. — The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides: "SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." This right unites with the right
to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: "SEC. 15. The State shall protect and
promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." While the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in
the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution
itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not
only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but
parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

2. ID.; ID.; TIMBER LICENSES; NATURE THEREOF; NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE MAY NOT BE
INVOKED; CASE AT BAR. — all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director
of Forestry, (125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983]) This Court held: ". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. 'A license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property
right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation' (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576) . . ." We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:
(190 SCRA 673 684 [1990]) ". . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments
by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of
Forestry,G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]." Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." In the
second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or
even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-
impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp.,
(110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]) this Court stated: "The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not
meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, moral and general welfare." The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, (291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940 947-949) quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, (22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968]) to wit: "'Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall
be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the
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common interest.'" In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. (Ongsiako vs.
Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., supra; Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, supra; Alalyan vs. NLRC, 24 scra 172 [1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA
54 [1974]; Kabiling vs. National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987]).

3. ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; NO LONGER IMPAIRED BY THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE;

RATIONALE. — It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government." Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says: "The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept
of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government. As worded, the new
provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of
the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of 'grave abuse of discretion,'
which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary." In Daza
vs. Singson, (180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs.
Macaraig, 191 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991]) Mr.
Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted: "In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes
even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . ."

4. REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADINGS; CAUSE OF ACTION, DEFINED; CASE AT BAR. — the right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty —
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of
1987 — to protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain
that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be
renewed or granted. A cause of action is defined as: ". . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." (Marao Sugar Central Co. vs.
Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere
vs. vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseñas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan,
202 SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].

5. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION, AS A GROUND; RULE; CASE AT
BAR. — It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of the said
allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be
resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint? In Militante vs. Edrosolano, this Court laid down the rule that the
judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground
of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged
and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens,
there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute." After a careful examination of the petitioners'
complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments
under the subheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; LOCUS STANDI, CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. — The Court explicitly
states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and maintenance of this suit
(Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a
class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter
of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class"
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appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future — it appears to me that everyone
who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is
vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of
action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned
and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such a
beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the
first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an
appropriate case.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO "A

BALANCE AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY"; INTERPRETATION. — The Court has also declared that the
complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is
"fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character,
I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to
language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character
than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this
rubric appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland
and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and
inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources
through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of
certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive
Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No.
1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional
statements of basic policy in Article II, Sections 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15
("the right to health"). As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section
16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-
reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

3. ID.; RIGHT TO HEALTH; SHOULD SPECIFICALLY EXIST IN OUR CORPUS OF LAW. — Justice
Feliciano suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is
or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the
trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should
be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; LEGAL RIGHTS, AS ESSENTIAL

COMPONENTS; STANDARDS. — the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is
that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due
process dimensions to this matter. The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of
law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
"Section 1 . . . Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the
right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional
qualifications. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

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 f. Pamatong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled “Declaration of
Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, 2 and
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the
policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. 3 The disregard of the provision does not give rise
to any cause of action before the courts. 4

An inquiry into the intent of the framers 5 produces the same determination that the provision is not self-
executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, “The State shall broaden
opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties.” 6 Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide,
Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word “broaden” to the phrase “ensure equal access,”
and the substitution of the word “office” to “service.” He explained his proposal in this wise:

I changed the word “broaden” to “ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO” because what is important would be equal
access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would be mandated to
create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of
broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should not mandate the State to make the
government the number one employer and to limit offices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet
offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the word “broaden.” 7 (emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate
as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the “Davide amendment” indicates the design of
the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the
imposition of a clear State burden.

Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights.
It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach
are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to
be entirely open-ended. 8 Words and phrases such as “equal access,” “opportunities,” and “public service” are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of
the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable
rights may be sourced.

As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions 9 of the
Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates” and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 10 dated December 10,
2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is
not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne
by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person
is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands and
has to be accorded due weight.

Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
misplaced.

VI. MANDATORY VS. DIRECTORY

a. Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957)

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL;

NATURE OF TRIBUNAL. — Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to
be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the letter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139; Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.)

2. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF "POLITICAL QUESTION"; CASE AT BAR. — The term "political question"
connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
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to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government
(16 C. J. S., 413). It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. In
the case at bar, the question for determination is whether the election of two senators, by the Senate, as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by another senator, who is a member and spokesman of the
party having the largest number of votes in the Senate, on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination *** of the party
having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political
question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations. It is clearly within the
legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceedings in connection
therewith. Hence, this Court has, not only jurisdiction, but, also the duty, to consider and determine the principal
issue raised by the parties herein.

3. ID.; ID.; MAIN OBJECTION IN PROVIDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS.

— The main objective of the framers of the Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral
Commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress was to insure the exercise of judicial
impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this
purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party
having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given
the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal so that they may realize that partisan
considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater
impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as each one of
said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal
with judicial temper.

4. ID.; ID.; MOST VITAL FEATURE OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS. — The most vital feature of the
Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of the parties having the largest and the second largest number of
votes in each House therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court
as members of said Tribunals.

5. ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED FOR SELECTION OF MEMBERS; COMPLIANCE WITH

PROCEDURE MANDATORY. — The framers of the Constitution intended to prevent the majority party from
controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the
majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justice of the Supreme Court, who are members of said
Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to
play. It constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts
performed in violation thereof are null and void.

6. ID.; ID.; PRESENT SITUATION NOT FORESEEN BY FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION; SPIRIT OF
THE LAW PREVAILS OVER ITS LETTER. — While it is true that the membership of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, in the case at bar, would in effect be limited to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members it must be
conceded that the present composition of the Senate, wherein twenty-three (23) of its members belong to one
party and one (1) member belongs to another, was not foreseen by the framers of the Constitution. Furthermore,
the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution,
for partisan considerations cannot be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court,
three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party
having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.

7. ID,; ID.; ID.; MODERATING ROLE OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT. — If the Nacionalista
Party would be allowed to nominate five (5) members to the Senate Electoral Tribunal instead of three (3), it
would have the absolute majority, since there would be one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three (3)
members of the Supreme Court, and hence, the philosophy underlying the Constitution would be entirely upset.
The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed, and, what is worse, the decisive
moderating role of the Justice of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be
thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests
pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall.

8. ID.; ID.; RELIANCE BY THE CONSTITUTION UPON THE METHOD OF SELECTION ESTABLISHED
THEREIN. — When the election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the
nomination of the political parties referred to in the Constitution, the latter thereby indicates its reliance upon the
method of selection thus established, regardless of the individual qualities of those chosen therefor. The delegates
to the Convention did not ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to giving general patterns or norms
of action. In connection, particularly with the composition of the Electorals, they believed that, even the most well
meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake of the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and
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to resist the demands of political exigencies, the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree
of predominance of the party from which it comes.

9. ID.; ID,; ID.; WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INTENDED FOR ONE'S BENEFIT —
Although "an individual may waive constitutional provisions intended for his benefit," particularly those meant
for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending "to secure his personal liberty" the power to
waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371) The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization of the
Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of the commonweal, and it has been held that "where
a statute is founded on public policy, those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions" (82
C. J. S., 874).

10. ID.; ACTS OF CONGRESS; AUTHORITY OF COURTS TO PASS UPON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY.
— The provision in the Constitution vesting the legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines does not
detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of act of Congress. Since judicial power
includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved
by the Executive there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses like that of any other
branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. In fact, whenever the conducting claims
of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or
of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so,
which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction.

11. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DOCTRINE OF CONTEMPORANEOUS OR PRACTICAL

CONSTRUCTION; WHEN APPLICABLE. — As a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and
ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any application. Where the meaning
of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to
no weight and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning. The reason is that the
application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of
constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory provisions, and that, except as to matters committed by
the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical construction is not
necessarily binding upon the courts even in a doubtful case. Hence if in the judgment of the court, such
construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount consideration of
public policy, it may be rejected (16 C. J. S., 71-72)

12. ID.; CONFLICT BETWEEN SPIRIT AND LETTER OF A STATUTE. — As a general rule of statutory
construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of
a statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, while that which is within the letter, but
not within the spirit of a statute, is not within the statute, but, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext
of pursuing its spirit. (82 C.J.S., 613)

b. Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 28196, November 9, 1967

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT TO DETERMINE PROPER

ALLOCATION OF POWERS BETWEEN SEVERAL DEPARTMENTS. — The "Judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof" (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil., 139).

2. ID.; POWER TO PASS UPON VALIDITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. — In Mabanag vs.

Lopez Vito, (78 Phil., 1), the Court declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes
cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement
of the fundamental law, characterizing the issue as a political one. The force of this precedent has been weakened
by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil. 818), Avelino vs. Cuenco (1-12851, March 4, and 14,
1949), Tañada vs. Cuenco (L-10520, Feb. 18, 1957), and Macias vs. Commission on Elections, 58 Off. Gaz; (51)
8388. The Court rejected the theory, advanced in these four cases, that the issues therein raised were political
questions, the determination of which, is beyond judicial review.

3. ID.; NATURE OF POWER TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION. — The power to amend the Constitution or
to propose, amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Sec. 1, Art,
VI, Const.) It is part of the inherent powers of the people - as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state,
such as ours (Sec. 1, Art. II, Const.) — to make and hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may
propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicit]y grants such power (Sec. 1, Art. XV,
Const.). Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same
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function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution - they are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself.

4. ID.; POWER OF APPORTIONMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS. — It is not true that Congress

has not made an apportionment within three years after the enumeration or census made in 1960. It did actually
pass a bill, which became Republic Act 3040 (Approved, June 17, 1961) purporting to make said apportionment.
This Act was, however, declared unconstitutional, on the ground that the apportionment therein undertaken had
not been made according to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the Philippines (Macias vs.
Commission on Elections, supra).

5. ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF CONGRESS TO MAKE APPORTIONMENT DID NOT MAKE CONGRESS
ILLEGAL OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — The fact that Congress is under legal obligation to make
apportionment as required under the Constitution, does not justify the conclusion that failure to comply with such
obligation rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de facto officers. The
effect of the omission has been envisioned ia the Constitution (Sec. 5, Art. VI, Const.). The provision does not
support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to make their apportionment, a Congress which falls to
make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary it implies necessarily that Congress shall continue to
function with representative districts existing at the time of the expiration of said period.

6. ID.; ID.; NO VALID APPORTIONMENT SINCE ADOPTION OF CONSTITUTION IN 1935; EFFECT

THEREOF. — Since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has not made a valid apportionment as
required in the fundamental law.

7. ID.; ID.; SENATE AND HOUSE CONSTITUTED ON DECEMBER 30, 1961 WERE DE JURE BODIES. —
The Senate and House of Representatives organized or constituted on December 30, 1961 were de jure bodies and
the Members thereof were de jure officers.

8. ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF CONGRESS TO DISCHARGE MANDATORY DUTY. — Neither our political law,
in general, nor our law on public officers, in particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory
duty, whatever it may be, would automatically result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to
this effect.

9. ID.; ID.; PROVISIONS OF ELECTION LAW RELATIVE TO ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

IN 1965, NOT REPEALED. — The provisions of our Election Law relative to the election of Members of
Congress in 1965, were not repealed in consequence of the failure of said body to make an apportionment within
three years after the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were presumably held in
conformity with said Election Law and the legal provisions creating Congress - with a House of Representatives
composed of members elected by qualified voters of representative districts as they existed at the time of said
elections - remained in force, we cannot see how said Members of the House of Representatives can be regarded
as de facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to make a reapportionment within the
period aforementioned.

10. ID.; DE FACTO DOCTRINE REASON THEREOF. — The main reason for the existence of the de facto
doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of persons holding under color of title, an office created by a
valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public — as distinguished from the officer in question - is
concerned (Lino Luna vs. Rodriquez, et al., 37 Phil., 192 and other cases). Indeed, otherwise, those dealing with
officers and employees of the Government would be entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their title
to the positions they hold, before dealing with them, or before recognizing their authority or obeying their
commands, even if they should act within the limits of the authority vested in their respective offices, positions or
employments (Torres vs. Ribo, 81 Phil., 50). One can imagine the great inconvenience, hardships and evils that
would result in the absence of the de facto doctrine.

11. ID.; ID.; TITLE OF DE FACTO OFFICER CANNOT BE ASSAILED COLLATERALLY. — The title of a
de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally (Nacionalista Party vs. De Vera, 85, Phil., 126). It may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings.

12. ID.; ID.; VALIDITY OF ACTS OF DE FACTO OFFICER CANNOT BE ASSAILED COLLATERALLY.
— Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer (People
vs. Gabitanan, 43 Off. Gaz. 3211). And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to
toe office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the
public is concerned.

13. ID.; MEANING OF THE TERM "OR". — The term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-
versa, when the spirit or context of the law warrants it (50 Am. Jur. 267-268).

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14. ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO APPROVE RESOLUTIONS AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION. —
There is nothing in the Constitution or in the history thereof that would negate the authority of different
Congresses to approve the contested resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in different sessions or
different days of the same congressional session. Neither has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the
denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.

15. ID.; MEANING OF TERM "ELECTION" IN ART. XV, CONSTITUTION. — There is in this provision
nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special", not a general, election. The circumstance
that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special
elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not
negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

16. ID.; LEGISLATION CANNOT BE NULLIFIED FOR FAILURE OF CERTAIN SECTORS TO DISCUSS
IT SUFFICIENTLY. — A legislation cannot be nullified by reason of the failure of certain sectors of the
community to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than
those existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law enforcing agencies,
particularly those that take place subsequently to the passage or approval of the law.

17. ID.; PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS. — A considerable portion of the people
may not know how over 160 of the proposed maximum of representative districts are actually apportioned by
RBH No. 1 among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not impossible however, that they are not interested in the
detail of the apportionment, or that a careful reading thereof may tend, in their simple minds, to impair a clear
vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more sophisticated, may enlighten themselves sufficiently by
reading the copies of the proposed amendments posted in public places, the copies kept in the polling places and
the text of the contested resolutions as printed in full on the back of the ballots they will use.

18. ID.; JUDICIAL POWER TO NULLIFY EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE ACTS, NOT VIOLATIVE OF
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS. — The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial
power to strike down acts of the Executive or of Congress transcending the confines set forth in the fundamental
law is not in derogation of the principle of separation of powers, pursuant to which each department is supreme
within its own sphere.

19. ID.; DETERMINATION OF CONDITIONS FOR SUBMISSION OF AMENDMENTS TO PEOPLE,

PURELY LEGISLATIVE. — The determination of the conditions under which the proposed amendments shall
be submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls within the legislative sphere.

MAKALINTAL, J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION; RATIFICATION BY THE

PEOPLE; SECTIONS 2 AND 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT 4913 IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW. — Considered in itself and without reference to extraneous factors and
circumstances, the manner prescribed in Sections 2 and 4 of R.A. 4913 is sufficient for the purpose of having the
proposed amendments submitted to the people for their ratification, as enjoined in Section 1, Article XV of the
Constitution. I am at a loss to say what else should have been required by the Act to make it adhere more closely
to the constitutional requirement. Certainly it would have been out of place to provide, for instance, that
governmental officials and employees should go out and explain the amendments to the people, or that they
should be the subject of any particular means or form of public discussion.

2. ID., ID.; ID.; SUBMISSION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE PEOPLE AT A GENERAL ELECTION. — I

reject the argument that the ratification must necessarily be in a special election or plebiscite called for that
purpose alone. While such procedure is highly to be preferred, the Constitution speaks simply of "an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," and I do not subscribe to the restrictive
interpretation that the petitioners would have on this provision, namely, that it means only a special election.

BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION; REPUBLIC ACT 49138. —

Republic Act 4913, effective June 17, 1967, is an Act submitting to the Filipino people for approval the
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of
both Houses Numbered 1 and 3, adopted on March 16, 1967. Said Republic Act fixes the date and manner of the
election at which the aforesaid proposed amendments shall be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds
for said election. Resolutions of both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 propose two amendments to the Constitution: the first,
to amend Sec. 5 Art. VI, by increasing the maximum membership of the House of Representatives from 120 to
180, apportioning 160 of said 180 seats and eliminating the provision that Congress shall by law make an

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apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration; the second, to amend Sec. 16, Art. VI, by
allowing Senators and Representatives to be delegates to a constitutional convention without forfeiting their seats.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIFICATION BY THE PEOPLE IN A SPECIAL ELECTION FOR THE PURPOSE NOT
SPECIFICALLY REQUIRED. — Nowhere in Sec. 1, Art. XV is it required that the ratification be thru an
election solely for that purpose. It only requires that it be at "an election at which the amendments are submitted
to the people for their ratification." To join it with an election for candidates to public office, that is, to make it
concurrent with such election, does not render it any less an election at which the proposed amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification. No prohibition being found in the plain terms of the Constitution,
none should be inferred. Had the framers of the Constitution thought of requiring a special election for the
purpose only of the proposed amendments, they could have said so, by qualifying the phrase with some word such
as "special" or "solely" or "exclusively". They did not.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTE WHICH PROVIDES FOR HOW AND WHEN THE AMENDMENTS ALREADY
PROPOSED ARE GOING TO BE VOTED UPON AND APPROPRIATES FUNDS TO CARRY OUT ITS
PROVISIONS DOES NOT NEED THE 3/4 VOTE OF CONGRESS IN JOINT SESSION. — The submission of
proposed amendments can be done thru an ordinary statute passed by Congress. The Constitution does not
expressly state by whom the submission shall be undertaken; the rule is that a power not lodged elsewhere under
the Constitution is deemed to reside with the legislative body, under the doctrine of residuary powers. Congress
therefore validly enacted Republic Act 4913 to fix the details of the date and manner of submitting the proposed
amendments to the people for their ratification. Since it does not "propose amendments" in the sense referred to
by Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, but merely provides for how and when the amendments already proposed,
are going to be voted upon, the same does not need the 3/4 vote in joint session required in Sec. 1, Art. XV of the
Constitution. Furthermore, Republic Act 4913 is an appropriation measure. Sec. 6 thereof appropriates
P1,000,000 for carrying out its provisions. Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution states that "All appropriation bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives". Republic Act 4913, therefore, could not have been
validly adopted in a joint session, reinforcing the view that Sec. 1, Art. XV does not apply to such a measure
providing for the holding of the election to ratify the proposed amendments, which must perforce appropriate
funds for its purpose.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTE WHICH PROVIDES SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY TO THE VOTERS TO CAST
AN INTELLIGENT VOTE ON THE PROPOSALS, NOT OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE. — Republic Act 4913 does not offend against substantive due process. An examination of the
provisions of the law shows no violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. The publication in the
Official Gazette at least 20 days before the election, the posting of notices in public buildings not later than Oct.
14, 1967, to remain posted until after the elections, the placing of copies of the proposed amendments in the
polling places, aside from printing the same at the back of the ballot, provide sufficient opportunity to the voters
to cast an intelligent vote on the proposal. Due process refers only to providing fair opportunity; it does not
guarantee that the opportunity given will in fact be availed of; that is the look out of the voter and the
responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and reasonable opportunity to be informed is given, and it is, the due
process clause is not infringed.

5. ID.; ID.; RATIFICATION OF; VOTERS TO BE SUFFICIENTLY INFORMED OF THE PROPOSED

AMENDMENTS TO INTELLIGENTLY VOTE THEREON; METHOD ADOPTED IN THE CASE AT BAR
NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFECTIVE. — Non-printing of the provisions to be amended as they now stand,
and the printing of the full proposed amendments at the back of the ballot instead of the substance thereof at the
face of the ballot, do not deprive the voter of fair opportunity to be informed. The present wording of the
Constitution is not being veiled or suppressed from him; he is conclusively presumed to know them and they are
available should he want to check on what he is conclusively presumed to know. Should the voters choose to
remain ignorant of the present Constitution, the fault does not lie with Congress. For opportunity to familiarize
oneself with the Constitution as it stands has been available thru all these years. Perhaps it would have been more
convenient for the voters if the present wording of the provisions were also to be printed on the ballot. The same
however, is a matter policy. As long as the method adopted provides sufficiently reasonable chance to
intelligently vote on the amendments, and I think it does in this case, it is not constitutionally defective.

6. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; POWER OF CONGRESS TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS OR CALL

A CONVENTION FOR THAT PURPOSE. — Sec. 1, Art. XV states that Congress "may propose amendments or
call a convention for that purpose". The term "or", however, is frequently used as having the same meaning as
"and" particularly in permissive, affirmative sentences so that the interpretation of the word "or" as "and" in the
Constitution in such use will not change its meaning (Vicksburg, S. and P. R. Co. v. Goodenough, 32 So. 404,
411, 108 La. 442). And it should be pointed out that the resolutions proposing amendments (R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3)
are different from that calling for a convention (R.B.H. No. 2). Surely, if Congress deems it better or wise to
amend the Constitution before a convention caused for is elected, it should not be fettered from doing so. For our
purposes in this case, suffice it to note that the Constitution does not prohibit it from doing so.

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7. ID.; ID.; MEMBERS OF CONGRESS; REPRESENTATION ACCORDING TO DISTRICTS; STATUS QUO
RETAINED IN THE ABSENCE OF APPORTIONMENT REQUIRED BY LAW. — Sec. 5 of Art. VI of the
Constitution provides in part that "The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the
return of every enumeration, and not otherwise". It however further states in the next sentence: "Until such
apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as
that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present
Assembly districts". The failure of Congress, therefore, to pass a valid redistricting law since the time the above
provision was adopted, does not render the present districting illegal or unconstitutional. For the Constitution
itself provides for its continuance in such cases, rendering legal and de jure the status quo.

SANCHEZ J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION; AN EXPRESSION OF THE

PEOPLE'S SOVEREIGN WILL. — A constitutional amendment is not a temporary expedient. Unlike a statute
which may suffer amendments three or more times in the same year, it is intended to stand the test of time. It is an
expression of the people's sovereign will.

2. ID.; ID.; RATIFICATION BY THE PEOPLE; SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS;

GOVERNMENT TO EXERT EFFORTS TO INFORM EVERY CITIZEN OF THE PROVISIONS TO BE
AMENDED. — The words "submitted to the people for ratification", if construed in the light of the nature of the
Constitution — a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people, an expression of their sovereign
will — mean that it can only be amended by the people expressing themselves according to the procedures
ordained by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or
spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample
opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments and try to reach a
conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious
influences. We believe the word "submitted" can only mean that the government, within its maximum
capabilities, should strain every effort to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed
amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if
one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of
the word as intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the
government, in submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its
structural framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection.
For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission,
intelligent consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the amendment no matter how
prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For, the people decree their own fate.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO PROPER SUBMISSION WHERE PEOPLE NOT SUFFICIENTLY INFORMED OF
THE AMENDMENT TO BE VOTED UPON. — If the people are not sufficiently informed of the amendments
to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner, it cannot be said
that in accordance with the constitutional mandate, "the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification."

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RA 4913 VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION FOR PRESCRIBING A PROCEDURE
WHICH DOES NOT EFFECTIVELY BRING THE MATTER TO THE PEOPLE. — When the voters do not
have the benefit of proper notice of the proposed amendments thru dissemination by publication in extenso and
people do not have at hand the necessary data on which to base their stand on the merits and demerits of said
amendments, there is no proper submission of the proposed constitutional amendments within the meaning and
intendment of Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution.

REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION; RATIFICATION BY THE

PEOPLE; SUBMISSION OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AT A SPECIAL ELECTION CALLED FOR
THE PURPOSE. — The framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof, and of the need
of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could have only meant that any amendments thereto should be
debated, considered and voted upon at an election wherein the people could devote undivided attention to the
subject, That this was the intention and the spirit of the provision is corroborated in the case of all other
constitutional amendments in the past, that were submitted to and approved in special elections exclusively
devoted to the issue whether the legislature's amendatory proposals should be ratified or not.

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION; JUDICIAL INQUIRY AS TO

THE AMENDING PROCESS APPROPRIATE TO ASSURE UTMOST COMPLIANCE WITH THE
Page | 43
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. — In Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947) this Court through
Justice Tuazon followed Coleman v. Miller, 307 US 433 (1939) in its holding that certain aspects of the amending
process may be considered political. His opinion quoted with approval the view of Justice Black, to which three
other members of the United States Supreme Court agreed, that the process itself is political in its entirety, "from
submission until am amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control
or interference at any point." In a sense that would solve the matter neatly. The judiciary would be spared the at
times arduous and in every case soul-searching process of determining whether the procedure for amendments
required by the Constitution has been followed. At the same time, without impugning the motives of Congress,
which cannot be judicially inquired into at any rate, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a failure to
observe the requirements of Article XV would occur. In the event that judicial intervention is sought, to rely
automatically on the theory of political question to avoid passing on such a matter of delicacy might under certain
circumstances be considered, and rightly so, as nothing less than judicial abdication or surrender.

c. Rep. Edcel Lagman, et al. v. Executive Secretary Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

1. The Court agrees that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui
generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections
1 and 5 of Article VIII. The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a
complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.

2. a.) In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should
look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the
Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President
could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the
situation. To require him otherwise would impede the process of his decision-making.

b.) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution shows that the President’s power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the
requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to
common sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego.
Only on the President can exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.

c.) As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since
the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there
is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or
available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension which facts or information are found
in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the
situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be
from the present depends on the President.

3. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the
ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. The power to review by the Court and the power to
revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly,
they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation.

4. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2)
public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to
believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.

The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in determining the existence of either
invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most
practical and most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of
rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. To require him to satisfy a higher
standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers.

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5. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the President’s decision of which
among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion
into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially,
lies with the President.

6. a.) Inclusion of “other rebel groups ” does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague. The term “other rebel
groups” in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the context of the words that accompany it.
Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to “other rebel groups” found in Proclamation No. 55, which it
cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.

b.) Lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague. Operational guidelines
will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the proclamation.

There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational
guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its
review. Any act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws should be resolved
in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as
trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.

7. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. By a review of the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of
which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the
Chief Executive of any of his power and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable
cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

8. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism,
which has a broader scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various
means by which terrorism can be committed.

Meanwhile, public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be concurrence of 1.) actual rebellion or invasion and 2.) the public
safety requirement.

In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were
directed not only against government forces or establishment but likewise against civilians and their properties.
There were bomb threats, road blockades, burning of schools and churches, hostages and killings of civilians,
forced entry of young male Muslims to the group, there were hampering of medical services and delivery of basic
services, reinforcement of government troops, among others. These particular scenarios convinced the President
that the atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

9. a.) The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect
Proclamation No. 55.

The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law. Even so, the Court’s review of the President’s
declaration of martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted
for that particular purpose.

b.) Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts of the President
done pursuant thereto. Under the operative fact doctrine,” the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an
“operative fact” before it is declared unconstitutional.

Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region. The Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are
hereby DISMISSED.

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VII. PROSPECTIVE VS. RETROACTIVE

a. Hagonoy Water Distirct v. NLRC, 165 SCRA 272, G.R. No. 81490, August 31, 1988

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; WATER UTILITY DISTRICTS; EMPLOYEES THEREOF GOVERNED BY

THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW. — The Labor Arbiter asserted jurisdiction over the alleged illegal dismissal of
private respondent Villanueva by relying on Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 198, known as the "Provincial
Water Utilities Act of 1973" which went into effect on 25 May 1973, and which provides as follows: "Exemption
from Civil Service. — The district and its employees, being engaged in a proprietary function, are hereby exempt
from the provisions of the Civil Service Law. Collective Bargaining shall be available only to personnel below
supervisory levels: Provided, however, That the total of all salaries, wages, emoluments, benefits or other
compensation paid to all employees in any month shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of average net monthly
revenue, said net revenue representing income from water sales and sewerage service charges, less pro-rata share
of debt service and expenses for fuel or energy for pumping during the preceding fiscal year." The Labor Arbiter
however failed to take into account the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1479, which went into effect on 11
June 1978. P.D. No. 1479 wiped away Section 25 of P.D. 198 quoted above, and Section 26 of P.D. 198 was
renumbered as Section 25 in the following manner: "Section 26 of the same decree [P.D.198] is hereby amended
to read as Section 25 as follows: 'Section 25. Authorization. — The district may exercise all the powers which are
expressly granted by this Title or which are necessarily implied from or incidental to the powers and purposes
herein stated. For the purpose of carrying out the objectives of this Act, a district is hereby granted the power of
eminent domain, the exercise thereof shall, however, be subject to review by the Administration.' Thus, Section
25 of P.D. 198 exempting the employees of water districts from the application of the Civil Service Law was
removed from the statute books.

2. LABOR LAW; LABOR ARBITER; PROVISIONS OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION CONFERRING

JURISDICTION OVER CASES PREVIOUSLY OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF ITS COMPETENCE; DO NOT
OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY. — We believe and so hold that the 1987 Constitution did not operate
retrospectively so as to confer jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiter to render a decision which, under the law
applicable at the time of the rendition of such decision, was clearly outside the scope of competence of the Labor
Arbiter. Thus, the respondent Commission had nothing before it which it could pass upon in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. For it is self-evident that a decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter without jurisdiction over
the case is a complete nullity, vesting no rights and imposing no liabilities.

b. Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 (1996)

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT; DECISION AND FINAL ORDERS OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN; APPEALABLE BY PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI ON PURE
QUESTIONS OF LAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT; EXCEPTIONAL
CASES. — As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 expressly provides that
"(d)ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." However, in
exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions of fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where
there was palpable error or grave misapprehension of facts by the lower court. Criminal cases elevated by
convicted public officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough treatment by this Court as criminal
cases involving ordinary citizens simply because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be overcome
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal cases, a person's life and liberty are at stake. As a petition for
review under Rule 45 is the available remedy, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 would not prosper. Basic it is
that certiorari is invocable only where there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy. TSCIEa

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED DURING INVESTIGATION

FOR THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE; ENUMERATED. — The relevant rights of an accused under
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia,as follows: "(1) Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families."
(emphasis supplied.) Obviously, the 1973 Constitution did not contain the right against an uncounselled waiver of
the right to counsel which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, above
underscored)

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3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF COUNSEL; WHEN
ADMISSIBLE. — By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver
by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel
may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of
said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit
of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. Although
a number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect,
should have been made with the assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983
when this Court, through Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile,121 SCRA 538, 554, issued the guidelines to be observed by law
enforcers during custodial investigation. The Court specifically ruled that "(t)he right to counsel may be waived
but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel."

4. ID.;JUDICIAL DECISIONS; PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF "JUDGE-MADE" LAWS UPHELD BY

THE COURT. — The prospective application of "judge-made" laws was underscored in Co vs. Court of Appeals,
227 SCRA 444, 448-449, October 28, 1993, where the Court ruled thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa that in
accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that "(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines," and Article 4 of the same Code
which states that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided," the principle of
prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves
are not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means.

5. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; DISTINGUISHED FROM PENAL LAWS. — A bill of rights is a declaration and
enumeration of the individual rights and privileges which the Constitution is designed to protect against violations
by the government, or by individuals or groups of individuals. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a
limitation upon the power of the State. Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are those imposing
punishment for an offense committed against the state which the executive of the State has the power to pardon.
In other words, a penal law denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the State for a crime or offense against
its law.

6. ID.;ID.;ARREST; IRREGULARITY THERETO IS DEEMED WAIVED BY VOLUNTARILY

SUBMITTING TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. — It is well-settled that any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be
made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for
the first time by appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on this
ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial.
Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after trial free from error.

7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT; BINDING UPON THE
SUPREME COURT. — Weighing heavily against the defense is the well-settled doctrine that findings of facts of
the trial courts — in this case, the Sandiganbayan itself — particularly in the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, is binding upon this Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error.

8. CRIMINAL LAW; BRIGANDAGE; CONSTRUED. — 'The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent
the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three
armed persons for the purpose indicated in Art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of Art.
306. It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually
committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the
organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by Art. 306. On the other hand, if
robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing
robbery or kidnapping, etc.,the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery.Simply because robbery was
committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of
brigands. In the Spanish text of Art. 306, it is required that the band 'sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar.' A
finding of brigandage or highway robbery involves not just the locus of the crime or the fact that more than three
(3) persons perpetrated it. It is essential to prove that the outlaws were purposely organized not just for one act of
robbery but for several indiscriminate commissions thereof. In the present case, there had been no evidence
presented that the accused were a band of outlaws organized for the purpose of "depredation upon the persons and
properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another." What was duly proven
in the present case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van. There was also no evidence of any previous attempts
at similar robberies by the accused to show the "indiscriminate" commission thereof.

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c. Co v. Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, 92202-03, July 30, 1991

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND

HOUSE OF SENATE; SOLE JUDGES OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND
QUALIFICATIONS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. — The Constitution explicitly provides that the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members (See Article
VI, Section 17, Constitution). The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The
use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals. The Supreme Court in the
case of Lazatin vs. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive. And that, " . . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the
power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be
reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the
exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the
same."

2. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENTS THEREOF AS A RULE BEYOND JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE; EXCEPTION;

ARBITRARY AND IMPROVIDENT USE OF POWER RESULTING TO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS. — In
the case of Robles vs. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1980]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal
are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . .
upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." In the leading case of Morrero vs. Bocar (66 Phil.
429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in
any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse
of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide (See Marcos vs.
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]). It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. As constitutional
creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of
the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs — independent of Congress and the
Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as
if it had remained originally in the legislature (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]). In passing
upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this
exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has placed it (See Veloso vs. Boards
of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]).

4. ID.; SUPREME COURT; EXPANDED JURISDICTION UNDER 1987 CONSTITUTION. — The Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions
of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within bounds
of the Constitution (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution). Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely
check whether or not the government branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view.

5. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS; HOW CONSTRUED; SPIRIT AND INTENDMENT MUST

PREVAIL. — In construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its
language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter
would result in absurdity and injustice (Casela vs. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970]). A Constitutional
provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed,
hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof (Jarrolt vs. Mabberly, 103 U.S.
580). In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuazon vs. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]); "To that primordial
intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically,
for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their
essence in their form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal . . . ."

6. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE IV OF 1987 CONSTITUTION;

CONSTRUED. — Article IV of the Constitution provides: "Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines: . . . (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
Page | 48
upon reaching the age of majority; and . . . Section 2. Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." The Court
interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after
February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino
women. To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in
an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive. The provision in question was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status
of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect
Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father
were placed in equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens. Hence, the bestowment of the
status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of
citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members. It is for this reason that the amendments
were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before
the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that
Constitution.

7. ID.; ID.; SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP;

APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE BORN OF FILIPINO MOTHER AND ALIEN FATHER BUT NOT TO ONE
WHOSE FATHER HAS BEEN NATURALIZED WHEN MINOR WAS ONLY NINE (9) YEARS OF AGE. —
There is no dispute that respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this
case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes
material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of
Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To expect
the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural
and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen
but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined
when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a
sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship in spite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969,
election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been
a citizen since he was nine years old.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) APPLIES IN CASE AT
BAR. — In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held: "Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he
came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship." The private respondent did more than
merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. For those in the peculiar
situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we
apply the In Re Mallare rule. The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who
still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.

9. ID.; ID.; AN ATTACK THERETO MAY ONLY BE DONE THROUGH A DIRECT ACTION. — The
petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature
taking of the oath of citizenship. The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of
his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son. The petitioners question the
citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisprudence, an attack on a
person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity (See Queto vs. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52
[1970]).

10. ID.; ID.; TO DECLARE THE GRANT THEREOF AS NULL AND VOID VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE WHERE PERSON INVOLVED HAS BEEN LAID TO REST. — To ask the Court to
declare that grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of
due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend
himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET: "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to
perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not rise beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend
himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case."

11. ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 17 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN SUB-PARAGRAPH 4 THEREOF IN RELATION
TO SECTION 4 OF THE PHILIPPINE BILL OF 1902, APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — Article 17 of the Civil
Page | 49
Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz: "ARTICLE 17. The following are
Spaniards: . . . (4). Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy."
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established (Article 50, NCC; Article 40,
Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig vs. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949]). Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang,
Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a
resident of Laoang, Samar. The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even
went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place where Ong Te set up his business and acquired his
real property. Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact that he
died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he
already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a
Spanish subject. If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under
the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been
defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, Vol. II). A priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a
Filipino citizen under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.

12. ID.; ID.; "RESIDENCE"; MEANING THEREOF UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. — Under the
Constitution, the term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return (Ong Huan Tin vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 966
[1967]). The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it
continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano
vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966]).

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTABLISHMENT THEREOF; OWNERSHIP OF A HOUSE NOT NECESSARY. — The
petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore,
be a resident of said place is misplaced. The properties owned by the Ong family are in the name of the private
respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of
succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co-heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names
of his parents. Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court
in the case of De los Reyes vs. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have
a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a
rented house or in that of a friend or relative.

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEMPORARY ABSENCE DOES NOT NECESSARILY CONNOTE CHANGE THEREOF;
"ANIMUS REVERTENDI" ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — It has also been settled that absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
elected, does not constitute loss of residence (Faypon vs. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]). The private respondent
stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his profession. There was no
intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home
province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.

15. ID.; ID.; PROSPECTIVE JUDICIAL RECOMMENDATION; MORE HUMANE AND LESS TECHNICAL
APPROACH TO CITIZENSHIP PROBLEMS. — Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth.
Citizenship is a special privilege which one must forever cherish. However, in order to truly revere this treasure of
citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who
qualify to share in its richness. Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization
laws only the very affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy,
sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew
how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the
naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an
applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to
citizenship problems is essential.

16. ID.; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE; CANDIDATES; PROPERTY OWNERSHIP; NOT A

QUALIFICATION. — To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet
the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the
candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run (see Maquera vs. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965]).

17. REMEDIAL LAW; BEST EVIDENCE RULE; EXCEPTION; ORIGINAL HAS BEEN LOST;
REQUIREMENTS THEREOF TO BE ADMISSIBLE; PROPERLY LAID IN CASE AT BAR. — The
petitioners' sole ground in disputing that respondent was a natural-born Filipino is that the documents presented to
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prove it were not in compliance with the best evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent
failed to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the
proceedings of the body upon which the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was predicated. On the
contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence rule. It
was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the
minutes of the plenary session of the 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be
found. This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty.
Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the
U.P. Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental
agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The execution of the
originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. The inability to produce the originals before the
HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the
inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it
be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found (see Government of P.I. vs. Martinez, 44
Phil. 817 [1918]). Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established,
the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION THEREOF; EXPANDED UNDER THE

1987 CONSTITUTION; DECISION OF HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW. — I believe that, contrary to the respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and
competence to review the questioned decision of the House Electoral Tribunal and to decide the present
controversy. Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The Constitution, it is true,
constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero vs. Bocar (66 Phil. 429),
construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provided that " . . . The Electoral Commission
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly." that: "The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such and
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, 'upon a clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law' (Barry vs. US ex rel.
Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz., 23)." And then
under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is duty-bound to
determine whether or not, in an actual controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — The present controversy, involves more than perceived
irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it
may be contended with great legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal should be final
and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional directive, made the sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The
present controversy, however, involves no less than a determination of whether the qualifications for membership
in the House of Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be
unforgivably remiss in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person,
not a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives, solely because
the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal would have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of its power
of judicial review. Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for the office of
Member of the House of Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners who, at the same time, claim that
they are entitled to the office illegally held by private respondent. From this additional direction, where one
asserts and earnestly perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable
controversy proper for this Court to consider and decide.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS. — The Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, does not assert supremacy
over it in contravention of the time-honored principle of constitutional separation of powers. The Court in this
instance simply performs a function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of interpreting, in a justiciable
controversy, the pertinent provisions of the Constitution with finality. "It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and,
when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the
three branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in
action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (the Supreme Court in Modern
Role, C.B. Sevisher, 1958, p. 36)." Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to

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determine whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a public office which is
specifically reserved by the Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.

4. ID.; CITIZENSHIP; NATURAL-BORN; REQUISITE; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — The
records show that private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen,
and Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In other words, at birth, private
respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his father was then a Chinese
citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was enforced at the time of private
respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were considered
Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens. Following the basic definition in the 1987
Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of
his birth, although from birth, private respondent had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his
mother, but only upon his reaching the age of majority.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 15 OF THE REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW (C.A. 473); DID NOT CONFER
STATUS OF NATURAL-BORN IN CASE AT BAR. — While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization
Law (C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the Philippines prior to the
naturalization of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens, this does not alter the fact that private
respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not confer upon him
the status of a natural-born citizen merely because he did not have to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
status as a Filipino citizen.

6. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; NATURE THEREOF; PRIVILEGE NOT A RIGHT. — "Naturalization is not
a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting public interest
of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor."

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION; GRANT THEREOF; APPEALABLE; OATH TAKEN BEFORE EXPIRATION OF
THE PERIOD OF APPEAL; IMPROPER. — It is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite
oath of allegiance of one who has previously obtained a decision favorable to his application for naturalization, is
appealable. It is, therefore, improper and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the issuance of said order
and before the expiration of the reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said order. In Cua Sun Ke vs.
Republic (159 SCRA 477), this Court held that: "Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as
issuance of order granting citizenship is irregular and makes the proceedings so taken null and void (Republic vs.
Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 1381)."

8. ID.; ID.; NATURAL-BORN; DEFINED AND INTERPRETED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. —
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as: "Natural-born citizens
are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution
provides that: "Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: . . . (3) Those born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority." It would appear
then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to
equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino
citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino
fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those
born to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of
the age of majority, may be made before or after 17 January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in consonance
with the fundamental purpose of the Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's individual interests,
and to foster equality among them.

9. ID.; ID.; ELECTION THEREOF; MUST BE MADE EXPRESSLY AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 625. — It is settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that election of Philippine
citizenship must be made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625, Sections 1 and 2 of the Act mandate that
the option to elect Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly, not impliedly.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE (ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 533,
SEPTEMBER 12, 1974, [59 SCRA 45]) NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The respondent tribunal
cites In re: Florencio Mallare which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
age, constituted a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as
authority for the doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship, is not applicable to the case at bar. The
respondent tribunal failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of majority in 1924, or seventeen (17)
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years before CA 625 was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years before the 1935 Constitution (which
granted the right of election) took effect.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE PROVIDED FOR UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 625 NOT
COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — The respondent tribunal erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473,
the Revised Naturalization Law, providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino citizenship by reason of
the naturalization of his father, the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him. For, assuming
arguendo that the naturalization of private respondent's father was valid, and that there was no further need for
private respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet, this did
not mean that the operation of the Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of Philippine
citizenship as contemplated by the Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship derived from one's
Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of majority, not during one's minority. There is no doubt in my
mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in
1969 or within a reasonable time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he cannot be deemed a natural-
born Filipino citizen under Sections 2 and 1 (3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.

12. ID.; ELECTION PROTEST; QUESTIONING ELIGIBILITY OF A CANDIDATE-ELECT; IN EFFECT A

QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDING; INELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE-ELECT RESULTS IN NO-CHOICE.
— Neither of the petitioners may take the place of private respondent in the House of Representatives
representing the second district of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal (176 SCRA 1), is controlling. There
we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as
mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the
election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for mayor of that City. A petition alleging
that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even if it is labelled
an election protest. It is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily to install the
protestant in his place. The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an
ineligible candidate in an election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. In such a case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity.

13. ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE BILL OF 1902; REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED THEREIN; NOT COMPLIED WITH
IN CASE AT BAR. — The "test," following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is whether or
not Ong Te, private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was "an inhabitant of the Philippines who
continued to reside therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he met these requirements of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, then, Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a Filipino citizen. Petitioners
(protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z, AA, BB,
CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the "Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show that
Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar where he is claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners
(protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal Exhibit V, a certification
of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records and Management and Archives Office, stating that the name of
Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These exhibits prove or
at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April
1899 and, therefore, could not continue residing in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to private
respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY
REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE.

14. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA; NOT APPLICABLE. — The decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in
the case of Emil L. Ong was a decision of a political body, not a court of law. And, even if we have to take such a
decision as a decision of a quasi-judicial body (i.e., a political body exercising quasi-judicial functions), said
decision in the Emil L. Ong case can not have the category or character of res judicata in the present judicial
controversy, because between the two (2) cases, there is no identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while
the other involves private respondent) and, more importantly, there is no, identity of causes of action because the
first involves the 1935 Constitution while the second involves the 1987 Constitution. As held in Lee vs.
Commissioners on Immigration (G.R. No. L-23446, 20 December 1971, 42 SCRA 561): " . . . Everytime the
citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered
as res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand."

15. ID; SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION; MUST BE ENFORCED. — It is regrettable that one (as
private respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes for the elective position of
Representative (Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the second district of Northern Samar, would
have to cease in office by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full membership of the Court had participated in
this case, with the result that the legislative district would cease to have, in the interim, a representative in the
House of Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in case of this nature is the Constitution and only
the Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that when the electorate in the second legislative district of
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 Northern Samar cast the majority of their votes for private respondent, they seemed and believed that he was fully
eligible and qualified for the office because he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and
belief can not prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the Constitution.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; AS

SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTEST RELATING TO MEMBERS THEREOF; ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
INCLUDED; BEYOND JUDICIAL INTERVENTION. — The question of citizenship is a question of fact, and
as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite agreed that the Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the membership in the
House, as follows: "Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." is the best judge of facts and this Court
can not substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows better.

2. ID.; SUPREME COURT; EXPANDED JURISDICTION THEREOF; REVIEW OF FACTS NOT

INCLUDED. — In the case of Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections (88 SCRA 251), it was held that this Court
can not review the errors of the Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all election contests) — in the
sense of reviewing facts and unearthing mistakes — and that this Court's jurisdiction is to see simply whether or
not it is guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred expanded powers
on the Court, but as the Charter states, our authority is "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." It is not to review facts.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; "GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION" DEFINED. — "Grave abuse of discretion" has been
defined as whimsical exercise of power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of due process
of law.

CHAPTER II
INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

I. BASIS, EXTENT AND LIMITATIONS

a. Article VIII, Section 1 and Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various
courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.

SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by
the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and
regularly released.

SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may
sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall
be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,

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proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case,
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case
shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary
assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

b. Rules of Court, Rules 63 and 65

RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition.
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to
consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.
Sec. 2. Parties.
All persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties; and
no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the
action.
Sec. 3. Notice on Solicitor General.
In any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or any other governmental
regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party assailing the same and shall be entitled to be heard
upon such question.
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Sec. 4. Local government ordinances.
In any action involving the validity of a local government ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of
the local governmental unit involved shall be similarly notified and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is
alleged to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard.
Sec. 5. Court action discretionary.
Except in actions falling under the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the court, motu proprio or upon
motion, may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a
decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or in any case where the
declaration or construction is not necessary and proper under the circumstances.
Sec. 6. Conversion into ordinary action.
If before the final termination of the case, a breach or violation of an instrument or a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation should take place, the action may thereupon be
converted into an ordinary action, and the parties shall be allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or
proper.

RULE 65
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.
When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus.
When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
section 3, Rule 46.
Sec. 4. Where petition filed.
The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to
be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation,
board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by
the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-
judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable
only by the Court of Appeals.
Sec. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases.
When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such
public respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and
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it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf
of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in
favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial
agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public respondents shall not
appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher
court by either party, the public respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless
otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein.
Sec. 6. Order to comment.
If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such process, the court shall issue an order requiring
the respondent or respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Such order shall be served on the respondents in such manner as the court may direct, together with a copy of the
petition and any annexes thereto.
In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provisions of section 2, Rule 56,
shall be observed. Before giving due course thereto, the court may require the respondents to file their comment
to, and not a motion to dismiss, the petition. Thereafter, the court may require the filing of a reply and such other
responsive or other pleadings as it may deem necessary and proper.
Sec. 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief.
The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case.
Sec. 8. Proceedings after comment is filed.
After the comment or other pleadings required by the court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired,
the court may hear the case or require the parties to submit memoranda. If after such hearing or submission of
memoranda or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof the court finds that the allegations of the petition
are true, it shall render judgment for the relief prayed for or to which the petitioner is entitled.
The court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
Sec. 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment.
A certified copy of the judgment rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be served upon the
court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person concerned in such manner as the court
may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or
costs awarded in accordance with section 1 of Rule 39.

c. Record of the Constitutional Commission, 434-436 (1986)

d. Endencia v. David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953) G.R. Nos. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TAXATION; INTERPRETATION OF LAWS, A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. —

The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a
judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. "Defining
and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted
to the courts by the Constitution." (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44 N.W., 2nd, 341, 342; see also 11 Am. Jur., 714-
715 and 905.) The act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the
well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

2. ID.; SEPARATION OF POWERS. — Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative
department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the
execution or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong
exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the
Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide
whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.

3. TAXATION; INCOME TAX; TAXING SALARIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS, A DIMINUTION OF

THEIR COMPENSATION AS FIXED BY LAW. — The doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer (85
Phil., 552) to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated.

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e. Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, 15 July 1936

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS. — The separation of powers is a fundamental

principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and
is supreme within its own sphere.

2. ID.; ID.; SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES. — But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of various departments of government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is 80 far made a check on the legislative power that his assent is required in the enactment of laws.
This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the
President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly.
The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other
hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a
majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for
their support, the National Assembly exercises to a certain extent control over the judicial department. The
Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the
law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL ARBITER TO ALLOCATE

CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES. — But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and
in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government.
The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes
makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERATING POWER OF THE JUDICIARY IS GRANTED, IF NOT EXPRESSLY, BY
CLEAR IMPLICATION. — As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide,
that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions
and limitations are transcended, it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism
by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for, then, the distribution of powers
would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government
mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in the Constitution are real as they
should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries.
In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII
of our Constitution.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT IS MEANT BY "JUDICIAL SUPREMACY". — The Constitution is a definition of the
powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself
has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW LIMITED TO ACTUAL LITIGATION; WISDOM, JUSTICE OR
EXPEDIENCY OF LEGISLATION. — Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
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dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is
in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments not only because the
Legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SYSTEM ITSELF NOT THE CHIEF PALLADIUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY;
SUCCESS MUST BE TESTED IN THE CRUCIBLE OF FILIPINO MINDS AND HEARTS. — But much as we
might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be
remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional
liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready
to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the last and ultimate
analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of
Filipino minds and hearts than in the consultation rooms and court chambers.

8. ID.; OUR CONSTITUTION HAS ADOPTED THE AMERICAN TYPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL

GOVERNMENT. — Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the
framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given
effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American example,
provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret
the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of
direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of
Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (article 81,
chapter IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions
are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South
Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak
Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial
constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws.

9. ID.; JURISDICTION OVER THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION. — The nature of the present controversy
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies
created by the Constitution. If the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, a void would be created in our
constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework. Natura vacuum
abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy
for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly."

10. ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION; CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT OF POWER TO THE

ELECTORAL COMMISSION TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE
ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. — The
original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the
rule that the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken
from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be
the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August
29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate
and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of
their elective members, . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred
upon each House of the Legislature over the particular cases therein specified. This court has had occasion to
characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear
and complete". (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)

11. ELECTORAL COMMISSION; HISTORICAL INSTANCES. — The transfer of the power of determining the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an
independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement
of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the
High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved
successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 &
32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s.
2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51], s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act,
1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada,
election contests which were originally heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in
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the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by
each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against
the election of members of the Upper House of Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law
22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution
of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or
National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the
German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art.
19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43) all provide for an Electoral
Commission.

12. ID.; ELECTORAL COMMISSION IN THE UNITED STATES. — The creation of an Electoral Commission
whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United
States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by
each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency,
Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229),
creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected
by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four
designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting
separately. Although there is not much moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this regard,
the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.

13. ID.; ID.; FAMILIARITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION WITH THE
HISTORY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD; ELECTORAL
COMMISSION IS THE EXPRESSION OF THE WISDOM AND ULTIMATE JUSTICE OF THE PEOPLE. —
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men
mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political
development of other countries of the world. When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral
Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only
in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the
world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our
Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its
creation, the plan was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the
approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and
"ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE WAS TO TRANSFER IN ITS TOTALITY POWER EXERCISED PREVIOUSLY
BY THE LEGISLATURE OVER THE CONTESTED ELECTIONS OF THE MEMBERS TO AN
INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL. — From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it
is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the Legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need
of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through
their delegates to the Convention to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in
view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan
influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court.

15. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS AN INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL

CREATION ALTHOUGH FOR PURPOSES OF CLASSIFICATION IT IS CLOSER TO THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT THAN TO ANY OTHER. — The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested
with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it
by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the
legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (sec. 4) creating the Electoral Commission
under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its composition is also
significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the Legislature. But it is a body separate from and
independent of the Legislature.

16. ID.; ID; ID.; GRANT OF POWER TO THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION INTENDED TO BE AS
COMPLETE AND UNIMPAIRED AS IF IT HAD REMAINED ORIGINALLY IN THE LEGISLATURE. —
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the Legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an
implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon
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the legislative power as an express prohibition in the constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.
Whisman, 33 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If the power claimed for the National Assembly to regulate the
proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the Electoral Commission to lay down a period
within which protest should be filed were conceded, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective.
The Electoral Commission in such a case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases
involving the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all
times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our
Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority
would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be
presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but
in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and wherever the National
Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our
Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably
lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by
indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be
permitted.

17. ID.; ID.; ID; ID.; THE POWER TO PROMULGATE INCIDENTAL RULES AND REGULATIONS
LODGED ALSO IN THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION. — The creation of
the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general
power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In
the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before
the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
exercise of its exclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.

18. ID; ID.; ID.; POSSIBILITY OF ABUSE NO ARGUMENT AGAINST GRANT OF POWER. — The
possibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not
susceptible of abuse. If any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in
investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes
of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. The
people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive
determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as it has given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases
entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve
specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action
must be deemed to be animated with same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were
created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired
in given instances, is inherent in the imperfections of human institutions. From the fact that the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts,
however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenged in appropriate cases over which the courts may
exercise jurisdiction.

19. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTS OF THE CASE; EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS. — The Commonwealth
Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions
mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on
November 25, of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner was approved by that body
on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent against the election of the petitioner was filed on
December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized
but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a
resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National
Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National
Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized. As a matter of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives division of
the National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of
the Supreme Court and the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were
respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1936. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the
time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it
still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases — had already barred the presentation of protests
before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be
followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not
have been contemplated, and should be avoided.
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20. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CAN NOT DEPRIVE THE
ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF ITS AUTHORITY TO FIX THE TIME WITHIN WHICH PROTESTS
AGAINST THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE FILED. — Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of
members against whom no protests has been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1936, can not be
construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good
reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of members of the Legislature at the time the power to decide
election contests was still lodged in the Legislature, confirmation alone by the Legislature cannot be construed as
depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix
the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its
members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. Confirmation of
the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member.
As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-
elect to a seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules
of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

21. ID.; EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION UNDER THE JONES LAW. — Under the practice prevailing when the
Jones Law was still in force, each House of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests against the
election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law
making each House the sole judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law
(sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each House respectively to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of
filing contest the election of members of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for
the filing of protests had already expired, each House passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of
such members against whose election no protest had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as
cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad
vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, p. 89; Urgello vs. Rama [Third
District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record
— First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record
— First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record — First
Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has expressly repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act
No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power
to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law
nor constitutional provision which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on
December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the National
Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.

f. Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 15 September 1989

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE'S COUNTRY, NOT

AMONG THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED. — The right to return to one's country is not among the rights
specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO RETURN CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW. — It is the court's well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as
a generally accepted principle of international law and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art.
II Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]

3. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO RETURN, DISTINCT AND SEPARATE FROM THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL. — It is
distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

4. ID.; ALLOCATION OF POWER IN THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT A GRANT OF ALL

THE POWERS INHERENT THERETO. — As the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)]
pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial
power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.] If
this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of
more than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally
be said of the executive power which is vested in one official — the President.

5. ID.; PRESIDENT'S POWER UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; EXTENT AND LIMITATION. —
Consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are
essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987
Constitution. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
Page | 62
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

6. ID.; PRESIDENT'S RESIDUAL POWER TO PROTECT THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE;
THE POWERS INVOLVED. — The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore
Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the
Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary
powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace
and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision.

7. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO

THE PHILIPPINES; TO BE TREATED AS ADDRESSED TO THE RESIDUAL UNSTATED POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT. — The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot
be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to
travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely
similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a
broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

8. ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; POWER TO DETERMINE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION ON ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. — The present
Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen
the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them.
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is
being questioned.

9. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; DENIAL OF REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO

RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES, NOT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — We find that from the
pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners
and respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision. The documented history
of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia
bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the
violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos. With these before her, the President cannot be said to
have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a
serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: dissenting:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; ITS PROVISIONS PROTECT ALL MEN, AT ALL TIMES
AND UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. — "The Constitution . . . is a law for rulers and people, equally in war
and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than
that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government." (Ex Parte Milligan,
4 Wall. 2; 18 L. Ed. 281 [1866]).

2. ID.; POLITICAL QUESTIONS; OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL DETERMINATION. — It is a well-

settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power
to deal with such questions has been conferred on the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions.

3. ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED. — It is not so easy, however, to define the phrase political question, nor to determine
what matters fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the
judicial power. More properly, however, it means those questions which, under the constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government.

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4. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL POWER VESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN THE PRESIDENT OR CONGRESS,
BEYOND PROHIBITION OR EXAMINATION BY THE COURT REQUIRED FOR ITS EXISTENCE. — For
a political question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the President or
Congress, the exercise of which the court should not examine or prohibit. A claim of plenary or inherent power
against a civil right which claim is not found in a specific provision is dangerous. Neither should we validate a
roving commission allowing public officials to strike where they please and to override everything which to them
represents evil. The entire Government is bound by the rule of law. The authority implied in Section 6 of the Bill
of Rights itself does not exist because no law has been enacted specifying the circumstances when the right may
be impaired in the interest of national security or public safety. The power is in Congress, not the Executive.

5. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; RIGHT TO TRAVEL INCLUDES RIGHT TO
TRAVEL OUT OF OR BACK TO THE PHILIPPINES. — Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states categorically that
the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon a
lawful order of a court. Not by an executive officer. Not even by the President. Section 6 further provides that the
right to travel, and this obviously includes the right to travel out of or back into the Philippines, cannot be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

6. ID.; POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE NO LONGER UTILIZED BY THE COURT; COURT

COMPELLED TO DECIDE THE CASE UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. — The framers of the
Constitution believed that the free use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years
to fall back on prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of consequences or a fear
that it was extravagantly extending judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and strike down an
exercise of authoritarian power. Parenthetically, at least two of the respondents and their counsel were among the
most vigorous critics of Mr. Marcos (the main petitioner) and his use of the political question doctrine. The
Constitution was accordingly amended. We are now precluded by its mandate from refusing to invalidate a
political use of power through a convenient resort to the political question doctrine. We are compelled to decide
what would have been non-justiceable under our decisions interpreting earlier fundamental charters.

7. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; DENIAL A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. —
We do not have to look into the factual bases of the ban Marcos policy in order to ascertain whether or not the
respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion. Nor are we forced to fall back upon judicial notice of the
implications of a Marcos return to his home to buttress a conclusion. In the first place, there has never been a
pronouncement by the President that a clear and present danger to national security and public safety will arise if
Mr. Marcos and his family are allowed to return to the Philippines. It was only after the present petition was filed
that the alleged danger to national security and public safety conveniently surfaced in the respondents' pleadings.
Secondly, President Aquino herself limits the reason for the ban Marcos policy to (1) national welfare and interest
and (2) the continuing need to preserve the gains achieved in terms of recovery and stability. Neither ground
satisfies the criteria of national security and public safety. The "confluence theory" of the Solicitor General or
what the majority calls "catalytic effect," which alone sustains the claim of danger to national security is fraught
with perilous implications. Any difficult problem or any troublesome person can be substituted for the Marcos
threat as the catalysing factor. It was precisely the banning by Mr. Marcos of the right to travel by Senators
Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores of other "undesirables" and "threats to national security" during
that unfortunate period which led the framers of our present Constitution not only to re-enact but to strengthen the
declaration of this right.

g. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R No. 141284, 15 August 2000

The President of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines
to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. In compliance with the
presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of
Instruction 02/2000 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force
Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of
Metro Manila. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The
President also declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature
and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the
Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that the deployment of marines in Metro Manila is
violative of the Constitution because no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify, even only
remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work; hence, said deployment in derogation of Article
II, Section 3 of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in
Page | 64
his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court,
thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own. It does not, however, prevent
an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the
President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon
the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The petition failed to discharge
such heavy burden as there was no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling
out the armed forces nor was grave abuse committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as
to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of the Court's
duty of "purposeful hesitation" before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President's judgment and to doubt is to
sustain. The Court also ruled that the calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself,
which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines' authority. It is noteworthy that the local police
forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. Under
the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. It cannot be properly argued
then that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist
the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an "insidious
incursion" of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution.

1. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; PETITIONER

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE REQUISITES OF LEGAL
STANDING IN CASE AT BAR; PETITIONER HAS NOT SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED A DIRECT
AND PERSONAL INJURY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE QUESTIONED ACT. — The IBP primarily
anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this
declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP
of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the
resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to
elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be
affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the
IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present
action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue.
Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown
any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none
of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation
of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil
liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed
"militarization" of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more
harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too
vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not
successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess
the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not
categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The
IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial
resolution of the controversy.

2. ID.; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT; THE PRESIDENT DID NOT
COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CALLING OUT THE MARINES. — When the President
calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of
the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its
own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the
constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the
armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual
basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion
that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the
proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to
violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Court's
duty of purposeful hesitation" before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such
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grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President's judgment. To doubt is to
sustain.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; GROUNDS FOR THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENSION OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; SAID CONDITIONS ARE NOT REQUIRED IN THE CASE OF THE POWER
OF THE PRESIDENT TO CALL OUT THE ARMED FORCES. — Under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose
martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety
must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the Armed Forces. The only
criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide
latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF NECESSITY FOR POWER TO CALL OUT ARMED FORCES IF
SUBJECTED TO UNFETTERED JUDICIAL SCRUTINY COULD BE A VERITABLE PRESCRIPTION FOR
DISASTER, AS SUCH POWER MAY BE UNDULY STRAITJACKETED BY AN INJUNCTION OR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER EVERY TIME IT IS EXERCISED. — The President as Commander-
in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly
confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly
and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present
situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The
determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a
veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary
restraining order every time it is exercised. Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his
judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the
petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the President's exercise of judgment
deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CIVILIAN
SUPREMACY CLAUSE NOR DOES IT INFRINGE THE CIVILIAN CHARACTER OF THE POLICE
FORCE. — The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes
and bounds of the Marines' authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the
visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the
overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to
brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and
render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:

POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; THE ACT OF THE
PRESIDENT IN SIMPLY CALLING ON THE ARMED FORCES, AN EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE, TO
ASSIST THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE IN "JOINT VISIBILITY PATROLS" DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT WOULD WARRANT AN EXERCISE BY THE
COURT OF ITS EXTRAORDINARY POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW. — The term grave abuse of discretion
is long understood in our jurisprudence as being, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise
of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Minus the not-so-unusual exaggerations often invoked by
litigants in the duel of views, the act of the President in simply calling on the Armed Forces of the Philippines, an
executive prerogative, to assist the Philippine National Police in "joint visibility patrols" in the metropolis does
not, I believe, constitute grave abuse of discretion that would now warrant an exercise by the Supreme Court of its
extraordinary power as so envisioned by the fundamental law. HSTAcI

PUNO, J., separate opinion:

1. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; CONDITIONS THAT

MUST BE MET BEFORE THE PRESIDENT, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, MAY CALL OUT THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; SAID CONDITIONS DEFINE THE PARAMETERS OF THE
CALLING OUT POWER AND WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAID
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PARAMETERS IS A JUSTIFIABLE ISSUE AND NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION. — It is clear from Section
18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the
Philippines, may call out the armed forces subject to two conditions: (1) whenever it becomes necessary; and (2)
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Undeniably, these conditions lay down the sine qua
requirement for the exercise of the power and the objective sought to be attained by the exercise of the power.
They define the constitutional parameters of the calling out power. Whether or not there is compliance with these
parameters is a justiciable issue and is not a political question. I am not unaware that in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Bernas opined that the President's exercise of the "calling out power,"
unlike the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law, is not a
justiciable issue but a political question and therefore not subject to judicial review. It must be borne in mind,
however, that while a member's opinion expressed on the floor of the Constitutional Convention is valuable, it is
not necessarily expressive of the people's intent. The proceedings of the Convention are less conclusive on the
proper construction of the fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute,
for in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature the courts seek, while in the former, courts seek to arrive at
the intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives. The conventional
wisdom is that the Constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed it, but from the people
who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; IT MAY BE CONCEDED THAT THE EXERCISE OF THE CALLING OUT POWER MAY
BE A "LESSER POWER" COMPARED TO THE POWER TO SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE POWER TO DECLARE MARTIAL LAW, STILL ITS EXERCISE
CANNOT BE LEFT TO ABSOLUTE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, AS COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES, AS ITS IMPACT ON THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE PROTECTED BY
THE CONSTITUTION CANNOT BE DOWNGRADED. — It is true that the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution expressly gives the Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual
bases used by the President in the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the declaration of
martial law. It does not follow, however, that just because the same provision did not grant to this Court the power
to review the exercise of the calling out power by the President, ergo, this Court cannot pass upon the validity of
its exercise. Given the light of our constitutional history, this express grant of power merely means that the Court
cannot decline the exercise of its power because of the political question doctrine as it did in the past. In fine, the
express grant simply stresses the mandatory duty of this Court to check the exercise of the commander-in-chief
powers of the President. It eliminated the discretion of the Court not to wield its power of review thru the use of
the political question doctrine. It may be conceded that the calling out power may be a "lesser power" compared
to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law. Even then,
its exercise cannot be left to the absolute discretion of the Chief Executive as Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces, as its impact on the rights of our people protected by the Constitution cannot be downgraded. We cannot
hold that acts of the commander-in-chief cannot be reviewed on the ground that they have lesser impact on the
civil and political rights of our people. The exercise of the calling out power may be "benign" in the case at bar
but may not be so in future cases. THaCAI

MENDOZA, J., concurring and dissenting:

1. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; JUDGMENT ON THE

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER MUST AWAIT AN ACTUAL CASE INVOLVING
REAL PARTIES WITH "INJURIES" TO SHOW AS A RESULT OF THE OPERATION OF THE
CHALLENGED EXECUTIVE DECISION. — I submit that judgment on the substantive constitutional issues
raised by petitioner must await an actual case involving real parties with "injuries" to show as a result of the
operation of the challenged executive action. While as an organization for the advancement of the rule of law
petitioner has an interest in upholding the Constitution, its interest is indistinguishable from the interest of the rest
of the citizenry and falls short of that which is necessary to give petitioner standing. As I have indicated
elsewhere, a citizens' suit challenging the constitutionality of governmental action requires that (1) the petitioner
must have suffered an "injury in fact" of an actual or imminent nature; (2) there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action by this Court. The "injury in fact" test requires more than injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the
party seeking review be himself among those injured. My insistence on compliance with the standing requirement
is grounded in the conviction that only a party injured by the operation of the governmental action challenged is in
the best position to aid the Court in determining the precise nature of the problem presented. Many a time we have
adverted to the power of judicial review as an awesome power not to be exercised save in the most exigent
situation. For, indeed, sound judgment on momentous constitutional questions is not likely to be reached unless it
is the result of a clash of adversary arguments which only parties with direct and specific interest in the outcome
of the controversy can make. This is true not only when we strike down a law or official action but also when we
uphold it. ESTDIA

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECT OF MILITARY PRESENCE IN MALLS AND
COMMERCIAL CENTERS, I.E., WHETHER SUCH PRESENCE IS COERCIVE OR BENIGN. — In this case,

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because of the absence of parties with real and substantial interest to protect, we do not have evidence on the
effect of military presence in malls and commercial centers, i.e., whether such presence is coercive or benign. We
do not know whether the presence of so many marines and policemen scares shoppers, tourists, and peaceful
civilians, or whether it is reassuring to them. To be sure, the deployment of troops to such places is not like
parading them at the Luneta on Independence Day. Neither is it, however, like calling them out because of actual
fighting or the outbreak of violence. We need to have evidence on these questions because, under the
Constitution, the President's power to call out the armed forces in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion is subject to the limitation that the exercise of this power is required in the interest of public safety.

h. Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014

The Court notes that the initial or original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was grounded on
Jardeleza’s “inability to discharge the duties of his office”. The records bear that Chief Justice Sereno initially
invoked the “unanimity rule”during the JBC meeting where she expressed her position that Jardeleza did not
possess the integrity required to be a member of the Court. The Court cannot consider Chief Justice Sereno’s
invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as conformably within the contemplation of the rule. What this
disposition perceives, therefore, is the inapplicability of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the original ground of
its invocation. When an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a
judicial post becomes “unanimous”instead of the “majority vote”.

Considering that JBC-009 employs the term “integrity”as an essential qualification for appointment, and its
doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all the members of
the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that “integrity”as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. The
crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due process in JBCproceedings. The Court concludes that the
right to due process is available and thereby demandable as a matter of right.The Court does not brush aside the
unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. The fact that a proceeding is sui generis and is impressed with
discretion, however, does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process. Disciplinary
proceedings are actually aimed to verify and finally determine, if a lawyer charged is still qualified to benefit from
the rights and privileges that membership in the legal profession evoke.

The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the
observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfilment of the duty of JBC to recommend.
This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the
precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. Having been able to secure four (4)
out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to propound is that a majority of the members of the JBC,
nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice and this grants him a rightful spot
in the shortlist submitted to the President.

i. Saturnino Ocampo v. Executive Secretary Medialdea, G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016

Ocampo, et al. invoked Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II; Sec. 17 of Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art.
XIV; Sec. 1 of Art. XI; and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution. While the Constitution is a product of our
collective history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about
anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.

Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing. The
reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced
from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade “into the uncharted ocean of
social and economic policy making.” In the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing
provision. The Court also found the reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the
Constitution to be misplaced, with such provisions bearing no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos’ interment
at the LNMB. The Court also found no violation of President Duterte’s mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the
Constitution to take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law.

Ocampo, et al. also invoked RA 289, which authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the burial place
of the mortal remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes and patriots, as well as a Board on
National Pantheon to implement the said law. Ocampo, et al. are mistaken. Both in their pleadings and during the
oral arguments, they miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that the LNMB
and the National Pantheon are one and the same. To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any
funds for its construction or the creation of the Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative
will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a singular interment place for the mortal remains of all
Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.

Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, Ocampo, et al.'s allegations must fail. To apply
the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero" would be violative of public
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policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains resting therein, and
infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant
of authority to the President under existing laws and regulations.

Ocampo, et al. also invoked RA 10368, modifiying AFP Regulations G-161-375, which they interpreted as
implicitly disqualifying Marcos’ burial at the LNMB because the legislature, a co-equal branch of the
government, has statutorily declared his tyranny as a deposed dictator and has recognized the heroism and
sacrifices of the Human Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs).

Ocampo, et al. argued that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the rights of the HRVVs to “full” and
“effective” reparation, provided under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, and the Updated Set
of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity.

When the Filipinos regained their democratic institutions after the successful People Power Revolution that
culminated on February 25, 1986, the three branches of the government have done their fair share to respect,
protect and fulfill the country's human rights obligations. The 1987 Constitution contains provisions that promote
and protect human rights and social justice. As to judicial remedies, aside from the writs of habeas corpus,
amparo, and habeas data, the Supreme Court promulgated AO No. 25-2007, which provides rules on cases
involving extra-judicial killings of political ideologists and members of the media. On the part of the Executive
Branch, it issued a number of administrative and executive orders. Congress has passed several laws affecting
human rights.

Contrary to Ocampo, et al.’s postulation, our nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of
President Duterte, acting through the Enriquez, et al., to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether Ocampo, et al. admit
it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the
present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and popularization of our
history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective endeavor of every freedom-
loving citizen of this country.

Under AFP Regulations G-161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor
Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c) Secretaries of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of Staff,
AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active
draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in
combat operations or combat related activities; (g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined
the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (i)
Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or reinternment
has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and g) Former
Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of Former Presidents,
Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff.

Similar to AFP Regulations G-161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel
who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized personnel who were
convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude. In the absence of any executive issuance or
law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G-161-375 remains to be the sole authority in determining who are
entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered to do so, former
Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial
Law, did not revise the rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB.

It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue that the word "bayani" in
the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism of heroism may attach to the LNMB as a national
shrine for military memorial, the same does not automatically attach to its feature as a military cemetery and to
those who were already laid or will be laid therein. Whether or not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is
unwarranted and should be restricted in order to be consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB is
immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active
military service and military-related activities. Ocampo, et al. did not dispute that Marcos was a former President
and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a
Medal of Valor awardee.

For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, the Court may disregard Marcos as a President and
Commander-in-Chief, but the Court cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he
held or the awards he received. In this sense, the Court agreed with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed
and judged in his totality as a person. While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a
human who erred like us.
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Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications stated in AFP
Regulations G-161-375. He was neither convicted by final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor
dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active military service. Despite ostensibly persuasive arguments
as to gross human rights violations, massive graft and corruption, and dubious military records, the 1986 popular
uprising as a clear sign of Marcos’ discharge from the AFP, the fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by
final judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. The various cases cited by Ocampo, et al., which were
decided with finality by courts here and abroad, have no bearing in this case since they are merely civil in nature;
hence, cannot and do not establish moral turpitude.

To the Court’s mind, the word "service" should be construed as that rendered by a military person in the AFP,
including civil service, from the time of his/her commission, enlistment, probation, training or drafting, up to the
date of his/her separation or retirement from the AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and retirement from
the AFP is outside the context of "service" under AFP Regulations G-161-375. Hence, it cannot be conveniently
claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the EDSA Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable
separation, reversion or discharge from the military service.

Not being a military person who may be prosecuted before the court martial, the President can hardly be deemed
"dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as contemplated by AFP Regulations G-161-375.
Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-constitutional and direct sovereign act of the
people which is beyond the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere administrative regulation. It is undeniable
that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people through the so-called EDSA Revolution. Said
political act of the people should not be automatically given a particular legal meaning other than its obvious
consequence - that of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead the Court to the treacherous and
perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious inferences or theories arising from the various acts of
the people.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing provision of the
Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn,
by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former
President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the
incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his predecessors,
and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most
effective in carrying out his mandate.

Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use and for specific
public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved land shall remain subject to the
specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At present, there is no law or
executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the use it was originally
intended by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President
and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, military personnel, a veteran, and a
Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the public
use requirement.

Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over Ocampo, et al.'s highly disputed
factual allegation that, in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually
motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses.

Conclusion

In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to check and override an
act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. Truly, the President's discretion is not totally unfettered.
"Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is reined in to keep it from
straying. In its classic formulation, 'discretion is not unconfined and vagrant' but 'canalized within banks that keep
it from overflowing."' At bar, President Duterte, through Enriquez, et al., acted within the bounds of the law and
jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the call of human rights advocates, the Court must uphold what is legal and just.
And that is not to deny Marcos of his rightful place at the LNMB. For even the framers of our Constitution intend
that full respect for human rights is available at any stage of a person's development, from the time he or she
becomes a person to the time he or she leaves this earth.

There are certain things that are better left for history - not this Court - to adjudge. The Court could only do so
much in accordance with the clearly established rules and principles. Beyond that, it is ultimately for the people
themselves, as the sovereign, to decide, a task that may require the better perspective that the passage of time
provides. In the meantime, the country must move on and let this issue rest.

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j. Rep. Edcel Lagman, et al. v. Executive Secretary Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

1. The Court agrees that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui
generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections
1 and 5 of Article VIII. The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a
complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.

2. a.) In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should
look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the
Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President
could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the
situation. To require him otherwise would impede the process of his decision-making.

b.) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution shows that the President’s power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the
requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to
common sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego.
Only on the President can exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.

c.) As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since
the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there
is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or
available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension which facts or information are found
in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the
situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be
from the present depends on the President.

3. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the
ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. The power to review by the Court and the power to
revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly,
they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation.

4. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2)
public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to
believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.

The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in determining the existence of either
invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most
practical and most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of
rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. To require him to satisfy a higher
standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers.

5. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the President’s decision of which
among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion
into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially,
lies with the President.

6. a.) Inclusion of “other rebel groups ” does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague. The term “other rebel
groups” in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the context of the words that accompany it.
Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to “other rebel groups” found in Proclamation No. 55, which it
cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.

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 b.) Lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague. Operational guidelines
will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the proclamation.

There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational
guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its
review. Any act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws should be resolved
in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as
trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.

7. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. By a review of the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of
which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the
Chief Executive of any of his power and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable
cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

8. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism,
which has a broader scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various
means by which terrorism can be committed.

Meanwhile, public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be concurrence of 1.) actual rebellion or invasion and 2.) the public
safety requirement.

In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were
directed not only against government forces or establishment but likewise against civilians and their properties.
There were bomb threats, road blockades, burning of schools and churches, hostages and killings of civilians,
forced entry of young male Muslims to the group, there were hampering of medical services and delivery of basic
services, reinforcement of government troops, among others. These particular scenarios convinced the President
that the atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

9. a.) The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect
Proclamation No. 55.

The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law. Even so, the Court’s review of the President’s
declaration of martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted
for that particular purpose.

b.) Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts of the President
done pursuant thereto. Under the operative fact doctrine,” the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an
“operative fact” before it is declared unconstitutional.

Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region. The Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are
hereby DISMISSED.

II. REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

a. Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017

The question of constitutionality of a governmental action is raised, the judicial power that the courts exercise is
likewise identified as the power of judicial review– the power to review the constitutionality of the actions of
other branches of government. As a rule, as required by the hierarchy of courts principle, these cases are filed with
the lowest court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. The judicial review that the courts undertake requires:
1) there be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

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2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

The lower court’s decision under the constitutional scheme reaches the Supreme Court through the appeal
process, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In the present case, the
KOR elevated this case immediately to this Court in an original petition for injunction which we later on treated
as one for mandamus under Rule 65. There is, however, no clear legal duty on the City of Manila to consider the
provisions of Ordinance No. 8119 for applications for permits to build outside the protected areas of the Rizal
Park. Even if there were such legal duty, the determination of whether the City of Manila failed to abide by this
legal duty would involve factual matters which have not been admitted or established in this case. Establishing
factual matters is not within the realm of this Court. Findings of fact are the province of the trial courts.

b. Hon. Philip Aguinaldo v. President Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016

The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary. It is a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, intended to rid
the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities.

It is apparent from the CONCOM deliberations that nomination by the JBC shall be a qualification for
appointment to the Judiciary, but this only means that the President cannot appoint an individual who is not
nominated by the JBC.

It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's
power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the
vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by
the JBC, the appointment is valid.

Moreover, in the case at bar, there were six simultaneous vacancies for the position of Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice, and the JBC cannot, by clustering of the nominees, designate a numerical order of seniority of the
prospective appointees. The Sandiganbayan, a collegiate court, is composed of a Presiding Justice and 20
Associate Justices divided into seven divisions, with three members each. The numerical order of the seniority or
order of preference of the 20 Associate Justices is determined pursuant to law by the date and order of their
commission or appointment by the President.

This is clear under Section 1, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, which reads:Sec. 1. Sandiganbayan;
composition; qualifications; tenure; removal and compensation. - x x xx x x xThe Presiding Justice shall be so
designated in his commission and the other Justices shall have precedence according to the dates of their
respective commissions, or, when the commissions of two or more of them shall bear the same date, according to
the order in which their commissions have been issued by the President.

Consistent with the foregoing, Rule II, Section 1(b) of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan similarly
provides:Sec. 1. Composition of the Court and Rule on Precedence.-x x x x(b) Rule on Precedence - The
Presiding Justice shall enjoy precedence over the other members of the Sandiganbayan in all official functions.
The Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the order of their appointments.

Apropos herein is the following ruling of the Court in Re: Seniority Among the Four (4) Most Recent
Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,[50] which involved the Court of
Appeals, another collegiate court:

In other words, the earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the more senior he/she is over the other
subsequent appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more appointees bear the same date that the
order of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material.

Evidently, based on law, rules, and jurisprudence, the numerical order of the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices
cannot be determined until their actual appointment by the President.

It bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint members of a collegiate court, such as the
Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed members
by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members' appointment or commission papers.

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There is also a legal ground why the simultaneous vacant positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice should not
each be assigned a specific number by the JBC. The Sandiganbayan Associate Justice positions were created
without any distinction as to rank in seniority or order of preference in the collegiate court. The President appoints
his choice nominee to the post of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, but not to a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
position with an identified rank, which is automatically determined by the order of issuance of appointment by the
President. The appointment does not specifically pertain to the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, or 21st Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice, because the Sandiganbayan Associate Justice's ranking is temporary and changes every time a
vacancy occurs in said collegiate court.

Furthermore, the JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six clusters, one for every vacancy, could influence
the appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate of recommending qualified nominees to the President.
Clustering impinges upon the President's power of appointment, as well as restricts the chances for appointment
of the qualified nominees, because (1) the President's option for every vacancy is limited to the five to seven
nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the President has appointed from one cluster, then he is proscribed from
considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. The said limitations are utterly without
legal basis and in contravention of the President's appointing power.

Additionally, in 1995, when Republic Act No. 7975 increased the divisions in the Sandiganbayan from three to
five, which similarly created six simultaneous vacant positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, the JBC, with
then Supreme Court Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa as Chairman, submitted a single list of nominees from
which former President Fidel V. Ramos subsequently chose his six appointees.

nce more, on November 23, 2009, the JBC, then headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Puno),
submitted to former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) a single list of nominees for two
vacant positions of Supreme Court Associate Justice, from which President Macapagal-Arroyo ultimately
appointed Associate Justices Jose P. Perez and Jose C. Mendoza.

And, as mentioned by the OSG, the JBC, during the Chairmanship of Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona, submitted to President Aquino on June 21, 2011 just one list of nominees for two vacant positions of
Supreme Court Associate Justice, from which President Aquino eventually appointed Associate Justices
Bienvenido L. Reyes and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.

There is no explanation for the shift in practice by the JBC, which impaired the power of the President to appoint
under the 1987 Constitution and his statutory authority to determine seniority in a collegiate court. The clustering
by the JBC of the qualified nominees for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice appears to have
been done arbitrarily, there being no clear basis, standards, or guidelines for the same. The number of nominees
was not even equally distributed among the clusters.In view of the foregoing, President Aquino validly exercised
his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into
six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices.

President Aquino merely maintained the well-established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential
constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37 qualified
nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list.

The ruling of the Court in this case shall similarly apply to the situation wherein there are closely successive
vacancies in a collegiate court, to which the President shall make appointments on the same occasion, regardless
of whether the JBC carried out combined or separate application process/es for the vacancies. The President is not
bound by the clustering of nominees by the JBC and may consider as one the separate shortlists of nominees
concurrently submitted by the JBC.

Article VIII, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution gives the JBC the principal function of "recommending
appointees to the Judiciary," but it also explicitly states that the JBC shall be "under the supervision of the Court"
and that "[i]t may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it."

The Court also provided the following definition of supervision in the Jardeleza Decision[59]:As a meaningful
guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the
authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the
conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are
followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace
them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules.
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They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to
see to it that the rules are followed.

"Supervision" is differentiated from "control," thus:Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power
of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body. Officers in
control lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order
the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover
such authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down
such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
the work done or re-done to conform to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of
the act.[60] (Citations omitted.)

The Court had recognized that "[s]upervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not
without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power
real and effective."

c. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, 5 October
2010

Judicial review is proper to determine whether a statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness. It is so when
it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as applied” challenge. “Facial”
challenge is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual
operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. Under no case may ordinary penal
statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. If facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of
crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible.

d. Penafrancia Sugar Mills v. Sugar Regulatory Administration, G.R. No. 208660, 5 March 2014

Judicial review will not be used by the Court when the case or the issue is already moot and academic. A case or
issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In
such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the
ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal
effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.

e. Mendoza v. Familara, G.R. No. 191017, 15 November 2011

Barangay elections; three-consecutive term limit rule. Mendoza was a candidate for Barangay Captain of
Barangay Balatasan, Oriental Mindoro, in the 29 October 2007 Barangay Elections. Prior thereto, Mendoza had
been elected as Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan for three consecutive terms, on 9 May 1994, 12 May
1997 and 15 July 2002. On 26 October 2007, respondent Senen C. Familara (Familara) filed a Petition to
Disqualify Mendoza averring that Mendoza, under Section 2 of RA No. 9164, is ineligible to run again for
Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, having been elected and having served in the same position for three
consecutive terms immediately prior to the 2007 Barangay Elections. When the case was brought to the Supreme
Court, one of the issues Mendoza raised was the constitutionality of the retroactive application to the 1994
Barangay Elections of the three-consecutive term limit rule. The Supreme Court held that the issue has already
been settled in the case of COMELEC v. Cruz. The Court reiterated that no retroactive application was made
because the three-term limit has been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the
1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the Local Government Code and can still be found in the
current law.

f. Kilosbayan v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, 17 July 1995

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; "LAW OF THE CASE"; DOCTRINE APPLICABLE ONLY WHEN A CASE
IS BEFORE A COURT A SECOND TIME AFTER A RULING BY AN APPELLATE COURT. — Petitioners
argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of "law of the case." We do not think
this doctrine is applicable considering the fact that while this case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not its
continuation. The doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate
court.

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2. ID.;ID.;ID.;DEFINITION. — "Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal.
More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court.

3. ID.;ID.;"LAW OF THE CASE" DIFFERENTIATED FROM RES JUDICATA.— As this Court explained in
another case, "The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of an appellate court, merely expresses the
practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. It differs from res judicata in that the
conclusiveness of the first judgment is not dependent upon its finality. The first judgment is generally, if not
universally, not final. It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent
proceedings in the same case." (Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals,93 SCRA 503, 521 [1979])

4. ID.; ID.; "LAW OF THE CASE"; DOCTRINE WILL NOT APPLY WHERE THE PARTIES ARE THE
SAME BUT THE CASES ARE DIFFERENT. — It follows that since the present case is not the same one
litigated by the parties before in G.R. No. 113375, the ruling there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of
this case." The parties are the same but the cases are not.

5. ID.;ID.;RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT OR PRECLUSION OF ISSUES; DOCTRINE

CONSTRUED. — Nor is inquiry into petitioners' right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the related doctrine of
"conclusiveness of judgment." According to the doctrine, an issue actually and directly passed upon and
determined in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties
involving a different cause of action. (Peñalosa v. Tuason,22 Phil. 303, 313 [1912];Heirs of Roxas v. Galido,108
Phil. 582 [1960])

6. ID.;ID.;ID.;DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO ISSUES OF LAW. — It has been held that the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least
when substantially unrelated claims are involved. (Montana v. United States,440 U.S. 147, 162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210,
222 [1979];BATOR MELTZER, MISHKIN AND SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1058, n. 2 [3rd Ed.,1988])

7. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID. — This exception to the General Rule of Issue Preclusion is authoritatively formulated in
Restatement of the Law 2d, on Judgments, as follows: Sec. 28. Although an issue is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the
issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances: ...(2) The issue is
one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination is
warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid
inequitable administration of the laws.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE STANDING TO QUESTION THE
EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT (ELA), A LEGAL QUESTION. — The question whether petitioners have
standing to question the Equipment Lease Agreement or ELA is a legal question. As will presently be shown, the
ELA, which petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different from the 1993 Contract
of Lease entered into by the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determination in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375)
that petitioners had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does not
preclude determination of their standing in the present suit.

9. ID.;ID.;RULE ON STANDING AND REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST, DIFFERENTIATED. — The difference

between the rule on standing and real party-in-interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note
...that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions
relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party-in-interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions
require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the
judiciary in certain areas. (FRIEDENTHAL, KANE AND MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 328 [1985]) Standing
is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or
voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions." (Baker v. Carr,369 U.S. 7 L. Ed. 2d 633 [1962]) On the other hand, the question as to "real party-in-
interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to
the avails of the suit.'" (Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co.,Ltd.,88 Phil 125, 131 [1951])

10. ID.;ID.;REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST IN ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS ARE PARTIES TO THE

AGREEMENT. — In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those who are
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parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect
to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the
contract even though they did not intervene in it (Ibañez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank,22 Phil. 572 [1912]),or
who claim a right to take part in a public bidding but have been illegally excluded from it. (See De la Lara
Co.,Inc. v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications,G.R. No. L-13460, Nov. 28, [1958])

11. ID.;ID..ID.;PARTIES WITH PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST; "PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL

INTEREST," CONSTRUED. — These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a
mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. The phrase 'present substantial
interest' more concretely is meant such interest of a party in the subject matter of action as will entitle him, under
the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the
defendant will be protected in a payment to or recovery by him." (1 MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES
OF COURT 154-155 [1979])

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTIES WITHOUT PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN THE EQUIPMENT LEASE
AGREEMENT, NOT ENTITLED TO BRING SUIT FOR ANNULMENT; CASE AT BAR. — But petitioners
do not have such present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. Denying to them
the right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in the execution of government
contracts. Questions as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before
they may be made can be raised in an appropriate case before the Commission on Audit or before the
Ombudsman. The Constitution requires that the Ombudsman and his deputies, "as protectors of the people shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof including government-owned or controlled corporations."
(Art. XI, 12) In addition, the Solicitor General is authorized to bring an action for quo warranto if it should be
thought that a government corporation, like the PCSO, has offended against its corporate charter or misused its
franchise. (Rule 66, Sec. 2 [a] [d] For reasons set for, we hold that petitioner have no cause against respondents
and therefore their petition should be dismissed.

13. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT, A LEASE
CONTRACT. — The features of the old Contract of Lease have been removed in the present ELA. While the rent
is still expressed in terms of percentage (it is now 4.3% of the gross receipts from the sale of tickets) in the ELA,
the PGMC is now guaranteed a minimum rent of P35,000.00 a year per terminal in commercial operation. (Par. 2)
The PGMC is thus assured of payment of the rental. The PCSO now bears all losses because the operation of the
system is completely in its hands. This feature of the new contract negates any doubt that it is anything but a lease
agreement. In this case the rental has to be expressed in terms of percentage of the revenue of the PCSO because
rentals are treated in the charter of the agency (R.A. No. 1169, Sec. 6[C]) as "operating expenses" and the
allotment for "operating expenses" is a percentage of the net receipts. We hold that the ELA is a lease contract
and that it contains none of the features of the former contract which were considered "badges of a joint venture
agreement" To further find fault with the new contract would be to cavil and expose the opposition to the contract
to be actually an opposition to lottery under any and all circumstances. But "[t]he morality of gambling is not a
justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se...It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit."
(Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. Inc.,234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994].Cf. Lim v. Pacquing,G.R. No. 115044, Jan.
27, 1995) In the case of lottery, there is no dispute that, to enable the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office to
raise funds for charity, Congress authorized the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to hold or conduct
lotteries under certain conditions.

14. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; WILL GENERALLY NOT INTERFERE WITH MATTERS OF BUSINESS
JUDGMENT. — Petitioners reply that to obviate the possibility that the rental would not exceed 15% of the net
receipts what the respondents should have done was not to agree on a minimum fixed rental of P35,000.00 per
terminal in commercial operation. This is a matter of business judgment which, in the absence of a clear and
convincing showing that it was made in grave abuse of discretion of the PCSO, this Court is not inclined to
review.

15. ID.;EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS; GOVERNMENT IS PRESUMED TO HAVE ACTED IN GOOD

FAITH IN TAKING CONTRACTS; CASE AT BAR. — By virtue of the provision on upgrading of equipment,
petitioners claim, the parties can change their entire agreement and thereby, by "clever means and devices,"
enable the PGMC to "actually operate, manage, control and supervise the conduct and holding of the on-line
lottery system," considering that as found in the first decision, "the PCSO had neither funds of its own nor the
expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery." The claim is speculative. It is just as possible to speculate that
after sometime operating the lottery system the PCSO will be able to accumulate enough capital to enable it to
buy its own equipment and gain expertise. As for expertise, after three months of operation of the on-line lottery,
there appears to be no complaint that the PCSO is relying on others, outside its own personnel, to run the system.
In any case as in the construction of statutes, the presumption is that in making contracts the government has
acted in good faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason for denying power to the government
holds true also in cases involving the validity of contracts made by it.
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16. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; LEASE CONTRACTS, DEFINED. — A contract of
lease, as this is defined in Civil law, may call for some form of collaboration or association between the parties
since lease is a "consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative contract by which one person binds himself to
grant temporarily the use of a thing or the rendering of some service to another who undertakes to pay some rent,
compensation or price." (5 PADILLA, CIVIL CODE 611 [6TH Ed 1974]).

17. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE (RA 1169); NOT
PROHIBITED FROM HOLDING OR CONDUCTING LOTTERY "IN COLLABORATION, ASSOCIATION
OR JOINT VENTURE" WITH ANOTHER PARTY; PROHIBITION REFERS TO INVESTMENT IN
BUSINESS ENGAGED IN LOTTERIES AND SIMILAR ACTIVITIES. — The charter of the PCSO does not
absolutely prohibit it from holding or conducting lottery "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with
another party. What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is to invest in a business engaged in sweepstakes races,
lotteries and similar activities, and it is prohibited from doing so whether in "collaboration, association or joint
venture" with others or "by itself." The reason for this is that these are competing activities and the PCSO should
not invest in the business of a competitor. When parsed, it will be seen that 1 grants the PCSO authority to do any
of the following: (1) to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and similar activities; and/or (2) to
invest whether "by itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company
entity" in any "health and welfare-related investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit
oriented," except "the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)," i.e.,sweepstakes races, lotteries and
similar activities. The PCSO is prohibited from investing activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)"
because, as already stated, these are competing activities. The subject matter of 1(B) is the authority of the PCSO
to invest in certain projects for profit in order to enable it to expand its health medical assistance and charitable
grants. The exception in the law refers to investment in businesses engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and
similar activities. The limitation applies not only when the investment is undertaken by the PCSO "in
collaboration, association or joint venture" but also when made by the PCSO alone, "by itself." The prohibition
can not apply to the holding of a lottery by the PCSO itself. Otherwise, what it is authorize to do in par. (A) would
be negated by what is prohibited by par. (B).To harmonize pars. (A) and (B),the latter must be read as referring to
the authority of the PCSO to invest in the business of others. Put in another way, the prohibition in 1(B) is not so
much against the PCSO entering into any collaboration, association or joint venture with others as against the
PCSO investing in the business of another franchise holder which would directly compete with PCSO's own
charity sweepstakes races, lotteries or similar activities. The prohibition applies whether the PCSO makes the
investment alone or with others.

18. ID.; ID.; MAY ENTER INTO EQUIPMENT LEASE CONTRACT WITHOUT PUBLIC BIDDING. —
Finally the question is whether the ELA is subject to public bidding. In justifying the award of the contract to the
PGMC without public bidding, the PCSO invokes E.O. No. 301. E.O. No. 301, Sec. 1 applies only to contracts for
the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment. It does not refer to contracts of lease of equipment like the
ELA. The provisions on lease are found in Secs. 6 and 7 but they refer to the lease of privately-owned buildings
or spaces for government use or of government-owned buildings or spaces for private use, and these provisions do
not require public bidding. It is thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can be applied to the ELA when the only
feature of the ELA that may be thought of as close to a contract of purchase and sale is the option to buy given to
the PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a contract of purchase and sale.

PADILLA, J.,concurring opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DUTY TO APPLY THE LAW IRRESPECTIVE OF PERSONAL
CONVICTION OF MEMBER. — It is the duty of the Supreme Court to apply the laws enacted by Congress and
approved by the President, (unless they are violative of the Constitution) even if such laws run counter to a
Member's personal conviction that gambling should be totally prohibited by law.

2. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; LEASE, DEFINED. — A lease is a contract whereby one
of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain and for a period
which may be definite or indefinite (Article 1643, Civil Code).

3. ID.;ID.;ID.;LESSOR OF EQUIPMENT, FREE TO DEMAND AMOUNT OF RENTALS. — It would appear

from the above legal provision that the ELA is truly a straight contract of lease. That the parties to the ELA have
stipulated on flexible rentals does not render it less of a lease contract and more of a joint venture. Surely, the
PGMC as owner of the leased equipment is free to demand the amount of rentals it deems commensurate for the
use thereof and, as long as PCSO agrees to the amount of such rentals, as justifying an adequate net return to it,
then the contract is valid and binding between the parties thereto. This is the essence of freedom to enter into
contracts.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE; EQUIPMENT LEASE

AGREEMENT (ELA),A STRAIGHT LEASE EQUIPMENT. — Petitioners have not cited any law which
prevents such stipulations to be included in contracts of lease or which changes the nature of such agreement from
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a lease to some other juridical relation. In fact, such stipulations are common in leases of real estate for
commercial purposes. A ruling that would prevent PCSO from entering into such lease agreement for the
operation by PCSO of the lottery would defeat the intent of the law to raise, from such lotto operations, funds for
charitable institutions and government civic projects, because an outright purchase by PCSO of the lottery
equipment appears next to impossible or at least not feasible costwise considering the capital equipment involved.
In enacting the law creating the PCSO, Congress, to be sure, did not intend to make it impossible for PCSO to
attain its given purposes. A rigid interpretation of the restriction on "association, collaboration, and joint venture"
will result in such impossibility. Neither can petitioners' argument that certain provisions in the ELA will ensure
PGMC's continued participation and interest in the lottery operations provide enough grounds for granting the
petition in this case. Such arguments are based on speculations devoid of any material or concrete factual basis. In
sum, the ELA constitutes, in my view, a straight lease agreement of equipment between PCSO and PGMC. Such
an agreement is, as far as PCSO's charter is concerned, validly and lawfully entered into.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; SHOULD NOT PREEMPT JUDGMENT OF COMMISSION ON

AUDIT (COA) ON MATTERS WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION; ISSUE ON NECESSITY OF PUBLIC
BIDDING IN ELA, WITHIN COA'S JURISDICTION. — On the allegation of lack of public bidding on the
ELA, the Commission on Audit (COA) has yet to resolve a case where the issue of the validity of the ELA due to
lack of public bidding has been squarely raised. This matter surfaced during the hearing of the present case.
Needless to say, the Court should not preempt the determination and judgment of the COA on matters which are
within its primary jurisdiction under the Constitution.

6. POLITICAL LAW; ISSUE AS TO WHETHER ELA IS GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE

GOVERNMENT, A POLITICAL QUESTION. — As to whether or not the ELA is grossly disadvantageous to
the government, it should be stressed that the matter involves, basically, a policy-determination by the executive
branch which this Court should not ordinarily reverse or substitute with its own judgment, in keeping with the
time honored doctrine of separation of powers.

FELICIANO, J.,dissenting opinion:

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE; PROHIBITION AGAINST

HOLDING OR CONDUCTING LOTTERY IN COLLABORATION, ASSOCIATION OR JOINT VENTURE
WITH ANOTHER PARTY; VIEW EXPRESSED BY THE INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATOR WHO CRAFTED
QUESTIONED PROVISION SHOULD AT LEAST BE ENTITLED TO A STRONG PRESUMPTION OF
CORRECTNESS. — I turn first to the novel argument made in the majority opinion that the charter of PCSO
does not "prohibit [—] it from holding or conducting lottery in collaboration, association or joint venture with
another party." That opinion argues that "what [PCSO] is prohibited from doing is to invest in a business engaged
in sweepstakes races, lotteries and similar activities" which are "competing activities and the PCSO should not
invest in the business of a competitor." In so doing, my learned brother Mendoza, J .purports to controvert and
overturn the reading that the majority of this Court, through Mr. Justice Davide, Jr.,in the first Kilosbayan case
gave to the relevant provisions of the PCSO charter. It so happens that the critical language in the relevant PCSO
charter provision — that is, the "except" clause in Section 1 (B) of the PCSO charter as amended by B.P. Blg. 42
— was crafted by the then Assemblyman Hilario G. Davide, Jr. during the deliberations in the Interim Batasan
Pambansa on the bill that became B.P. Blg. 42. It is impliedly contended by the majority that the intent of an
individual legislator should not be regarded as conclusive as to the "collect" interpretation of the provision of a
statute. This is true enough, as a general proposition, for it is the intent of the legislative body as manifested in the
language used by the legislature that must be examined and applied by this Court. However, it seems to me that
the view expressed by an individual legislator who eventually comes to sit in this Court as to the meaning to be
given to words crafted by himself should, at the very least, be regarded as entitled to a strong presumption of
correctness. Put a little differently, I respectfully submit that in a situation such as that presented in this case, a
strong presumption arises that the interpretation given by Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. and approved and adopted by the
majority of the Court in the first Kilosbayan case faithfully reflected the intent of the legislative body as a whole.

2. ID.;ID.;ID.;INTENT CLEARLY DISCERNIBLE IN WORDS USED BY LEGISLATURE. — Fortunately, in

the present case, it is not necessary to take the word of Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. as to what the intent of the
legislative body was in respect of Section 1 (B) of the present PCSO charter. For that intent is clearly discernible
in the very words used by the legislative body itself. Examining the actual text of Section 1 (B),it will be noted
that what PCSO has been authorized to do is not simply "to invest — whether by itself or in collaboration,
association or joint venture —' in any health and welfare-related investments, programs, projects and activities
which may be profit-oriented ..." Rather, the PCSO has been authorized "to engage in health and welfare-related
investments,programs, projects and activities which may be profit-oriented.

3. ID.;ID.;ID.;CONSTRUED. — The "except" clause in Section 1 (B),is not designed as a non-competition

provision,nor as a measure intended to prevent PCSO from putting its money in enterprises competing with
PCSO. What the law seeks thereby to avoid, rather, is the PCSO sharing or franchising out its exclusive authority
to hold and conduct sweepstakes races, lotteries and similar activities by collaborating or associating or entering
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into joint ventures with other persons or entities not government-owned and legislatively chartered like the PCSO
is. The prohibition against PCSO sharing its authority with others is designed, among other things, to prevent
diversion to other uses of revenue streams that should go solely to the charitable and welfare-related purposes
specified in PCSO's charter. It will be seen that without the "except" clause inserted at the initiative of former
Assemblyman Davide, Jr.,Section 1(B) would be so comprehensively worded as to permit PCSO precisely to
share its exclusive right to hold and conduct sweepstakes races, lotteries and the like. It is this "except" clause
which prevents such sharing or lending or farming out the PCSO "franchise" "by itself or in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, except
for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A) ..." This "except" clause thus operates, as it were, as a
renvoi clause which refers back to Section 1 (A) and in this manner avoids the necessity of simultaneously
amending the text of Section 1 (A).The textual location, in other words, of the "except" clause offers no support
for the new-found and entirely original interpretation offered in the majority opinion.

4. ID.; ID.; EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT (ELA); PUBLIC BIDDING, A NECESSARY

PREREQUISITE; CASE AT BAR. — I consider next the question of whether the "Equipment Lease Agreement"
(ELA) is subject to public bidding. PCSO refers to Executive Order No. 301 dated 26 July 1987 in seeking to
justify the award of the ELA to the PGMC without public bidding. In accepting the contentions of PCSO, the
majority opinion relies basically on two (2) propositions. The first of these is that Executive Order No. 301,
Section 1 refers to contracts of purchase and sale [only]. The second proposition offered is that the use of the term
"supplies" "cannot be limited so as to exclude 'materials' and 'equipment' without defeating the purpose for which
these exceptions are made." The first proposition finds no basis in the actual language used in the operative
paragraph of Section 1 of Executive Order No. 301 setting out the general rule ". . . no contract for public services
or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the government or any of its branches, agencies or
instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into without public bidding, except under any of the following
situations: ...It is worthy of special note that the above opening paragraph does not even use the words "purchase
and sale" or "buy and sell";the actual term used is "furnishing ...equipment to the government." The term
"furnishing" can scarcely be limited to sales to the government but must instead be held to embraced any contract
which provides the government with either title to or use of equipment. A contrary view can only result in serious
emasculation of Executive Order No. 301. It is common place knowledge that equipment leases (especially
"financial leases" involving expensive capital equipment) are often substitutes for or equivalents of purchase and
sale contracts, given the multifarious credit and tax constraints operating in the market place. Thus the above first
proposition fails to take into account actual commercial practice already reflected in our present commercial and
tax law. The second proposition similarly requires one who must interpret and apply the provisions of Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 310 to disregard the actual language used in that Order. For Executive Order No. 301 uses
done (3) distinguishable terms "supplies," "materials" and "equipment." These terms are not always used
simultaneously in Executive Order No. 301. In some places, only "supplies" is used; in other places, only
"materials" is employed; and in still other places, the term "equipment" is used alongside with, but separately
from, both of the other two (2) terms. To say that "supplies," "materials" and "equipment" are merely synonymous
or fungible would appear too casual a treatment of the actual language of Executive Order No. 301. The
fundamental difficulty with the above two (2) propositions is this: that public bidding is precisely the standard and
best way of ensuring that a contract by which the government seeks to provide itself with supplies or materials or
equipment is in fact the most advantageous to government. It is true enough that public bidding may be
inconvenient and time consuming; but it is still the only method of procurement so far invented by man by which
the government could reasonably expect to keep relatively honest those who would contract with it. This is the
basic reason why competition through public bidding is the general rule and not the exception.

5. ID.;ID.;JOINT VENTURE NOT CONVERTED INTO AN ORDINARY EQUIPMENT LEASE

AGREEMENT BY SIMPLE REARRANGEMENT OF WORDS AND PARAGRAPHS. — I would address
finally the question of whether or not the original contract between PCSO and PGMC which the Court in the first
Kilosbayan case found to be a joint venture, has been so substantially changed as to have been effectively
converted from a joint venture arrangement to an ordinary equipment lease agreement. The majority of the Court
have concluded that the ELA has been effectively "purged" of the characteristics of a joint venture arrangement
and that it should now be regarded as lawful under the provisions of the revised PCSO charter. It is suggested,
with respect that the burden of showing that the elements found by the Court in the first Kilosbayan case to
constitute the prohibited "collaboration, association or joint venture" have truly (and not simply ostensibly) been
expunged from the relationship between PCSO and PGMC rests, not on Kilosbayan nor on this Court, but rather
on PCSO and PGMC. It is respectfully submitted further that that burden has not been adequately discharged in
the present case by the simple re-arrangement of words and paragraphs of the old contract considering that the
reality of the re-arrangement is controverted by the commercial terms of the new contract.

6. ID.;ID.;ID.;RENTAL IS NOT EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF A FIXED AND ABSOLUTE FIGURE. — I

begin with the natare and form of the rental provisions of the ELA. The rental payable by PCSO as lessee of
equipment and other assets owned by PGMC as lessor, is fixed at a specified percentage, 4.3% of the gross
revenues accruing to PCSO out of or in connection with the operation of such equipment and assets. The rental
payable is not, in other words, expressed in terms of a fixed and absolute figure, although a floor amount per
leased terminal is set. Instead, the actual total amount of the rental rises and falls from month to month as the
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revenues grow or shrink in volume. I respectfully suggest that thereby the lessor or the facilities leased has
acquired a legal interest either in the business of the lessee PCSO that is conducted through the operation of such
facilities and equipment, or at least in the income stream of PCSO originating from such operation. In the
commercial world, a rental provision cast in terms of a fixed participation in the gross revenues of the lessee,
signals substantial economic interest in the business of such lessee. Such a provision cannot be regarded as
compatible with an "ordinary" equipment rental agreement. On the other hand, it is of the very substance of a
commercial joint venture and of economic collaboration or association. The assertion that the 4.3% rental rate is
"well within the maximum of 15% net receipt fixed by law" is entirely meaningless insofar as explaining the
structure of the rental provision and the reasonableness thereof is concerned. In the second place, it is child's play
for an accountant to convert absolute figures representing operating expenses [actual or budgeted] into a
percentage of "net receipts [actual or expected]";there is nothing in Section 6 (C) of the PCSO charter that either
requires or justifies the adoption of the rental provision found both in the old contract and in the ELA giving
PGMC a fixed share in gross revenues. The explanation offered by the Solicitor General is unfortunately merely
contrived; its acceptance depends on lack of familiarity with elementary accounting concepts.

7. ID.;ID.;APPROPRIATE RECOURSE TO THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO VENTILATE LEGAL

RESTRICTIONS ON ITS REVISED CHARTER. — The PCSO appears sincerely convinced that the legal
restrictions placed upon its operations by the actual text of Section 1 (B) of its revised charter prevent it from
realizing the kinds and volume of revenues that it needs for charitable and health and welfare-oriented programs.
In this situation, the appropriate recourse is not to make light of nor to conjure away those legal restrictions but
rather to go to the legislative authority and there ask for further amendment of its charter. In that same forum, the
petitioners may in turn ventilate their own concerns and deeply felt convictions.

REGALADO, J.,dissenting opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; "LAW OF THE CASE" DOCTRINE; PURPOSE. — Even in American law,
the "law of the case" doctrine was essentially designed to express the practice of courts generally to refuse to
reopen what has been decided and, thereby, to emphasize the rule that the final judgment of the highest court is a
final determination of the rights of the parties. That is the actual and basic role that it was conceived to play in
judicial determinations, just like the rationale for the doctrines of res judicataand conclusiveness of judgment.

2. ID.;ID.;ID.;MAY ARISE FROM AN ORIGINAL HOLDING OF A HIGHER COURT ON A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI. — The "law of the case" may also arise from an original holding of a higher court on a writ of
certiorari,and is binding not only in subsequent appeals or proceedings in the same case, but also in a subsequent
suit between the same parties. Furthermore, since in our jurisdiction an original action for certiorari to control and
set aside a grave abuse of official discretion can be commenced in the Supreme Court itself, it would be absurd
that for its ruling therein to constitute the law of the case, there must first be a remand to a lower court which
naturally could not be the court of origin from which the postulated second appeal should be taken.

3. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;WITH SAME BINDING EFFECT WITH THAT OF AN APPEALED CASE. — What I wish
to underscore is that where, as in the instant case, the holding of this highest Court on a specific issue was handed
down in an original action for certiorari,it has the same binding effect as it would have had if promulgated in a
case on appeal.

4. ID.;ID.;CAUSE OF ACTION; CONCEPT THEREOF IN PUBLIC INTEREST CASES SHOULD DIFFER

FROM PRIVATE INTEREST LITIGATIONS. — It is true that a right of action is the right or standing to enforce
a cause of action. For its purposes, the majority urges the adoption of the standard concept of a real party in
interest based on his possession of a cause of action. It could not have failed to perceive, but nonetheless refuses
to concede that the concept of a cause of action in public interest cases should not be straitjacketed within its
usual narrow confines in private interest litigations.

5. ID.;ID.;REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST; NO DEFINED RULE FOR ITS DETERMINATION. — There is no

clearly defined rule by which one may determine who is or is not real party in interest, nor has there been found
any concise definition of the term. Who is the real party in interest depends on the peculiar facts of each separate
case, and one may be a party in interest and yet not be the sole real party in interest.

6. ID.;ID.;ID.;ABSENCE OF REMEDIAL MEASURE, AVAILABLE TO PERSONS NOT REAL PARTIES-

IN-INTEREST IN QUESTIONING GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS. — If the majority would have its way in
this case, there would be no available judicial remedy against irregularities or excesses in government contracts
for lack of a party with legal standing or capacity to sue. The legal dilemma or vacuum is supposedly remediable
under a suggestion submitted in the majority opinion. The majority has apparently forgotten its own argument that
in the present case petitioners are not the real parties, hence they cannot avail of any remedial right to file a
complaint or suit. It is, therefore, highly improbable that the Commission on Audit would deign to deal with those
whom the majority says are strangers to the contract. Again, should this Court now sustain the assailed contract,
of what avail would be the suggested recourse to the Ombudsman? Finally, it is a perplexing suggestion that
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petitioners ask the Solicitor General to bring a quo warranto suit, either in propria persona or ex relatione,not only
because one has to contend with that official's own views or personal interests but because he is himself the
counsel for respondents in this case. Any proposed remedy must take into account not only the legalities in the
case but also the realities of life.

7. ID.;ID.;JUDGMENT; CHANGE OF MEMBERSHIP OF MEMBERS OF COURT, NOT GROUND TO

REEXAMINE RULING. — The majority believes that in view of the retirement and replacement of two
members of the Court, it is time to reexamine the ruling in the first lotto case. A previous judgment of the Court
may, of course, be revisited but if the ostensible basis is the change of membership and known positions of the
new members anent an issue pending in a case in the Court, it may not sit well with the public as a judicious
policy. This would be similar to the situation where a judgment promulgated by the Court is held up by a motion
for reconsideration and which motion, just because the present Rules do not provide a time limit for the resolution
thereof, stays unresolved until the appointment of members sympathetic thereto. Thus, the unkind criticisms of
"magistrate shopping" or "court packing" levelled by disgruntled litigants is not unknown to this Court.

8. ID.;ID.;"LAW OF THE CASE" DOCTRINE; ISSUE ON RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO FILE AND

MAINTAIN ACTION QUESTIONING LEGALITY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, FORECLOSED BY
COURT'S JUDGMENT IN FIRST LOTTO CASE. — I hold the view that the matter of the right of petitioners to
file and maintain this action — whether the objection thereto is premised on lack of locus standi or right of action
— has already been foreclosed by our judgment in the first lotto case, G.R. No. 113375. If the majority refuses to
recognize such right under the "law of the case" principle, I see no reason why that particular issue can still be
ventilated now as a survivor of the doctrinal effects of res judicata.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF SOME OBJECTIONABLE TERMS OF CONTRACT
DOES NOT EXTINGUISH IDENTITY OF SUBJECT MATTER IN BOTH CASES. — It is undeniable that in
that case and the one at bar, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Evidently, the judgment
in G.R. No. 113375 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, it was an adjudication on the merits, and
has long become final and executory. There is, to be sure, an attempt to show that the subject matter in the first
action is different from that in the instant case, since the former was the original contract and the latter is the
supposed expanded contract. I am not persuaded by the proffered distinction. The removal and replacement of
some objectionable terms of a contract, which nevertheless continues to operate under the same basis, with on the
same property, for the same purpose, and through the same contracting parties does not suffice to extinguish the
identity of the subject matter in both cases. This would be to exalt form over substance. Furthermore, respondents
themselves admitted that the new contract is actually the same as the original one, with just some variants in the
terms of the latter to eliminate those which were objected to. The contrary assumption now being floated by
respondents would create chaos in our remedial and contractual laws, open the door to fraud, and subvert the rules
on the finality of judgments.

10. ID.;ID.;CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT; ALL ISSUES FINALLY ADJUDGED SHALL BE

CONCLUSIVE BETWEEN PARTIES ON APPEAL; CASE AT BAR. — Even assuming purely ex hypothesi
that the amended terms in the expanded lease agreement created a discrete set of litigable violations of the
statutory charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, thereby collectively resulting in a disparate
actionable wrong or delict, that would merely constitute at most a difference in the causes of action in the former
and the present cases. Under Section 49(c),Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, we would still have a situation of
collateral estoppel, better known in this jurisdiction as conclusiveness of judgment. Hence, all relevant issues
finally adjudged in the prior judgment shall be conclusive between the parties in the case now before us and that
definitely includes at the very least the adjudgment therein that petitioners have the locus standi or the right to sue
respondents on the contracts concerned.

DAVIDE, JR.,J.,dissenting opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; SUDDEN REVERSAL OF RULING PUTS TO JEOPARDY THE
FAITH AND CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE CERTAINTY AND STABILITY OF THE
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS COURT. — I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in Kilosbayan,
Inc.,et al. vs. Guingona, et al.(hereinafter referred to as the first lotto case) regarding the application or
interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169), as
amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and on the issue of locus standi of the petitioners to question the contract of lease
involving the on-line lottery system entered into between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and
the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC).Such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of the law
of the case, res judicata,and stare decisis.It puts to jeopardy the faith and confidence of the people, specially the
lawyers and litigants, in the certainty and stability of the pronouncements of this Court. It opens the floodgates to
endless litigations for reexamination of such pronouncements and weakens this Court's judicial and moral
authority to demand from lower courts obedience thereto and to impose sanctions for their opposite conduct.

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2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE; CANNOT HOLD AND
CONDUCT CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES RACES, LOTTERIES AND OTHER SIMILAR ACTIVITIES IN
COLLABORATION, ASSOCIATION OR JOINT VENTURE WITH ANY OTHER PARTY. — In the first lotto
case, this Court also emphatically ruled that the language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg.
42, is indisputably clear that with respect to this [PCSO's] franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO cannot exercise it "in collaboration,
association or joint venture" with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase
"except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)," namely, "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries
and other similar activities."

3. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF EITHER THE LAW OF THE CASE OR RES
JUDICATA,THE PCSO AND PGMC ARE BOUND BY THE RULING IN THE FIRST LOTTO CASE ON
THE LOCUS STANDI OF THE PETITIONERS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE EXCEPTION CLAUSE
IN PARAGRAPH B, SECTION 1 OF R.A. 1169, AS AMENDED FOR FAILING TO MOVE FOR ITS
RECONSIDERATION. — The PCSO and the PGMC never challenged our application or interpretation of the
exception clause and our definitions of the terms collaboration, association,and joint venture.On the contrary, they
unconditionally accepted the same by not asking for reconsideration of our decision in the first lotto case. Under
the principle of either the law of the case or res judicata the PCSO and the PGMC are bound by the ruling in the
first lotto case on the locus standi of the petitioners and the application or interpretation of the exception clause in
paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. Moreover, that application or interpretation has been laid
to rest under the doctrine of stare decisis and has also become part of our legal system pursuant to Article 8 of the
Civil Code which provides: "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part
of the legal system of the Philippines."

4. ID.;ID.;LAW OF CASE; CONSTRUED. — The principle of the law of the case "is necessary as a matter of
policy to end litigation. There would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals,
compel a court to listen to criticisms on their opinions, or speculate on chances from changes in its members."

5. ID.;ID.;ID.;DOCTRINE APPLIES WHERE THE SECOND CASE IS BUT A SEQUEL TO AND

CONTINUATION OF THE FIRST LOTTO CASE. — It is, however, contended that the law of the case is
inapplicable because that doctrine applies only when a case is before an appellate court a second time after its
remand to a lower court. While indeed the statement may be correct, it disregards the fact that this case is nothing
but a sequel to and is, therefore, for all intents and purposes, a continuation of the first lotto case. By their
conduct, the parties admitted that it is, for which reason the PGMC and the PCSO submitted in the first lotto case
a copy of the ELA in question, and the petitioners commenced the instant petition also in the said case. Our
resolution that the validity of the ELA could not be decided in the said case because the decision therein had
become final does not detract from the fact that this case is but a continuation of the first lotto case or a new
chapter in the raging controversy between the petitioners, on the one hand, and the PCSO and the PGMC, on the
other, on the operation of the on-line lottery system.

6. ID.;ID.;CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT; APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR WHERE THE

CONTRACT IN QUESTION IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM OR UNRELATED TO THE FIRST NULLIFIED
CONTRACT. — Equally unacceptable is the majority opinion's rejection of the related doctrine of conclusiveness
of judgment on the ground that the question of standing is a legal question, as this case involves a different or
unrelated contract. The legal question of locus standi which was resolved in favor of the petitioners in the first
lotto case is the same in this case and in every subsequent case which would involve contracts relating or
incidental to the conduct or holding of lotteries by the PCSO in collaboration, association, or joint venture with
any person, association, company, or entity. And, the contract in question is not different from or unrelated to the
first nullified contract, for it is nothing but a substitute for the latter. Respondent Morato was even candid enough
to admit that no new and separate public bidding was conducted for the ELA in question because the PCSO was
of the belief that the public bidding for the nullified contract was sufficient.

7. ID.;ID.;PRECLUSION OF ISSUES OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL; DOES NOT APPLY TO CASE AT

BAR WHERE ISSUE INVOLVED IS ONE OF LAW. — Its reliance on the ruling in Montana vs. United States
that preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated
claims are involved, is misplaced. For one thing, the question of the petitioners' legal standing in the first lotto
case and in this case is one and the same issue of law.For another, these cases involve the same and not
substantially unrelated subject matter, viz.,the second contract between the PCSO and the PGMC on the operation
of the on-line lottery system. The majority opinion likewise failed to consider that in the very authority it cited
regarding the exception to the rule of issue preclusion (Restatement of Law, 2d Judgments S. 28),the second
illustration stated therein is subject to this NOTE: "The doctrine of the stare decisis may lead the court to refuse to
reconsider the question of sovereign immunity," which simply means that stare decisis is an effective bar to a re-
examination of a prior judgment.

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8. ID.;ID.;DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS;CONSTRUED; ABANDONMENT THEREOF NOT
WARRANTED IN CASE AT BAR. — The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or
rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in
other cases involving a similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the
law and does not require identity or privity of parties. This is explicitly fleshed out in Article 8 of the Civil Code
which provides that decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal
system. Such decisions "assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only
of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto." Abandonment
thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons — which I do not find in this case — otherwise, the
becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the
public's confidence in the stability of its solemn pronouncements diminished.

9. ID.;ID.;RES JUDICATA;ASPECTS. — The doctrine of res judicata has dual aspects: (1) as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action; and (2) as preclusion to the
relitigation of particular facts or issues in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of
action.

10. ID.;ID.;ID.;CONSTRUED. — Public policy, judicial orderliness, economy of judicial time, and the interest of
litigants as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability should be accorded judgments; that
controversies once decided on their merits shall remain in repose; that inconsistent judicial decisions shall not be
made on the same set of facts; and that there be an end to litigation which, without the said doctrine, would be
endless. It not only puts an end to strife, but recognizes that certainty in legal relations must be maintained. It
produces certainty as to individual rights and gives dignity and respect to judicial proceedings.

11. ID.;ID.;RULE ON REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST SUBORDINATE TO DOCTRINE OF LOCUS

STANDI.— In public law the rule of real party-in-interest is subordinated to the doctrine of locus standi.The
majority opinion declares that the real issue in this case is not whether the petitioners have locus standi but
whether they are the real parties-in-interest. This proposition is a bold move to set up a bar to taxpayer's suits or
cases invested with public interest by requiring strict compliance with the rule on real-party-in-interest in ordinary
civil action, thereby effectively subordinating to that rule the doctrine of locus standi.I am not prepared to be a
party to that proposition. First. Friendenthal, et al.,whose book is cited in the majority opinion in its discussion of
the rule on real party in interest and the doctrine of locus standi,admit that there is a difference between the two,
between the two, and that the former is not strictly applicable in public law cases. Second. The attempt to use the
real-party-in-interest rule is to resurrect the abandoned restrictive application of locus standi,This Court, speaking
through the constitutionalist nonpareil, Justice and later Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, has already declared in
Tan vs. Macapagal that as far as a taxpayer's suit is concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether
or not it should be entertained. Third. Such attempt directly or indirectly restricts the exercise of the judicial
authority of this Court in an original action — and there had been many in the past — to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Only a very limited few may qualify, under the real-party-in-interest rule, to
bring actions to question acts or contracts tainted with such vice. Where, because of fear of reprisal, undue
pressure, or even connivance with the parties benefited by the contracts or transactions, the so-called real-party-
in-interest chooses not to sue, the patently unconstitutional and illegal contracts or transactions will be placed
beyond the scrutiny of this Court, to the irreparable damage of the Government, and prejudice to public interest
and the general welfare.

12. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LAWS; LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT; AUTHOR THEREOF, BEST

AUTHORITY ON INTENTION OR RATIONALE OF AMENDMENT. — Before I take up the defined issues, I
find it necessary to meet squarely the majority opinion's interpretation of paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No.
1169, as amended. This is, of course, on the assumption that this Court may now disregard the doctrines of the
law of the case, res judicata,and stare decisis.I respectfully submit that the best authority on the intention or
rationale of a legislative amendment is its author. Fortunately, I happened to be the author of the exception clause
in said provision. The language of that clause is very short and simple, and the elaboration given therefor, as
earlier shown, is equally short and simple. The sponsor of the measure, then Assemblyman, now Congressman,
Ronaldo Zamora did not even ask for an explanation or clarification; he readily accepted the amendment. Nobody
from the floor interpellated me for an explanation or clarification. I regret then to say that neither the letter nor the
spirit of the exception clause in paragraph B supports the interpretation proposed in the majority opinion. The
reason given in the majority opinion for the alleged prohibition from investing in "activities mentioned in the
preceding paragraph (A)" (i.e.,the holding or conducting of charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar
activities) is that "these are competing activities." In that aspect alone, the majority opinion has clearly
misconstrued the exception clause. The prohibition is not direct against such activities, since they are in fact the
franchised primary activities of the PCSO. What is prohibited is the conduct or holding thereof "in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign." In the
first lotto case, this Court explained the principal reasons for such prohibition. If the purpose of the prohibition in

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the exception clause is indeed to prevent competition, it would be with more reason that no other person, natural
or juridical, should be allowed to share on the PCSO's franchise to hold and conduct lotteries. In short, the
argument in the majority opinion sustains the rationale of the prohibition.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE (PCSO);EQUIPMENT

LEASE CONTRACT (ELA),A JOINT VENTURE CONTRACT; DELETION OF PROVISIONS WHICH
HOWEVER DID NOT AFFECT THE INDIVISIBILITY OF COMMUNITY OF INTEREST ON THE ON-
LINE LOTTERY SYSTEM DOES NOT TRANSFORM CONTRACT TO ONE OF LEASE. — I am not
persuaded. To my mind, the parties only performed a surgery on the nullified contract by merely deleting
therefrom provisions which this Court had considered in the first lotto case to be badges of a joint venture contract
and by engrafting some modifications on rental, which include an option to purchase. The PGMC and the PCSO
conveniently forgot that per this Court's findings in the first lotto case, they had an indivisible community of
interest in conception, birth,and growth of the on-line lottery and that each is wed to the other for better or for
worse. The surgery affected only the post-natal activities of the union, but not the indivisibility of their
community of interest at conception and at the birth of the on-line lottery system. Put differently, it only separated
one from the other from bed and board but did not dissolve the bonds of such indivisibility or community of
interest. This was confirmed by respondent Morato when he candidly confessed in his letter to the COA Chairman
that: [I]t is apparent that the lease of the needed equipment through negotiations is the most advantageous to the
Government since so many studies, plans and procedures had already been worked out with PGMC since October
1993 as a result of the previous bidding (Sec. 1. e, Executive Order No. 301 [1987]).

14. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;RENTAL CLAUSE. — Even on the face of the new ELA, the elements of the proscribed joint
venture or, at the very least, collaboration or association, can be detected, albeit they are hidden behind the skirt of
the following: (a) the Rental Clause; (b) the upgrading provision under the Repair Services Clause; and (c) the
details of what are embraced in the term Lottery Equipment and Accessories subject of the contract, which are
found in Annex "A" of the ELA. The Rental Clause provides for a flexible rate based on a percentage of the gross
amount of ticket sales, payable bi-weekly, with an annual minimum rental fixed at P35,000.00 per terminal in
commercial operation, any shortfall of which shall be paid out of the proceeds of the current ticket sales. This is
an unusually novel arrangement which insures and guarantees the PGMC full participation in the gross proceeds
of ticket sales even if, ultimately, a draw could mean losses to the PCSO. The rental clause is, indeed, a subtle
scheme to unconditionally guaranty PGMC's share in the profits.

15. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;UPGRADING CLAUSE. — It should be stressed here that in the old contract the upgrading
clause is under facilities,which include among other things all capital equipment, computers, terminals, and
softwares. Under the upgrading provision, new equipment may be used; the number of terminals may be
increased; and new terms and conditions, including rates of "rentals" and the purchase price in case of exercise of
the option to buy, may be agreed upon. This makes the ELA not just a sweetheart contract, but one which will
preserve the parties' indivisible union and community of interest, thereby giving further credence to this Court's
observation in the first lotto case that each is wed to the other for better or for worse.

16. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;EQUIPMENT. — It may be observed that the term facilities in the old contract included all
capital equipment but excluded "technology, intellectual property rights, knowhow, processes and systems." As
this Court found in the first lotto case, there was a separate provision on the PGMC's obligations (1) to train
PCSO and other local personnel and (2) to effect the transfer of technology and other expertise. Clearly, the
inclusion of "technology, intellectual property rights, knowhow, processes and systems" in the term Equipment
was a ploy to hide, again, the continuing indispensable collaboration of the PGMC in the conduct of the on-line
lottery business.

17. ID.;ID.;ID.;PUBLIC BIDDING, A PREREQUISITE. — Even assuming that the subject ELA is not a joint
venture contract, still it must be nullified for having been entered into without public bidding and for being
grossly disadvantageous to the Government. The opening paragraph of E.O. No. 298, series of 1940, of President
Manuel L. Quezon, entitled "Prohibiting the Automatic Renewal of Contracts, Requiring Public Bidding Before
Entering Into New Contracts, Providing Exceptions Therefor," states that . . . contracts for public services or for
furnishing of supplies, materials, and equipment to the Government be submitted to public bidding. This was
restated in E.O. No. 301 of President Corazon C. Aquino, entitled "Decentralizing Actions on Government
Negotiated Contracts, Lease Contracts and Records Disposals, " whose Section 1 reads in part that . . . no contract
for public services or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the government or any of its branches,
agencies or instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into without public bidding, except under any of the
following situations. It is clear that Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 301 refer to contracts for public
services,or furnishing supplies, materials,and equipment to the government. In no uncertain terms, the Executive
Order itself distinguishes the terms supplies,materials, and equipment from each other, i.e.,it did not intend to
consider them as synonymous terms. If such were the intention, there would have been no need to enumerate
them separately and to limit subparagraphs (a),(b),and (e) to supplies;subparagraph (c) to materials,and
subparagraph (f) to all three (supplies, materials and equipment).The specific mention of supplies in
subparagraphs (a),(b),and (e) was clearly intended to exclude therefrom materials and equipment,and the specific
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mention of materials in subparagraph (c) was likewise intended to exclude supplies and equipment.Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.Elsewise stated, the Executive Order leaves no room for a construction that confuses
supplies with materials or equipment or either of the last two with the first or with each other. Besides,
subparagraph (e) of Section 1 unequivocally refers to a contract of purchase of supplies.The ELA in question is
not a contract of purchase of supplies. The parties themselves proclaim to the whole world and solemnly represent
to this Court that it is a contract of lease of equipment. They titled it, in bold big letters, "EQUIPMENT LEASE
AGREEMENT," and devote the first clause thereof to EQUIPMENT. Accordingly, since the ELA is not a
contract of purchase of supplies, we are unable to understand why the DOJ applied Section 1(e) of E.O. No. 301
to exempt the ELA from the public-bidding requirement.

18. ID.;ID.;ID.;NOT COVERED BY COA RULES AND REGULATION FOR PREVENTION OF

IRREGULAR, UNNECESSARY, EXCESSIVE AND EXTRAVAGANT EXPENDITURES. — The submission
of the petitioners that the ELA violates paragraph 4.3 of the COA Rules and Regulations for the Prevention of
Irregular, Unnecessary, Excessive, and Extravagant Expenditures is not persuasive. The said paragraph covers
Lease Purchase contracts. The ELA in question hardly qualifies as a lease purchase contract because there is no
perfected agreement to purchase (sale) but only an option on the part of PCSO to purchase the equipment for P25
million. It is, in fact, an option which is not supported by a separate and distinct consideration, hence, not really
binding upon the PGMC.

19. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; OPTIONAL CONTRACT, CONSTRUED. — An

optional contract is a privilege existing in one person, for which he had paid a consideration, which gives him the
right to buy certain specified property from another person, if he chooses, at any time within the agreed period, at
a fixed price. Said contract is separate and distinct contract from the contract which the parties may enter into
upon the consummation of the option. The second paragraph of Article 1479 of the Civil Code expressly provides
that "[a]n accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the
promisor if the promise supported by a consideration distinct from the price."

20. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE (PCSO);EQUIPMENT

LEASE CONTRACT (ELA);CONTRACT GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE PCSO. — A
comparison between the nullified contract and the assailed ELA to prove that the latter is grossly disadvantageous
to the PCSO is not at all hampered by any perceived difficulty. For all the representations, duties, obligations, and
responsibilities, as well as the automatic loss of its ownership over the facilities without any further consideration
in favor of the PCSO after the expiration of only eight years, the PGMC gets only a so-called rental of 4.9% of
gross receipts from ticket sales, payable net of taxes required by law to be withheld, which may, however, be
drastically reduced, or in extreme cases, totally obliterated because the PGMC bears "all risks if the revenue from
ticket sales, on an annualized basis, are insufficient to pay the entire prize money." Under the assailed ELA,
however, the PGMC is entitled to receive a flexible rental equivalent to 4.3% of the gross ticket sale (or only
0.6% lower than it was entitled to under the old contract) for the use of its on-line lottery system equipment (as
distinguished from facilities in the old contract),which does not anymore include the nationwide
telecommunications network, without any assumption of business risks and the obligations (1) to keep the
facilities in safe condition and if necessary, to upgrade, replace, and improve them from time to time as
technology develops, and bear all expenses relating thereto; (2) to undertake advertising and promotions
campaign; (3) to bear all taxes, amusements, or other charges imposed on the activities covered by the contract;
(4) to pay the premiums for third party or comprehensive insurance on the facilities: (5) to pay all expenses for
water, light, fuel, lubricants, electric power, gas, and other utilities used and necessary for the operation of the
facilities; and to pay the salaries and related costs of skilled and qualified personnel for administrative and
technical operations and maintenance crew. The PGMC is also given thereunder a special privilege of receiving
P25 million as purchase price for the equipment at the expiration of eight years should the PCSO exercise its
option to purchase. Unlike in the old contract where nothing may at all be due the PGMC of the event that the
ticket sales, computed on an annual basis, are insufficient to pay the entire prize money, under the new ELA the
PCSO is under obligation to pay rental equivalent to 4.3% of the gross receipts from ticket sales, the aggregate
amount of which per year should not be less than the minimum annual rental of P35,000.00 per terminal in
commercial operation. Any shortfall shall be paid out of the proceeds of the then current ticket sales after payment
of prizes and agents' commissions but prior to any other payments, allocations, or disbursements. The grossness of
the disadvantage to the PCSO is all too obvious, and why the PCSO accepted such unreasonable, unconscionable,
and inequitable terms and conditions confounds as.

VITUG, J.,concurring opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; JUDICIAL POWER, DEFINED. — "Judicial power," is such authority and
duty of courts of justice "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. I take it that the provision
of Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution has not been intended to unduly mutate, let alone to disregard, the long
established rules on locus standi. Neither has it been meant, I most respectfully submit, to do away with the
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principle of separation of powers and its essential incident such as by, in effect, conferring omnipotence on, or
allowing an intrusion by, the courts in respect to purely political decisions, the exercise of which is explicitly
vested elsewhere, and subordinate to that of their own the will of either the Legislative Department of the
Executive Department — both co-equal, independent and coordinate branches, along with the Judiciary, in our
system of government. Again, if it were otherwise, there indeed would be truth to the charge, in the words of
some constitutionalist, that "judicial tyranny" has been institutionalized by the 1987 Constitution, an apprehension
which should, I submit, rather be held far from truth and reality.

2. ID.;ACTIONS; LOCUS STANDI,RULE THEREON NOT DISREGARDED BY CONSTITUTIONAL

DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL POWER. — I most humbly reiterate the separate opinion I have made in
Kilosbayan, Inc.,et al.,vs. Teofisto Guingona, Sr.,etc.,et al. (G.R. No. 113375, promulgated on 05 May 1994).
Back to the core of the petition, however, the matter of the legal standing of petitioners in their suit assailing the
subject-contract appears to me, both under substantive law and the rules of procedure, to still be an insuperable
issue. I have gone over carefully the pleadings submitted in G.R. No. 118910, and I regret my inability to see
anything new that can convince me to depart from the view I have expressed on it in G.R. No. 113375.

g. David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006

(1) The issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic because all the exceptions to
the “moot and academic” principle are present. The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
All these exceptions are present here. It is alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as they do the
people’s basic rights to the freedoms of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the
duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function
of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the
protection given by constitutional guarantees. Lastly, the contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the
present petitions are subject to judicial review.

(2) All the petitioners have legal standing in view of the transcendental importance of the issue involved.
It has been held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. Taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (a)the
cases involve constitutional issues; (b)for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds
or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (c)for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the
validity of the election law in question; (d)for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (e)for legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Being a mere procedural
technicality, however, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion.
The question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. In view of
the transcendental importance of this issue, all the petitioners are declared to have locus standi.

(3) There were sufficient factual bases for the President’s exercise of her calling-out power, which
petitioners did not refute. In other cases, the Court considered the President’s “calling-out” power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s
decision is totally bereft of factual basis. Nonetheless, the Court stressed that “this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.” Under the expanded power of judicial review, the
courts are authorized not only “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable,” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” As to how the Court
may inquire into the President’s exercise of the power, “judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court
not that the President’s decision is correct,” but that “the President did not act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid
down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the
calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP
1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Petitioners did not refute such events. Thus, absent any
contrary allegations, the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Judging the
seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent
or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In times of emergency, our
Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the
Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.

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 j. General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, 29 March 2011

Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office. Since the petitioner merely
holds an acting appointment (expired acting appointment), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain
the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at
any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an
office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to
succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.

CHAPTER III
STATUTES

I. LEGISLATIVE POWER

1. LEGISLATIVE POWER IN GENERAL, WHERE LODGED

a. David v. Arroyo, G.R. 171396, May 3, 2006

(4) PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law, but merely an invocation of the President’s calling-out
power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of
the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” Considering the circumstances then prevailing,
President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in
the best position to determine the actual condition of the country. But the President must be careful in the exercise
of her powers. Every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires.
There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations. In declaring a
state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, but also
on Sec. 17, Art. XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility
and business affected with public interest. It is plain in the wordings of PP 1017 that what President Arroyo
invoked was her calling- out power. PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. As such, it cannot be used to
justify acts that can be done only under a valid declaration of Martial Law. Specifically, arrests and seizures
without judicial warrants, ban on public assemblies, take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship,
and issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief
only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

(5) PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees.
The second provision of the operative portion of PP 1017 states: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to
all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.” The operative clause of
PP 1017 was lifted from PP 1081, which gave former President Marcos legislative power. The ordinance power
granted to President Arroyo under the Administrative Code of 1987 is limited to executive orders, administrative
orders, proclamations, memorandum orders, memorandum circulars, and general or special orders. She cannot
issue decrees similar to those issued by former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws
which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the
exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution. Legislative power
is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. She cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain
laws. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.

(6) PP 1017 does not authorize President Arroyo during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from
Congress. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the framers of
our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus: (a)there must be a war or other emergency; (b)the delegation must be for a limited period only;
(c)the delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe; and (d)the emergency
powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.
Thus, when Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Whether or not the
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President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to her pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. There is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a state
of national emergency and her authority to exercise emergency powers. Her authority to declare a state of national
emergency is granted by Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be
raised. The exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. The President cannot
decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. Nor can she determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.
Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public
interest that should be taken over.

(7) The illegal implementation of PP 1017, through G.O. No. 5, does not render these issuances
unconstitutional. The criterion by which the validity of a statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential
basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. PP 1017 is limited to the
calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had
accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017
allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional
rights. But when in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed
acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional
and illegal. David, et al. were arrested without a warrant while they were exercising their right to peaceful
assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that
warranted the limitation of that right. Likewise, the dispersal and arrest of members of KMU, et al. were
unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s directive canceling all
permits to hold rallies. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that
“freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.” Furthermore, the search of the Daily Tribune offices is
illegal. Not only that, the search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. It cannot be denied that the CIDG
operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing
of policemen in the vicinity of the offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain
censorship. The “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 is, however, unconstitutional. G.O. No. 5 mandates the
AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.” The phrase “acts of terrorism” is still an amorphous and vague
concept. Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who
has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without
restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and
residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings
unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the
calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution.

b. Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230

Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former
may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto
power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the
same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the
event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not
applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not
treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which
are fundamental in our constitutional set up.

c. Chavez, v. JBC, G.R. 202242, April 16, 2013

From a simple reading of Section 8, Article VIII, it can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and
unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of the
Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On
the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the
JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of
Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for
any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is,
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)

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representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a
well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words
of a statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single
vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually
muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be
rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be
unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they
knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

d. Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

The wisdom behind RH Law for it is not within the province of the court but of Congress for it is where
lawmaking power is lodged. The Supreme Court clarified that it cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid
down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the
law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to
look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of the Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It
is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with
apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law,
guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is
therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by
the lawmaking body.

e. Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976

In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution,
that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process.
Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that
power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section
15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the
legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is
not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic
character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the
case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to
approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

f. La Suerte Cigar v. CA, G.R. No. 125346, November 11, 2014

The High Court clarified that the power of taxation is inherently legislative and may be imposed or revoked only
by the legislature. Moreover, this plenary power of taxation cannot be delegated by Congress to any other branch
of government or private persons, unless its delegation is authorized by the Constitution itself. Hence, the
discretion to ascertain the following — (a) basis, amount, or rate of tax; (b) person or property that is subject to
tax; (c) exemptions and exclusions from tax; and (d) manner of collecting the tax — may not be delegated away
by Congress. However, it is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and manner as to the enforcement and
administration of a law may be delegated to various specialized administrative agencies like the Secretary of
Finance in this case, called as permissible delegation of legislative powers.

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Thus, rules and regulations implementing the law are designed to fill in the details or to make explicit what is
general, which otherwise cannot all be incorporated in the provision of the law. Such rules and regulations, when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law,
“deserve to be given weight and respect by the courts in view of the rule-making authority given to those who
formulate them and their specific expertise in their respective fields.” To be valid, a revenue regulation must be
within the scope of statutory authority or standard granted by the legislature. Specifically, the regulation must (1)
be germane to the object and purpose of the law; (2) not contradict, but conform to, the standards the law
prescribes; and (3) be issued for the sole purpose of carrying into effect the general provisions of our tax laws.

2. BICAMERALISM

a. Chavez, v. JBC, G.R. 202242, April 16, 2013

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially
intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a
bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the
Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government –
to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the
process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount.
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists
in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

b. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 235 SCRA 630

It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments, added by the High Court.
Indeed, the SC furthered, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from
the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House
can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing
in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

c. Garcillano vs., House of Rep. G.R. 170338, December 23, 2008

The SC stressed that the exercise of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases
and controversies and the Court will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be
granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in
the nature of things, cannot be enforced.

The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.”
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is
indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that “Laws shall take effect after 15 days
following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines.”

3. EXTENT AND LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE POWER

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 a. In re: Cunanan 94 Phil. 534

The Judicial system from which the Philippines has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring,
and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. The Constitution has not
conferred on Congress and the SC equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The
primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in in the SC.

The retroactivity of RA 972 (Bar-Flunkers’ Act) is invalid in such a way that what the law seeks to “cure” are not
the rules set in place by the Court but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not
included in the power granted by the Constitution to Congress because it lies exclusively within the judiciary. The
law is unconstitutional because there was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court as it is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court (denying admissions of those who
did not pass the bar), and only the SC may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so, R.A. 972 violated the
Constitution.

Through the said law, the Congress has exceeded its power because it has not power in the first place to repeal,
alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar.

b. Belgica v. Ochoa G.R. 208566, November 19, 2013

(a) Separation of powers – the power of the Congress is to make laws, the power of the President is to enforce
laws, and the power of the Court is to interpret laws. The principle of separation of power is to avoid
concentration of these powers in any one branch and unduly encroaches on the domain of another. The Legislative
department formulates an appropriation act and in implementing the national budget the role of the Executive
department. Based on the findings and recommendations in the Report made by CoA “an illustration of how
absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the
constitutional [principle of separation of powers.]” the provisions under 2013 PDAF Article showed the
legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority to identify PDAF projects. The Court declares the 2013
PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-
enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

(b) Non-delegability of legislative power - Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. The Court observes that
the 2013 PDAF Article confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators violates the
principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the
power of appropriation, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to
dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. The 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the power of appropriation the
Constitution does not allow the congress to delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.

(c) Checks and balances – Under Section 27 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the President has a power
to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval
through a process known as “bill presentment.” After the GAA is passed the intermediate appropriations are made
by legislators. It means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. The appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President's power of item veto.

(d) Accountability - The post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, therefore impairing public accountability.

c. ABAKADA Guro Party-List v. Purisima, G.R. 166715, August 14, 2008

The power of oversight is intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.
Oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance
with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive
waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. Hence, congressional oversight is not
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 unconstitutional per se because it does not necessarily constitute an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as
it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

To forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes
two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with
either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be
limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1)
scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection
with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter
pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed
by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a
legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation
designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which
Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitution’s diagram of power a sit entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its
own laws.

d. League of Cities v. COMELEC, G.R. 176951, February 15, 2011

The Congress has the power to exempt certain municipalities from the requirements of cityhood under the Local
Government Code by passing subsequent laws simply because the Congress has the control over local
government units. Court cannot use judicial review on the wisdom and clear legislative intent and it should duly
recognize the certain collective wisdom of both houses of Congress.

e. Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. 19671, October 18, 2011

The ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based
on the wording and structure of the Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor,
vice-governor and regional assembly representatives fall within the classification of “local” elections, since they
pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the perspective of the
Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article
X of the Constitution entitled “Local Government.” Autonomous regions are established and discussed under
Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.

The Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of
choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive
duty or of a refusal to perform its duty nor is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse
of discretion. In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local
elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If
their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the
whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although
its national effect cannot be discounted.

II. STATUTES AND THEIR ENACTMENT

1. TITLE OF BILLS

a. Lidasan v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496

Under the constitution, the constitutional provision on law-making contains dual limitations upon legislative
power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second.
The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance in the present case, according to the SC, is the
second directive.

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The subject of the statute must be “expressed in the title” of the bill. This constitutional requirement “breathes the
spirit of command.” Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the
obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill.

The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should
serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it informs the legislators, the persons interested in the subject
of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this,
to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and,
thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth,
a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of
the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

b. PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965)

Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation
for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites. It is evident that
retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of
one possessing any office. Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22,
1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term
of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision
clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore
unconstitutional.

c. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. 177508, August 7, 2009

To resolve the issue on the participation of major political parties, the Supreme Court revisited the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission to interpret the provision on Party-List System in accordance with the intent of
the framers. The Supreme Court pronounced that neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major
political parties from participating in the party-list system. However, it is ruled that, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral
wings. This is also manifested when the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any
permanent sectoral seats and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. The
Court added in this wise:

“In defining a ‘party’ that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a
sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in
the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This
Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.”

In construing together R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it can be inferred,
as ruled by the Court, that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes.

“There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list
election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other
major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To
further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the
party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng
Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.”

The Court also ruled that under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s
nominee to wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity as there is no financial status required in the law. It is
enough that the nominee of the sectoral party, organization or coalition belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the
nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
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In this case also, the Court pronounced that the Constitution or R.A. No. 7941 does not mandate the filling-up of
the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1,
Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to
Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be
more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
Having ruled it by the Court, the Court, nonetheless, said that it cannot allow the continued existence of a
provision in the law, which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. Furthermore, the Court also ruled that the three-seat cap, as a limitation to the
number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents
any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in
accordance with the guidelines abovementioned. However, due to the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue
the ruling in Veterans case disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections,
directly or indirectly. This is in line with the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno.

CONCURRING and DISSENTING OPINION

– JUSTICE PUNO
Chief Justice Puno as joined by seven other Justices contended that the participation of the major political
parties in the election of party-list representatives, directly or indirectly, is not the intention of the Constitution in
harmony with other provisions therein. Chief Justice Puno and the seven Justices opined that the ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayani case must still be upheld. In this wise, said the Chief,

“Today, less than a decade after, there is an attempt to undo the democratic victory achieved by
the marginalized in the political arena in Ang Bagong Bayani. In permitting the major political
parties to participate in the party-list system, Mr. Justice Carpio relies on the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. Allegedly, the said deliberations indicate that the party-list system is
open to all political parties, as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors. Buttressing his view, Mr. Justice Carpio notes that the major political
parties also fall within the term “political parties” in the Definition of Terms in Republic Act
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Likewise, he holds that the qualifications of
a party-list nominee as prescribed in Section 9 of the said law do not specify any financial status
or educational requirement, hence, it is not necessary for the party-list nominee to wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity. It is then concluded that major political parties may now
participate in the party-list system. With all due respect, I cannot join this submission. We stand
on solid grounds when we interpret the Constitution to give utmost deference to the democratic
sympathies, ideals and aspirations of the people. More than the deliberations in the
Constitutional Commission, these are expressed in the text of the Constitution which the people
ratified. Indeed, it is the intent of the sovereign people that matters in interpreting the
Constitution.”

It is noteworthy that the party-list system was also in consideration of historical precedents on how the elected
Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa and the regular Batasang Pambansa tried to torpedo sectoral
representation and delay the seating of sectoral representatives on the ground that they could not rise to the same
leveled status of dignity as those elected by the people. To avoid this bias against sectoral representatives, the
President was given all the leeway to break new ground and precisely plant the seeds for sectoral representation so
that the sectoral representatives will take roots and be part and parcel exactly of the process of drafting the law
which will stipulate and provide for the concept of sectoral representation.

Chief Justice Puno opined that the Court should remember that while it is permissible in this jurisdiction to
consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose
of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their
votes, but they give no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law.

Chief said that, it is safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face and it must be harmonized
with the other provisions and to make every word of the fundamental law operative and avoid rendering some
words idle and nugatory, and by harmonizing Article VI, Section 5 with related constitutional provisions, it will
result to revealing the better intent of the people, as the sovereign Filipinos who ordained and promulgated the
Constitution, as regards the party-list system.

Chief Justice Reynato Puno ended his separate opinion by providing a wise interpretation of history behind party-
list system, he said,
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 “In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the
framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the
Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people
recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the
traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political
institutions. If we allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral
process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and
betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the
party-list system.”

d. Giron v. COMELEC, G.R. 188179, January 22, 2013

It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of a
legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just law. Because of this strong
presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the petition must fail. There must be a compelling reason that
would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act.

The proscription under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution is aimed against the evils of the so-called
omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision
merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. To determine whether there
has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title,
the Court laid down the rule that Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes
should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

2. FORMALITIES

a. Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. 19671, October 18, 2011

The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave full recognition to
the Presidents certification for urgency and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing
short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our
power of judicial review. The petitioners, however, failed to provide with any cause or justification for this course
of action. Hence, while the judicial department and Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President’s
certification by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due
to the co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the
judicial hand, the High Court added. In any case, according to the Court, despite the Presidents certification, the
two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of every bill must always be
observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them.
Specifically, the purpose with respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they
shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process. The Court
finds, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents of the proposed
measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153
on the cited ground.

b. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 235 SCRA 630

A bill may be passed even if the three reading were not done in separate days if certified. Hence, when the
President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent, such presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not
only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the
President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
supported by the weight of legislative practice.

c. PHILJA vs., Prado, G.R. 105371, November 11, 1993

Article VI, Sec. 26 (l), of the Constitution providing that “Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the
body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if
the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not
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 calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement. The SC ruled that although, it is convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some
agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a
more efficient and effective postal service system. However, its ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing
clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

3. APPROVAL OF BILLS

a. Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia, G.R. L-20740, June 30, 1964

Executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions. Thus, if the veto is
unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the
appropriation bill, therefore, remains.

b. ABAKADA Guro Party-List v. Purisima, G.R. 166715, August 14, 2008

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed
by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a
legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation
designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which
Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitution’s diagram of power a sit entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its
own laws.

III. EVIDENCE OF DUE ENACTMENT OF LAWS

1. ENROLLED BILL THEORY

a. Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito, G.R. L-1223, March 5, 1947

An enrolled bill is binding to the Supreme Court. But the Court may determine if there were irregularities in the
journal of Congress, it if finds no irregularities, then such Journal is binding and the enrolled bill as deliberated in
the said Journal is conclusive to the Court. An enrolled bill deserves respect by the court because it has been duly
introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each House, approved by the president
and filed by the secretary of state. The deliberation as reflected in the Journals of both Houses are considered
political questions to which Courts may not inquire as a courtesy.

b. Casco Phils. Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, G.R. L-17931, February 28, 1963

The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill do not
represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the
courts. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing
the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

c. Morales v. Subido, G.R. 29658, November 29, 1968

The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10
is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go
beyond the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the
Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as
the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted
role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent
impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in
all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution
expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act
may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide
upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds
is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the
event of any discrepancy.

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 d. Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. 127255, August 14, 1997

The Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite
number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction
to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
When the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House, the Court should not be
concerned.

Enrolled bill doctrine must be given respect because to disregard the “enrolled bill” rule in such cases would be to
disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of
the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the
Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena
to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.

The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of
legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so.

2. JOURNAL ENTRY RULE

a. United States v. Pons, 34 Phil 729 (1916)

The SC may look into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the
recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of
the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to
violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. The Journals and the enrolled bill are conclusive to the Court.

b. Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. 23475, April 30, 1974

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it.
While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the
journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No.
9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal
discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not
asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when
they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was
never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous
bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended
by the law-making body.

IV. EFFECT OF STATUTES

1. WHEN THE CONSTITUTION BECOMES EFFECTIVE

a. Alfredo M. de Leon v. Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987

1. POLITICAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; DATE OF RATIFICATION; RETROACTS ON THE DAY OF

THE PLEBISCITE. — The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took
effect on February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it took effect on
February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the
Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino. The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect
on the date its ratification shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or
reject it." This view was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was withdrawn by
its proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be effective on the very
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day of the plebiscite." The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports
the Court's judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Commission in
unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is
the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation
of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the official
confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution
when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."

2. ID.; PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION; TENURE OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES; ONE YEAR

PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO DESIGNATE SUCCESSOR SHORTENED BY THE RATIFICATION AND
EFFECTIVITY ON FEBRUARY 2, 1987 OF THE CONSTITUTION. — The Court next holds as a consequence
of its declaration at bar that the Constitution took effect on the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on
February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution promulgated on March 25, 1986 must be deemed to have
been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date,
February 2, 1987, absent any saying clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer exercise the power to replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay
Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's
designation on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force and effect. While the
Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on March 25, 1987 within which the power of
replacement could be exercised, this period was shortened by the ratification and effectivity on February 2, 1987
of the Constitution. Had the intention of the framers of the Constitution been otherwise, they would have so
provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed they provided for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six
sections of Article XVIII, e.g. extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to
noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections, the continued exercise of legislative powers
by the incumbent President until the convening of the first Congress, etc.

2. WHEN STATUTES BECOME EFFECTIVE

a. Civil Code, Article 2

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

b. Administrative Code, Book I, Chapter 5, Section 18

c. Administrative Code, Book I, Chapter 6, Sections 24 – 25

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

BOOK I
CHAPTER 5
OPERATION AND EFFECT OF LAWS

Section 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.

Section 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided.

Section 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances. - In the interpretation of a law or administrative
issuance promulgated in all the official languages, the English text shall control, unless otherwise specifically
provided. In case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts may be consulted.

Section 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law which expressly repeals a prior law itself
repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.

Section 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself
repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise.

Section 23. Ignorance of the Law. - Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

CHAPTER 6
OFFICIAL GAZETTE

Section 24. Contents. - There shall be published in the Official Gazette all legislative acts and resolutions of a
public nature; all executive and administrative issuances of general application; decisions or abstracts of decisions
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of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, or other courts of similar rank, as may be deemed by said courts
of sufficient importance to be so published; such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be
published by law; and such documents or classes of documents as the President shall determine from time to time
to have general application or which he may authorize so to be published.
The publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie
evidence of its authority. lawphi1.net

Section 25. Editing and Publications. - The Official Gazette shall be edited in the Office of the President and
published weekly in Pilipino or in the English language. It shall be sold and distributed by the National Printing
Office which shall promptly mail copies thereof to subscribers free of postage.

d. Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, 29 December 1986

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the
instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate
concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but “one year after such publication.” The general rule did not apply because it
was “otherwise provided.”

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is
that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so
not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this
is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

The term “laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law
granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does
not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the
body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an
ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations
and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual
or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be
published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case
studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances
are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

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 e. Philippine Veterans Bank v. Vega, G.R. No. 105364, 28 June 2001

During the pendency of Case No. SP-32311, a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the Philippine Veterans
Bank (PVB). Republic Act No. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of the bank, was passed into law. It was
approved by the President on January 2, 1992 and published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
Meanwhile, PVB filed a motion to terminate liquidation proceedings with respondent judge in view of the passage
of R.A. No. 7169. Another motion of the same character was filed by the liquidator, but respondent judge
continued with the proceedings. August 3, 1992, the PVB opened its doors to the public and started regular
banking operations.

The enactment of Republic Act No. 7169 has rendered the liquidation court functus officio and respondent judge
has been stripped of the authority to issue orders involving acts of liquidation. Liquidation connotes a winding up
or settling with the creditors and debtors while rehabilitation connotes a reopening or reorganization. Both are
diametrically opposed to each other, such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time.

1. COMMERCIAL LAW; PRIVATE CORPORATIONS; LIQUIDATION; CONSTRUED; CONCEPT OF

LIQUIDATION IS CONTRARY TO CONCEPT OF REHABILITATION SUCH THAT BOTH CANNOT BE
UNDERTAKEN AT THE SAME TIME. — Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling
with creditors and debtors. It is the winding up of a corporation so that assets are distributed to those entitled to
receive them. It is the process of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss. It is
crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to the concept of rehabilitation,
such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the liquidation proceedings to continue would
seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject rank.

2. ID.; ID.; REHABILITATION; CONSTRUED. — On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which
connotes a reopening or reorganization. Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities
in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency.

3. CIVIL LAW; EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS; WHEN LAWS SHALL TAKE EFFECT; SECTION 10 OF R.A.
NO. 7169 SHALL TAKE EFFECT UPON ITS APPROVAL. — While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen
(15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause
"unless otherwise provided." In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides: Sec. 10. Effectivity. —
This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law
effective immediately upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President
Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.

3. WHEN REGULATIONS BECOME EFFECTIVE

a. Administrative Code, Book VII, Sections 2 – 9

BOOK VII
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Scope. - This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except
the Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating
exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and state universities and colleges.
Section 2. Definitions. - As used in this Book:
(1) "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the National
Government authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and
adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions; government corporations with respect to
functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary
power as provided by law.
(2) "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and
describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes
memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not affecting the
rights of, or procedure available to, the public.
(3) "Rate" means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms, including individual
or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometerage and other
special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and followed by any person.
(4) "Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
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(5) "Contested case" means any proceeding, including licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges
asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are to be determined after hearing.
(6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private organization of any
character other than an agency.
(7) "Party" includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right
to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an agency
from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited purposes.
(8) "Decision" means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an interlocutory character, whether
affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter, including licensing, rate fixing and
granting of rights and privileges.
(9) "Adjudication" means an agency process for the formulation of a final order.
(10) "License" includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval,
registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise
of a right or privilege.
(11) "Licensing" includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment,
withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license.
(12) "Sanction" includes the whole or part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of
any person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or
withholding of property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost, charges or
fees; the revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive action.
(13) "Relief" includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance, license, authority, privilege,
exemption, exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or exception; or
taking of any action upon the application or petition of any person.
(14) "Agency proceeding" means any agency process with respect to rule-making, adjudication and licensing.
1. "Agency action" includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its
equivalent or denial thereof.

CHAPTER 2
RULES AND REGULATIONS

Section 3. Filing. -
(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every
rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months
from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section
under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.

Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this
Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a
different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and
welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take
appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.
Section 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall:
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete
index and appropriate tables.
Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. -
(1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its
publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be
made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the
general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained.
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or
subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.

Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall
furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office
of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall
be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other
persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.

Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as
published in the bulletin or the codified rules.

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Section 9. Public Participation. -
(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed
rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published
in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

b. People vs. Que Po Lay, G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954

1. CRIMINAL LAW; PENAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS IMPOSING PENALTIES, NEED BE

PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE BEFORE IT MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE. — Circulars and
regulations, especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation, should
be published before becoming effective. Before the public may be bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must be published and the people officially and specifically informed of
said contents and its penalties.
2. ID.; JURISDICTION; APPEALS; QUESTIONS THAT MAY BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL. — If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its violation,
then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently the accused committed no
violation of the circular, and the trial court may be said to have no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings whether or not raised in the court below.

c. Tanada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE; LEGAL

PERSONALITY OF PETITIONERS TO FILE MANDAMUS TO COMPEL PUBLICATION, RECOGNIZED.
— The subject of the petition is to compel the performance of a public duty and petitioners maintain they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course. The right sought to be enforced by petitioners
is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to
institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has
entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 2 CIVIL CODE DOES NOT PRECLUDE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL
GAZETTE EVEN IF THE LAW ITSELF PROVIDES FOR DATE OF ITS EFFECTIVITY. — That publication
in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates is correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily
reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The clear object of Article 2 of the Civil Code is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES "OF A PUBLIC NATURE" OR "OF
GENERAL APPLICABILITY," A REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS; UNPUBLISHED PRESIDENTIAL
ISSUANCES WITHOUT FORCE AND EFFECT. — The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to
all concerned. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil.
150) It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court therefore declares that presidential
issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY OF UNPUBLISHED PRESIDENTIAL DECREES DOES

NOT AFFECT THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN ENFORCED OR IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO THEIR
PUBLICATION. — The implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
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cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration . . .that an all inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring with qualification:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT NEED NOT BE CONFINED

TO THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE. — It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process
question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. But such publication required need not be confined
to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is to be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all
circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree, or any other executive act of the same category being bereft
of any binding force and effect. To so hold would raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would
lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity
unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT IN ART. 2 CIVIL CODE DOES NOT HAVE THE JUDICIAL FORCE
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND. — The Chief Justice's qualified concurrence goes no further than to
affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. He is
not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its
Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover,
the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the
juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of
law can legally provide for a different rule.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TO DECLARE UNPUBLISHED PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE
AND EFFECT WOULD RESULT IN UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES. — Nor does the Chief Justice agree
with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts
not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in his
opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. He finds himself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES, PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE; NECESSARY

PURSUANT TO THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS. — The Rule of
Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstanced and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedure. The Court had
consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its
violation," (People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. L-11003, August 31, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras) citing the
settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents.
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specially informed of said contents and its penalties." Without official publication in the Official Gazette as
required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor
justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions
of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance
of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith."

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENTS' CONTENTION THAT "ONLY LAWS WHICH ARE SILENT AS TO THEIR
EFFECTIVITY DATE NEED TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THEIR
EFFECTIVITY," UNTENABLE. — The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided," i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that
had been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this
is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect (only) one year (not 15
days) after such publication." To sustain respondents misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of
their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity" would
be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in
the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in
the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the
Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE; RETROACTIVITY
IN EFFECTIVITY DATE NOT ALLOWED WHERE IT WILL RUN COUNTER TO CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OR DESTROY VESTED RIGHTS. — There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides
for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. When a date effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the
decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no
retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., separate opinion:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE NOT ESSENTIAL

FOR EFFECTIVITY FOR EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS. — The Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not
that precise. Neither is the publication in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

2. ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION MAY BE MADE ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE. — Article
2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided." Two things may be said of this provision:
Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it
clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also
a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official
Gazette.

3. ID.; ID.; COMMONWEALTH ACT 638 CANNOT NULLIFY OR RESTRICT OPERATION OF A

STATUTE WITH A PROVISION AS TO ITS EFFECTIVITY. — Not all legislative acts are required to be
published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, Commonwealth Act
No. 638 does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as
it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general
application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute
that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution,
can assume the role.

d. Yaokasin vs. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 84111, 22 December 1989

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; POWER OF AUTOMATIC REVIEW OF THE COMMISSIONER OF

CUSTOMS OVER THE DECISION OF THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS IN PROTEST AND SEIZURE
CASES; RATIONALE FOR THE PROVISION. — Taxes being the lifeblood of the Government, Section 12,
which the Commissioner of Customs in his Customs Memorandum Order No. 20-87, enjoined all collectors to
follow strictly, is intended to protect the interest of the Government in the collection of taxes and customs duties
in those seizure and protest cases which, without the automatic review provided therein, neither the Commissioner
of Customs nor the Secretary of Finance would probably ever know about. Without the automatic review by the
Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of Finance, a collector in any of our country's far-flung ports, would
have absolute and unbridled discretion to determine whether goods seized by him are locally produced, hence, not
dutiable, or of foreign origin, and therefore subject to payment of customs duties and taxes. His decision, unless
appealed by the aggrieved party (the owner of the goods), would become final with no one the wiser except
himself and the owner of the goods. The owner of the goods cannot be expected to appeal the collector's decision
when it is favorable to him. A decision that is favorable to the taxpayer would correspondingly be unfavorable to
the Government, but who will appeal the collector's decision in that case? Certainly not the collectors.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHED FROM REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF A COLLECTOR UNDER
SECTION 2913 OF THE TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE. — Section 12 of the Plan and Section 2313 of the
Tariff and Customs Code do not conflict with each other. They may co-exist. Section 2313 of the Code provides
for the procedure for the review of the decision of a collector in seizure and protest cases upon appeal by the
aggrieved party, i.e., the importer or owner of the goods. On the other hand, Section 12 of the Plan refers to the
general procedure in appeals in seizure and protest cases with a special proviso on automatic review when the
collector's decision is adverse to the government. Section 2313 and the provision in Section 12, although they
both relate to the review of seizure and protest cases, refer to two different situations — when the collector's
decision is adverse to the importer or owner of the goods, and when the decision is adverse to the government.

3. ID.; EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATION ORDERS OR PROCLAMATIONS; MUST BE PUBLISHED

IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE; RECEPTION. — Commonwealth Act No. 633 (an Act to Provide for the
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Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette) enumerates what shall be published in the Official
Gazette besides legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines. Executive
and administrative orders and proclamations, shall also be published in the Official Gazette, except such as have
no general applicability." CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of
the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs
collectors). "It need not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned" (Tañada vs.
Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27).

e. Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, 1

February 2012

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other
hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves
the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed,
before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.

It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
law.

In summary, petitioners violated respondent's right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they
failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise violated
respondent's right to equal protection of laws when they provided for an unreasonable classification in the
application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated
authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.

f. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc., G.R. No.

150947, 15 July 2003

Whether pawnshops were included in the term lending investors for the purpose of imposing the 5% percentage
tax under then Section 116 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)of 1977, as amended by Executive
Order No. 273, the Court ruled in the negative. Congress never intended pawnshops to be treated in the same way
as lending investors as they were subjected to different tax treatments. Section 116 of the NIRC of 1977, as
amended, also subjected to percentage tax only dealers in securities and lending investors; there was no mention
of pawnshops. Hence, several rulings were made to that effect by the BIR. Finally, Section 116 of the NIRC of
1977 had already been repealed by RA 7716. Consequently, in the case at bar, Revenue Memorandum Order
(RMO) No. 15-91 and Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 43-91, issued pursuant to Section 116 of the
NIRC of 1977, were without force and effect and, therefore, Lhuillier Pawnshop cannot be made liable to pay the
5% lending investor's tax.

1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES OF THE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE LAW SOUGHT TO BE
APPLIED. — RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 were issued in accordance with the power of the CIR to make
rulings and opinions in connection with the implementation of internal revenue laws, which was bestowed by then
Section 245 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended by E.O. No. 273. Such power of the CIR cannot be controverted.
However, the CIR cannot, in the exercise of such power, issue administrative rulings or circulars not consistent
with the law sought to be applied. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law,
but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law.

2. TAXATION; WORDS AND PHRASES; LENDING INVESTOR AND PAWNSHOP, DEFINED. — Under
Section 157(u) of the NIRC of 1986, as amended, the term lending investor includes "all persons who make a
practice of lending money for themselves or others at interest." A pawnshop, on the other hand, is defined under
Section 3 of P.D. No. 114 as "a person or entity engaged in the business of lending money on personal property
delivered as security for loans and shall be synonymous, and may be used interchangeably, with pawnbroker or
pawn brokerage."

3. ID.; NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE; PERCENTAGE TAX; PAWNSHOPS; PAWNSHOP NOT
CONSIDERED LENDING INVESTOR FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPOSING 5% PERCENTAGE TAXES. —
While it is true that pawnshops are engaged in the business of lending money, they are not considered "lending
investors" for the purpose of imposing the 5% percentage taxes for the following reasons: First. Under Section

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192, paragraph 3, sub-paragraphs (dd) and (ff), of the NIRC of 1977, prior to its amendment by E.O. No. 273, as
well as Section 161, paragraph 2, sub-paragraphs (dd) and (ff), of the NIRC of 1986, pawnshops and lending
investors were subjected to different tax treatments; . . . Second. Congress never intended pawnshops to be treated
in the same way as lending investors. Section 116 of the NIRC of 1977, as renumbered and rearranged by E.O.
No. 273, was basically lifted from Section 175 of the NIRC of 1986, which treated both tax subjects differently. . .
. Third. Section 116 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended by E.O. No. 273, subjects to percentage tax dealers in
securities and lending investors only. There is no mention of pawnshops. Under the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. Thus, if a statute
enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be
excluded from its operation and effect. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules
of logic and natural workings of the human mind. Fourth. The BIR had ruled several times prior to the issuance of
RMO No. 15-91 and RMC 43-91 that pawnshops were not subject to the 5% percentage tax imposed by Section
116 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended by E.O. No. 273. This was even admitted by the CIR in RMO No. 15-91
itself. Considering that Section 116 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended, was practically lifted from Section 175 of
the NIRC of 1986, as amended, and there being no change in the law, the interpretation thereof should not have
been altered.

4. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; REPEAL OF THE LAW AUTOMATICALLY REPEALS

ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES MADE PURSUANT THERETO. — The approved bill which became R.A.
No. 7716 repealed Section 116 of NIRC of 1977, as amended, which was the basis of RMO No. 15-91 and RMC
No. 43-91. . . . Since Section 116 of the NIRC of 1977, which breathed life on the questioned administrative
issuances, had already been repealed, RMO 15-91 and RMC 43-91, which depended upon it, are deemed
automatically repealed. Hence, even granting that pawnshops are included within the term lending investors, the
assessment from 27 May 1994 onward would have no leg to stand on.

5. ID.; ID.; QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS; ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES REQUIRE PUBLICATION.

— Adding to the invalidity of the RMC No. 43-91 and RMO No. 15-91 is the absence of publication. While the
rule-making authority of the CIR is not doubted, like any other government agency, the CIR may not disregard
legal requirements or applicable principles in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers. EADCHS

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES; LEGISLATIVE RULE AND INTERPRETATIVE RULE,
DISTINGUISHED. — Let us first distinguish between two kinds of administrative issuances: the legislative rule
and the interpretative rule. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a
primary legislation by providing the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on the other hand, is designed to
provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. In Misamis Oriental
Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary, this Tribunal ruled: . . . In the same way
that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted
there must be hearing. In this connection, the Administrative Code of 1987 provides: Public Participation. — If
not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules
and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the
fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the
rules on contested cases shall be observed. In addition, such rule must be published. When an administrative rule
is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative
rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to
accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 cannot be viewed simply as
implementing rules or corrective measures revoking in the process the previous rulings of past Commissioners.
Specifically, they would have been amendatory provisions applicable to pawnshops. Without these disputed CIR
issuances, pawnshops would not be liable to pay the 5% percentage tax, considering that they were not
specifically included in Section 116 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended. In so doing, the CIR did not simply
interpret the law. The due observance of the requirements of notice, hearing, and publication should not have been
ignored.

8. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENTS; RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS NOT
BINDING UPON THE SUPREME COURT. — There is no need for us to discuss the ruling in CA-G.R. SP No.
59282 entitled Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Agencia Exquisite of Bohol Inc., which upheld the validity
of RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91. Suffice it to say that the judgment in that case cannot be binding upon
the Supreme Court because it is only a decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court, by tradition and in
our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable
controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings.
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 4. WHEN LOCAL ORDINANCES TAKE EFFECT

a. Local Government Code, Sections 54 – 59

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

RA 7610
CHAPTER III
Local Legislation

Section 48. Local Legislative Power. - Local legislative power shall be exercised by the sangguniang
panlalawigan for the province; the sangguniang panlungsod for the city; the sangguniang bayan for the
municipality; and the sangguniang barangay for the barangay.

Section 49. Presiding Officer. -

(a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan; the city vice-mayor, of the
sangguniang panlungsod; the municipal vice-mayor, of the sangguniang bayan; and the punong barangay, of the
sangguniang barangay. The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie.
(b) In the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian session, the members
present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer. He shall
certify within ten (10) days from the passage of ordinances enacted and resolutions adopted by the sanggunian in
the session over which he temporarily presided.

Section 50. Internal Rules of Procedure. -

(a) On the first regular session following the election of its members and within ninety (90) days thereafter, the
sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules of procedure.
(b) The rules of procedure shall provided for the following:
(1) The organization of the sanggunian and the election of its officers as well as the creation of standing
committees which shall include, but shall not be limited to, the committees on appropriations, women and family,
human rights, youth and sports development, environmental protection, and cooperatives; the general jurisdiction
of each committee; and the election of the chairman and members of each committee;
(2) The order and calendar of business for each session;
(3) The legislative process;
(4) The parliamentary procedures which include the conduct of members during sessions;
(5) The discipline of members for disorderly behavior and absences without justifiable cause for four (4)
consecutive sessions, for which they may be censured, reprimanded, or excluded from the session, suspended for
not more than sixty (60) days, or expelled: Provided, That the penalty of suspension or expulsion shall require the
concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) vote of all the sanggunian members: Provided, further, That a member
convicted by final judgment to imprisonment of at least one (1) year for any crime involving moral turpitude shall
be automatically expelled from the sanggunian; and
(6) Such other rules as the sanggunian may adopt.

Section 51. Full Disclosure of Financial and Business Interests of Sanggunian Members. -
(a) Every sanggunian member shall, upon assumption to office, make a full disclosure of his business and
financial interests, or professional relationship or any relation by affinity or consanguinity within the fourth civil
degree, which he may have with any person, firm, or entity affected by any ordinance or resolution under
consideration by the sanggunian of which he is a member, which relationship may result in conflict of interest.
Such relationship shall include:
(1) Ownership of stock or capital, or investment, in the entity or firm to which the ordinance or resolution may
apply; and
(2) Contracts or agreements with any person or entity which the ordinance or resolution under consideration may
affect.
In the absence of a specific constitutional or statutory provision applicable to this situation, "conflict of interest"
refers in general to one where it may be reasonably deduced that a member of a sanggunian may not act in the
public interest due to some private, pecuniary, or other personal considerations that may tend to affect his
judgment to the prejudice of the service or the public.
(b) The disclosure required under this Act shall be made in writing and submitted to the secretary of the
sanggunian or the secretary of the committee of which he is a member. The disclosure shall, in all cases, form part
of the record of the proceedings and shall be made in the following manner:
(1) Disclosure shall be made before the member participates in the deliberations on the ordinance or resolution
under consideration: Provided, That, if the member did not participate during the deliberations, the disclosure
shall be made before voting on the ordinance or resolution on second and third readings; and

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(2) Disclosure shall be made when a member takes a position or makes a privilege speech on a matter that may
affect the business interest, financial connection, or professional relationship described herein.

Section 52. Sessions. -

(a) On the first day of the session immediately following the election of its members, the sanggunian shall, by
resolution, fix the day, time, and place of its regular sessions. The minimum numbers of regular sessions shall be
once a week for the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan, and twice a
month for the sangguniang barangay.
(b) When public interest so demands, special sessions may be called by the local chief executive or by a majority
of the members of the sanggunian.
(c) All sanggunian sessions shall be open to the public unless a closed-door session is ordered by an affirmative
vote of a majority of the members present, there being a quorum, in the public interest or for reasons of security,
decency, or morality. No two (2) sessions, regular or special, may be held in a single day.
(d) In the case of special sessions of the sanggunian, a written notice to the members shall be served personally at
the member's usual place of residence at least twenty-four (24) hours before the special session is held.
Unless otherwise concurred in by two-thirds (2/3) vote of the sanggunian members present, there being a quorum,
no other matters may be considered at a special session except those stated in the notice.
(e) Each sanggunian shall keep a journal and record of its proceedings which may be published upon resolution of
the sanggunian concerned.

Section 53. Quorum. -

(a) A majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a
quorum to transact official business. Should a question of quorum be raised during a session, the presiding officer
shall immediately proceed to call the roll of the members and thereafter announce the results.
(b) Where there is no quorum, the presiding officer may declare a recess until such time as a quorum is
constituted, or a majority of the members present may adjourn from day to day and may compel the immediate
attendance of any member absent without justifiable cause by designating a member of the sanggunian to be
assisted by a member or members of the police force assigned in the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit concerned, to arrest the absent member and present him at the session.
(c) If there is still no quorum despite the enforcement of the immediately preceding subsection, no business shall
be transacted. The presiding officer, upon proper motion duly approved by the members present, shall then
declare the session adjourned for lack of quorum.

Section 54. Approval of Ordinances. -

(a) Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan
shall be presented to the provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief
executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he
shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same.
The sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its
members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes.
(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the sanggunian within fifteen (15)
days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance
shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it.
(c) Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of all its members, be
signed by the punong barangay.

Section 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. -

(a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the sanggunian panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
or sanggunian bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons
therefor in writing.
(b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay, shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public
investment program, or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto
shall not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect unless
the sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided; otherwise, the item or items in the
appropriations ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted.
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The sanggunian may override the
veto of the local chief executive concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the
ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief executive concerned.

Section 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.

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(a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall
forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving
the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after the receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the sangguniang
panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the
provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a
period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his
comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the sangguniang panlalawigan in making its
decision.
(c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred
upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution
invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the
corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such
an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.

Section 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. -
(a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish copies of all barangay
ordinances to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether the
ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal ordinances.
(b) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to take action on barangay
ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved.
(c) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the barangay ordinances
inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and recommendations to the sangguniang barangay
concerned for adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the barangay ordinance is
suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected.

Section 58. Enforcement of Disapproved Ordinances or Resolutions. - Any attempt to enforce any
ordinance or any resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, after the
disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or dismissal of the official or employee
concerned.

Section 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. -

(a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the local development plan and public
investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a
bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and
in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned.
(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in the bulletin
board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2)
conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval thereof.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the language
understood by the majority of the people in the local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the
sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting.
(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within
the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general
circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the
province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features of the ordinance or
resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of
general circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be
published in any newspaper of general circulation.

b. Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 127820, 20 July 1998

Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Parañaque filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, on September 20, 1993 a complaint for expropriation against
private respondent over two parcels of land with a combined area of about 10,000 square meters located at Wakas,
San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila and covered by Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the
complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes
for the homeless through a socialized housing project.

In an Order dated February 4, 1994, the trial court authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property
upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its
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current tax declaration. Private respondent filed its answer alleging in the main that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by the Local
Government Code. The trial court then nullified its February 4, 1994 order and dismissed the case. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's resolution. Hence, this petition.

The Supreme Court held that the petition is not meritorious. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of government which may delegate the exercise thereof to local government units, other public
entities and public utilities. A local government unit may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints, imposed through the
law conferring the power or in other legislations.

A local government unit, like the Municipality of Parañaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of private
property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly
requires an ordinance or a law for the purpose. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance
is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the complaint for expropriation which
was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause
of action. On the other hand, the principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the
expropriation of the same property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied with.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

BY AN LGU; A MUNICIPALITY MAY EXERCISE THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN PURSUANT
ONLY TO AN ORDINANCE AND NOT A MERE RESOLUTION. — Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates
to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows:
"Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor
and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws: . . . In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
authorized through an ordinance. If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did
not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically
requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT DOES NOT
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION; REASON. — It is hornbook doctrine that ". . . in a motion to dismiss based on
the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted before the court for
determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are true or not
is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to
be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint?" The fact that there
is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere
resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's Decision which
dismissed the expropriation suit.
3. ID.; EMINENT DOMAIN NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA. — The Court holds that the principle of res
judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its
agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State,
dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata.
The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every form of property which the State
might need for public use." All separate interests of individuals in property are held by the government under this
tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest
and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their
sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest
requires it." Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason
alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.

c. Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 41631, 17 December 1976

While the Revised Charter of the City of Manila requires publication before the enactment of the ordinance and
after the approval thereof in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, the Local Tax Code only
prescribes for publication after the approval of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges"
either in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government or by
posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government. Petitioners' compliance with the Local Tax Code rather than with
the Revised Charter of the City spawned this litigation.
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There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City
of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments.
Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as one relating
to particular persons or things of a class. 1 And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily
repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that
the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other
as the law of a particular case. 2 However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a
subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular. The exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the
case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e.,
irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances
levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it
approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the
Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision. 3 Special
provision governs. 4 This is especially true where the law containing the particular provision was enacted later
than the one containing the general provision. The City Charter of Manila was promulgated on June 18, 1949 as
against the Local Tax Code which was decreed on June 1, 1973. The law-making power cannot be said to have
intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems upon the same subject, or to leave in force
provisions of a prior law by which the new will of the legislating power may be thwarted and overthrown. Such a
result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the law to the reproach of uncertainty and
unintelligibility.

In fact, there is no rule which prohibits the repeal even by implication of a special or specific act by a general or
broad one. 7 A charter provision may be impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute, and where a statute
is controlling, it must be read into the charter notwithstanding any particular charter provision. 8 A subsequent
general law similarly applicable to all cities prevails over any conflicting charter provision, for the reason that a
charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of the state. 9 A chartered city is not an
independent sovereignty. The state remains supreme in all matters not purely local. Otherwise stated, a charter
must yield to the constitution and general laws of the state, it is to have read into it that general law which governs
the municipal corporation and which the corporation cannot set aside but to which it must yield. When a city
adopts a charter, it in effect adopts as part of its charter general law of such character.

5. MANNER OF COMPUTING TIME

a. Civil Code, Article 13

b. Administrative Code, Book I, Chapter 8, Section 31
c. Administrative Code, Book I, Chapter 7, Section 28

CHAPTER 7
REGULAR HOLIDAYS AND NATIONWIDE SPECIAL DAYS

Section 26. Regular Holidays and Nationwide Special Days. -

1. Unless otherwise modified by law, order or proclamation, the following regular holidays and special days shall
be observed in this country:
(A) Regular Holidays
New Year's Day January 1
Maundy Thursday Movable date
Good Friday Movable date
Araw ng Kagitingan April 9
Labor Day May 1
Independence Day June 12
National Heroes Day Last Sunday of August
Bonifacio Day November 30
Christmas Day December 25
Rizal Day December 30
(B) Nationwide Special Days
All Saints Day November 1
Last Day of the Year December 31

(2) The terms "legal or regular holiday" and "special holiday", as used in laws, orders, rules and regulations or
other issuances shall be referred to as "regular holiday" and "special day", respectively.

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Section 27. Local Special Days. - The President may proclaim any local special day for a particular date, group or
place.

Section 28. Pretermission of Holiday. - Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by
law falls on a regular holiday or special day, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day.

CHAPTER 8
LEGAL WEIGHTS MEASURES AND PERIOD

Section 29. Official Use of Metric System. - The metric system of weights and measures shall be used in the
Philippines for all products, articles, goods, commodities, materials, merchandise, utilities, services, as well as for
commercial transactions like contracts, agreements, deeds and other legal instruments publicly and officially
attested, and for all official documents. Only weights and measures of the metric system shall be officially sealed
and licensed.

Section 30. Mandatory Nation-wide Use. - The metric system shall be fully adopted in all agricultural,
commercial, industrial, scientific and other sectors. Persons or entities allowed under existing laws to use the
English system or other standards and weights are given until the date to be fixed by the Metric System Board to
adopt the metric system.

Section 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days,
unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days
the specific month contains; "day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and "night," from sunset to sunrise.

d. National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson, G.R. No. 29131, 27 August 1969

1. CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; ACTION FOR REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT; PERIOD

THEREFOR. — Pursuant to Article 1144-(3) of our Civil Code,an action upon a judgment "must be brought
within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues," which, in the language of Art. 1152 of the same Code
"commences from the time judgment sought to be revived has become final."

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIBED IN INSTANT CASE. — An action for revival of judgment which become
final on December 21, 1955, was filed on December 21, 1965. The lower court dismissed the action on the ground
of prescription, it having found that the aggregate of 10 years or 3,650 days from December 21, 1955 expired on
December 19, 1965, there being two leap years with the month of February of 29 days. HELD: The order of
dismissal should be affirmed. Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines limits the computation of each "year" to
365 days.

3. ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF MONTHS; JURISPRUDENCE. — Prior to the approval of the Civil Code
of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof had held on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a
"natural" month or "solar" month, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. Such provision was
incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared
that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said Code, "whenever months . . . are referred to in the law, it shall be understood that
the months are of 30 days," not the "natural," "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are "designated by name,"
in which case "they shall be computed by the actual number of days they have." This concept was later, modified
in the Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, pursuant to which, "month shall be
understood to refer to a calendar month." In the language of this Court, in People vs. Del Rosario "with the
approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) . . . we have reverted to the provisions of the
Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month and not the
solar or civil month," with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or
nights," ours has added thereto the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of
three hundred sixty-five days."

4. SUPREME COURT; NO POWER OF LEGISLATION BY JUDICIAL DECREE. — Where, by upholding the

theory of appellant, Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is ignored and Section 13 of the Revised
Administrative Code is revived, the Court by such an interpretation would be engaging in judicial legislation, and
in effect, repealing an act of Congress. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the
Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.

e. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., G.R. No.

162155, August 28, 2007

As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be
equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson, 25 we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365
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days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. However, in 1987, EO 27 292 or the Administrative
Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:

Sec. 31.Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of
thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours
and; "night" from sunrise to sunset.

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain." 28
It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the
corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month,
then up to and including the last day of that month." 29 To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31,
2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from
February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008. 30

A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and abrogated by another)
or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with the previous one).
31 Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:

Sec. 27.Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the
laws to be abolished. 32 Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the
Administrative Code of 1987.

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and unmistakably intended
by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former
law and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled. 33

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal
with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to
365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is
composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is
irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code
and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori
derogat priori.

f. PNB v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 134, G.R. No. 98382, May 17, 1993

1.CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; "WEEK." DEFINED. — It must be conceded that
Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what is a "week". In Concepcion vs. Zandueta (36 O.G. 3139
[1938]; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, Second Ed., 1972, p. 660), this term was interpreted to mean as a
period of time consisting of seven consecutive days a definition which dovetails with the ruling in E.M. Derby
and Co. vs. City of Modesto, et al. (38 Pac. Rep. 900 [1984]; 1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated,
Twelfth Ed., 1989, p. 88; 1 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, 1990, p. 46).

2.ID.; ACT NO. 3135 AS AMENDED BY ACT NO. 4118; MORTGAGE; FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE
MUST BE PUBLISHED "AT LEAST TWO WEEKS" BEFORE SALE; PUBLICATION OF NOTICE ON THE
FIRST DAY OF THE THIRD WEEK, NON-COMPLIANCE THEREOF. — Following the interpretation in
Derby as to the publication of an ordinance for "at last two weeks" in some newspaper that: . . . . here there is no
date or event suggesting the exclusion of the first day's publication from the computation, and the cases above
cited take this case out of the rule stated in Section 12, Code Civ. Proc. which excludes the first day and includes
the last; the publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as sufficient advertisement for the second
week because the period for the first week should be reckoned from March 28, 1969 until April 3, 1969 while the
second week should be counted from April 4, 1969 until April 10, 1969. It is clear that the announcement on April
11, 1969 was both theoretically and physically accomplished during the first day of the third week and cannot
thus be equated with compliance in law. Indeed, where the word is used simply as a measure of duration of time
and without reference to the calendar, it means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the
week on which it begins (1 Tolentino, supra at p. 467 citing Derby).

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 g. Garvida v. Sales, Jr., 271 SCRA 767, G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997

1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991; SEC. 532 (a), PROVIDES WHICH LAW
SHALL COVER AND WHICH GOVERNING BODY SHALL, SUPERVISE THE CONDUCT OF THE SK
ELECTIONS. — Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK
elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election Code. The
Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy, viz; "Sec. 78, Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate
of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before election." In
relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC
on the ground that the candidate has made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition may be
heard and evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided
by the COMELEC itself. Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of
candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be
entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or
ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or
rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore the COMELEC
sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases. This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules thus:
"Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and
decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt and
special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arms of the Commission.

2. ID.; ELECTIONS; COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURES; PROVIDES FOR THE FORMAL

REQUIREMENTS OF PLEADINGS FILED WITH THE COMELEC. — Formal requirements of pleadings
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure: "Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. — Every pleading, motion and other
papers must be filed in ten (10) legible copies. However, when there is more than one respondent or protestee, the
petitioner or protestant must file additional number of copies of the petition or protest as there are additional
respondents or protestees. Sec. 2. How Filed. — The documents referred to in the immediately preceding section
must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the Commission personally, or, unless otherwise provided
in these Rules, by registered mail. In the latter case, the date of mailing is the date of filing and the requirement as
to the number of copies must be complied with. Sec. 3. Form of pleadings, etc. — All pleadings allowed by these
Rules shall be printed, mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper shall be in English or Filipino. . . ."
Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and
filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the
COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT SANCTION A PLEADING FILED BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION. — A
facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic
matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area
by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via
microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position
and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on
paper referred to as a facsimile. Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at
best, in exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on
its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his
counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.

4. ID.; ID.; KATIPUNAN NG KABATAAN; SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN (SK); COMPOSITION AND

TERMS OF OFFICE. — The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not
more than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The
chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of the Sanggunian Barangay. A member of the SK holds
office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies
or resigns from office. Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down
by the Local Government Code of 1991.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS; OF MEMBERS; OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS. — Under Section 424
of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an
actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly
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registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires
that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d)
at least 15 years but not more 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must
not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2824 DEFINED HOW A MEMBER OF THE
KATIPUNAN NG KABATAAN BECOMES A QUALIFIED VOTER AND AN ELECTIVE OFFICIAL. — For
the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified
voter and an elective official. A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6,
1996 SK elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not more than 21 years of age on election day, i.e., the
voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at
least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the
barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AGE QUALIFICATIONS; DISTINGUISHED. — A closer look at the Local Government
Code will reveal a distinction between the maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the
maximum age of an elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21 years only.
There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section
428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The
addition of the phrase "on the day of his election" is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21
years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective
official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day, of election. The distinction is understandable
considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. (Of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar.) The courts
may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or
qualification. The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he
lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. In the same vein, if the candidate is over the
maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected will not
make the age requirement directory, nor will it validate his election. The will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT MORE THAN 21 YEARS OF AGE; CONSTRUED. — The provision that an
elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day, of his election is very clear. The
Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that
years are of 365 days each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the
365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21
years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a
fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-days cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not
equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate be
less than 22 years on election day.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE AND EXCEPTION. — The general rule is that an elective official of the
Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is
when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to
serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the youth leader
must have "been elected prior to his 21st birthday. Conversely, the SK official must not have turned 21 years old
before his election. Reading Section 423 [b] together with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK
elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth official must
therefore be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his
election.

10. ID.; ID.; AGE QUALIFICATION, A QUESTION OF ELIGIBILITY; CONSEQUENCE OF NON-

COMPLIANCE; CASE AT BAR. — The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared elected. A
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. Moreover, despite his claims, private respondent has
failed to prove that the electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner's ineligibility and that they maliciously
voted for her with the intention of misapplying their franchises and throwing away their votes for the benefit of
her rival candidate. Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the Local Government Code
petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the next higher number of
votes in the May 6, 1996 elections. Section 435 applies when a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is
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removed from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months." The question
of the age qualification is a question of eligibility. Being "eligible" means being "legally qualified; capable of
being legally chosen." Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section
435 for succession of the SK Chairman.

h. Vir-jen Shipping v. NLRC, G.R. No. 58011, 20 July 1982

At first glance it might seem that the judgment of the NLRC should have more weight than that of NSB. Having
in view, however, the set up and relationship of these two entities framed by the Labor Code, the NSB is not only
charged directly with the administration of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment
by seeing to it that our seamen "secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and
secure compliance therewith". Its composition as of the time this controversy arose is worth noting — for it is
made up of the Minister of Labor as Chairman, the Deputy Minister as Vice Chairman, and a representative each
of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Education and Culture, the Central Bank, the Bureau of
Employment Service, a worker's organization and an employee's organization and the Executive Director of the
Overseas Employment Development Board. (Article 23, Labor Code) It is such a board that has to approve all
contracts of Filipino seamen (Article 18, Labor Code). And after such approval, the contract becomes unalterable,
it being "unlawful" under Article 34 of the Code "for any individual, entity, licensee or holder of authority: (i) to
substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by Department of Labor from the time of actual
signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the
Department of Labor." In other words, it is not only that contracts may not be altered or modified or amended
without mutual consent of the parties thereto; it is further necessary to have the change approved by the
Department, otherwise, the guilty parties would be penalized.

i. Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, G.R. No. 28841, 24 July 1983

1.CRIMINAL LAW; LIGHT OFFENSES; PRESCRIPTION; COMPUTATION OF PERIOD. — Under Article

90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses prescribe in two months. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that
when the law speak of months, it shall be understood that months are of thirty days each. The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The term of prescription shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

2.ID.; STATUTE OF LIMITATION IN CRIMINAL CASES; NATURE ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM

STATUTE OF LIMITATION IN CIVIL SUITS. — The case at hands does not involve the simple issue of when
to do an act. It deals with the prescription of a criminal action. Under unquestioned authorities, the question to be
resolved is when the State is deemed to have lost or waived its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished
by law. "We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying to statutes of limitation in
criminal suits the construction that has been given statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two classes of statutes,
however, are essentially different. In civil suits the statute is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter
between two contending parties. In the construction of the statue, therefore, there is no intendment to be made in
favor of either party. Neither grants the right to the other; there is therefore no grantor against whom the ordinary
presumptions of construction are to be made. But it is otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the
State. Here the State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and declaring the offense
to be no longer the subject of prosecution. The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly
applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender
shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he
may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt and blotted out.

3.ID.; RULES DEALING WITH THE COMPUTATION OF TIME ALLOWED TO PERFORM A

PARTICULAR ACT; INAPPLICABLE TO STATUTE OF LIMITATION IN CRIMINAL CASES. — The rules
contained in Section 31 of the Revise Administrative Code and Section 1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court deal
with the computation of time allowed to do a particular act, such as, the filling of tax returns on or before a
definite date, filing an answer to a complainant, taking an appeal, etc. they do not apply to lengthen the period
fixed by the State for it to prosecute those who committed a crime against it. The waiver or loss of the right to
prosecute such offenders is automatic and by operation of law. Where the sixtieth and last day to file an
information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the next working
day. Prescription has automatically set in. The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution to file the information on the
last working day before the criminal offense prescribes.

RELOVA, J., dissenting:

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REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION; WHERE THE LAST
DAY OF FILLING THEREOF FELL ON A SUNDAY OR HOLIDAY, THE SAME MAY BE FILED ON THE
NEXT SUCCEEDING BUSINESS DAY. — Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
"where the day or the last day, for doing an act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be
done on the next succeeding business day." In the case at bar since the last day within which ti file the complaint
or information in court fell on a Sunday, the filing thereof may be done on the next succeeding business day.

6. EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS UNTIL REPEALED

a. Concept of Temporary Statutes

In form, temporary legislation merely sets a date on which an agency, regulation, or statutory scheme will
terminate unless affirmative action satisfying the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment is
taken by the legislature.1 In function however, temporary legislation differs systematically from permanent
legislation in significant ways that implicate core problems of institutional design, inter-temporal allocation of
political control within the legislature, the ability of concentrated interest both to lobby for rents and to have rents
extracted from them by legislators, the production and aggregation of information and expertise in the policy-
making process, and the transaction costs of enacting and maintaining public policy. Temporary and permanent
laws differ only in their respective default rules; but given the magnitude of transaction costs in legislatures, the
import of that difference is remarkable. Both because temporary legislation constitutes so significant a portion of
the overall legislative docket and because of the far-reaching impact on law and politics, more extensive and
nuanced analysis of temporary legislation is critical. This Article represents the first systematic attempt to analyze
the historical, legal, and political implications of temporary legislation.

b. Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5, 17 September 1945

1. POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW; VALIDITY OF ACTS OF "DE FACTO" GOVERNMENT. —

It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid.

2. ID.; KINDS OF "FACTO" GOVERNMENTS. — There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or
government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by
force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the
latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first the Parliament and later by Cromwell as
Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the
cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the in the war of 1812, and of Tampico,
Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the third is that established
as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state,
such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt against the Union during the war of secession.

3. ID.; DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF SECOND KIND OF "DE FACTO" GOVERNMENT. —

The distinguishing characteristics of the second kind of de facto government, more aptly denominated a
government of paramount force, are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power within the
territories and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exist it
must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission
to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the
rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and
conditions. They are usually administered by military authority, but they may be administered, also, by civil
authority, supported more or less directly by military force.

4. ID.; ID.; POWERS AND DUTIES OF GOVERNMENT OF PARAMOUNT FORCE. — The powers and
duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the Hague Convention of 1907,
which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of Military Authority
over Hostile Territory. Article 43 of said Section III provides that "the authority of the legitimate power having
actually passed into the hands of the occupants, the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and issue,
as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country."

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION, A "DE FACTO" GOVERNMENT OF THE
SECOND KIND. — It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No.
1, issued on January 23, 1942 by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by
the military forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de
facto government of the second Kind. It was not different from the government established by the British in
Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "the government established over
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an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the
conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence
whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its
authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so far as it concerns the
inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its
acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military
government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OF SAME CHARACTER AS PHILIPPINE
EXECUTIVE COMMISSION. — The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and
organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and
reality, a government established by the belligerent occupants or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the
same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same —
the Japanese military authority and government. Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the
Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latest sovereignty of, the Filipino
people, before its military occupation and possession of the islands had matured into an absolute and permanent
dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-
established doctrine in international law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hague Convention of 1907 (which
prohibits compulsion of the population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power), that
belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory
controlled although the de jure government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its
rights as such. Even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino people
who, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, had organized an independent
government under that name with the support and backing of Japan, such government would have been
considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state of the United
States. And, as such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that organized by the confederate states
during the war of secession and recognized by the as such by the Supreme Court of the United States in numerous
cases; and similar to the short-lived government established by the Filipino insurgents in the Islands of Cebu
during the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de facto government by same court in the case of McCleod vs.
United States (229 U. S., 416).

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; VALIDITY OF JUDICIAL ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF PHILIPPINE EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AFTER REOCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES.
— The governments of the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during Japanese
military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by
virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of
General Douglas MacArthur.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR ANNULLING ALL
"PROCESSES OF ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINE." — The phrase "processes of any
other government" is broad and may refer not only to judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative,
as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines of other governmental agencies established
in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, according to the well-
known principles of international law all judgments and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political
complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and
remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be
presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the
phrase "processes of any other government" in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of
said principles of international law. The only reasonable construction of the said phrase is that it refers to
governmental processes other than judicial processes or court proceedings, for according to a well-known rule of
statutory construction, set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains."

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF COMMONWEALTH TO CONTINUE PROCEEDINGS IN

ACTIONS PENDING IN COURTS DURING JAPANESE MILITARY OCCUPATION. — Although in theory
the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military
occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own
hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined,
unless absolutely prevented, to respect. Following this practice and the precepts of the law of nations, the
Commander in Chief of the Japanese forces proclaimed on January 3, 1943, when Manila was occupied, the
military administration under martial law over the territory occupied by the army, and ordered that "all the laws
now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for
the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present post and carry on faithfully
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their duties as before." When the Philippine Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese
Commander in Chief, on January 23, 1943, the Chairman of the Executive Commission, by Executive Orders
Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and February 5, respectively, continued the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court
of First Instance, and justices of the peace courts, with the same jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions
given by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese army in Order No.3 of February 20, 1942. And on
October 14, 1943 when the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts were continued
with no substantial change in the organization and jurisdiction thereof. If the proceedings pending in the different
courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military
administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to
reason the same courts, which become reestablished and conceived of as having been in continued existence upon
the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law,
7th ed., p. 526), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting
a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTINUITY OF LAW. — It is a legal maxim that, excepting that of a political nature, "Law
once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. It is not changed merely by
chance of sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary section 9, citing
Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws
(Cambridge, 1916, section 131): "There can be no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into
existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of human
society. Once created, it persist until a change takes place, and when changed it continues in such changed
condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to amend; in
spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative act creates a
change." As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence depends upon that of the laws which create and
confer upon them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being of a political nature, are not abrogated
by a change of sovereignty, and continues in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative
acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly continued is not necessary in order that they may
continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the intention of respecting and not repealing
those laws. As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued
by or transferred to another court, are not required by the mere change of government or sovereignty. They are
necessary only in case the former courts are abolished or their jurisdiction so changed that they can no longer
continue taking cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the
courts having jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings.

c. William F. Peralta v. The Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-49, 12 November 1945

1. CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH AND CONSTITUTION OF THE SO-

CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — As the so-called
Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount force), the questions
involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government,
because the belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying
out the administration over said territory (Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. II, Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944,
p. 342); and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases involving the validity
of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States, considered as de facto governments of the third kind,
does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippines which is a de facto government of
paramount force. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied, since the
validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant, whose
criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations.

2. VALIDITY OF THE CREATION OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL AND EXCLUSIVE CRIMINAL

JURISDICTION — The so called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the
belligerent occupant, had the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of a political complexion, for it is a mere
governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its
judgments and sentences may be of political complexion or not depending upon the nature or character of the law
so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question.

3. VALIDITY OF THE SUMMARY PROCEDURE ADOPTED FOR SAID COURT. — With respect to the
summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, and followed in the trial of the case which resulted in the
conviction of the herein petitioner, there is also no question as to the power or competence of the belligerent
occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon
the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones, especially the criminal law as well
as the laws regarding procedure, so far as it is necessary for military purposes, that is, for his control of the
territory and the safety and protection of his army, are those imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. It is obvious that
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the summary procedure under consideration does not violate these precepts. It cannot be considered as violating
the laws of humanity and public conscience, for it is less objectionable, even from the point of view of those who
are used to the accusatory system of criminal procedure, than the procedural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial
or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in continental Europe.

4. VALIDITY OF ACT NO. 65 OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES. — It was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the
National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes
the crimes of robbery and other offenses as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a
state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of
the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations. They are not the same
ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. 65 are those
committed by persons charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and
distribution of foods and other necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and
much heavier than those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized by
said Act were taken out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called martial law by
international jurists, defined above by Hyde, in order, not only to prevent food and other necessaries from
reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the
country, but also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that in case of necessity, the Imperial
Japanese forces could easily requisition them, as they did, and as they had the right to do in accordance with the
law of nations for their maintenance and subsistence (Art LII, sec. III, Hague Conventions of 1907). Especially
taking into consideration the fact, of which this court may take judicial notice, that the Imperial Japanese Army
had depended mostly for their supply upon the produce of this country.

5. POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE CRIMES PENALIZED BY SAID ACT NO. 65 AND ORDINANCE
NO. 7 OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. — The crimes
penalized by Act No. 65 — as well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations, and the crimes
against public order, penalized by Ordinance No. 7 and placed under the jurisdiction of the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction — are all of a political complexion, because the acts constituting those offenses
were punished, as are all political offenses, for public rather than private reasons, and were acts in aid or favor of
the enemy and directed against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant.

6. VALIDITY OF SENTENCES DURING OCCUPATION FOR CRIMES OF POLITICAL COMPLEXION,

AFTER REOCCUPATION OR LIBERATION. — The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and
valid during the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso
facto upon the reoccupation of these Islands and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.
(Hall's International Law, seventh edition, p. 518; Westlake, International Law, Part Ii, War, pp. 97, 98;
Wheaton's International Law, War, seventh edition, 1944, p. 245.)

Per PERFECTO, J., concurring:

7. ORDINANCE NO. 7 NULLIFIED BY OCTOBER PROCLAMATION. — Ordinance No. 7 issued by

President Laurel, of the "Republic of the Philippines" under the Japanese regime, was nullified by the
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944.

8. THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION. — The October Proclamation was issued by General MacArthur in
keeping with the official statement issued by the President of the United States of October 23, 1943, denying
recognition or sympathy to the collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" and the Laurel "Philippine
Republic."

9. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. — Ordinance No. 7 is incompatible with the

fundamental principles and essential safeguards in criminal procedure, universally recognized in civilized modern
nations, and can only be justified by a retrogressive and reactionary mentality developed under the social, cultural,
and political atmosphere of the era of darkness.

10. WARRANTS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE. — The provisions of Ordinance no. 7 as to issuance of search
warrants are repugnant to the Filipino sense of right in the matter of warrants of search and seizure, sense of right
which has been clearly and definitely stereotyped in Art. III, Sec. 1 (3), of the Constitution of the Philippines.
Under the Constitution of the Philippines, search warrants should be issued only by a judge.

11. HABEAS CORPUS — Section 7 of Ordinance No. 7, suspending the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus,
is violative of one of the fundamental guarantees in the Constitution of the Philippines.

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12. SELF-INCRIMINATION — The criminal procedure authorized by Ordinance No. 7, in relation with
Executive Order No. 157, is violative of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.

13. REVOLTING PROCEDURE. — The procedure provided under Ordinance No. 7 is so revolting, so
nauseating, and so opposed to human nature, that it takes real courage to keep one's equanimity when analyzing it.
It is beyond comprehension how a man, endowed with reason, could devise such an execrable system of judicial
procedure, which is but a shameless mockery of the administration of justice.

14. THE GUARANTEE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION SHOULD BE RETAINED JEALOUSY — It is

necessary to be careful to retain jealously the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. It was acquired
as a result of protests against all inquisitorial and third degree procedure.

15. THIRD DEGREE PROCEDURES. — We must not forget that even during normal times, under the twentieth
century lights, just before the last global war started, in America and in the Philippines, it was heard not rarely
denunciations of third degree procedures employed by agents of the law. This very Supreme Court, not only once,
had to deal with cases where such tactics were conclusively proved. Even today, among criminal cases we have
under consideration, there is evidence of confessions exacted through cruel and brutal means.

16. EVERYBODY'S SECURITY JEOPARDIZED. — Even with the existence of the constitutional guarantee
against self-incrimination, there are officers of the law who cannot resist the temptation of using their power to
compel, through third degree methods, innocent of guilty persons to admit involuntarily real or imaginary
offenses. Let us allow changes tending to nullify the protection against self- incrimination, and no man, however
innocent be may be, shall be secure in his person, in his liberty, in his honor, in his life.

17. APPEAL IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF ALL ACCUSED. — Under the provisions of the Constitution
of the Philippines (Art. VIII, sec. 2), the right of appeal has been recognized as one of the fundamental rights of
all accused in the Philippines.

18. ID., REASONS OF THE DRAFTERS OF THE CONSTITUTION. — The drafters of our Constitution, taught
by the unerring lessons of human experience, came to the conclusion that mistake is one of the most irretrievable
human weaknesses. To reduce to the minimum the effects of such innate human weakness, they provided n our
fundamental law that appeal to the highest tribunal of the land may be enjoyed by any accused.

19. INSTRUMENTALITY IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE. — The Supreme Court is just one of the
instrumentalities created by the Constitution in the service of the people. It is one of the means considered
necessary to better serve the supreme interest of the people.

20. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS ABRIDGED. — The summary procedure in criminal cases under
Ordinance No. 7 abridged the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

21. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE VIOLATED. — The summary procedure established by Ordinance No. 7
violates the constitutional principle that all accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved
beyond all reasonable doubt.

22. THE HAGUE CONVENTION. — The Hague Convention of 1899 is flagrantly violated by the enactment of
Ordinance No. 7.

23. INTERNATIONAL LAW. — Under international law, under the most elemental principles of law, the
legitimate government, once restored to his own territory, after expelling the invader, enjoys the absolute freedom
of not recognizing or by nullifying any and all acts of the invader.

24. DECISION RENDERED UNDER FOREIGN AUTHORITY UNENFORCEABLE. — The decision is by

which petitioner was convicted and is being held for life, having been rendered by a tribunal created, functioning,
and acting under the authority of a foreign state, the Emperor or the Imperial Government of Japan, is
unenforceable.

25. VESTIGES OF A PEOPLE SPIRITUALLY PERVERTED AND DEBASED. — The process and judgment
under which petitioner has been convicted is one of the hateful vestiges left in our country by the moral savagery
of a people spiritually perverted and debased. We must erase those vestiges if we want to keep immune from all
germs of decay the democratic institutions which are the pride of our people and country.

26. PERFECTION OF ELEMENTAL HUMAN CONCEPTS.— The procedure here in question exhibits either
inversion, retroversion, subversion, or perversion of elemental human concepts. It ignores completely the high
purposes of a judicial procedure.
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 d. Laurel v. Misa, G.R. No. L-409, 30 January 1947

1. INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ALLEGIANCE OF CITIZEN OR SUBJECT TO

SOVEREIGN; NATURE OF. — A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and
permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF ENEMY OCCUPATION. — The absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not
transferred thereby to the occupier.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SOVEREIGNTY, EFFECT ON, OF ENEMY OCCUPATION. — The subsistence of the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during a war,
"although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of
international law of our times."

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; "TEMPORARY ALLEGIANCE" SIMILAR TO ALLEGIANCE OF FOREIGNER TO

GOVERNMENT OF HIS RESIDENCE. — The words "temporary allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and
other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy
toward the military government established over them, may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary
allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for
the protection he receives and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen
residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TREASON IN FOREIGN COUNTRY AND IN TERRITORY UNDER MILITARY
OCCUPATION. — Just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted
of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military
forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the
enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 114 OF REVISED PENAL CODE, APPLICABILITY OF. — Article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter
during the enemy occupation.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF MILITARY OCCUPANT TO CHANGE LAWS OR MAKE NEW ONES. —
Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he
has, nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing
laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is
necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the
restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws
of humanity and the requirements of public conscience.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MILITARY OCCUPANT CANNOT REPEAL OR SUSPEND OPERATION OF LAW OF
TREASON. — Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or
subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or
forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a
corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE, EFFECT OF THEORY OF, ADOPTED. — Adoption of the
petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or
states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow
invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own
government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are
not to aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and
conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty —such theory
would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the
nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by
them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide.

10. ID., SOVEREIGNTY, IN WHOM DOES IT RESIDE. — Sovereignty resides in the people of the Philippines.

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 11. ID.; ID.; COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT. — The
Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to certain
limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY, POLITICAL. — The question of sovereignty is "a purely
political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government
conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officer, citizens and subjects of the country."

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC, RIGHT OF, TO PROSECUTE TREASON COMMITTED DURING
JAPANESE OCCUPATION. — Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State
Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the
sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the
change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those
charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same
government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that: "The government
established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine Independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines."

CHAPTER IV
CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

I. LITERAL INTERPRETATION

1. VERBA LEGIS

a. Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC & Estrada, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to
wit:

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws,
rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of
the Commission.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction;
and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of
statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

In Cristobal v. Labrador, and Pelobello v. Palatino, which were decided under the 1935 Constitution, wherein the
provision granting pardoning power to the President shared similar phraseology with what is found in the present
1987 Constitution, the Court then unequivocally declared that "subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action." The Court reiterated
this pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. 29 thereby establishing that, under the present Constitution, "a
pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action." Thus, it is
unmistakably the long-standing position of this Court that the exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in
the President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits
provided for by the Constitution.

This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President's power of pardon by acts of Congress,
specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987
Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power of the
President in the form of "offenses involving graft and corruption" that would be enumerated and defined by
Congress through the enactment of a law.
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It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum.
From the words of a statute there should be no departure. 31 It is this Court's firm view that the phrase in the
presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights" substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.

b. Trade Investment Development Corp. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182249,
March 5, 2013

The CSC's rule-making power, albeit constitutionally granted, is still limited to the implementation and
interpretation of the laws it is tasked to enforce.

The 1987 Constitution created the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government mandated to establish a
career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil
service. 26 It is a constitutionally created administrative agency that possesses executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-
legislative or rule-making powers.

While not explicitly stated, the CSC's rule-making power is subsumed under its designation as the government's
"central personnel agency" in Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. The original draft of Section 3
empowered the CSC to "promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions, classify positions, prescribe
conditions of employment except as to compensation and other monetary benefits which shall be provided by
law." This, however, was deleted during the constitutional commission's deliberations because it was redundant to
the CSC's nature as an administrative agency

The 1987 Administrative Code then spelled out the CSC's rule-making power in concrete terms in Section 12,
Book V, Title I-A, which empowered the CSC to implement the civil service law and other pertinent laws, and to
promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the civil service. 29

The CSC's rule-making power as a constitutional grant is an aspect of its independence as a constitutional
commission. It places the grant of this power outside the reach of Congress, which cannot withdraw the power at
any time. As we said in Gallardo v. Tabamo, Jr.,30 a case which upheld the validity of a resolution issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC),another constitutional commission:

Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory authority to grant the
Commission broader and more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from
legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw
the same at any time. Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly independent Commission on Elections
committed to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the
people's sacred right of suffrage — the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of government and
in achieving and promoting political stability.

But while the grant of the CSC's rule-making power is untouchable by Congress, the laws that the CSC interprets
and enforces fall within the prerogative of Congress. As an administrative agency, the CSC's quasi-legislative
power is subject to the same limitations applicable to other administrative bodies. The rules that the CSC
formulates must not override, but must be in harmony with, the law it seeks to apply and implement

2. DURA LEX SED LEX

a. Revaldo v. People, G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of the Forestry Code, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.

As the Court held in People v. Que, in the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of
cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued
by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and
removal of the forest products are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents
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 consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because the Forestry
Code is a special law which considers mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
documentation as malum prohibitum.

On whether the police officers had the authority to arrest petitioner, even without a warrant, Section 80 of the
Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the PNP to arrest,
even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses
defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense
or the forest products gathered or taken by the offender. Section 80 reads:

Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. — A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or
any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even
without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government,
the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or
taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense…

Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when the police officers accosted
him. In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as
well as the fact that he did not have any legal documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber
for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documentation
consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law.

b. Sagana v. Francisco, G.R. No.161952, October 2, 2009

It is, at times, difficult to reconcile the letter of the law with its spirit. Thus, it is not altogether surprising that two
competing values are usually discernable in every controversy — the principle of dura lex sed lex versus the
notion that technicalities should yield to broader interests of justice. In our rules of procedure, for instance, judges
often struggle to find a balance between due process considerations and a liberal construction to secure a just
disposition of every action. In such cases, where a measure of discretion is permitted, courts must tread carefully,
with due consideration of the factual milieu and legal principles involved. In so doing, we take steps —
sometimes tentative, sometimes bold — to apply prior experience and precedent towards an eventual just
resolution. It is these principles that animate our decision in the instant case.

We do not intend this ruling to overturn jurisprudence to the effect that statutory requirements of substituted
service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully, and that any substituted service other than that authorized
by the Rules is considered ineffective. 32 However, an overly strict application of the Rules is not warranted in
this case, as it would clearly frustrate the spirit of the law as well as do injustice to the parties, who have been
waiting for almost 15 years for a resolution of this case. We are not heedless of the widespread and flagrant
practice whereby defendants actively attempt to frustrate the proper service of summons by refusing to give their
names, rebuffing requests to sign for or receive documents, or eluding officers of the court. Of course it is to be
expected that defendants try to avoid service of summons, prompting this Court to declare that, "the sheriff must
be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant". 33 However, sheriffs are
not expected to be sleuths, and cannot be faulted where the defendants themselves engage in deception to thwart
the orderly administration of justice.

II. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION

1. STATUTES MUST BE CAPABLE OF INTERPRETATION

a. Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; COMELEC'S FAILURE TO ACT ON

MOTION TO DISMISS AND ITS INSISTENCE TO HOLD ON TO THE PETITION RENDERED RIPE AND
VIABLE THE PETITION UNDER SECTION 2 OF RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT. — Except for the
petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for
this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. . . It
must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. The COMELEC made no
ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on
12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. The
COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold onto the petition rendered ripe
and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

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2. ID.; ID.; THE COURT MAY BRUSH ASIDE TECHNICALITIES OF PROCEDURE IN CASES OF
TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE. — The Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure in cases of
transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.: A Party's standing before this Court
is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of
issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS; PROVISION ON

THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO DIRECTLY PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, NOT
SELF-EXECUTORY. — Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. In his book, Joaquin
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated: Without implementing legislation Section 2
cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action. Bluntly stated the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain
entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise,
while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; R.A. 6735; INTENDED TO COVER INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION. — We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No.
17. The former was prepared by the committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of Representatives on the basis
of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, which dealt with the initiative and referendum
mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, which dealt with the
subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article XVII of
the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 solely, dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or
resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the
House of Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONGRESS, INVESTED WITH THE POWER TO PROVIDE FOR THE RULES
IMPLEMENTING THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT. — There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to
implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or
rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of
Section 2 of Article XVII then reading: "The Congress shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise
of this right with the Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right." This substitute
amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules implementing the exercise of the
right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried out."

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE POWER AND DUTY OF CONGRESS TO
PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT. — First, Contrary to the
assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to
the Constitution. The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is
neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national
laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As
pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not
accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through
the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."' . . . Second. It is
true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and
mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of
the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Section 5 paragraph (c) requires, among other things, a statement of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approve or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents
of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. . . . The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle, II) and for
Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. . . . The
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foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms
and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive
matter are fatal and. cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act."

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBTITLING OF THE ACT, NOT ACCURATE. — A further examination of the Act even
reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, (2) that portion of Section 1] (Indirect
Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local governments, and (3) Section 12 on
Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the
petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and local initiative and
referendum.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 18 ON AUTHORITY OF COURTS UNDER SUBTITLE ON LOCAL
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM, MISPLACED. — Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on
Local Initiative and Referendum is misplaced, since the provision therein applies to both national and local
initiative and referendum.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILED TO GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION ON THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT BEING THE PARAMOUNT
SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE. — While R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the
details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them
special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its
twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions the word "Constitution" in Section 2. (b) defines "initiative on the
Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of
"plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition, in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or
rejected by the people., (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign
the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition. There was, therefore, an
obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a
humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip
service.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARGUMENT THAT INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION IS
SUBSUMED UNDER SUBTITLE ON NATIONAL INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM, NOT ACCEPTABLE.
— We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National
Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the
classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is national
initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass.
It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the
legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
can pass. This classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER TO VALIDLY PROMULGATE RULES
AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO DIRECTLY
PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION UNDER R.A. 6735. — It logically follows that the
COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power
under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution
is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a)
Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DELFIN PETITION, DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE
SIGNATURES OF THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF VOTERS. — Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at
least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3%
of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters.
Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to
obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed
validly initiated.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DELFIN PETITION, NOTHING MORE THAN A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER. — The
COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
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pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. . . . Since the Delfin Petition
is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or
given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not
fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No.
2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely
entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should
not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order
directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

14. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ; DELEGATION OF POWER; WHAT HAS BEEN
DELEGATED CANNOT BE DELEGATED; EXCEPTIONS THEREOF. — The rule is that what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. The
recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section
28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2)
of Article VI of the Constitution; (3) Delegation to the people at large; (4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

15. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR VALID DELEGATION; SUFFICIENT STANDARD; CONSTRUED; R.A.
6735 MISERABLY FAILED TO SATISFY BOTH REQUIREMENTS. — In every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in
itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a
standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks
its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be effected. Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation
of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS: R.A. 6735;

SUFFICIENTLY IMPLEMENTS THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE TO INITIATE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION THRU INITIATIVE. — I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the
people to initiate amendments to the Constitution thru initiative. . . . We need not torture the text of said law to
reach the conclusion that it implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is replete
with references to this prerogative of the people. First, the policy statement declares: "Sec. 2. Statement of Policy.
— The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements and guaranteed." Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the
people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called
for the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved
or rejected by the people." Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution. Section 5(b) states that "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein." It also states that
"(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter." Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the
amendment. Section 9(b) states that "(t)he proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority
of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite."

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENTLY STATES THE POLICY AND STANDARDS TO GUIDE THE
COMELEC IN PROMULGATING THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE LAW;
CASE AT BAR. — R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in
promulgating the law's implementing rules and regulations of the law. . . . In the case at bar, the policy and the
standards are bright-lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20 look at the law cannot miss them. They were not written by
our legislators in invisible ink. The policy and standards can also be found in no less than Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold that the standards provided for
in R.A. No. 6735 are insufficient for in other cases we have upheld as adequate more general standards such as
"simplicity and dignity," "public interest," "public welfare," "interest of law and order," "justice and equity,"
"adequate and efficient instruction," "public safety," "public policy," "greater national interest, "protect the local
consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates," and "promote simplicity, economy and efficiency
in government." A due regard and respect to the legislature, a co-equal and coordinate branch of government,
should counsel this Court to refrain from refusing to effectuate laws unless they are clearly unconstitutional.

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3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 MERELY PROVIDES THE PROCEDURE TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICY OF R.A. 6735, HENCE, DID NOT VIOLATE THE RULES ON VALID
DELEGATION. — In enacting R.A. No. 6735, it cannot be said that Congress totally transferred its power to
enact the law implementing people's initiative to COMELEC. A close look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
will show that it merely provided the procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that the
rules of procedure to enforce the people's initiative can be delegated. . . . The prohibition against the legislature is
to impair the substantive right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. It is not, however,
prohibited from legislating the procedure to enforce the people's right of initiative or to delegate it to another body
like the COMELEC with proper standard.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARGUMENT ON LACK OF SUB-TITLE ON PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE TO AMEND THE
CONSTITUTION, SHOULD BE GIVEN THE WEIGHT OF HELIUM. — The argument that R.A. No. 6735
does not include people's initiative to amend the Constitution simply because it lacks a sub-title on the subject
should be given the weight of helium. Again, the hoary rule in statutory construction is that headings prefixed to
titles, chapters and sections of a statute may be consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn therefrom
are entitled to very little weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the enacting clauses.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LAPSES IN R.A. 6735 ARE TO BE EXPECTED, FOR LAWS ARE NOT ALWAYS
WRITTEN IN IMPECCABLE ENGLISH. — It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained
interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to defeat its intent which it itself concedes is to implement people's initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. Thus, it laments that the word "Constitution" is neither germane nor
relevant to the Policy thrust of Section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not accurate. These lapses are to be
expected for laws are not always written in impeccable English. Rightly, the Constitution does not require our
legislators to be word-smiths with the ability to write bills with poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa or in lyrical
prose like Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not to refuse to effectuate the intent of a law
on the ground that it is badly written. As the distinguished Vicente Francisco reminds us: "Many laws contain
words which have not been used accurately. But the use of inapt or inaccurate language or words, will not vitiate
the statute if the legislative intention can be ascertained. The same is equally true with reference to awkward,
slovenly, or ungrammatical expressions, that is, such expressions and words will be construed as carrying the
meaning the legislature intended that they bear, although such a construction necessitates a departure from the
literal meaning of the words used."

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION AGAINST RESPONDENTS PEDROSAS SHOULD BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE IT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION. — The petition should be dismissed with respect to the
Pedrosas. The inclusion of the Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show that the case at bar
started when respondent Delfin alone and by himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by People's Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the petition.
. . . Petitioners sued the COMELEC, Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as
founding members of the People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA). The suit is an
original action for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the Pedrosas. The only allegation against the Pedrosas is
that they are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to undertake the signature drive for people's
initiative to amend the Constitution.

7 ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SOLICITATION OF SIGNATURES IS A RIGHT GUARANTEED IN BLACK AND
WHITE BY SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE XVII OF THE CONSTITUTION. — One need not draw a picture to
impart the proposition that in soliciting signatures to start a people's initiative to amend the Constitution the
Pedrosas are not engaged in any criminal act. Their solicitation of signatures is a right guaranteed in black and
white by Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution which provides that ". . . amendments to this Constitution
may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . . . ." This right springs from the principle
proclaimed in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution that in a democratic and republican state "sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The Pedrosas are part of the people and
their voice is part of the voice of the people. They may constitute but a particle of our sovereignty but no power
can trivialize them for sovereignty is indivisible.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENTS' RIGHT OF SOLICITING SIGNATURES TO AMEND THE

CONSTITUTION, CANNOT BE ABRIDGED WITHOUT ANY IFS AND BUTS. — Section 16 of Article XIII
of the Constitution provides: "The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall
by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms." This is another novel provision of the
1987 Constitution strengthening the sinews of the sovereignty of our people. In soliciting signatures to amend the
Constitution, the Pedrosas are participating in the political decision-making process of our people. The
Constitution says their right cannot be abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a question mark on their
right.
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9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENTS' CAMPAIGN TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION IS AN EXERCISE OF
THEIR FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION AND THEIR RIGHT TO PETITION THE
GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES. — The Pedrosas' campaign to amend the Constitution is
an exercise of their freedom of speech and expression. We have memorialized this universal right in all our
fundamental laws from the Malolos Constitution to the 1987 Constitution. We have iterated and reiterated in our
rulings that freedom of speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important rights of our people. Undeniably,
freedom speech enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think and let think. For this reason, the
Constitution encourages speech even if it protects the speechless.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENTS, RIGHT TO SOLICIT SIGNATURES TO START A PEOPLE'S
INITIATIVE TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT DEPEND ON ANY LAW. — It is thus evident
that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures to start a people's initiative to amend the Constitution does not
depend on any law, much less on R.A. No. 6735 or COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. No law, no Constitution can
chain the people to an undesirable status quo. To be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no
irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear change. Mankind has long
recognized the truism that the only constant in life is change and so should the majority.

11. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE; THE INTENT OF R.A. 6735 IS TO
IMPLEMENT THE PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION. — Our effort to discover the
meaning of R.A. No. 6735 should start with the search of the intent of our lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent
is critical for the intent of the legislature is the law and the controlling factor in its interpretation. Stated otherwise,
intent is the essence of the law, the spirit which gives life to its enactment. . . . Since it is crystalline that the intent
of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution, it is our bounden duty to
interpret the law as it was intended by the legislature. We have ruled that once intent is ascertained, it must be
enforced even if it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the law and this ruling is as old as the mountain.
We have also held that where a law is susceptible of more than one interpretation, that interpretation which will
most tend to effectuate the manifest intent of the legislature will be adopted. The text of R.A. No. 6735 should
therefore be reasonably construed to effectuate its intent to implement the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. . . . All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that refuses to enforce the manifest
intent or spirit of R.A. No. 6735 to implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It blatantly
disregards the rule cast in concrete that the letter of the law is its body but its spirit is its soul.

12. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; DELEGATION OF POWER; SUFFICIENT

STANDARD; PURPOSE THEREOF. — Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz similarly elucidated that "a sufficient
standard is intended to map out the boundaries of the delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy and
indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is
to prevent a total transference of legislative power from the lawmaking body to the delegate."

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT HAS PRUDENTIALLY REFRAINED FROM INVALIDATING
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF ADEQUATE STANDARD. — A survey of
our case law will show that this Court has prudentially refrained from invalidating administrative rules on the
ground of lack of adequate legislative standard to guide their promulgation. As aptly perceived by former Justice
Cruz, "even if the law itself does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend backward to locate the
same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS; R.A. 6735; DELFIN

PETITION, UTTERLY DEFICIENT. — The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with
the constitutional imperatives, the petition would rather have much of its burden passed on, in effect, to the
COMELEC. The petition would require COMELEC to schedule "signature gathering all over the country," to
cause the necessary publication of the petition "in newspapers of general and local circulation," and to instruct
"Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED BY THE COURT SHOULD BE HELD TO
COVER ONLY THE DELFIN PETITION. — The TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is
made permanent under the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so
understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such
a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative.

FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring:

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1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS; R.A. 6735; AMPLY
COVERS AN INITIATIVE ON THE CONSTITUTION. — Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise known as "The
Initiative and Referendum Act" amply covers an initiative on the Constitution. In its definition of terms, Republic
Act No. 6735 defines initiative as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose." The same section, in enumerating the
three systems of initiative, included in "initiative on the constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the constitution." Paragraph (e) again of Section 3 defines "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by
which an initiative on the constitution is approved or rejected by the people." And as to the material requirements
for an initiative on the Constitution, Section 5(b) distinctly enumerates the following: "A petition for an initiative
on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of the registered voters
as signatories, of which every legislative distinct must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein. Initiative on the constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the
ratification of 1987 Constitution and only once every five years thereafter." These provisions were inserted, on
purpose, by Congress the intent being to provide for the implementation of the right to propose an amendment to
the Constitution by way of initiative. "A legal provision," the Court has previously said, "must not be construed as
to be a useless surplusage, and accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no
effect whatsoever thereon". . . . Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on the constitution. Any
other construction as what petitioners foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and spirit behind the
enactment.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC CANNOT TAKE ANY ACTION ON DELFIN PETITION BECAUSE IT IS
UNACCOMPANIED BY THE REQUIRED PERCENTAGE OF REGISTERED VOTERS; CASE AT BAR. — I
agree with the ponencia that the Commission on Elections, at present, cannot take any action (such as those
contained in the Commission's orders dated December 6, 9, and 12, 1996 [Annexes B, C and B-1 ]) indicative of
its having already assumed jurisdiction over private respondents' petition. This is so because from the tenor of
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it would appear that proof of procurement of the required percentage of registered
voters at the time the petition for initiative is filed, is a jurisdictional requirement. Here private respondents'
petition is unaccompanied by the required signatures. This defect notwithstanding, it is without prejudice to the
refiling of their petition once compliance with the required percentage is satisfactorily shown by private
respondents. In the absence, therefore, of an appropriate petition before the Commission on Elections, any
determination of whether private respondents' proposal constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.

3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; EVERY PART OF THE STATUTE MUST BE INTERPRETED WITH

REFERENCE TO THE CONTEXT. — It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 may not
be interpreted in isolation. The legislative intent behind every law is to be extracted from the statute as a whole.

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS; R.A. 6735; TAKEN

TOGETHER AND INTERPRETED PROPERLY, THE CONSTITUTION, R.A. 6735 AND COMELEC
RESOLUTION 2300 ARE SUFFICIENT TO IMPLEMENT CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES. — While R.A.
6735 may not be a perfect law it was — as the majority openly concedes — intended by the legislature to cover
and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution. I
completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo
J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative, sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly
consistent with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on
Elections, that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate
and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby'; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any effort
to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected."

2. ID.; ID.; ID .; ID.; MAJORITY'S POSITION ALL TOO SWEEPING AND ALL TOO EXTREMIST. — I find
the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent to burning the whole house to
exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do
we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly
and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its
proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and for the right reason.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC CANNOT ENTERTAIN ANY PETITION IN THE ABSENCE OF THE
REQUIRED NUMBER OF SIGNATURES. — Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required
number of signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every
legislative district — no public funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative to
amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such signatures.
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4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WISELY EMPOWERED THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO PROMULGATE
RULES AND REGULATIONS. — No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In
recognition of this, R.A. 6735 wisely empowered the Commission on Elections "to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued
its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the
conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws," not by the
incumbent Commission on Elections by one then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms.
Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of
these Commissioners who signed resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission, and thus we cannot ascribe
any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a cherished right of
our people.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT HAS NO POWER TO RESTRAIN ANYONE FROM EXERCISING THEIR
RIGHT OF INITIATIVE. — The Court has no power to restrain them from exercising their right of initiative.
The right to propose amendments to the Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and free
assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading
others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, "I may disagree with what you say, but I
will defend to the death your right to say it." After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as
Justice Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we hate."

2. RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA

a. Navarro v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011

The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting clearly show the manifest intention
of Congress to promote development in the previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas by allowing
them to directly share in the allocation of funds under the national budget. It should be remembered that, under
Sections 284 and 285 of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based on land
area, population, and local revenue.

Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice,
then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law, 31 or
may consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive
and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed
incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.

It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of
both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 533 32 of the LGC. As Section 533 provides,
the Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient
and effective implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the
principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also mandated by the Constitution that a
local government code shall be enacted by Congress, to wit —

Section 3.The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.

These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain decentralization and
countryside development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a
new law, now the LGC of 1991,which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an
archipelagic country. This accounts for the exemption from the land area requirement of local government units
composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the
creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of
provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.

With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives, particularly the chairpersons
of their respective Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight
Committee of the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of

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one (1) or more islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the
LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR. To be sure, the Oversight
Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an exemption in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR. The
Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of
society and considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was
formulated. 33 Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and
respect from this Court, 34 but to legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of representatives
from the four leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight Committee.

With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the
LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be
impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress,
recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355,
following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can
only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers,
Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into
law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.

Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of
Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate
into the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it
consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC
was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.

Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or
intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within
the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of
the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is
not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should
not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.

So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal branch of
government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of
statutes. This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of government and the corollary separation of
powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each
other's acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end,
courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To
doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure
that no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed. Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified,
an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one,
must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court

b. Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

These cases, constituting 54 Petitions, were filed before the Supreme Court, for Certiorari and Prohibition by the
party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations. The Court revisited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission in 1986 and was convinced
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also
non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the
party-list system.

Thus, in the end, the proposal, said the Court, to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted.
Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to
make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system
to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties. The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral
parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide
elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections.
The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-
traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, as revisited by the Court, to include in the party-
list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
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What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer. The party-list
system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The
text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral
parties.

The Court opined that it is clear from the text of the provision, the party-list system is composed of three different
groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent
any particular sector.

Furthermore, added by the Court, Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a party as either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties. Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Quoting Section
3(c) of R.A. No. 7941, the Court further provides that a political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government. On the other
hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a “sectoral party” refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral
party. Obviously, said the Court, they are separate and distinct from each other. R.A. No. 7941 does not require
national and regional parties or organizations to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

The Court is of the view that to require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology based and cause-oriented
parties from the party-list system and posed the question, “How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded
from the party-list system?” To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list
system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

Moreover, the Court said that, it is noticeable that the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily
marginalized and underrepresented. For sure, added by the Court, professionals are not by definition marginalized
and underrepresented, not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth may lack well-defined political constituencies, and can thus organize themselves into sectoral
parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Interpreting anew the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941, the Court declared that such policy
broadly refers to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, the specific implementing
provisions of R.A. No. 7941, according to the Court, do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or
parties must be marginalized and underrepresented. On the contrary, the Court is in the position that to even
interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are marginalized and underrepresented would lead to
“absurdities.”

the Court said that the phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” should refer only to the sectors in Section 5
that are, by their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented. These sectors are distinguished by the
Court, such as, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, added by the Court, a majority of the members of
the sectoral party must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented.” The nominees of the sectoral party
either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sector does not mean one must wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity.
It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically
marginalized and underrepresented are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National
Statistical Coordination Board.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party
system where those marginalized and underrepresented, both in economic and ideological status will have the
opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the
party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to
masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity, even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in
SUVs.

SEPARATE OPINIONS
–Chief Justice Sereno

Chief Justice is still in the view that Social Justice remains the primordial reason of the Party-List System.

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She vied that it is within this historical and textual millieu that the party-list provisions in the 1987 Constitution
should be interpreted. Every provision should be read in the context of all the other provisions so that contours of
constitutional policy are made clear. She further added that, the place of the party-list system in the constitutional
scheme was that it provided for the realization of the ideals on social justice in the political arena party-list system
is primarily a tool for social justice, the standard of “marginalized and underrepresented” under Section 2 must be
deemed to qualify national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. To argue otherwise, the Chief warned,
is to divorce national and regional parties or organizations from the primary objective of attaining social justice,
which objective surrounds, permeates, imbues, and underlies the entirety of both the 1987 Constitution and RA
7941.
Section 2 of RA 7941, according to the Chief, states that the party-list system seeks to “enable Filipino citizens
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to become members of the
House of Representatives.” On its face, it is apparent that “marginalized and underrepresented” qualifies
“sectors,” “organizations,” and “parties”.
In her last contention, Chief Justice interpreted the phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” as standards to
provide for sufficient legislations. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and
underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector, those sectors include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers, while the sectors that lack
“well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. Ending her
dissent, she is of the view that, such principles enunciated by the law are ever evolving concepts, created to
address social disparities, to be able to give life to the “social justice” policy of our Constitution.

3. LITERAL IMPORT MUST YIELD TO INTENT

a. Automotive Parts & Equipment Co. v. Lingad, G.R. No. L-26406, October 31, 1969

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE; SECTION 19 OF R.A. No. 602 TO BE

INTERPRETED IN CONFORMITY WITH SUCH PRINCIPLE. — Petitioner-appellant believes that Section 19
of R.A. No. 602, particularly that portion prohibiting the reduction of wages paid to employees in excess of the
minimum wage established in the Act or supplements theretofore granted to employees only refers and applies to
employers in business prior to and at the time of enactment of R.A. No. 602 and that the prohibition thereof
against reduction of supplements in Section 19 of said Republic Act should not be applied prospectively to
employers coming into existence subsequent to the effective date of said R.A. No. 602, and that despite the
passage of R.A. No. 4180, such interpretation is not altered since said R.A. No. 4180 amended only Section 3 of
R.A. No. 602 in the amendatory Act. Such construction is in collision with the constitutional command pursuant
to the social justice principle that the government extend protection to labor. If the interpretation offered by
appellant would be considered acceptable, then there would be a negation of the purpose of the amendatory act
increasing the minimum wage law. That would be to defeat and frustrate rather than foster its policy.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WORD "NOW" AND PHRASE "FURNISH ON THE DATE OF ENACTMENT." — In
connection with the use of the word "now" and the phrase "furnish on the date of enactment" appellant would
have this Court accept the view that as it began business after the Minimum Wage Law was enacted in 1951, the
safeguard in said Section 19 of R.A. No. 602 that would preclude any evasion thereof becomes nugatory because
of the presence therein of the word "now" which for appellant, would have the effect of limiting its application
only to business establishments existing as of the date of its effectivity on April 6, 1951. Such view pays no heed
to the constitutional command of protection to labor or to assure that the legislative purpose be attained. It would
defy common sense. It best amounts to a manifestation of verbal ingenuity but hardly satisfies the test of
rationality on which law must be based.

3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DUTY OF COURTS. — Courts are not to give words a meaning which
would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequence. It is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to
avoid such a deplorable result.

b. US v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, G.R. No. 5060, January 26, 1910

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; SLAUGHTER OF LARGE CATTLE. — Section 30 and 33 of Act No.

1147 construed.

2. ID.; ID. — Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction
should be adopted which will most tend to give effect of the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the
object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render
abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought of attain by its
enactment.

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3. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER OF THE STATE. — The provisions of Act No. 1147 prohibiting and penalizing the
slaughter of carabaos for human consumption which are fit for "agricultural work and draft purposes," held to be a
reasonable and justifiable exercise of the sovereign police power of the State, under the conditions existing in
theses Islands.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE. — These provisions held not
to constitute an appropriation of private property interests to a "public use" so as to bring them within the
principles of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain and to entitle the owners to compensation,
being no more than a just restraint of an injurious private use of property.

5. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING USE OF THE POLICE POWNER. — "To justify the State" in the
exercise of its sovereign police power "it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are
reasonable necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals."
(Lawton vs. Steele, 152 U. S., 133, 136.)

c. Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim and Sy, G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009

For while a third-party complaint is not included in the allowed pleadings, neither is it among the prohibited ones.
Nevertheless, this conflict may be resolved by following the well-entrenched rule in statutory construction, that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
Statutes, including rules, should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to
be suppressed and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and
secure the benefits intended. A statute should therefore be read with reference to its leading idea, and its general
purpose and intention should be gathered from the whole act, and this predominant purpose will prevail over the
literal import of particular terms or clauses, if plainly apparent, operating as a limitation upon some and as a
reason for expanding the signification of others, so that the interpretation may accord with the spirit of the entire
act, and so that the policy and object of the statute as a whole may be made effectual and operative to the widest
possible extent. Otherwise stated, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a
statute, as in the rules in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.

d. Matabuena v. Cervantes, G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON
OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE;
APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. — While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent character as well
as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954
Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old
Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice
J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear
of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law;
'porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,' [according to] the Partidas
(Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale 'Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur' of the Pandects (Bk
24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to
persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to
such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger
that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib.
32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist lest the condition of those who
incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason
and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.

2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER

SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. — The lack of validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to defendant
Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to
the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage
on March 28. 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.

e. Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait v. Sec. Angelo
Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015

While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987
Constitution seem like mere formalities, they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As we have explained in La
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Bugal, they are the safeguards put in place by the framers of the Constitution to "eliminate or minimize the abuses
prevalent during the martial law regime." 78 Thus, they are not just mere formalities, which will only render a
contract unenforceable but not void, if not complied with. They are requirements placed, not just in an ordinary
statute, but in the fundamental law, the non-observance of which will nullify the contract. Elucidating on the
concept of a "constitution," this Court, in Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,79 held:

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation.It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government,
assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on
which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of
the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered
into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract.
As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President himself be the signatory of service
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving the exploration, development, and utilization of our
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power cannot be taken lightly.

This Court could not simply assume that while Presidential Decree No. 87 had not yet been expressly repealed, it
had been impliedly repealed. As we held in Villareña v. The Commission on Audit,71 "[i]mplied repeals are not
lightly presumed." It is a settled rule that when laws are in conflict with one another, every effort must be exerted
to reconcile them. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcopper Mining Corporation,72 we said: AaCTcI

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of
implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus
interpretendi, i.e.,every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the
subject. (Citation omitted.)

Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a construction that it is in
harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred. 73 This Court, in
Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections 74 expounding on this point, pronounced:

It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution
and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be
read according to its spirit and intent. . . . . (Citation omitted.)

Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the ground that there is no
general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts
involving oil exploration and extraction.

But note must be made at this point that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon
which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed below,
the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law
passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS 75 area.

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