PREPRIT

ABRIDGED AND REVISED VERSION TO BE PUBLISHED IN

Just the Arguments (Wiley-Blackwell, edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone)

A modern modal argument for the soul

Rafal Urbaniak, Gdansk University/Ghent University, rfl.urbaniak@gmail.com
Agnieszka Rostalska, Jagiellonian University, arostalska@gmail.com

Brief description

Richard Swinburne, one of the most prominent representatives of dualism in the 20th century,
formulated his modal argument for the existence of the soul (Swinburne and Shoemaker 1984;
Swinburne 1986) as an improvement of Descrates‟ analogous argument. Roughly speaking,
Swinburne argues that human beings currently alive have non–bodily immaterial parts called
souls using the assumption that it is logically possible that a human being survives the
destruction of their body (and a few additional supposedly quite innocent premises). The
modern twist to the argument which makes it technically interesting is that it employs a
quantified propositional modal logic. The argument raises also a general philosophical interest
like all seemingly simple and correct philosophical arguments for strong conclusions.

Technical apparatus needed

The argument employs quantified propositional modal logic T. It‟s a rather straightforward
extension of classical propositional logic. One just needs to extend the language with two
modal operators: „◊‟ read as „it is possible that‟ and „□‟ read as „it is necessary that‟ and
quantifiers binding propositional variables. On top of the classical rules of inference one
needs to add two axiom schemata (called traditionally K and T):
(K) □(A→B)→( □A→□B)
(T) □A→A
Apart from that, we add two rules of inference: necessitation, which tells us that if something
is a thesis of the system, it is necessary, and propositional universal quantifier elimination,
which works like universal quantifier elimination in classical predicate logic, except that we
eliminate quantifiers binding propositional variables and substitute well-formed formulas for
the variables (if the mechanism doesn‟t seem to clear, it should become obvious once we take
a look at some proofs). We‟ll start with a brief presentation of the argument in its original
formulation. Then, we‟ll reconstruct the argument in more detail. Next, we‟ll describe main
known objections to the argument, describe how one of the objections (usually considered to
be lethal) can be avoided, and finally, provide our own brief assessment of what we think the
main weakness of the argument is.

Swinburne’s original formulation

“The argument was originally designed to prove that I [Swinburne] have a soul in 1984, and I
leave it in that form. Updating is always possible for any year in which Premiss one is
manifestly true. Likewise any name or other referring expression can be substituted for „I‟, so
long as Premiss 1 remains manifestly true. […] I define:
p = „I am a conscious person and I exist in 1984‟
q = „My body is destroyed in the last instant of 1984‟
r = „I have a soul in 1984‟
s = „I exist in 1985‟
 x ranges over all consistent propositions compatible with (p&q) and describing 1984
states of affairs.
„(x)‟ is to be read in the normal way as „for all x‟.
The argument is then as follows:
p (Premiss 1)
(x)◊(p&q&x&s) (Premiss 2)
~◊(p&q&~r&s) (Premiss 3)

Premiss 2 says that it is possible that I survive into 1985, given that I am conscious in 1984,
even if my body is totally destroyed and whatever else might be the case in 1984, compatible
with these last two suppositions. Premiss 3 says that it is not possible that I who am conscious
in 1984 survive into 1985 if my body is totally destroyed, unless there is a non-bodily part of
me in 1984, namely, a soul. It follows from Premiss 2 and Premiss 3 that ~r is not within the
range of x. But since ~r describes a 1984 state of affairs it follows that it is not compatible
with (p&q). Hence (p&q) entails r. But the addition to p of q, which describes what happens
to my body at the end of 1984 can hardly affect whether or not p entails r. So I conclude that
p by itself entails r. Hence, from Premiss 1, r.” (Swinburne 1986, 322-323)
Detailed reconstruction

Once we point out tacit assumptions and explicate a slightly muddling restriction on
quantification, the argument comes out valid in a rather modest modal logic T with universal
propositional quantifier elimination. First, a few abbreviations:

C ⇔ Swinburne is a Conscious person and exists in 1984.

D ⇔ Swinburne‟s body is (completely) Destroyed in the last instant of 1984.
S ⇔ Swinburne has a Soul in 1984.
E ⇔ Swinburne Exists in 1985.
84(p) ⇔ Sentence p is about 1984.
Now, the premises are:
(1) C Prem
(2) ∀p[84(p)&◊(p&C&D)→◊(C&D&p&E)] Prem
(3) ~◊(C&D&~S&E) Prem
(4) 84(~S) Prem
(5) □((C&D)→S)→□(C→S) Prem

The first premise is straightforward. The second one now incorporates the restrictions which
Swinburne put on quantification in meta-language, which means that now we are able to
substitute any proposition whatsoever for p. (2) says that any proposition about 1984
compatible with the claim that Swinburne is conscious and his body is (afterwards) destroyed
is compatible with him being conscious, his body being (afterwards) destroyed and his having
a soul in 1984. Premise (3) says that it‟s impossible for Swinburne to survive the complete
destruction of his body if he doesn‟t have a soul. Premise (4) says that the claim that he
doesn‟t have a soul in 1984 is a claim about year 1984. Premise (5) says that if his being
conscious and his body being destroyed entail that he has a soul, his being conscious itself
entails the same claim (thus capturing the intuition that whether his body is destroyed has no
impact on whether he has a soul).
First, we eliminate the universal quantifier in (2) and substitute ~S for p:
(6) 84(~S)&◊(~S&C&D)→◊(C&D&~S&E) ∀E: (2)
Then, we apply modus tollens to (3) and (6):
(7) ~(84(~S)&◊(~S&C&D)) MT: (3), (6)
Now, we apply DeMorgan‟s law obtaining:
(8) ~84(~S)∨~◊(~S&C&D) DM: (7)
Since premise (4) tells us that the first disjunct is out of the question, we can infer the second
one:
(9) ~◊(~S&C&D) ∨Elim: (8), (4)
But if something is not possible, then its negation is necessary:
(10) □~(~S&C&D) Def□: (9)
The formula within the scope of the necessity operator in (10) is logically equivalent to the
claim that C&D materially implies S. Hence:
(11) □((C&D)→S) Substitution of provable equivalents (10)
This, however, gives us the antecedent of (5), so:
(12) □(C→S) MP: (5), (11)
Now we can apply schema T (that is, □A→A) together with MP and (1) to obtain:
(13) S T, MP: (1), (12)
which completes the proof and shows that (a version of) the argument is logically valid.

Main objections

The argument has been attacked from various angles.

1. Shoemaker (1984) says that (2) involves a de re possibility claim which cannot be
justified by bare thought experiments. He also complains that even if we had good
reasons to accept this de re claim, still no conclusion about the actual world can follow
from de re possibility claims. (Swinburne 1996) agrees with the last statement, but
responds that one of his premises (1) is a contingent claim about the actual world and
that‟s why his conclusion is not solely based on modal claims. As for the former
objection, Swinburne argues that there is no logical incoherence in the story in which
he himself survives the destruction of his body and that‟s enough to accept the de re
claim.
2. Hasker (1998) argues that Swinburne‟s argument is epistemically circular: no
reasonably well-informed person who does not already accept the conclusion would
accept the premises. By the time Hasker‟s paper was published, Swinburne (1996)
attempted to defend against this sort of criticism by indicating that someone may
accept premise 2 without even understanding the conclusion, or without accepting
premise 3. It is rather unclear whether this is sufficient for an argument to avoid
circularity, but this unclarity seems to be inherited from the vagueness of our
common-sense notion of epistemic circularity.
3. Reames (1999) gives a parallel argument for the opposite conclusion (in terms of our
formalization, it is obtained by replacing ~S with S and vice versa and by replacing E
with ~E and vice versa). Inessential details aside, its main assumptions say that no
proposition compatible with Swinburne‟s being conscious and his body being
destroyed excludes the possibility that he won‟t survive the destruction of his body,
and that it is not possible that he won‟t survive if he has a soul. Perhaps, some space is
still left for Swinburne, for he can argue at least that the latter claim is false, for even if
one has a soul, its continuous existence is a contingent fact granted by the grace of
God.
4. The gist of Nagasawa‟s (2005) criticism is that he disagrees with the so-called quasi-
Aristotelian premise which says that there is no identity through time between two
objects if they have no part in common (Swinburne used it to defend (3)). He points
 out that there might be some unusual and yet metaphysically possible scenarios where
one can survive the destruction of their body even if one does not have a soul, or at
least, that Swinburne hasn‟t excluded such a possibility.
5. Probably the best known objection which is most often considered to be lethal is the
substitution objection formulated against the truth of premise (2) (Zimmerman 1991;
Alston and Smythe 1994; Stump and Kretzmann 1996). Basically, these authors point
out that if we substitute for p a sentence which states „Swinburne is purely material in
1984‟ (let‟s abbreviate it by M) or „Swinburne is identical with his body or some part
of it‟, premise (2) comes out false, for (arguably) it is not possible that Swinburne is
purely material and yet he survives the destruction of his body, even though it is
possible that he is purely material and yet conscious.

Dealing with the substitution objection

Even though the substitution objection seems like a knock-down argument, it‟s not exactly as
damaging as it often is claimed to be. Sure, one cannot try to save (2) by insisting that the
consequent of the problematic substitution instance is true, for on the assumption that being
material entails not having a soul, this move would falsify premise (3).
Swinburne himself tried a slightly different strategy:

[…] someone already having a firm philosophical position contrary to mine can challenge my
premise (2) by inserting a p which he claims to be compatible with C&D and which he claims
will show the premise to be false, where p states a philosophical thesis about the very issue in
dispute, contrary to the one which I am seeking to prove. […] Now of course I claim that no
such p is compatible with [C&D]. Since I put forward premisses (2) and (3) as purported
necessary truths, my argument was designed to show that (given C) S is a necessary truth.
The claim therefore that any p of the above type is compatible with [C&D] amounts to the
denial of my conclusion. […] Now it is true that my argument will not convince anyone who
claims to be more certain that the conclusion is false than that the premises are true. But then
that does not discredit my argument --- for no argument about anything will convince
someone in that position. (Swinburne 1996: 71)

Alas, this defense doesn‟t seem too convincing. Prima facie, to say that it is possible that
Swinburne is conscious and material (and his body is later destroyed) is not to state a
philosophical thesis about the very issue in dispute or to be more certain that the conclusion is
false than that the premises are true. One can admit the possibility of conscious (purely)
material beings without asserting that conscious beings actually are (purely) material. Quite
the opposite seems more likely: if you reject the compossibility of being material and
conscious, you no longer even need Swinburne‟s argument since then from the mere claim
that Swinburne is conscious you‟ll be able to conclude that he is not purely material.

All this doesn‟t mean that there‟s no way out from this quandary for Swinburne. As it turns
out, a slight modification to one of the premises yields a valid argument which doesn‟t fall
prey to the substitution objection. Instead of „being about 1984‟ let‟s use „being true about
1984‟ in premise (2) and let‟s leave other premises intact. If we use 84(p)&p instead of 84(p)
we get:
(2*) ∀p[84(p)&p&◊(p&C&D)→◊(C&D&p&E)] Prem
which says that no true sentence about 1984 compatible with C&D excludes C&D&E. The
first thing to observe is that we still can derive S. For indeed, the analogue of (8) will be:
(8) ~84(~S)∨ ~~S∨~◊(~S&C&D) DM, (7)
which, given that ~~S gives us S immediately, brings us back to line (9), from which we can
continue the proof as before. The second thing to note is that (2*), as a case of strengthening
the antecedent, is properly weaker than (2), just because A&B→C is weaker than A→C. Last
but not least, (2*) is not susceptible to the substitution objection. For to believe that
substituting M for p will falsify (2*) one has to believe that the antecedent of such an instance
will be true:
84(M)&M&◊(M&C&D)
This, however, clearly requires one to accept M itself, and thus indeed to have made up one‟s
mind about the philosophical debate in question. Thus, interestingly, we can save the
argument from one of the main objections in the literature by weakening one premise.

Final remarks

Does this move completely immunize the argument to criticism? Of course not, it only shows
that the main fault doesn‟t lie with what the substitution objection claimed it did. Apart from
the worries raised by other objectors, it seems, one has to consider the following issue.

Clearly, the key premises here are (2*) and (3). The former says that no true sentence about
1984 excludes Swinburne‟s survival in 1985 and the latter says that such a survival is
impossible if one doesn‟t have a soul. If presented with those sentences separately, we might
feel compelled to say: Sure, there is no (logical) reason why sentences purely about 1984
should exclude sentences about 1985, so the possibility stated in (2*) takes place. Sure, there
is no way one could survive the complete and instantaneous destruction of one‟s body if they
didn‟t have a soul. The key question here is whether the modalities underlying those intuitions
are the same. It seems that the modality that motivates us to accept (3) is a rather strong
metaphysical modality with quite a few metaphysical assumptions built in, whereas the one
that compels us to buy into (2*) looks definitely weaker (ask yourself this: would a modality
that makes it impossible to survive into 1985 if you didn‟t have a soul in 1984 make you think
that no true sentence about 1984 excludes your survival into 1985?).

Swinburne himself admits only one type of possibility and explicitly identifies the
metaphysical and the logical:

[. . .] the contrast [between the metaphysical and the logical necessity] is misleading. For not merely
is the necessity of both kinds equally hard, but it has the same nature – the necessary is that which
holds in all possible worlds, where ‘possible’ means ‘coherently describable’. (Swinburne 1986: 314)

The mere fact, however, that Swinburne didn‟t want to accept such a distinction doesn‟t mean
that we ourselves should make no distinction between the kinds of modalities involved in the
intuitive assessment of (2*) and (3). And in fact, if this distinction is made, we not only have
an explanation of why the argument initially might seem compelling (we don‟t notice our
intuitions employ two different modalities), but also the argument itself cannot be interpreted
as a valid argument anymore. For if the modality in (2*) is different from the one employed in
(3), the conclusion no longer follows (unless we assume that logical possibility entails
metaphysical possibility, which doesn‟t seem to be independently plausible).

References

Alston, W. P. & Smythe, T. W. (1994), 'Swinburne's Argument for Dualism', Faith and
Philosophy 11(1), 127-133.

Hasker, W. (1998), 'Swinburne's Modal Argument for Dualism: Epistemically Circular', Faith
and Philosophy 15, 366-370.

Nagasawa, Y. (2005), 'Critical Notice of Richard Swinburne's ``The Evolution of the Soul
(Revised Version)''', Posted on The Secular Web website.

Reames, K. (1999), 'A Response to Swinburne's Latest Defense of the Argument for Dualism',
Faith and Philosophy 16, 90-97.

Stump, E. & Kretzmann, N. (1996), 'An Objection to Swinburne's Argument for Dualism',
Faith and Philosophy 13, 405-412.

Swinburne, R. & Shoemaker, S. (1984), Personal Identity, Basil Blackwell.

Swinburne, R. (1986), The Evolution of the Soul, Clarendon Press.

Swinburne, R. (1996), 'Dualism intact', Faith and Philosophy 13(1), 68-77.

Zimmerman, D. W. (1991), 'Two Cartesian Arguments for the Simplicity of the Soul',
American Philosophical Quarterly 3, 217-226.