225 Mun of Paranaque vs. VM Realty

11/7/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 292
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation
*
G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998.
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE, petitioner, vs. V.M.

REALTY CORPORATION, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; A Local Government

Unit (LGU) may exercise the power to expropriate private property
only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s
control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the
power or in other legislations.—The power of eminent domain is
lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may
delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and
public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress
and subject to the latter’s control
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
679
VOL. 292, JULY 20, 1998 679
and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power or

in other legislations.” In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which
delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down
the parameters for its exercise.
Same; Same; Essential requisites before an LGU can exercise

the power of eminent domain.—Thus, the following essential
requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of
eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local
legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf
of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016e459b6847278d9570003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose

or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There
is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid
and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
accepted.
Same; Same; In the case at bar, there was no compliance with

the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an
ordinance; RA 7160, the present Local Government Code which
was already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was
filed, explicitly required an ordinance for the purpose.—In the case
at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council.
Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the
mayor be authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites
Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals to show that a resolution may
suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. This
case, however, is not in point because the applicable law at that
time was BP 337, the previous Local Government Code, which
had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to
exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160, the present Local
Government Code which was already in force when the Complaint
for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for
this purpose.
Same; Same; A municipal ordinance is different from a

resolution.—We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that
the terms “resolution” and “ordinance” are synonymous. A
municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance
is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment
or opinion of a lawmaking
680
body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and

permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently—a third reading is
necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
Same; Same; It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is

controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule
issued for its implementation.—Petitioner relies on Article 36,
Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This

is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself,
surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it.
It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and
cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate
is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules,
since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising
the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU
must act pursuant to an ordinance.
Remedial Law; Action; Motion; In a motion to dismiss based

on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action,
the question submitted before the court for determination is the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself.—It is
hornbook doctrine that “x x x in a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the
question submitted before the court for determination is the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether
those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth
is hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue rather is:
admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer of the complaint?”
Same; Res Judicata; All the requisites for the application of

res judicata are present in this case.—As correctly found by the
Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for the
application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a
previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation
case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of
action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over it.
681
VOL. 292, JULY 20, 1998 681
Same; Same; The principle of res judicata, which finds

application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the
right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property.—Be
that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata,
which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings,
cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate
private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an
inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the
power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res
judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police
power, can “reach every form of property which the State might
need for public use.” “All separate interests of individuals in

property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or
implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals,
the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property,
remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people
in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the
possession of the property whenever the public interest requires
it.” Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever
barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous
noncompliance with any legal requirement.
Same; Same; In Republic vs. De Knecht, the Court ruled that

the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is
not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over
the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to
the parties.—While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate
the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to
specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final
judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that
there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same
issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from
thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law,
and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the
same property. By the same token, our ruling that petitioner
cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a
mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar
proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter,
all others are properly complied with. Parenthetically and by
parity of reasoning, the same is also true of the principle of “law of
the case.” In Republic vs. De Knecht, the Court ruled that the
power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not
diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the
property to be expropriated has become the law of the
682
case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still
subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property,
once all legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise
will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain,
but also clearly defeat social justice.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Leo Luis P. Mendoza for petitioner.
Robiso & Reyes for respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of

Parañaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of private
property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body.
The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires
an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution
that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the
Municipal Council will not suffice. On the other hand, the
principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent
proceedings for the expropriation of the same property
when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are
complied with.
Statement of the Case
These principles are applied by this Court in resolving this

petition 1 for review on certiorari
2
of the July 22, 1996
Decision of the Court3of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 48048,
which affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court’s August 9,
1994
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 21-25.

2 Special Sixth Division, composed of J. Antonio M. Martinez (now an
associate justice of the Supreme Court), ponente and chairman; and JJ.
Ricardo P. Galvez and Hilarion L. Aquino, concurring.
3 See rollo, p. 25.
683
VOL. 292, JULY 20, 1998 683

4
Resolution. The trial court dismissed the expropriation
suit as follows:
“The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain

is not disputed. However, such right may be exercised only
pursuant to an Ordinance (Sec. 19, R.A. No. 7160). In the instant
case, there is no such ordinance passed by the Municipal Council
of Parañaque enabling the Municipality, thru its Chief Executive,
to exercise the power of eminent domain. The complaint,
therefore, states no cause of action.
Assuming that plaintiff has a cause of action, the same is
barred by a prior judgment. On September 29, 1987, the plaintiff
filed a complaint for expropriation involving the same parcels of
land which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17939 of this Court
(page 26, record). Said case was dismissed with prejudice on May
18, 1988 (page 39, record). The order of dismissal was not
appealed, hence, the same became final. The plaintiff can not be
allowed to pursue the present action without violating the
principle of [r]es [j]udicata. While defendant in Civil Case No.
17939 was Limpan Investment Corporation, the doctrine of res
judicata still applies because the judgment in said case (C.C. No.
17939) is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-
interest (Vda. de Buncio vs. Estate of the late Anita de Leon). The
herein defendant is the successor-in-interest of Limpan
Investment Corporation as shown by the ‘Deed of Assignment
Exchange’ executed on June 13, 1990.
WHEREFORE, defendant’s motion for reconsideration is
hereby granted. The order dated February 4, 1994 is vacated and
set aside.
This case is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
5
SO ORDERED.”
Factual Antecedents
Pursuant to Sangguniang
6
Bayan Resolution No. 93-95,
Series of 1993, the Municipality of Parañaque filed on
Septem-
_______________
4 Penned by acting Presiding Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

5 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, p. 2; rollo, p. 70.
6 Rollo, pp. 41-43.
684

7
ber 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against
Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan
Psd- 17917), with a combined area of about 10,000 square
meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro
Manila, and covered by Torrens Certificate of Title No.
48700. Allegedly, the complaint was filed “for the purpose
of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged
by providing homes 8
for the homeless through a socialized
housing project.” Parenthetically, it was also for this
stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its9
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991,
previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of
the property10
with private respondent, which the latter did
not accept.
Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance,

the Regional Trial Court of Makati,11
Branch 134, issued an
Order dated January 10, 1994, giving it due course.
Acting on petitioner’s motion,
12
said court issued an Order
dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon deposit with its
clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its
fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
On February 21, 1994, private respondent filed its
Answer containing
13
affirmative defenses and a
counterclaim, alleging in the main that (a) the complaint
failed to state a cause of action because it was filed
pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as
required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b)
the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment
or res judicata. On private respondent’s mo-
_______________
7 Ibid., pp. 27-32.

8 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 1; rollo, p. 184.
9 Rollo, pp. 37-38.
10 Complaint, p. 3; rollo, p. 29.
11 Rollo, p. 45.
12 Ibid., p. 47.
13 Ibid., pp. 48-51.
685
VOL. 292, JULY 20, 1998 685

14
tion, its Answer 15was treated as a motion to dismiss. On
March 24, 1994, petitioner filed its opposition, stressing
that the trial court’s Order dated February 4, 1994 was in
accord with Section 19 of RA 7160, and that the principle of
res judicata was not applicable.
Thereafter,
16
the trial court issued its August 9, 1994
Resolution nullifying its February 4, 1994 Order and
dismissing the case. Petitioner’s motions for
reconsideration and transfer of venue were denied by the 17
trial court in a Resolution dated December 2, 1994.
Petitioner then appealed to Respondent Court, raising the
following issues:
“1. Whether or not the Resolution of the Parañaque

Municipal Council No. 93-95, Series of 1993 is a
substantial compliance of the statutory
requirement of Section 19, R.A. 7180 [sic] in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain by the
plaintiff-appellant.
Whether or not the complaint in this case states no

2. cause of action.
3. Whether or not the strict adherence to the literal
observance to the rule of procedure resulted in
technicality standing in the way of substantial
justice.
4. Whether or not the principle18 of res judicata is
applicable to the present case.”
As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals affirmed in

toto the trial court’s Decision. Respondent Court, in its
19
assailed Resolution promulgated on January 8, 1997,
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.
_______________
14 Private respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 197-198.

15 Rollo, pp. 66-68.
16 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
17 Ibid., pp. 71-72.
18 Ibid., pp. 78-79.
19 Ibid., p. 26.
686

20
Hence, this appeal.
The Issues
Before this Court, petitioner posits two issues, viz.:
“1. A resolution duly approved by the municipal council

has the same force and effect of an ordinance and
will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid
cause of action.
2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for
dismissal of case is not applicable
21
when public
interest is primarily involved.”
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Resolution Different from an Ordinance
Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the

municipal council for the purpose of initiating an
expropriation case “substantially
22
complies with the
requirements of the law” because the terms “ordinance”
and “resolution” are synonymous for “the purpose of
bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through
its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings
23
in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.”
Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article
36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code, which provides: “If the LGU fails
to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or
welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said
property through a resolution of the
_______________
20 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 13, 1998,
when the Court received private respondent’s Memorandum.
22 Ibid., p. 4; rollo, p. 188.
23 Ibid.
687
VOL. 292, JULY 20, 1998 687

Sanggunian authorizing its 24

chief executive to initiate
expropriation proceedings.” (Italics supplied.)
The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is
lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may
delegate the exercise25 thereof to LGUs, other public entities
and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the
power to expropriate private property only when
authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control
and restraints, imposed “through 26
the law conferring the
power or in other legislations.” In this case, Section 19 of
RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent
domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It
provides as follows:
“Section 19. Eminent Domain.—A local government unit may,

through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose,
or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the
power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such
offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the property

upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making
a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of
the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally,
That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at
the time of the taking of the property.” (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before

an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
_______________
24 Paragraph A.
25 Moday vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586, 592, February 20, 1997.
26 Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 173, 179-
180, May 17, 1993, per Quiason, J.
688

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative

council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public
use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required
under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and
other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made
to the owner of the property sought 27to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to

exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
authorized through an ordinance. 28 Petitioner cites
Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals to show that a
resolution may suffice
29
to support the exercise of eminent
domain by an LGU. This case, however, is not in 30point
because the applicable law at that time was BP 337, the
previous Local Government Code, which had provided that
a mere resolution would enable an31 LGU to exercise
eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160, the present Local
_______________
27 Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., The Local Government Code of

1991: The Key To National Development, 1993 ed., p. 110.
28 Supra.
30 Approved on February 10, 1983 and published in 79 O.G. No. 7. See
Moday vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 593. Sec. 9 of BP 337 reads:
“SEC. 9. Eminent Domain.—A local government unit may, through its head and
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent
domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
31 Effective January 1, 1992.
689
VOL. 292, JULY 20, 1998 689

Government Code which was already in force when the

Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required
an ordinance for this purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the
terms “resolution” and “ordinance” are synonymous. A
municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration
of the sentiment32
or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in
nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently—a
third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided
33
otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent
domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply
adopted the language of the previous Local Government
Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the
previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160
categorically requires that the local chief executive act
pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, “[l]egislative intent is
determined principally from the language of a statute.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either
34
impossible or absurd or
would lead to an injustice.” In the instant case, there is no
reason to depart from this rule, since the law requiring an
ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.
_______________
32 Mascuñana vs. Provincial Board of Negros Occidental , 79 SCRA 399,
405, October 18, 1977; cited in private respondent’s Memorandum, p. 5.
33 Article 107, pars. a and c, Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
7160; cited in Pimentel, Jr., supra, pp. 163-164.
34 Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, 762, February 26, 1997,
per Panganiban, J.; citing Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590,
596, September 28, 1995.
690

Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily

involves a derogation
35
of a fundamental or private right of
the people. Accordingly, the manifest change in the
legislative language—from “resolution” under BP 337 to
“ordinance” under RA 7160—demands a strict construction.
“No species of property is held by individuals with greater
tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more
sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for
greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an
individual without his consent, the plain meaning of36the
law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.”
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the
Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to
authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is
clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law
itself, surely prevails
37
over said rule which merely seeks to
implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the
law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere
administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides,
what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight
in the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32,
Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power
of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act
pursuant to an ordinance.
In this ruling, the Court does not diminish the policy
embodied in Section 2, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides that “territorial and political subdivisions shall
enjoy local autonomy.” It merely upholds the law as worded
in RA 7160. We stress that an LGU is created by law and
all its
_______________
35 City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349, 366

(1919), and Arriete vs. Director of Public Works, 58 Phil. 507, 511 (1933).
See also Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines; A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 348.
36 Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., p. 59.
37 See Villa vs. Llanes, Jr., 120 SCRA 81, 84, January 21, 1983, and
Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676 (1947). See also Art. 7, Civil Code of
the Philippines.
691
VOL. 292, JULY 20, 1998 691

powers and rights are sourced therefrom. It has therefore

no power to amend or act beyond the authority given and
the limitations imposed on it by law. Strictly speaking, the
power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality
not eminent but “inferior” domain, since it must conform to
the limits imposed by the delegation,38
and thus partakes
only of a share in eminent domain. Indeed, “the national
legislature is still the principal of the local government 39
units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.”
Complaint Does Not State a Cause of Action

In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner
argues that its Sangguniang Bayan passed an ordinance on
October 11, 1994 which reiterated its Resolution No. 93-35,
Series of 1993, and ratified all the 40
acts of its mayor
regarding the subject expropriation.
This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place,
petitioner merely alleged the existence of such an
ordinance, but it did not present any certified true copy
thereof. In the second place, petitioner did not raise this
point before this Court. In fact, it was
41
mentioned by private
respondent, and only in passing. In any event, this
allegation does not cure the inherent defect of petitioner’s
Complaint for expropriation filed on September 23, 1993. It
is hornbook doctrine that
“x x x in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the

complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted
before the court for determination is the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are
true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically
admitted by the motion.
_______________
38 Bernas, supra, pp. 348-349.

39 Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 272-273, July 20,
1994, per Cruz, J.
40 Rollo, pp. 81-82.
41 See private respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 201-202.
692

The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the
42
complaint?”
The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the

face of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on
a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing
the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in affirming the trial court’s Decision
which dismissed the expropriation suit.
Second Issue:Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res

Judicata
43
As correctly
44
found by the Court of Appeals and the trial
court, all the requisites for the application of res judicata
are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment
on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving
identical interests, subject matter and cause of action,
which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of
res judicata, which
45
finds application in generally all cases
and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its
agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of
eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State,
dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute
and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata.
The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police
power, can “reach every form of
_______________
42 Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 199
SCRA 205, 210, July 15, 1991, per Cruz, J.; citing The Heirs of Juliana
Clavano vs. Genato, 80 SCRA 217, 222, October 28, 1977.
43 Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 25.
44 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, p. 2; rollo, p. 70.
45 Republic vs. Director of Lands, 99 SCRA 651, 657, September 11,
1980.
693
VOL. 292, JULY 20, 1998 693

46
46
property which the State might need for public use.” “All
separate interests of individuals in property are held of the
government under this tacit agreement or implied
reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the
eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of
property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate
body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they
have the right to resume the possession47 of the property
whenever the public interest requires it.” Thus, the State
or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from
exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-
compliance with any legal requirement.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the
right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply
to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a
final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the
ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit
raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or
its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement,
as prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising
48
its power
of eminent domain over the same property. By the same
token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its
delegated power of eminent domain through a mere
resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar
proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that
matter, all others are properly complied with.
Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also
true of the
49
principle of “law of the case.” In Republic vs. De
Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its
agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the
mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to
be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the
parties. The State or its authorized agent may still
subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same
property, once all legal
_______________
46 Bernas, supra, p. 349.

47 Ibid.
48 See National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 577,
March 11, 1996.
49 182 SCRA 142, 147-148, February 12, 1990.
694

Re: Cases Left Undecided By Judge Sergio D. Mabunay,
RTC, Branch 24, Manila
requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not

only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but
also clearly defeat social justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED without
prejudice to petitioner’s proper exercise of its power of
eminent domain over subject property. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and

Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Note.—Eminent domain is the highest and most exact

idea of property remaining in the government that may be
acquired for some public purpose through a method in the
nature of a forced purchase by the State. (Manosca vs.
Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 [1996])
——o0o——
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11/7/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 292

678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE, petitioner, vs. V.M.

Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; A Local Government

VOL. 292, JULY 20, 1998 679

Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power or

Same; Same; Essential requisites before an LGU can exercise

The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose

Same; Same; In the case at bar, there was no compliance with

Same; Same; A municipal ordinance is different from a

680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and

Same; Same; It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is

resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This

Remedial Law; Action; Motion; In a motion to dismiss based

Same; Res Judicata; All the requisites for the application of

VOL. 292, JULY 20, 1998 681

Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

Same; Same; The principle of res judicata, which finds

need for public use.” “All separate interests of individuals in

Same; Same; In Republic vs. De Knecht, the Court ruled that

682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Robiso & Reyes for respondents.

A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of

Statement of the Case

These principles are applied by this Court in resolving this

1 Rollo, pp. 21-25.

VOL. 292, JULY 20, 1998 683

“The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain

4 Penned by acting Presiding Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance,

7 Ibid., pp. 27-32.

VOL. 292, JULY 20, 1998 685

“1. Whether or not the Resolution of the Parañaque

Whether or not the complaint in this case states no

As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals affirmed in

14 Private respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 197-198.

686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Before this Court, petitioner posits two issues, viz.:

“1. A resolution duly approved by the municipal council

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the

VOL. 292, JULY 20, 1998 687

Sanggunian authorizing its 24

“Section 19. Eminent Domain.—A local government unit may,

government unit may immediately take possession of the property

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before

688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to

27 Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., The Local Government Code of

31 Effective January 1, 1992.

VOL. 292, JULY 20, 1998 689

Government Code which was already in force when the

690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily

35 City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349, 366