Navarro vs.

Domagtoy

On October 27, 1994, Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy performed a marriage

ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside
his court’s jurisdiction at his residence in the Municipality of Dapa, which does
not fall withing his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monico and
Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the Municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. Respondent judge avers that in solemnizing the marriage
between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Art. 7 par 1 of the Family
Code which states that: Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;” and that Art. 8 should be
applied instead which states: Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in
the chambers the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in
the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house
or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.”

Issue: Whether or not the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the

courts jurisdiction covered by Art. 7 and 8 of the Family Code.

Held:

As the provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing
in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or
del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the
written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only
one party, Gemma del Rosario. In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction
covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was also not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8
and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this
provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the
formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does
not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the
preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
Aranes vs. Judge Salvador Occiano

Facts:
On February 17, 2000, Judge Occiano, presiding judge of the MTC of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, solemnized the petitioner’s marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. Respondent was
requested to solemnize a marriage in his sala at the MTC of Balatan. However,
the groom had a difficulty in walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling
to Balatan which is located almost 25km from his residence in Nabua.
Respondent judge acceded to their request to solemnize the marriage in Nabua.
Upon careful examination of the marriage requisites, he discovered that the
parties didn’t have a marriage license and refused to solemnize the marriage. But
proceeded anyways due to human compassion. Petitioner party’s re assured that
the missing marriage license would be delivered at this sala in the MTC of
Balatan that same day but failed to do so.

Issue: Whether or not Respondent judge had jurisdiction

Held:

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the
case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage. Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage
without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, we held that a
marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that
the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of
validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance
of the law.

Balogbog vs. CA

Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting
against their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of
their grandparents’ estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was
granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the latter affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961
respectively. They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their
older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they
were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they
were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However,
Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons
and that he was married. They started to question the validity of the marriage
between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself
admitted during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his
nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino.

In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parent’s
marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from
1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and
Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three children. Catalina
herself testified that she was handed a “receipt” presumably the marriage
certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.

On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the
family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil
Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record of the
names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant Municipal
Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalina’s marriage is valid.

HELD:

Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in
rendering Gavino and Catalina’s marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and
Generoso one third of their grandparents’ estate.

The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did
not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the
Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of this country. Therefore,
Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower
court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance
with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil
Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the
Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married.

Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to

present it would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may
be presented where in this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of
witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in
1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six
and that they are recognized by Gavino’s family and by the public as the
legitimate children of Gavino.

Trinidad vs CA

Facts
Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad, who together with
Felix and Lourdes, his siblings, are heirs to four parcels of land of their deceased
father. He presented the following evidence. A testimony of Gerardo that
Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a child. A testimony of Meren that she
was present in the marriage of Inocentes. His own baptismal certificate (his birth
certificate had been destroyed) Family pictures and his own testimony that he
lived with Lourdes, until he got married. Lourdes, the aunt of Inocentes,
presented the following evidence to refute Arturio’s claims that the testimony of
Briones that Inocentes was never married and her own testimony that Inocentes
died childless and she claimed that Arturio was simply a neighbor. She denied
knowledge of the pictures Arturio presented, where she is shown holding the
baby of Arturio, together with Arturio and his wife.
Issue
Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturio’s filiation are
sufficient.
Held
Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient
proof of marriage: fact of marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties,
birth certificate of the child, and other documents. Arturio presented the first 3.
For filiation, when the birth certificate can’t be produced, other evidence like the
baptismal certificate, is admissible. Use of surname without objection is also
presumptive evidence of legitimacy.