Villaflor vs.

Vivar

The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of an information or render it defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court or constitute
a ground for quashing the information. Instead of dismissing the information, the court should hold the proceedings in abeyance and order the public prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation.

Facts:

Vivar mauled Villaflor outside a bar in Muntinlupa City. On his way out, Vivar told Villaflor, "next time, I will use my gun on you". A preliminary investigation for slight physical
injuries was made by the assistant city prosecutor. Vivar was later charged with the crime of slight physical injuries.

When the injuries sustained by Villaflor turned out to be more serious than they had appeared at first, the charge of slight physical injuries was withdrawn and an Information
for serious physical injuries was filed. Another Information for grave threats was also filed against Vivar.

Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, Vivar filed a Motion to Quash the Information for grave threats. He contended that the threat, having been made in connection with the
charge of serious physical injuries, should have been absorbed by the latter; hence, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.

MTC denied the motion to quash. Vivar was arraigned for grave threats and pleaded not guilty.
RTC reversed the Order, granted the motion to quash and dismissed the charges for failure of the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.

Issues:

1. Can the court motu propio order the dismissal of the two (2) criminal cases for serious physical injuries and grave threats on the ground that the public prosecutor failed
to conduct a preliminary investigation?

2. Is there a need for a new preliminary investigation?

3. Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation be considered a ground to quash the criminal informations for serious physical injuries
and grave threats filed against the accused-respondent?

Held:
1. No. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of
the court or constitute a ground for quashing the information. The trial court, instead of dismissing the information, should hold in abeyance the proceedings and order the
public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.

2. No. A new preliminary investigation cannot be demanded by Vivar. This is because the change made by the public prosecutor was only a formal amendment.

The filing of the Amended Information, without a new preliminary investigation, did not violate the right of respondent to be protected from a hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution; an open and public accusation of a crime; or from the trouble, the expenses and the anxiety of a public trial. The Amended Information could not have come as
a surprise to him for the simple and obvious reason that it charged essentially the same offense as that under the original Information. Moreover, if the original charge was
related to the amended one, such that an inquiry would elicit substantially the same facts, then a new preliminary investigation was not necessary.

3. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides the grounds on which an accused can move to quash the complaint or information. Nowhere in the
above-mentioned section is there any mention of a lack of a preliminary investigation as a ground for a motion to quash. Furthermore, we stress that the failure of the accused
to assert any ground for a motion to quash before arraignment, either because he had not filed the motion or had failed to allege the grounds therefor, shall be deemed a
waiver of such grounds. In this case, he waived his right to file such motion when he pleaded not guilty to the charge of grave threats. (Villaflor vs. Vivar, G.R. No. 134744.
January 16, 2001)

SAN AGUSTIN v. PEOPLE, 437 SCRA 392 (2004)

FACTS: Luz Tan executed a notarized criminal complaint and filed the same with the NBI charging petitioner Barangay Chairman Ernesto San Agustin with serious illegal
detention alleging that the petitioner detained her husband Vicente Tan without lawful ground. The investigation of the NBI found that the victim TAN was mistaken as a
“snatcher” and was turned over to petitioner San Agustin where Tan was beaten and locked up. Luz Tan (complainant) went to the barangay hall and inquired but they denied
having seen the victim Tan.

Later on, an inquest investigation was conducted by the State prosecutor. She came out with a Resolution which wasaffirmed by the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, finding
probable cause against the petitioner for serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that he was illegally arrested and subjected to an inquest investigation; hence, he was deprived of his right
to a preliminary investigation. He also prayed that he be released from detention and that the prosecutor conduct a preliminary investigation.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner should be released on the ground that it did not conform with Section 7 Rule 112 which requires preliminary investigation to be conducted before
the information is filed.

HELD: NO. An inquest investigation is proper only when the suspect is lawfully arrested without a warrant. Although the procedure does not conform with Section 7 Rule 112,
it is not a ground to nullify the arrest.

RATIO: The warrantless arrest or the detention of the petitioner in the instant case does not fall within the provision of Section 5, Rule 113. The inquest investigation
conducted is void because under Rule 112, Section 7, an inquest investigation is proper only when the suspect is lawfully arrested without a warrant:

SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. – When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation,
the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest investigation has been conducted in accordance with existing
rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the
basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court but merely the regularity of the proceedings. It does not impair the validity of
the Information or otherwise render it defective. Neither is it a ground to quash the Information or nullify the order of arrest issued against him or justify the release of the
accused from detention. However, the trial court should suspend proceedings and order a preliminary investigation considering tha t the inquest investigation conducted by
the State Prosecutor is null and void. The RTC committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the City Prosecutor to conduct
a reinvestigation which is merely a review by the Prosecutor of his records and evidence instead of a preliminary investigation as provided for in Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Whether or not there is a need for a preliminary investigation under Section 1 in relation to Section 9 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure depends upon
the imposable penalty for the crime charged in the complaint filed with the City or Provincial Prosecutor's Office and not upon the imposable penalty for the crime found to
have been committed by the respondent after a preliminary investigation. In this case, the crime charged in the complaint of the NBI filed in the Department of Justice was
kidnapping/serious illegal detention, the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua to death

VICENTE P. LADLAD vs. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007

LADLAD vs. VELASCO

G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007

Facts:

Beltran Petition:

On February 24, 2006, PGMA signed Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a “State of National Emergency.” Following that, police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on
while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame.
Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for which he was arrest ed.

He was subjected to a first inquest involving the crime of inciting to sedition. This was based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February
2006. Inquest prosecutor found probable cause.

BASIS: joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally.

He was also subjected to a second inquest involving the crime of rebellion conducted by DOJ state prosecutors.

The inquest was based on two letters from CIDG executive officer and deputy director. The letters contained results of CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, et al as
“leaders and promoters” of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. DOJ state prosecutors found probable cause.

Beltran opposes the second inquest finding probable cause that he committed rebellion and that such inquest was void.

Ladlad and Maza petitions:

Ladlad, Maza, et al were called for a preliminary investigation for the crime of rebellion.

Basis of the PI: results of the CIDG investigation, culled from the Beltran inquest.

During the PI, CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes, who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners. Velasco, who was the prosecutor, gave
copies of the affidavit of Fuentes to media members present during the proceedings.

Ladlad moved for the inhibition of Velasco citing lack of impartiality and independence, considering the political milieu under which petitioners were investigated, the
statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners’ case, and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the
preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, they contend that the PI was tainted with irregularities as not pursuant to Rule 112 Sec3.

Issues:
1. WON the inquest for rebellion against Beltran was valid? NO.
2. WON there is probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion? NO.
3. WON the PI conducted against Ladlad and Maza were tainted with irregularity? YES.

Held:

1)

The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.

The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers15 states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant,16 for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the
inquest prosecutor could only have conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected
Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw Beltran
commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to
form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly
seditious speech on 24 February 2006.

2)

Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance
to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors
who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over these documents and
find merit in Beltran’s contention that the same are insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion.
Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.

3)

The prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3a of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint must be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses,
subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Here, the
prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of
them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.

Section 3(b) of Rule 112 also mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is
none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall “issue a subpoena to the respondents.” Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued
subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 “to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments.”

During the investigation, prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded
to distribute copies of Fuentes’ affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings. Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the
subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainant’s antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness’ affidavit to members of the media knowing that
petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to
petitioners’ claim that the entire proceeding was a sham. Hence, the court concluded that there was indeed partiality on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the PI.
G.R. No. 216920 January 13, 2016

GIRLIE QUISAY, Petitioner

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PERLAS-BERNABE, J:

FACTS: On December 28, 2012, Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of
R.A No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) Consequently a Pabatid or Information was filed to RTC charging petitioner
such crime.

Petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. In support to her
motion, petitioner pointed out that the Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal were issued without the approval or authority from the City Prosecutor. As such, the Information must be
quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured.
 The RTC ruled to deny the petitioner’s motion to quash due to the lack merit since it found that the certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal have sufficienty
complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires the prior written authority or approval by, among others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of
Informations. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration but denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA that consequently, affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the CA correctly held that RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing petitioner’s motion to quash.

HELD: NO. CA erred in affirming CA’s ruling.

Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of
the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts, to wit:

Sec. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the
resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant
and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed
of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the
dismissal of the complaint.
xxxx

(3) No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial
or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

Xxxx (Emphases supplied)

Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without prior written authority or approval of the authorized officers renders the same as
defective and therefore subject to quashal.

In this case, there was no proof that a certain officer was authorized to perform the written authority with the approval and in behalf of the City Prosecutor. In the
prior circumstances, the CA erred in affirming RTC’s ruling, that the officer who filed the same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Thus, Paabatid Sakdal must be
quashed resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.

Finally, it must be stressed that the Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines. For an orderly administration of justice,
the provisions contained therein should be followed by all litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm of the Government.
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of CA Petitioners: FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and Benjamin Perez Respondents: Reynaldo Ventus and Jojo
Joson FACTS 1. On Dec 2002, Ventus and Joson filed a Complaint for estafa against petitioners before the OCP of Manila a. both parties were business partners in financing
casino players b. sometime in March and April 2002, petitioners connived in convincing them to part with their 260,000 in consideration of a pledge of 2 motor vehicles i. the
motor vehicles were misrepresented by the petitioners to be owned by Aguinaldo, but turned out to be owned by Levita de Castro, manager/operator of LEDC Rent A Car. 2.
Perez denied accusation against him and claimed that his only participation in the transaction between respondents and Aguinaldo was limited to having initially introduced
them to each other. a. respondents: Perez was the one who showed them photocopies of the registration paper of the motor vehicles in the name of Aguinaldo, as well as
the one who personally took them out from the rent-a-car company 3. Asst City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending petitioners to be indicted for estafa 4. An
information for estafa was filed with RTC. 5. Perez was arrested a. Perez filed an Urgent Motion for Reduction of Bail to be posted in cash – granted b. filed Very Urgent
Motion to Recall or Quash Warrants of Arrest 6. Petitioners filed with OCP their: a. Motion for Reconsideration and b. Motion for Withdrawal of Information Prematurely
filed with the RTC c. claim: no deceit or false pretenses was committed because respondents were fully aware that she does not own the pledged motor vehicles 7. Public
respondent granted motion for withdrawal of information and directing recall of arrest warrant only insofar as Aguinaldo is concerned, pending resolution of her MR with the
OCP 8. Petitioners filed Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Arraignment, pending resolution of the MR filed with OCP a. public respondent ordered arraignment to be deferred
until resolution of petitioners’ MR b. ordered case archived pending resolution of petitioners’ MR 9. OCP, through ACP, filed a Motion to Set Case for Trial a. denying the
motion for reconsideration and withdrawal of information 10. Petitioners filed with DOJ a petition for review 11. public respondent directed the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against Aguinaldo and setting of case for arraignment 12. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment and Suspend Further Proceedings until petition for
review before DOJ is resolved with finality a. granted 13. On June 2004, Levita de Castro, through law firm of Lapena and Associates, filed a Motion to reinstate case and to
issue warrant of arrest a. alleged she was the private complainant in the estafa case b. claimed that DOJ already promulgated resolution denying petition for review 14.
Public Respondent issued an order granting a Motion to Reinstate Case and Issue Warrant of Arrest 15. Petitioners: a. public respondent erred in reinstating the case and
issuing an arrest warrant against Aguinaldo b. the Provision of Sec 11, Rule 116 limiting the pension for arraignment to only 60 days is merely directory, thus it cannot deprive
petitioners of their procedural right to due process as their petition for review has not yet been resolved by the DOJ c. even before they could receive a copy of the DOJ
resolution denying their petition for review and move for reconsideration, info had already been filed with RTC ISSUES 1. W/N De Castro was a proper party – No 2. W/N the
provision of Sec 11, Rule 116 is merely directory – No 3. W/N filing of the information and issuance of warrant of arrest put petitioners at risk of incarceration without
preliminary investigation having been completed – NO RULING & RATIO 1. No, de Castro is not even a private complainant, but a mere witness for being the owner of vehicles
allegedly used by petitioners in defrauding and convincing private respondents to part with their 260,000. a. Public respondent should have treated De Castro’s motion as a
mere scrap of paper with no legal effect, as it was filed by one who is not a party to that case. b. In reinstating the case and issuing the arrest warrant against Aguinaldo,
the public respondent erroneously relied on the DOJ resolution dismissing the petition for review in a different case.

However, their petition for review with DOJ is still pending resolution. 2. No, the provision of Sec 11, Rule 116 limiting the suspension for arraignment to only 60 days is not
directory a. relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of
justice requires it. b. CA correctly ruled that the period of 1 year and 1 month from April 16, 2004 to May 16, 2005 when public respondent ordered the issuance of a warrant
of arrest of Aguinaldo was more than ample time to give the petitioners the opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition for review from the DOJ c. The delay by DOJ
does not extend the period of 60 days prescribed under the ROC 3. NO. While they are correct in stating that the right to PI is a substantive right, petitioners are wrong in
arguing that the information filed without affording the respondent the right to file a MR of an adverse DOJ resolution is fatally premature. a. With the info for estafa against
petitioners having been filed on July 16, 2003, the public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Aug 23 order denying the motion to quash
warrant of arrest and setting their arraignment pending the final resolution of petition for review by the DOJ b. the period of almost 1 year and 7 months from time petitioners
filed their petition with DOJ on Feb 27, 2004 to Sept 14, 2005 when trial court finally set their arraignment was more than ample time to give petitioners the opportunity to
obtain a resolution of their petition. c. Indeed, with more than 11 years having elapsed, it is not high time for the continuation of the trial on the merits in the criminal case
below, as 60 days has already elapsed from filing of petition from DOJ. 4. Petitioners were afforded the right to due process a. When an opportunity to be heard either
through oral arguments or pleadings is accorded, there is no denial procedural due process.

ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015 Quantum of proof necessary in Preliminary Investigations

OCTOBER 2, 2017

FACTS:

The Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada copies of the two criminal complaints for plunder against him. Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed
their counter-affidavits.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings”
(“Request”).

Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’
(Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”

The Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution which found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his co-respondents with plunder and violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019.

Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for the issuance of a new resolution dismissing the charges against him. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Ombudsman’s Order denying his Request, Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set aside the latter Order.

ISSUE:

What is the quantum of evidence necessary during preliminary investigation?

RULING:

First, there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. The Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman do not provide for the relief sought by Sen. Estrada in his Request.

It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of
guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full
exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation
are limited to those granted by procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence
now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s
probable guilt thereof.

A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a
well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Futhermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.

Supremacy of the Constitution

Genuino vs Delima

April 17, 2018

Case digest by: SMBonrustro

Facts:

The case is a consolidated case of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against former DOJ Secretary Delima for her issuance of DOJ circular no. 41. Series of 2010,
known as the “Consolidated Rules and Regulations Governing Issuance and Implementation of Hold Departure Orders (HDO), Watchlist Orders (WLO) and Allow Departure
Orders (ADO)”. The Petitioners questions the constitutionality of this DOJ circular on the ground that it infringes the constitutional right to travel. The petitioners in these
consolidated cases are former President Arroyo and her husband, and Efraim and Erwin Genuino. Former DOJ Secretary De lima issued HDO and WLO against petitioners on
the ground that criminal charges of plunder, qualified theft and violation of the Omnibus Election Code were filed against them. Petitioners, particularly Spouses Arroyo, file
temporary restraining order against the issued HDO and WLO of DOJ seeking relief and grant from court to allow them to travel so that former president Arroyo may seek
medical treatment abroad. The court granted relief sought on a condition that petition will file a bond of PhP2M, an undertaking that petitioners shall report to Philippine
consulate in the countries they are to visit (Germany, Singapore, USA, Italy, Spain and Austria) and shall appoint a representative to receive on their behalf subpoena, orders
and other legal processes. Petitioners complied all the conditions

Instead of following the order of the court, DOJ caused for the refusal to process the petitioners travel documents. Hence, this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the issued DOJ circular 41 infringes the constitutional rights of the petitioners to travel and thus an ultra vires to the constitution.

Ruling of the Court:

 The constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation; it is deemed written in every statute and contr act. If a law or administrative rule
violates any norm of the constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.

In this case, the right to travel is a guarantee of the constitution under the Bill of rights. There are allowable restrictions in the exercise of this right which are for the
interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law.

The ground of the respondent in the issuance of DOJ circular 41 is for the petitioners to be present during the preliminary investigation of their cases which is outside
the allowable restrictions provided by the constitution, hence, it is an ultra vires and has no effect.