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Abandonment/Surrenders

Voluntary surrender, as a mode of c agricultural leasehold tenancy

relations, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by
competent evidence. (Nisnisan v. Court of Appeals, 294 bSCRAs
d173)

The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent

of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest
that have been abandoned. (Castellano v. Francisco, 554 SCRA 63)

Abandonment or neglect is defined as a “wilful failure of the agrarian

reform beneficiary, together with his farm household, to cultivate, till
or develop his land to produce any crop, or to use the land for a
specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar
years.” (Estolas v. Mabalot, 381 SCRA 702)

Mere employment or transfer of residence does not amount to

abandonment unless it is coupled with failure on the part of the
agrarian reform beneficiary and his family to cultivate the lot for at
least two years. (Manuel v. Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, 528 SCRA 29)

Agrarian Law Implementation

Protests regarding the implementation of the CARP fall under the

exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. He determines whether
a tract of land is covered by or exempt from CARP. (Department of
Agrarian Reform v. Polo Coconut Plantation Co., Inc., 564 SCRA
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78; Department of Agrarian Reform v. Philippine Communication

Satellite Corporation, 490 SCRA 729)

Annulment of Judgment/ Null and Void Judgments

A judgment can only be annulled on two (2) grounds: (a) that the
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of
law; or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud.
In order for fraud to serve as a basis for the annulment of a
judgment, it must be extrinsic or collateral in character. (Salonga v.
Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 534)

No laches attach when the judgment is null and void for want of
jurisdiction. (Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 20)

A void judgment never acquires finality and any action to declare its
nullity does not prescribe. (Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galves v.
Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 672)

It is settled that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction

over the subject matter is void. (Golangco v. Fung, 504 SCRA 321)

Void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot

be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. (Leonor
vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA, 69; Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. De
Mindo, 521 SCRA 85)

Appeals
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In case the DAR Secretary denies their petition, petitioners may

appeal to the Office of the President, and in case of an adverse
ruling, a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 43
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. (Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and
Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, 475 SCRA 743)

BARC Certification

The absence of a certification from the Barangay Argrarian Reform

Committee (BARC) is not fatal to a party’s cause. (Siacor v.
Gigantana, 380 SCRA 306)

CARP

The CARP is the bastion of social justice of poor landless farmers,

the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the
natural right to toil the earth and liberate them from oppressive
tenancy. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Department of
Education Culture and Sports, 426 SCRA 217)

Notice is part of the constitutional right to due process of law. It

informs the landowner of the State’s intention to acquire a private
land upon payment of just compensation and gives him the
opportunity to present evidence that his landholding is not covered
or is otherwise excused from the agrarian law. (Sta. Monica
Industrial and Development Corporation v. Department of Agrarian
Reform Regional Director for Region III, 555 SCRA 97)
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A covered landholding does not revert back to the owner even if the
beneficiaries thus selected do not meet all the necessary
qualifications. (Hermoso v. C.L. Realty Corporation, 489 SCRA 556)

A transfer of ownership over a property within the coverage of CARP

can only be effected when just compensation has been given to the
owners. (Hermoso v. C.L. Realty Corporation, 489 SCRA 556)

Since land acquisition under Presdiential Decree No. 27 and the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary
method of expropriating private property, the law must be strictly
construed – any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies
that results from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for
expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and
should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. (Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot v. Court of
Appeals, 517 SCRA 232)

In order to be exempt from CARP coverage, the subject property

must have been classified as industrial/residential before June 15,
1988. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Oroville Development
Corporation, 519 SCRA 112)

Cause of Action

A cause of action has three elements namely: (1)- a right of the

plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it arises or is created;
(2)- an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate such right; and (3)- an act or omission on the part of
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such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a

breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. (Del Bros
Hotel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 33; Rava
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 144)

CLOAs and EPs

The mere issuance if an emancipation patent does not put the

ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and
scrutiny. (Ayo-Alburo v. Matobato, 456 SCRA 399)

Emancipation patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian

laws, rules and regulations. Section 12(g) of P.D. No. 946 vested
the Court of Agrarian Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving
the cancellation of emancipation patents issued under P.D. No. 266.
Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases was later lodged with the
DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure. (Ayo-Alburo v. Matobato, 456 SCRA 399; Gabriel v.
Jamias, 565 SCRA 443)

An emancipation patent, while it presupposes that the grantee

thereof shall have already complied with all the requirements
prescribed under PD No. 27, serves as a basis for the issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title – it is the issuance of this emancipation
patent that conclusively entitles the farmer/grantee of the rights of
absolute ownership. (Omadle v. Casuno, 493 SCRA 108)

Transfer certificates of title (TCTs) issued pursuant to Emancipation

Patents acquire the same protection accorded to other transfer
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certificates of title (TCTs). Such emancipation patent shall become

irrevocable and indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from
the date of its issuance. (Estribillo v. Court of Appeals, 494 SCRA
218)

Conversion

An ordinance converting agricultural lands into residential or light

industrial should be given prospective application only, and should
not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the
legal relationships existing over such lands. (Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation v. Amante, 453 SCRA 432)

After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands,
though reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion,
jurisdiction over which is vested in the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR).

Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of

agricultural land into some other use as approved by the
Department of Agrarian Reform. (Ros v. Department of Agrarian
Reform, 468 SCRA 471)

Reclassification is very much different from conversion – the former

is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for
non-agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such
as residential, industrial or commercial, as embodied in the land use
plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for land use
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conversion; while the latter is the act of changing the current use of
a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the
Department of Agrarian Reform. A mere reclassification of an
agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change
its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants – he has to
undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the
agricultural land for other purposes. (Ludo & Luym Development
Corporation v. Barreto, 471 SCRA 391)

In Ros v. DAR (G.R. No. 132477, 31 August 2005, 468 SCRA 471),
we held that reclassified agricultural lands must undergo the
process of conversion in the DAR before they may be used for other
purposes. Since the DAR never approved the conversion of the Polo
estate from agricultural to another use, the land was never placed
beyond the scope of the CARP. (Department of Agrarian Reform v.
Polo Coconut Plantation Co., Inc., 564 SCRA 78)

Section 20 of the Local Government Code provides that a city or

municipality can reclassify land only through the enactment of an
ordinance. In this instance, reclassification was undertaken by mere
resolution; thus it was invalid. (Department of Agrarian Reform v.
Polo Coconut Plantation Co., Inc., 564 SCRA 78)

The reclassification of lands to non-agricultural cannot be applied to

defeat vested rights of tenant-farmers under Presidential Decree
No. 27. (Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 503 SCRA
378)
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The law is clear that court proceedings are indispensable where the
reclassification of the landholding is duly determined before
ejectment can be effected, which in turn paves the way for the
payment of disturbance compensation. (Alarcon v. Court of
Appeals, 405 SCRA 440)

A mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically

allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment
of the tenants. (Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, 405 SCRA 440)

Due Process

Jurisprudential declarations are rich to the effect that the essence of

due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side. A
formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy. (Nueva Ecija Electric
Cooperative (NEECO) II v. National Labor Relations Commission,
461 SCRA 169)

The Court shall not fake naivete of the prevalent practice among
lawyers who, for lack of better argument to bolster their position,
engage in waxing lyrical to a “denial of due process.” As the eminent
Justice Hermosisima Jr. noted, some lawyers who, lacking plausible
support for their position, simply claim a denial of due process as if
it were a universal absolution. The ground will prove unavailing as it
is virtually only a pro forma argument. Due process is not to be
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bandied like a slogan. It is not a mere catchphrase. As the highest

hallmark of the free society, its name should not be invoked in vain
but only when justice has not been truly served. (Nueva Ecija
Electric Cooperative (NEECO) II v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 461 SCRA 169)

Homelot

A mere member of the farmer-beneficiary’s household is not entitled

to be awarded a homelot nor construct a house of his own on the
homelot. (Cecilleville Realty and Services Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 278 SCRA 819)

Jurisdiction - in general

Well settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action
as well as the court which has jurisdiction of the case is the
allegations made by the plaintiff in his complaint. (Republic v.
Sebastian, 72 SCRA 222; Ganadin v. Ramos 99 SCRA 613;
Unilongo v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 632)

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well

as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the
complaint and the character of relief sought. (Morta Sr. v.
Occidental, 308 SCRA 167)

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-

judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject
matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material
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allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,

irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to
any or all such relief. (Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro
v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, 475 SCRA 743)

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is

conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or
waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can
it be acquired through or waived by, any act or omission of the
parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to
a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the
parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent
the court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARAB’s
lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or
petition. (Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of
Alberto Cruz, 475 SCRA 743)

Jurisdiction – DARAB/Agrarian Disputes

In order for the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over a case, there

must be a tenancy relationship between the parties. (Morta Sr. v.
Occidental, 308 SCRA 167; Heirs of Rafael Magpily v. De Jesus,
474 SCRA 628; Arzaga v. Copias, 400 SCRA 148)

Where there are no tenurial, leasehold or any agrarian relations

whatsoever between the parties that could bring a controversy
under the ambit of agrarian reform laws, the DARAB has no
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jurisdiction. (Heirs of the late Herman Rey Santos v. Court of

Appeals, 327 SCRA 293)

Jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving a tenancy

relationship between the parties. (Almuete v. Andres, 369 SCRA
619)

Without a valid leasehold agreement between the parties, there is

no tenancy relationship involved and jurisdiction belongs to the
regular courts. (Gutierrez v. Cabrerra, 452 SCRA 521)

Respondents’ cause of action is actually one for forcible entry – their

allegation that they were deprived of their landholdings due to the
grower’s contract will not automatically make the case an agrarian
dispute that would call for the application of tenancy laws and the
assumption of jurisdiction by the DARAB. (Suarez v. Saul, 473
SCRA 628)

An action not involving an agrarian dispute but only for the recovery
of possession of real property is within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and adjudication. (Ramos v. Stateland
Investment Corporation, 474 SCRA 726)
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An agrarian dispute is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act

No. 6657 as follows: (d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation
of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farm-workers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner
and tenant, or lessor and lessee. (Heirs of Rafael Magpily v. De
Jesus, 474 SCRA 366)

For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over cases involving the

issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which are
registered with the LRA, they must relate to an agrarian dispute
between land owner and tenants to whom CLOAs have been issued
by the DAR Secretary. (Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora
Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, 475 SCRA 743)

The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Boars has primary

and exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian related cases, i.e., rights
and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in
the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and other
related agrarian laws, or those cases involving the ejectment and
dispossession of tenant and/or leaseholders. On the other hand,
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Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by

Republic Act 7691, provides that exclusive original jurisdiction over
cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer is lodged with the
metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and MCTCs.
(Salmorin v. Zaldivar, 559 SCRA 564)

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from

resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. For
agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of
Agrarian Reform; more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Executive Order 229 vested
the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. This law
divested the regional trial courts of their general jurisdiction to try
agrarian reform matters. Under Republic Act No. 6657, the DAR
retains jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. (Hilario v.
Prudente, 564 SCRA 485)

It is well-settled that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e, the
DARAB and its regional and provincial adjudication boards,
exercises quasi-judicial functions and jurisdiction on all matters
pertaining to an agrarian dispute or controversy and the
implementation of agrarian reform laws. Pertinently, it is provided in
DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure that the DARAB has primary
and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine
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all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and related
agrarian reform laws. Such jurisdiction shall extend to cases
involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents which
are registered with the Land Registration Authority. (Gabriel v.
Jamias, 565 SCRA 443)

For sure, the jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot be deemed to

disappear the moment a certificate of title is issued, for, such
certificates are not modes of transfer of property but merely
evidence of such transfer, and there can be no valid transfer of title
should the CLOA, on which it was grounded be void. The same
holds true in the case of a certificate of title issued by virtue of a void
emancipation patent. (Gabriel v. Jamias, 565 SCRA 443)

From the foregoing, it is therefore undeniable that it is the DARAB

and not the regular courts which has jurisdiction herein, this
notwithstanding the issuance of Torrens titles in the names of the
petitioners. For, it is a fact that the petitioners’ Torrens titles
emanated from the emancipation patents previously issued to them
by virtue of being the farmer-beneficiaries identified by the DAR
under the OLT of the government. The DAR ruling that the said
emancipation patents were erroneously issued for failing to consider
the retention rights of respondents had already attained finality.
Considering that the action was filed by respondents with the
DARAB was precisely to annul the emancipation patents issued to
the petitioners, the case squarely, therefore, falls within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. (Gabriel v. Jamias, 565 SCRA 443)
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Just Compensation

Under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the
initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed land
reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Through
notice sent to the landowner pursuant to Section 16(a) of Republic
Act No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case the landowner
rejects the offer, a summary proceeding is held and afterward the
provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB)
adjudicator, as the case may be, depending on the value of the land,
fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not
agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter before the RTC
acting as Special Agrarian Court. (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 263
SCRA 758; Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 357 SCRA 599)

There is nothing contradictory between the Department of Agrarian

Relations’ primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the
determination of questions of just compensation, and the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for
the determination of just compensation – primary jurisdiction is
vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just
compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform
program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the
courts. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, 458 SCRA 441)
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The expropriation of private property under RA 6657 is a

revolutionary kind of expropriation, being a means to obtain social
justice by distributing land to the farmers, envisioning freedom from
the bondage of the land they actually till. As an exercise of police
power, it puts the landowner, not the government, in a situation
where the odds are practically against him. He cannot resist it. His
only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of
compensation to be paid for the property taken by the government.
As expected, the landowner will exercise this right to the hilt, subject
to the limitation that he be entitled to “just compensation.” Clearly
therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR, the
landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation.
(Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla, 556 SCRA 102)

“Just compensation” is the sum equivalent to the market value of the

property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who
receives and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of
the actual taking by the government. Just compensation is defined
as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
its expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that
the true measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The
word “just” is used to modify the meaning of the word loss. The word
“just” is used to modify the meaning of the word “compensation” to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to
be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. (Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Orilla, 556 SCRA 102)
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While the payment of just compensation requires the immediate

deposit and release to the landowner of the provisional
compensation as determined by the DAR, it also encompasses the
payment in full of the just compensation to the landholders as finally
determined by the courts. Thus, it cannot be said that there is
already prompt payment of just compensation when there is only a
partial payment thereof, as in this case. (Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Orilla, 556 SCRA 102)

Laches/Prescription

The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant,
or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which
the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or
notice of defendant’s conduct as having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the
part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in
which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant
if the suit is not held barred. (Jison v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA
495; Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) v.
Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 287)

The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in
asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of defendant’s conduct as having been afforded
an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on
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the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right
in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the
suit is not held to be barred. These elements must all be proved
positively. (Heirs of Rosa Dumaliang v. Serban, 516 SCRA 343;
Department of Education, Division of Albay v. Oñate, 524 SCRA
200; Vda. De Tirona v. Encarnacion, 534 SCRA 394)

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an

unreasonable length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it. (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29; Lim
Tay v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 634)

Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable

and unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or declined to
assert it. (Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones, 514 SCRA 197;
Regalado v. Go, 514 SCRA 616; Republic v. Unimex Micro-
Electronics GmBH, 518 SCRA 19; Cañezo v. Rojas, 538 SCRA 242)

The rationale behind the prescription of actions is to prevent

fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of
time, thus surprising the parties or their representatives when the
facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or the defective
memory or death or removal of the witnesses. (Antonio, Jr. v.
Morales, 512 SCRA 318)
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The statute of limitation was devised to operate primarily against

those who slept on their rights and not against those desirous to act
but could not do so far for causes beyond their control. (Antonio, Jr.
v. Morales, 512 SCRA 318)

Prescription, as a ground for a motion to dismiss, is adequate when

the complaint shows on its face that the action has already
prescribed. (Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. v. Navarro, 526
SCRA 51)

The law helps the vigilant but not those who sleep on their rights for
time is a means of destroying obligations and actions, because time
runs against the slothful and contemnors of their own rights.
(Salandanan v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 671)

Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subveniunt – the law comes

to the succour only to aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their
rights. (Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, 532 SCRA
391)

Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 533 SCRA 571)

Negative Pregnant
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A negative pregnant is a form of a negative expression which carries

with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favourable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a
fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words
of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has
been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while
the fact itself is admitted. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 406 SCRA
190)

Party-in-interest

A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or

injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Farmer beneficiaries and those who are mere qualified
beneficiaries who are not approved awardees of Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) are not real parties-in-interest.
(Samahang Magsasaka ng 53 Hektarya v. Mosquera, 518 SCRA
668)

Payment

When the existence of a debt is fully established by evidence, the

burden of proving that it has been extinguished by payment
devolves upon the debtor who offers such a defense to the claim of
the plaintiff creditor. (IV Tolentino, p. 275; Piñon v. De Osorio, 30
Phil. 365, Ropali Trading Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 296 SCRA 309)
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Thus, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation
has been discharged with payment falls on the debtor, in
accordance with the rule that one who pleads payment has the
burden of proving it. Only when the debtor introduces evidence that
the obligation has been extinguished does the burden shift to the
creditor, who is then under a duty of producing evidence to show
why payment does not extinguish the obligation. (G & M Philippines
v. Cuambot, 507 SCRA 552)

PD No. 27

The law is clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the
promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 on October 21, 1972,
petitioner was deemed owner of the land in question. As of that date,
he was declared emancipated from the bondage of the soil. As such,
he gained the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding
for himself. Those rights over that particular property were granted
to him and to no other. To insure his continued possession and
enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any
valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary
succession to his successors. (Torres v. Ventura, 187 SCRA 96)

Presidential Decree No. 27 does not automatically vest ownership

of a piece of land to a tenant farmer. (Berboso v. Court of Appeals,
494 SCRA 583)

Sales of lands made in violation of Presidential Decree No. 27 and

Executive Order No. 228 declaring tenant-tillers as the full owners
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of the lands they tilled, are considered null and void. (Siacor v.
Gigantana, 380 SCRA 306)

Presidential Decree No. 27 specifically provides that title to land

acquired pursuant to its mandate or to that of the Land Reform
Program of the government shall not be transferable except to the
grantee’s heirs by hereditary succession or back to the government
by other legal means. (Estolas v. Mabalot, 381 SCRA 702)

The rule of pari delicto may not be invoked in a case of the waiver
of rights under P.D. No. 27 since it runs counter to an avowed
fundamental policy of the State. (Siacor v. Gigantana, 380 SCRA
306)

The prohibition against transfers to persons other than the heirs of

other qualified beneficiaries stems form the policy of the
Government to develop generations of farmers to attain its avowed
goal to have an adequate and sustained agricultural production –
with certitude, such objective will not see the light of day if lands
covered by agrarian reform can easily be converted for non-
agricultural purposes. (Estate of the late Encarnacion Vda. De
Panlilio v. Dizon, 536 SCRA 565)

Since there appears to be no irreconcilable conflict between P.D. 27

and Sec. 6 of EO 228, then the two (2) provisions can be made
compatible by maintaining the rule in PD 27 that lands acquired
under said decree can only be transferred to the heirs of the original
beneficiary or to the Government. PD 27 is the specific law on
agrarian reform while EO 228 was issued principally to implement
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PD 27. (Estate of the late Encarnacion Vda. De Panlilio v. Dizon,

536 SCRA 565)

Redemption

The right of lessees to redeem the land they have been working on
that has been disposed of without their knowledge is statutory in
character and attaches to a particular landholding by operation of
law. (Cuano v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 122)

In this instance, the price paid for the land by third persons is
considered as the reasonable redemption price to be paid by the
lessees. (Cuano v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 122)

Right of redemption by tenants has not yet prescribed where there

was no notice in writing of the sale of the property given by the
vendee upon the tenants.

Requirement for the exercise of the right of redemption by the

agricultural lessees or tenants is 180 days from written notice from
thee vendee of the property upon registration of the sale as
prescribed by Republic Act No. 3844 as amended. (Mallari v. Court
of Appeals, 161 SCRA 503)

In the event that the landholding is sold to a third person without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter is granted by law the
right to redeem it within one hundred eighty (180) days from notice
in writing and at a reasonable price and consideration.
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The law does not prescribe any particular form of notice nor any
distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner.

In making a repurchase, it is not sufficient that a person offering to

redeem merely manifests his desire to repurchase. This statement
of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous
tender of payment which constitutes the legal use or exercise of the
right to repurchase. (Quiño v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 249)

Res judicata

Res judicata, according to Black, “refers to the rule that a final

judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as
to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving
the same demand or cause of action.”

The four elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar
the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the disposition of
the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be
between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action. (Heirs of Igmedio Maglaque and
Sabina Payawal v. Court of Appeals, 524 SCRA 234; Dayot v. Shell
Chemical (Phils.), Inc., 525 SCRA 535; Puno v. Court of Appeals,
533 SCRA 549)

A judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights and

liabilities of the parties based on the ultimate facts as disclosed by
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the pleadings or issues presented for trial. (Heirs of Igmedio

Maglaque and Sabina Payawal v. Court of Appeals, 524 SCRA 234;
Dayot v. Shell Chemical (Phils.), Inc., 525 SCRA 535; Puno v. Court
of Appeals, 533 SCRA 549)

Absolute identity of parties is not a condition sine qua non for res
judicata to apply – substantial identity of the parties would suffice –
privity or a shared identity of interest between a party in the first case
and the party in he second is sufficient to invoke the coverage of the
principle. (Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Sandiganbayan, 530 SCRA 13)

It is well-established that a party cannot by varying the form of action

or adopting a different method of presenting his case, or by pleading
justifiable circumstances, escape the operation of a principle that
one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.
Authorities tend to widen rather than restrict the doctrine of res
judicata on the ground that public as well as private interest
demands the ending of suits by requiring the parties to sue once
and for all in the same case all the special proceedings and
remedies to which they are entitled. (Del Rosario v. Far East Bank
and Trust Company, 537 SCRA 571)

Where a right, question or fact is distinctly put in issue and directly

determined by a court in a first case, between the same parties or
their privies, the former adjudication of that fact, right or question is
binding on the parties and their privies irrespective of whether the
causes of action are the same. (Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Sandiganbayan, 530 SCRA 13)
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Material facts which were in issue in a former action and were

admitted or judicially determined therein become res judicata and
may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same
parties or their privies. (Herrera v. Canlas, 310 SCRA 318)

Rulings in earlier related cases, which had long attained finality,

effectively foreclose any further inquiry. (Mata v. Court of Appeals,
318 SCRA 416)

Conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation of particular facts

or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action. (Mata v. Court of Appeals, 318
SCRA 416)

Res judicata does not apply to rights, claims or demands, although

growing out of the same subject matter, which constitute separate
or distinct causes of action and were not put in issue in the former
action. (Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 516)

Retention

The right to retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is

subject to qualification by the legislature. For as long as the area to
be retained is compact or contiguous and does not exceed the
retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner’s choice of the
area to be retained must prevail. (Danan v. Court of Appeals, 474
SCRA 113)
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Social Justice

Laws which have for their object the preservation and maintenance
of social justice are not only meant to favour the poor and
underprivileged – they apply with equal force to those who,
notwithstanding their more comfortable position in life, are equally
deserving of protection from the courts. (Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot
v. Court of Appeals, 517 SCRA 232)

Tenancy – Elements thereof

The meaning of landholder in a tenancy relationship is not limited to

the owner, as the term includes a civil law lessee, usufructuary or a
legal possessor of land. (Esquivel v. Reyes, 410 SCRA 404)

In order to establish a tenancy relationship, the following elements

must concur:

a. the parties are a landowners and tenant;

b. the subject property is agricultural land;

c. there is consent between the parties;

d. the purpose of the relationship is agricultural

production;

e. there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant;

f. there is sharing of the harvest between the parties.

(Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 429 SCRA 109)
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Tenancy relationship exists when the following essential requisites

concur: 1. the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2. the
subject is agricultural land; 3. there is consent; 4. the purpose is
agricultural productions; 5. there is personal cultivations; and 6.
there is sharing of harvest (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. L-
34613, January 26, 1989, 169 SCRA 383; ) .

In order for a tenancy relationship to exist, the following elements

must concur:
1. the parties are landholder and tenant;
2. subject is agricultural land;
3. there is consent by the landholder for the tenant to
work on the land given orally or in writing, expressly
or impliedly;
4. there is personal cultivation by the tenant or with the
help of the immediate farm household;
5. purpose is agricultural production; and

6. there is compensation either in a fixed amount of

money and/or produce. (Carag v. Court of Appeals,
151 SCRA 144; Chico v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA
33)

We stress that a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. In order

for a tenancy agreement to arise, it is essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, viz.: 1) the parties are the landowner and
tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship
is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
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agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of

the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
(Cornes v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., 560 SCRA 545)

Tenancy – Consent

Persons cannot validly claim to be the legitimate and recognized

tenants of certain parcels of land where their agreement to till the
land was not with the real landowner. (Bacaling v. Muya, 380 SCRA
714)

A landowner is deemed to have consented to the tenancy albeit

impliedly by allowing the tenant to cultivate the landholding and by
receiving from him the landowner’s share of the harvest over a
considerable period of time. (Felizardo v. Fernandez, 363 SCRA
182)

Tenancy – Establishment

The two modes for the establishment of agricultural leasehold

relations are: (1)- by operation of law in accordance with section 4
of Republic Act No. 3844; or (2)- by oral or written agreement, either
express or implied. (Reyes v. Reyes, 388 SCRA 471)

The right to hire a tenant is a personal right of the landowner. (Reyes

v. Joson, 523 SCRA 365)
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Tenancy - Evidence

A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. (VHJ Construction and

Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 436 SCRA 392;
Suarez v. Saul, 473 SCRA 628)

It is well settled that an allegation must be supported by evidence.

An unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand alone. (PT Cerna
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19; Top Weld
Manufacturing Inc. v. ECED S.A. 138 SCRA 118)

It is settled that the existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be

presumed; Mere allegations are not evidence nor equivalent to
proof. (Dalwampo v. Quinocol Farmers, Farm Workers and Settlers’
Association, 488 SCRA 208)

To prove a tenancy relationship, the requisite quantum of evidence

is substantial, defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (Reyes v.
Joson, 523 SCRA 365)

Independent evidence, aside from self-serving statements, is

needed to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvests or consent
of the landowner in order to establish a tenancy relationship.
Substantial evidence does not only entail the presence of a mere
scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be
established – there must be concrete evidence on record adequate
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enough to prove the element of sharing. (De Jesus v. Moldex Realty,

Inc., 538 SCRA 316)

Self-serving statements in pleadings are inadequate – proof must

be adduced; He who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of proof, and the same rule applies to administrative cases.
(Cornes v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., 560 SCRA 545)

Substantial evidence is the requisite quantum of evidence in

agrarian cases. (Deloso v. Marapao, 474 SCRA 585)

Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not

automatically convert a tiller or farmworker into an agricultural
tenant recognized under agrarian laws. (De Jesus v. Moldex Realty,
Inc., 538 SCRA 316)

Tenancy – Extinguishment

The tenancy relation cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of

the term or period in a leasehold contract or by sale, alienation or
the transfer of legal possession of the landholding. (Bautista v. Vda
De Villena, 438 SCRA 259)

Leasehold relations cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of

the term or period in a leasehold contract or by sale, alienation or
the transfer of legal possession of the landholding. (Ancheta v. Court
of Appeals, 200 SCRA 407)
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The existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship is not

terminated by mere changes of ownership, in cases of sale or
transfer of legal possession as in lease. (Ludo & Luym Development
Corporation v. Barreto, 471 SCRA 391)

An agricultural leasehold relation once established shall terminate

only for causes provided by law and solely based on contractual
stipulation. (Granada v. Bormaheco, Inc., 528 SCRA 259)

Tenancy – Intent

The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship

exists is intent. Tenancy is not purely a factual relationship
depending on what the alleged tenant does on the land. It is also a
legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when
the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these
are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more
important. (Isidro v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 503)

The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship

exists is intent; all the element for a tenancy relationship must
concur in order to create a tenancy relationship – the absence of
one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, a cultivator or a
planter thereon, a de jure tenant. (Reyes v. Joson, 523 SCRA 365)

Occupancy and continued possession do not make one a de jure

tenant – tenancy status only arises if an occupant has been given
possession of an agricultural landholding for the primary purpose of
agricultural production. (Reyes v. Joson, 523 SCRA 365)
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Tenancy – Security of Tenure

He has a right to continue working on the land and he may not be

ejected therefrom except for causes as provided by law (De Jesus
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 175 SCRA 559)

Where there is a tenancy relationship between the parties, the land

owner is bound to respect the security of tenure which the law vests
upon her tenant. (Batongbakal v. Zafra, 448 SCRA 399)

A tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to

security of tenure – she can only be ejected from the landholding on
grounds provided for by law. (Perez-Rosario v. Court of Appeals,
494 SCRA 66)

Once a leasehold relation has been established, the agricultural

lessee is entitled to security of tenure. (Dolorfino v. Court of Appeals,
191 SCRA 880)

A tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a

security of tenure. (Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, 405 SCRA 440)

The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be

invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true or
lawful tenants. (Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot v. Court of Appeals, 517
SCRA 232)

Tenancy – Share Tenancy

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We note that agricultural share tenancy was declared contrary to

public policy and, thus, abolished by the passage of RA 3844,
amended. Share tenancy exists: [W]henever two persons agree on
a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party
furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several items of production, the tenant
cultivating the land personally with the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof
to be divided between the landholder and the tenant. In alleging that
he is a tenant of Zaldivar, Salmorin (in his affidavit dated April 26,
2000) relates their arrangement was for him to do all the cultivation
and that the expenses therefor will be deducted from the harverst.
The rest of the harvest will be divided equally between himself and
Zaldivar. If Salmorin’s version was to be believed, their arrangement
was clearly one of agricultural share tenancy. For being contrary to
law, Salmorin’s assertion should not be given merit. (Salmorin v.
Zaldivar, 559 SCRA 564)

Tenancy – Personal Cultivation

The landowner, by allowing another to cultivate the property and

receiving the owner’s share of the produce, implicitly recognizes the
latter as tenant. (Ayo-Alburo v. Matobato, 456 SCRA 399)

The fact alone of working on another’s landholding does not raise a

presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. There must be
substantial evidence on record adequate to prove the element of
sharing. Moreover, in Rivera v. Santiago, 410 SCRA 113 (2003), we
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stressed: “[T]hat it is not unusual for a landowner to receive the

produce of the land from a caretaker who sows thereon. The fact of
receipt, without an agreed system of sharing, does not ipso facto
create a tenancy. (Salmorin v. Zaldivar, 559 SCRA 564)

The fact that a tenant, or an agricultural lessee for that matter,

employs farm laborers to perform some aspects of farm work does
not preclude the existence of agricultural lease relationship provided
an agricultural lessee does not leave the entire process of cultivation
on the hands of hired helpers. (Verde v. Macapagal, 461 SCRA 97)

Tenancy – Lease Rentals

There can be no delay in the payment of an undetermined lease

rental because it is impossible to pay an undetermined amount.
(Heirs of Enrique Tan, Sr. v. Pollescas, 475 SCRA 203)

It should be noted that under our law and jurisprudence, mere failure
of a tenant to pay the landholder’s share does not necessarily give
the latter the right to eject the former when there is a lack deliberate
intent on the part of the tenant to pay or there is failure of crop due
to fortuitous event. (Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, 1 SCRA 1106; Paz,
et. al. v. Santos et. al., L-12047, September 30, 1959)

Delay or non-payment of lease rentals does not justify the drastic

remedy of ejectment as provided by agrarian law. Where there is
substantial compliance, the tenants ought to be maintained in
peaceful possession and cultivation of the landholding so as to allow
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them to faithfully settle their balances with the landowner. De

Tanedo v. De la Cruz, 32 SCRA 63.

The agricultural tenant’s failure to pay the lease rentals must be

wilful and deliberate in order to warrant his dispossession of the land
that he tills. (Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo, G.R. No. 164340,
November 28, 2008)

In an En Banc Decision by this Court in Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando

et al., We held that under our law and jurisprudence, mere failure of
a tenant to pay the landholder’s share does not necessarily give the
latterju the right to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate
intent on the part of the tenant to pay. This ruling has not been
overturned. (Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo, G.R. No. 164340,
November 28, 2008)

The term “deliberate” is characterized by or results from slow,

careful, thorough calculation and consideration of effects and
consequences. The term “wilful”, on the other hand, is defined as
one governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to
reason. (Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo, G.R. No. 164340, November
28, 2008)

Good faith was clearly demonstrated by the petitioner when,

because respondents refused to accept the proffered payment, they
even went to the point of seeking government intervention in order
to address their problems with respondents. Absent such deliberate
and wilful refusal to pay lease rentals, the petitioner’s ejectment from
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the subject land is not justified. (Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo, G.R.
No. 164340, November 28, 2008)

Tenancy – Transfer of Subject Landholding

Where a lot is sold to another person, the claim of tenancy over the
said lot should be directed against the new owners/vendees who
are subrogees to the rights and obligations of the agricultural
lessor/vendor. (Pascual v. Court of Appeals, 371 SCRA 338)

The agricultural lessee’s rights are enforceable against the

transferee or the landowner’s successors-in-interest. (Philippine
National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 70)

Transfers involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural

leasehold relationship subsists resulting in a change of ownership
will not terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee. (Endaya v.
Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 109)

Tenancy – Waiver/Abandonment

The intention of a tenant to surrender the landholding and

concomitantly the statutory rights emanating from the status of
being a tenant, absent a positive act, cannot, and should not, be
presumed, much less determined by implication alone. Tenancy
relations cannot be bargained away except for strong reasons
provided by law which must be convincingly shown by evidence.
(Ludo & Luym Development Corporation v. Barreto, 471 SCRA 391)
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Waivers of rights and/or interests over landholdings awarded by the

government are invalid for being violative of the agrarian reform
laws. (Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation v. Estita,
449 SCRA 240)

Tenant

A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic act No. 1199 as

a person who by himself, or with the aid available from within his
immediate household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed
by another, with the latter’s consent for the purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder (Matienzo v. Servidad, 107
SCRA 276).

Transactions involving agricultural land over which an agricultural

leasehold subsists resulting in a change of ownership will not
terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee. Heirs of Guillermo A.
Batongbacal v. Court of Appeals, 389 SCRA 517

As an agricultural lessee, the law gives him the right to be informed

about matters affecting the land he tills without need for him to
inquire about it. Heirs of Guillermo A. Batongbacal v. Court of
Appeals, 389 SCRA 517

Torrens Certificates of Title

When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the

action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the
judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is
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direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set

aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand,
the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as
incident thereof. (Mallilin, Jr. v. Castillo, 333 SCRA 628)

An issuance of a transfer certificate of title tainted with mistake and

fraud cannot be valid. Reconveyance is an action in personam and
is always available so long as the property has not been passed to
an innocent third party for value. (Rodrigo v. Ancilla, 492 SCRA 514)

While jurisprudence is settled on the impresciptibility and

indefeasibility of a Torrens title, there is equally an abundance of
cases where we unequivocally ruled that registered owners may
lose their right to recover possession of property through the
equitable principle of laches. (Vda. de Tirona v. Encarnacion, 534
SCRA 394)

The defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not extend to

transferees who take a certificate of title in bad faith. (Tanglao v.
Parungao, 535 SCRA 123)

A title once registered under the Torrens system, cannot be

defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession, and
neither can it be defeated by prescription.

The Torrens system is intended to guarantee the integrity and

conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, and it cannot be
used for the perpetuation of fraud against the real owner of the
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registered land. (Heirs of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato

Doronio, 541 SCRA 479)

Trusts

Implied or constructive trusts are obligations create by law and the

prescriptive period to enforce the same prescribes in ten years.
(Marquez v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 653)

If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining

it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes. (Pedrano v.
Heirs of Benedicto Pedrano, 539 SCRA 401)

An action for the reconveyance of a parcel of land based on an

implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years, the point of
reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of
the issuance of the certificate of title of the property; without an
Original Certificate of Title (OCT), the date from whence the
prescriptive period could be reckoned is unknown and it could not
be determined if indeed the period has already elapsed or not
(Pedrano v. Heirs of Benedicto Pedrano, 539 SCRA 401)