SECTION 24 – Disqualification by reason of privileged communication

1. Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc., G.R. No.
204700, November 24, 2014

Issue: Is the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA) a privilege/confidential bank document?

Held: Respondent’s contention that the LSPA is privileged and confidential is likewise untenable.
Indeed, Rule 27 contains the proviso that the documents sought to be produced and inspected
must not be privileged against disclosure. Privileged communications under the rules of
evidence is premised on an accepted need to protect a trust relationship. It has not been shown
that the parties to the deed of assignment fall under any of the foregoing categories.

This court has previously cited other privileged matters such as the following:
1. editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news;
2. voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted;
3. trade secrets;
4. information contained in tax census returns;
5. bank deposits” (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act);
6. national security matters and intelligence information; and
7. criminal matters.

Nonetheless, the LSPA does not fall within any of these classes of information. Moreover, the
privilege is not absolute, and the court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for
doing justice.

(Other Issues)

Issue: Does the parol evidence apply when the deed of assignment refers to the LSPA?

The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the deed of
assignment and do not base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot be prevented from seeking
evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of assignment. Even assuming that Rule
130, Section 9 is applicable, an exception to the rule under the second paragraph is when the
party puts in issue the validity of the written agreement. Besides, what is forbidden under the
parol evidence rule is the presentation of oral or extrinsic evidence, not those expressly referred
to in the written agreement. “Documents can be read together when one refers to the other.”
By the express terms of the deed of assignment, it is clear that the deed of assignment was meant
to be read in conjunction with the LSPA.

Issue: May the LSPA be admitted in evidence?

Held: Rule 132, Section 17 of the Rules of Court allows a party to inquire into the whole of the
writing or record when a part of it is given in evidence by the other party. Since the deed of
assignment was produced in court by respondent and marked as one of its documentary exhibits,
the LSPA which was made a part thereof by explicit reference and which is necessary for its
understanding may also be inquired into by petitioners.

2. Air Philippines Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No. 172835, December 13, 2007

Issue: Are the chemical components of respondent’s products trade secrets that are not subject
to compulsory disclosure?

Held: Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive
economic value from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public; The
party seeking disclosure of trade secrets should show a compelling reason for the courts to lift
the veil of confidentiality which shields the other party’s trade secrets.—The privilege is not
absolute; the trial court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice. In this
case, the chemical formulation of the respondent’s products is not known to the general public
and is unique only to it.

The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation has rights therein
which may be treated as property, and ordinarily an injunction will be granted to prevent the
disclosure of the trade secret by one who obtained the information “in confidence” or through
a “confidential relationship.” American jurisprudence has utilized the following factors to
determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit: (1) the extent to which the information is
known outside of the employer’s business; (2) the extent to which the information is known by
employees and others involved in the business; (3) the extent of measures taken by the employer
to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to the employer and to
competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the
information; and (6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained
through an independent source.

(a) Husband and Wife

1. Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Issue: Are the documents and papers so forcibly taken or seized by the wife from and without
the consent of her husband as the owner of the same, admissible in evidence in a case of legal
separation file by the wife against the husband?

Held: Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a]
court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of
this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

2. Lacurom v. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006

Issue: Does the marital disqualification rule apply when the defendant failed to timely object to
the presentation of evidence which would violate the rule?

Held: The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the
claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied
consent. The waiver applies to the defendant because he impliedly admitted authorship of the
“motion” by stating that he “trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and
believed to be gigantic and monumental.”

3. United States v. Antipolo, G.R. No. L-13109, March 6, 1918

Issue: Should the deceased’s widow be excluded as a witness to her husband’s death?

Held: The widow of the deceased is a competent witness, in a prosecution for homicide, to
testify on behalf of the defense or the prosecution regarding dying declarations to her by the
deceased concerning the cause of his death.

4. People v. Carlos, G.R. No. 22948, March 17, 1925

Issue: Is the letter between husband and wife admissible in evidence?

Held: A letter written by a wife to her husband is incompetent as evidence in a criminal case
against the latter where there is no indication of assent on his part to the statements contained
in the letter. The letter may, however, be admissible to impeach the testimony of the wife if she
goes upon the witness-stand in the trial of the case.

Where a privileged communication from one spouse to the other comes into the hands of a
third party, without collusion or voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the
privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes
admissible in evidence.

b. Attorney and Client

1. Hilado v. David, G.R. No. L-961, September 21, 1949

Issue: May a lawyer whom the prospective client approached for a legal opinion regarding her
case and who sent a legal opinion letter to the latter disqualified from being the counsel of the
adverse party?

Held: The mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting
the opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received
by him from his first client. To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the
client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not
necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material
that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation
was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his
attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the
professional employment must be regarded as established."

Information so received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains, and to permit it to be

used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is to strike at
the element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the essential security in, the
relation of attorney and client.

An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information

imparted to the firm.

2. Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, 108113, September 20, 1996

Issue: Should lawyers divulge the identity of their clients?

Held: Generally, a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of his client.—As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in
mystery.

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.

First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.

Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.

Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule,
know his adversary. “A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is.” He cannot
be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions.

1. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s
advice.
2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3. Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless, by
revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client’s name is
privileged.
4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance.
5. Nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the
identity which is intended to be confidential.

3. Saura, Jr. v. Agdeppa, A.C. No. 4426, 4429 (Resolution), February 17, 2000

Issue: Is the request of the co-owners to the lawyer to provide information as to the sale of the
property a violation of the attorney-client privilege?

Held: Information requested regarding the sale of the property and to account for the proceeds
is not a violation of the attorney-client privilege.— The petitioners are only asking for the
disclosure of the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds. Petitioners certainly have the
right to ask for such information since they own the property as co-heirs of the late Ramon E.
Saura and as co-administrators of the property. Hence, respondent cannot refuse to divulge such
information to them and hide behind the cloak of the attorney-client relationship.

4. Sanvicente v. People, G.R. No. 132081, November 26, 2002

Issue: May the lawyer of the accused who wrote the letter to the Station Commander on behalf
of the accused be compelled to testify as to the contents of the letter?

Held: The contents of exhibit LL, particularly with regard to the details of the shooting
communicated by petitioner to his lawyer is privileged because it is connected with the business
for which petitioner retained the services of the latter. Said communication was relayed by
petitioner to the lawyer to seek professional advice or assistance in relation to the subject matter
of the employment, or to explain something in connection with, so as to enable him to better
advice his client or manage the litigation.
Person authorized to practice medicine and patient

Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals

Appeals; Evidence; It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court,
adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed
on appeal.—At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity of the trial
court’s finding of facts. It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court,
adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal. Petitioners, however, argue that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
not binding on this Court when there appears in the record of the case some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence which has been overlooked, or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the case.

Parent and Child; Evidence; Death Certificates; Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that one’s
parent is “deceased” is not necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said
form was being accomplished; A death certificate would be the best evidence as to when a person
died.—The evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say
the least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that one’s parent is
“deceased” is not necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was
being accomplished. Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as
to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latter’s
death at that time, being merely secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunao’s death certificate
would have been the best evidence as to when the latter died. Petitioners have, however,
inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is no showing that said death certificate
has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunao’s death.

Evidence; Physician-Patient Privileged Communication Rule; Requisites.—As to Dr. Arenas’

affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged communication
under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The rule on confidential communications
between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or treatment given
or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient existed
between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the
advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while
professionally attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the performance of his
professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation
of the patient.

Same; Same; Same; Virility and Sterility; Given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility
alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease,
would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient.—Petitioners do not dispute that the
affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that the finding as to Ricardo
Abad’s “sterility” does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners conveniently forget
that Ricardo Abad’s “sterility” arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most
assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility
alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease,
would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit
inadmissible in evidence. And the same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the
death of Ricardo Abad.

Parent and Child; Illegitimate Children; Succession; The presence of illegitimate children of the
deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives to his estate.—With the finding that private
respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are precluded from
inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions are: Art. 988. In the absence of
legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased. Art. 1003. If there are no . . . illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles. (Italics supplied)Courts; Supreme Court; Hierarchy of Courts; Well-settled is
the dictum that the rulings of the Supreme Court are binding upon and may not be reversed by
a lower court.—Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores
de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time. This
affirmance is erroneous, for on July 9, 1985, this Court had already ruled that the same was not
filed out of time. Well-settled is the dictum that the rulings of the Supreme Court are binding
upon and may not be reversed by a lower court. Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 322,
G.R. No. 117740 October 30, 1998
Lim vs. Court of Appeals

Evidence; Witnesses; Disqualification by reason of privileged communication; Physician-patient

relationship; Significance of amendments in Rules.—The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24
of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads: “SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication.—The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases: x x x (c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot
in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment
given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a
professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and
which would blacken the reputation of the patient.” This is a reproduction of paragraph (c),
Section 21, Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court with two (2) modifications, namely, (a)
the inclusion of the phrase “advice or treatment given by him,” and (b) substitution of the word
reputation for the word character. Said Section 21 in turn is a reproduction of paragraph (f),
Section 26, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court with a modification consisting in the change of
the phrase “which would tend to blacken” in the latter to “would blacken.” Verily, these changes
affected the meaning of the provision. Under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was sufficient if the
information would tend to blacken the character of the patient. In the 1964 Rules of Court, a
stricter requirement was imposed; it was imperative that the information would blacken such
character. With the advent of the Revised Rules on Evidence on 1 July 1989, the rule was relaxed
once more by the substitution of the word character with the word reputation. There is a
distinction between these two concepts. “Character’ is what a man is, and ‘reputation’ is what
he is supposed to be in what people say he is. ‘Character’ depends on attributes possessed, and
‘reputation’ on attributes which others believe one to possess. The former signifies reality and
the latter merely what is accepted to be reality at present.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites in order that privilege may be successfully claimed.—In
order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur: “1.
the privilege is claimed in a civil case; 2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one
duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3. such person acquired the
information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; 4. the information
was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and 5. the information was confidential, and,
if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient.” These requisites
conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege
against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit: “1. The communications must originate
in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. 2. This element of confidentiality must be essential
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 3. The relation must
be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered. 4. The injury that
would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.” The physician may be considered to
be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or
palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to
enable him “safely and efficaciously to treat his patient” are covered by the privilege. It is to be
emphasized that “it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of
making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations,
are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Privilege not violated by permitting physician to give expert opinion
testimony.—xxx The rule on this point is summarized as follows: “The predominating view, with
some scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory physician-patient privilege, though duly
claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in response to
a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental condition of a patient
whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical
facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have
concerning such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege where it
is asserted in such a case, the physician must base his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized
in the question, excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient acquired
through the physician and patient relationship. If he cannot or does not exclude from
consideration his personal professional knowledge of the patient’s condition he should not be
permitted to testify as to his expert opinion.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure to seasonably object amounted to waiver of privilege.—Finally,
while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the issuance of
a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the
said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of
her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness on the ground
that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial court’s advise that said
counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony “once it becomes apparent that the
testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule.” The particular
portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s
Petition and Memorandum, and in the private respondent’s Memorandum, do not at all show
that any objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado
could be covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver
thereof. Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 273, G.R. No. 91114 September 25, 1992

Chan vs. Chan

Remedial Law; Evidence; Physician-Patient Privileged Communication Rule; The physician-patient

privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while
professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent
as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation.―The physician-patient privileged
communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while professionally
attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any
facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient
to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his
body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the
appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court
and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam
up, thus putting his own health at great risk.

Same; Same; Objection to Evidence; Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must
be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court.―The case presents a procedural
issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital records,
would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony
or as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the patient’s
health problems. Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the
offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus: SEC. 36. Objection.—Objection to evidence
offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. Objection to a question
propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. An offer of evidence in writing shall be
objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by
the court. In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. Since the offer of
evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She
will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination
at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so
to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-
disclosure of privileged matters.
Same; Same; Physician-Patient Privileged Communication Rule; To allow the disclosure during
discovery procedure of the hospital records ― the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him ― would be to allow
access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent.―The right to compel the
production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are “not privileged.”
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it
is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c)
of Rule 130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient,
be examined” regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not
cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial. To allow,
however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records — the results of tests
that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he
gave him — would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s
consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them
would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained
while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:

Remedial Law; Evidence; Physician-Patient Privileged Communication Rule; View that the hospital
records of respondent Johnny Chan may not be produced in court without his/her consent.―I
agree that the hospital records of respondent Johnny Chan may not be produced in court without
his/her consent. Issuance of a subpoena duces tecum for its production will violate the physician-
patient privilege rule under Rule 130, Sec. 24(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, this
privilege is not absolute. The request of petitioner for a copy of the medical records has not been
properly laid. Instead of a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, Josielene Lara
Chan should avail of the mode of discovery under Rule 28 of Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 28
pertains to the physical or mental examination of persons. This may be ordered by the court, in
its discretion, upon motion and showing of good cause by the requesting party, in cases when
the mental and/or physical condition of a party is in controversy. Aside from showing good cause,
the requesting party needs only to notify the party to be examined (and all other parties) and
specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination, including the name of
the physician who will conduct the examination.

Same; Same; Same; View that the examined party may obtain a copy of the examining physician’s
report concerning his/her mental or physical examination.―The examined party may obtain a
copy of the examining physician’s report concerning his/her mental or physical examination. The
requesting party shall deliver this report to him/her. After such delivery, however, the requesting
party becomes entitled to any past or future medical report involving the same mental or physical
condition. Upon motion and notice, the court may order the examined party to deliver those
medical reports to the requesting party if the examined party refuses to do so. Moreover, if the
examined party requests a copy of the examining physician’s report or if he/she takes the
examining physician’s deposition, the request waives the examined party’s privileges when the
testimony of any person who examined or will examine his/her mental of physical status is taken
in the action or in any action involving the same controversy.

Same; Same; Same; View that the physician-patient privilege does not cover information
discovered under Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.―Discovery procedures provide a balance
between the need of the plaintiff or claimant to fully and fairly establish her case and the policy
to protect ― to a certain extent ― communications made between a patient and his doctor.
Hence, the physician-patient privilege does not cover information discovered under Rule 28. This
procedure is availed with the intention of making the results public during trial. Along with other
modes of discovery, this would prevent the trial from being carried on in the dark. Chan vs. Chan,
702 SCRA 76, G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013

Krohn vs. Court of Appeals

Evidence; Privileged Communication; Physician-Patient Relationship; Requisites in order that the

privilege may be successfully invoked.—Requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully
invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person
acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d)
the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was
confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient.”

Same; Same; Same; The person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized
to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is the patient’s husband who wishes to testify on a
document executed by medical practitioners. His testimony cannot have the force and effect of
the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report.—In the instant
case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient’s husband who wishes to testify on a
document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the
claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition
because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who
examined the patient and executed the report.

Same; Same; Same; In failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel
waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be
admitted.—Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private
respondent on the ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court dated
10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on privileged communications but never questioned the
testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the testimony on the
ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and, consequently,
the evidence offered may be admitted.

Courts; Lawyers; Appeals; Counsels should exercise prudence in appealing lower court rulings and
raise only legitimate issues so as not to retard the resolution of cases.—If all lawyers are allowed
to appeal every perceived indiscretion of a judge in the course of trial and include in their appeals
depthless issues, there will be no end to litigations, and the docket of appellate courts will forever
be clogged with inconsequential cases. Hence, counsel should exercise prudence in appealing
lower court rulings and raise only legitimate issues so as not to retard the resolution of cases.
Krohn vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 146, G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994

Minister or priest and person making the confession

Public officer

Others

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations

Presidency; Executive Privilege; Separation of Powers; Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation;

There is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege; The presidential
communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted
in the separation of powers under the Constitution.—Respondent Committees argue as if this
were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential communications privilege is
mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The Court, in the earlier
case of Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 (1995), affirmed that the presidential communications
privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), the case
relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated
the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized, among them Almonte v.
Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), 299 SCRA 744 (1998)
and Chavez v. PEA, 384 SCRA 152 (2002). The Court articulated in these cases that “there are
certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public,” that there is
a “governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding
military, diplomatic and other national security matters;” and that “the right to information does
not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by
which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-
door Cabinet meetings.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; When an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said
Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of
authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the President to said executive official, such
that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure.—Respondent Committees’ observation that this Court’s Decision reversed the
“presumption that inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure” arises
from a piecemeal interpretation of the said Decision. The Court has repeatedly held that in order
to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be
isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety. Note that the
aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining in Senate v. Ermita,
488 SCRA 1 (2006), which declared void Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464,
Series of 2005. The pertinent portion of the decision in the said case reads: From the above
discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this
jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress,
the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be
valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of
the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in
favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Obviously, the last sentence of the
above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the “exemption” being claimed by the
executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely by virtue of their positions in
the Executive Branch. This means that when an executive official, who is one of those mentioned
in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no
presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the President to said
executive official, such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Quintessential” and “Non-Delegable,” Defined;
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power
less executive; “Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the
concentrated essence of substance; “Non-delegable” means that a power or duty cannot be
delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor; The fact
that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit
to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans,
does not diminish the executive nature of the power.—The fact that a power is subject to the
concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive. “Quintessential” is
defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of substance.
On the other hand, “non-delegable” means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another
or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor. The power to enter into an
executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its
decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive
nature of the power.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of “Operational Proximity”; The doctrine of
“operational proximity” was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege.—It must be stressed that the doctrine of “operational proximity” was
laid down in In re: Sealed Case, No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997, 121 F.3d 729, 326 U.S. App. D.C. 276,
precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege. The U.S. court was
aware of the dangers that a limitless extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully
cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to White House staff, and not to staffs of the agencies,
and then only to White House staff that has “operational proximity” to direct presidential
decision-making.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Organizational Test”; In determining which test to use—
whether the Operational Proximity Test or the Organizational Test—the main consideration is to
limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President,
not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s
organizational structure.—In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege “to a large
swath of the executive branch” (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because
the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term “advisor” of
the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family. Nevertheless, in
circumstances in which the official involved is far too remote, this Court also mentioned in the
Decision the organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 365 F
3d. 1108, 361 U.S. App. D.C. 183, 64 Fed. R. Evid. Serv.141. This goes to show that the operational
proximity test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. In determining
which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to
officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by
reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. Thus, respondent
Committees’ fear that the scope of the privilege would be unnecessarily expanded with the use
of the operational proximity test is unfounded.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is
meant to protect.—It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not
merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15,
2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in relation to
diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Thus,
the Letter stated: The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which this information were
conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. (emphasis
supplied) Even in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), it was held that Congress must not require
the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of
the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a
coordinate and co-equal department.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the information sought through the three (3)
questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more
reason, the Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not
only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions
with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need.—
Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition
involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of
approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented
acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors
on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in
office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to
unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased frequency and great publicity. No
Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense and unchecked
legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making process, which inevitably
would involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.

Same; Same; Same; Public Officers; Right to Information; Accountability and Transparency; The
constitutional right of the people to information and the constitutional policies on public
accountability and transparency are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a
democratic government.—There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of
the people to information and the constitutional policies on public accountability and
transparency. These are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic
government. The citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the
power has been delegated if they are denied access to information. And the policies on public
accountability and democratic government would certainly be mere empty words if access to
such information of public concern is denied. In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive
privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right to
information or diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to information is not an absolute right—that
there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information covered by executive
privilege is a recognized principle in other democratic States.—This Court did not rule that the
Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the
assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project.
They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself
has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from the scope
of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers covered by executive
privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to answer
the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why these answers are covered by executive
privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information is a
recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information is not
an absolute right. Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not
espouse an absolute right to information. By their wording, the intention of the Framers to
subject such right to the regulation of the law is unmistakable.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The demand of a citizen for the production of documents
pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces
tecum issued by Congress and neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to
exact testimony from government officials.—The right primarily involved here is the right of
respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid of legislation, not the people’s
right to public information. This is the reason why we stressed in the assailed Decision the
distinction between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), “the
demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does
not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress” and “neither
does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government
officials.” As pointed out, these rights belong to Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth
mentioning at this juncture that the parties here are respondent Committees and petitioner Neri
and that there was no prior request for information on the part of any individual citizen. This
Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the distinctions between the Legislature’s right to
information in a legitimate legislative inquiry and the public’s right to information.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally
guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative
investigation, the legislative purpose of the Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported
by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole
may have relevance—the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of
compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.—It must be
clarified that the Decision did not pass upon the nature of respondent Committees’ inquiry into
the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent Committees’ power to
investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However, this Court cannot uphold the view that
when a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course
of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of respondent Committees’ questions can be
sufficiently supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their
inquiry as a whole may have relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past
decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a
showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with
the compelling or demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the
judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies.—The need for hard facts in crafting legislation
cannot be equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical and specific need for facts
which is so essential to the judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies. Also, the bare
standard of “pertinency” set in Arnault cannot be lightly applied to the instant case, which unlike
Arnault involves a conflict between two (2) separate, co-equal and coordinate Branches of the
Government.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the
conflicting claims between the Executive and the Legislative Branches is the recognized existence
of the presumptive presidential communications privilege.—Whatever test we may apply, the
starting point in resolving the conflicting claims between the Executive and the Legislative
Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive presidential communications privilege.
This is conceded even in the Dissenting Opinion of the Honorable Chief Justice Puno, which
states: A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the conclusion that it bestowed a qualified
presumption in favor of the Presidential communications privilege. As shown in the previous
discussion, U.S. v. Nixon, as well as the other related Nixon cases Sirica and Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, et al. v. Nixon in the D.C. Court of Appeals, as
well as subsequent cases all recognize that there is a presumptive privilege in favor of Presidential
communications. The Almonte case quoted U.S. v. Nixon and recognized a presumption in favor
of confidentiality of Presidential communications.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the
burden on the respondent Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating
their specific need for the information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions
subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation—for sure, a factual basis for situations
covered by bills is not critically needed before legislative bodies can come up with relevant
legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law.—The presumption in favor of
Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate Committees to overturn
the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the information to be elicited by the
answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation. Here,
there is simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the
power to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear
what matters relating to these bills could not be determined without the said information sought
by the three (3) questions. As correctly pointed out by the Honorable Justice Dante O. Tinga in
his Separate Concurring Opinion: …If respondents are operating under the premise that the
president and/or her executive officials have committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected
or prevented from recurring by remedial legislation, the answer to those three questions will not
necessarily bolster or inhibit respondents from proceeding with such legislation. They could
easily presume the worst of the president in enacting such legislation. For sure, a factual basis
for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislatives bodies can come up with
relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Oversight Function; Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it
must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information in the exercise of this function
is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature—
curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress.—Anent the function to
curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information
in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry
is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function
of Congress. And if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3)
questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative
in nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and corruption is a
legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent Committees’ investigation cannot
transgress bounds set by the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential
culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a given government
transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform—the role of the Legislature is to make
laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing.—The general thrust and the
tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the President. While
it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high government officials,
including the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate
to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime
or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as
the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress; There is no Congressional power to expose for the
sake of exposure.—No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they
cannot assume the power reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination
of who is/are liable for a crime or illegal activity, the investigation of the role played by each
official, the determination of who should be hauled to court for prosecution and the task of
coming up with conclusions and finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the
determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the Senate. Congress is neither a law
enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it
must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation.
Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and “punish” those investigated
are indefensible. There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; Courts; The Office of the Ombudsman is the body
properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the
allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor, and the same holds true for our courts
upon which the Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality.—It is
important to stress that complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been filed against
President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. Under our
Constitution, it is the Ombudsman who has the duty “to investigate any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.” The Office of the Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the
Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly
are true and who are liable therefor. The same holds true for our courts upon which the
Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality. Indeed, the rules of
procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman and the courts are well-defined and ensure that the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of all persons, parties and witnesses alike, are protected and
safeguarded.

Same; Same; Congress; The Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and
corruption cannot be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information
validly covered by executive privilege.—Should respondent Committees uncover information
related to a possible crime in the course of their investigation, they have the constitutional duty
to refer the matter to the appropriate agency or branch of government. Thus, the Legislature’s
need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption cannot be deemed compelling
enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by executive privilege. As
discussed above, the Legislature can still legislate on graft and corruption even without the
information covered by the three (3) questions subject of the petition.
Same; Same; Same; Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting
standards of evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law;
Every person, from the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a competent court or body.—
Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting standards of
evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section
10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that
“technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings which do not affect substantive
rights need not be observed by the Committee.” Court rules which prohibit leading, hypothetical,
or repetitive questions or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not apply to
a legislative inquiry. Every person, from the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen,
has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a competent
court or body.

Same; Congress; An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked

Executive, generates its own abuses.—Respondent Committees’ second argument rests on the
view that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), requiring invitations or subpoenas to
contain the “possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry” along with the
“usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof” is not provided for by the Constitution and is merely an obiter dictum. On the contrary,
the Court sees the rationale and necessity of compliance with these requirements. An
unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its own
abuses. Consequently, claims that the investigative power of Congress has been abused (or has
the potential for abuse) have been raised many times. Constant exposure to congressional
subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the Executive to function effectively. The requirements
set forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit Congress’
power. The legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus, prevent the
“roving commissions” referred to in the U.S. case, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
Likewise, witnesses have their constitutional right to due process. They should be adequately
informed what matters are to be covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to prepare the
pertinent information and documents. To our mind, these requirements concede too little
political costs or burdens on the part of Congress when viewed vis-à-vis the immensity of its
power of inquiry.

Same; Courts; Judicial Review; While it is true that the Court must refrain from reviewing the
internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a
constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance
therewith.—Anent the third argument, respondent Committees contend that their Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the “Rules”) are beyond the reach of this
Court. While it is true that this Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of
Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a constitutional requirement
exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith. We cannot turn a
blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy.
Same; Same; Contempt; The Court does not believe that respondent Committees have the
discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish, and this is especially true where what is
involved is the contempt power; It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated to benefit
legislative committees—more than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest stake in
the proper observance of the Rules.—Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees
that led to the issuance of the contempt order is flawed. Instead of being submitted to a full
debate by all the members of the respondent Committees, the contempt order was prepared
and thereafter presented to the other members for signing. As a result, the contempt order which
was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of the proceedings that took
place on said date. Records clearly show that not all of those who signed the contempt order
were present during the January 30, 2008 deliberation when the matter was taken up. Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution states that: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any
of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected. (Emphasis supplied) All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form
part of the witness’ settled expectation. If the limitations are not observed, the witness’ settled
expectation is shattered. Here, how could there be a majority vote when the members in
attendance are not enough to arrive at such majority? Petitioner has the right to expect that he
can be cited in contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in which the matter has
been fully deliberated upon. There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when the
concerns and objections of the members are fully articulated in such proceeding. We do not
believe that respondent Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they
wish. This is especially true here where what is involved is the contempt power. It must be
stressed that the Rules are not promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is the
witness who has the highest stake in the proper observance of the Rules.

Senate; Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not
dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members,
but in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress before it.—On the nature of the Senate as a
“continuing body,” this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the
Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national
election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day
business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the
Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states: RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up
at the next session in the same status. All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon
the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for
the first time. (emphasis supplied) Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular
Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely
optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the
same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily
apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a
different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and
deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even
with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated
with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next
Congress with the same status.

Same; Rules on Legislative Inquiries; It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its
legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the
same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to
sufficiently put public on notice.—Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into
account the new composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the
amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly elected
Senators shall begin their term. However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its
main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or
repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state “(t)hese
Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.” The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until
they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate
rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next
Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business. The language of Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly
published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules
for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state
that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed
to sufficiently put public on notice. If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the
same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.

Same; Same; Not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are
null and void—only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered
null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses
as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.—Lest the Court be misconstrued, it
should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the
subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should
be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the
rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation,
orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective. Separation of Powers; Checks and
Balances; In a free and democratic society, the interests of these Executive and Legislative
branches inevitably clash, but each must treat the other with official courtesy and respect.—On
a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the fact that the Executive and the Legislature are
political branches of government. In a free and democratic society, the interests of these
branches inevitably clash, but each must treat the other with official courtesy and respect. This
Court wholeheartedly concurs with the proposition that it is imperative for the continued health
of our democratic institutions that we preserve the constitutionally mandated checks and
balances among the different branches of government.

Same; Same; Accountability and Transparency; There is no question that any story of government
malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity, but the best venue for this noble undertaking is
not in the political branches of government—the customary partisanship and the absence of
generally accepted rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving
justice that meets the test of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.—While this
Court finds laudable the respondent Committees’ well-intentioned efforts to ferret out
corruption, even in the highest echelons of government, such lofty intentions do not validate or
accord to Congress powers denied to it by the Constitution and granted instead to the other
branches of government. There is no question that any story of government malfeasance
deserves an inquiry into its veracity. As respondent Committees contend, this is founded on the
constitutional command of transparency and public accountability. The recent clamor for a
“search for truth” by the general public, the religious community and the academe is an
indication of a concerned citizenry, a nation that demands an accounting of an entrusted power.
However, the best venue for this noble undertaking is not in the political branches of
government. The customary partisanship and the absence of generally accepted rules on
evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the test
of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. We believe the people deserve a more
exacting “search for truth” than the process here in question, if that is its objective. Neri vs.
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, 564 SCRA 152, G.R. No.
180643 September 4, 2008

Phil. National Bank vs. Gancayco

Bank deposits; Disclosure of bank accounts of a depositor who is under investigation for
unexplained wealth.—Whereas section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits
are "absolutely confidential x x x and, therefore, may not be examined, inquired or looked into,"
except in those cases enumerated therein, section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft Law)
directs in mandatory terms that bank deposits "shall be taken into consideration in the
enforcement of this section, not-withstanding any provision of law to the contrary." The only
conclusion possible is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1405 by providing an additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of
bank deposits.

Same; Same; Disclosure not contrary to the policy making bank deposits confidential.—The
disclosure would not be contrary to the policy making bank deposits confidential for while section
2 of Republic Act No. 1406 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential" it nevertheless
allows such discloin the following instances: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in
of impeachment; (3) upon of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials; (4) in cases where the money deposited is the subject of the litigation. Cases of
unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen
why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits
confidential. Phil. National Bank vs. Gancayco, 15 SCRA 91, No. L-18343 September 80, 1965

Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Purisima

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Writ of certiorari cannot issue simply on a showing
of disagreement between a party and the court upon some material factual or legal issue.—It is
difficult to see how the refusal by the Court a quo to issue the temporary restraining order
applied for by the petitioner—in other words, its disagreement with the petitioner’s advocated
theory—could be deemed so whimsical, capricious, despotic or oppressive an act as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion. Obviously, the writ of certiorari cannot issue simply on a showing of
disagreement between a party and the court upon some material factual or legal issue. There
must be a reasonable demonstration that a party’s contentions are so clearly correct, or the
court’s ruling thereon so clearly wrong, to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. “No such
demonstration exists in this case. Indeed, for aught that the record shows, the Court’s refusal to
grant the application for a restraining order was, in the premises, licit and proper, or its validity,
fairly debatable, at the very least.

Same; Commercial Law; Banking; Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits; Exception to the rule against
disclosure of bank deposits is in cases of unexplained wealth.—In our decision in Philippine
National Bank v. Gancayco, rendered on September 30, 1965, we upheld the judgment of the
Trial Court “sustaining the power of the defendants (special prosecutors of the Department of
Justice) to compel the disclosure (by PNB) of bank accounts of ACCFA Administrator Jimenez
(then under investigation for unexplained wealth), x x (it being ruled) that, by enacting section 8
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Congress clearly intended to provide an additional
ground for the examination of bank deposits x x (for) without such provision the x x prosecutors
would be hampered if not altogether frustrated in the prosecution of those charged with having
acquired unexplained wealth while in public office.”

Same; Same; Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Inquiry into illegally acquired property
extends to cases where such property is concealed by being held or recorded in the name of other
persons; Reason.—The inquiry into illegally acquired property—or property NOT “legitimately
acquired"—extends to cases where such property is concealed by being held by or recorded in
the name of other persons. This proposition is made clear by R.A. No. 3019 which quite
categorically states that the term, “legitimately acquired property of a public officer or employee
shall not include x x property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is
concealed by its record in the name of, or held by, respondent’s spouse, ascendants,
descendants, relatives or any other persons.” To sustain the petitioner’s theory, and restrict the
inquiry only to property held by or in the name of the government official or employee, or his
spouse and unmarried children, is unwarranted in the light of the provisions of the statutes in
question, and would make available to persons in government who illegally acquire property an
easy and fool-proof means of evading investigation and prosecution; all they would have to do
would be to simply place the property in the possession or name of persons other than their
spouse and unmarried children. This is an absurdity that we will not ascribe to the lawmakers.
Same; Same; Same; Subpoena; Power of Tanodbayan to issue subpoena, not disputed in case at
bar.—The power of the Tanodbayan to issue subpoenae ad testificandum and subpoenae duces
tecum at the time in question is not disputed, and at any rate does not admit of doubt. The
subpoenae issued by him, will be sustained against the petitioner’s impugnation. Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Purisima, 161 SCRA 576, No. L-56429 May 28, 1988

People vs. Estrada

Criminal Law; Illegal Use of Alias; Definition of an Alias; There must be a sign or indication that
the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day
forth for the use of alias to fall within the prohibition contained in Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
142 as amended.—How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an
alias—“a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually
usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or
baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority.” There must be,
in the words of Ursua, a “sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the
alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth… [for the use of alias to] fall within the
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.”

Same; Same; The repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed “habitual” as it
does not amount to a customary practice or use.—Separately from the constitutional dimension
of the allegation of time in the Information, another issue that the allegation of time and our
above conclusion raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a violation of the offense charged,
were actually alleged in the Information. The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the
People’s case, as it deals a fatal blow on the People’s claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose
Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed
“habitual,” as it does not amount to a customary practice or use. This reason alone dictates the
dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142 and the terms of Ursua.

Same; Same; In order to be held liable for a violation of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 142, the
user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that
other name.—Albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the
law of libel—that mere communication to a third person is publicity—does not apply to violations
of CA No. 142. Our close reading of Ursua—particularly, the requirement that there be intention
by the user to be culpable and the historical reasons we cited above—tells us that the required
publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the
alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause
it to become generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of
the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other
name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.

Same; Same; Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for
public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that
time.—The presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened
Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known
henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public
who had no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in
Malacañan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared
matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath
of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus,
Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public
consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time.
The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming
the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada’s representations to these
people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.

Same; Same; Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing the documents as “Jose Velarde”
related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a
public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing.—We have consistently ruled
that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily
protected or recognized zones of privacy. Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing the
documents as “Jose Velarde” related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim
that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We
need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No. 1405 on the bank
officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these
kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a
conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.
People vs. Estrada, 583 SCRA 302, G.R. Nos. 164368-69 April 2, 2009

Pentagon Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Labor Law; Evidence; Information and statements made at conciliation proceedings shall be
treated as privileged communication and shall not be used as evidence in the Commission;
Conciliators and similar officials shall not testify in any court or body regarding any matters taken
up at conciliation proceedings conducted by them.—We agree with the petitioner, but for a
different reason. The correct reason for the CA’s error in considering the actions and agreements
during the conciliation proceedings before the labor arbiter is Article 233 of the Labor Code which
states that “[i]nformation and statements made at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as
privileged communication and shall not be used as evidence in the Commission. Conciliators and
similar officials shall not testify in any court or body regarding any matters taken up at conciliation
proceedings conducted by them.” This was the provision we cited in Nissan Motors Philippines,
Inc. v. Secretary of Labor (401 SCRA 604 [2006]) when we pointedly disallowed the award made
by the public respondent Secretary; the award was based on the information NCMB
Administrator Olalia secured from the confidential position given him by the company during
conciliation.
Same; Same; Compromise Agreements; Offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are
not intended as admissions by the parties making them.—Offers for compromise are irrelevant
because they are not intended as admissions by the parties making them. A true offer of
compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a defendant
that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless or
even doubtful, since it is made with a view to avoid controversy and save the expense of litigation.
It is the distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively, hypothetically,
and in contemplation of mutual concessions.

Same; Abandonment; Abandonment is a matter of intention that cannot be lightly presumed from
equivocal acts; Elements to Constitute Abandonment; Employer bears the burden of showing a
deliberate and unjustified refusal by the employee to resume his employment without any
intention of returning.—In evaluating a charge of abandonment, the jurisprudential rule is that
abandonment is a matter of intention that cannot be lightly presumed from equivocal acts. To
constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intent, manifested through overt acts, to sever
the employer-employee relationship. The employer bears the burden of showing a deliberate
and unjustified refusal by the employee to resume his employment without any intention of
returning.

Same; Same; Where the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal was coupled with a
prayer for reinstatement; the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal is proof enough of the
desire to return to work.—The respondent’s filing of the amended complaint for illegal dismissal
on January 20, 2003 strongly speaksagainst the petitioner’s charge of abandonment, for it is
illogical for an employee to abandon his employment and, thereafter, file a complaint for illegal
dismissal. That abandonment is negated finds support in a long line of cases where the immediate
filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal was coupled with a prayer for reinstatement; the filing
of the complaint for illegal dismissal is proof enough of the desire to return to work. The prayer
for reinstatement, as in this case, speaks against any intent to sever the employer-employee
relationship.

Same; Illegal Dismissals; Constructive Dismissal; A dismissal effected through the fig leaf of an
alleged violation of a company directive is no less than an actual illegal dismissal that
jurisprudence has labeled as a constructive dismissal; Constructive dismissal does not always
involve forthright dismissal or diminution in rank, compensation, benefit and privileges.—A
dismissal effected through the fig leaf of an alleged violation of a company directive is no less
than an actual illegal dismissal that jurisprudence has labeled as a constructive dismissal. Hyatt
Taxi Services, Inc. v. Catinoy (359 SCRA 686 [2001]) describes this type of company action when
it ruled that “[c]onstructive dismissal does not always involve forthright dismissal or diminution
in rank, compensation, benefit and privileges—there may be constructive dismissal if an act of
clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part
of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued
employment.”
Same; Same; Legal Consequences of an Illegally Dismissed Employee.—The respondent’s illegal
dismissal carries the legal consequence defined under Article 279 of the Labor Code: the illegally
dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent, computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
his actual reinstatement. The imposition of this legal consequence is a matter of law that allows
no discretion on the part of the decision maker, except only to the extent recognized by the law
itself as expressed in jurisprudence.

Same; Same; Doctrine of Strained Relations; The doctrine of strained relations cannot be used
recklessly or applied loosely to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his means of livelihood
and deny his reinstatement; The degree of hostility attendant to a litigation is not, by itself,
sufficient proof of the existence of strained relations that would rule out the possibility of
reinstatement.—The existence of strained relations between the parties was not clearly
established. We have consistently ruled that the doctrine of strained relations cannot be used
recklessly or applied loosely to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his means of livelihood
and deny him reinstatement. Since the application of this doctrine will result in the deprivation
of employment despite the absence of just cause, the implementation of the doctrine of strained
relationship must be supplemented by the rule that the existence of a strained relationship is for
the employer to clearly establish and prove in the manner it is called upon to prove the existence
of a just cause; the degree of hostility attendant to a litigation is not, by itself, sufficient proof of
the existence of strained relations that would rule out the possibility of reinstatement. Pentagon
Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 591 SCRA 160, G.R. No. 174141 June 26, 2009

SECTION 25 – Parental and filial privilege

Lee vs. Court of Appeal

Right to Privacy; Subpoenas; The grounds “unreasonable” and “oppressive” are proper for
quashing a subpoena duces tecum—for the production of documents and things in the possession
of the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of
privacy—but not for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum.—Petitioner Emma Lee claims that
the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that
it was unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on
oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh children’s theory that she had illicit relation with Lee
and gave birth to the other Lee children. But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds cited—
unreason-able and oppressive—are proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production
of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has a tendency to
infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
thus provides: “SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena.—The court may quash a subpoena duces
tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before the time specified therein if
it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not
appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable
cost of the production thereof.”
Witnesses; It is the trial court’s duty to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an
examiner and this is especially true where the witness is of advanced age.—Regarding the physical
and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled at her age and
condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the
satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have passed from the time the Lee-Keh children
sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial court. The RTC would have
to update itself and determine if Tiu’s current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the
ordeal of coming to court and being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued
to her. Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering by
adverse counsel. The trial court’s duty is to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of
an examiner and this is especially true where the witness is of advanced age.

Same; Filial Privilege; Filial privilege applies only to “direct” ascendants and descendants, a family
tie connected by a common ancestry—a stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her
stepmother.—Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter,
petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:
“SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.—No person may be compelled to testify against his
parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.” The above is an
adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal
cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all
kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct
ascendants or descendants. But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the
stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies
only to “direct” ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Lee vs. Court of Appeal, 625 SCRA 66,
G.R. No. 177861 July 13, 2010

People vs. Invencion

Criminal Law; Rape; Remedial Law; Witnesses; Filial Privilege; It is doctrinally settled that the
factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the witnesses, are accorded great
weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.—It is doctrinally settled that the factual
findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the witnesses, are accorded great weight
and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This is so because the trial court has the
advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion, the sudden pallor of a discovered lie,
the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer, the forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive
glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it,
the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and mien. This rule,
however, admits of exceptions, as where there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and
influence that has been ignored or misconstrued by the court, or where the trial court has acted
arbitrarily in its appreciation of the facts. We do not find any of these exceptions in the case at
bar.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule on “filial privilege” refers to a privilege not to testify, which
can be invoked or waived like other privileges.—As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule
that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the
rule on “filial privilege.” This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is
not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not
to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower
court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege
when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness
against his father of his own accord and only “to tell the truth.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Ulterior Motive; The rule is that where there is no evidence that the
principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that
he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence.—The alleged ulterior motive
of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant consideration. Such insinuation of ill-
motive is too lame and flimsy. As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age, could not
have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a motive
other than to bring to justice the despoiler of his sister’s virtue. There is no indication that Elven
testified because of anger or any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any showing that he
was unduly pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his father. The
rule is that where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated
by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled
to full credence.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The exact time or date of the commission of rape is not an element of
the crime. What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of the rape by the accused has
been sufficiently proved.—We find as inconsequential the alleged variance or difference in the
time that the rape was committed, i.e., during the night as testified to by Elven, or between 6:00
and 7:00 a.m. per the testimony of Eddie. The exact time or date of the commission of rape is not
an element of the crime. What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of the rape by
the accused has been sufficiently proved. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters
irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal. In this case,
we believe that the crime of rape was, indeed, committed as testified to by Elven and Eddie.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to minor and
insignificant details do not destroy the witnesses’ credibility—what is important is that the
testimonies agree on the essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent and coherent
whole.—The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do not impair the
credibility of these witnesses. We agree with the trial court that they are minor inconsistencies,
which do not affect the credibility of the witnesses. We have held in a number of cases that
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to minor and insignificant details do not
destroy the witnesses’ credibility. On the contrary, they may even be considered badges of
veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on the material points in the testimonies. What is
important is that the testimonies agree on essential facts and substantially corroborate a
consistent and coherent whole.
Same; Same; Penalties; Qualifying Circumstances; To justify the imposition of the death penalty
in a rape committed by a father on a daughter, the minority of the victim and her relationship
with the offender, which are special qualifying circumstances, must be alleged in the complaint
or information and proved by the prosecution during the trial by the quantum of proof required
for conviction.—To justify the imposition of the death penalty in a rape committed by a father on
a daughter, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender, which are special
qualifying circumstances, must be alleged in the complaint or information and proved by the
prosecution during the trial by the quantum of proof required for conviction. The accusatory
portion of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 9375 reads as follows: “That on or about the month
of March 1996 at Sapang Tagalog, Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Artemio S. Invencion did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by using force and intimidation have carnal
knowledge of his daughter Cynthia P. Invencion who was sixteen (16) years old, in their house.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; In the absence of sufficient proof of Cynthia’s minority, Artemio cannot
be convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. He should only be
convicted of simple rape and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.—It must be stressed that
the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes
the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of
procedure and evidence. Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient proof of Cynthia’s minority,
Artemio cannot be convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. He
should only be convicted of simple rape and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. People vs.
Invencion, 398 SCRA 592, G.R. No. 131636 March 5, 2003