PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M.

DACANAY, PETITIONER
B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law
until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his
ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine
citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

Issue:

Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine

bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship

Ruling:

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines
shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since
Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to
engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship
ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice
of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as

a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225.
This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to
have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to
resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the

Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions
“(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice.
ISIDRA TING-DUMALI vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES
ADM CASE NO. 5161. APRIL 14, 2014

FACTS:

The parents of Isidra Ting-Dumali died intestate and they left several properties
including two parcels of land Lot 1586 and Lot 1603 both in Malabon. Isidra
has 5 other siblings.

In 1986 however, two of her siblings, Felicisima Ting-Torres and Miriam Ting-
Saria, executed two Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement. They were assisted by
Felicisima’s husband, Atty. Rolando Torres – who was also the administrator of
the Ting Estate. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement covering Lot 1586, they
made it appear that Felicisima and Miriam were the only heirs of the Tings.
Atty. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement covering Lot 1603, the signature of
Isidra was forged to make it appear that she was a party to the Deed. Torres
then presented the Deeds to the Registry of Deeds of Cavite for the purpose of
transferring the titles into the name of Miriam and Felicisima. Thereafter,
Felicisima and Miriam sold the lands to a corporation.

Consequently, Isidra filed several complaints. One of the complaints is this

disbarment case against Atty. Torres.

Torres, in his defense, averred that he acted in good faith in allowing his wife
and Miriam to execute the Deeds; that he thought that the Deeds were agreed
to by the other siblings pursuant to a toka or verbal will left by Isidra’s mother
and as implemented by their eldest brother, Eliseo Ting; that the exclusion of
the other heirs was merely an oversight.

Isidra denied the existence of the toka. Eliseo also said there was no such
toka.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Torres should be disbarred for allowing the exclusion of the
other heirs from the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement despite his knowledge of
their presence.

HELD:

Yes. He violated his oath as he engaged in deceitful conduct. He has

committed falsehood. By letting his wife and Miriam declare in a public
document that they are the only heirs to the estate when in fact there are other
compulsory heirs and then later presenting these Deeds to the Registry of
Deeds, Atty. Torres failed to advise that the two were doing acts contrary to
law. He participated in the making of these Deeds as well as to the subsequent
transactions involving the sale of the properties covered by the Deeds. His acts
facilitated a wrong against the other heirs.
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR. REQUESTING FOR
EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES,
BM NO. 1370. MAY 9, 2005

Facts:

Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC requesting for exemption from payment of
his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that
after admission to the Bar he worked at the Civil Service Commission then
migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his
employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law profession and he
did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP
annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer.
His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same
constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the
law.

Issues:

1. Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the

time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in
the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-
2003?

2. Does the enforcement of the penalty of removal amount to

a deprivation of property without due process?

Held:

1. No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation. If

the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an
incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It
would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to
defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it
the power to impose such exaction.

The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP,

of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment
of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless
of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

2. No. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the
State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondents right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be
avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but
a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a

privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment
of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such
privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROBERTO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR.,
MELITON D. EVANGELISTA, SR. AND NELSON B. MELGAR VS. ATTY.
NORBERTO M. MENDOZA

A.c.no. 5151, October 19, 2004

Facts:

Pedro G. Tolentino filed a complaint against Atty. Mendoza for grossly immoral
conduct and gross misconduct. The respondent was a former MTC judge who
abandoned his wife in favor of his paramour who was also a married one. The
two was openly and publicly cohabitating with each other and has two children.
The paramour declared at the birth certificate of their children that they
got married with the respondent sometime in 1986 to make it appear that their
children are legitimate one. In addition to that, respondent also stated in his
certificate of candidacy his legal wife but declared it as separated. Respondent
filed a comments stressing that said complaints was politically motivated and
the evidence submitted were hearsay and violated the rule 24 of administrative
order no. 1 series of 1993 therefore cannot be admitted as evidence.

Issue:

Is the act of the respondent an immoral one?

Ruling:

Yes, the court finds the act of the respondent as violative to the code
of professional responsibility that a lawyer shall not engage in an unlawful,
deceitful and immoral act. The respondent has violated the said rule. The
respondent is open and public cohabitation with his paramour is a mockery of
the fundamental institution of marriage, therefore, the respondent is guilty of
immorality and is suspended indefinitely from practicing his profession until he
submits satisfactory proof that he has abandoned his immoral course of
conduct.
JULIETA B. NARAG vs. DOMINADOR M. NARAG
A.C NO. 3405. JUNE 29, 1998
FACTS:

Atty. Narag’s spouse filed a petition for disbarment in the IBP alleging that her husband
courted one of his students, later maintaining her as a mistress and having children by
her. Atty. Narag claims that his wife was a possessive, jealous woman who abused him
and filed the complaint out of spite.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Narag should be disbarred.

HELD:

Atty. Dominador Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute the
testimony given against him and it was proved that his actions were of public knowledge
and brought disrepute and suffering to his wife and children. Good moral character is a
continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails
to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or
her privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is
not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all
members. Hence when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be
suspended or disbarred. Grossly immoral means it must be so corrupt as to constitute
a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency. As a lawyer, one must not only refrain from adulterous relationships but must
not behave in a way that scandalizes the public by creating a belief that he is flouting
those moral standards
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE vs. EDWIN L. RANA
BAR MATTER NO. 103. JUNE 10, 2003
Facts:

Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled
mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on
the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in an election.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal

government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon,
Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any
court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses

respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the
latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the
pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does
not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar

Ruling:

The Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal
knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of
the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing
the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing
the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should
know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll
of Attorneys.
In Re: Lanuevo 66 SCRA 254 August 29, 1975

FACTS:
This is an administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanueva who was the Bar
Confidant during the 1971 Bar Examination emanating from the revelation of one
Oscar Landicho, a bar examinee of the same bar exam, in his confidential letter
that the result of the bar exam of one of the bar examinee later identified as
Ramon Galang was raised before the result was released to make him pass the
bar. Acting upon said letter, the court called the 5 bar examiners and the Bar
Confident Lanuevo to submit their sworn statements on the matter. It appears that
each of the 5 bar examiners were approached by Lanuevo with the examination
booklet asking them to re-evaluate the grades of the bar examiner explaining that
it is a practice policy in bar exams that he will review the grades obtained in all
subjects by an examinee and when he finds a candidate to have extraordinary
high grades in other subjects and low grade in one subject he can bring it to the
examiner for reconsideration to help the candidate pass. In good faith of trust and
confidence to the authority of Lanuevo, the examiners re-evaluated the exam of
the candidate and reconsider the grade they give for each subject matter. Further
investigation also revealed that Ramon Galang was charged with crime of slight
physical injuries in the Mla. MTC but did not revealed the information in his
application to take the bar examination.

ISSUE:
WON Lanuevo has the authority to ask bar examiners to re-evaluate and re-
correct the examination result of a bar candidate.

RULING:
The court ruled that it is evident that Lanuevo has deceptively staged a plot to
convince each examiner individually to re-evaluate the grades of Galang in order
to help him pass the bar without prior authorization of the Court. His duty as a Bar
Confident is limited only as a custodian of the examination notebooks after they
are corrected by the examiners where he is tasked to tally the general average of
the bar candidate. All requests for re-evaluation of grades from the bar exam shall
be made by the candidate themselves. With the facts fully established that
Lanuevo initiated the re-evaluation of the exam answers of Galang without the
authority of the Court, he has breached the trust and confidence given to him by
the court and was disbarred with his name stricken out from the rolls of attorneys.
Galang was likewise disbarred for fraudulently concealing the criminal charges
against him in his application for the bar exam while under oath constituting
perjury. The court believed that the 5 bar examiners acted in good faith and
thereby absolved from the case but reminded to perform their duties with due care.

FACTS:
IN MATTER OF THE PETITION OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF
UNSUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES OF 1946 TO 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL

RESOLUTION. MARCH 18, 1954

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952.
The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from
1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any
subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall
be included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in
the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to
1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of
the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for
1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was
based under the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to
1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of
World War II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of
the said candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may
be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal,
alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this
power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on
who can practice law; and

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes
to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence,
it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an
petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter,
supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN IN L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO vs. VIRGINIA Y.
YAPTINCHAYO

NO. L-27664. FEBRUARY 18, 1970

FACT: Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They
lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the
opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of
said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals
denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme
Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.

This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional.
He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of
title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when members
of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client
was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became “one of
the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb.”

The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the Court wanted
to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his
lawyer’s certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked
that he may be permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing.” He said he preferred this
considering that the Supreme Court is “the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.”
Almacen was however unapologetic.

ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed
because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every
petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its
constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide “only those
cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It should be remembered that a
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial. For
one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.

On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said
criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has
the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts
of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair
and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has
always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts.

In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should

have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of
the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the
court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen
was suspended indefinitely.