Crtitcal Thinking

CRITICAL THINKING IS EPISTEMICALLY RESPONSIBLE
Author(s): JUHO RITOLA

Source: Metaphilosophy, Vol. 43, No. 5 (October 2012), pp. 659-678
Published by: Wiley
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©2012 The Author
Metaphilosophy © 2012 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and
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METAPHILOSOPHY
Vol. 43, No. 5, October 2012
0026-106B
CRITICAL THINKING IS EPISTEMICALLY RESPONSIBLE
JUHO RITOLA
Abstract: Michael Huemer (2005) argues that following the epistemic strate
of Critical Thinking—that is, thinking things through for oneself—leaves t
agent epistemically either worse off or no better off than an alternative strate
of Credulity—that is, trusting the authorities. Therefore, Critical Thinking is n
epistemically responsible. This article argues that Reasonable Credulity enta
Critical Thinking, and since Reasonable Credulity is epistemically responsible, t
Critical Thinking that it entails is epistemically responsible too.
Keywords: critical thinking, epistemic responsibility, appeal to authority, inform

logic, applied epistemology, social epistemology.
Introduction
Michael Huemer (2005) argues that following the reasoning strategy

endorsed by a typical Critical Thinking class and thinking things through
for oneself leaves the agent, for example a typical student in a Critical
Thinking class, epistemically either worse off or no better off than the
agent would have been if he or she had followed the advice of experts.
Following strategy ti leaves an agent epistemically worse off than follow
ing t2, if following ti results in a smaller number of true beliefs and a
greater number of false beliefs than following t?.1 Basically, this result is
due to the fact that a layperson who thinks things through for himself or
herself will not equal the reliability of an expert in the normal case. Since
we should use the most reliable method, we should just trust the experts
and not engage in Critical Thinking: using the less reliable method is
epistemically irresponsible. If this is the case, it is also not epistemically
responsible to teach Critical Thinking. We do not want to engage in, or
encourage, activities that leave the students epistemically either worse off
or no better off than they would have been otherwise.
But what does a typical Critical Thinking class recommend? I will
assume that such a class teaches the student some method of analyzing
1 For example, if there are one hundred beliefs formed under each, and Credulity results
in eighty true beliefs and twenty false beliefs, then under Critical Thinking, the number of
true beliefs is <80 and the number of false beliefs is >20, respectively.
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660 JUHO RITOLA
and evaluating argumentation and forming opinions based on thes

esses. The specifics of this need not be discussed here. All we need do
note, along with Huemer (2005, 523), that this education gives roughly
following epistemic recommendation: if a person decides to form
sonable opinion on some publicly debated matter (evolution, abo
gun laws, and so on), he or she should gather arguments and evi
available to him or her, from all sides of the issue, and assess them
himself or herself. If the person is able to form an impression of the m
he or she should form a belief based on that impression. If not, he or
should withhold judgment.
Let us describe this process of "thinking things through" in differe
terms. In it, an epistemic agent looks for justified beliefs, report
observations about an issue. The agent purports to cognitively a
pieces of information, to decide which ones are worth believing and w
they mean. The agent then purports to move via justifiedly believed i
ential relations to a conclusion that thus becomes a justified bel
the agent. Following this strategy appears approvable to the intern
approach to justified belief.2 However, internalism poses a rather
model of justification. Some reject it altogether, some consider it too
possibly only an ideal model. Yet it does have great intuitive appe
it certainly captures something we deem essential to scientific rea
and expert knowledge. The aim of Critical Thinking courses has been
after the class a student's belief acquisition would approximate that of
expert: students would able to evaluate, more often than before
justification of new (and old) claims with the appropriate method
through this process enhance the justification of their belief set. Wit
picture it has seemed prima facie reasonable to organize Critical Think
classes and encourage students to participate in such courses. If
outcome is more Critical Thinking, why not?
As noted, Huemer answers in the negative, because Critical Thin
will either leave the epistemic agent epistemically no better off than
ing the experts or leave the agent epistemically worse off. In this art
I argue that given the setting of Huemer's case, one needs to thi
oneself, because one needs to think about whom to believe and wh
expert opinion really is. One can obviously implement the strat
believing what the experts say very poorly too. Since implement
poorly implies that the agent is left worse off than by implementing
it should be acceptable to require that following the strategy be
2 I do not mean to imply that everyone who teaches critical thinking is, or should
epistemological internalist; rather, the approach to belief acquisition advocated
classes has a strong internalistic flavor—that is, these classes often advocate the
reflection of premise beliefs and inferences that appears to fulfill the internalistic
criteria of justified belief. For discussion of types of internalism and externalism,
Pry or 2001.
© 2012 The Author

CRITICAL THINKING IS EPISTEMICALLY RESPONSIBLE 661
panied by some Critical Thinking by the agent himself or herself.3 I will

discuss some essential cases of Huemer's argumentation to show this. I
will also discuss another aspect of the issue, what Huemer sees as a
dilemma stemming from the agent-centered epistemic norm of Critical
Thinking classes, and argue that the dilemma can be resolved. My argu
mentation proceeds from Huemer's starting point. Toward the end of the
article, I also briefly note some alternative starting points from which
Huemer's argumentation can be challenged and discuss some results of the
empirical research on human reasoning.
The Case Against Critical Thinking

Suppose you are confronted with an issue that is discussed in public and
you want to decide what to believe about it. You want to form a true belief
or at least avoid having a false belief on the issue. Huemer (2005, 522-23)
notes that there are at least three different strategies you could adopt. If
you were to follow the strategy of Credulity, you would canvass the
opinions of a number of experts and adopt the belief held by most of them.
The ideal situation would be that you had a poll of experts; failing that,
you might look through several books and articles and identify their
overall conclusions. You would then form an opinion based on this
process. If you could not identify a consensus view, you would withhold
judgment. If you were to follow the strategy of Skepticism, you would
withhold judgment on the issue straight away. If you were to apply the
strategy of Critical Thinking, you would gather the arguments and evi
dence available on the issue, from all sides, and assess them for yourself.
You would try thereby to form some overall impression. If you did form
such an impression, you would base your belief on that. Otherwise, you
would suspend judgment.
Huemer's case has some initial conditions that need to be noted. First,
as mentioned, you want to form an opinion on the matter. (No mention is
made of the importance of the matter to you.) Second, you are a "typical"
person, generally ordinary, and have no exceptional cognitive advantages:
you don't have a genius-level IQ, or access to important evidence about
the issue that others, especially the experts, lack. Third, you know there is
a body of information on the issue: several experts have published their
views on the subject in readily available form. Fourth, these experts are by
definition intelligent and well informed about the issue and have spent
considerable time studying it (Huemer 2005, 522).
Suppose first that you are confronted with an issue on which there is a
consensus among the experts. Huemer (2005, 524) recommends that you
choose the strategy of Credulity over Critical Thinking, meaning that you
3 Huemer (2005, 529-30) considers an argument of this kind, but I believe he fails to
appreciate its full strength.
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662 JUHO RITOLA
accept the consensus view. You should do so because if you apply C

Thinking, one of the three things will happen. (1) You will come to ag
with the experts. In this case you gain no advantage over the experts,
the standpoint of gaining true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. (2
will come to disagree with the experts. However, it is very unlikely th
you would be correct and the experts incorrect. First, you are less like
be more reliable on the matter than any given expert. Second, Hu
(2005, n. 2) reminds us of Condorcet's Jury Theorem, according to wh
the reliability of an expert community outdoes the reliability of any
expert by a large margin, given certain levels of individual reliab
and a certain number of experts in the majority relative to experts in
minority. So the consensus reached by a community of experts is sign
cantly more likely to be true than the belief of any given expert, wh
already more likely to be correct than a layperson. (3) You will su
judgment. In this case, you will probably forgo a possibility to gain a
belief for reasons similar to those in case (2). So, it would appear t
none of the cases where there is an expert consensus are you epistemi
better off based on Critical Thinking.
Suppose now there is no consensus among the experts. In this
Huemer (2005, 525) recommends that you withhold judgment. If
instead adopt Critical Thinking, one of two things will happen. (1
will not be able to form a clear impression, and you will suspend
ment. Hence, the result is the same as it would have been had you foll
Credulity from the start. (2) You will form a clear impression an
your belief on that. But now it is again very unlikely that you are
reliable than the experts. If they ended up with different opinions on
matter, we can infer that they were not reliable on the matter, and if
were not reliable on the issue, we can infer that you will not be reliab
the matter either. So again, no advantage is gained by Critical Thi
Hence, whether there is expert consensus or not, Critical Thinkin
leave you either no better off or worse off than will Credulity. Credu
simply is more reliable.4 Therefore, Critical Thinking is not epistemic
responsible.
To top off his case, Huemer (2005, 525-26) asks us to imagine a
situation in which an average undergraduate student who has completed
a Critical Thinking class informs his professor that he has formed a
definite opinion on a difficult philosophical issue that currently divides the
philosophers of the relevant field. Should the professor now accept the
result of the student? Whichever way the professor chooses, she seems to
4 Suppose you have two alternative methods of belief formation on a given issue, and the
two methods exclude each other. Method 1 may be 80 percent reliable, and Method 2 may
be 60 percent reliable. Under no circumstances would you prefer to use the Method 2 over
Method 1, other things being equal (Huemer 2005, 524). The same should apply to strategies
of Credulity and Critical Thinking: if one is clearly more reliable than the other, you should
use the more reliable one.
©2012 The Author

disregard the recommendation of Critical Thinking that we should

things through by ourselves. According to Huemer (2005, 525-26
caused by the agent-centered nature of the epistemic norm of
Thinking.
Suppose that the professor accepts the result presented by the st
She is then not following the advice of Critical Thinking and think
matter through herself. Yet it seems implausible that the student
more reliable on the matter than the several professional philo
who have come to disagree on this issue. So, it would seem reasonab
to accept the student's results. Suppose next that the professor
accept what the student says. On the one hand, she is in line w
recommendation of Critical Thinking, but on the other hand, it als
that she is in some sense disregarding Critical Thinking. If the
received through Critical Thinking are reliable, they should be reli
applied by an average student. And if they are, then why sho
professor not believe the results of this student? So, if the p
chooses to ignore the student's view, she seems to imply that the m
used by the student are not reliable. But if the results receiv
Critical Thinking are not reliable, and not to be trusted, why teach
techniques to students? Either way, we seem to have landed in a pic
conclusion, neither Critical Thinking itself nor teaching it app
stemically responsible in the way we have thus far thought it to b
The Case for Critical Thinking
I will argue that in order to follow the strategy of Credulity i

stemically sound way, one has to exercise some Critical Thinkin
this strategy, the combination of Critical Thinking and Credul
sonable Credulity. Since Reasonable Credulity is epistemically respon
the Critical Thinking that it entails is epistemically responsible and
be exercised and taught.
Critical Thinking in Reasonable Credulity

Huemer's epistemic recommendation is not simply "follow Cred
Although his recommendation is a lot shorter than a typical
Thinking class, it is not quite that short. Paraphrasing, it is t
should believe what you can ascertain to be the majority view
relevant experts, or, if no consensus view can be identified, yo
withhold judgment. The epistemic agent has to decide how to im
this advice in a given case. First and foremost, the agent has to
whom to trust. The only way to do this is to apply some reas
methods or standards of identification. However, such standards
self-evident. There are probably many ways to acquire such sta
They may come from one's formal education, but there are other s
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664 JUHO RITOLA
as well, and a typical agent will have to do some epistemic work to acq
them. These standards are something that is, and should be, taugh
typical Critical Thinking class or a book (see, e.g., Walton 2008, ch
Students should understand that if expertise is claimed, one should
ate whether the person really is an expert, whether the person is an e
in a relevant field—that is, in a field that gives us a reason to believe
the expert is more reliable on the issue than a layperson, and so on. If
accept that following such standards can be the basis of an epistem
responsible decision of whom to trust, epistemically responsible Credu
entails Critical Thinking in its key case.
This, however, is not enough for a reasonable decision, accordin
Huemer. His recommendation is that we canvass the opinion of th
evant community, which is a lot more work than we tend to do.5 But
we face another question: how does one canvass the opinions of identif
experts in the given field? Huemer notes that, ideally, one should
poll of experts. But polls present us with notorious problems. A ty
recommendation in a Critical Thinking class is that one try to evaluat
validity of the poll with which one is faced: how was the poll sam
what was the sample, how were the questions in the poll set, and so on
e.g., Walton 2008, chap. 8). Taking heed of those recommendations
instance of Critical Thinking. Hence, epistemically responsible Cre
entails Critical Thinking.
It could be that there is no poll available. In such a case, Huemer (20
522) recommends that one look through several books and article
identify their overall conclusions. How does one do that, given that on
not an expert in the field in question? How does one identify what bo
and articles to read, and how does one identify their overall conclu
This is a tall order for a layperson, who has several other responsibili
such as to make ends meet, care for his or her children, and so on. Bu
the question is really important, a review of the literature is indeed s
thing that should be done from an epistemic point of view. How
canvassing the professional literature of a given field can be a dau
task, especially if one has no background in the field. A typical C
Thinking class or book gives the student detailed instructions on h
identify the main conclusion of a text, how to map the argumen
structure of a larger text, and how to analyze and evaluate the ded
and inductive arguments.6 Following the recommendation of Hu
5 We tend to, for example, uncritically assume that a person portrayed in the med
expert on, say, oncology, gives us an accurate portrayal of the received views of his
field. That is, if some of the recommendations or conclusions that the expert presents ar
under debate in the field in question, the reader/listener/viewer is given an indication o
But of course this is not always the case.
6 Of course, whether the student, based on the course, can and will improve his
reflection is something that needs to be addressed. Hence the validity and projection p
of teaching Critical Thinking. See, e.g., Fisher and Scriven 1997 for discussion.
©2012 The Author

thus seems to require Critical Thinking as typically conceived by teacher

of Critical Thinking classes and Huemer's own case description. As
matter of fact, it involves pretty much everything in a typical Crit
Thinking class. Again, Reasonable Credulity entails Critical Thinking
There is a way that might seem to allow one to avoid Critical Thinking
in the pursuance of Credulity. Instead of trying to think for oneself wh
opinion to trust, one might consult the community of epistemic experts
that is, persons who are experts in deciding who is an expert and what i
the majority view of the noteworthy experts. But this seems to lead to a
dilemma for the Credulity-without-Critical-Thinking view. We would lik
to know what the proper training is for becoming an expert in decid
who is an expert. By the very nature of expertise, it seems dubious t
there could be a community of experts of everything.7 But if there is, eith
(1) this expert knowledge consists of knowledge of everything or (2) the
are some general principles and methods that can be learned to make
decision reliably. The first option seems unfeasible: limitations of time a
human cognition make this an unachievable goal. If the second option
the case, we face an obvious question. If there are some general principle
and methods that can be taught to agents so that they become experts in
deciding expertise, why could these principles and methods not be used i
a Critical Thinking class to everyone's benefit? As a matter of fact, we ha
landed on something that is thought by many to be the core of Crit
Thinking classes: the common feature is good reasoning, be it in t
scientific context or the marketplace. Regardless, identification problem
resurface with respect to this second-level community of experts. T
layperson would need to decide who the members of this second-le
community are and what their opinion is. If we accept that the epistemi
agents need to be aware of the strategy they apply, these points show th
some Critical Thinking is required from each and every epistemica
responsible agent. It seems to me that we can assume that the agents nee
to be aware of the strategy they apply: the idea of giving epistemic
ommendations that the agents cannot even in principle reflect on, yet ar
supposed to follow as a strategy, appears odd.
Let us look at some specific cases of public debate Huemer mentio
First, he notes (2005, 523) that we think it would not be reasonable advic
to give to a friend who has started to suffer from chronic abdominal pa
that she should not take the word of some medical doctor but should
instead diagnose and treat the pain herself. That does indeed not sound
like a good piece of advice.8 Nevertheless, the teachers of Critical Thinking
classes need not think that such advice is something that would follow
7 This is not to say that there are no persons claiming to have such expertise, only that this
seems to exacerbate the problem.
8 Of course, there are cases where we think she should not believe the word of some
doctors, and cases where we would still advise her to seek more opinions, to canvass the field,
but here we consider this advice in general.
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666 JUHO RITOLA
from what they have taught or that it is good from an epistemic pers
tive. (I have no polls at hand, but I certainly hope that they in general
some principled answers to the question why and when to trust m
doctors.) In my view, this is because no reasonable teacher of Cr
Thinking would claim that in every case and every issue, regardless of
circumstances, we should reach final conclusions as to what to believe,
they instances of either theoretical or practical reasoning, by ours
alone. But it is important to notice that in order for us to recog
whether we are in a situation in which it is best to rely on someone el
say-so, we have to Think Critically. But it is also true that there are c
where no one else can take the final decisive step for the person, wher
or she has to decide for himself or herself, for example whether to enr
medical school, to marry, to have children, and so on.9 A compe
epistemic agent is responsible for the decision to trust someone els
given matter just as much as he or she is responsible for the decisi
trust only himself or herself.
Another case Huemer discusses is the issue of evolution versus crea
tionism. He holds that there is a consensus among the experts on this issue.
I do not wish to dispute that. But it is clear that Huemer has identified
some body of experts that have authority on the issue. So, Critical Think
ing, as I understand it, has occurred. But, as Huemer notes, the issue is still
debated publicly. Why is that? Again, I have no statistics to back up my
claim here, but I conjecture that it is not because too many people have
been taught to exercise Critical Thinking and now they are unwisely
making up their own minds, because of the lessons learned in those classes.
Rather, it seems to me that not enough Critical Thinking has occurred.
But this Critical Thinking does not imply that one needs to become an
expert in biology, paleontology, chemistry, and whatever further area of
expertise that might be demanded to fully understand all aspects of the
issue. Instead, the minimum requirement is that one does some thinking
about whom to believe. In order to do this reasonably, one needs to
exercise Critical Thinking.
The third case Huemer mentions is abortion. This issue is still under
fierce debate (although the arguers, perhaps more often than is usual in
debates, see the matter as settled despite the ongoing debate). But disa
greement in ethics is further complicated by the fact that there are different
viewpoints as to what the objective of such ethical debates is and what is
possible to achieve in them. Some think that the objective is to find
clear-cut answers to questions like abortion. Such persons, however, do
not typically offer only the conclusion to the layperson; they also provide
the argumentation used to resolve the issue. But if the expectation is that
9 i should note that Huemer (2005, 529) does not advocate Credulity in all areas of life.
In his discussion of objections, he modifies his claim to apply primarily to publicly discussed
issues.
©2012 The Author

a layperson should just accept the conclusion, why bother to provide

argumentation? Yet this might seem question-begging against Huemer. A
we have assumed (perhaps unjustifiably) that a layperson should not j
accept the conclusion of an ethical expert, we have engaged in practi
that are not important after all. Still, the intuition that moral problems a
not to be resolved by straightforwardly accepting the end result of phil
sophical or religious theorizing is quite strong. Regardless, this does
remove the identification problem, so Critical Thinking is necessary und
this approach to ethical argumentation.
The alternative view is that a professional philosopher whose expertise
lies in applied ethics cannot or should not claim there are univocal answe
to ethical dilemmas. Instead, the agents should become aware of th
ethical principles they hold to be of greatest value, see how they compet
with other values they consider important, how they can be consistent o
inconsistent with other values and actions, and try to sort out a position
that they themselves can hold consistently in accordance with their set
ultimate values. If one starts from this position, it is easy to see how
reasonable decision about an ethical question would require Crit
Thinking. Hence, regardless of which of the two positions one hol
Critical Thinking is necessary. Furthermore, based on these cases, we can
infer that if the reliability of Critical Thinking can be improved by com
pleting a Critical Thinking class, it is also epistemically responsible
organize Critical Thinking classes.10
Critical Thinking and Agent Centeredness
Huemer raises an interesting question about the agent-centered epistemic

norm of Critical Thinking. He argues that a problem arises in that we se
to think that if a person applies certain techniques in arriving at a
clusion, then he or she has good reason to accept the conclusion, b
others, who know that he or she arrived at the conclusion by thos
techniques, do not accordingly have good reason to accept it. Huem
(2005, 526) thinks it is unclear why this should be so: why should
professor not trust the student who announces that he or she has solved
difficult philosophical question through Critical Thinking?
Before discussing this case further, we should note that this problem
not specific to Critical Thinking. Consider a case where a student comes
see a professor of mathematics and informs him that she has solved
complex problem that has puzzled mathematicians for decades. The p
fessor himself has been responsible for teaching the student in quest
10 A further problem is that the research results that the experts possess and underst
do not always mechanically translate into policy decisions. Hence, a policy maker (wh
often a layperson) might have to choose between options in a situation where it is
self-evident which policy is in line with the received view or is best supported by it. Such ca
seem to require Critical Thinking too.
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668 JUHO RITOLA
from the start of her studies and has taught her not only the bas
certain fields of mathematics but also several techniques for construct
proofs. Should he believe her? If he does believe her, is he not following
advice he himself has given? But then again, it seems unreasonab
suppose that the student would have found a solution to a problem of
kind. But if the professor does not believe her, is he not implying tha
methods he has taught are not reliable in the hands of an average stud
And if the methods are not reliable, why teach them? Analogous p
can be repeated in other areas: a student has been taught the bas
medicine and experimental science. He comes into the office to inform
professor that he has found the cure for cancer. Should the prof
believe him? Whether she does or not, she seems to behave inconsisten
I think the dilemma can be resolved, but there are several complicat
factors involved: the aspect of epistemic equality, the fact that there
different sources of justification, and different standards of justificati
different contexts." 1 hold that if there are two reasoners, A and B, w
are epistemic equals, that is, who do not differ in epistemically re
aspects with respect to issue p (their expertise with respect to p is the s
they are otherwise roughly equal reasoners, they have the same ev
available, and so on), and A has reasoned to a conclusion with jus
inferences, she is epistemically in a better position than B, who m
knows that A has reasoned to the conclusion with some methods.12 Yet I
see no reason to accept that B has no reason to believe the conclusion
based on his knowledge that A claims to have resolved the question. But
A's position is better: reasoning things by oneself by checking the premises
for acceptability and ascertaining that the inferences are correct is a reason
to believe that one is epistemically better positioned than if one had not
done so.13
Thus, when it comes to epistemic equals, a person is generally epistemi
cally better off believing something based on reasoning than something
based on the say-so of others. This is not to say that testimony is not an
important, perhaps even an a priori, source of knowledge and justified
belief, nor to say that the division of labor we have in the production of
knowledge has not worked wonders. Further, this does not imply that
11 Acknowledging that whether the sentence "S is justified in believing that p" is true may
vary across contexts need not imply that one accepts a contextual theory of justification.
12 In the case of epistemic equals, as B becomes better aware of the methods A has used,
his justification approaches the quality and quantity of A's justification. In the case of
epistemic unequals, such a process does not imply that the justifications would end up being
the same either qualitatively or quantitatively: the expert's justification is still likely to be
better, because of the larger background knowledge.
13 For one thing, let us assume that A's reliability on the issue that p is 0.7. If B comes to
know that A believes that p, B does not thereby come to know that p on the probability of
0.7. B should weigh the value of A's testimony, A's reliability on that p, and go through the
inference: A said that p. Therefore, p. The resulting probability, the probability of p to B,
is <0.7. Therefore, B is epistemically in a less ideal position than A is.
©2012 The Author

between epistemic unequals the layperson should not believe th

but, as has been noted, he or she should not (at least not in all cases
the word of just one expert (to begin with). Yet, understanding
experts have taken the position they have improves the overall qua
one's justification with respect to mere acceptance of the received v
Critical Thinking can increase the likelihood of this happening
when properly applied, be epistemically reasonable.
Next, we should note that the standards of justification are diffe
a discussion between two philosophers about an issue (or a phi
and a philosopher-to-be) and in one between a philosopher and
son, and even between a philosopher-to-be and a layperson. The
was why the professor should not accept the reasoning of the studen
believes the student has internalized the methods of Critical Think
has thought about the matter. But professional philosophers sh
just take anyone's word for the claim that some complex philos
theory has now been shown to be correct, especially if the mat
within their area of expertise. If the issue is a complex philosophic
we know that it requires argumentation before it can be acce
such debates, there are sets of questions and arguments that ne
addressed before one can have any legitimacy for claiming to have
burden of proof.
The student can aim to meet the burden of proof by settin
premises and arguments, typically in written form. The recommen
of a Critical Thinking class is that the reader of this text shou
analyze the structure of the argumentation, examine the acceptabil
the premises, evaluate the strength of the reasoning, and finally, b
an evaluation of whether all the relevant questions have been an
form an overall opinion of the significance of the argumentation. T
what agent centeredness in fact demands, and it is also what the st
of professional philosophy demand. This demand is amplified
knowledge of the fact that becoming a philosopher is a process that
time and individual effort. We are more likely, with good re
believe that the student is wrong about a philosophical thesis,
under the case description he is a beginning student. We know that
few people are reliable when it comes to understanding and ana
much less solving, complex philosophical dilemmas in their first ye
studies. Regardless, in the context of professional philosophy the r
must submit his or her reasoning for the evaluation of others, whe
beginning student or an established professor. No matter how estab
one becomes, even primus inter pares, one still occasionally has to s
to double-blind reviewing.
These considerations show that the horns of the dilemma of whether to
believe the student are not exclusive: depending on the topic, the discus
sants, and the type and amount of justification required, we come to
different conclusions. Standards of justification change, there are different
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670 JUHO R1TOLA
sources of justification, and we justifiedly believe that some reasoners a

more likely to be right than others. That a student would solve a diffic
scientific or scholarly problem is not unheard of, and if one hears a cla
to that effect, one is given some reason to believe that the puzzle has be
solved. But that is a very weak reason, and many would probably h
that it is not enough, by itself, to make probable the claim that t
problem in question has been solved. A stronger reason would be to
that a colleague has solved it, for the simple reason that we have g
reason to believe that an expert is more reliable at solving such problem
A still better reason would be to hear that the relevant community
philosophers has come to accept the claim. But the best reason woul
to know the premises and recognize the validity of the inference to
conclusion and hence understand why the community has come to accep
it. One does not disregard the recommendations of a Critical Think
class, even if one at times does not believe before one has seen and
examined the argument for oneself. In the end. Critical Thinking is not
agent centered; it is reason centered. The arguments in question decide
what is justifiable, considering them is our only way of getting to truth.
Not everyone has to go through every piece of reasoning, and there are
different kinds and degrees of justification. So, the evaluation of the
reasonability of accepting a given conclusion in a given context is depend
ent on many factors, and 1 think Huemer's argumentation glosses over
these complications.
Reasoning to a conclusion oneself, assuming that the expert views are
given proper consideration, also presents one with further benefits that
should not be underestimated. This reasoning provides the epistemic agent
with more stable justifications than the word of others. One generally not
only remembers the results better, one is also better able to evaluate new
arguments against the position one has come to accept. Having worked
something out oneself also gives one a greater number of sources with
which to verify results again. Suppose one tries to decide whether the
current data support the view that global warming is occurring. Given that
one responsibly gathers evidence about the majority view of the relevant
experts, and that one understands at least most of the essential parts of the
evidence, one is definitely better equipped to see which arguments against
global warming are not worth entertaining and which might have some
thing to them. This is an advantage given, for example, how quickly the
coverage given to some problem in the media may change: the average
citizen cannot stay in touch with the expert view all the time. So, one's
belief set becomes more stable, in the sense that one can reject poor
argumentation, even though it might have seemed credible at first and
would have been accepted had the critical resources and dispositions not
been available.
Critical Thinking increases the probability that one's belief set is prop
erly responsive, in the sense that one can revise one's belief set reasonably
© 2012 The Author

when faced with arguments that objectively point out the need for revi
sion. Improving the understanding of the basic nature of scientific reason
ing allows one to see why scientifically justified beliefs may change. This
allows for greater tolerance of uncertainty, which is no small reward.
Having realized how scientific results are acquired, one is in a better
position to understand why it might be the case that, for example, the
scientific recommendations for a healthy diet might change. One also
understands that the fact that there are changes does not refute the rea
sonableness of believing scientifically received results: one is in a better
position to understand that it is not reasonable to change one's diet before
the results of some study that proposes radical changes to the current
understanding are repeated. And so on. The benefits of Critical Thinking
lie in the ability to analyze and evaluate (and base decisions on these
conclusions) the enormous flow of information the citizens of well-to-do
societies are faced with daily.14
Further Discussion
There are some further points that need to be discussed. The first two
pertain to giving epistemic recommendations: the context in which pro
fessional philosophers give recommendations to the layperson, and the
totality of reasons on the basis of which we should give such recommen
dations. The third is the issue of reductivism and antireductivism about
testimony. The fourth issue I touch on is the empirical study of human
reasoning.15
First, when it comes to the question whether people should think things
through themselves, we can safely say that the cat is out of the bag:
whether people should or not, they like to think about things themselves.
Giving people tools that can increase the reliability of an activity they
do anyway, tools that can also lead to the conclusion that in some cases
they should believe someone else's word on the matter at hand, seems
reasonable.
The second issue is the widespread acceptance of public participation
(or procedural rights) in Western philosophical and political theory. Based
on this acceptance, motivated by values independent of epistemic consid
erations, procedures have been established where the acceptance of a given
14 It must be acknowledged that the question which strategy produces the largest number
of truths or the best ratio of true and false beliefs over different periods of time is a difficult
one and cannot be addressed fully here. In short, the idea of Critical Thinking in education
is that by developing critical abilities and dispositions, the student would in the long run end
up with more true beliefs and fewer false beliefs than without such properties and, further
more, would exhibit the kind of rationality that is desirable from a normative point of view.
For further discussion, see, e.g., Goldman 1999, esp. chap. 11, and for criticism of Goldman's
veritistic approach, see Siegel 2005 and Ritola 2011.
15 I am indebted to an anonymous Metaphilosophy referee for pointing out the need to
discuss the latter two points.
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672 JUHO RITOLA
policy is offered for public consideration and vote. If Critical Thinkin

increase the quality of these procedures, then it is epistemically r
mendable. Only if no other values are relevant to how much people sh
think for themselves should we base the recommendations about it sol
on the epistemic point of view.
The third important issue in this discussion is the position one t
with regard to the general nature of testimonial knowledge. The stand
way (see, e.g., Stevenson 1993 and Adler 2010) of presenting this p
sophical issue is to present it as a dispute between, on the one han
Humean (reductivist) approach that holds one should not believe
mony unless one has evidence of its reliability and, on the other hand
Reidian (antireductivist) approach that holds one may believe testim
in the absence of discrediting evidence.'6 It might seem that the appro
advocated in the present article is more naturally linked with the
tivist position, as one is urged to search for evidence as to whethe
expert really is an expert. Yet this division need not separate my posit
from that of Huemer's. Expert knowledge is a special case of testim
knowledge: it is given with the special backing of expertise, and the in
mation provided is supposed to be therefore more reliable than in the
case in philosophical discussion on testimony, that is, information
vided by an arbitrary fellow human being (as in the case of askin
directions from the literal man or woman on the street). So, in the ca
are discussing, evidence for the trustworthiness of the testimony
already been presented. Huemer's argument seems to proceed from
assumption that if the testimony is provided with this backing, the a
should prefer it to his or her own thinking. I am arguing that from
point of view of the agent, the situation is more complex and ther
requires further scrutiny that qualifies as Critical Thinking. One
hold that testimony is an independent source of justification but
require that if expertise is claimed, one should ascertain whether that
is tenable.
The fourth issue is the fact that according to a large body of empirical
evidence, we are poor reasoners. According to the so-called Heuristics and
Biases tradition, we ignore basic axioms of probability, fail to consider
alternative explanations, overscrutinize evidence that threatens our
current beliefs, and employ questionable heuristic strategies based on, for
example, the availability of evidence.17 Research in general shows we
accept invalid arguments and refuse valid arguments at an alarming rate
and commit various informal fallacies (Perkins 2002). What is worse is the
16 So, the Humean believes that testimony reduces to other forms of justification, such as
perception, whereas the Reidian believes testimony is an independent form of justification,
though dependent on sense perception for transmission.
17 The seminal article on this tradition is Tversky and Kahneman 1974. The now classic
source is Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982. A strong criticism of this tradition is Cohen
1981.
©2012 The Author

fact that these inferential problems seem to endure despite rigorous

ing.18 It is as if these strategies are endemic to our cognitive archit
Another important tradition concerning human reasoning and ration
is the so-called Bounded Rationality (or Ecological Rationality) tr
(see, e.g., Gigerenzer and Selten 2001), which starts from the id
these strategies are indeed endemic to us. It sees heuristics as str
that evolved with our fundamental psychological structures. Th
theme of this research is that we are reasoners bound by limited re
and have developed various strategies that allow us to bypass ver
but normatively correct computations. Yet these strategies ofte
"good enough" results that allow us to survive. These two trad
Bounded Rationality and Heuristics and Biases, have been at logg
for some time over the nature of human rationality, so suspens
judgment on the nature of our misperformance might be reasonable
that as it may, this body of empirical (and theoretical) work ce
should give us pause as to just how much reasoning we should
selves and how much weight we should place on it.20
The literature on this topic is massive, and it is not possible to rev
here, much less to pronounce verdicts on it.21 From the viewpoint o
article, however, we can make some observations. First, the ev
indeed points to the fact that the consensus opinion of experts
valuable, as the Condorcet Jury Theorem would have us believ
experts are prone to mistakes. The public examination of reasoning
community of experts appears to be the best way of checking for m
But as I have argued here, reasonable reliance on expert knowl
and acquiring a reliable view of the consensus opinion, implies C
18 Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, prominent researchers in the Heuristics an

tradition, note: "Our richest source of data demonstrating human inferential failin
. . . from ourselves and our friends, most of whom are trained social scientists" (1
Lehman et al. 1988 reports that two years of graduate training in psychology l
percent increase in test scores in tests measuring statistical and methodological re
Medical training led to an increase of 25 percent, while training in law and chemist
no improvement. There were no initial differences in the test scores. One oft-quote
misperformance is Casscells et al. 1978, according to which, out of a group com
Harvard Medical School faculty, staff, and fourth-year students, only 18 perce
correct (or close to correct) answer to a basic problem on conditional probability.
" But there is also rather convincing argumentation in Samuels, Stich, and Bish
that the difference between the two traditions is actually much smaller than
perceived; the article also lists references to the dialectic between the two tradition
20 This work should shake our overconfidence. See Nisbett and Ross 1980, 119, f
references to the relevant literature. This overconfidence is also known as the Lake
effect: it means that in many instances everyone tends to believe that he or sh
average on a given task. See, e.g., Alicke, Dunning, and Krueger 2005.
21 The aforementioned texts provide good starting points to this literature. Perk
is an instructive metastudy of studies on human reasoning and contains insightful
of the meaning of these results to the normative status of deductive logic in e
reasoning.
© 2012 The Author

674 JUHO RITOLA
Thinking. Second, if one were to take the results of this empirical researc
to the extreme, one might argue that even experts should place little weigh
on their own reasoning in matters of their expertise before that reasonin
has been subjected to public scrutiny, and that they should place no weigh
on their own reasoning outside the narrow confines of their field. Surely
this is a perverse recommendation and impossible to live by. Suppose
tighten the standards of knowledge, or justified belief, accordingly. Then
in the case of a medical doctor making a diagnostic decision, we shou
not believe the doctor before he or she can show us that the consensus
opinion of the medical profession would in this case be the same. Notice
that under such tight standards, it is not sufficient that the doctor has
followed an established procedure in making this specific diagnostic deci
sion, for we know that such procedures are typically wide enough to
contain several relevant pieces of information that do not all necessarily
point to the same conclusion. Typically the doctor has to decide what the
most important diagnostic clues are in a particular case, whether he or she
can safely ignore certain clues, and so forth.22 But the empirical evidence
tells us that the physician is prone to the same mistakes as the rest of us.
So, under these very strict standards, the physician is not justified in his or
her decision.
Researchers on human reasoning have not succumbed to such pessi
mism. Many of them suggest various ameliorative methods, that is, ways
to combat our intuitive but at times dubious reasoning strategies: one
should consider the opposite position (for example, try to generate argu
ments for why one's position might be false), pay attention to base rates
and regression from the mean, convert probabilities into frequencies, and
so on.23 But we should notice that the use of these ameliorative methods
entails our first getting an adequate grasp of the norms of good reasoning
(deductive, inductive, and abductive), and then being made aware of the
ways we are prone to violate these standards. Only by acquiring such
knowledge can humans, whether experts or laypeople, learn to avoid these
mistakes, at least at times. This fact suggests a more modest position on
how to interpret the empirical evidence on reasoning. Depending on the
issue at hand, it is indeed often wise to consult the experts. Knowledge of
our fallibility in reasoning gives us a sustained reason to do so. But there
is a danger of oversimplification here. The nature, the importance, and the
scope of the issue at hand all affect the amount and type of thinking one
should do oneself. It is not possible to rely on experts for every issue and
on every occasion, so we all must do some thinking. But more to the point
22 See Bishop and Trout 2005, chap. 2, for discussion on some disconcerting evidence on
the reliability of clinical decisions and on the problem of when to defect from an established
procedure. The latter is important, as we are prone to defect too easily, that is, to overem
phasize the value of some clues.
23 See, e.g., Nisbett and Ross 1980, chap. 12; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982, chap.
30; Cosmides and Tooby 1996; and Bishop and Trout 2005, chap. 9.
© 2012 The Author

for our purposes here, the problems of our cognitive strategies ide
in the empirical literature apply, mutatis mutandis, to followin
advice: if we are not aware of the ways we tend to go wrong, w
believe the expert who was the most memorable (which is not a
sign of veridicality or representativeness), acknowledge and re
only that expert reasoning which is consistent with our existing b
so on. Therefore, one has to be able to recognize situations and
which it is reasonable to trust the experts and do so in a reas
manner. But all this requires Critical Thinking as typically conc
So, we have to recognize that people do want to, and sometimes s
think things through for themselves. Whether there are unfortun
dencies in this can be debated, but we still have to face up to it. Ho
as I noted, Critical Thinking classes need not recommend that one i
the advice of medical doctors or experts in general. On the co
reflecting on the production of knowledge should help students to
there is more to being a medical doctor than being in possession
numbers of individual pieces of knowledge about the human ph
One certainly needs that, but one also needs a proper scientif
standing of the relevant processes and knowledge about how to app
knowledge in practice. This is something that very few individ
achieve without rigorous training. So, in order to think critically o
to rely on others first in any case. Credulity requires Critical Think
Critical Thinking requires Credulity.
Conclusion
I have argued that Critical Thinking is a necessary condition of Reason

able Credulity. I have also offered some further reasons why Critical
Thinking is important. Huemer does, however, qualify the conclusion he
draws from his cases in two ways, and it is appropriate to address these
qualifications before closing. First, he (2005, 531) argues that Critical
Thinking should only be applied if (a) something about the experts renders
them less able than ordinary people to implement the techniques of Criti
cal Thinking or (b) the experts have not generally tried to implement those
techniques. This seems to imply that one should not exercise Critical
Thinking unless one has first exercised Critical Thinking—namely, criti
cally examined the question who the relevant authorities are and whether
they are reliable on the given issue.24 But one cannot implement such a
strategy, so I recommend that one follow Reasonable Credulity, and the
entailed Critical Thinking, in guiding one's belief formation. Critical
thinkers should not easily dismiss the views of the experts but should be
24 For example, Condorcet's Jury Theorem is very vulnerable to problems in its auxiliary
assumptions. If the experts do not form their opinions independently of others, or hold
common mistaken assumptions, the reliability of the expert community drops drastically.
©2012 The Author

676 JUHO RITOLA
willing and able to do so if the situation so requires. In addition,

capability for Critical Thinking is unlikely to be developed out of thin
on the spot. Therefore, it is better to teach Critical Thinking.
Second, Huemer (2005, 529) notes that he is only proposing that
fessional philosophers ought not to advise laypeople to think criti
about certain kinds of issues. Based on the discussion in the present ar
I would argue that this recommendation is not suitably formula
Instead, when teaching Critical Thinking, professional philosoph
should give students tools for epistemically justified rational belief fo
tion, teach how to apply these tools in practice, and note that the reli
ity of such processes can be improved with training and further stud
should also add that experts are likely to have worked on their ability
reason in their own subject matter. So teaching Critical Thinking is m
vated partly by the aim of students to become more reliable in recogn
situations in which they are epistemically better off believing the wo
others. Huemer is making an important point, and some discussion of
complexity might well be included in Critical Thinking classes. The te
ing of Critical Thinking should encourage neither inflated views
one's own resources and capabilities as a reasoner, a kind of epist
hubris, if you will, nor deflated views about existing bodies of cri
thought and hard-earned knowledge. It is just that I believe nothing o
sort is included in Critical Thinking.
University of Turku
Department of Philosophy
20014 Turku
Finland
juho. ritola@utu.fi
Acknowledgments
This article was written while I was working on a Finnish Academy
project for postdoctoral studies entitled "Argument and Inference," no.
114902.1 am indebted to Harvey Siegel, Timo Kajamies, and the members
of the Turku Moral Science Club, especially Juha Raikka, Helena Siipi,
and Erik Lagerspetz, for helpful discussion and comments. I also thank an
anonymous Metaphilosophy referee for questions that I think led to an
improvement of my view.
References
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©2012 The Author


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CRITICAL THINKING IS EPISTEMICALLY RESPONSIBLE

Author(s): JUHO RITOLA

CRITICAL THINKING IS EPISTEMICALLY RESPONSIBLE

Keywords: critical thinking, epistemic responsibility, appeal to authority, inform

Michael Huemer (2005) argues that following the reasoning strategy

©2012 The Author

and evaluating argumentation and forming opinions based on thes

© 2012 The Author

panied by some Critical Thinking by the agent himself or herself.3 I will

The Case Against Critical Thinking

© 2012 The Author

accept the consensus view. You should do so because if you apply C

©2012 The Author

disregard the recommendation of Critical Thinking that we should

The Case for Critical Thinking

I will argue that in order to follow the strategy of Credulity i

Critical Thinking in Reasonable Credulity

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©2012 The Author

thus seems to require Critical Thinking as typically conceived by teacher

©2012 The Author

©2012 The Author

a layperson should just accept the conclusion, why bother to provide

Critical Thinking and Agent Centeredness

Huemer raises an interesting question about the agent-centered epistemic

© 2012 The Author

©2012 The Author

between epistemic unequals the layperson should not believe th

©2012 The Author

sources of justification, and we justifiedly believe that some reasoners a

© 2012 The Author

©2012 The Author

policy is offered for public consideration and vote. If Critical Thinkin

©2012 The Author

fact that these inferential problems seem to endure despite rigorous

18 Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, prominent researchers in the Heuristics an

© 2012 The Author

© 2012 The Author

I have argued that Critical Thinking is a necessary condition of Reason

©2012 The Author

willing and able to do so if the situation so requires. In addition,

Adler,.Jonathan. 2010. "Epistemological Problems of Testimony." In The

© 2012 The Author

©2012 The Author

Stevenson, Leslie. 1993. "Why B

©2012 The Author

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