Sprachphilosophie

Philosophy of Language
La philosophic du langage
Bin Internationales Handbuch zeitgenossischer Forschung
An International Handbook of Contemporary Research
Manuel international des recherches contemporaines

Herausgegeben von / Edited by / Edite par

Marcelo Dascal • Dietfried Gerhardus
Kuno Lorenz • Georg Meggle
1. Halbband / Volume 1 / Tome 1

Sonderdmck / Offprint / Tire a part

Walter de Gruyter • Berlin • New York

1992
17. Bhartrhari (ca. 450-510)
17. Bhartrhari (ca. 450-510)
1. Introduction
2. Summary of the Vakyapadiya
2.1. The Brahmakdnda
2.2. The Vdkyakdnda
2.3. The Padakdnda
3. Assessment of Bhartrhari's contribution to
philosophy of language
4. Selected references
1. Introduction
1.1. Bhartrhari's predecessors
The history of the famous Paninian tradition
of Sanskrit grammar begins with three lumi-
naries, i. e. Panini (ca. 400 B. C.), Katyayana
(ca. 250 B.C.) and Patanjali (ca. 150 B.C.).
Panini, the founder of the school, composed
the well known Sanskrit grammar named As-
tddhydyi. Katyayana wrote brief comments
on the Astddhyayi called Vdrttikas. Finally,
Patanjali composed a massive commentary on
Panini's Astddhyayi and on Katyayana's
Varttikas. This commentary is known as the
Mahabhasya. Panini's work provides us rules
for the derivation of Sanskrit sentences and
takes care of the domains of syntax, mor-
phology and phonology. It uses meanings as
the starting point for derivation and as con-
ditioning factors in many rules. However, this
great grammar does not provide us any direct
access to Panini's philosophy of language.
Generally, it can be said that Panini was not
interested in having philosophical issues be-
come part of a grammatical work. However,
Katyayana and Patanjali bring up significant
issues concerning the philosophy of language
and discuss them alongside the issues of der-
ivational procedures. Essentially, in the works
of these two grammarians, we see the begin-
ning of two distinct but related analytical
traditions, namely the tradition of deriva-
tional grammar (sabdaprakriya) and the tra-
dition of dealing with meaning (arthaprak-
riya). There are philosophical issues which
concern both of these traditions, but in these
early works, philosophical issues are not
clearly separated from other concerns (s.
art. 5).
1.2. Bhartrhari and his works
It is in the work of Bhartrhari that we see a
full development of the philosophical issues
within the tradition of grammar. After Patan-
jali, Bhartrhari is the next most prominent
269
name in the tradition of Sanskrit grammar.
While there are still debates concerning his
date, it now seems fairly certain that he must
be placed about 450-510 A.D. (Iyer 1969,
2). He was known as a historical person of
great fame to the Chinese traveler I-ching,
and was apparently used as a source by the
Buddhist logician Dignaga (ca. 480 — 540).
Bhartrhari's teacher was Vasurata (ca. 430 —
490) who was evidently a student of the well
known Buddhist grammarian and philoso-
pher Candragomin. We also know of a poet
Bhartrhari who composed the famous Sa-
takas [one hundred verses] each on the topics
of nlti [worldly ways of behavior], srngara
[love] and vairagya [renunciation]. It cannot
yet be conclusively decided whether the poet
Bhartrhari was the same as the grammarian-
philosopher. While some scholars attribute
the authorship of the poem Bhattikdvya to
Bhartrhari, this is not generally accepted.
Bhartrhari's extant works on grammar are as
follows:
(1) Mahabhasyatikd (-dipikd?)
(2) Vakyapadiya (kdrikd), Kandas I, II and
III. This work is also called TrikdndT.
(3) Vrtti on Vakyapadiya I and II
A fourth work, Sabdadhdtusamiksd, is known
from references in other works, but is not
available today. The first work is a commen-
tary on Patanjali's Mahabhasya. In its origi-
nal form, it must have been a voluminous
work, but we now have only a fragment of
this commentary available in a single manu-
script. It covers only the first 53 rules of
Panini's Astddhyayi. Kaiyata (llth century)
relied upon this work of Bhartrhari in writing
his own commentary on the Mahabhasya
called the Pradlpa. The surviving fragment of
Bhartrhari's commentary, now available in
several editions, shows great erudition on the
part of its author and helps us reconstruct
the state of grammatical exegesis about 500
A. D. Though philosophical issues are raised
while discussing the text of the Mahabhasya,
this commentary is not an exclusively philo-
sophical text. The main contribution to phi-
losophy of grammar and philosophy of lan-
guage is found in the Vakyapadiya and its
commentary Vrtti (found only on the first
two chapters). The first chapter or >kanda< is
called 'brahmakanda' or 'agamakanda'. The
second >kanda< is called 'vakyakanda', and
270
the third is called 'padakanda', 'prakirna' or
'prakirnaka'. Often the first two chapters
were traditionally considered to constitute the
Vakyapadiya (= VP), and the third chapter
was considered to be a separate work. How-
ever, there is some evidence (i. e. VP II, 488)
to show that the third chapter is an integral
part of the Vakyapadiya. While the text differs
slightly according to different published edi-
tions, according to the critical edition of the
verse portion of the Vakyapadiya published
by Wilhelm Rau in 1977, the first and the
second chapters have 183 and 490 verses,
respectively. The third chapter, which is di-
vided into 14 sections, has 1325 verses. All
references to the verses of the VP in this
article refer to Rau's critical edition. Among
all the scholars who have worked on the Vak-
yapadiya, K. A. Subramania Iyer made the
most voluminous contributions by editing all
the different chapters with various commen-
taries and translating the whole text with
notes. His book (Iyer 1969), though some-
what dated, remains the single most compre-
hensive study of Bhartrhari's contribution to
the philosophy of language. Madeleine Biar-
deau (1964) and Gaurinath Sastri (1959) are
also important general works discussing
Bhartrhari's linguistic philosophy.
1.3. Commentaries on Bhartrhari's
Vakyapadiya
There are several commentaries on the Vak-
yapadiya, the oldest of which is called Vrtti,
Vivarana or Tika. This commentary, in its
available form, .covers only the first two chap-
ters with some significant gaps. Although it
is traditionally ascribed to Bhartrhari himself,
some manuscripts give the name of the author
as Harivrsabha. There is a commentary called
Paddhati by Vrsabhadeva on the >karikas<
and >vrtti< of the first chapter. Another com-
mentary on the second chapter is traditionally
ascribed to Punyaraja. Some scholars have
argued that this commentary is most proba-
bly a shortened version of a commentary by
Helaraja, who also composed the commen-
tary Prakasa on the third chapter. Of these
commentaries, the Vrtti is traditionally con-
sidered as being not a commentary on the
Vakyapadiya, but an integral part of the Vak-
yapadiya. However, modern scholars have
raised doubts concerning the authorship of
the Vrtti (for discussion, see Iyer 1969, 16ff).
There are several modern Sanskrit commen-
taries of which the most noteworthy is the
commentary Ambakartri by Raghunatha
II. Personen
Sarma. It covers the entire Vakyapadiya.
While the date of Punyaraja is uncertain, He-
laraja belonged to the earlier part of the elev-
enth century A. D. The date of the commen-
tator Vrsabhadeva is still not certain though
he is most probably pre-Kumarila. Besides
these, there is a commentary called Vakya-
padiyaprameyasangraha by an unknown au-
thor covering the second chapter of the Vak-
yapadiya. This is really an abridgement of the
commentary usually ascribed to Punyaraja.
1.4. The historical context
In the history of Sanskrit grammar, the po-
sition of Bhartrhari is unique. There is a long
hiatus in our knowledge about the history of
the Sanskrit grammatical tradition between
Patanjali and Bhartrhari which can be filled
only with bits and pieces of information. We
are informed by Bhartrhari (VP II, 481 -487,
or by his student to whom this portion is
ascribed by some) that an earlier work on the
philosophy of grammar was Vyadi's San-
graha. After this massive work fell into disuse,
Patanjali composed his Mahabhasya which to
some extent performed the same function as
the Sangraha did in explaining the theoretical
stance of the grammarians. However, the Ma-
habhasya turned out to be an unfathomable
text and only a few accomplished scholars
were able to understand the depth behind its
apparent simplicity. Also there were other
philosophers, interested in just plain hairsplit-
ting, such as Baiji, Saubhava and Haryaksa,
who vehemently attacked the Mahabhasya.
As a result of this situation, Patanjali's dis-
ciples lost the tradition of the Mahabhasya
and the knowledge of the background of
grammar, which came to be preserved only
in written form in South India. The proper
appreciation of the Mahabhasya was recov-
ered from these southern sources by Bhar-
trhari's grand-teacher Candracarya (= Can-
dragomin) who made the >agama< or the the-
oretical background knowledge of grammar
a subject of intellectual activity. Many details
about how exactly the Mahabhasya was trans-
mitted and revived are hotly debated by schol-
ars, but the general outline is quite clear.
Bhartrhari therefore represents not a contin-
uous tradition going back to Patanjali, but a
revival. Along with his teachers, Bhartrhari
attempted to make sense of the theories of
Patanjali. The contemporary philosophical
traditions were used to develop further in-
sights into linguistic theories. While he defi-
nitely represents the Brahmanical tradition,
17. Bhartrhari (ca. 450-510)
in all probability he was in close contact with
the Buddhist tradition. Bhartrhari's date
comes very close to a time when the Buddhist
schools of the Vijnanavada and Madhya-
maka were flourishing, and the Brahmanical
thinkers were involved in developing their
theories by taking into account the arguments
of their philosophical adversaries. The Gram-
marians also took into account the philo-
sophical ideas concerning language developed
by other Brahmanical schools such as the
Mlmamsa and the Vaisesika schools (s. art.
5). Bhartrhari also seems to have been in close
contact with Brahmanical schools professing
monistic idealism of some kind. Bhartrhari's
thought as expressed in the Vdkyapadiya un-
mistakably represents a kind of linguistic mo-
nism, a philosophy in which a language-prin-
ciple stands ultimately as the source of the
entire material existence. In the process of
such intense interactions, new ideas were
grafted on the old and speculation concerning
the role of language in every aspect was de-
veloped with full vitality. While the scope of
Bhartrhari's work is truly encyclopedic, we
shall briefly consider some of Bhartrhari's
major contributions.
2. Summary of the Vdkyapadiya
2.1. The Brahmakanda
2.1.1. The doctrine of language-reality:
Sabdabrahman
The first >kanda< begins with an assertion that
the ultimate reality, Brahman, is the imperish-
able principle of language, without beginning
and end, and the evolution of the entire world
occurs from this language-reality in the form
of its meaning (VP I, 1). Though this lan-
guage-reality is ultimately only one and in-
divisible, through its manifold powers it
seems as if it is differentiated (VP I, 2).
Through these powers, this single language-
reality becomes the seed for all multiplicity
and exists in the form of the experiencer, the
experienced and the experience (VP I, 4). The
Veda is the means of attaining the true state
of this language-reality, and while it is one, it
is handed down in many traditions (VP I, 5).
In order to propagate the knowledge of the
Veda, the learned sages created the traditions
of remembered lore (smrti). Grammar is the
foremost of the ancillary sciences dealing with
the Veda, closest to that language-reality. It
is the direct path to the attainment of the
highest blissful essence of the manifested lin-
271
guistic diversity. Language is the vehicle of
all human activity and the knowledge of lan-
guage cannot come about without grammar.
Thus grammar is a gateway to salvation, a
treatment for the defilements of language,
and the leading branch of knowledge.
Through the science of grammar as some-
thing including among other things a lan-
guage-based spirituality, one can attain to the
state of the highest language-reality (VP I,
11-22).
2.1.2. Issues concerning language
Bhartrhari (VP II, 24-26) enumerates eight
major topics discussed in his work: (1) Mean-
ings which are isolated through analysis, (2)
meanings which are in their natural pre-anal-
ysis state, (3) expressions which need to be
explained, i. e. the data, the subject matter of
grammar, (4) expressions which are instru-
mental in derivation, which help in gram-
matical process, (5) cause-effect relation be-
tween expressions and meanings, (6) their fit-
ness to express certain meanings, (7) their
ability to produce merit, and (8) their ability
to express meaning. Bhartrhari discusses (VP
I, 27 — 43) the importance of the tradition and
the necessity of relying on the inherited
knowledge in deciding non-mundane matters
such as acquisition of spiritual merit. The
tradition of grammar is also part of this tra-
ditional wisdom and the issues of correctness
(sadhutva) and incorrectness (asadhutva) are
decided by referring to this hoary tradition.
2.1.3. Sphota [real word] versus dhvani
[physical sound]
From VP I, 44 onwards, Bhartrhari begins
the technical discussion on the nature of lan-
guage. Here we have the discussion of the
sphota doctrine for which Bhartrhari is par-
ticularly well known (s. art. 43). The real word
(sphota) is to be distinguished from >nada< or
>dhvani< [physical sound]. We are told how
the real word which has no parts and se-
quence is revealed by the physical sounds.
Properties such as duration, speed and se-
quentiality apply only to the manifesting
physical sounds and not to the manifested
real word, which is conceived by the speaker
and perceived by the listener as a single unit.
By evaluating the properties of dhvani and
sphota discussed by Bhartrhari, one can con-
clude that, in modern terminology, 'sphota'
amounts to something like >schema< or >type<
instantiated by the dhvani tokens. The tokens
are uttered in order to reveal sphota or the
272
type. This token-type or dhvani-sphota rela-
tionship may be considered at the level of
individual sounds, words and sentences.
2.1.4. Grammar
as a spiritual path to salvation
Ultimately, the language-principle is related
to and identical with the ultimate reality,
Brahman. The possession of this language-
principle distinguishes the animate from the
inanimate. There cannot be any cognition
without being formulated in language. The
language-principle resides within us and is
identical with Brahman, the ultimate reality.
Bhartrhari's effort to elevate grammar to the
status of not only a philosophical system but
a spiritual path toward salvation is an elab-
oration of ideas scattered in Patanjali's work.
Thus the first chapter briefly describes the
purposes of studying grammar as a philo-
sophical and a spiritual system, the nature of
language and grammar in general terms, the
general issues of semantics, and the impor-
tance of relying on the tradition for true
knowledge.
2.2. The Vdkyakdnda
2.2.1. Different conceptions of sentence
(vdkya)
These different views are as follows: A sen-
tence is defined variously by philosophers as
(1) a verbal form (qualified by the meanings
of other sentence constituents), (2) a (con-
nected) collection of words, (3) the universal
property residing in a collection of words, (4)
one undivided expression, (5) a sequence of
words, (6) a unification in mind, (7) the first
word (in which the meanings of the following
words are anticipated), and (8) all words ex-
pectant of other words. Some of these views
are based on a belief in the indivisibility (akh-
andapaksa) of a sentence, while others are
based on the notion of its divisibility (khan-
dapaksa). Among those views which hold a
sentence to be divisible, some are based on
the notion that the constituents of a sentence
first express their individual meanings and
these individual meanings then get intercon-
nected (abhihitanvayavada). Other views are
based on the notion that the constituents of
a sentence express interrelated meanings
which are simply connected to each other to
form the meaning of a sentence (anvitabhidha
navada). These views may be briefly ex-
plained as follows:
II. Personen
View 1: A sentence primarily consists of a
verbal form, which constitutes the nexus of
the sentence. A verb form conveys its mean-
ing, i.e. an action, as related to other con-
stituents of the sentence expressing the par-
ticipants in that action (karakas) etc. (see VP
II, 327).
View 2: A sentence is a collection (sahghata)
of words. Words convey their individual
meanings which are then interrelated (abhi-
hitanvayavada). In this view, a sentence has
divisible constituents (padas) right from the
outset which convey the same meaning in
isolation as in a sentence (see VP II, 41 —46).
View 3: A sentence is not merely a particular
collection of words, an individual instance of
language, but a universal that characterizes
many identical speech-instances. While an in-
dividual speech-instance is a divisible collec-
tion of words, the universal pertaining to such
speech-instances is indivisible (see VP II, 7 —
16 and VP II, 56).
View 4: This view is similar to View 3 in that
it holds a sentence to be an indivisible entity.
However, in this view, a sentence is not a
universal shared by identical-sounding
speech-instances. A sentence is an indivisible
particular instance. It is a particular, which
has no constituents at the level of communi-
cation. It is viewed as being divisible on the
level of analysis (see VP II, 56).
View 5: A sentence is not a mere collection
of words but a particular sequence of words
(krama). This view gives particular consider-
ation to the sequential production and per-
ception of a sentence (see VP II, 49 — 53).
View 6: A real sentence is not a collection of
words or their sequence, or some universal.
A sentence consists in mentally gathering into
one group sequentially perceived or cognized
entities. It is a conceptual construction in
which the listener pulls together everything
he hears in sequence. The speaker also has a
similar conceptual unit which has no sequen-
tiality of its own. The sequence comes in only
during the transmission (see VP II, 30 — 33).
View 7: The first word of a sentence is the
focal constituent (adyam padam). The focal
word is considered as conveying not only its
own lexical meaning, but also its potential
relationships to other words in a generic way.
The actual words which may follow this initial
word successively constrain the potentialities
expressed by the initial word. Thus the func-
17. Bhartrhari (ca. 450-510)
tion of the rest of the sentence is to restrict
the potentialities conveyed by the first word
to a particular situation. This view may be
considered to fall within the theory of >anvi-
tabhidhanavada< mentioned above (see VPII,
47 f).
View 8: A sentence is a collection of words
which have mutual expectancy. If these words
are taken separately, then their mutual expec-
tancy is not fulfilled and they would seem
incomplete utterances. However, in a sentence
the mutual expectancies of the constituent
words are properly fulfilled, and hence a co-
herent sentence-meaning is produced. This
view generally represents the theory of >abhi-
hitanvayavada< referred to earlier (see VP II,
47 f).
2.2.2. Definition of sentence in Mimamsa
and grammar
The verses VP II, 3 — 6 discuss the definition
of sentence offered by Mimamsa in compar-
ison with that offered by the grammarian
Katyayana. The Mlmamsasutra (II, i, 41) de-
fines a sentence as: "an utterance serving a
single purpose, such that its constituent
words, if separated from the sentence, remain
expectant of other words". The Mimamsa
definition thus relates to a sentence as an
expression communicating a single purpose
or a single complete idea, and does not stip-
ulate whether it may contain one or more
verbs etc.. Bhartrhari points out that this
notion of a sentence differs from the notion
developed by the grammarian Katyayana for
the purpose of explaining sentential accents
etc.. Katyayana defines a sentence as a group
of words centered around one and only one
finite verb. He considers the finite verb as the
nexus of a sentence with other words such as
the related indeclinables and words expressing
participants in the action expressed by the
verb. With such a restricted definition, Ka-
tyayana expects to be able to explain the
sentential accents (prescribed by rules such as
Panini 8, 1, 28). The Mimamsa definition of
a sentence represents a discourse unit larger
than that which a grammarian calls a sen-
tence. In order to enable the definition given
by Katyayana to cover a somewhat larger
corpus of sentences, Bhartrhari says that a
vocative word should be construed as being
a modifier of the verb and hence part of a
sentence (VP II, 5). However, in contrast to
Katyayana's ideas about a sentence, Bhar-
273
trhari also enunciates Panini's view that there
could be more than one finite verb in a single
sentence (VP II, 6; II, 445).
2.2.3. Indivisible sentence (sphota)
and its indivisible meaning
In verses VP II, 7 — 16, Bhartrhari elaborates
his idea that as a linguistic reality, as distinct
from an object of grammatical study, a sen-
tence in fact is an indivisible unit and so is
its meaning. He makes a distinction between
real undivided cognitions of sentences in ac-
tual communication and their deliberate sub-
sequent divisions by grammarians through
theoretical analysis. He compares this with a
cognition of a patch of variegated color. This
is an undivided partless cognition which can
be subsequently analysed into its seeming
components in terms of cognitions of differ-
ent colors and shapes (VP II, 7f). Similarly,
a sentence is in reality an undivided whole,
complete in itself. However, it can be subse-
quently interpreted in terms of seeming com-
ponents which are words with mutual expec-
tancy. These words are not the real compo-
nents of the original sentence, which has no
parts. Just as words are subsequently analysed
as having stems and affixes, so is a sentence
subsequently analysed as having component
words. But these components are not real.
Just as the word 'vrsabha' is not made up by
combining V with 'rsabha', similarly a sen-
tence is not made up by combining words.
Since there are no divisions in a sentence, the
meaning conveyed by a sentence has no di-
visions either. A person who does not know
the true nature of language considers divi-
sions of a sentence into its components
through subsequent theoretical analysis as be-
ing real (VP II, 9-14) (s. art. 63). Bhartrhari
criticizes the opinion of the Mimamsakas and
others that the components of a sentence first
convey their general lexical meanings which
are subsequently combined to form a partic-
ular sentence-meaning. If a word first conveys
a generic lexical meaning, how could it then
be pinned down to a particular context? If
somehow it is pinned down to a particular
instance, then we have to abandon the earlier
generic meaning. How can something once
accepted be abandoned? Since the sentence-
meaning does not directly stem from the
words, one could, to think in a reverse way,
possibly get a word-meaning without a word.
If such be the case, then the connection of a
linguistic expression with its meaning is com-
pletely lost (VP II, 15f). Bhartrhari himself
274
seems to clearly advocate the view of a sen-
tence being indivisible. However, such an in-
ternal undivided unit cannot be transmitted
without physical sounds which are of neces-
sity produced in sequence. Thus the sequence
belongs to the transmitting sounds, and not
to the conceived sentence. In the same way,
the uttered sentence is received through a
sequence of sounds, and yet finally perceived
as a single sentence. The undivided sentence
is initially perceived indistinctly. As more and
more sounds are perceived, the shape of the
sentence becomes more and more distinct un-
til at the end it is perceived distinctly (VP II,
19). A linguistic expression conceived as a
single indivisible unit is referred to by the
word 'sphota' by the commentators on the
Vakyapadiya. However, Shivram Dattatray
Joshi (1967, 35 ff) argues that Bhartrhari uses
the terms 'sphota' and 'sabda' in different
ways. According to Joshi, for Bhartrhari
>sabda< [word, linguistic expression] is a
meaning bearing unit, such as a sentence.
However, he uses the word 'sphota' in the
context of manifestation of eternal or generic
sounds through the employment of transitory
instances of physical sounds (dhvani). The
term 'sphota' is not used to refer to a neces-
sarily meaning-bearing unit. In terms of the
original statements of Bhartrhari, the notion
of indivisibility of a sentence refers to a sen-
tence as a meaning-bearing unit being indi-
visible, rather than a sentence as an uttered
expression being indivisible. The sphota
"stands for a single phoneme or sound-pat-
tern" manifested by physical sounds (dhvani),
and it "may or may not be meaning-bearing"
(Joshi 1967, 51). The commentators on the
Vakyapadiya, on the other hand, extend the
term 'sphota' to the level of the meaning-
bearing units such as sentences and then es-
sentially identify the notions of 'sabda' and
'sphota' as meaning a permanent mental-in-
tellectual expression. This view of Joshi is
rejected by Iyer (1969, 158ff) by showing
passages from the Mahabhasyadlpika and the
Vrtti on the Vakyapadiya where Bhartrhari
uses the word 'sphota' to gloss 'sabda' refer-
ring to a linguistic unit as a meaning-bearing
entity. Iyer (1969, 160) concludes in the fol-
lowing way:
"The identification of Patanjali's sabda with the
sphota is an accomplished fact in Bhartrhari. Ku-
marila (ca. 620—680) knew it and rejected it and
Mandana Misra (ca. 660 — 720) knew it and ac-
cepted it. There is no justification to look upon it
as a misinterpretation of Bhartrhari by later gram-
II. Personen
marians. [...] It does not make much sense to main-
tain that Bhartrhari believed in the sphota, but that,
for him, it is not the meaning-bearing unit, because
the sphota doctrine arose as a solution to the prob-
lem of the understanding of meaning. The problem
was how to explain the understanding of meaning
from sounds which are uttered in a temporal se-
quence. As they are not simultaneous and cannot
co-exist, they cannot co-operate in order to convey
the meaning. The doctrine of sphota is the gram-
marian's solution of the problem".
Following Joshi, we derive a sphota theory
under another name; probably it should be
termed the sabda theory of Bhartrhari. To
follow the tradition of the commentators and
most modern authors on the subject is to
derive a similar theory through a wide as-
sumption that 'sabda' and 'sphota' are in
certain contexts synonymous — a theory
more properly called the sphota theory (s. art.
43). From a strictly historical point of view,
Joshi's arguments are valuable to decide what
name we use for the so-called sphota theory.
However, the theory remains the most valu-
able contribution made by Bhartrhari. It may
be observed that in Patanjali's work the no-
tion of a >sanghata< [collection] as a meaning-
bearing unit appears, and he considers that
this >collection< is manifested by the physical
sounds and discerned by one's intellect. Bhar-
trhari saw the logical problems in such a
notion and advanced the notion of unity and
partlessness of the revealed sentence. Thus,
he most certainly advances the logic of the
sphota theory beyond Patanjali.
2.2.4. Sentence: A conceptual entity
While the conceived and the perceived sen-
tence has no sequence or parts in it as an
experience of language in operation, the sen-
tence is manifested and heard through the
medium of sequential physical sounds. This
sequence leaves its imprint on the partless
cognition of a sentence and its meaning, and
hence the partless sentence and its meaning
appear as if they have parts (VP II, 22 — 27).
If one believes that a sentence is divisible into
words and words are divisible into their con-
stituents, then the sounds themselves would
have to be broken down into their parts, like
atoms. Since such parts (and their parts)
would not form any cohesion, there could not
be any wholes such as sounds and words, and
finally we would not be able to point to
anything as being a meaning-bearing unit (VP
II, 28 f). Thus it is advisable to accept a sen-
tence as representing a single linguistic unit
which is not an external physical entity, but
17. Bhartrhari (ca. 450-510)
an internal conceptual entity (antah-sabda-
tattvam, VP II, 30). This indivisible internal
linguistic unit is manifested through physical
sounds. Similarly, the meaning of this internal
linguistic unit is manifested through the di-
visions of meanings. The linguistic unit as the
manifester of meaning and the meaning as
the manifested notion are both internal and
are in reality two aspects of the same internal
entity (VP II, 31 f).
2.2.5. Sentence-meaning is not divisible
Bhartrhari criticizes what we view as primar-
ily the Mfmamsa doctrine that even in com-
munication there are constituent words in a
sentence and that they each have their indi-
vidual meanings. If, on the basis of common-
sense understanding, one were to claim that
there are such constituent words and their
individual meanings, then these individual
meanings would have to be abandoned after
an integrated sentence-meaning is produced,
and hence the individual words would become
purposeless (VP II, 34). In the expression
'asvakarna' which refers to a kind of tree, the
meaning is understood without first compre-
hending the meaning of the components
'asva' [horse] and 'karna' [ear]. Thus, we do
not need to think of this word as having parts.
Similarly, a sentence conveys its meaning as
a single idea, and there is no need to imagine
any constituent words (VP II, 36). When the
so-called constituents of an expression convey
a meaning totally unrelated to the meaning
of a whole compound, even the grammarians
consider these as indivisible conventional ex-
pressions (VP II, 37). The division of a sen-
tence into its constituent words and the di-
vision of a word into its constituent mor-
phemes is only a useful fiction, and there is
no invariant rule governing the nature of
these useful fictions (VP II, 38).
2.2.6. Padavada versus Vakyavada
Some philosophers, the Vakyavadins, con-
sider a sentence to be a primary unit and
believe that words are analytically derived
from sentences. Others, the Padavadins, argue
that words are more primary and that sen-
tences are built by combining these words
(VP II, 57). Bhartrhari presents a detailed
controversy between these two views (s. art.
63). The Vakyavadin argues that just as
sounds in a word are meaningless, so are
words in a sentence. The sentence as a whole
is the only meaningful unit. The Padavadin
argues that the sentence-meaning is under-
275
stood only when all the words come together.
Similarly, the meaning of a word is under-
stood only when all the constituent sounds
come together (VP II, 60f). If the sentence
as a whole is a single entity communicating a
single meaning, then, argues the Padavadin,
how shall we deal with sentences like 'one
should sacrifice with rice'? In case one cannot
obtain rice, one can normally use some other
substitute. However, if a sentence does not
have any constituent words, then how would
it be possible to deal with such a substitute?
(VP II, 64 — 71). When one hears a sentence
and does not understand a particular word,
he asks 'what does this word mean?' That
shows that there must be words in a sentence
(VP II, 72). The Padavadin argues that the
existence of words in a sentence must be ac-
cepted, so that all the conflict-resolving pro-
cedures in Vedic interpretation may become
workable. If sentences are undivided whole
entities, then most of these procedures will
become meaningless, since one will not be
able to show conflicts between, say, the mean-
ing of a particular sentence and the meaning
of a particular word in that sentence (VP II,
73 — 83). Similarly, most exegetical techniques
will be meaningless if words are meaningless
(VP II, 84-87). The Vakyavadin replies that
all these procedures will work, even if the
sentence-meaning is indivisible, because after
the initial indivisible cognition, one can ana-
lytically isolate the constituent-meanings (VP
II, 88 ff). Since the so-called constituent
words of a sentence do undergo euphonic
changes in a sentence, their original shape is
destroyed and it is often impossible to point
exactly to the boundary between two words.
If the words cannot even be separated from
each other, how can their separate meaning
be established? (VP II, 95). Therefore, it is
prudent to accept a sentence as an indivisible
entity.
2.2.7. A linguistic unit
and its relation to its meaning
Bhartrhari argues that through repeated prac-
tice a linguistic unit (sabda = word or sen-
tence) leads to an instantaneous cognition
(pratibha) of its meaning, not only for formal
communicators, but for children and animals
as well (VP II, 117). This repeated usage of
language is the same as the convention which
has no beginning in time and is inherited from
prior lives.
276
2.2.8. Nature of word-meaning (sabddrtha)
Bhartrhari argues that the primary meaning
of all words is of the form 'x exists'. Such is
the case with words like 'merit', 'divinity' and
'heaven', as well as with words like 'cow' (VP
II, 119). In the actual usage of words, when
we comprehend the specific configuration
(akara) of such entities, that configuration is
not conveyed by the words themselves, but is
understood from a person's repeated obser-
vation of the contextual usage of language
(VP II, 120). Some meanings, such as univer-
sals (jati), are directly comprehended from
specific words. In those cases, the particular
objects (vyakti) which share in that universal
are understood, not from the word itself, but
through associative thinking (VP II, 122).
Similarly, a word such as 'pot' does not con-
vey the specific shape (akara) of the object.
The specific features are understood through
associative thinking. Like the Naiyayikas,
Bhartrhari seems to have made a distinction
between shape or configuration (akara, akrti)
and a universal (jati). The Mimamsakas on
the other hand use the terms 'akrti' and 'jati'
to refer to a single notion of a universal.
Bhartrhari refers to various different views
on word-meaning (s. art. 5). These views dif-
fer on the question of how much of the final
cognition came directly from the word and
how much came from subsequent associative
cognitions (anusanga, nantariyaka) etc. The
argument takes into account the fact that
when we understand some meaning, other
factors which in our daily experience are in-
variably associated with it are also under-
stood through subsequent thinking (VP II,
121 —126). Another factor which creates dif-
ferences concerning the notion of meaning is
whether meaning refers to items of external
reality (bahyavastu) or only to our concep-
tions (buddhivisaya) (VP II, 132f). Bhar-
trhari also points out that the meaning is not
understood by different listeners in an iden-
tical shape. Each person understands the
meaning in terms of the conceptions which
he has developed in his mind, and hence the
comprehension of meaning differs from per-
son to person (VP II, 134f). Even the same
person may interpret the same word differ-
ently on different occasions, and in different
contexts and conditions (VP II, 136f).
These are some of the major topics dis-
cussed in the second chapter of the Vakya-
padlya.
II. Personen
2.3. The Padakanda
The third chapter of the Vakyapadlya is the
most massive of the three, as it contains 1325
verses divided into 14 sections. It deals with
the meanings of individual words obtained
through analysis. It discusses notions ex-
pressed by verbs, nouns, particles and various
inflectional morphemes. Bhartrhari himself
says (VP II, 488) that in the third chapter he
will discuss in detail topics which have been
only briefly mentioned in the earlier two
chapters. The titles of the sections are suffi-
cient to indicate the variety and the richness
of Bhartrhari's coverage of various topics:
(1) Jatisamuddesa [On the notion of univer-
sal]
(2) Dravyasamuddesa [On the notion of sub-
stance]
(3) Sambandhasamuddesa [On the notion of
relation]
(4) Bhuyodravyasamuddesa [Again on the
notion of substance]
(5) Gunasamuddesa [On the notion of qual-
ity]
(6) Diksamuddesa [On the notion of direc-
tion]
(7) Sddhanasamuddesa [On the notion of a
participant producing an action]
(8) Kriyasamuddesa [On the notion of ac-
tion]
(9) Kalasamuddesa [On the notion of time
(and tense)]
(10) Purusasamuddesa [On the notion of
grammatical person]
(11) Samkhyasamuddesa [On the notion of
number]
(12) Upagrahasamuddesa [On the distinction
between active and middle affixes]
(13) Lingasamuddesa [On the notion of gen-
der]
(14) Vrttisamuddesa [On the complex for-
mations (such as compounds, secondary
nouns etc.)]
Of these fourteen sections, some are very
small in size, but some like the section on
complex formations and on participants pro-
ducing an action etc. are very large. While
most of these topics have been discussed by
Patanjali in his Mahabhasya in one context
or another, these discussions are scattered
throughout his work. To Bhartrhari goes the
credit of organizing these discussions in a
systematic fashion and presenting them in the
form of a continuous discussion. Bhartrhari
also brings in arguments from other systems
such as Mlmamsa to sharpen these concepts.
17. Bhartrhari (ca. 450-510)
3. Assessment
of Bhartrhari's contribution
to philosophy of language
3.1. We know from the tradition that a work
called Sangraha by Vyadi was the first known
massive work devoted to general issues such
as the eternal or non-eternal nature of lan-
guage, and whether a word denoted a uni-
versal or a particular. However, this work
which existed before Patanjali's time was soon
lost. Among available texts, Bhartrhari's Vak-
yapadiya is the very first devoted to a system-
atic investigation of issues relating to lan-
guage. While many such discussions are scat-
tered in the works of Katyayana, Patanjali,
Jaimini etc., Bhartrhari deals with them in a
systematic fashion. While he explains hun-
dreds of different theories, there are some
theories for which he is particularly well
known. Among these, we must include his
notion of Brahman, the ultimate reality, as a
language-principle, the evolution of the ma-
terial world from the Brahman being likened
to the manifestation of meanings by words.
While this notion existed in a rudimentary
form before Bhartrhari, he presents it in a
decisive shape. The second significant contri-
bution of Bhartrhari is the notion of sphota,
>real word<, being without parts and sequence,
and yet being manifested by sounds which
appear in a particular sequence. A related
notion is that of a sentence being indivisible
and its meaning also being indivisible. If the
sentence-meaning is indivisible, then it is cer-
tainly not understood as a sequence of the
constituent word-meanings. Bhartrhari's no-
tion is that the sentence-meaning is under-
stood in a flash of understanding (pratibha).
While granting this unitary character of a
sentence, its meaning etc., Bhartrhari also ad-
mits that subsequent analysis allows us to
isolate components of sentences and words,
as well as those of sentence-meanings and
word-meanings. Such an analytical under-
standing is valued for theoretical purposes,
but one is warned that in the actual linguistic
communication in the real world, such ana-
lysed entities do not occur.
3.2. Bhartrhari's doctrines earned him fame
in a very short time, as his work is cited by
his near-contemporary adversaries like the
Buddhist Dignaga and the Jaina Mallavadin
(around 500 A. D.). The impact of his doc-
trines is felt throughout the later history of
277
the philosophy of language in India. While
the Paninian tradition continued to uphold
most of his theories, most of the other schools
rejected his ideas as being too radical. Thus
the idea of the ultimate reality (Brahman)
being a language-principle did not fit well
with most of the later philosophical schools.
Similarly, the doctrine of sphota was upheld
by the later grammarians, but was generally
rejected by the Mimamsakas, Vedantins and
the Nyaya-Vaisesikas. The ideas that a sen-
tence is an indivisible entity and that the
sentence-meaning is also an indivisible entity
were generally rejected by most later schools,
because these schools were not truly con-
cerned with the notion of communication of
meanings They were more concerned with
either the interpretation of Vedic texts for
which no speaker or author was admitted, or
in relating the structure of a sentence to the
structure of the world in terms of a realist
ontology. The indivisibility of a sentence and
its meaning was counter-productive for such
purposes. Bhartrhari's notion that all cogni-
tion is permeated with language and that
there can be no cognition without the involve-
ment of language is not accepted by most
other schools. In an interesting way, Bhar-
trhari's theories show a greater understanding
of the psychology of communication than the
theories of other schools such as Mimamsa
which indicate a restricted approach to lan-
guage guided primarily by the necessity of
interpreting Vedic texts or by the perceived
necessity of matching the structure of lan-
guage and the structure of the world. Bhar-
trhari's position emphasizes the fact that lin-
guistic communication relates more to the
level of conceptual structures than to the
structure of the world out there. While he is
not eager to question the very existence of
external reality, as were many schools of Bud-
dhism, he was also not particularly eager to
defend a certain brand of realist ontology. As
a true philosopher of language, he frees him-
self from this dilemma by arguing that lan-
guage deals only with a world of conceptual
structures, quite irres-pective of whether or
not there is a world out there. A word can
lead to the cognition of meaning even if the
object referred to by the word may not exist
in the world out there, and hence the meaning
of a word is essentially a notional entity
(bauddhartha), with no necessary connection
to any external reality (bahyartha). For a
grammarian-philosopher such as Bhartrhari,
there is no ontological commitment.
278
4. Selected references
Bhartrhari 1977, Vakyapadlya.
Biardeau 1964, Theorie de la connaissance et phi-
losophic de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique.
Coward 1980, The Sphota Theory of Language: A
Philosophical Analysis.
Iyer 1969, Bhartrhari, A Study of the Vakyapadlya
in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries.
18. Jayanta (ca. 840-900)
1. Historical setting
2. Main theses
3. Selected references
1. Historical setting
About Jayanta Bhatta's personal history we
know very little. His son, Abhinanda, wrote
the Kadambarlkathdsdra, in which he men-
tioned that his ancestors came from Gauda
(Bengal) to Kasmir. They settled in a village
which came to be known as Gauramulaka.
In Jayanta's Nyayamanjari, a monumental
work on the Nyaya system of philosophy a
large part of which was devoted to the dis-
cussion of philosophy of language, this village
was mentioned by name while Jayanta was
elaborating one example. Jayanta's great-
grandfather was a minister of King Lalitadi-
tya (flourished around 750) of Kasmir. Jay-
anta himself worked apparently under King
Sankaravarman (865 — 902).
It used to be believed that the great work
Nyayamanjari (1934) was written by Jayanta
while he was, for some unexplained reason,
imprisoned by the King. Such a speculation
sprang from an oblique comment made by
Jayanta when he began writing the second
part of his book. He said in the introductory
verse of this part that he had been writing
this work in order to avoid the boredom of
loneliness, for the king had forced him to live
in what was called a 'soundless den' (gahvara).
Cakradhara who wrote a short commentary
(perhaps the earliest one) on Nyayamanjarl,
explained the verse, however, in a different
manner. He said that the King probably sent
him to an arid and largely uninhabited coun-
try called 'Khasa — it could have been an
exile or he could have been sent there as the
king's representative.
Jayanta was both a poet and a philosopher.
He wrote a play called Agamadambara. Be-
II. Personen
Joshi 1967, Sphotanirnaya of Kaundabhatta.
Rau 1977, Bhartrhari's Vakyapadlya.
Shastri 1959, The Philosophy of Word and Meaning.
Shastri 1980, A Study in the Dialectics of Sphota.
Madhav M. Deshpande, Ann Arbor,
Mich. (USA)
sides Nyayamanjari, he wrote another short
Nyaya treatise Nydyakalika. There has been
some controversy and confusion over the rel-
ative chronology of three Naiyayikas, Bhas-
arvajna (ca. 860 — 920), Jayanta, and Vacas-
pati Misra (ca. 900-980). Elsewhere I have
shown that this confusion can be cleared up
and that Jayanta was the oldest of these three
philosophers, and hence he was rightly re-
ferred to by Gangesa (flourished around
1300) as 'jarannaiyayika' (old Naiyayika)
(Matilal 1977).
2. Main theses
As far as philosophy of language is con-
cerned, Jayanta's main contribution lies in
two areas. He provided a very systematic and
elaborate critique of the sphotavada (s.
art. 43) of the Vaiyakaranas, i.e. the Gram-
marians. Besides, he discussed at length the
controversy between the sentence-holism on
the one hand and the Prabhakara theory of
>related designation of words< (anvitabhid-
hana-vada) versus the Bhatta theory of des-
ignation before (syntactic) relation< (abhihi-
tanvaya-vada) (s. art. 63).
Regarding the first, Jayanta asks an inter-
esting question in the beginning: what harm
does it do to the Nyaya system of philosophy,
if >language< is accepted as the eternal entity,
e.g. as sphota? The reply is that it goes against
the Nydya-sutra idea of >language< as the ut-
terance (or the >uttered instruction^ of the
reliable speaker. Jayanta then establishes that
our knowledge or memory-impression of the
(uttered) last letter (or sound) along with the
memory-imprint of all the previous letters
(uttered in sequence) beginning from the first
one will constitute a unity and give rise to a
unitary meaning either of a word or of a
sentence. And hence an additional entity like
word-sphota or sentence-sphota would not be