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Power and Civilisation

Norbert Elias
Published online: 30 Jul 2008.

To cite this article: Norbert Elias (2008) Power and Civilisation, Journal of Power, 1:2, 135-142,
DOI: 10.1080/17540290802309540

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 Journal of Power
Vol. 1, No. 2, August 2008, 135–142

Power and Civilisation

Norbert Elias

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Elias’s 1981 lecture contains a mature restatement of ideas that he first put forward in
The Civilizing Process more than four decades earlier, especially the connection he
traced between processes of habitus formation on the one hand and of state formation on
the other. But he also draws into his presentation ideas that he developed in his middle
years, notably the theory of knowledge and the sciences that he advanced in his book
Involvement and Detachment. For Elias, neither ‘civilisation’ nor ‘power’ are fixed
things or qualities. ‘Civilisation’ relates to ongoing historical processes in the course of
which people’s social habitus is gradually transformed in the direction of more habitual
and reliable self-restraint. ‘Power’ is always a relationship, a ratio between parties linked
together in all forms of social (including political) interdependence. The two are linked
through processes of state formation; the gradual monopolisation of the means of
violence by the state, exerting steady pressure upon people to live in peace with each
other. As violence and danger diminish in everyday life, individuals grow less fearful
and more rationally restrained in their social demeanour. Nevertheless, the potential for
violent confrontation still exists in international politics between internally pacified
states.

Power is in bad odour today. Many people believe it ought not to exist. Or, more precisely,
since the term ‘power’ is somewhat unclear, they believe that there ought to be no differences
of power. Civilisation, on the other hand, is in good odour. Its value is affirmed by many
people. Civilisation, they say, is a good thing.
I mention this because I would like to state at the outset that I do not concern myself
with valuations of that kind. I shall not talk about what ought to be. I concern myself with
the fact that differences of power exist, and with the fact that processes of civilisation exist.
I am concerned with explaining them, and with exploring the possible connection between
power relationships and processes of civilisation.
That is difficult; for it is no easy thing to regard power as a social fact without at the
same time being overcome by the feeling that it is something unpleasant. The reason, above
all, is that none of us wants to be in the power of anyone else. That would mean people
being at the mercy of other people. Others could order us about, could force us, even from
a great distance, to do what we have to. It is difficult to talk about power because power
brings with it danger for people. And where danger is concerned people find it difficult to
think calmly and without affect. Here we come up against a universal regularity. Although
it does not fall directly within my subject, I think I should explain it to you.

The escape from the maelstrom

Philosophers have accustomed us to thinking in a kind of empty space, to discussing a
matter independently of its situation, investigating knowledge independently of the situation

ISSN 1754-0291 print/ISSN 1754-0305 online

© 2008 Norbert Elias Foundation, Amsterdam
DOI: 10.1080/17540290802309540
http://www.informaworld.com
 136 N. Elias

in which it is obtained. As a sociologist, I cannot do that. I must also consider the situation
in which people find themselves.
So perhaps you will allow me briefly to illustrate the relationship of thought to the
situation in which it takes place – especially to a situation of danger – with a little parable.
I shall take as an example a story by Edgar Allan Poe which may be familiar to you (Poe
1908 [1841], pp. 263–279).1
It is the story of the fishermen in the maelstrom. It tells how three fishermen – three
brothers – were accidentally sucked into a maelstrom, how they were slowly engulfed by
the foam from the raging sea. The eldest brother fell overboard and vanished. The two
other fishermen sat in the boat as it drew closer to the vortex, the great vortex which in
some way represented the abyss. A lot of flotsam was being tossed around its rim. The
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fishermen were now dragged down into the vortex, and in this situation both were over-
come by panic and fear. But after a time, the younger of the brothers overcame the fear
and began to look around to see what was actually happening. Here was this huge whirl-
pool on the edge and walls of which flotsam, including their boat, was being whirled
around.
While he was observing all this as if he were a disinterested party – he was able for a
moment to detach himself from the danger – he gradually realised that certain regularities
could be made out. It became clear to him that large pieces of flotsam were drawn down
more quickly than small ones, long ones faster than round ones. And once he had recognised
this regularity he had an idea, a theory began to form. He saw two barrels intended for the
fish lying in the boat. He thought: ‘If I strap myself to such a barrel I may perhaps be pulled
down less quickly’. And that is what he did. He took some rope, lashed himself firmly to
the little barrel and advised his brother to do the same. But the latter was so paralysed by
fear that he could not think. When the younger man saw that it was hopeless to try to save
his brother he took the barrel and jumped overboard with it. He was whirled around in the
torrent and had to watch as the boat shot down and disappeared below, while he, when the
vortex slowly closed again after six hours, found himself floating on the surface of the sea
and was rescued by another fisherman.
The greater the dangers are, the less able are people to think in a manner adequate to the
reality of the situation, the more their thinking is charged with affect and the less they are
able to control the situation and the danger it holds. They are caught in a vicious circle.
Only if one can stand back, if one can detach oneself and comprehend the situation, can one
succeed in recognising the connections that can lead to safety.
Natural forces can be so overwhelmingly powerful that however much people might
detach themselves, however far they might stand back, they are unable to save themselves.
On the other hand, people who are unable to think or do anything for themselves may be
rescued by chance. In our time, therefore, we have to perceive the interplay of detachment
and involvement in relation to power.

Power is a relationship
I have now sketched some of the outlines of the problem I started from. Let me now say
a few words about the problem of power itself: Power, ladies and gentlemen, is under-
stood today in everyday speech as if it were something that one owns, that one could
put in one’s pocket, so to speak, like a coin or a piece of soap. But power is nothing of
the kind.
Power, ladies and gentlemen, is a relationship. We really need language which is
much more detached and differentiated to express the fact that power always consists in a
 Journal of Power 137

relationship of balance between control and dependence, and not only in extreme cases
when one side has total superiority.
I would like to illustrate the problem of power with a little example, that of lovers. Just
as two lovers are dependent on one another through their love, the one who loves less has
the greater power. Whoever is less dependent on others has more power in the interdepen-
dent relationship. That, in a word, is the secret of power. Power relationships are always
relationships of interdependence, if we leave aside extreme cases such as being overrun by
barbarians.

Civilisation is a process
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Allow me now to say something, too, about civilisation, without giving a definition of it.
Civilisation is not a thing; language misleads us into thinking that. It is a process. Humanity
has become civilised in the course of a long development. No one can say that we are
civilised. We may be more civilised than our ancestors, but if you asked me what it means
to be more civilised – you can read about this in my book2 – I would say today that the
simplest aspect of a process of civilisation is the formation of what we call conscience.
Conscience-formation means that we forgo using the full extent of our power, or even
just of our physical or military strength, to exploit or coerce others.
It is because we have a kind of conscience, which brings with it an identification with
all human beings, that we can call ourselves civilised. That, at any rate, is one of the char-
acteristics of the process of civilisation. That people identify to a greater degree with other
people, even those less powerful, is becoming clear especially in our time, when the more
powerful states are trying to help the weaker ones, at least up to a certain point.
We stand in the midst of a process of civilisation. The question – which we do not
always ask ourselves – is how it has come about that people who are more powerful, who
are physically stronger or have other means of exerting power, do not use them. How have
things reached a point where, in the societies in which we live, we can live almost entirely
without violence, at least as far as purely physical violence is concerned – leaving aside the
economic form? Or at least, we can live with much less violence than people of earlier
times.
Here, ladies and gentlemen, I must correct one aspect of general thinking which I come
across constantly. It is commonly pointed out that a great deal of violence still takes place
in our societies. You in Austria are said to be lucky enough to be without terrorism,
whereas in the German Federal Republic and many other countries there is still a great
deal of violence.3 I believe that this question is wrongly posed. We ought really to ask
ourselves how it has come about that we live so extraordinarily peacefully with one
another. We live at a time in which more people than ever before exist together in peace.
To see this, one needs only to step back, like the rescued fisherman in the maelstrom, and
distance oneself from the affect-charged and emotional viewpoint of violence. If one steps
back only a little and views the development of humanity, one will come to this conclu-
sion, even though, because of the emotionally charged nature of our thinking, it is out of
fashion. A future historian will know that the starting point is not the self-perception of
educated people today, but the state in which people roamed the world as nomads, almost
like wild animals, surrounded by dangers. That is the starting point of our history. If we
see that clearly, we become fully conscious of the riddle posed by our own communal life,
our civilised existence.
How have so many people managed to live so peacefully together? There was a time
when people, who belonged biologically to exactly the same species as we do, called
 138 N. Elias

Homo sapiens, wandered the world in small groups and bands, constantly in fear of being
assailed by a stronger group. They retreated into caves because caves may have offered a
certain protection. They used fire to protect themselves. How did these people experience
their world? Here, once again, the parable of the maelstrom comes to our help. If one
lives in a world which has a very high level of danger, one thinks with one’s affects,
one’s emotions. One is completely overwhelmed by the dangers to which one is exposed.
Thus, people in the early period of humanity, over many millennia, thought in the manner
that we today call magical–mythical. They thought with their feelings; they thought in
relation to themselves, for they lacked the possibility of detachment, of stepping back and
seeing how things are connected together. They asked themselves: ‘What do things mean
for us; are they good or bad for us?’ That is to say that the emotional, self-centred think-
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ing which was taken for granted as human thinking for thousands of years was the
primary thinking of human beings. They saw everything in direct relation to themselves.
They saw everything, as we say, animistically – as alive, as centred on themselves. Here
a basic figure of human society manifests itself. Because those people thought in a way
which, to the highest degree, was charged with affect and centred on themselves, they
could not master the dangers. And because they could not master the dangers, they
thought in an affect-charged, emotional way. They were, in a word, caught in a ‘double
bind’4 process.

Escaping the double bind

In this lecture, I cannot talk in detail about this basic figure of the human situation, a basic
figure in which people are so tightly enmeshed that they find themselves in a double bind.
I can only pass on to you the concept of the double bind process. It was enormously difficult
for people to extricate themselves from a situation in which they could not master dangers
because of the affectivity and the fantasy content of their thinking, and in which the great
dangers themselves caused the high level of fantasy and emotionality in thinking. In the end,
scientific thinking was the answer to this double bind. It was the way out of the process.
This poses a riddle, one of the unspoken, unanswered questions, namely, the question how
people were finally able to renounce mythical–magical thinking, and thus be better able to
master natural dangers. For three or four centuries, we have been able to push back natural
forces more and more. Of course, only relatively. Nature is always stronger, always more
powerful than human beings. The maelstrom story describes such a power relationship
between human being and nature. But we have been able slowly to overcome the dangers
with the help of more reality-adequate thinking. This was a breakthrough, a release from the
double binds I have just spoken about. A breakthrough that was difficult and painfully slow.
But the corresponding breakthrough, in the sphere of the dangers which arise in the relations
of human beings to one another, has not yet been made. We find ourselves today in the very
curious situation of being able to overcome mythical–magical thinking in relation to the
dangers of natural events, but not in relation to the danger represented by human beings for
other human beings. There, we are still caught in the trap. We are still at the mercy of the
more powerful, and our thinking itself is still charged with affect, not in the mythical–magical
way but still in a very emotional way.

Subduing individual violence

Let us return to our starting point: our ancestors (threatened by natural forces and other
human beings) perceived the world as a society like their own. They confronted everything
 Journal of Power 139

with their self-centred thinking. The process of pacification in which human beings
succeeded in achieving a greater degree of peacefulness, at least within their society, was
connected to the formation of states.
State-formation is a social invention which has made possible at least a relative pacifi-
cation of violence. I call it an ‘invention’, although we now usually restrict that concept to
the technical sphere. But there are also social inventions, even if not made by an individual
‘inventor’. I use the term only to emphasise that something which we regard as self-evident,
the fact that we live in states yet have no clear idea of the function of states, calls for reflection.
Our knowledge now reveals to us the point in the development of humanity at which the
organisational form of the state first emerged.
Curiously (or actually not curiously at all) the development of state-formation was very
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closely bound up with another invention, which is also much talked about. It is the technical
invention of script, of writing. We know that both came into being in about the fourth
millennium BC in southern Mesopotamia, in Sumer. According to our current knowledge,
the Sumerian city-states were the first societies which developed the form of the state and
made use of script.
What does that mean? Special arrangements, special institutions were created which had
to safeguard internal peace and at the same time protect the society against external
enemies. There were special institutions, that we call kings, which took upon themselves the
monopoly of physical force – to use an expression of Max Weber’s (1978 [1920], p. 54).
That is to say that they were able to prevent the physically stronger members of their society
from using their strength to coerce others. They alone reserved the right to force all others
by physical violence to be peaceful. Here, therefore, within the states, the first steps were
taken towards human pacification, on which everything called economic and cultural
development is really based.

The state and the birth of conscience

We find that the first stages of conscience-formation are very closely bound up with state-
formation. Admittedly, this does not apply everywhere. But we know that the first traces
of the forming of a conscience are manifested in the question whether one has done right
or wrong, whether one has exploited the poorer and weaker. This happened for the first
time – at least according to our current knowledge – in ancient Egypt. An American
Egyptologist has written a book on the birth of conscience.5 Exactly like reason –
assumed by philosophers, of course, to be innate in all human beings – conscience was
formed only in the course of humanity’s development. Here, we find the emergence of
good and evil in conjunction with the power-monopoly of the pharaoh. The pharaoh used
his power to compel even his most powerful citizens, the great ones of his realm, not to
exploit the poorer ones. He did this in his own interest. Those in power usually act in
their own interest. But whatever the interests may have been, the holder of power here
introduced the law which made it the duty of the judges of his country not to exploit the
poorest and weakest, because he needed them to build pyramids. In the tomb inscriptions,
we find the first indications that a human being stood before the gods and weighed his
heart in the balance. His heart is asked: ‘Have you done right or wrong?’ He asks his
heart not to betray him, so that he is not sent to the grim underworld. Here we find the
beginnings of what may be called a process of civilisation: people restraining themselves
not only out of fear of stronger people, but out of fear of their own conscience. This inter-
nalisation of outer compulsions is one of the central and basic figures of the process of
civilisation.
 140 N. Elias

The Janus face of the monopoly of force

I have pointed to two processes which mark the beginning of the development of civilisation.
Human beings are pacified by state-formation and by the internalisation of a conscience. I
have shown that state and civilisation are bound up with one another extremely closely. It
also emerges, however, that the movement of civilisation is restricted. Allow me to jump
from the past to the present and to consider the latter for a moment as a stage on the path of
the process of civilisation.
It is the case today that we have created within our states relatively highly pacified or,
if you will, civilised spaces in which a monopoly of physical force exists. That is to say that
state governments lay claim to the sole exercise of violence. The use of force against one’s
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neighbour is prevented by the state organisation of force, by the police and the military. It
can already be seen from the institutional character of the monopoly of force how difficult
it is to imagine that pacification could have taken place through a progressive renunciation
of violence on the individual level. For this reason, I have called the creation of those
organisations a social invention. It is difficult for human beings not to make use of physical
differences. Only through the special organisation of police and military is it possible to
create pacified spaces in which 5, 60 or 400 million people can live with one another with
a relative absence of violence.
However, I would like to say clearly that the social invention of the monopoly of force,
like all human inventions, cuts both ways. I am sure this question has already posed itself
for you. All human inventions are Janus-faced, can be used for good or ill, for example,
nuclear energy for weapons and for peaceful purposes. It was the same with fire, which could
be used just as well for cooking raw meat as for burning down one’s neighbours’ huts. In
just the same way, the state is Janus-faced. It places extraordinary power in the hands of the
rulers, gives them authority over the monopoly of physical force. Undoubtedly, people over
the millennia have used the monopoly of force for their own purposes, to exploit others for
their own benefit. The question arises why, from the start, state-formation led via the stage
of absolute monarchies. How do we explain that kings and priests stand at the beginning of
the development of culture? Because the use of the monopoly of power by the god-like king
yielded a surplus from the exploitation of all strata of the population, a surplus that was avail-
able for the creation of cultural assets. The cultural assets of ancient Egypt that we admire
today came into being through force. Moreover, this cultural development benefited prima-
rily the upper stratum. I would mention, by the way, that this view of history is somewhat
different to the Marxist one. Economic development itself was made possible only by the
monopolisation of force, the pacification of people. State-formation is the precondition for
economic commodity exchange. Of course, even in ancient Mesopotamia it was the richest
people who made profits in and through war. Yet the primary problem of humanity was to
create the pacified spaces which made possible the construction of an economy and the
development of culture.

In the double bind

We have in our society very large spaces – civilised spaces, if you like – which are distin-
guished by self-constraint, by external constraint converted into self-constraint, by a
compulsion to hold back, to exercise self-control, to develop reason and conscience. But
we have no common monopoly of force between the individual societies, the states. As far
as the relationships of states are concerned, we are still living in the situation of our ances-
tors. There is no one to hold back the strong, so that we must be constantly on guard
against attack. It is true that a certain moderation exists, as the pacified spaces within the
 Journal of Power 141

individual societies radiate outwards on to the relationships between states, but non-violent
conduct at this level is far from having been achieved. This contrast has structural causes,
since the solution lies in the creation of a monopoly of force which is stronger than the
strongest state. The question that arises from this situation is a utopian one. Let me return
in this context to the double bind process. If there is no central monopoly of force, the
powers are subjected to very specific constraints. And it is constraints that really concern
the sociologist.
I have already said that I am not concerned here with what ought to be, but only with
analysing what is. One would seriously misunderstand the relationship of Russia to America
today if one believed that the opposition between them was based solely on the difference
between capitalism and communism. That does play a part. Certainly, we find ourselves
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today, if you like, in an age of wars of social beliefs, in which professions of faith in capitalism
or communism motivate and divide human beings. The question of physical military strength
also plays a decisive part. But all that is not enough to explain the relations between the Soviet
Union and the United States. Both are prisoners of the double bind. Each step that strengthens
America is felt by Russia as a threat and vice versa. It is this double bind that causes the
arms race. Yet this situation between states is nothing new. Carthage and Rome found them-
selves in a similar one; it was the same with the Assyrians and the Egyptians in the ancient
world, and the same with conflicts between the Assyrians and Babylonians within Mesopot-
amia. As always in history, two deadly rivals stand opposed at the top of a hierarchy of states.
We are inclined to judge emotionally, to blame and criticise one or the other. Sociologically,
however, one has to consider the situation of compulsion in which people find themselves.
The problem is how we can release ourselves from the two-way trap, the double bind process.
Let me conclude by mentioning a few possibilities that will show you how difficult this
is, and what problems are actually lurking here.
One speaks quite rightly of a balance of power. That is indeed entirely correct. This
balance is precisely the double bind. And that situation is not confined to America and
Russia. If you consider the whole pyramid of states formed by humanity, you see that the
states are ordered according to the magnitude of their sources of power. Within this hierar-
chy there is constant movement. The power positions shift. The difficulty is that each
movement also affects the balance of power between America and Russia. If, for example,
the relationship between Egypt and Libya changes, that also affects the relationship between
the great powers. Naturally, I am simplifying. I do not forget China. We are really living in
a tri-polar world. But I do not want to delve into these complicated matters here. I would
just indicate a few aids to recognising the pattern of thought that seeks the guilty parties
among individuals and people and distinguishes between good and evil. I should like to help
in enabling this pattern of thought to be discarded in favour of a thinking based on
structures. For the pyramid of states now dividing the world is a structure which is interde-
pendent and in which each change affects the equilibrium of the whole.

Three scenarios or: ‘Tu felix austria…’

I have elaborated in jest, if you like, some scenarios which illustrate the possibilities of
escaping the double bind situation.
First scenario: One of the two hegemonic powers is so undermined by internal struggles
and civil wars that the other exploits this weakness to extend its hegemony over three-quarters
of the world. The balance would be abolished and capitalist or communist governments
would be installed everywhere. Unification of the world under a central monopoly would
be brought about – a world state under the leadership of one of the two hegemonic powers.
 142 N. Elias

Another possibility – and it is a utopian possibility – would be that an agreement was

reached, that the United Nations had at its disposal police and military power which far
surpassed the strength of each individual state. It is agreed that the troops of the United
Nations will be commanded in a two-year rota by each member of the Security Council.
You can see at once the impossibility of this scenario.
Why is it impossible? Because if the Americans were in command, the Russians would
not trust them not to use the mighty power of the UN troops to extend their hegemony over
the whole world. And it would be exactly the same in the opposite case. In other words, the
situation of the double bind has not been eliminated. The confidence that the other side will
obey the rules is lacking. The question arises whether this confidence can ever be established.
In conclusion, let me consider the third scenario. War actually breaks out. But the war
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is confined to Russia and America. The hegemonic powers mutually unleash their bombs
on the territory of their opponent and destroy each other. That is, of course – if I may say
so very quietly here – a wishful dream, an unfulfillable dream. But I cannot avoid thinking
how splendid that would be. Then we as onlookers would remain neutral, and the old saying
you all know might again apply to Austria: ‘Bella gerunt alii, tu felix austria nube’.6 Of
course, there’s no need to get married straight away, but at all events, war should be fought
by others. Let us hope that that will be the case.

Notes
1. Elias uses the same story in his much more elaborate essay, ‘The Fishermen in the Maelstrom’
(Elias 2006, pp. 105–178). – SM
2. Elias 2000 (On the Process of Civilisation, Collected Works, vol. 3). – SM
3. Elias was speaking at a time when the Red Army Faction or Baader–Meinhof Gang was still
active in Germany. See his essay ‘Thoughts on the Federal Republic’ (Elias 1996, pp. 403–433).
– SM
4. Elias adopted this term from Gregory Bateson (1972). For a fuller discussion, see Elias’s essay
‘The Fishermen in the Maelstrom’ (Elias 2007, pp. 105–178). – SM
5. James Henry Breasted (1933). – SM
6. ‘Let others wage war; you, happy Austria, marry’. This hexameter, attributed to Matthias
Corvinus, King of Hungary (1458–1490), was inspired by a series of Habsburg dynastic
marriages between 1477 and 1496. – SM

Notes on contributor
Norbert Elias (1897–1990) was born in Breslau, where he read medicine and philosophy and gained
his doctorate. He pursued further studies in sociology in Heidelberg and Frankfurt, but went into exile
in 1933, spending more than 40 years in Britain, eventually teaching at the University of Leicester
and as Professor at the University of Ghana. Only towards the end of his long life was he recognised
as one of the most profound sociological thinkers of the twentieth century, and he served as visiting
professor in several major universities. By the time of his death, his publications amounted to 14
books and more than hundred essays.

References
Breasted, J.H., 1933. The dawn of conscience. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Elias, N., 1996. The Germans: Power struggles and the development of habitus in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, vol. 11 of Collected works of Norbert Elias. Cambridge: Polity.
Poe, E.A., 1908 [1841]. A descent into the maelström. In Tales of mystery and imagination. London:
J.M. Dent.
Weber, M., 1978 [1920]. Economy and society. Berkeley: University of California Press.