CASE ON DOCTRINES ON TORTS AND CRIMES the traffic light turned red.
the traffic light turned red. He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right behind it. The two
1.PEOPLE V LIGON
G.R. No. 74041 July 29, 1987
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO LIGON y TRIAS and FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused,
FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused-appellant.
YAP, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XX, rendered on February 17,
1986, convicting the accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat, of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales y Ortiz, a ,Seventeen-year old working student who was
earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of Es cigarette box containing cigarettes worth
P300.00 more or less.1
Only Fernando Gabat was arrested and brought to trial and convicted. The other accused, Rogelio Ligon, was never
apprehended and is still at large.
The fatal incident happened on a Sunday, October 23, 1983 at about 6:10 p.m. The accused, Fernando Gabat, was
riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father, Antonio Gabat, and driven by the other accused, Rogelio
Ligon. The Kombi was coming from Espana Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. Fernando Gabat was
seated beside the driver, in the front seat by the window on the right side of the Kombi. At the intersection of
Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, the Kombi
had to stop as the traffic light was red. While waiting for the traffic light to change, Fernando Gabat beckoned a
cigarette vendor, Jose Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales for short) to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales approached the
Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed to
green, and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. As to what precisely happened between
Gabat and Rosales at the crucial moment, and immediately thereafter, is the subject of conflicting versions by the
prosecution and the defense. It is not controverted, however, that as the Kombi continued to speed towards
Quiapo, Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement.
Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple
physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October 30, 1983.
Following close behind the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Prudencio Castillo. He was
behind the Kombi, at a distance of about three meters, travelling on the same lane in a slightly oblique position ("a
little bit to the right").2 As the Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of the
underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver stop. When
they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons in it. He
sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao."3 The two men in the jeep joined
the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when
men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew
their guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi. It was
found out that there was a third person inside the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear
seat.4The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. Fernan
Payuan. The taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also went along with them. The written statements of Castillo and
Rodolfo Primicias were taken by the traffic investigator, Pfc. Fernan Payuan.5 Payuan also prepared a Traffic
Accident Report, dated October 23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released early morning the
following day, but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation.
Investigating Fiscal Alfredo Cantos, filed an information in court against Rogelio Ligon dated December 6, 1983
charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.7 Six months later, however, or on June 28, 1984, Assistant
Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide.8 He
filed the latter information on the basis of a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo 9 and a joint affidavit of
Armando Espino and Romeo Castil, cigarette vendors, who allegedly witnessed the incident on October 23,
1983.10These affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17, 1984.
On October 31, 1983, an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Dr. Orlando V. Salvador, who stated in his autopsy report that the cause of death of Rosales was
"pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral, secondary to traumatic injuries of the head."11
The prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, that Gabat
grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand from the window of the Kombi,
resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement. In its decision, the trial court summarized the
testimony of Castillo as follows: At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of October 23, 1983, Castillo was then driving
his taxicab along Lerma Street near Far Eastern University, and at the intersection of Lerma and Quezon Boulevard,
the traffic light changed from green to red. The vehicular traffic stopped and Prudencio Castillo's taxi was right
behind a Volkswagen Kombi. While waiting for the traffic light to change to green, Castillo Idly watched the
Volkswagen Kombi and saw Gabat, the passenger sitting beside the driver, signal to a cigarette vendor. The
cigarette vendor, Rosales, approached the right side of the Kombi. While Rosales was handing the cigarettes to
Gabat, the traffic light suddenly changed to green. When the Kombi moved forward, Gabat suddenly grabbed the
cigarette box held by Rosales. Taken aback, Jose Rosales ran beside the Kombi and was able to hold on to the
windowsill of the right front door with his right hand. While Rosales was clinging to the windowsill, with both feet
off the ground, the Kombi continued to speed towards the C.M. Recto underpass. Castillo, who was closely
following the Kombi, then saw Gabat forcibly remove the hand of Rosales from the windowsill and the latter fell
face down on Quezon Boulevard near the Recto underpass.12
The version of the defense, on the other hand, was summarized by the court as follows: On the date and time in
question, Fernando Gabat, 31 years old, an underwriter, was on board the Volkswagen Kombi driven by Rogelio
Ligon. The Kombi had to stop at the intersection of Lerma Street and Quezon Boulevard when the traffic light
turned red. Fernando Gabat, who wanted to buy cigarettes, called a cigarette vendor who approached the right
side of the Kombi. Gabat bought two sticks of cigarettes and handed to the cigarette vendor, Rosales, a P5.00 bill.
In order to change the P5.00 big, Rosales placed his cigarette box containing assorted cigarettes on the windowsill
of the front door of the Kombi between the arm of Gabat and the window frame. Suddenly, the traffic light
changed from red to green and Rogelio Ligon moved the vehicle forward, heedless of the transaction between
Gabat and the cigarette vendor. As the vehicle sped onward, the cigarette box which was squeezed between the
right arm of Gabat and the window frame fell inside the Kombi. Rosales then ran beside the vehicle and clung to
the windowsill of the moving vehicle. Gabat testified that when he saw the cigarette vendor clinging on the side of
the front door, he told Ligon to veer to the right in order that Rosales could get off at the sidewalk. However,
Gabat declared, that Ligon said that it could not be done because of the moving vehicular traffic. Then, while the
vehicle slowed down and Ligon was maneuvering to the right in an attempt to go toward the sidewalk, Rosales lost
his grip on the window frame and fell to the pavement of Quezon Boulevard. Gabat allegedly shouted at Ligon to
stop but Ligon replied that they should go on to Las Pinas and report the incident to the parents of Gabat, and later
they would come back to the scene of the incident. However, while the Kombi was speeding along Dewey
Boulevard, it was blocked by the taxi of Prudencio Castillo and a jeep driven by policemen. Gabat and Ligon were
brought to police headquarters, but neither of them executed any written statement.13
The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat
forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because, otherwise, there could be no reason for the latter
to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window. The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly
removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not
have fallen down, having already been able to balance himself on the stepboard.
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed
the cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he was trying to get from his
pocket the change for the 5-peso bill of Gabat. The court said that it is of common knowledge that cigarette
vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their cigarette box; no vendor lets go of his precious box of
cigarettes in order to change a peso bin given by a customer.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great respect and are not disturbed on appeal, unless it
is shows that the findings are not supported by the evidence, or the court failed to consider certain material facts
and circumstances in its evaluation of the evidence. In the case at bar, a careful review of the record shows that
certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would
alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the
accused to acquittal.
While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterested witness with no motive, according to the court a
quo, "other than to see that justice be done," his testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is not entirely free from
doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty or mistaken. The taxicab which Castillo was
driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at the
trial.14Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagen Kombi is on the
upper portion, occupying approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making it visually
difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated.
These are circumstances which must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what
exactly happened between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before the latter fell down.
As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi, following it at a distance of about three meters, Castillo's line of vision
was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His testimony that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box
from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a
reasonable doubt, specially considering that this occurrence happened in just a matter of seconds, and both
vehicles during that time were moving fast in the traffic.
We find it significant that in his statement given to the police that very evening, 15
Castillo did not mention that he
saw Gabat forcibly prying off the hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi, although the police report
prepared by the investigating officer, Pfc. Fermin M. Payuan, on the same date, stated that when the traffic signal
changed to green and the driver stepped on the gas, the cigarette box of the cigarette vendor (Rosales) was
grabbed by the passenger Gabat and "instantly the former clung to the door and was dragged at a distance while
at the same time the latter punched the vendor's arm until the same (sic) fell to the pavement," thus showing that
during the police investigation Castillo must have given a statement to the police which indicated that Gabat did
something to cause Rosales to fall from the Kombi.16 It was by way of a supplementary affidavit prepared by the
lawyer of the complainant and sworn to by Castillo before the Assistant City Fiscal on January 17, 1984 that this
vital detail was added. This supplementary affidavit was made the basis for filing another information charging
both Gabat and the driver with the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the accused
Fernando Gabat has been established beyond reasonable doubt. In our view, the quantum of proof necessary to
sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with homicide has not been met in this case. He is
therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt.
However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability.1avvphi1 While
the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.17 The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.18
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil
liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the
most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter
is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while
the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different
from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise
upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not
thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the
accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a
serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice a cause for disillusionment on the part
of the innumerable persons injured or wronged. 19
In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the
civil liability of Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court's evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and
defense witnesses at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, we find that a
preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused
damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done. Gabat's wilfull act of calling Rosales, the
cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to
the death of Rosales. Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward
while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the latter clung precariously to the moving
vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the driver's act of
speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim. These proven facts taken together are firm
bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code20 for the damage done to Rosales.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered acquitting the appellant Gabat for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
However, he is hereby held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault or negligence, and sentenced
to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz in the amount of P15.000.00 for the latter's death, P1,733.35 for
hospital and medical expenses, and P4,100.00 for funeral expenses. The alleged loss of income amounting to
P20,000.00, not being supported by sufficient evidence, is DENIED. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
2.rufo mauricio const. V IAC
G.R. No. 75357 November 27, 1987
RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION and/or RUFO MAURICIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PARAS, J :
Illustre Cabiliza was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the 5th Judicial Region, Branch II, Legaspi City with
homicide and damage to property through reckless imprudence, in an information which reads-
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1979, in the city of Legaspi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the driver of an Izusu dump truck, bearing Plate No.
WD-224 T Philippines "79, belonging to and owned by RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTIONS, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, operate and manage the said vehicle in a reckless and imprudent
manner without taking the necessary precaution to prevent and/or avoid accident to persons and/or damage to
property, and without regard to traffic rules and regulations, causing as a result of his carelessness and
imprudence the said vehicle that he was driving to sideswipe and hit a Colt Gallant with Plate No. AC -206 S
Pilipinas "79, driven and owned by the late JUDGE ARSENIO SOLIDUM, thereby inflicting injuries upon the said
Judge Arsenio Solidum which directly caused his untimely death, and further causing damage to the said Colt
Gallant in the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency to the damage and prejudice of
the late Judge Arsenio Solidum and/or his family, and likewise causing damage to the house owned by PABLO
NAVARRA, to the damage and prejudice of the said Pablo Navarro.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, pp. 74-75)
After arraignment and trial on the merits, Cabiliza was convicted of the crime charged in a Decision dated October
12, 1983, the dispositive portion of which reads —
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Illustre Cabiliza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide
and damage to property thru reckless imprudence and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of two (2) years and four (4) months, as minimum to six (6) years, as maximum of prision correccional to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Judge Arsenio G. Solidum, the sum of P115,723.05 as actual and compensatory damages,
Pl,447,200.00 for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased; P200,000.00 as moral damages; and P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 75)
The aforesaid judgment was promulgated on November 9, 1983. On November 11, 1983, Cabiliza filed a Notice of
Appeal. But he did not live to pursue his appeal as he died on January 5, 1984. A notice of death dated February 4,
1984 was filed by his counsel Atty. Eustaquio S. Beltran. In the same notice of death, Atty. Beltran manifested the
intention of Rufo Mauricio, as employer of Cabiliza to proceed with the case on appeal pursuant to his right as
employer who is subsidiarily liable.
On March 5, 1984, the lower court issued an Order requiring the heirs of Cabiliza to appear and to substitute him
as appellant with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
On motion of the heirs of the victim, the lower court in its order dated August 23, 1984 ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution and accordingly on the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a writ.
The writ of execution was however returned unsatisfied per Sheriff's return of service dated September 3, 1984,
because Cabiliza was found insolvent. A certificate of insolvency was issued by the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cagayan and by the Municipal Assessor of Claveria Cagayan where Cabiliza appears to be a permanent
resident.
On September 3, 1984, the victim's widow, Mrs. Aurora Solidum, filed a motion for the issuance of a subsidiary
writ of execution to be enforced against the employer of Cabiliza, Rufo Mauricio and/or Rufo Mauricio
Construction Co., which was granted by the court in its order dated September 6, 1984. A subsidiary writ of
execution was issued by the Clerk of Court also on September 6, 1984.
On September 12, 1984, Rufo Mauricio thru his counsel Atty. Beltran filed a motion to quash the subsidiary writ of
execution. Resolution of this motion was held in abeyance.
Meanwhile, Rufo Mauricio, as the employer of Cabiliza pursued the latter's appeal before the Intermediate
Appellate Court (AC-G.R. No. 01829). He interposed the following assignment of errors —
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND IMPRUDENT IN
TRYING TO OVERTAKE ANOTHER TRUCK WHEN THERE WAS AN ON COMING CAR FROM THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION;
IITHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION RESULTING IN
DEATH OF JUDGE ARSENIO SOLIDUM AND DAMAGE TO HIS CAR, WAS DUE TO THE LATTER'S GROSS NEGLIGENCE
AND IMPRUDENCE IN INVADING THE PROPER LANE OF THE ISUZU DUMP TRUCK OWNED BY RUFO MAURICIO
CONSTRUCTION;
IIITHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE TOTAL OF P 1,782,923.05 DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE COMPLAIN
ANTS;
IVTHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATION AGAINST THE ACCUSED UPON PROOF OF HIS
DEATH AND IN NOT RELEASING THE EMPLOYER RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTIONS AND/OR RUFO MAURICIO
FROM LIABILITY;
VTHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING APPELLANT RUFO MAURICIO AND/OR RUFO MAURICIO
CONSTRUCTION A DAY IN COURT TO RESIST THE DAMAGES BEING CLAIMED BY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM.
On April 8, 1986, the Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated its now assailed Decision, 1 the pertinent portion
of which reads —
We find that the proper amount of damages for loss of earnings based on Life expectancy of the deceased is
Pl,082,223.84. In this respect, the trial court's findings is modified. The Judgment appealed from is affirmed in all
other aspects.
WHEREFORE, with the afore-mentioned modifications, the appealed Judgment is AFFIRMED. (Rollo, p. 86)
Rufo Mauricio filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution of the
Intermediate Appellate Court dated July 18, 1986.
The said Decision and Resolution are the subject of the present petition. Petitioner contends that —
1. The dismissal of the criminal case against the accused employee wipes out not only the employee's primary civil
liability, but also his employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence, because:
a. The criminal case is based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code wherein criminal liability and the exemption
of criminal liability implies exemption from civil liability arising from crime.
b. The civil liability of the employer petitioner is based, if any, on quasi-delict, since the accused was exempted
from criminal liability.
2. Exemplary damages cannot be imposed upon an employer who at the time of the alleged incident was not
present nor inside the vehicle involved in the accident.
3. The petitioner employer cannot be condemned (to pay) an exhorbitant amount of damages to the tune of
P1,417,946.89, without giving him opportunity to cross examine the witness supporting such claim and affording
him opportunity to adduce evidence to resist the claim, because that would be deprivation of property without
due process of law, repugnant to the Freedom Constitution.
4. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court misapplied the facts contrary to the physical evidence and relied
on conjectures and surmises that depicted a different picture of the accident when the evidence shows that it was
the victim who was negligent at the time of the accident. (Rollo, pp. 18-19)
The first contention of petitioner that the death of the accused-employee wipes out not only the employee's
primary civil liability but also his employer's subsidiary liability is without merit. The death of the accused during
the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction (rendered against him by the lower court)
became final and executory extinguished his criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the imprisonment
imposed and his pecuniary liability for fines, but not his civil liability should the liability or obligation arise (not
from a crime, for here, no crime was committed, the accused not having been convicted by final judgment, and
therefore still regarded as innocent) but from a quasi-delict (See Arts. 2176 and 2177, Civil Code), as in this case.
The liability of the employer here would not be subsidiary but solidary with his driver (unless said employer can
prove there was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove due diligence in the selection and
supervision of his driver). (See 8th par. of Art. 2180, Art. 2194, Civil Code; also People vs. Navoa, 132 SCRA 412;
People vs. Tirol, 102 SCRA 558; People vs. Sandaydiego 82 SCRA 120).
Inasmuch as the employer (petitioner herein) was not a party in the criminal case, and to grant him his day in court
for the purpose of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses on their testimonies on the driver's alleged
negligence and the amount of damages to which the heirs of the victim are entitled, as well as to introduce any
evidence or witnesses he may care to present in his defense, the hearing on the motion to quash the subsidiary
writ of execution must be reopened precisely for the purpose adverted to hereinabove.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the appellate court is hereby SET ASIDE, and this case is
REMANDED to the trial court for the hearing adverted to in the next preceding paragraph.
SO ORDERED.
3.CHUA V CA G.RNO 150793
FRANCIS CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA C. HAO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner assails the Decision,1 dated June 14, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57070, affirming the
Order, dated October 5, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19. The RTC reversed the Order,
dated April 26, 1999, of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 22. Also challenged by herein
petitioner is the CA Resolution,2 dated November 20, 2001, denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On February 28, 1996, private respondent Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation, filed a
complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Manila charging Francis Chua and his wife, Elsa Chua, of four counts
of falsification of public documents pursuant to Article 1723 in relation to Article 1714 of the Revised Penal Code.
The charge reads:
That on or about May 13, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a private individual,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of falsification upon a public document, to wit:
the said accused prepared, certified, and falsified the Minutes of the Annual Stockholders meeting of the Board of
Directors of the Siena Realty Corporation, duly notarized before a Notary Public, Atty. Juanito G. Garcia and
entered in his Notarial Registry as Doc No. 109, Page 22, Book No. IV and Series of 1994, and therefore, a public
document, by making or causing it to appear in said Minutes of the Annual Stockholders Meeting that one LYDIA
HAO CHUA was present and has participated in said proceedings, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused
fully well knew that said Lydia C. Hao was never present during the Annual Stockholders Meeting held on April 30,
1994 and neither has participated in the proceedings thereof to the prejudice of public interest and in violation of
public faith and destruction of truth as therein proclaimed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Thereafter, the City Prosecutor filed the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 285721 6 for falsification of
public document, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 22, against Francis Chua but
dismissed the accusation against Elsa Chua.
Herein petitioner, Francis Chua, was arraigned and trial ensued thereafter.
During the trial in the MeTC, private prosecutors Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Atty. Ariel Bruno Rivera appeared as
private prosecutors and presented Hao as their first witness.
After Hao's testimony, Chua moved to exclude complainant's counsels as private prosecutors in the case on the
ground that Hao failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case.
In an Order, dated April 26, 1999, the MeTC granted Chua's motion and ordered the complainant's counsels to be
excluded from actively prosecuting Criminal Case No. 285721. Hao moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, Hao filed a petition for certiorari docketed as SCA No. 99-94846,7 entitled Lydia C. Hao, in her own behalf
and for the benefit of Siena Realty Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the Honorable Hipolito dela Vega, Presiding
Judge, Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19.
The RTC gave due course to the petition and on October 5, 1999, the RTC in an order reversed the MeTC Order.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent Court is ordered to allow the intervention of the private
prosecutors in behalf of petitioner Lydia C. Hao in the prosecution of the civil aspect of Crim. Case No. 285721,
before Br. 22 [MeTC], Manila, allowing Attys. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Ariel Bruno Rivera to actively participate in the
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.8
Chua moved for reconsideration which was denied.
Dissatisfied, Chua filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The petition alleged that the lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion in: (1) refusing to consider material facts; (2) allowing Siena Realty
Corporation to be impleaded as co-petitioner in SCA No. 99-94846 although it was not a party to the criminal
complaint in Criminal Case No. 285721; and (3) effectively amending the information against the accused in
violation of his constitutional rights.
On June 14, 2001, the appellate court promulgated its assailed Decision denying the petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED. The Order, dated
October 5, 1999 as well as the Order, dated December 3, 1999, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner had argued before the Court of Appeals that respondent had no authority whatsoever to bring a suit in
behalf of the Corporation since there was no Board Resolution authorizing her to file the suit.
For her part, respondent Hao claimed that the suit was brought under the concept of a derivative suit. Respondent
maintained that when the directors or trustees refused to file a suit even when there was a demand from
stockholders, a derivative suit was allowed.
The Court of Appeals held that the action was indeed a derivative suit, for it alleged that petitioner falsified
documents pertaining to projects of the corporation and made it appear that the petitioner was a stockholder and
a director of the corporation. According to the appellate court, the corporation was a necessary party to the
petition filed with the RTC and even if private respondent filed the criminal case, her act should not divest the
Corporation of its right to be a party and present its own claim for damages.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated November 20, 2001.
Hence, this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals committed reversible errors:
I. … IN RULING THAT LYDIA HAO'S FILING OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 285721 WAS IN THE NATURE OF A DERIVATIVE
SUIT
II. … IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF JUDGE DAGUNA THAT SIENA REALTY WAS A PROPER PETITIONER IN SCA NO.
[99-94846]
III. … IN UPHOLDING JUDGE DAGUNA'S DECISION ALLOWING LYDIA HAO'S COUNSEL TO CONTINUE AS PRIVATE
PROSECUTORS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 285721
IV. … IN [OMITTING] TO CONSIDER AND RULE UPON THE ISSUE THAT JUDGE DAGUNA ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION IN SCA NO. [99-94846] FOR BEING A SHAM PLEADING.10
The pertinent issues in this petition are the following: (1) Is the criminal complaint in the nature of a derivative suit?
(2) Is Siena Realty Corporation a proper petitioner in SCA No. 99-94846? and (3) Should private prosecutors be
allowed to actively participate in the trial of Criminal Case No. 285721.
On the first issue, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred when (1) it sustained the lower court in giving
due course to respondent's petition in SCA No. 99-94846 despite the fact that the Corporation was not the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 285721, and (2) when it ruled that Criminal Case No. 285721 was in the nature of
a derivative suit.
Petitioner avers that a derivative suit is by nature peculiar only to intra-corporate proceedings and cannot be made
part of a criminal action. He cites the case of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. v. Salas, 11 where the court said
that an appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal case cannot be treated as a derivative suit. Petitioner asserts that in
this case, the civil aspect of a criminal case cannot be treated as a derivative suit, considering that Siena Realty
Corporation was not the private complainant.
Petitioner misapprehends our ruling in Western Institute. In that case, we said:
Here, however, the case is not a derivative suit but is merely an appeal on the civil aspect of Criminal Cases Nos.
37097 and 37098 filed with the RTC of Iloilo for estafa and falsification of public document. Among the basic
requirements for a derivative suit to prosper is that the minority shareholder who is suing for and on behalf of the
corporation must allege in his complaint before the proper forum that he is suing on a derivative cause of action
on behalf of the corporation and all other shareholders similarly situated who wish to join. . . .This was not
complied with by the petitioners either in their complaint before the court a quo nor in the instant petition which,
in part, merely states that "this is a petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law to set aside a portion
of the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098" since the trial court's judgment of acquittal failed to
impose civil liability against the private respondents. By no amount of equity considerations, if at all deserved, can
a mere appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal case be treated as a derivative suit.12
Moreover, in Western Institute, we said that a mere appeal in the civil aspect cannot be treated as a derivative suit
because the appeal lacked the basic requirement that it must be alleged in the complaint that the shareholder is
suing on a derivative cause of action for and in behalf of the corporation and other shareholders who wish to join.
Under Section 3613 of the Corporation Code, read in relation to Section 23,14 where a corporation is an injured
party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of directors or trustees. 15 An individual stockholder is permitted to
institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation wherein he holds stocks in order to protect or vindicate
corporate rights, whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold the
control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the
corporation as the real party in interest.16
A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action. The corporation is a necessary
party to the suit. And the relief which is granted is a judgment against a third person in favor of the corporation.
Similarly, if a corporation has a defense to an action against it and is not asserting it, a stockholder may intervene
and defend on behalf of the corporation.17
Under the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.18 When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.19
In Criminal Case No. 285721, the complaint was instituted by respondent against petitioner for falsifying corporate
documents whose subject concerns corporate projects of Siena Realty Corporation. Clearly, Siena Realty
Corporation is an offended party. Hence, Siena Realty Corporation has a cause of action. And the civil case for the
corporate cause of action is deemed instituted in the criminal action.
However, the board of directors of the corporation in this case did not institute the action against petitioner.
Private respondent was the one who instituted the action. Private respondent asserts that she filed a derivative
suit in behalf of the corporation. This assertion is inaccurate. Not every suit filed in behalf of the corporation is a
derivative suit. For a derivative suit to prosper, it is required that the minority stockholder suing for and on behalf
of the corporation must allege in his complaint that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the
corporation and all other stockholders similarly situated who may wish to join him in the suit. 20 It is a condition
sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded as a party because not only is the corporation an indispensable
party, but it is also the present rule that it must be served with process. The judgment must be made binding upon
the corporation in order that the corporation may get the benefit of the suit and may not bring subsequent suit
against the same defendants for the same cause of action. In other words, the corporation must be joined as party
because it is its cause of action that is being litigated and because judgment must be a res adjudicata against it.21
In the criminal complaint filed by herein respondent, nowhere is it stated that she is filing the same in behalf and
for the benefit of the corporation. Thus, the criminal complaint including the civil aspect thereof could not be
deemed in the nature of a derivative suit.
We turn now to the second issue, is the corporation a proper party in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65
before the RTC? Note that the case was titled "Lydia C. Hao, in her own behalf and for the benefit of Siena Realty
Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the Honorable Hipolito dela Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila." Petitioner before us now claims that the corporation is not a private complainant in Criminal
Case No. 285721, and thus cannot be included as appellant in SCA No. 99-94846.
Petitioner invokes the case of Ciudad Real & Dev't. Corporation v. Court of Appeals.22 In Ciudad Real, it was ruled
that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the standing of Magdiwang Realty
Corporation as a party to the petition for certiorari, even though it was not a party-in-interest in the civil case
before the lower court.
In the present case, respondent claims that the complaint was filed by her not only in her personal capacity, but
likewise for the benefit of the corporation. Additionally, she avers that she has exhausted all remedies available to
her before she instituted the case, not only to claim damages for herself but also to recover the damages caused to
the company.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,23 when a trial court commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the person aggrieved can file a special civil action for certiorari. The aggrieved
parties in such a case are the State and the private offended party or complainant.24
In a string of cases, we consistently ruled that only a party-in-interest or those aggrieved may file certiorari cases. It
is settled that the offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s)
aggrieved" to file special civil action of prohibition and certiorari.25
In Ciudad Real, cited by petitioner, we held that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
sanctioned the standing of a corporation to join said petition for certiorari, despite the finality of the trial court's
denial of its Motion for Intervention and the subsequent Motion to Substitute and/or Join as Party/Plaintiff.
Note, however, that in Pastor, Jr. v. Court of Appeals26 we held that if aggrieved, even a non-party may institute a
petition for certiorari. In that case, petitioner was the holder in her own right of three mining claims and could file
a petition for certiorari, the fastest and most feasible remedy since she could not intervene in the probate of her does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no
father-in-law's estate.27 waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.32

In the instant case, we find that the recourse of the complainant to the respondent Court of Appeals was proper.
The petition was brought in her own name and in behalf of the Corporation. Although, the corporation was not a
complainant in the criminal action, the subject of the falsification was the corporation's project and the falsified
documents were corporate documents. Therefore, the corporation is a proper party in the petition for certiorari
because the proceedings in the criminal case directly and adversely affected the corporation.
We turn now to the third issue. Did the Court of Appeals and the lower court err in allowing private prosecutors to
actively participate in the trial of Criminal Case No. 285721?
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo,28 holding that where from the nature of the offense or where the
law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not
intervene in the prosecution of the offense.
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a
separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil
liability arising from the offense committed, and the private offended party has the right to intervene through the
private prosecutors.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision, dated June 14, 2001, and the Resolution, dated
November 20, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57070, affirming the Order, dated October 5, 1999,
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, are AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the private prosecutors are
hereby allowed to intervene in behalf of private respondent Lydia Hao in the prosecution of the civil aspect of
Criminal Case No. 285721 before Branch 22, of Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner's contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two
entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; III.CONCURRENCE OF CAUSES OF ACTION
and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or
directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is
punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to A. MEANING
another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to
repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done
intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty
imposed by law for the commission of the crime.29 The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the 1. FEBTC V. CA G.R.NO 108164
offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.30 G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995

Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS A. LUNA and
to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.31 Rule 111(a) of the CLARITA S. LUNA, respondents.
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
VITUG, J.:
action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."

Some time in October 1986, private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor
by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. Upon his request, the bank also
institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors
issued a supplemental card to private respondent Clarita S. Luna.
can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.

In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita
Petitioner avers, however, that respondent's testimony in the inferior court did not establish nor prove any
submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures and policy would
damages personally sustained by her as a result of petitioner's alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that
appear to be to meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled
since no personal damages were proven therein, then the participation of her counsel as private prosecutors, who
Card" in its master file.
were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis.

On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend, a Filipino-American, and another guest at
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the damages claimed and
the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his
the court should determine who are the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from the
FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit
crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or
Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13.
Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.
In a letter, dated 11 October 1988, private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the
payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a vice-president of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies to Luis. In his
letter, dated 03 November 1988, Festejo, in part, said:
In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost, FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action to avert its
unauthorized use (such as tagging the card as hotlisted), as it is always our intention to protect our cardholders.
An investigation of your case however, revealed that FAREASTCARD failed to inform you about its security policy.
Furthermore, an overzealous employee of the Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider the possibility that
it may have been you who was presenting the card at that time (for which reason, the unfortunate incident
occurred). 1
Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that private
respondents were "very valued clients" of FEBTC. William Anthony King, Food and Beverage Manager of the
Intercontinental Hotel, wrote back to say that the credibility of private respondent had never been "in question." A
copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo.
Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a complaint for damages with
the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.
On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to
pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00
attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this
petition for review.
There is merit in this appeal.
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or
with malice in the breach of the contract. 2 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that,
under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. (Emphasis supplied)
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence.3 Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral
damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed 4 ) of the
common carrier.5
Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation.
Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate
intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to
give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.6
We are not unaware of the previous rulings of this Court, such as in American Express International,
Inc., vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (167 SCRA 209) and Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court (206 SCRA 408), sanctioning the application of Article 21, in relation to Article 2217 and Article 2219 7 of the
Civil Code to a contractual breach similar to the case at bench. Article 21 states:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even if we are to
assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract, its application can be warranted only
when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of
misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a
general principle in human relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220
of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to
fraud or bad faith.
Mr. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in his ponencia in Fores vs. Miranda8 explained with great clarity the predominance
that we should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations; we quote:
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly
ruled (Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc., 101 Phil. 523; 54 Off. Gaz., [26], 6599; Necesito, et al. vs. Paras,
104 Phil., 75; 56 Off. Gaz., [23] 4023), that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a
breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide as
follows:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that,
under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or
deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art.
2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused contractual breach, but
because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a
"preexisitng contractual relations between the parties."
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a
passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that
entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased" (Necesito vs. Paras, 104 Phil. 84, Resolution on motion to
reconsider, September 11, 1958). But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where
the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was
guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per
se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is
no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral
damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as
required by Art. 2220, would be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial
legislation.
xxx xxx xxx
The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and
negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their
consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable
shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the
parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may
be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the mind of
the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. It is
true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice; but the fact must be shown in evidence,
and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through
negligence of the carrier's employees.
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a
contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort9 even where there is a
pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant (Phil. Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 143;
Singson vs. Bank of Phil. Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155). This doctrine,
unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission
complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict
can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract
between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the
parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private
respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act
or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent
actionable tort.
The Court finds, therefore, the award of moral damages made by the court a quo, affirmed by the appellate court,
to be inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.
Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an example or as correction for the public good
in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil Code; see Prudenciado vs.
Alliance Transport System, 148 SCRA 440; Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431). In criminal
offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code). In quasi-delicts, such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have
been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice (See Art. 2231, Civil Code; CLLC E.G. Gochangco
Workers Union vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 655; Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. CA, 176 SCRA 778). In contracts
and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code; PNB vs. Gen. Acceptance and
Finance Corp., 161 SCRA 449).
Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as arduous to sustain
the exemplary damages granted by the courts below (see De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 166).
Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private respondent
Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing
thusly:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him.
Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such recovery to be just and equitable (Art.
2208, Civil Code). We see no issue of sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing the award
thereof by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is given due course. The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting the award
of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents; in its stead, petitioner is ordered to pay private
respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages. In all other respects, the appealed
decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
2. SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC. V. TANGCO
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER PAJARILLO, petitioners,
vs.
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI
TANGCO and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer
Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the Decision1 dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated October 20, 2004 issued
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan
Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card.
Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence,
approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag
to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the
abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No.
0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said
criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19,
2000.3 On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision4 dated
July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint5 for damages
against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was
not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory
counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against
defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to pay the plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, the following:
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00), as actual damages
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity;
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorney's fees; and
6. costs of suit.
For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 8
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in
self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior
to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The
RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper
prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly;
that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to
proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that
while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly
of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to
attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes
not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the
guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are
faithfully complied with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard
Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No
pronouncement as to costs.9
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies
under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory
judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions
of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely
dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also
the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that
the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising
from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of
employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only
subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated October 20, 2004.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment of errors, to wit:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment
of damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding
petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of damages and other money
claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, hence, should be excused from any
liability.10
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard
should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based on culpa aquiliana under Article 217611 of
the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has established that
it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil
liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a separate civil action against
petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages arising from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of
Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code12 is subsidiary and the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not available to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of homicide, for which he had
already been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may
be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.13
It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.14 The purpose of an action or
suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.15
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and posted in the Ecology Bank – Katipunan Branch,
Quezon City, who was employed and under employment of Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. hence there is
employer-employee relationship between co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage
to herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her bag,
suddenly without exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the use of his shotgun, fired and
burst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly and severally liable for the death of Evangeline
M. Tangco.16
Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover damages against
Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing Evangeline
under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay v. Court of
Appeals,17 we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also
acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this
Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may
be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but
one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
crime.18 The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission
punishable by law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,19 where the issue involved was whether the civil action filed by
plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by the offended
party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate civil action.
Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the
accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the validity of that assumption. In
Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that case was
pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right
to file a separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That
was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.
xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article
2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the
negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the
family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that
appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from
choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final and executory, such
judgment has no relevance or importance to this case.21 It would have been entirely different if respondents' cause
of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only
subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.22
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in the selection of
the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact, which, as a
general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
errors of law.23 Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may
not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record. [24]
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us to deviate from the factual
finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting
Evangeline.
Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in going to the bank was to renew her time
deposit.25On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at him,
thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about one meter or one arm's
length26he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her.27 It is however unimaginable that
petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements if indeed the gun was already pointed at him. Any movement
could have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere apprehension that Evangeline
will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to
the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10 meters away from the bank28 and
saw her talking to a man thereat;29 that she left the man under the fly-over, crossed the street and approached the
bank. However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed Evangeline was
seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no
evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or the bank's branch manager regarding his concerns
or that he reported the same to the police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have already apprised herself that
Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the
bank30manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really had a companion, she would leave
him under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a
back-up. In fact, she would have known, after surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure
entrance to the bank as there were guards manning the entrance door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in
itself — such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial
cognizance.31
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was actually in the act of pulling her
gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in
petitioners' petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen
pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as
a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct;32 that the act of drawing a gun is a
threatening act, regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo;33 that
the fear that was created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her
purse was suddenly very real and the former merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.34
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillo's claim of self-defense cannot be
accepted specially when such claim was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than his
testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillo's apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank
robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of
Pajarillo's imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although she was a licensed firearm holder,
she had no business bringing the gun in such establishment where people would react instinctively upon seeing
the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun and did not
conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank; that she should not have held the gun
with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.
As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming outside the
vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's death was merely due to
Pajarillo's negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately shown that it had exercised the
diligence required in the selection and supervision of its employees. It claims that it had required the guards to
undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite qualifications and credentials which even the RTC
found to have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise the diligence required in
the supervision of its employee. Safeguard further claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its
personnel, wherein supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of the security guards which include
among others, whether or not they are in their proper post and with proper equipment, as well as regular
evaluations of the employees' performances; that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguard's
operating procedure is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper supervision; that it
was likewise error to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and policies were not
properly implemented by reason of one unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the
former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of
law. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records.35 On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its
employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To
this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the
constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their
supervisory functions.36 To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since the
record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St.
Martin de Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing
training course for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in the supervision of its employee,
particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations, who
testified on the issuance of company rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned
To Banks,37 Weapons Training,38 Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship Training Lesson
Plan,39Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,40 it had also been established during Camero's cross-examination that
Pajarillo was not aware of such rules and regulations.41 Notwithstanding Camero's clarification on his re-direct
examination that these company rules and regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors
during classroom instructions and not necessary to give students copy of the same, 42 the records do not show that
Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation of the security guard's
performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa,
his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with Safeguard. It was established
that the concept of such training was purely on security of equipments to be guarded and protection of the life of
the employees.43
It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted further training
of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature of business with that of
Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from being on duty in a factory since a
bank is a very sensitive area.44
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of
immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients and
on human psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go around the bank two times a
day to see the daily performance of the security guards assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of
such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline
could have been taken noticed and reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in the amount P157,430.00
which were the expenses incurred by respondents in connection with the burial of Evangeline were supported by
receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Evangeline is likewise in order.
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the spouse, legitimate children and
illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the
defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.45 The intensity of the pain experienced by the
relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with
the wealth or means of the offender.46
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangeline's death was so sudden causing
respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six children who were all minors at the time of her death.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,47 we awarded one million pesos as moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old
girl who was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,48 we likewise awarded the
amount of one million pesos as moral damages to the parents of a third year high school student and who was also
their youngest child who died in a vehicular accident since the girl's death left a void in their lives. Hence, we hold
that the respondents are also entitled to the amount of one million pesos as Evangeline's death left a void in the
lives of her husband and minor children as they were deprived of her love and care by her untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil
Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.49 It is awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions.
In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.50
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case,
exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
is SOLIDARYand PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED
B. CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO UNDER ART 100 RPC
1. DIONISIO V .ALYENDIA
2. andamo v.iac 191 scra 204
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE,
INC., respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation, which has built
through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and
damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code
on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso)
Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a
religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers
during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82, before the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers
and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time a
civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. However, on
April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action,
issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal
Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued on August 27,
1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was
instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a),
Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a decision 4 affirming
the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the
Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil
Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of
prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but
rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily
determined or controlled by its title or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible
denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally
construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the
aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof
leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete
hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial highway, and connected
by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant
cross-wise beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts again
connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence
on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected by defendant to the
cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or
opening which was also built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which
separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of the floodwater
coming from the land of defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land
of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of plaintiffs, defendant also
constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its
water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or
stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above it inundates, portions
of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned water conductors, contrivances
and manipulators, a young man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer,
as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide and long canals, such that the same
can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177
of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c)
the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by
the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged
to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act
of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or
negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held
that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication
between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the
residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity
for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the
instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners
have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or
omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection
between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear
case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides
that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC
UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which
require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests
of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners
and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission
constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so
novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation
of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case,
unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action
arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of
the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this,
for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution —
whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action
and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the
order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V.
Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing
of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.
C.INDEPENDENT CIVIL LIABILITIES
Article 31 of the civil code, intentional torts under artciles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under article 2176
of the civil code; article 33 of the civil code.
SANTOS V PIZARRO, G.R.NO 151452
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY,
NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and
VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS,
President/Chairman, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated March 1, 2002, petitioners assail the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing their petition for certiorari and
denying their motion for reconsideration, arising from the dismissal of their complaint to recover civil indemnity
for the death and physical injuries of their kin.
The following facts are matters of record.
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a
southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the
van’s driver and three (3) of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5)
of the van’s passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a
reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial
court in its decision promulgated on December 17, 1998.2
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their
reservation to file a separate civil action.3 They cited therein the judgment convicting Sibayan.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper service of summons, prescription and
laches, and defective certification of non-forum shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as
defendant in view of the separate personality of Viron Transit from its officers.4
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that the right to file a separate action in this
case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As there was no
appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint which was filed barely two (2) years thence was clearly
filed within the prescriptive period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action had already prescribed.
According to the trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners’ cause of action to be,
prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners
reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of
prescription.5
Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a ground for dismissal of the complaint as summons was
served through a certain Jessica Ubalde of the legal department without mentioning her designation or position.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the complaint is not based on quasi
delictbut on the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the finality
of the judgment.6 The trial court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration reiterating that petitioners’ cause
of action was based on quasi delict and had prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint
was filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular accident.7 As regards the improper service of summons, the
trial court reconsidered its ruling that the complaint ought to be dismissed on this ground.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same for error in the choice
or mode of appeal.8 The appellate court also denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration reasoning that even if
the respondent trial court judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, certiorari is
still not the permissible remedy as appeal was available to petitioners and they failed to allege that the petition
was brought within the recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu of appeal.9
In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for
appeal will result in a judicial rejection of an existing obligation arising from the criminal liability of private
respondents. Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint arose ex delicto and is not
based on quasi delict. The trial court allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion when it insisted that the cause
of action invoked by petitioners is based on quasi delict and concluded that the action had prescribed. Since the
action is based on the criminal liability of private respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the
judgment of conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the appellate court was procedurally flawed, petitioners implore the Court to
exempt this case from the rigid operation of the rules as they allegedly have a legitimate grievance to
vindicate, i.e., damages for the deaths and physical injuries caused by private respondents for which no civil
liability had been adjudged by reason of their reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.
In their Comment10 dated June 13, 2002, private respondents insist that the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of prescription was in order. They point out that the averments in the complaint make out a cause of
action for quasi delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four (4)
years should be reckoned from the time the accident took place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not ordered to pay
damages in the criminal case. It is Viron Transit’s contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer
contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a situation where the civil aspect of the case
was instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil case was made.
Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to the Court of Appeals via certiorari was improper as
petitioners should have appealed the adverse order of the trial court. Moreover, they point out several other
procedural lapses allegedly committed by petitioners, such as lack of certification against forum-shopping; lack of
duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed order of the trial court; and non-indication of the full names
and addresses of petitioners in the petition.
Petitioners filed a Reply11 dated September 14, 2002, while private respondents filed a Rejoinder12 dated October
14, 2002, both in reiteration of their arguments.
We grant the petition.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.13 Such civil
liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of consequential
damages.14 When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, subject to three notable exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly waives the
right to recover damages from the accused; second, when the offended party reserves his right to have the civil
damages determined in a separate action in order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause;
and third, when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a private suit against the offender by
instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which governed the institution of the
criminal action, as well as the reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. Section 1, Rule 111 thereof
states:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file,
any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate
or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon filing thereof in court for trial.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime
committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting
Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latter’s civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation to file a separate civil action made in
the criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private
respondents’ civil liability arising from crime. Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in the
complaint, the trial court dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners’ cause of action was based on quasi
delict and should have been brought within four (4) years from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., from the
time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioners’ claim that the action
was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of
Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based
on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to
enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil
Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.15 Either of these liabilities may
be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double
recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi
delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter
action had been expressly reserved.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company16 was decided upon a similar set of facts. Therein, the driver of
La Mallorca Bus Company was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property. The plaintiff
made an express reservation for the filing of a separate civil action. The driver was convicted which conviction was
affirmed by this Court. Later, plaintiff filed a separate civil action for damages based on quasi delict which was
ordered dismissed by the trial court upon finding that the action was instituted more than six (6) years from the
date of the accident and thus, had already prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted another action, this time
based on the subsidiary liability of the bus company. The trial court dismissed the action holding that the dismissal
of the earlier civil case operated as a bar to the filing of the action to enforce the bus company’s subsidiary liability.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary
liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes
subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so
because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the
aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but
instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners’
allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss17 and motion for reconsideration18 of the order
of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil
actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of
the same act or omission of the offender.19 However, since the stale action for damages based on quasi
delict should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private
respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This interpretation is also
consistent with the bar against double recovery for obvious reasons.
Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should have appealed the order of dismissal of the trial court
instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however, should be
exempted from the strict application of the rules in order to promote their fundamental objective of securing
substantial justice.20 We are loathe to deprive petitioners of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and
by a final judgment of conviction based solely on a technicality. It is our duty to prevent such an injustice.21
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing the present action and denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration, as well as the orders of the lower court dated February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001. Let
the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
A. ICL from Law (art.31)
B. ICL from Intentional torts I (Art 32)
VINZONS-CHATO V. FORTUNE, G.R. NO 141309
NACHURA, J.:
It is a fundamental principle in the law of public officers that a duty owing to the public in general cannot give rise
to a liability in favor of particular individuals.[1] The failure to perform a public duty can constitute an individual
wrong only when a person can show that, in the public duty, a duty to himself as an individual is also involved, and
that he has suffered a special and peculiar injury by reason of its improper performance or non-performance.[2]
By this token, the Court reconsiders its June 19, 2007 Decision[3] in this case.
As culled from the said decision, the facts, in brief, are as follows:
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3,
1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands Champion, Hope, and More were considered local brands
subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA
7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in
effect subjected Hope, More, and Champion cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec.
142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and
which imposes an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five
Pesos (P5.00) per pack.
On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a
copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993,
Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993,
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a
letter dated July 30, 1993. The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency
amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10
days from receipt thereof. On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation
of RMC 37-93. In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid,
and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued
pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93,
has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.
On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in her
private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against
deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her
because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her
authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the
one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice
or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was signed by respondents counsel in
violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same.
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the
allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the
parties to present evidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against forum shopping
was cured by respondents submission of the corporate secretarys certificate authorizing its counsel to
execute the certification against forum shopping. x x x x
xxxx
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However,
same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the
defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I
of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the
Civil Code is the special law that governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not
be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the
certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the corporate secretarys certificate
giving authority to its counsel to execute the same.[4] [Citations and underscoring omitted.]

In the aforesaid June 19, 2007 Decision, we affirmed the disposition of the Court of Appeals (CA) and directed the
trial court to continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK.[5]
Petitioner, on July 20, 2007, subsequently moved for the reconsideration of the said decision.[6] After respondent
filed its comment, the Court, in its April 14, 2008 Resolution,[7] denied with finality petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Undaunted, petitioner filed, on April 29, 2008 her Motion to Refer [the case] to the Honorable Court En
Banc.[8] She contends that the petition raises a legal question that is novel and is of paramount importance. The
earlier decision rendered by the Court will send a chilling effect to public officers, and will adversely affect the
performance of duties of superior public officers in departments or agencies with rule-making and quasi-judicial
powers. With the said decision, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue will have reason to hesitate or refrain from
performing his/her official duties despite the due process safeguards in Section 228 of the National Internal
Revenue Code.[9] Petitioner hence moves for the reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision.[10]
In its June 25, 2008 Resolution,[11] the Court referred the case to the En Banc. Respondent consequently moved for
the reconsideration of this resolution.
We now resolve both motions.
There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the duty owing to the public collectively (the body
politic), and the duty owing to particular individuals, thus:
1. Of Duties to the Public. The first of these classes embraces those officers whose duty is owing
primarily to the public collectively --- to the body politic --- and not to any particular individual; who act
for the public at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public treasury.
The officers whose duties fall wholly or partially within this class are numerous and the distinction will
be readily recognized. Thus, the governor owes a duty to the public to see that the laws are properly
executed, that fit and competent officials are appointed by him, that unworthy and ill-considered acts
of the legislature do not receive his approval, but these, and many others of a like nature, are duties
which he owes to the public at large and no one individual could single himself out and assert that they
were duties owing to him alone. So, members of the legislature owe a duty to the public to pass only
wise and proper laws, but no one person could pretend that the duty was owing to himself rather than
to another. Highway commissioners owe a duty that they will be governed only by considerations of the
public good in deciding upon the opening or closing of highways, but it is not a duty to any particular
individual of the community.
These illustrations might be greatly extended, but it is believed that they are sufficient to define the
general doctrine.
2. Of Duties to Individuals. The second class above referred to includes those who, while they owe to
the public the general duty of a proper administration of their respective offices, yet become, by reason
of their employment by a particular individual to do some act for him in an official capacity, under a
special and particular obligation to him as an individual. They serve individuals chiefly and usually
receive their compensation from fees paid by each individual who employs them.
A sheriff or constable in serving civil process for a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording the
deed or mortgage of an individual, a clerk of court in entering up a private judgment, a notary public in
protesting negotiable paper, an inspector of elections in passing upon the qualifications of an elector,
each owes a general duty of official good conduct to the public, but he is also under a special duty to
the particular individual concerned which gives the latter a peculiar interest in his due performance.[12]
In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or non-performance of a duty, it
must first be determined which of the two classes of duties is involved. For, indeed, as the eminent Floyd R.
Mechem instructs, [t]he liability of a public officer to an individual or the public is based upon and is co-extensive
with his duty to the individual or the public. If to the one or the other he owes no duty, to that one he can incur no
liability.[13]
Stated differently, when what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an individual cannot have a cause
of action for damages against the public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or inaction of
the officer. In such a case, there is damage to the individual but no wrong to him. In performing or failing to
perform a public duty, the officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no duty to him as
an individual.[14] The remedy in this case is not judicial but political.[15]
The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special
injury on account of the public officers improper performance or non-performance of his public duty. An individual
can never be suffered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the public only; he must show a wrong which
he specially suffers, and damage alone does not constitute a wrong.[16] A contrary precept (that an individual, in
the absence of a special and peculiar injury, can still institute an action against a public officer on account of an
improper performance or non-performance of a duty owing to the public generally) will lead to a deluge of suits,
for if one man might have an action, all men might have the likethe complaining individual has no better right than
anybody else.[17] If such were the case, no one will serve a public office. Thus, the rule restated is that an individual
cannot have a particular action against a public officer without a particular injury, or a particular right, which are
the grounds upon which all actions are founded.[18]
Juxtaposed with Article 32[19] of the Civil Code, the principle may now translate into the rule that an individual can
hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act or omission that violates a constitutional
right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to the former. This is consistent with this Courts
pronouncement in its June 19, 2007 Decision (subject of petitioners motion for reconsideration) that Article 32, in
fact, allows a damage suit for tort for impairment of rights and liberties.[20]
It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plaintiff to maintain an action for damages for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed the
plaintiff, meaning a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. Indeed,
central to an award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law.[21] Thus,
in Lim v. Ponce de Leon,[22] we granted the petitioners claim for damages because he, in fact, suffered the loss of
his motor launch due to the illegal seizure thereof. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[23] we upheld the right of
petitioner to the recovery of damages as there was an injury sustained by him on account of the illegal withholding
of his horserace prize winnings.
In the instant case, what is involved is a public officers duty owing to the public in general. The petitioner, as the
then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is being taken to task for Revenue Memorandum Circular
(RMC) No. 37-93 which she issued without the requisite notice, hearing and publication, and which,
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,[24] we declared as having fallen short of a valid and
effective administrative issuance.[25] A public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or
rule-making power, owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of
valid administrative regulations. But it is a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire body politic
who would be affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative rule.
Furthermore, as discussed above, to have a cause of action for damages against the petitioner, respondent must
allege that it suffered a particular or special injury on account of the non-performance by petitioner of the public
duty. A careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court reveals that no particular injury is alleged to have
been sustained by the respondent. The phrase financial and business difficulties[26] mentioned in the complaint is a
vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot translate into a particular injury. In contrast, the facts of the case
eloquently demonstrate that the petitioner took nothing from the respondent, as the latter did not pay a single
centavo on the tax assessment levied by the former by virtue of RMC 37-93.
With no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or wrongful act or omission
attributable to the petitioner that would violate the primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or
tortious act or omission, the complaint then fails to state a cause of action, because a cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another.[27]
A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages.[28]
The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of action is to set up this defense in a
motion to dismiss, or in the answer. A motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action in the
complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. However, the hypothetical admission is
limited to the relevant and material facts well-pleaded in the complaint and inferences deducible therefrom. The
admission does not extend to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity
of which is subject to judicial notice.[29]
The complaint may also be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious from the complaint and
its annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.[30]
The June 19, 2007 Decision and the dissent herein reiterates that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of
the public officer may accrue even if he/she acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of constitutional
rights, citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[31] where we said:
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To
be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioners, even on the
pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of duties.[32]
The complaint in this case does not impute bad faith on the petitioner. Without any allegation of bad
faith, the cause of action in the respondents complaint (specifically, paragraph 2.02 thereof) for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code would be premised on the findings of this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Court of Appeals (CIR v. CA),[33] where we ruled that RMC No. 37-93, issued by petitioner in her capacity as
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, had fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance. This is a logical
inference. Without the decision in CIR v. CA, the bare allegations in the complaint that respondents rights to due
process of law and to equal protection of the laws were violated by the petitioners administrative issuance would
be conclusions of law, hence not hypothetically admitted by petitioner in her motion to dismiss.
But in CIR v. CA, this Court did not declare RMC 37-93 unconstitutional; certainly not from either the
due process of law or equal protection of the laws perspective. On due process, the majority, after determining
that RMC 37-93 was a legislative rule, cited an earlier Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC No. 10-86) requiring
prior notice before RMCs could become operative. However, this Court did not make an express finding of
violation of the right to due process of law. On the aspect of equal protection, CIR v. CA said: Not insignificantly,
RMC 37-93 might have likewise infringed on uniformity of taxation; a statement that does not amount to a positive
indictment of petitioner for violation of respondents constitutional right. Even if one were to ascribe a
constitutional infringement by RMC 37-93 on the non-uniformity of tax provisions, the nature of the constitutional
transgression falls under Section 28, Article VInot Section 1, Article IIIof the Constitution.
This Courts own summation in CIR v. CA: All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated
RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance, does not lend itself to an interpretation
that the RMC is unconstitutional. Thus, the complaints reliance on CIR v. CAwhich is cited in, and a copy of which is
annexed to, the complaintas suggestive of a violation of due process and equal protection, must fail.
Accordingly, from the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that paragraph 2.02 of respondents complaint
loses the needed crutch to sustain a valid cause of action against the petitioner, for what is left of the paragraph is
merely the allegation that only respondents Champion, Hope and More cigarettes were reclassified.
If we divest the complaint of its reliance on CIR v. CA, what remains of respondents cause of action for
violation of constitutional rights would be paragraph 2.01, which reads:
2.01. On or about July 1, 1993, defendant issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (hereinafter
referred to as RMC No. 37-93) reclassifying specifically Champion, Hope and More as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand. A copy of the aforesaid circular is attached hereto and
made an integral part hereof as ANNEX A. The issuance of a circular and its implementation resulted in
the deprivation of property of plaintiff. They were done without due process of law and in violation of
the right of plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws. (Italics supplied.)
But, as intimated above, the bare allegations, done without due process of law and in violation of the right of
plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws are conclusions of law.They are not hypothetically admitted in
petitioners motion to dismiss and, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, are not deemed as facts.
In Fluor Daniel, Inc. Philippines v. EB. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd.,[34] this Court declared that the test of
sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. In the instant case,
since what remains of the complaint which is hypothetically admitted, is only the allegation on the reclassification
of respondents cigarettes, there will not be enough facts for the court to render a valid judgment according to the
prayer in the complaint.
Furthermore, in an action for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code premised on violation of due process, it
may be necessary to harmonize the Civil Code provision with subsequent legislative enactments, particularly those
related to taxation and tax collection. Judicial notice may be taken of the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, and of the law creating the Court of Tax Appeals. Both statutes provide ample
remedies to aggrieved taxpayers; remedies which, in fact, were availed of by the respondentwithout even having
to pay the assessment under protestas recounted by this Court in CIR v. CA, viz.:
In a letter, dated 19 July 1993, addressed to the appellate division of the BIR, Fortune Tobacco
requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July
1993. The following day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax
deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00.
On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA.[35]
The availability of the remedies against the assailed administrative action, the opportunity to avail of the same,
and actual recourse to these remedies, contradict the respondents claim of due process infringement.
At this point, a brief examination of relevant American jurisprudence may be instructive.
42 U.S. Code 1983, a provision incorporated into the Civil Rights Act of 1871, presents a parallel to our own Article
32 of the Civil Code, as it states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, usage, or any State or
Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other
proper proceeding for redress.
This provision has been employed as the basis of tort suits by many petitioners intending to win liability cases
against government officials when they violate the constitutional rights of citizens.
Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Investigation,[36] has emerged as the leading
case on the victims entitlement to recover money damages for any injuries suffered as a result of flagrant and
unconstitutional abuses of administrative power. In this case, federal narcotics officers broke into Bivens home
at 6:30 a.m.without a search warrant and in the absence of probable cause. The agents handcuffed Bivens,
searched his premises, employed excessive force, threatened to arrest his family, subjected him to a visual strip
search in the federal court house, fingerprinted, photographed, interrogated and booked him. When Bivens was
brought before a United States Commissioner, however, charges against him were dismissed. On the issue of
whether violation of the Fourth Amendment by a federal agent acting under color of authority gives rise to a cause
of action for damages consequent upon his constitutional conduct, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Bivens is
entitled to recover damages for injuries he suffered as a result of the agents violation of the Fourth Amendment.
A number of subsequent decisions have upheld Bivens. For instance, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,[37] a liability suit for
money damages was allowed against Ohio Governor James Rhodes by petitioners who represented three students
who had been killed by Ohio National Guard troops at Kent State University as they protested
against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In Wood v. Strickland,[38] local school board members were sued by high
school students who argued that they had been deprived of constitutional due process rights when they were
expelled from school for having spiked a punch bowl at a school function without the benefit of a full
hearing. In Butz v. Economou,[39] Economou, whose registration privilege as a commodities futures trader was
suspended, without prior warning, by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, sued on a Bivens action, alleging that the
suspension was aimed at chilling his freedom of expression right under the First Amendment. A number of other
cases[40] with virtually the same conclusion followed.
However, it is extremely dubious whether a Bivens action against government tax officials and employees may
prosper, if we consider the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky,[41] that a Bivens
remedy will not be allowed when other meaningful safeguards or remedies for the rights of persons situated as (is
the plaintiff) are available. It has also been held that a Bivens action is not appropriate in the civil service
system[42] or in the military justice system.[43]
In Frank Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of the United States of
America,[44] petitioner Vennes instituted a Bivens action against agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) who
alleged that he (Vennes) owed $250,000 in tax liability, instituted a jeopardy assessment, confiscated Vennes
business, forced a total asset sale, and put Vennes out of business, when in fact he owed not a
dime. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, ruled:
The district court dismissed these claims on the ground that a taxpayers remedies under the Internal
Revenue Code preclude such a Bivens action. Vennes cites to us no contrary authority, and we have
found none. Though the Supreme Court has not addressed this precise question, it has strongly
suggested that the district court correctly applied Bivens:
When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it
considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the
course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.
xxxx
Congress has provided specific and meaningful remedies for taxpayers who challenge overzealous tax
assessment and collection activities. A taxpayer may challenge a jeopardy assessment both
administratively and judicially, and may sue the government for a tax refund, and have authorized
taxpayer actions against the United States to recover limited damages resulting from specific types of
misconduct by IRS employees. These carefully crafted legislative remedies confirm that, in the politically
sensitive realm of taxation, Congresss refusal to permit unrestricted damage action by taxpayers has
not been inadvertent. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed Venness Bivens claims against IRS
agents for their tax assessment and collection activities.
In still another Bivens action, instituted by a taxpayer against IRS employees for alleged violation of due process
rights concerning a tax dispute, the U.S. District Court of Minnesota said:
In addition, the (Tax) Code provides taxpayers with remedies, judicial and otherwise, for correcting and
redressing wrongful acts taken by IRS employees in connection with any collection activities. Although
these provisions do not provide taxpayers with an all-encompassing remedy for wrongful acts of IRS
personnel, the rights established under the Code illustrate that it provides all sorts of rights against the
overzealous officialdom, including, most fundamentally, the right to sue the government for a refund if
forced to overpay taxes, and it would make the collection of taxes chaotic if a taxpayer could bypass the
remedies provided by Congress simply by bringing a damage suit against IRS employees.[45]
American jurisprudence obviously validates the contention of the petitioner.

Finally, we invite attention to Section 227, Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997), which provides:
Section 227. Satisfaction of Judgment Recovered Against any Internal Revenue Officer. When an action
is brought against any Internal Revenue officer to recover damages by reason of any act done in the
performance of official duty, and the Commissioner is notified of such action in time to make defense
against the same, through the Solicitor General, any judgment, damages or costs recovered in such
action shall be satisfied by the Commissioner, upon approval of the Secretary of Finance, or if the same
be paid by the person sued shall be repaid or reimbursed to him.
No such judgment, damages or costs shall be paid or reimbursed in behalf of a person who
has acted negligently or in bad faith, or with willful oppression.
Because the respondents complaint does not impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money
judgment by the trial court against her will have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the
complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.[46]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT petitioners motion for reconsideration of the June 19, 2007
Decision and DENY respondents motion for reconsideration of the June 25, 2008 Resolution. Civil Case No.
CV-97-341-MK, pending with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
C. ICL from Intentional Torts II (art.34)
D.ICL from Quasi-Delicts (art.2176)
E. ICL in cases of Defamation, Fraud, Physical Injuries (Art.33)
1. CARANDANG V. SANTIAGO 97 PHIL. 94
G.R. No. L-8238. May 25, 1955.]
CESAR M. CARANDANG, Petitioner, v. VICENTE SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Manila and TOMAS VALENTON, Sr. and TOMAS VALENTON, Jr., Respondents.
S. Mejia-Panganiban for Petitioner.
Evangelista & Valenton for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; TERM "PHYSICAL INJURIES" EXPLAINED. — Articles 33 of the new Civil Code uses the words
"defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there
are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as names of offenses defined therein. With
this apparent circumstances in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its
specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission
would have used terms in the same article — some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other
words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries
as defined in the Revised Penal Code.
2. ID.; ID.; CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES WILL LIE WHETHER BODILY INJURY WAS INFLICTED WITH TO KILL OR NOT.
— The Code Commission recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for
assault and battery in American Law, and his recommendation must have been accepted by the Legislation when it
approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm
received by the complainant similar to be civil action for assault and battery as the Code Commission states, the
civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or
attempted homicide, or even death.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SUSPENSION OF CIVIL ACTION PENDING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION; EXCEPTION. — The
civil action for damages founded on injury to the person may be brought by the injured party and the trial court
may proceed with the trial of the case without awaiting the result of the pending criminal case. (Article 33 of the
new Civil Code.)
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable Vicente Santiago, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
to annul his order in Civil Case No. 21173, entitled Cesar M. Carandang v. Tomas Valenton, Sr. Et. Al., suspending
the trial of said civil case to await the result of the criminal Case No. 534, Court of First Instance of Batangas. In this
criminal case, Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against the
person of Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
where the case is now pending.
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in the criminal case was rendered on September 1, 1953 and
petitioner herein filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover from the defendant Tomas
Valenton, Jr. and his parents, damages, both actual and moral, for the bodily injuries received by him on occasion
of the commission of the crime of frustrated homicide by said accused Tomas Valenton, Jr. After the defendants
submitted their answer, they presented a motion to suspend the trial of the civil case, pending the termination of
the criminal case against Tomas Valenton, Jr. in the Court of Appeals. The judge ruled that the trial of the civil
action must await the result of the criminal case on appeal. A motion for reconsideration was submitted, but the
court denied the same; hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code, which is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Code Commission itself states that the civil action allowed (under Article 33) is similar to the action in tort for
libel or slander and assault and battery under American law (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 46-47). But
respondents argue that the term "physical injuries" is used to designate a specific crime defined in the Revised
Penal Code, and therefore said term should be understood in its peculiar and technical sense, in accordance with
the rules statutory construction (Sec. 578, 59 C. J. 979).
In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it
was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein
Cesar Carandang, which wound is a bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but frustrated
homicide, for the reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill. So the question arises
whether the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 means physical injuries in the Revised Penal Code only, or
any physical injury or bodily injury, whether inflicted with intent to kill or not.
The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are
used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms
as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to
impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent
circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as
a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used
terms in the same article — some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term
"physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the
terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action
for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation
must have been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has
been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault
and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of
physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death.
A parallel case arose in that of Bixby v. Sioux City, 164 N.W. 641, 643. In that case, the appellant sought to take his
case from the scope of the statute by pointing out that inasmuch as notice is required where the cause of action is
founded on injury to the person, it has no application when the damages sought are for the death of the person.
The court ruled that a claim to recover for death resulting from personal injury is as certainly "founded on injury to
the person" as would be a claim to recover damages for a non-fatal injury resulting in a crippled body.
For the foregoing considerations, we find that the respondent judge committed an error in suspending the trial of
the civil case, and his order to that effect is hereby revoked, and he is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of
said civil case without awaiting the result of the pending criminal case. With costs against
the Defendant-Appellees.
2. CONSING V PEOPLE, G.R. NO 161075
RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to
stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is
because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
The Case
On appeal is the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted
the writ of certiorari upon petition by the State in C.A.-G.R. No. 71252 entitled People v. Han. Winlove M Dumayas,
Presiding Judge, Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Makati City and Rafael Consing, Jr., and set aside the assailed
order issued on November 26, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, in Makati City deferring the
arraignment of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-120 entitled People v. Rafael Consing, Jr. upon his motion on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question in the civil cases pending between him and the complainant in the
trial courts in Pasig City and Makati City.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz) various loans
totaling ₱18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage
constituted on a parcel of land (property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite registered under the name of de la Cruz.2 In accordance with its option
to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a total
consideration of ₱21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount of ₱18,000,000.00 and paying an
additional amount of ₱3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus
Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital.3
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the property was
really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property had
been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.4
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of ₱41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had
been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands.5
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig civil case) for
injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of the
₱41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public document
against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office.6
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a
sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (Makati civil case).7
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an
information for estafa through falsification of public document in the RTC in Makati City (Criminal Case No. 00-120),
which was assigned to Branch 60 (Makati criminal case).8
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of
existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001,
Consing reiterated his motion for deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA. On November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion.9
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18, 2001, the RTC denied the Prosecution’s motion
for reconsideration.10
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the Makati criminal case via petition for
certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252,11 dismissing the petition for certiorari
and upholding the RTC’s questioned orders, explaining:
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case, i.e. whether or not private respondent may be held
liable in the questioned transaction, will determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent Consing in both
the Cavite and Makati criminal cases.
The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case, Makati criminal case, Makati civil case and Cavite criminal case
show that: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the transactions in controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer Certificate
of Titles (TCT) involved are identical; (4) the questioned Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in
question are identical; and (6) the issue of private respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions is
identical in all the proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the Pasig civil case identical to or intimately related to the
criminal cases in Cavite and Makati. The similarities also extend to the parties in the cases and the TCT and Deed of
Sale/ Mortgage involved in the questioned transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the arraignment of private respondent in the Makati case, in
view of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not a party thereto, did so pursuant to its mandatory power to
take judicial notice of an official act of another judicial authority. It was also a better legal tack to prevent
multiplicity of action, to which our legal system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 may be validly invoked to suspend private
respondent’s arraignment in the Makati City criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was
an offshoot, merely, in the Cavite criminal case.12
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders commenced its own suit for damages against Consing (Civil
Case No. 99-95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila civil case).13
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against Consing
and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite
criminal case). Consing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil cases. On January 27, 2000, however, the RTC handling
the Cavite criminal case denied Consing’s motion. Later on, it also denied his motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, Consing commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking to enjoin
his arraignment and trial in the Cavite criminal case. The CA granted the TRO on March 19, 2001, and later
promulgated its decision on May 31, 2001, granting Consing’ petition for certiorari and setting aside the January 27,
2000 order of the RTC, and permanently enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the arraignment and trial until
the Pasig and Manila civil cases had been finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in this Court (G.R. No. 148193), praying for the reversal of
the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA. On January 16, 2003, the Court granted the petition for review in G.R. No.
148193, and reversed and set aside the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA,14 viz:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive
Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in
Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent
and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed
lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the
questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for
conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759
for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through
falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in question will not be
determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return
of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa
through falsification of public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should
not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case
where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of Article 319 of the Revised
Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor of another party without consent
of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for termination of management
contract, one of the causes of action of which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while the
previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the
criminal case be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial question, the resolution of
which was necessary before the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial court denied the suspension of the
criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled
that:
… the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of action based on the
fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in favor of the said CMS Estate,
Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was "free from all liens and
encumbrances" will not determine the criminal liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for
violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of
argument, a prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact remains that both the crime charged in the
information in the criminal case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence both
the civil and criminal cases could proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code
which provides: "In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence." (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred
to in the instant petition was not made with "grave abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud
committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of
the criminal case at bar.15
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the
CA, citing the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect that the Pasig and Manila civil cases did not present a
prejudicial question that justified the suspension of the proceedings in the Cavite criminal case, and claiming that
under the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig and Makati civil cases did not raise a prejudicial question that would
cause the suspension of the Makati criminal case.
In his opposition to the State’s motion for reconsideration, Consing contended that the ruling in G.R. No. 148193
was not binding because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus Builders, which was different from Unicapital, the
complainant in the Makati criminal case. He added that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 did not yet become final
and executory, and could still be reversed at any time, and thus should not control as a precedent to be relied
upon; and that he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for his mother, and should not be held personally
liable under a contract that had involved property belonging to his mother as his principal.
On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision, reversing itself. It relied upon the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, and
held thusly:
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at bench. The transactions in controversy, the documents involved;
the issue of the respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions are all identical in all the proceedings; and
it deals with the same parties with the exception of private complainant Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Jose
Consing, Jr. (G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003) held that "Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and attachment
on account of alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to Plus Builders,
Inc. is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar." In view of the aforementioned decision of the
Supreme Court, We are thus amending Our May 20, 2003 decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 26, 2001 and
March 18, 2002 issued by the respondent Judge are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 00-120 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.16
Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,17 but the CA denied the motion through the second assailed resolution
of December 11, 2003.18
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 was not controlling in relation to C.A.-G.R.
No. 71252, which involved Plus Builders, not Unicapital, the complainant in Criminal Case No. 00-120. He posits
that in arriving at its amended decision, the CA did not consider the pendency of the Makati civil case (Civil Case
No. 99-1418), which raised a prejudicial question, considering that the resolution of such civil action would include
the issue of whether he had falsified a certificate of title or had willfully defrauded Unicapital, the resolution of
either of which would determine his guilt or innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-120.
In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Unicapital brought the Makati civil case as
an independent civil action intended to exact civil liability separately from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner
fully authorized under Section 1(a) and Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.20 It argues that the CA correctly
took cognizance of the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, holding in its challenged amended decision that the Makati civil
case, just like the Manila civil case, was an independent civil action instituted by virtue of Article 33 of the Civil
Code; that the Makati civil case did not raise a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of Criminal Case
No. 00-120; and that as finally settled in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig civil case did not also raise any prejudicial
question, because the sole issue thereat was whether Consing, as the mere agent of his mother, had any obligation
or liability toward Unicapital.
In his reply,21 Consing submits that the Pasig civil case that he filed and Unicapital’s Makati civil case were not
intended to delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-120, nor to pre-empt such resolution; and that such civil
cases could be validly considered determinative of whether a prejudicial question existed to warrant the
suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120.
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the
suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to the effect
that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended because the Makati civil case was an
independent civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to do
considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity between his case with Plus Builders and his
case with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was predicated on fraud. This
was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted
in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as security and later object of sale, a
property which they do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious title." 22 As such, the action was one that
could proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states as
follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent
and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed
lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the
questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for
conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759
for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through
falsification of public document.25 (Words in parentheses supplied; bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003; and ORDERS petitioner
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently
instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify
the suspension of a criminal case.23 This was precisely the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:

Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.

xxxx

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud
committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of
the criminal case at bar.24

Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not improper for the CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case with
Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and
Unicapital), the civil actions Plus Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against him were undeniably of
similar mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly,
the Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending the resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital
had filed.

As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consing’s being a mere agent of his mother who should not
be criminally liable for having so acted due to the property involved having belonged to his mother as principal has
also been settled in G.R. No. 148193, to wit:

In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive
Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in