Living with the Iran nuclear deal

aspistrategist.org.au/living-with-the-iran-nuclear-deal

Richard N. Haass July 16,

2015

It is probable that after 60 days of intense debate in Washington, DC, and

conceivably Tehran, the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” signed on
July 14 by Iran and the UN Security Council’s five permanent members
plus Germany (the P5+1), will enter into force. But no one should confuse
this outcome with a solution to the problem of Iran’s nuclear ambitions or
its contributions to the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East. On the
contrary, depending on how it is implemented and enforced, the
agreement could make matters worse.

This is not to suggest the JCPOA makes no contribution. It places a ceiling

for the next decade on the quantity and quality of centrifuges Iran is
allowed to operate and allows the country to possess only a small amount
of low-enriched uranium for the next 15 years. The agreement also
establishes, in US President Barack Obama’s words, a “where necessary,
when necessary” inspections mechanism that has the potential to verify
whether Iran is meeting these and other commitments.
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The net result is that the accord should lengthen the period it would take
Iran to produce one or more nuclear weapons from several months to as
much as a year, making it more likely that such an effort would be
discovered in time. The prospect that the JCPOA could keep Iran without
nuclear weapons for 15 years is its main attraction. Sanctions alone could
not have accomplished this, and using military force would have entailed
considerable risk with uncertain results.

On the other hand (there always is another hand in diplomacy), the

agreement permits Iran to keep far more nuclear-related capacity than it
would need if it were interested only in civil research and in
demonstrating a symbolic ability to enrich uranium. The agreement also
provides Iran with extensive relief from economic sanctions, which will
fuel the regime’s ability to support dangerous proxies throughout the
Middle East, back a sectarian government in Baghdad, and prop up Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Moreover, the accord does not rule out all nuclear-related research and
does not constrain work on missiles. Sales of ballistic missiles and missile
parts to Iran are banned for no more than eight years. Sales of
conventional arms to Iran are prohibited for no more than five years.

There is also the danger that Iran will fail to comply with parts of the
agreement and undertake prohibited work. Given Iran’s record, this has
understandably been the focus of much concern and criticism regarding
the pact. What matters is that non-compliance be met with renewed
sanctions and, if needed, military force.

A bigger problem has received much less attention: the risk of what will
happen if Iran does comply with the agreement. Even without violating
the accord, Iran can position itself to break out of nuclear constraints
when the agreement’s critical provisions expire. At that point, there will be
little to hold it back except the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a
voluntary agreement that does not include penalties for non-compliance.

It is important that the United States (ideally, joined by other countries) let
Iran know that any action to put itself in a position to field nuclear
weapons after 15 years, though not explicitly precluded by the accord, will
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not be tolerated. Harsh sanctions should be reintroduced at the first sign
that Iran is preparing a post-JCPOA breakout; this, too, is not precluded by
the accord.
Iran should likewise be informed that the US and its allies would
undertake a preventive military strike if it appeared to be attempting to
present the world with a fait accompli. The world erred in allowing North
Korea to pass the nuclear-weapons threshold; it should not make the
same mistake again.

In the meantime, a major effort must be launched to assuage the

concerns of Iran’s neighbors, several of which will be tempted to hedge
their bets against Iran’s potential breakout in 15 years by pursuing nuclear
programs of their own. The Middle East is already nightmarish enough
without the added risks posed by a number of would-be nuclear powers.
Obama’s claim that the agreement has “stopped the spread of nuclear
weapons in this region” is premature, at best.

It will also be essential to rebuild strategic trust between the US and

Israel; indeed, this will need to be a high priority for Obama’s successor.
And the US should push back as warranted against Iran’s foreign policy or
treatment of its own people.

None of this rules out selective cooperation with Iran, be it in Afghanistan,

Syria, or Iraq, if interests overlap. But here, too, realism should prevail.
The notion that the nuclear agreement will lead Iran to moderate its
radicalism and rein in its strategic ambitions should not be anyone’s
baseline scenario. In fact, the emergence of an ever more capable Iran,
not a transformed one, is likely to be one of the main challenges
confronting the Middle East, if not the world, in the coming years.

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