Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 37 (2017) 234e247

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Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jngse

Effect of full-bore natural gas release on fire and individual risks: A

case study for an LNG-Fueled ship
Bongsik Chu, Daejun Chang*
Department of Mechanical Engineering, School of Mechanical, Aerospace and Systems Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 291
Daehak-ro, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon 34141, Republic of Korea

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This study investigated the significance of categorizing and selecting representative leak sizes in
Received 29 June 2016 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for estimating natural gas fire risks. In most fire QRA procedures, the
Received in revised form full-bore sizes of leaks have been overlooked even though they causes the catastrophic consequences
27 September 2016
with relatively high frequencies. So, in the present study, the effect of particular leak sizes on the in-
Accepted 19 November 2016
Available online 24 November 2016
dividual risks (IRs) were investigated through the fire risk assessment. As case studies, LNG (Liquefied
Natural Gas) fuel gas supply system for a large ship were considered with three different approaches.
Approach 1 considers only three categories of leak sizes; small, medium, and large. Approach 2 includes
Keywords:
Quantitative risk assessment
the full-bore leak in addition to categories of Approach 1, and Approach 3 reflects more categories of leak
Hydrocarbon fire sizes with every 1 mm increment in diameter. Compared with the total IR of Approach 3, the total IR of
Full-bore leak Approach 1 was two times lower, whereas Approach 2 resulted in the comparable total IR with an
Individual risk approximately 4% deviation. Admitting that Approach 3 should be close to the exact solution, Approach 2
LNG fuel gas supply system gave acceptable results, whereas Approach 1 unsatisfactorily underestimated the total IR. The results
indicated that full-bore leak accidents are critically important scenarios and omission of them can lead to
misjudgment in the risk-informed decision-making process. Taking the full-bore accidents into addi-
tional account to the conventional simplified QRA can reduce the time and effort for estimating the leak-
related risks without a significant loss of accuracy in the estimated risks.
© 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.

1. Introduction accompanying catastrophic outcomes have occurred in the offshore

To meet the increasing demands for energy and strict environ-
mental regulations, the consumption of natural gas is steadily
expanding across the world (Economides and Wood, 2009; Wood,
2012), presenting challenges to improve safety standards. One of
the most important challenges to hydrocarbon systems is the
management of fire and explosion risks because the combustible
fluids are usually stored in bulk and used at high pressure or
cryogenic conditions (Lee et al., 2016). Shipping and offshore in-
dustries that are additionally subject to extreme marine environ-
ments have especially been intrinsically threatened by such
hazards, leading to disastrous consequences: injury or death of
operators, damage to assets, physical and biological degradation of
facilities, interruption of operation and production, and disruption
of business (Spouge, 1999). A number of hydrocarbon accidents
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: djchang@kaist.ac.kr (D. Chang).
field over the last several decades (HSE, 2007).
To reduce the risk of such disasters, industries have made an
incessant effort to provide a combination of prevention, detection,
control and mitigation measures. The performance standards for
these measures should be consolidated at the concept design stage,
during which design and operating philosophies, including those
for fire and explosion safety, are established. Target systems or fa-
cilities should be designed to meet these philosophies and the
acceptance criteria in normal engineering practice.
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) has been employed as a
rational and rigorous method to estimate the risks, including the
fire risk, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the implemented
measures. Although the term Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is
preferable to QRA in the shipping industry, there is no fundamental
difference between them. QRA or FSA is used to quantify risks,
which are expressed as a combination of frequency and conse-
quences, and to provide input to a decision-making process. QRA
has made great advances in recent decades thanks to plentiful
theoretical and experimental investigations.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jngse.2016.11.043
1875-5100/© 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.
 B. Chu, D. Chang / Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 37 (2017) 234e247 235

Nomenclature F(d) frequency of holes exceeding size d (per meter year)

HP high pressure
a equipment constant HSE health and safety executive
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable IMO International Maritime Organization
A10% 10% of lethal area (m2) IR individual risk
A50% 50% of lethal area (m2) LNG liquefied natural gas
A100% 100% of lethal area (m2) m equipment constant
C equipment constant n equipment constant
Cn number of fatalities for nth accident scenario NOx nitrogen oxide
CO2 carbon dioxide OGP International Association of Oil and Gas Producers
D equipment diameter (mm) P&ID piping and instrumentation diagram
d hole diameter (mm) PBU pressure build-up
EER escape, evacuation and rescue PFD process flow diagram
ESD emergency shutdown PLL potential loss of life (per year)
ETA event tree analysis pignition
n ignition probability for nth accident scenario
FABIG Fire and Blast Information Group POBavg average annual number of people on board
FGSS fuel gas supply system Pr probit function
Fn fire frequency for nth accident scenario (per year) Q thermal radiation (kW/m2)
fnleak leak frequency for nth accident scenario (per year) QRA quantitative risk assessment
Frup additional rupture frequency (per meter year) SOx sulfur oxide
FSA formal safety assessment t exposure time (s)

Although the accuracy of QRA has been remarkably improved,
most QRA approaches have been influenced by inherent uncer-
tainty, which reduces confidence in the results. The uncertainty is
especially significant for the QRA of hydrocarbon fire accidents.
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) defined several sources of un-
certainty regarding fire accidents and paid attention to inaccuracy
and incompleteness by selecting representative scenarios (HSE,
2006).
Accidents can occur through infinitely various scenarios. Thus, it
is infeasible to model all cases and possibilities due to limited time
and effort, especially during the initial design stage. The measured
risks from frequency and consequence analysis are highly depen-
dent on the defined scenarios. Analysts may have the challenge of
selecting a limited number of scenarios that can represent all
possible events with acceptable tolerance. In consequence, the se-
lection of representative scenarios is one of the most important
tasks for an accurate assessment.
Selecting representative scenarios is also a formidable challenge
for the QRA of hydrocarbon fire accidents because the frequency
and consequences of fire accidents can be affected by many factors.
The selection of representative leak sizes is a crucial task in the
selection of scenarios (Spouge, 1999). A hydrocarbon fire accident
begins with a leak, and the results of frequency and consequence
analysis are significantly affected by the leak sizes. For example, the
ignition probability of a leak is largely affected by the leak rate,
which is in turn a strong function of leak size. Although the se-
lection of leak sizes may give rise to one of the largest uncertainties
causing inaccuracy in QRA, there is no definite basis or criterion for
choosing representative leak sizes. Most QRA approaches to hy-
drocarbon accidents have classified leak sizes in three different
categories without any sensitivity analysis (Ahmad et al., 2013;
Badri et al., 2013; Bris et al., 2014; Dan et al., 2014; FABIG, 2010;
FABIG, 2014; Krueger and Smith, 2003; Moon et al., 2009; Paik
et al., 2011; Yanlin and Jang, 2015).
This investigation identifies a limitation in the procedure of
selecting representative leak sizes for estimating hydrocarbon fire
risks. This study pays attention to a particular leak size that is
frequently omitted or overlooked in existing QRA approaches,
despite its importance. A case study is performed to compare the
QRA results of two different approaches to selecting representative
leak sizes and to determine the effects of a particular leak scenario
on the risk estimation.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Procedure of quantitative risk assessment of hydrocarbon fire
Fig. 1 presents the steps of the QRA procedure to estimate and
control fire risks. The QRA procedure used to estimate hydrocarbon
fire risks includes various approaches and techniques that are in-
tegrated for one common aim: the quantification of frequency and
consequences. There are three primary tasks to estimate and
manage the fire risks: the selection of representative scenarios, the
estimation of frequency, and the analysis of consequences.
2.2. Selection of representative scenarios
Hydrocarbon accidents can occur through innumerable sce-
narios. As the first step of the QRA, analysts should choose a limited
number of scenarios that represent all possible events. This step has
a significant influence on the estimates of fire frequency and con-
sequences in the subsequent steps.
How a leak can lead to accidents depends on whether it is
ignited or not. The location, direction of leak and environmental
conditions exert a combined effect on the hydrocarbon fire risks.
For example, a leak located in the central part of the system has
more detrimental potential than one occurring in the circumfer-
ential part. However, in the case where the leak direction of the
latter is toward the inside of the system, its consequences can be as
severe as those of the former. Accordingly, the occurrence and
escalation of hydrocarbon accidents are influenced by various pa-
rameters, and scenarios are sequential combinations of those
parameters.
The Event Tree Analysis (ETA), which is as a systematic approach
to determining representative scenarios, is well developed and
widely used (Spouge, 1999). An event tree is a diagram that shows
how an initial event evolves into its final states based on binary
reasoning through the evolution of the event, including the ignition
236 B. Chu, D. Chang / Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 37 (2017) 234e247

Fig. 1. Steps of the QRA procedure for hydrocarbon fire accidents.

and operability of safety systems, together with the parameters of 2.3. Leak frequency function based on leak size
leak size and direction.
Defining representative leak sizes is a crucial task in selecting The dependence of the leak frequency on equipment can be
representative scenarios because the estimated risks are sensitive obtained from statistical data sources, which show a strong corre-
to the leak size (FABIG, 2010; FABIG, 2014; Spouge, 1999). Note that lation between the leak frequency and size. The HSE database is one
discrete leak sizes should be defined for QRA although real leak of the standard sources of leak frequency with a high quality and
sizes are arbitrary and continuous. QRA usually considers the hole quantity of data for offshore fields (DNV, 2007; Falck et al., 2009;
diameter range from 1 mm to the maximum or full-bore diameter Lee et al., 2015; OGP, 2010a; Pitblado et al., 2011; Spouge, 1999,
of pipe segments. In terms of the leak rate, only release rates 2005, 2006; Vinnem, 2007b). Spouge (2005) presented a set of
exceeding 0.1 kg/s are usually considered because small leaks lead analytical leak frequency functions based on the HSE database as
to an insignificant impact (Vinnem, 2007a). shown in Eq. (1). This generic leak frequency function has been
In most existing QRA methodologies, leak sizes are classified
into three size categories: small (minor), medium (significant), and
large (major). Typically, the median value of each leak size range is Table 1
used as a representative value. It is assumed that the values Example of categories of leak sizes and typical leak rate ranges.
selected for each category represent all possible leak accidents.
Leak size category Hole diameter range, mm Leak rate, kg/s
Table 1 shows an example of categories of hole diameter and their
typical leak rate ranges (Spouge, 1999). Of course, the leak rate is a Small 1e10 0.1e1
Medium 10e50 1e20
function of fluid properties as well as the hole diameter.
Large 50 ~ equipment diameter >20
 B. Chu, D. Chang / Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 37 (2017) 234e247
Fig. 2. Frequency of a process pipe segment with 1 m in length and 100 mm in diameter.
verified and developed to obtain credible and consistent leak fre-
quency for any leak size categories (Falck et al., 2009; OGP, 2010a;
Pitblado et al., 2011; Spouge, 2006). Besides, with this equation,
DNV has developed the commercial LEAK software which is
frequently used in the industrial and academic fields (Celnik and
Bain, 2012; DNV, 2007; Lee et al., 2015; Reniers et al., 2006;
Vinnem, 2007b).
FðdÞ ¼ Cð1 þ aDn Þdm þ Frup
This equation expresses the frequency of leaks as a function of
the hole diameter. Here, F(d) is the frequency of holes exceeding
size d, D is the equipment diameter, d is the hole diameter, and Frup
is the additional rupture frequency. C, a, m, and n are constants for
each equipment type. The rupture frequency and constants are
defined depending on the type of equipment and leak.
All leaks in the HSE database are divided into three scenarios:
zero pressure leaks, limited leaks, and full leaks. It is statistically
known that 10% of leak accidents are zero pressure leaks, 59% of
leak accidents are limited leaks, and the remaining 31% are full
leaks (Spouge, 2005). The zero pressure leaks are normally
excluded from QRA for hydrocarbon accidents because most of
them do not lead to significant consequences. Full leaks are pres-
surized leaks and always included in QRA. They may initiate serious
accidents for personnel, structures and other safety functions.
Limited leaks include all other pressurized leaks. This type of leak
may have a limited leak duration or leak rate. Thus, this scenario is
concerned with personnel risk rather than asset risk or global
structural failure (OGP, 2010a).
Hole diameters vary from 1 mm to the full-bore diameter. Most
statistical data sources indicate that the smaller the size is, the
larger its frequency is. Fig. 2 shows the total leak frequency, F(d), of
a process pipe segment with 1 m in length and 100 mm in diameter,
derived from a general leak frequency function (DNV, 2007).
As shown in the graph, leak frequency exponentially diminishes
with increasing hole diameter. However, a sudden peak in fre-
quency is observed at the point of the largest hole diameter, or the
full-bore size. This study pays attention to this point because the
full-bore release may potentially lead to the most catastrophic
237
consequences.
The reason for the high frequency of the full-bore leak is highly
related to the cause of rupture of the process equipment. Dropped
object accidents onto the installation can damage equipment con-
taining hydrocarbons and may result in a full-bore release (DNV,
2010b; Mazzola, 2000; OGP, 2010a; Spouge, 1999). Several condi-
tions should be satisfied for a dropped object to result in hydro-
carbon leaks; it should penetrate the deck or protection above the
equipment, if any, and then strike the equipment with sufficient
(1) kinetic energy to fully cut off the piping. Table 2 presents the
probability of dropped objects per lift derived from the Worldwide
Offshore Accident Databanks and UK HSE's ORION databases (OGP,
2010b). The frequency of objects dropped onto the installation can
be estimated based on the probability of the dropped objects per
lift and the number of annual lifts.
The number of lifts per year depends on the types of units. For
example, in the case of a wellhead platform, the number of annual
loaded lifts that could cause full rupture is approximately 800 lifts
per year. In this situation, the frequency of objects dropped onto the
installation is 0.01 per year. Even if all dropped object accidents
would not lead to rupturing process equipment, this can certainly
be considered a large number. Furthermore, full-bore leaks due to
dropped objects could have high ignition probability as a result of a
large release rate and sparks on impact. Based on this reasoning,
the full-bore hydrocarbon release seems to have the highest po-
tential risk, and the contribution to the hydrocarbon leak scenario
should not be neglected.
2.4. Comparative approaches with different leak size categories
Based on the reasoning, three approaches are conceivable for
QRA of the fire accidents:
Table 2
Probability of dropped objects per lift.
Drop onto: Installation Sea Vessel
Mobile units (per lift) 1.2E-05 1.4E-06 9.4E-07
Fixed installations (per lift) 1.4E-05 8.8E-07 1.6E-06
238 B. Chu, D. Chang / Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 37 (2017) 234e247

Fig. 3. LNG fuel gas supply system for large oil tanker.
 B. Chu, D. Chang / Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 37 (2017) 234e247 239

Fig. 4. Process flow diagram of LNG-FGSS.

Table 3
Isolatable segments and major inventories for target system.

Segment Segment 1 ~ 8 e Gas Segment 1 ~ 8 e Liquid Segment 9 Segment 10 Segment 11

Description LNG Fuel Tank LNG Fuel Tank Suction Drum HP pump HP vaporizer
Mole fraction
Nitrogen 0.0287 0.0025 0.0287 0.0287 0.0287
Methane 0.9707 0.9394 0.9707 0.9707 0.9707
Ethane 0.0005 0.0480 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
Propane 0.0000 0.0082 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
n-Butane 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
i-Butane 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pressure, bara 5.0 5.0 5.0 300 300
Temperature,  C 137.4 137.4 137.4 116.6 45
Phase Gas Liquid Liquid Liquid Gas
Density, kg/m3 8.1 406.8 406.8 414.9 217.6

 Approach 1 considers only three categories of leak sizes: small,
medium, and large.
 Approach 2 considers four categories of leak sizes: small, me-
dium, large, and full bore.
 Approach 3 considers more categories of leak sizes, for example,
every hole diameter in increments of 1 mm.
Approach 1 has been employed by most conventional QRA
studies, whereas Approach 2 additionally considers the effect of the
full bore leak. Approach 3 is highly costly in terms of effort and time
and unreasonable to implement in usual QRA studies for large-scale
hydrocarbon installations. However, the results of Approach 3 can
be regarded as the exact solution to judge the accuracy of Ap-
proaches 1 and 2.
3. Case study
3.1. General
For compliance with emission regulations on SOX, NOX, partic-
ulate matter and CO2 (Devanney, 2011; IMO, 2009a, b), a significant
portion of oceangoing ships are expected to sail on natural gas. The
use of natural gas as a fuel also has validity from the viewpoint of
economics (Li et al., 2015; Seo et al., 2016). Because fuel gas should
be stored in a liquefied form or LNG, a dedicated system, called the
LNG fuel gas supply system (FGSS), should be installed onboard.
The system should accompany subsystems for the storage and
handling of pressurized LNG that surely present LNG-related risks.
When the LNG-FGSS is above the deck, the fire risk is more
detrimental than the explosion risk. An explosion in open space is
unlikely to occur, and the overpressure even in the case of explo-
sion is not considerable. In contrast, the fire risk due to cryogenic
LNG and high-pressure natural gas after evaporation may lead to
catastrophic consequences and should be addressed appropriately.
An LNG-FGSS for a large oil tanker, as shown in Fig. 3, is
considered for the case study.
This system mainly comprises eight LNG storage tanks of cy-
lindrical pressure vessels, a suction drum, a high-pressure (HP)
pump, and an HP vaporizer, as shown in Fig. 4. A pressure build-up
(PBU) is installed with the storage tank to boost the internal pres-
sure. Alternatively, a submerged pump can be installed. The suction
drum removes vapor that otherwise could enter the pump, leading
the mechanical damage. The pressurized LNG is evaporated in the
vaporizer and supplied to a main engine.
The case study conducts Approaches 1 and 2 to demonstrate the
effects of a full-bore hydrocarbon leak on the estimated risk. As
described in Section 2.4, Approach 1 categorizes the leak sizes into
three different ranges of small, medium, and large, in line with
most studies. In contrast, Approach 2 separates a full-bore leak
scenario from a large leak scenario. Thus, this approach contains
four categories of leak sizes: small, medium, large, and full-bore.
The individual risk (IR) of the target system is estimated by the
two different approaches to observe how the approaches affect the
risk estimation.
Approach 3 is also conducted to verify the results of Approach 1
and Approach 2. In this approach, leak sizes are categorized every
1 mm, which requires leak scenarios to be subdivided as finely as
possible. It is obvious that Approach 3 is the most detailed analysis
240 B. Chu, D. Chang / Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 37 (2017) 234e247

Table 4
Leak size categories and representative hole diameters for each segment and each approach.

Segment Approach Leak size category Hole diameter range, mm Representative hole diameter, mm

Segment 1 ~ 8 e Gas Approach 1 Small 10e20 15

Medium 20e50 35
Large 50e150 100
Approach 2 Small 10e20 15
Medium 20e50 35
Large 50e150 100
Full bore 150 150
Approach 3 10 mm 10 10
11 mm 11 11
« « «
149 mm 149 149
150 mm 150 150
Segment 1 ~ 8 e Liquid Approach 1 Small 5e15 10
Medium 15e50 32
Large 50e150 100
Approach 2 Small 5e15 10
Medium 15e50 32
Large 50e150 100
Full bore 150 150
Approach 3 5 mm 5 5
6 mm 6 6
« « «
149 mm 149 149
150 mm 150 150
Segment 9 Approach 1 Small 5e15 10
Medium 15e40 28
Large 40e100 70
Approach 2 Small 5e15 10
Medium 15e40 28
Large 40e100 70
Full bore 100 100
Approach 3 5 mm 5 5
6 mm 6 6
« « «
99 mm 99 99
100 mm 100 100
Segment 10 Approach 1 Small 3e5 4
Medium 5e30 18
Large 30e100 65
Approach 2 Small 3e5 4
Medium 5e30 18
Large 30e100 65
Full bore 100 100
Approach 3 3 mm 3 3
4 mm 4 4
« « «
99 mm 99 99
100 mm 100 100
Segment 11 Approach 1 Small 3e10 6
Medium 10e30 20
Large 30e80 55
Approach 2 Small 3e10 6
Medium 10e30 20
Large 30e80 55
Full bore 80 80
Approach 3 3 mm 3 3
4 mm 4 4
« « «
79 mm 79 79
80 mm 80 80

and may give the most accurate results among the three ap-
proaches. The case study commonly follows the procedure pre-
sented in Fig. 1.
3.2. Scenario selection
The target process facility is divided into several isolatable
segments by ESD (Emergency Shutdown) valves as shown in Fig. 4.
Typically, the inventory within an isolatable section is subject to
practically identical pressure and temperature. In the event of a
leak in an isolatable segment, the ESD valves are closed, and the
inventory in the isolatable segment is released to a safe location.
The isolatable segments and major inventories are listed in Table 3.
Note that Segments 1 to 8 correspond to the eight LNG fuel tanks.
The segment volume includes that of the process equipment and
piping segments.
Hydrocarbon fire risk analysis is performed on the basis of
representative leak size categories. The hole diameter ranges are
bounded from the low end by the minimum with a 0.1 kg/s leak rate
to the largest diameter of the pipe segment. The midpoints of hole
 B. Chu, D. Chang / Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 37 (2017) 234e247
Table 5
Summary of variables for accident scenarios.
Variables
Leak size
Leak position
Leak direction
Ignition type
Wind speed
Atmospheric condition (Pasquill stability class)
Fig. 5. Ignition probability with leak rate.
diameter ranges are selected as representative hole diameters. It
should be noted that the defined ranges of each segment vary with
the characteristics of the segment, including inventory conditions
and facility characteristics. Table 4 shows leak size categories and
representative hole diameters for each segment and each approach.
Other variables should be identified for further fire risk analysis.
It is assumed that the leakage position should be located at the
volumetric center of the defined segment. This study considers the
most critical leak direction at each leak position to ensure conser-
vative results.
The leaked inventory may catch fire, explode, or cause no harm
depending on whether the leak is ignited or diluted out. There are
two main types of ignition: immediate ignition and delayed igni-
tion. For defined inventory conditions, the leakage of liquid in-
ventory immediately becomes a spray of small droplets and could
incur only jet fire upon ignition (Dan et al., 2014; Spouge, 1999).
Thus, pool fire is not considered in the case study. Delayed ignition
of the flammable gas cloud results in explosion. Because flammable
gas clouds rarely form in the given condition, explosion is not
considered in this case. Although an explosion can occur above the
open deck, its impact or explosion overpressure are insignificant.
The properties of fire also depend on the weather conditions on
the sea. To obtain conservative results, the atmospheric condition is
assumed to be very stable with wind speed set as 1.5 m/s to
consider a lower dispersion scenario (Dan et al., 2014). Table 5
shows the summary of variables for the scenarios and their
241
Description
 Approach 1: Classified into small, medium and large size categories
 Approach 2: Classified into small, medium, large and full-bore size categories
 Approach 3: Classified into hole diameter categories of every 1 mm
(the leak rate depends on the inventory condition and hole diameter)
 Located at the center of the target segment
 Critical leak direction at each leak position
 Immediate ignition: Early ignition to cause jet fires
 1.5 m/s
 F (Stable)
descriptions.
3.3. Frequency analysis
The frequency analysis is carried out with a combination of ETA
and statistical data. The event is a hydrocarbon leak, and the leaked
inventory may be a fire or harmless depending on ignition. The fire
frequency for the nth accident scenario Fn is calculated by multi-
plication of the leak frequency and conditional probabilities of
ignition as shown in the following equation.
ignition
Fn ¼ fnleak  pn (2)
where fleak is the leak frequency and pignition is the ignition
probability.
The leak frequency is obtained from the historical data and Eq.
(1) in Section 4. For the estimation of leak frequency, all equipment
and piping elements of each segment are counted. Pressurized
leaks, including full leaks and limited leaks, are considered as the
leak scenario. The ignition probability can be inferred from the
simplified and sophisticated models based on historical data. The
change in the ignition probability with the leak rate for gas and
liquid is shown in Fig. 5 (Cox et al., 1990; Mannan, 2014). The im-
mediate ignition probability is assumed to be 0.5 of the overall
ignition probability.
The results of the frequency estimation for each segment and
242 B. Chu, D. Chang / Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 37 (2017) 234e247

Table 6
Results of frequency analysis.

Segment Approach Leak size category Leak freq., per year Ignition prob. Fire freq., per year

Segment 1 ~ 8 e Gas Approach 1 Small 3.721E-03 2.783E-03 1.035E-05

Medium 5.570E-04 8.264E-03 4.603E-06
Large 4.382E-05 3.183E-02 1.395E-06
Approach 2 Small 3.721E-03 2.783E-03 1.035E-05
Medium 5.570E-04 8.264E-03 4.603E-06
Large 2.788E-05 3.183E-02 8.875E-07
Full bore 1.594E-05 5.359E-02 8.545E-07
Approach 3 10 mm 3.313E-04 1.653E-03 5.476E-07
11 mm 2.799E-04 1.868E-03 5.230E-07
« « « «
149 mm 9.371E-08 5.313E-02 4.979E-09
150 mm 1.594E-05 5.359E-02 8.545E-07
Segment 1 ~ 8 e Liquid Approach 1 Small 3.266E-04 6.780E-03 3.266E-04
Medium 1.269E-04 3.021E-02 1.269E-04
Large 1.222E-04 1.306E-01 1.222E-04
Approach 2 Small 3.266E-04 6.780E-03 3.266E-04
Medium 1.269E-04 3.021E-02 1.269E-04
Large 4.607E-05 1.306E-01 4.607E-05
Full bore 7.613E-05 2.198E-01 7.613E-05
Approach 3 5 mm 7.267E-05 2.783E-03 2.023E-07
6 mm 5.390E-05 3.518E-03 1.896E-07
« « « «
149 mm 1.421E-07 2.179E-01 3.098E-08
150 mm 7.613E-05 2.198E-01 1.674E-05
Segment 9 Approach 1 Small 4.988E-04 6.780E-03 3.382E-06
Medium 1.788E-04 2.545E-02 4.551E-06
Large 1.946E-04 8.258E-02 1.607E-05
Approach 2 Small 4.988E-04 6.780E-03 3.382E-06
Medium 1.788E-04 2.545E-02 4.551E-06
Large 8.022E-05 8.258E-02 6.625E-06
Full bore 1.144E-04 1.306E-01 1.494E-05
Approach 3 5 mm 1.094E-04 2.783E-03 3.044E-07
6 mm 8.160E-05 3.518E-03 2.871E-07
« « « «
99 mm 5.422E-07 1.289E-01 6.989E-08
100 mm 1.144E-04 1.306E-01 1.494E-05
Segment 10 Approach 1 Small 1.292E-03 8.165E-03 1.055E-05
Medium 1.625E-03 5.637E-02 9.161E-05
Large 1.070E-03 2.934E-01 3.140E-04
Approach 2 Small 1.292E-03 8.165E-03 1.055E-05
Medium 1.625E-03 5.637E-02 9.161E-05
Large 5.131E-04 2.934E-01 1.505E-04
Full bore 5.572E-04 5.102E-01 2.843E-04
Approach 3 3 mm 5.988E-04 5.642E-03 3.378E-06
4 mm 4.014E-04 8.165E-03 3.278E-06
« « « «
99 mm 2.806E-06 5.037E-01 1.413E-06
100 mm 5.572E-04 5.102E-01 2.843E-04
Segment 11 Approach 1 Small 1.220E-03 1.024E-02 1.249E-05
Medium 3.617E-04 4.808E-02 1.739E-05
Large 3.712E-04 1.763E-01 6.545E-05
Approach 2 Small 1.220E-03 1.024E-02 1.249E-05
Medium 3.617E-04 4.808E-02 1.739E-05
Large 1.553E-04 1.763E-01 2.739E-05
Full bore 2.159E-04 2.853E-01 6.160E-05
Approach 3 3 mm 3.898E-04 4.203E-03 1.638E-06
4 mm 2.456E-04 6.082E-03 1.494E-06
« « « «
79 mm 1.164E-06 2.808E-01 3.268E-07
80 mm 2.159E-04 2.853E-01 6.160E-05

category are shown in Table 6. Frequency analysis of all approaches
is carried out in the same way. Because Approach 1 and Approach 2
have the same small and medium leak categories, they have the
same frequencies of leak, ignition, and fire among the leak cate-
gories. However, the frequencies are different for the larger cate-
gories; the leak frequency of the large leak category in Approach 1
is equal to the sum of the leak frequencies of the large and full-bore
leak categories in Approach 2. Note that this equality does not hold
for the ignition probability and fire frequency due to the following
reason. The ignition probabilities of the large leak categories in
Approach 1 and Approach 2 are identical because representative
hole diameters of them are same. Approach 2 separates a full-bore
leak scenario from a large leak scenario and it has its own repre-
sentative hole size. Since the fire frequency is the product of the
leak frequency and the ignition probability, the sum of the fire
frequencies of the large and full-bore leak categories in Approach 2
is not same with the fire frequency of the large leak category in
Approach 1 as shown in Table 6.
 B. Chu, D. Chang / Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 37 (2017) 234e247 243

Table 7
Results of consequence analysis.

Segment Approach Leak size category Area of lethality level, m2

10% 50% 100%

Segment 1 ~ 8 e Gas Approach 1 Small 18.1 9.3 5.4

Medium 130.8 84.9 54.3
Large 1073.7 735.0 499.2
Approach 2 Small 18.1 9.3 5.4
Medium 130.8 84.9 54.3
Large 1073.7 735.0 499.2
Full bore 2359.4 1638.0 1124.8
Approach 3 10 mm 3.7 1.3 0.0
11 mm 6.2 1.5 0.9
« « « «
149 mm 2329.1 1616.6 1109.8
150 mm 2359.4 1638.0 1124.8
Segment 1 ~ 8 e Liquid Approach 1 Small 150.4 96.9 61.5
Medium 1563.5 1063.2 715.2
Large 9663.1 8876.6 6895.9
Approach 2 Small 150.4 96.9 61.5
Medium 1563.5 1063.2 715.2
Large 9663.1 8876.6 6895.9
Full bore 14772.8 13939.4 12940.9
Approach 3 5 mm 23.3 16.2 9.1
6 mm 42.8 28.1 16.7
« « « «
149 mm 14705.5 13868.5 12848.7
150 mm 14772.8 13939.4 12940.9
Segment 9 Approach 1 Small 150.4 96.9 61.5
Medium 1206.2 815.0 545.7
Large 7029.1 4947.7 3415.8
Approach 2 Small 150.4 96.9 61.5
Medium 1206.2 815.0 545.7
Large 7029.1 4947.7 3415.8
Full bore 9663.1 8876.6 6895.9
Approach 3 5 mm 23.3 16.2 9.1
6 mm 42.8 28.1 16.7
« « « «
99 mm 9617.3 8803.3 6761.3
100 mm 9663.1 8876.6 6895.9
Segment 10 Approach 1 Small 130.0 80.4 55.8
Medium 2612.3 1830.5 1260.9
Large 11978.8 10907.3 9359.6
Approach 2 Small 130.0 80.4 55.8
Medium 2612.3 1830.5 1260.9
Large 11978.8 10907.3 9359.6
Full bore 19980.0 17293.2 14319.4
Approach 3 3 mm 80.00 35.80 27.20
4 mm 130.0 80.4 55.8
« « « «
99 mm 19980.0 17176.1 14245.5
100 mm 19980.0 17293.2 14319.4
Segment 11 Approach 1 Small 79.3 45.7 21.1
Medium 1471.0 1000.1 671.9
Large 4880.8 4262.8 3902.1
Approach 2 Small 79.3 45.7 21.1
Medium 1471.0 1000.1 671.9
Large 4880.8 4262.8 3902.1
Full bore 7821.3 6637.8 6073.1
Approach 3 3 mm 0.35 0.00 0.00
4 mm 18.5 3.5 0.0
« « « «
79 mm 7722.6 6560.5 6005.6
80 mm 7821.3 6637.8 6073.1

3.4. Consequence analysis estimate the lethality of the accidents.

This section presents the physical impact of the fire on opera-
tors. Several models based on experimental data and commercial
codes are available to estimate the fire results. In this case study,
consequence modeling is conducted by DNV PHAST, which is one of
the most commonly used commercial codes in the industry (DNV,
2010a) and provides contours of thermal radiation levels to
The radiation contours from the consequence modeling are
used to estimate the fatality rate of personnel exposed to jet fires.
It is assumed that immediate fatality should be assumed for ra-
diation above 37.5 kW/m2. Delayed fatality depends on the radi-
ation intensity and the exposure time between 12.5 kW/m2 and
37.5 kW/m2 (Spouge, 1999). The lethality of the jet fire is esti-
mated through two radiation criteria which are 12.5 kW/m2 and
244 B. Chu, D. Chang / Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 37 (2017) 234e247

Table 8 exposed to thermal radiation over a given duration of time. It is

Number of fatalities for both approaches. assumed that the workers exposed to radiation should use escape
Segment Approach Leak size category No. Of fatalities routes and leave the area within 30 s. In other words, 30 s of
Segment 1 ~ 8 e Gas Approach 1 Small 0.0103
exposure time is considered to be the worst case. Incident radiation
Medium 0.0928 levels of 18.3 kW/m2 and 26.6 kW/m2 represent the 10 and 50%
Large 0.8145 lethality levels from a given probit function, respectively. Table 7
Approach 2 Small 0.0103 shows the results of the consequence analysis for each segment
Medium 0.0928
and category.
Large 0.8145
Full bore 1.8187 The number of fatalities for an accident scenario can be obtained
Approach 3 10 mm 0.0011 by considering the probability of death, the area of lethality level,
11 mm 0.0021 and the population density. The number of fatalities for the nth
« «
accident scenario Cn is defined as follows.
149 mm 1.7949
150 mm 1.8187
Segment 1 ~ 8 e Liquid Approach 1 Small 0.1058 Cn ¼ POBavg
Medium 1.1752



Large 9.9661
A100
n
% þ 0:5  A50 %  A100 % þ 0:1  A10 %  A50 %
n n n n
Approach 2 Small 0.1058

Deck Area
Medium 1.1752
Large 9.9661
(4)
Full bore 16.9213
Approach 3 5 mm 0.0167 where POBavg is the average annual number of people on board.
6 mm 0.0299 A100%, A50%, and A10% are the 100%, 50%, and 10% lethality levels,
« « respectively. It is assumed that the number of crew on deck is 25
149 mm 16.8197
and that the total deck area of the oil tanker is 19,980 m2. Table 8
150 mm 16.9213
Segment 9 Approach 1 Small 0.1058 shows the number of expected fatalities for each segment and ac-
Medium 0.9002 cident scenario. Note that both approaches have a number of fa-
Large 5.4929 talities for the small to large leak categories.
Approach 2 Small 0.1058
Medium 0.9002
Large 5.4929 3.5. Risk estimation
Full bore 9.9661
Approach 3 5 mm 0.0167
6 mm 0.0299
The risk to personnel is expressed by the IR, which states the
« « probability of fatalities per year for an individual worker. The IR is
99 mm 9.8394 expressed by the following equation (Vinnem, 2007b).
100 mm 9.9661
Segment 10 Approach 1 Small 0.0914 PLL
Medium 2.0319 IR ¼ 8760
(5)
Large 12.8135 POBavg $Exposed time ðHÞ
Approach 2 Small 0.0914
Medium 2.0319 where PLL is the potential loss of life, which is the annual number of
Large 12.8135
Full bore 20.1138
fatalities and can be calculated by multiplying the results of the
Approach 3 3 mm 0.0449 frequency and consequence analyses (Vinnem, 2007b).
4 mm 0.0914 X
« « PLL ¼ ðFn $Cn Þ (6)
99 mm 20.0090 n
100 mm 20.1138
Segment 11 Approach 1 Small 0.0460 For crews on board the oil tanker, it is assumed that the exposed
Medium 1.1049 time is 6 months per year, i.e., 4380 h per 8760 h.
Large 5.1855 Table 9 Summarizes the IR for crew members. Based on different
Approach 2 Small 0.0460
Medium 1.1049
representative leak categories, the results of the two approaches
Large 5.1855 produce different individual risks for the target system. The IR of
Full bore 8.1003 Approach 1 is 1.197E-04, whereas that of Approach 2 is 2.298E-04,
Approach 3 3 mm 0.0000 nearly two times higher than that of Approach 1. The IR of Approach
4 mm 0.0040
3 is 2.204E-04, which is relatively close to that of Approach 2. In
« «
79 mm 8.0071 consequence, Approach 1 considerably underestimates the IR in
80 mm 8.1003 comparison with Approach 2 or 3.

4. Results and discussion

37.5 kW/m2.
To predict the probability of delayed fatality from thermal ra-
diation, a probit function Pr is employed with thermal dose criteria
(Eisenberg et al., 1975).

4 
Pr ¼ 14:9 þ 2:56ln Q 3 t
where Q is the thermal radiation, and t is the exposure time.
The probit function estimates the fatality rate of personnel
The case study demonstrated obvious difference in the IRs be-
tween Approaches 1 and 2. Compared with the IR of Approach 3,
Approach 1 provided a significantly underestimated IR, whereas
Approach 2 gave a relatively comparable IR with an approximately
4% deviation. Regarding the results of Approach 3 as the most ac-
(3) curate solution, Approach 2 provides a more accurate result than
Approach 1 for the target system.
Fig. 6 shows the contribution of each leak category to the IR in
each approach. In Approach 1, the large leak size contributes 95.8%
 B. Chu, D. Chang / Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 37 (2017) 234e247 245

Table 9
IR for crew members.

Approach Segment IR, per year Total IR, per year Ratio of IR to Approach 3

Approach 1 Segment 1~ 8 e Gas 3.341E-08 1.197E-04 0.54

Segment 1~ 8e Liquid 3.275E-06
Segment 9 1.855E-06
Segment 10 8.421E-05
Segment 11 7.184E-06
Approach 2 Segment 1~ 8 e Gas 5.622E-08 2.298E-04 1.04
Segment 1~ 8e Liquid 6.958E-06
Segment 9 3.795E-06
Segment 10 1.567E-04
Segment 11 1.322E-05
Approach 3 Segment 1~ 8 e Gas 4.707E-08 2.204E-04 1.00
Segment 1~ 8e Liquid 6.611E-06
Segment 9 3.663E-06
Segment 10 1.509E-04
Segment 11 1.263E-05

Fig. 6. Contribution of each leak scenario to IR.

of the IR, followed by the medium leak size. The largest percentage
of the IR in Approaches 2 and 3 is the full-bore leak size. The small
leak size has little effect on the personnel risks in all three ap-
proaches. This means that the IR is governed by the larger sizes of
leaks that accompany a large amount of hydrocarbon release rather
than the smaller sizes of leaks.
Fig. 7 shows the contribution of each segment to the IR in each
approach. Although the IR of Approach 1 is distinguished in
magnitude from those of Approaches 2 and 3, the relative contri-
butions of each segment to the IR remain similar for all three ap-
proaches. Segments 10 and 11 containing high-pressure inventory
contribute the leading parts of the IR. Segment 10 contributes the
largest percentage of the IR because it contains the highest pressure
of liquid inventory, which may result in a large amount of hydro-
carbon release. This segment also has a relatively high leak fre-
quency, as shown in Table 6.
Fig. 8 shows a distribution of leak frequencies for all segments of
the target system. The distribution exponentially decays with
increasing hole diameter, but there are several outliers as shown in
the graph. Those outliers correspond to diameters of the piping
segments of the system. Within the segment, the full-bore leak size
has a much higher frequency than other large sizes of leaks. As
mentioned in Section 4, the reason for this is related to the rupture
of the piping segment, which is caused by the dropped object ac-
cidents onto the installation. With high frequency, this accident
may accompany a large amount of hydrocarbon release, causing
catastrophic consequences.
Table 10 shows the IRs depending on the piping diameter of the
target system. The IRs of Approaches 1 and 2 are different regard-
less of the piping segment diameter. The full-bore leak size has a
decisive effect on the results over the whole range of piping di-
ameters. In Approach 1, the underestimated IR results from
ignoring the full-bore leak accidents that led to the most cata-
strophic consequences. The full-bore leak size is the most critical
one in terms of fire risks to personnel and should be treated as an
individual scenario.
The results of the case study also relate to the fact that the full-
bore leak size has comparatively high frequency. If a full-bore hole
246 B. Chu, D. Chang / Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 37 (2017) 234e247

Fig. 7. Contribution of each segment to IR.

Fig. 8. Leak frequency for all segments.

diameter had the lowest frequency, unlike in the real situation, the
distribution of leak frequencies would exponentially decay without
the peak points at the full-bore hole diameters. Under this condi-
tion, the full-bore leak size would have little influence on the risk
estimation, and both approaches would give practically the same
results.
5. Conclusion
The full-bore leak size is the critical scenario that significantly
affects the estimated risks because it accompanies the largest
consequence with relatively high frequency. Omission of the full-
bore leak size in the QRA leads to underestimation of the fire
risks. This may cause misjudgment in the risk-informed decision-
making process. Therefore, the full-bore leak size should be
considered as one of representative scenarios in the QRA.
The effect of the full-bore leak size has been demonstrated by a
case study. These accidents feature a high leak rate, which has a
great effect on the fatality risk. Although it is not fully revealed for
other cases, the results concerning the personnel risk are not
 B. Chu, D. Chang / Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 37 (2017) 234e247
Table 10
IRs depending on piping diameters.
Approach IR, per year (Ratio to Approach 3)
<25 mm 80 mm
Approach 1 2.264E-08 (0.72) 7.184E-06 (0.57)
Approach 2 3.739E-08 (1.19) 1.321E-05 (1.05)
Approach 3 3.133E-08 1.263E-05
expected to differ significantly from those of the current case study.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to conduct comparative studies for
other cases.
Regarding the structure-related risk, the effect of neglecting the
full-bore leak category is not as clear as in the case of the personnel
risk. This is because of the intrinsic characteristics of the leak or the
tradeoff between the high heat dose rate and the short duration of
the full-bore leak. Its risk to the structure will be largely affected by
the safety systems, including emergency isolation, blowdown, and
especially passive fire protection, on the structure. The first two
safety systems determine the duration of the leak and thermal
dose, whereas the last mitigates the rate of temperature rise in the
structure.
It is clear that more scenarios are considered, the better accurate
estimates of the risk of hydrocarbon leak accidents can be obtained.
However, considering all the possible scenarios is a very-time
consuming task. This study indicates that taking the full-bore ac-
cidents into additional account to the conventional simplified QRA
can reduce the time and effort for estimating the leak-related risks
without a significant loss of accuracy in the estimated risks.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by a grant from the LNG Plant R&D
Center funded by the Ministry of Land, Transportation and Mari-
time Affairs (MLTM) of the Korean government (15CPTA-A058125-
08).
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