5th IEEE International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Grid Computing(PDGC-2018), 20-22 Dec, 2018, Solan, India

Secure Authentication Protocol for 5G Enabled IoT Network

Suraj Sharma1 , Shaswat Satapathy1 , Shivani Singh1 , Amiya Kumar Sahu1 , Mohammad S. Obaidat, Fellow of
IEEE2 , Sanjay Saxena1 , and Deepak Puthal3
1 International Institute of Information Technology, Bhubaneswar, India

Email: {suraj, sanjay}@iiit-bh.ac.in; {shaswat221b, shivanisinghn11, amiyakumar20072}@gmail.com

2 ECE Department, Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan

King Abdullah II School of IT, University of Jordan, Jordan

University of Science and Technology Beijing (USTB), Beijing, China
Email: msobaidat@gmail.com;
3 University of Technology Sydney, Australia

Email: deepak.puthal@gmail.com

Abstract—The rapid growth of Internet of Things(IoT) along
with wide range of applications made IoT popular. Moreover,the
network connectivity and communication support is provided
by 5G technology. The mobile technology is also becoming the
essential component of Social life, which is also becoming the
essential interface for IoT. Various services of IoT may be availed
from IoT server, which are enabled with 5G network technology.
The IoT service access would require a intermediate access
network to connect to 5G, and access network may be publicly
accessible. Hence, there exists security threat to user’s data.
Here, In this paper, We provided an application layer security
protocol to mitigate all those attacks originating from public
access network. We have also tested the security protocol by an
automated security testing tool, Scyther. The security protocol
exhibits Secrecy, Aliveness, Non-Injective Agreement, and Non-
Inective Synchronization.The protocol is resistant to various
attacks, which could originate from Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability. The user-credentials and services-request are secretly
communicated, thereby preserving the privacy.
Index Terms—Authentication, IoT, Security, 5G Service Slice
I. INTRODUCTION
With the evolution of communication industry from LTE
to 5G, it will provide a platform for emanating technologies
such as IoT and IoV to be an integral part of our economy and
society as a whole [1][2][3][4]. There is an increased demand
of bandwidth, ultra- low latency, and potential to manage huge
number of connected devices. Further, the features of 5G over
4G-LTE are low latency upto 1 millisecond, bandwidth per
unit area estimated to be 1000x, 1-10 Gbps speed, energy
efficient, 99 percent availability and many more [5]. The entire
5G network services can be classified into three different cate-
gories: enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), massive machine
type communications (mMTC), and ultra-reliable and low-
latency communications (uRLLC) as per The International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) [6]. The evolution in the shift
of paradigm of the mobile communication industry from 2G
to 5G are as follows:
• 2G cellular networks: The technology used is Global
System for Mobile communication(GSM) and enabling
services offered are normal voice system, fax, text mes-
sage services, etc. with data rate of around 9.6-10.0 Kbps
[7].
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• 3G Cellular networks: When Internet became the most
useful technology around the globe then the concept of
Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS)
emerged as a promising technology to provide a data rate
of around 2 Mbps [8].
• 4G Cellular networks: It provides all Internet protocol
and packet switching based communication services
such as IP telephony. The peak data rate provided by
4G-LTE for downloading is around 100 Mbps and for
LTE-Advanced is 1000 Mbps [9].
A. Features of 3GPP architecture
According to 3GPP Service based Architecture in 3GPP TS
23.501 [10], the architecture contains mainly two planes i.e.
Control plane and User plane.The user plane function (UPF)
consists of packet routing, packet forwarding, policy enforce-
ment,branching point to support multi-homed public display
unit (PDU) sessions and handling quality of service(QOS).
The control plane consists mainly of the following func-
tions:
• Access and Mobility Management (AMF): It is respon-
sible for maintaining mobility, registration and reacha-
bility management.It provides access authentication, ac-
cess authorization, Security Anchor Function support
(SEAF) support and Security Context Management Func-
tion (SCMF) support.
• Session Management Function (SMF): It is responsible
for managing sessions, allocating IP address for user
equipment, user plane selection and controlling policy
enforcement and QOS.
• Unified Data Management (UDM): It is responsible
for Authentication Credential Repository and Processing
Function (ARPF) support and subscription of data stor-
age.
• Policy Control Function (PCF): It is responsible for
making policies for Control plane.
• Authentication Server Function (AUSF): It provides au-
thentication for various services and user equipment(UE).
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 5th IEEE International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Grid Computing(PDGC-2018), 20-22 Dec, 2018, Solan, India
• Network Slice Selection Function (NSSF): It chooses the
group of network slice instances serving the UE, de-
termining allowed Network S lice Selection Association
Information (NSSAI) and determining the AMF Set to be
used to serve the UE.
Security protocols applied to different functions are ARPF,
SEAF, SCMF and SPCF. Authentication Credential Repository
and Processing Function (ARPF) are emplaced with UDM so
as to store the security credentials for authentication and exe-
cute cryptography algorithms [11]. Security Anchor Function
support (SEAF) presented in the AMF is used to store visited
network’s root key and separation of mobility function from
anchor function. The Security Context Management Function
(SCMF) generates the additional security key for the network,
which can be generated by SEAF key. The Secure policy
control function(SPCF) is collaborated with PCF to provide
the security policy to the network,integrity and confidentiality
protection.
B. IoT Reference Model
The rapid rise in the connected physical objects, and their
accompanying applications surrounding us, often collectively
referred to as the Internet of Things (IoT) has lead to a
growing interest and attention from the everyone including
governments, the industry, the scientific community amongst
other communities. Ericsson projects that by 2021, 28 billion
of smart device wearable devices will be connected where
15 billion M2M connected devices will be available across
the globe [12]. While Machina Research forecasts that “IoT
will account for one-quarter of the global 41 million 5G
connections in 2024.”[13]
The numerous opportunities presented by the IoT industry,
however, often come at the cost of privacy and security threats,
in exchange for fine-grained sensing and data analytic. The
IoT Architectural framework can be subdivided into perception
layer, network layer, application layer[14] and [15]. Security
challenges in each of these layers are described below briefly:
• Perception Layer: Due to limitation of computational
ability and low power consumption, it is more prone to
security threats. Interception of nodes by a third party and
confidentiality exploitation, timing attack are the major
issues [16].
• Network Layer: It is susceptible to eavesdropping, passive
monitoring and Man In The Middle Attack. Therefore,
secure key exchange mechanism is needed to prevent
identity thefts [17].
• Application Layer: Integrity between different application
and their respective authentication mechanism to avert
privacy and authentication threats [18].
To address some of these issues, we propose an Authenti-
cation framework supporting privacy-preserving slice selec-
tion and authenticated key agreement for 5G-enabled IoT.
It enables the IoT service provider to generate anonymous
delegation for subscribed users to access IoT services.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
discusses different existing methods for security. In Section
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III, we describe the proposed security protocol. Section IV
contains of the results of the security simulations. The paper
concludes with Section V where we also suggest some future
works.
II. R ELATED W ORKS
The objective of the research & development of 5G
is to increase the mobile broadband users, more capacity
than today’s 4G network, supporting the communication
between device to device (D2D) and huge comminucations
of machine-type [19]. To do so, different techniques are
applied to 5G, like massive multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO), full duplex communication, heterogeneous networks
(HetNet), millimeter wave (mmWave) [20] and networking
slicing [21]. In this paper, our main focus would be on the
network slicing concept involved in 5G. In [22] an end-to-end
vertical and horizontal slicing technique for 5G system is
proposed. In this work vertical slicing is used for the vertical
industry and services where as horizontal slicing is used
to improve the capacity of the system & experience of the
user. Zhou et al. [23] presented hierarchical network slicing
architecture, helping operators to offer customized end-
to-end cellular networks as a service. Ksentini et al. [24]
proposed a framework to enforce network slices, featuring
radio resources abstraction based on the 3GPP DCN and a
flexible RAN. Previous works present several network slicing
strategies for wireless network but unfortunately the security
of slice selection is ignored, which leads to user privacy
leakage.
3GPP TS 23.501 [10] specifies the system architecture
for the 5G System, the major changes being introduction
of network slicing concept, user plane separation, a new
service based architecture and a flexible Non-3GPP access
inter-working. This paper also presents the new security
features of the 5G core network with respect to the key
areas like User Plane security termination, authentication and
authorization, RAN security, and security within UE and
network slicing security.
Jianbing et al. proposed an secure and efficient service-
oriented authentication framework which supports the network
slicing technique for 5G-enabled IoT (ES 3 A) [25]. 5G com-
bines a variety of new and complex wireless technologies such
as D2D, etc. HEnce, it needs lightweight security techniques.
In [26] Fei Pan et al. proposed a lightweight multi-tier au-
thentication architecture. However, no simulation was done to
prove the correctness of the proposed framework.
Since 5G is a heterogeneous network, key generation for
encryption, distribution,etc. are going to be extremely chal-
lenging because of its dynamic nature. To resolve this issue,
Hamamreh et al. [27] proposed a physical layer security tech-
nique for safeguarding the transmission of OFDM waveforms
against eavesdropping in 5G.
The NGMN (Next Generation Mobile Networks) has
pointed new attacks and security issues which may arise with
5G system [21]. The NGMN allinace proposed 5G security
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 5th IEEE International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Grid Computing(PDGC-2018), 20-22 Dec, 2018, Solan, India
recommendations network slicing. For example, according to
NGMN, the Network Slice Manager, as well as the target
host platforms cannot be trusted and should be supported by
mutual authentication. Our security architecture could be used
to authenticate the user equipments (hosts) in the networks
they control on which the network slice instances are loaded.
5G plays as a key factor to meet the increasing demands of
the (IoT) services. Which includes increased througput, huge
coomunication between devices and low waiting time for the
response of the IoT, fog computing and network slicing. To
satisfy the rising demands of IoT services, network slicing
and fog computing are considered together in service-oriented
5G architecture, but this opens up the door for a lot of
security threats like, user privacy, etc. In [25] Jianbing et al.
presented a privacy-preserving slice selection mechanism that
would ensure fog nodes to select proper network slices based
on different application requirements. However, a valid sim-
ulated result of the proposed service-oriented authentication
is missing and proper designing of security algorithm is also
required to build secure communication between different user
equipments and its specific IoT servers.
III. P ROPOSED S ECURITY P ROTOCOL
A. Attack Scenario
5G is becoming the integral part of IoT services. As
Figure 1 depicts, there can be various types of services, such
as M2M communication, Vehicular Communication, Mobile
Communication, available from a 5G enabled IoT network.
A U ser − Equipment(Vehicle or Machine or Mobile) could
connect to 5Gnetwork through some Accessnetwork for
availing various services from various IoT servers. Typically,
a user device requests for a service to Core Access and Mo-
bility Management Function (AMF) which is the responsible
for service allocation after the verification of Network Slice
Selection Association Information NSSAI. UMD is responsi-
ble for authentication credential generation and subscription
management. NSSF selects the set of network slice instances
serving users and determines the NSSAI corresponding to
applicable network slice instances. In an open environment
of access network, an intruder may eavesdrop the selected
service and user credentials. The privacy of the User will
be in stake. Further, an attacker may use the extracted data
for impersonation and DoS attacks. Hence, There is a crucial
requirement of security protocol to preserve privacy along with
confidentiality and integrity of the data exchanged.
B. Security Assumptions
Real-world working assumptions for 5G enabled IoT sce-
nario are follows:
Assumption 1:The encrypted service-request/user-credential
can only be decrypted by a shared symmetric-key, which was
used for encryption.
Assumption 2: AMF is the full trusted party and physically
secured.
Assumption 3: User equipment is also trusted party of the
system; it is free from malware and not physically tampered.
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C. Threat Model
This paper considers the possible threats to 5G enabled
IoT service; which is based on three cryptological parameters:
authenticity of the user, confidentiality of the service request
by the user, and integrity of the confidential user credentials.
The threat models are illustrated as follows:
Threat on authentication: There is a possibility of unau-
thenticated attacker T rudy, who has the capability of moni-
toring, intercepting, and impersonate as an authenticated user
equipment to send data through the 5G network. The possible
attacks by the attacker are: Sybil, impersonation, identity-
based attacks, etc.
Threat to confidentiality: An adversary is an unauthorized
person who could access and understand the unauthorized
service-query or service-allocation in the path to 5G net-
work. Various possible passive attacks includes packet sniffing,
phishing, etc.
Threat to integrity: An attacker may have an attack on
integrity; he could monitor the service-request/user-credentials
in 5G and user equipment. The attacker may attempt to access
and alter the service before it reaches AMF of 5G network.
Numerous possible attacks include man-in-the-middle attack,
session hijacking attack, etc
Table I: Notations used in security protocol
Acronym Description
U Eid ith User Equipment’s ID.
Ki ith User Equipment’s shared secret key.
rn2 ith AMF’s temporary key
Skey Generated key for authentication
e1/e2/e3 Encrypted by User Equipment’s shared secret key Ki
h1/h2/h3/h4 Hash function applied for integrity of the data
rn
L Random number generated by the User Equipment
Bitwise XOR operation
k Concatenation operation
H() One way hash function
ServiceRequest The service requested by User Equipment
A Variable to carry integrity and authentication of the message
E() Encryption Function
D() Decryption function
D. Proposed protocol
The proposed security protocol shown in Figure 2 and the
notations are illustrated in Table I. Assume n number of User
Equipments associated with IoT services through 5G network
having U E1 , U E2 , ...., U En .
Step 1: Initially, a User Equipment U Ei sends its iden-
tification number U Eid and a random number rn obtained
by it. It sends (U Eid, rn) to the Core Access and Mobility
Management Function (AMF) through the Access Network.
The steps are as follows:
RandomN o : rn
EquipmentID : U Eid
1) U Ei → AM F :
{U Eid, rn}
Step 2: AMF receives the pair (U Eid, rn) from the User
Equipment U Eid, it retrieves its shared symmetric key, Ki .
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 5th IEEE International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Grid Computing(PDGC-2018), 20-22 Dec, 2018, Solan, India

IoT
Servers

M-2-M
Communication 
SLICE 1 5G  CONTROL
PLANE
NETWORK
M-2-M
communication Attacker
AUSF NRF AUSF UDM PCF AF

Vehicular 
Services
ACCESS
SLICE 2 NETWORK
Vehicular
Communication
AMF SMF

SLICE 3
Mobile
Services
Mobile
Communication 

Figure 1: Attack Scenario for IoT enabled 5G Network

after that, AMF generates a random number for communicat- (rn, Skey) =L Dki (e1)
ing with the corresponding User Equipment U Eid. AMF also rn2 = Skey Ki
calculates the key Skey by bit-wise X-ORing the temporary e2 = Eki (rn, Skey)
key rn2 and secret key Ki . The AMF encrypts the generated h2 = H(Skey k e2 k rn)
key Skey with the UEid’s random number rn. Then, AMF if( e1 == e2 and h1 == h2 )
calculates a message digest for integrity using one way hash { Authenticated AMF }
function H() and generates the end message h1. AMF sends else { Terminate the protocol
the secret message e1 with message digest h1. The steps are and communication }
0

as follows: h2 = H(h1 k Skey k e2 k

rn)
0
3) U E → AM F : {h2 }

0
Step 4: AMF receives the h2 from User Equipment U Eid,
then checks equality of it with H(h1 k Skey k e1 k rn). If it
is true, then User Equipment U Eid is authenticated by AMF
and it sends the h3; Otherwise, then exits. The sequence of
Ki ← retrievekey(U Eid) steps are as follows:
RandomN o L : rn2 h3 = H(h1 k Skey k e1 k
Skey = rn2 Ki rn)
0
e1 = Eki (rn, Skey) if(h3 == h2 ) authenticated
h1 = H(Skey k e1 k rn) User Equipment U Eid
2) U Eid ← AM F : {e1, h1} 4) U E ← AM F : {h3}

Step 5: The authenticated User Equipment U Eid. The User

Equipment ciphers the ServiceRequest with secret key Ki and
evaluates the message integrity h4 by H(e3). After that, it
Step 3: The User Equipment U Eid gets {h1, e1} from the creates a variable A and assigns the result obtained by bit-
0

AMF and decrypts the encrypted message e1 with D(). The wise X-ORing h4 and h2 and transmits it along with e3. The
User Equipment then finds rn2 by X-ORing Skey and ki . sequence of steps are as follows:
It then generates its own version of secret message and its e3 = Eki (ServiceRequest)
corresponding hash values as e2 and h2, respectively. The User h4 = H(e3)
L 0
Equipment, U Eid then compares its created versions e2 with A = h4 h2
0 0
e1 and h2 with h1. If it finds that both e2 = e1 and h2 = h1 5) U Eid → AM F : {e3, A}
true, then it authenticates the AMF, otherwise it terminates the
protocol. The steps are given as follows:
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 5th IEEE International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Grid Computing(PDGC-2018), 20-22 Dec, 2018, Solan, India

Core Access and Mobility

User Equipment (UE)
Management Function (AMF)

RandomNo: rn
EquipmentID: UEid UE AMF: { AUid, rn }
Step 1

Ki Sharedkey (UEid)

UE AMF: { e1 ,h1}
Step 2
{ rn, Skey}= Dki (e1)
rn2=Skey ⊕ Ki
e2 =Eki ( rn, Skey )
h2 =H( Skey || e2 || rn )
If ( e1==e2 && h1==h2 )
Authenticate the AMF
Else terminate
h2’ =H (h1 || Skey || e2 ||
rn)
UE AMF: { h3 }
Step 4
RandomNo: rn2
Figure 3: Security Verification settings for the security protocol
Skey= rn2 ⊕ Ki
e1 = Eki (rn , Skey)
h1=H ( Skey || e1 || rn) Step 6: AMF obtains {e3, A}. Then it retrieves h4 from
A by bit-wise X-ORing. Next, it evaluates its message di-
gest for integrity check from e3. After that, it checks the
0
equality betweenh4 and h4 . If equal, then the encrypted
ServiceRequest e3 is decrypted to obtain the Service Request.
It then processes the ServiceRequest and sends back the results
and acknowledgment to User Equipment U Eid. The steps
below depict the process:
L 0
h4 = A h2
0
h4 = H(e3)
0
if(h4 == h4) then integrity is
preserved
UE AMF: { h2’ } ServiceRequest = Dki (e3)
Step 3
execute the ServiceRequest
h3 = H(h1 || Skey || e1 || rn) 6) U E ← AM F : {Ack}
If ( h3 ==h2’ )
Authenticate UE The User Equipment U Eid can continue availing the IoT
Else terminate services till the session-time provided by 5G expires by
following steps Five and Six in sequence.

e3 =Eki (ServiceRequest) IV. S IMULATION AND R ESULTS

h4 =H (e3) The Security protocol for the IoT enabled 5G is simu-
A= h4 ⊕ h2 lated using Scyther security testing environment with Security
UE AMF: { e3 , A } Protocol Description Language (.spdl). Figure 4 shows the
Step 5 results in the Scyther tool depicting the status and different
security claims with the setting depicted in Figure 3. The
h4 =A ⊕ h3
Scyther tool is used for authentication and secrecy tests.
h4’ =H(e3 )
Our security protocol is tested for Secrecy, Aliveness, Non-
If ( h4' ==h4 )
Injective Agreement, and Non-Inective Synchronization. The
Integrity preserved; Process
definition of the above security terms are provided in [28].
The ServiceRequest=Dki ( e3)
From the result, it is evident that our protocol is resistant
UE AMF: { Ack} to various attacks which could originate from Confidentiality,
Step 6 Integrity and Availability. The user-credentials and service-
requests are secretly communicated thereby preserving the
privacy.
Figure 2: Proposed protocol steps for IoT enabled 5G Network

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 5th IEEE International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Grid Computing(PDGC-2018), 20-22 Dec, 2018, Solan, India
Figure 4: Simulation results of the proposed protocol
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
The next generation IoT will require a lot of bandwidth
to accommodate various services of ioT. 5G network would
provide a great support of connectivity, mobility and fast-
communication to existing IoT services. Nevertheless, the
security threat to it is inevitable. In this paper, we analyzed the
various IoT services through Access network and 5G network.
We depicted the threat to the user’s privacy and potential
danger for further attacks. We proposed an Application layer
efficient security protocol between User-Equipment and AMF
of 5G network. The protocol is then tested with Scyther, a
formal verification tool. With which we preserved Secrecy,
Aliveness, Non-Injective Agreement, and Non-Inective Syn-
chronization of the protocol.
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