Role playing leads to passivity

Antonio 95 (Robert, Professor of Philosophy at University of Kansas Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History, American Journal of Sociology,
Vol. 101, No. 1, pp. 1-43)

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for
slave morality and mass disci- pline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no
such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's
"objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its
emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that
subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to

correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered
"roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement.
While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized

occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement.

They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating

effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors "The role has actually

become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating
inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness,
spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes,
meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86;
1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4,316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized

"shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and
superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that
which is represented? ... [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves
"prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84 -86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 23233, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and

This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or

aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others.

participate in enduring networks of interdependence ; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the
societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a
watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always `might miss out on something.' `Rather do anything
than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion

Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and
in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others."

an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment
(e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership.
Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively
and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these
impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant,
all according to circumstances." Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one
knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely a god, prince, class,
The deadly combination of desperate
physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience."

conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way

for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).
7. Ontology precedes policy – policy without recognition of ontological flaws have
been empirically bad
Spanos 8 (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, Global American:
The Devastation of Language Under the Dictatorship of the Public Realm, p. 172-173, Muse) PJ

This argument against the Bush administration and its intellectual deputies by oppositional intellectuals is manifest. There is no
question that this presidential administration has gone farther than any other in the history of the U.S. to
relocate the power to govern, constitutionally allocated jointly to the Congress, the judiciary, and the executive branches, in
the presidency. And this revolutionary reactionary turn behooves oppositional intellectuals to resist this
ominous political momentum, that is, to participate in politics, in a far more active way than heretofore.
But this oppositional representation of the U.S.’s relation to the world, though true in part, is not finally commensurate with the
sociopolitical realities of what the neoconservative deputies of the dominant culture have called the “American Century”—the global
realities, that is, produced under the aegis of a commodity-driven techno-capitalist, and republican “America,” the America, in the phrase
coined by Theodore Roosevelt, as “Leader of the Free World.” Nor, therefore, is the consequent tendency of recent American oppositional
intellectuals to over-determine politics as the privileged site of resistance adequate to the imperatives of these global realities. In the
following, all too brief remarks, I want
to suggest, not an alternative to this kind of disciplinary oppositional politics, but a
comportment towards political resistance that perceives the act of thinking as ontologically
prior to, yet indissolubly related with politics. I have inferred this comportment from the decisive
disintegration of the base/superstructure and/or disciplinary models of the representation
of being enabled by the poststructuralist revolution, but, contrary to the poststructuralists’ tendency to
restrict the implications of this revolution to the site of language (textuality) as such, I have, like Edward
W. Said, understood this revolution as a historical and “worldly” one.2 More specifically, I read the “postmodern” revolution in thinking,
misnamed “theory” (from the Greek, theoria, to see) as the
precipitate of the fulfillment in post-
Enlightenment, capitalist/democratic America of the binary logic of the languages of
Western civilization that had their origin in a metaphysical interpretation of being that
reduces the many into the One, difference to Identity, be-ing to Being, or, in the binary that has not
been emphasized enough, temporality into Spatial (or Territorialized) Object. In other words, I read this revolution as the
coming to its end of a gradual but necessary and relentless process of reification—which is to say, of hardening and decay—that has
rendered the originative language of thinking depthless: an abstract, quantitative, calculative, and instrumental—utterly thoughtless—
sociopolitical agent of brutal violence, torture, mutilation, dispossession, death on those constituencies of the human community (and the
land that sustains them) that this system of language and thought deem expendable, those who, in Michel Foucault’s phrase, do not prove
“useful and docile” to the dominant culture.

7. Pragmatic approaches lead to imperialist violence in the face of

progressive policies

Spanos 2k (William V, Professor of English at Binghamton University, America’s Shadow, p. 186-187) PJ

marginalization has been the consequence of a number of interrelated tendencies: the growing
This
(American) pragmatist resistance to theory, the academic loss of nerve in the face of the existential
imperatives of the decentering of the subject, the nationalist or racist resistance to "white" postmodernist writing, the
nostalgic Left's representation of the decentering as a relativism that precludes
practice, and, not least, the disengagement incumbent on the institutionalization of
dissent. Whatever the causes, the marginalization of the postmodern demystification of the self-identical subject has been
disabling. It has paralyzed — indeed, rendered irrelevant — the critical function of the New Historicism and its affiliated cultural
and postcolonial discourses in the face of the horrifically paradoxical underside of the post-Cold War occasion: the occasion that
has given rise to the
ubiquitous and multisituated wars of Identity all-too-glibly represented
as "Balkanization," as if such violence were endemic to that particular ("unimproved"
or "underdeveloped") region of the world. I am not simply referring to Eastern Europe (the conditions of
sociopolitical life in the former Central European communist bloc, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union), the Middle East, and Africa.
I am also referring to the West, particularly, but certainly not exclusively, to the United States (the conditions of sociopolitical life
subsequent to the emergence in the post-Vietnam period of multiculturalism). The first instance bears pervasive
witness to the renewed spectacle of an old and virulent nationalism, ethnocentrism,
and racism — a violent sociopolitics of Identity. This is the state of life in the newly decolonized
cultures of Eastern and Central Europe, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, which have ironically reinscribed with a
vengeance the very metaphysically legitimated principle of self-presence that Stalinist
communism, by way of its apotheosis of the Party and the Proletariat as its principle of
identity, employed to justify the brutal totalitarian or imperial suppression and
oppression of the different social, cultural, ethnic, and racial enclaves of these
geopolitical spaces.30 Similarly, postcolonial countries in the Middle East and Africa have reinscribed the very
principle of identity that the imperial powers, by way of the apotheosis of the Western idea of civilization, employed to justify
 their cultural, economic, and political domination and exploitation of their spaces. These, too, as the examples of Iran, Iraq, and
Algeria testify, manifest their "freedom" from colonial rule in a virulent identity politics expressed in bloodletting.

9. Detachment for arguments are bad for the point of ____idea testing,fairness,
etc____ because we always come to a predeterimend conclusion, turns FW

Spanos 11 (interview with Bing debate puttingthekindebate.com)

CS: When we had our discussion in Binghamton, you asked me if teams were ever
marginalized or excluded for reading arguments based on your work. Some have argued
that this move is most frequently enacted during debates with an argument aptly referred
to as "framework" where one team will define and delimit their ideal 'world picture' of a
carefully crafted resolution and then explain why the opposing teams argument have
violated the parameters of this 'frame.' In earlier comments on debate you had criticized
the disinterested nature of the activity and its participants - the detached model of debate
where anything goes so long as you "score points" and detach yourself from the real
(human) weight of these issues. How might debaters approach debate or relate to our
resolutions in a more interested sense?

WVS: The reason I asked you that question is because I've always thought that the
debate system is a rigged process, by which I mean, in your terms, it's framed to exclude
anything that the frame can't contain and domesticate. To frame also means to
"prearrange" so that a particular outcome is assured," which also means the what's
outside of the frame doesn't stand a chance: it is "framed" from the beginning. It was,
above all, the great neo-Marxist Louis Althusser's analysis of the "problematic" - the
perspective or frame of reference fundamental to knowledge production in democratic-
capitalist societies -- that enabled me to see what the so called distinterestness of
empirical inquiry is blind to or, more accurately willfully represses in its Panglossian
pursuit of the truth.

Althusser's analysis of the "problematic" is too complicated to be explained in a few

words. (Anyone interested will find his extended explanation in his introduction --
"From Capital* to Marx's Philosophy" -- to his and Etienne Balibar's book *Reading
Capital*. It will suffice here to say that we in the modern West have been *inscribed* by
our culture --"ideological state apparatuses (educational institutions, media, and so on)--
by a system of knowledge production that goes by the name of "disinterested inquiry,"
but in reality the "truth" at which it arrives is a construct, a fiction, and thus ideological.
And this is precisely because, in distancing itself from earthly being --the transience of
time --this system of knowledge production privileges the panoptic eye in the pursuit of
knowledge. This is what Althusser means by the "problematic": a frame that allows the
perceiver to see only what it wants to see. Everything that is outside the frame doesn't
exist to the perceiver. He /she is blind to it. It's nothing or, at the site of humanity, it's
nobody. Put alternatively, the problematic -- this frame, as the very word itself suggests,
*spatializes* or *reifies* time -- reduces what is a living, problematic force and not a
thing into a picture or thing so that it can be comprehended (taken hold of, managed),
appropriated, administered, and exploited by the disinterested inquirer.

All that I've just said should suggest what I meant when, long ago, in response to
someone in the debate world who seemed puzzled by the strong reservations I expressed
on being informed that the debate community in the U.S. was appropriating my work on
Heidegger, higher education, and American imperialism. I said then -- and I repeat here
to you -- that the traditional form of the debate, that is, the hegemonic frame that rigidly
determines its protocols-- is unworldly in an ideological way. It willfully separates the
debaters from the world as it actually is-- by which I mean as it has been produced by the
dominant democratic I capitalist culture --and it displaces them to a free-floating zone, a
no place, as it were, where all things, nor matter how different the authority they
command in the real world, are equal. But in *this* real world produced by the
combination of Protestant Christianity and democratic capitalism things -- and therefore
their value --are never equal. They are framed into a system of binaries-Identity/
difference, Civilization/barbarism I Men/woman, Whites/blacks, Sedentary/ nomadic,
Occidental/ oriental, Chosen I preterit (passed over), Self-reliance I dependent
(communal), Democracy I communism, Protestant Christian I Muslim, and so on -- in
which the first term is not only privileged over the second term, but, in thus being
privileged, is also empowered to demonize the second. Insofar as the debate world
frames argument as if every position has equal authority (the debater can take either side)
it obscures and eventually effaces awareness of the degrading imbalance of power in the
real world and the terrible injustices it perpetrates. Thus framed, debate gives the false
impression that it is a truly democratic institution, whereas in reality it is complicitous
with the dehumanized and dehumanizing system of power that produced it. It is no
accident, in my mind, that this fraudulent form of debate goes back to the founding of
the U.S. as a capitalist republic and that it has produced what I call the "political class" to
indicate not only the basic sameness between the Democratic and Republican parties but
also its fundamental indifference to the plight of those who don't count in a system
where what counts is determined by those who are the heirs of this quantitative system
of binaries.

10)Claims of fairness, objectivity, predictability marginalize outside perspectives.

1) Delgado 92
2) Law Prof at U. of Colorado, 1992 [Richard, Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power, In Cornell Law Review, May]//TR
3) We have cleverly built power's view of the appropriate standard of conduct into the
very term fair. Thus, the stronger party is able to have his/her way and see
her/himself as principled at the same time. Imagine, for example, a man's likely reaction to the suggestion
that subjective considerations -- a woman's mood, her sense of pressure or intimidation, how she felt about the man, her
unexpressed fear of reprisals if she did not go ahead-- ought to play a part in determining whether the man is guilty of rape.
Most men find this suggestion offensive; it requires them to do something they are not accustomed to doing. "Why," they say,
"I'd have to be a mind reader before I could have sex with anybody?" "Who knows, anyway, what internal inhibitions the
woman might have been harboring?" And "what if the woman simply changed her mind later and charged me with rape?"
What we never notice is that women can "read" men's minds perfectly well. The male perspective is right out there in the
world, plain as day, inscribed in culture, song, and myth -- in all the prevailing narratives. These narratives tell us that men
want and are entitled [*820] to sex, that it is a prime function of women to give it to them, and that unless something unusual
happens, the act of sex is ordinary and blameless. We believe these things because that is the way we have constructed
women, men, and "normal" sexual intercourse. Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and
not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? The
"objective" approach is not inherently
better or more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of the
stronger party, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what
permission meant. Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, predictable
arguments about administrability, fairness, stability, and ease of determination points us
away from what [*821] really counts: the way in which stronger parties have
managed to inscribe their views and interests into "external" culture, so that we are now
enamored with that way of judging action. First, we read our values and preferences into the culture; then we pretend to
consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts.
4) 11.Enframing DA- policy-making excludes radical potential needed to challenge our
ontological relation to being. It excludes the education that challenges its foundational
assumptions leading to thought-police.
5) Harney and Moten 2013 (Stefano and Fred, Professor University of Singapore and Duke University respectively; “ The Undercommons:
Fugitive Planning & Black Study”)
6) Policy is not the one against the many, the cynical against the roman- tic, or the pragmatic against the principled. It is simply baseless vi- sion, woven into settler’s fabric. It is against all conservation, all

rest, all gathering, cooking, drinking and smoking if they lead to marron- age. Policy’s vision is to break it up then fix it,
move it along by fixing it, manufacture ambition and give it to
your children . Policy’s hope is that there will be more policy, more participation, more change. But there is also a danger in all this participation, a danger of crisis. When

Participation without fully entering the blinding light of this dim

those who plan together start to participate without first be- ing fixed, this leads to crisis.

enlightenment, without fully functioning families and financial responsibility, without respect for the rule of law, without distance and irony, without

submission to the rule of expertise; participation that is too loud, too fat, too loving, too full, too flowing, too dread; this leads to crisis.
People are in crisis. Economies are in crisis. We are facing an unprecedented crisis, a crisis of partici- pation, a crisis of faith. Is there any hope? Yes, there is, say the depu- ties, if we can pull together, if we

For policy, any crisis in the productivity of radical contingency is a crisis

can share a vision of change.

in participation, which is to say, a crisis provoked by the wrong participation of the

wrong(ed). This is the third rule of policy. The crisis of the credit crunch caused by sub-prime debtors, the crisis of race in the 2008 US elections produced by Reverend Wright and Bernie
Mac, the crisis in the Middle East produced by Hamas, the crisis of obesity produced by unhealthy eaters, the crisis of the envi- ronment produced by Chinese and Indians, are all instances of in- correct
and uncorrected participation. The constant materialisation of planning in such participation is simply the inevitability of crisis, ac- cording to the deputised, who prescribe, as a corrective, hope for and
hopefulness in correction. They say that participation must be hope- ful, must have vision, must embrace change; that participants must be fashioned, in a general imposition of self-fashioning, as hopeful,
visionary, change agents. Celebrating their freedom on lockdown in the enterprise zone, guarding that held contingency where the fash- ioning and correction of selves and others is always on automatic,

Deputies will lead the way toward concrete changes in the face of
the participant is the deputy’s mirror image.

crisis. Be smart, they say. Believe in change. This is what we have been waiting for. Stop criticising and offer solutions. Set up roadblocks and
offer workshops. Check ID’s and give advice. Distinguish between the desire to correct and the desire to plan with others. Ruthlessly seek out and fearfully beware militant preservation, in an undercom-

Now’s the time to declare and, in so doing, correctly fashion

mons of means without ends, of love among things.

yourself as the one who is deputised to correct others. Now’s the time, before its night again. Before you start singing another
half-illiterate fantasy. Before you re- sound that ongoing amplification of the bottom, the operations on the edge of normal rhythm’s soft center. Before someone says let’s get together and get some land.
But we’re not smart. We plan. We plan to stay, to stick and move. We plan to be communist about com- munism, to be unreconstructed about reconstruction, to be absolute about abolition, here, in that
other, undercommon place, as that other, undercommon thing, that we preserve by inhabiting. Policy can’t see it, policy can’t read it, but it’s intelligible if you got a plan.

7) 12.The world is unintelligible, an unknowable mess. Poetry is a way to come

to grips and make meaning with the lack of meaning. Trying to come up with
 stable definitions violently sanitizes all reason to act within the world and
policy will always exclude this poetics

8) [Baudrillard in ‘94]
9) [Jean, you should give us the ballot to affirm your method, Jean Baudrillard - Radical Thought;
http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/radical-thought/#note24] //Aboriginal Arnold
10)
11) Our point is not to defend radical thought. Any idea that can be defended is presumed
guilty. Any idea that does not sustain its own defense deserves to perish. But we have to fight
against charges of unreality, lack of responsibility, nihilism, and despair. Radical thought is never depressing. This would be a complete misunderstanding. A

moralizing and ideological critique, obsessed by meaning and content, obsessed by a

political finality of discourse, never takes into account writing, the act of writing, the
poetic, ironic, and allusive form of language, the play with meaning. This critique
does not see that the resolution of meaning is right here, in the form itself, in the
formal materiality of an expression. As for meaning, it is always unfortunate. Analysis is by its very
definition unfortunate since it is born out of a critical disillusion. But language on the
contrary is fortunate (happy), even when it designates a world with no illusion, with
no hope. This would in fact be here the very definition of radical thought: an
intelligence without hope, but a fortunate and happy form. Critics, always being unfortunate (unhappy) in their
nature, choose the realm of ideas as their battle field. They do not see that if discourse always tends to produce

meaning, language and writing on the contrary are always a matter of illusion. Language and writing are the living
illusion of meaning, the resolution of the misfortune of meaning operated through the good fortune of language. This is the only political or transpolitical act that a writer

What matters is the poetic singularity of analysis.

can accomplish. Everyone has ideas, even more than they need.

Only this witz, this spirituality of language, can justify writing. Not a miserable critical
objectivity of ideas. There will never be a solution to the contradiction of ideas,
except inside language itself, in the energy and fortune (happiness) of language. So the loneliness and sadness in Edward Hopper's paintings
are transfigured by the timeless quality of light, a light which comes from some place else and gives to the whole picture a totally non-figurative meaning, an intensity

it is better to
which renders loneliness unreal. Hopper says: "I do not paint sadness or loneliness; I only seek to paint light on this wall." In any case,

have a despairing analysis in a happy language than an optimistic analysis in

despairingly boring and demoralizingly plain language. Which is too often the case. The formal boredom that is
secreted by an idealist thought on values, or by a goal-oriented20. thought on culture, is the

secret sign of despair for this thought - not despair with the world, but despair
toward its own discourse. This is where the real depressing thought emerges. It
emerges with those people who only talk about a transcendence21. or a transformation of the
world, while they are totally unable to transfigure their own language. Radical thought is in no

way different from radical usage of language. This thought is therefore alien to any resolution of the world which would take the direction22. of an objective reality and

of its deciphering. Radical thought does not decipher. It anathematizes and "anagramatizes"
concepts and ideas, exactly what poetic language does with words. Through its
reversible chaining, it simultaneously gives an account of meaning and of its
fundamental illusion . Language gives an account of the very illusion of language as a definite23. stratagem and through that notes the illusion of
While being a transporter of
the world as an infinite trap, as a seduction of the mind, as a stealing away of all mental capacities.

meaning, language is at the same time a supra-conductor of illusion and of the

absence of meaning24.. Language is only signification's unintentional accomplice. By its very force, it calls for the spiritual imagination of sounds
and rhythms, for the dispersion of meaning in the event of language, similar to the role of the muscles in dance, similar to the role of reproduction in erotic games.
 Such a passion for the artificial, a passion for illusion, is the same thing as the
seductive joy (jouissance25.) to undo a too perfect constellation of meaning. It is also a joy (jouissance) to render transparent the imposture
of the world, that is to say the enigmatic function of the world, and its mystification which supposedly is its secret. Doing this while perhaps rendering its imposture

. .
transparent: deceiving rather than validating meaning.26 This passion "wins"27 in the free and spiritual usage of language, in the spiritual game of writing. And it only
disappears when language is used for a limited finality, its most common usage perhaps, that of communication. No matter what, if language wants to "speak the

language" of illusion, it must become a seduction.As for "speaking the language" of the real, it would not know
how to do it (properly speaking) because language is never real. Whenever it appears to be able to
designate things, it actually does so by following unreal, elliptic, and ironic paths. Objectivity and truth are metaphoric in

language. Too bad for the apodicticians or the apodidacticians! This is how language is, even unconsciously, the carrier of radical
thought, because it always starts from itself, as a trait d'esprit vis-a-vis the world, as an ellipse and a source of pleasure. Even
the confusion of languages in the Tower of Babel, a powerful mechanism of illusion for the human race, a source of non-communication and an end to the possibility of a

universal language, will have appeared, finally, not as a divine punishment but as a gift from God. Ciphering, not
deciphering. Operating illusions. Being illusion28. to be event. Turning into an enigma what is clear. Making
unintelligible what is far too intelligible. Rendering unreadable the event itself. Working all the events to make them unintelligible. Accentuating the fake transparency of

A viral
the world to spread a terroristic confusion, to spread the germs or viruses of a radical illusion, that is to say operating a radical disillusion of the real.

and deleterious thought, which corrupts meaning, and is the accomplice of an erotic
perception of reality's trouble. Erasing in oneself any remaining trace of the
intellectual plot. Stealing the "reality file" to erase its conclusions. But, in fact, it is reality itself which foments its
own contradiction, its own denial, its own loss through our lack of reality. Hence, the internal
feeling that all this affair - the world, thought, and language - has emerged from some place else and could disappear as if by magic. The world does

not seek to have more existence, nor does it seek to persist in its existence. On the contrary, it is looking for the
most spiritual way to escape reality. Through thought, the world is looking for what
could lead to its own loss. The absolute rule, that of symbolic exchange, is to return
what you received. Never less, but always more. The absolute rule of thought is to
return the world as we received it: unintelligible. And if it is possible, to return it a
little bit more unintelligible. A little bit more enigmatic.
12) 13.Telos DA-It is no longer a question of searching for Truth and violently
excluding anything that interferes, but rather of accepting difference. We cannot
rely upon common terms for discussion and an endpoint because it prevents debate
from occurring- turns FW.
13) Bleiker, 98 asst. prof. of International Studies at Pusan National University (Roland,
“Retracing and
14) redrawing the boundaries of events: Postmodern interferences with international theory”,
Alternatives,
15) Oct-Dec 1998, Vol. 23, Issue 4)
16) But dialogue is a process, an ideal, not an end point. Often there is no common
discursive ground, no language that can establish a link between the inside and the
outside. The link has to be searched first. But the celebration of difference is a process,
an ideal, not an end point. A call for tolerance and inclusion cannot be void of power.
Every social order, even the ones that are based on the acceptance of difference,
excludes what does not fit into their view of the world. Every form of thinking, some
international theorists recognize, expresses a will to power, a will that cannot but
"privilege, oppress, and create in some manner."[54] There is no all-encompassing gaze.
Every process of revealing is at the same time a process of concealing. By opening
up a particular perspective, no matter how insightful it is, one conceals everything
that is invisible from this vantage point. The enframing that occurs by such processes
of revealing, Martin Heidegger argues, runs the risk of making us forget that
enframing is a claim, a disciplinary act that "banishes man into that kind of
revealing that is an ordering." And where this ordering holds sway, Heidegger
continues, "it drives out every other possibility for revealing."[55] This is why one ,must
move back and forth between different, sometimes incommensurable forms of
insights. Such an approach recognizes that the key to circumventing the ordering
mechanisms of revealing is to think in circles--not to rest too long at one point, but to
pay at least as much attention to linkages between than to contents of mental resting
places. Inclusiveness does not lie in the search for a utopian, all-encompassing
worldview, but in the acceptance of the will to power--in the recognition that we need
to evaluate and judge, but that no form of knowledge can serve as the ultimate arbiter for
thought and action. As a critical practice, postmodernism must deal with its own will to
power and to subvert that of others. This is not to avoid accountability, but to take on
responsibility in the form of bringing modesty to a majority.