G.R. No.

L-36049 May 31, 1976

CITY OF NAGA, VICENTE P. SIBULO, as Mayor, and JOAQUIN C. CLEOPE, as Treasurer of the City of
Naga, petitioners,
vs.
CATALINO AGNA, FELIPE AGNA and SALUD VELASCO, respondents.

Ernesto A. Miguel for petitioners.

Bonot, Cledera & Associates for respondents. MARTIN, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari, which We treat as special civil action, of the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No. 7084, entitled Agna, et al. versus City of Naga, et al., declaring Ordinance No.
360 of the City of Naga enforceable in 1971 the year following its approval and requiring petitioners to pay to
private respondents the amounts sought for in their complaint plus attorney's fees and costs. Included in the present
controversy as proper parties are Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City Mayor and City Treasurer of the
City of Naga, respectively.

On June 15, 1970, the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360 changing and amending the graduated tax on
quarterly gross sales of merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to percentage tax
on gross sales provided for in Section 2 thereof. Pursuant to said ordinance, private respondents paid to the City of
Naga the following taxes on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970, as follows:

Catalino Agna paid P1,805.17 as per Official Receipt No. 1826591;

Felipe Agna paid P625.00 as per Official Receipt No. 1826594; and

Salud Velasco paid P129.81 as per Official Receipt No. 1820339.

On February 13, 1971, private respondents filed with the City Treasurer of the City of Naga a claim for refund of the
following amounts, together with interests thereon from the date of payments: To Catalino Agna, P1,555.17; to
Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81, representing the difference between the amounts they paid
under Section 3, Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga, i.e., P250.00; P65.00 and P12.00 respectively. They alleged
that under existing law, Ordinance No. 360, which amended Section 3, Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga, did not
take effect in 1970, the year it was approved but in the next succeeding year after the year of its approval, or in
1971, and that therefore, the taxes they paid in 1970 on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to
September 30, 1970 were illegal and should be refunded to them by the petitioners.

The City Treasurer denied the claim for refund of the amounts in question. So private respondents filed a complaint
with the Court of First Instance of Naga (Civil Case No. 7084), seeking to have Ordinance No. 360 declared
effective only in the year following the year of its approval, that is, in 1971; to have Sections 4, 6 and 8 of
Ordinance No. 360 declared unjust, oppressive and arbitrary, and therefore, null and void; and to require petitioners
to refund the sums being claimed with interests thereon from the date the taxes complained of were paid and to pay
all legal costs and attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000.00. Private respondents further prayed that the petitioners be
enjoined from enforcing Ordinance No. 360.

In their answer, the petitioners among other things, claimed that private respondents were not "compelled" but
voluntarily made the payments of their taxes under Ordinance No. 360; that the said ordinance was published in
accordance with law; that in accordance with Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of the City of Naga) an ordinance takes
effect after the tenth day following its passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance; that under existing law the
City of Naga is authorized to impose certain conditions to secure and accomplish the collection of sales taxes in the
most effective manner. As special and affirmative defenses, the petitioners allege that the private respondents have
no cause of action against them; that granting that the collection of taxes can be enjoined. the complaint does not
allege facts sufficient to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; that the refund prayed for by the
private respondents is untenable; that petitioners Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City Mayor and
Treasurer of the City of Naga, respectively are not proper parties in interest; that the private respondents are
estopped from questioning the validity and/or constitutionality of the provisions of Ordinance No. 360. Petitioners
counterclaimed for P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, for the alleged unlawful and malicious filing of the claim
against them, in such amount as the court may determine.

During the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and at the pre-trial conference
as well as at the trial on the merits of the case, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts: That on June
15, 1970, the City Board of the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360 entitled "An ordinance repealing Ordinance
No. 4, as amended, imposing a sales tax on the quarterly sales or receipts on all businesses in the City of Naga,"
which ordinance was transmitted to the City Mayor for approval or veto on June 25, 1970; that the ordinance was
duly posted in the designated places by the Secretary of the Municipal Board; that private respondents voluntarily
paid the gross sales tax, pursuant to Ordinance No. 360, but that on February 15, 1971, they filed a claim for refund
with the City Treasurer who denied the same.

On October 9, 1971, the respondent Judge rendered judgment holding that Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the
City of Naga was enforceable in the year following the date of its approval, that is, in 1971 and required the
petitioners to reimburse the following sums, from the date they paid their taxes to the City of Naga: to Catalino
Agna, the sum of P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to Salud Velasco, P127.81 and the corresponding
interests from the filing of the complaint up to the reimbursement of the amounts plus the sum of P500.00 as
attorney's fees and the costs of the proceedings.

Petitioners' submit that Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga, took effect in the quarter of the year
of its approval, that is in July 1970, invoking Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, 1 as amended, otherwise known as
the Charter of the City of Naga, which, among others, provides that "Each approved ordinance ... shall take effect
and be enforced on and after the 10th day following its passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance ... ". They
contend that Ordinance No. 360 was enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Naga on June 15, 1970 2 and
was transmitted to the City Mayor for his approval or veto on June 25, 1970 3 but it was not acted upon by the City
Mayor until August 4, 1970. Ordinarily, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, said ordinance should have
taken effect after the 10th day following its passage on June 15, 1970, or on June 25, 1970. But because the
ordinance itself provides that it shall take effect upon its approval, it becomes necessary to determine when
Ordinance No. 360 was deemed approved. According to the same Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, "if within 10
days after receipt of the ordinance the Mayor does not return it with his veto or approval 4 the ordinance is deemed
approved." Since the ordinance in question was not returned by the City Mayor with his veto or approval within 10
days after he received it on June 25, 1970, the same was deemed approved after the lapse of ten (10) days from June
25, 1970 or on July 6, 1970. On this date, the petitioners claim that Ordinance No. 360 became effective. They
further contend that even under Section 2, of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Acts) 5 which expressly
provides: "A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage unless the ordinance shall
provide otherwise', Ordinance No. 360 could have taken effect on June 30, 1970, which is the fifteenth day after its
passage by the Municipal Board of the City of Naga on June 15, 1970, or as earlier explained, it could have taken
effect on July 6, 1970, the date the ordinance was deemed approved because the ordinance itself provides that it
shall take effect upon its approval. Of the two provisions invoked by petitioners to support their stand that the
ordinance in question took effect in the year of its approval, it is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act) that is more relevant because it is the provision that specifically refers to effectivity of a tax
ordinance and being a provision of much later law it is deemed to have superseded Section 14 of Republic Act No.
305 (Charter of the City of Naga) in so far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned.

On the other hand, private respondents contend that Ordinance No. 360 became effective and enforceable in 1971,
the year following the year of its approval, invoking Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides:

Section 2309. Imposition of tax and duration of license.—A municipal license tax already in
existence shall be subject to change only by ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December
 of any year after the next succeeding year, but an entirely new tax may be created by any
ordinance enacted during the quarter year effective at the beginning of any subsequent quarter.

They submit that since Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga, is one which changes the existing
graduated sales tax on gross sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari merchants provided for in
Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to a percentage tax on their gross sales prescribed in the questioned ordinance,
the same should take effect in the next succeeding year after the year of its approval or in 1971.

Evidently, the divergence of opinion as to when Ordinance No. 360 took effect and became enforceable is mainly
due to the seemingly apparent conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). Is there really such a conflict in the above-mentioned provisions? It
will be easily noted that Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code contemplates of two types of municipal
ordinances, namely: (1) a municipal ordinance which changes a municipal license tax already in existence and (2) an
ordinance which creates an entirely new tax. Under the first type, a municipal license tax already in existence shall
be subject to change only by an ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December of any year after the next
succeeding year. This means that the ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December changing or repealing a
municipal license tax already in existence will have to take effect in next succeeding year. The evident purpose of
the provision is to enable the taxpayers to adjust themselves to the new charge or burden brought about by the new
ordinance. This is different from the second type of a municipal ordinance where an entirely new tax may be created
by any ordinance enacted during the quarter year to be effective at the beginning of any subsequent quarter. We do
not find any such distinction between an ordinance which changes a municipal license tax already in existence and
an ordinance creating an entirely new tax in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) which
merely refers to a "tax ordinance" without any qualification whatsoever.

Now to the meat of the problem in this petition. Is not Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code deemed
repealed or abrogated by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) in so far as effectivity of a tax
ordinance is concerned? An examination of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) fails to show any
provision expressly repealing Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. All that is mentioned therein is
Section 9 which reads:

Section 9 — All acts, executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations or parts thereof,
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed and modified accordingly.

The foregoing provision does not amount to an express repeal of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code.
It is a well established principle in statutory construction that a statute will not be construed as repealing prior acts
on the same subject in the absence of words to that effect unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them,
or unless the new law is evidently intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter in hand and to comprise itself
the sole and complete system of legislation on that subject. Every new statute should be construed in connection
with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand
together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation ... . 6 It will also be noted that Section 2309 of
the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) refer to the same
subject matter-enactment and effectivity of a tax ordinance. In this respect they can be considered in pari materia.
Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or
things, or have the same purpose or object. 7 When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction
dictates that they should be construed together. This is because enactments of the same legislature on the same
subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are supplementary or
complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the
existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. 8 Having thus in mind
the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to
have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes unless
there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be construed together. 9 In construing them the old statutes
relating to the same subject matter should be compared with the new provisions and if possible by reasonable
construction, both should be so construed that effect may be given to every provision of each. However, when the
new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter
expression of the legislative will. 10 Actually we do not see any conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). The conflict, if any, is
more apparent than real. It is one that is not incapable of reconciliation. And the two provisions can be reconciled by
applying the first clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code when the problem refers to the
effectivity of an ordinance changing or repealing a municipal license tax already in existence. But where the
problem refers to effectivity of an ordinance creating an entirely new tax, let Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264
(Local Autonomy Act) govern.

In the case before Us, the ordinance in question is one which changes the graduated sales tax on gross sales or
receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the City of
Naga to percentage tax on their gross sale-an ordinance which definitely falls within the clause of Section 2309 of
the Revised Administrative Code. Accordingly it should be effective and enforceable in the next succeeding year
after the year of its approval or in 1971 and private respondents should be refunded of the taxes they have paid to the
petitioners on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 plus the corresponding
interests from the filing of the complaint until reimbursement of the amount.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138496 February 23, 2004

HUBERT TAN CO and ARLENE TAN CO, petitioners,

vs.
THE CIVIL REGISTER OF MANILA and any person having or claiming an interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought, respondent.

DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co seeking to
reverse and set aside the Order1 dated September 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26,
dismissing their petition for correction of entries in the Civil Register. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside
is the Order dated April 27, 1999 of the court a quo denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the said
order.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Hubert Tan Co was born on March 23, 1974. His sister, Arlene Tan Co, was born on May 19, 1975. In their
respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents Co Boon Peng and Lourdes Vihong K. Tan are Chinese
citizens.

Thereafter, Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special
Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 270. His application was granted and he was
conferred Philippine citizenship under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1055. The Chairman of the Committee issued
on February 15, 1977 Certificate of Naturalization No. 020778 in his favor. Thus, on February 15, 1977, Co Boon
Peng took his oath as a Philippine citizen. In the meantime, Hubert and Arlene Co finished college and earned their
respective degrees in architecture and accountancy in Philippine schools.

On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court for correction of entries in their certificates of birth. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. 98-90470.
They alleged, inter alia, in their petition that:

(3) They were born in the Philippines and the legitimate children of CO BOON PENG;

(4) Co Boon Peng, who is formerly a citizen of China, was conferred Philippine citizenship by
naturalization under Presidential Decree No. 1055 and had taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on 15th February, 1977 in the City of Manila;

(5) At the time of birth of [the] petitioners, their father CO BOON PENG was still a Chinese citizen that is
why entry in their respective birth certificates as to their father’s citizenship was Chinese;

(6) Upon granting of Philippine citizenship by naturalization to Co Boon Peng in 1977, [the] petitioners
who were born in the Philippines and still minors at that time became Filipino citizens through the
derivative mode of naturalization. Our Naturalization Law, specifically Section 15 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535 which provides:

"Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
considered citizens thereof;"

(7) The naturalization of petitioners’ father in 1977 was an act or event affecting and concerning their civil
status that must be recorded in the Civil Register, Article 407 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides:
"Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the Civil Register." 2

The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, the trial court render judgment correcting and changing the
entries in their respective birth certificates as to the citizenship of their father Co Boon Peng, from "Chinese" to
"Filipino."3

On September 23, 1998, the court a quo issued an order dismissing the petition outright on the ground that the
petition was insufficient, solely because the petitioners’ father Co Boon Peng applied for naturalization under LOI
No. 270 and was conferred Philippine citizenship by naturalization under PD No. 1055 and not under
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473. 4

The petitioners sought the reconsideration of the assailed order arguing that LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 were
designed to grant citizenship to deserving aliens; hence, should be construed together. They averred that the benefit
of Section 15 of CA No. 473 should also be granted to the petitioners whose father was granted naturalization under
LOI No. 270. However, the RTC issued an Order on April 27, 1999, denying their motion for reconsideration for the
following reasons: (a) although Commonwealth Act No. 473 and Letter of Instructions No. 270 are statutes relating
to the same subject matter, they do not provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children of the
applicant. Section 15 of CA No. 473 expressly provides for the effect of the naturalization on the wife and children
of the applicant while LOI No. 270 does not have any proviso to that effect; (b) LOI No. 270 clearly refers to
qualified individuals only. The rules and regulations promulgated by the Committee established pursuant to LOI No.
270 and the amendments issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (LOI Nos. 292 and 491) clearly speak of
qualified individuals only; no proviso therein referred to its effect on the wife and children of the individual; (c)
Section 15 of CA No. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI No. 270; and, (d) the
application of the so-called "pari materia" rule of construction made by the petitioners is misplaced, as what should
be applied in the instant case is the rule on strict construction of legislative grants or franchise. The court a
quo stressed that legislative grants, whether they be of property, rights or privileges, whether granted to corporations
or individuals, must be strictly construed against the grantee and in favor of the grantor.

Aggrieved, the petitioners now come to this Court assailing the court a quo’s Order dismissing their petition outright
and its Order denying their motion for the reconsideration of the same.

The petitioners contend that the trial court erred in holding that their petition was insufficient. They assert that
contrary to the ruling of the trial court, they are qualified to claim the benefit of Section 15 of CA No. 473, which
provides that minor children of persons naturalized thereunder who were born in the Philippines shall likewise be
considered citizens thereof. They contend that although LOI No. 270, under which the petitioners’ father was
naturalized does not contain a provision similar to Section 15 of CA No. 473, the latter provision should be deemed
incorporated therein. They point out that both laws have the same purpose and objective, i.e., to grant Philippine
citizenship to qualified aliens permanently residing in the Philippines. The petitioners invoke the rule that statutes
in pari materia are to be read together.5 They posit that CA No. 473 and LOI No. 270 should be harmonized and
reconciled since "all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in
connection with it, and should be construed together as they constitute one law." 6

The petitioners maintain that the letter and spirit of LOI No. 270 was to grant the privilege of Philippine citizenship
not only to qualified aliens but also to their minor children who were born in the country. They assert that this is
apparent from paragraph 4-A thereof, which extends the option to adopt Filipino names not only to qualified
applicants for naturalization but also to their wives and minor children. They submit that when then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos enacted LOI No. 270, he must be presumed to have been acquainted with the provisions of CA
No. 473 and did not intend to abrogate and discontinue the beneficial effects of Section 15 thereof; otherwise, Pres.
Marcos would have expressly repealed Section 15 of CA No. 473 in relation to LOI No. 270. Thus, according to the
petitioners, the naturalization of their father during their minority is an act or event affecting their civil status that
must be recorded in the Civil Register pursuant to Article 407 of the Civil Code.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that the court a quo did not err in issuing the assailed orders.
Contrary to the petitioners’ theory, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are separate and distinct laws; therefore, are not
in pari materia. He points out that although LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 both govern the naturalization of aliens,
CA No. 473 deals with the requirements and procedure for naturalization by judicial decree; LOI No. 270, on the
other hand, deals with the requirements and procedure for naturalization by presidential decree.

The Solicitor General further asserts that the petitioners’ contention that the naturalization of their father is an event
affecting and concerning their civil status envisaged in Article 407 of the Civil Code has no legal basis. The
correction sought and allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court must be one that reflects a fact existing before
or at the time of birth. In the petitioners’ case, the naturalization of their father in 1977 took place long after they
were born. Moreover, according to the Solicitor General, under LOI No. 270 and its amendatory laws, the
naturalization of a father did not ipso facto render his children also naturalized. The petitioners thus cannot invoke
Article 407 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to avoid strict compliance with the naturalization
laws.

The petition is meritorious.

The rule on statutory construction provides that:

Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because enactments of the same legislature on the
same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or complimentary
(sic) to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing
legislations on the subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. 7

Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national policy, thus:

On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind the previous statutes relating to
the same subject matter, it is held that in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision
was enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should be construed
together. Provisions in an act which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will be applied in a
proceeding under the other act, when not inconsistent with its purpose. Prior statutes relating to the same subject
matter are to be compared with the new provisions; and if possible by reasonable construction, both are to be
construed that effect is given to every provision of each. Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent conflict, are
so far as reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other. 8

LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens residing in the Philippines.
While they provide for different procedures, CA No. 473 governs naturalization by judicial decree while LOI No.
270 governs naturalization by presidential decree; both statutes have the same purpose and objective: to enable
aliens permanently residing in the Philippines, who, having demonstrated and developed love for and loyalty to the
Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture, tradition and ideals of the Filipino people, and contributed to the
economic, social and cultural development of our country, to be integrated into the national fabric by being granted
Filipino citizenship. Under the LOI, the procedure for the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization is more
expeditious, less cumbersome and less expensive. The sooner qualified aliens are naturalized, the faster they are able
to integrate themselves into the national fabric, and are thus able to contribute to the cultural, social and political
well- being of the country and its people.

Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly posit, statutes in pari materia. Absent any
express repeal of Section 15 of CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said provision should be read into the latter law as
an integral part thereof, not being inconsistent with its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA No. 473, 9 which extends the
grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied to
the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case.

It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng,
and of his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are
likewise mandated to prove the following material allegations in their petition: (a) that they are the legitimate
children of Co Boon Peng; (b) that they were born in the Philippines; and, (c) that they were still minors when Co
Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen;

The petitioners’ recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is appropriate. Under Article 412 of the
New Civil Code, no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The law does not
provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed. But the Court approved Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to
provide for a procedure to implement the law. 10 The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the New Civil Code are
those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the New Civil Code which reads:

Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.

Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) Marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

Specific matters covered by the said provision include not only status but also nationality. 11 The acts, events or
factual errors envisaged in Article 407 of the New Civil Code include even those that occur after the birth of the
petitioner. However, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth will not be corrected or changed. The
decision of the court granting the petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the civil
register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar.12

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the
New Civil Code does not qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected or distinguished on the basis of
the effect that the correction or change may be.13 Such entries include not only those clerical in nature but also
substantial errors. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths about
the facts recorded therein.14

The proceedings in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are summary if the entries in the civil register sought to be
corrected are clerical or innocuous in nature. However, where such entries sought to be corrected or changed are
substantial: i.e., the status and nationality of the petitioners or the citizenship of their parents, 15 the proceedings are
adversarial in nature as defined by this Court in Republic v. Valencia, thus:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
Excludes an adoption proceeding.16

In such a proceeding, the parties to be impleaded as respective defendants are (a) the local civil registrar; and, (b) all
persons who have claims any interest which would be affected thereby. 17

In this case, the petitioners alleged in their petition that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng, who was
naturalized as a Filipino citizen, but that their certificates of birth still indicate that he is a Chinese national. In view
of their father’s naturalization, they pray that the entries in their certificates of birth relating to the citizenship of
their father be changed from "Chinese" to "Filipino."

The petitioners’ recourse to the procedure in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended, being appropriate, it
behooved the trial court to do its duty under Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, namely:
Sec. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the person named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.

After hearing, the court shall issue an order either dismissing the petition or issue an order granting the same. In
either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in the certificates of birth of the petitioners. The judgment of the court shall form part of the records of the
local civil register.18

In this case, the trial court dismissed the petition outright in violation of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Patently,
then, the trial court erred in so doing.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 26, are SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the
petition in Special Proceedings NO. 98-90470 in the court docket, and ORDERED to continue with the proceedings
in the said case under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 132051 - June 25, 2001

TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP., petitioner, v. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE
BANK, Respondent. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This principle of adherence to precedents has not lost its luster and continues to
guide the bench in keeping with the need to maintain stability in the law.

The principle finds application to the case now before us.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing
the Resolution dated December 23, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 44257.

Under Republic Act No. 337 (General Banking Act), commercial banks are allowed to invest in real property subject
to the limitation that:

"Sec. 25. Any commercial bank may purchase, hold and convey real estate for the following purposes:

"(a) such as shall be necessary for its immediate accommodation in the transaction of its business: Provided,
however, that the total investment in such real estate and improvements thereof, including bank equipment, shall not
exceed fifty percent (50%) of net worth x x x x x x ." (Emphasis Ours)

Investments in real estate made by savings and mortgage banks are likewise subject to the same limitation imposed
by the aforequoted provision.1

Bound by such limitation, the management of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino for
brevity) devised means to pursue its endeavor to expand its banking operations. To this end, Tala Realty Services
Corporation (Tala for brevity) was organized by Banco Filipino's four (4) major stockholders namely, Antonio Tiu,
Tomas B. Aguirre, Nancy Lim Ty and Pedro B. Aguirre. Tala and Banco Filipino agreed on this scheme - Tala
would acquire the existing branch sites and new branch sites which it would lease out to Banco Filipino.

On August 25, 1981, pursuant to their agreement, Banco Filipino sold its eleven (11) branch sites all over the
country to Tala. In turn Tala leased those sites to Banco Filipino under contracts of lease executed by both parties on
the same day.

Years after, dissension between Tala and Banco Filipino arose in connection with their lease contracts resulting in a
chain of lawsuits for illegal detainer. Some of these cases are still pending in courts. At present, three of the illegal
detainer cases have been passed upon by the Supreme Court.

The case at bar, involving Banco Filipino's Iloilo City branch site, is one of those cases for illegal detainer filed by
Tala against Banco Filipino based on these grounds: (a) expiration of the period of lease and (b) non-payment of
rentals.

The facts of the present controversy may be summed up as follows:

In its complaint in Civil Case No. 51(95) filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Iloilo City on March 29,
1995, Tala alleged that on the basis of a contract of lease executed on August 25, 1981 which provides in part:

"1. That the term of this LEASE shall be for a period of eleven (11) years, renewable for another period of nine (9)
years at the option of the LESSEE under terms and conditions mutually agreeable to both parties." 2,
its contract with Banco Filipino expired on August 31, 1992. However, Banco Filipino has continued to occupy the
premises even after the expiration of the lease.

On June 2, 1993, Tala imposed upon Banco Filipino the following terms and conditions: that the bank should pay
P70,050.00 as monthly rental retroactive as of September 1, 1992, with rental escalation of 10% per year; and
advance deposit equivalent to rents for four months, plus a goodwill of P500,000.00.

Banco Filipino did not comply and in April 1994, it stopped paying rents.

In its letter dated April 14, 1994, Tala notified Banco Filipino that the lease contract would no longer be renewed;
that it should pay its back rentals, including goodwill, deposit and adjusted rentals in the amount of P2,059, 540.00
and vacate the premises on or before April 30, 1994. 3 In its second letter dated May 2, 1994, Tala demanded upon
Banco Filipino to pay the rents and vacate the premises.4

In answer to Tala's complaint, Banco Filipino denied having executed the lease contract providing for a term of
eleven (11) years; claiming that its contract with Tala is for twenty (20) years, citing the Contract of Lease executed
on August 25, 1981 providing:

"That the term of this LEASE shall be for a period of twenty (20) years, renewable for another period of twenty (20)
years at the option of the LESSEE under terms and conditions mutually agreeable to both parties." 5

On July 1, 1996, the MTC rendered judgment holding that the eleven (11)-year lease contract superseded the twenty
(20)-year lease contract. Thus, the court ordered the ejectment of Banco Filipino from the premises on these
grounds: expiration of the eleven (11)-year lease contract and non-payment of the adjusted rental. Banco Filipino
was likewise ordered to pay back rentals in the amount of P79,050.00 corresponding to the period from May 1994
up to the time that it shall have surrendered to Tala possession of the premises.6

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Iloilo City affirmed the MTC decision. 7

Banco Filipino elevated the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the challenged decision. 8

Banco Filipino sought for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision, invoking in its Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration the Decisions of the same court in two of the other illegal detainer cases initiated by Tala
against Banco Filipino, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 39104 and 40524. In these cases, the Court of Appeals upheld
the validity of the lease contract providing for a period of twenty (20) years. Finding Banco Filipino's motions for
reconsideration meritorious, the Court of Appeals issued the herein assailed Resolution, thus:

"This Court agrees with petitioner that its Decision of August 30, 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 39104, having been
declared final and executory by no less than the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 127586, now constitutes the law of the
case between the parties in the present case. Accordingly, this Court is not at liberty to disregard or abandon the
same at will without wreaking havoc on said legal principle.

"WHEREFORE, petitioner's motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration are hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court's Decision of August 25, 1997 is hereby SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, a new
one is rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the appealed decision and DISMISSING the complaint for
ejectment filed against herein petitioner in the Municipal Trial Court of Iloilo City." 9

Tala now comes to this Court on the lone ground that:

"The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering that principle of 'the law of the case' finds application in the
instant case."10
Petitioner Tala contends that its complaint for illegal detainer should not have been dismissed by the Court of
Appeals on the basis of its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 39104. Petitioner claims that this decision is not a precedent.

The first in the series of illegal detainer cases filed by Tala against the bank which reached the Supreme Court is
CA-G.R. SP No. 39104. This involves the site in Malabon. The Court of Appeals held that Banco Filipino cannot be
ejected from the subject premises considering that the twenty (20)-year lease contract has not expired. Tala elevated
this Court of Appeals decision to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 127586. In a Resolution dated March 12, 1997, the
Supreme Court dismissed Tala's petition as the "appeal" was not timely perfected, thus:

"Considering the manifestation dated January 31, 1997 filed by petitioner that it is no longer pursuing or holding in
abeyance recourse to the Supreme Court for reasons stated therein, the Court Resolved to DECLARE THIS CASE
TERMINATED and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to INFORM the parties that the judgment sought to be reviewed has
become final and executory, no appeal therefrom having been timely perfected." 11

We agree with petitioner Tala that the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39104 holding that the
twenty (20)-year contract of lease governs the contractual relationship between the parties is not a precedent
considering that the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 127586 did not decide the case on the merits. The petition was
dismissed on mere technicality. It is significant to note, however, that the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
129887,12 through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, resolved the identical issue raised in the present petition, i.e.,
whether the period of the lease between the parties is twenty (20) or eleven (11) years, thus:

"Second. Petitioner Tala Realty insists that its eleven (11)-year lease contract controls. We agree with the MTC and
the RTC, however, that the eleven (11)-year contract is a forgery because (1) Teodoro O. Arcenas, then Executive
Vice-President of private respondent Banco Filipino, denied having signed the contract; (2) the records of the notary
public who notarized the said contract, Atty. Generoso S. Fulgencio, Jr., do not include the said document; and (3)
the said contract was never submitted to the Central Bank as required by the latter's rules and regulations (Rollo, pp.
383-384.).

"Clearly, the foregoing circumstances are badges of fraud and simulation that rightly make any court suspicious and
wary of imputing any legitimacy and validity to the said lease contract.

"Executive Vice-President Arcenas of private respondent Banco Filipino testified that he was responsible for the
daily operations of said bank. He denied having signed the eleven (11)-year contract and reasoned that it was not in
the interest of Banco Filipino to do so (Rollo, p. 384). The fact was corroborated by Josefina C. Salvador, typist of
Banco Filipino's Legal Department, who allegedly witnessed the said contract and whose initials allegedly appear in
all the pages thereof. She disowned the said marginal initials (id., p. 385).

"The Executive Judge of the RTC supervises a notary public by requiring submission to the Office of the Clerk of
Court of his monthly notarial report with copies of acknowledged documents thereto attached. Under this procedure
and requirement of the Notarial Law, failure to submit such notarial report and copies of acknowledged documents
has dire consequences including the possible revocation of the notary's notarial commission.

"The fact that the notary public who notarized petitioner Tala Realty's alleged eleven (11)-year lease contract did not
retain a copy thereof for submission to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the proper RTC militates against the use
of said document as a basis to uphold petitioner's claim. The said alleged eleven (11)-year lease contract was not
submitted to the Central Bank whose strict documentation rules must be complied with by banks to ensure their
continued good standing. On the contrary, what was submitted to the Central Bank was the twenty (20)-year lease
contract.

"Granting arguendo that private respondent Banco Filipino deliberately omitted to submit the eleven (11)-year
contract to the Central Bank, we do not consider that fact as violative of the res inter alios acta aliis non
nocet (Section 28, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court provides, viz.: 'Sec. 28. Admission by third party - The rights
of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.';
Compania General de Tabacos v. Ganson, 13 Phil. 472, 477 [1909]) rule in evidence. Rather, it is an indication of
said contract's inexistence.

"It is not the eleven (11)-year lease contract but the twenty (20)-year lease contract which is the real and genuine
contract between petitioner Tala Realty and private respondent Banco Filipino. Considering that the twenty (20)-
year lease contract is still subsisting and will expire in 2001 yet, Banco Filipino is entitled to the possession of the
subject premises for as long as it pays the agreed rental and does not violate the other terms and conditions
thereof (Art. 1673, New Civil Code)." (Emphasis supplied)

The validity of the twenty (20) year lease contract was further reinforced on June 20, 2000 when the First Division
of this Court, this time, speaking through Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, rendered a Decision in G.R.
No. 137980, likewise upholding the twenty (20)-year lease contract, thus:

"In light of the foregoing recent Decision of this Court (G.R. No. 129887), we have no option but to uphold the
twenty-year lease contract over the eleven-year contract presented by petitioner. It is the better practice that when a
court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and
apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. 'Stare decisis et non quieta movere.'

"That the principle of stare decisis applies in the instant case, even though the subject property is different, may be
gleaned from the pronouncement in Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 110398, 281
SCRA 534, 542-543 (1997)], to wit-

'Petitioner criticizes the lower court's reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing that although this case arose out of the
same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are different and trial was conducted separately. Petitioner
contends that the decision in this case should be based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence
adduced in it, or, in short, on the record of this case.

'The contention is without merit. What petitioner contends may be true with respect to the merits of the individual
claims against petitioner but not as to the cause of the sinking of its ship on April 22, 1980 and its liability for such
accident, of which there is only one truth. Otherwise, one would be subscribing to the sophistry: truth on one side of
the Pyrenees, falsehood on the other!

'Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court's policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence in
accordance with the legal maxim 'stare decisis et non quieta movere' (Follow past precedents and do not disturb
what has been settled.) Where, as in this case, the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward
by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue (J.M. Tuason & Corp. v. Mariano, 85 SCRA 644 [1978]).
In Woulfe v. Associated Realties Corporation (130 N.J. Eq. 519, 23 A. 2d 399, 401 [1942]), the Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that where substantially similar cases to the pending case were presented and applicable principles
declared in prior decisions, the court was bound by the principle of stare decisis. Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger
v. Gill (75 Ohio App., 62 N.E. 2d 760 [1944]), it was held that under the doctrine of stare decisis a ruling is final
even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceeding and not bound by the judgment under the res judicata
doctrine. The Philadelphia court expressed itself in this wise: 'Stare decisis simply declares that, for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different' (Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. 448, 452, 118A, 394, 395
[1922]. Manogahela Street Ry, Co. v. Philadelphia Co., 350 Pa 603, 39 A. 2d 909, 916 [1944]; In re Burtt's Estate,
353 Pa. 217, 4 A. 2d 670, 677 [1945]). Thus, in J.M. Tuason v. Mariano, supra, this Court relied on its rulings in
other cases involving different parties in sustaining the validity of a land title on the principle of 'stare decisis et non
quieta movere.'(underscoring, Ours)

"Here, therefore, even if the property subject of the Decision of G.R. No. 129887 is located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan
while that in the instant case is located in Davao, we can very well apply the conclusion in G.R. No. 129887 that it is
the twenty-year lease contract which is controlling inasmuch as not only are the parties the same, but more
importantly, the issue regarding its validity is one and the same and, hence, should no longer be relitigated."
Considering the above rulings, we hold that the term of the lease in the present case is also twenty (20) years.

Resolving now the issue of whether or not respondent Banco Filipino should be ejected for non-payment of rentals,
the First Division of this Court in the same G.R. No. 137980 held:

"Coming now to the issue of whether or not respondent should be ejected for non-payment of rentals, we do not
agree with the ruling in G.R. No 129887 that since the unpaid rentals demanded by petitioner were based on a new
rate which it unilaterally imposed and to which respondent did not agree, there lies no ground for ejectment. In such
a case, there could still be ground for ejectment based on non-payment of rentals. The recent case of T & C
Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals13 is instructional on this point. It was there cautioned that-

'The trial court found that private respondent had failed to pay the monthly rental of P1,800.00 from November 1992
to February 16, 1993, despite demands to pay and to vacate the premises made by petitioner. Even if private
respondent deposited the rents in arrears in the bank, this fact cannot alter the legal situation of private respondent
since the account was opened in private respondent's name. Clearly, there was cause for the ejectment of private
respondent. Although the increase in monthly rentals from P700.00 to P1,800.00 was in excess of 20% allowed by
B.P. Blg. 877, as amended by R.A. No. 6828, what private respondent could have done was to deposit the original
rent of P700.00 either with the judicial authorities or in a bank in the name of, and with notice to, petitioner. As this
Court held in Uy v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 671, 676 [1989]):

'The records reveal that the new rentals demanded since 1979 (P150.00 per month) exceed that allowed by law so
refusal on the part of the lessor to accept was justified. However, what the lessee should have done was to deposit in
1979 the previous rent. This deposit in the Bank was made only in 1984 indicating a delay of more than four years.

'From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the lessor was correct in asking for the ejectment of the delinquent lessee.
Moreover, he should be granted not only the current rentals but also all the rentals in arrears. This is so even if the
lessor himself did not appeal because as ruled by this Court, there have been instances when substantial justice
demands the giving of the proper reliefs.' x x x

"While advance rentals appear to have been made to be applied for the payment of rentals due from the eleventh
year to the twentieth year of the lease, to wit-

'3. That upon the signing and execution of this Contract, the LESSEE shall pay the LESSOR ONE MILLION
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P1,020,000.00) Philippine Currency representing advance rental to be
applied on the monthly rental for period from the eleventh to the twentieth year',

"the records show that such advance rental had already been applied for rent on the property for the period of
August, 1985 to November, 1989.

"Thus, when respondent stopped paying any rent at all beginning April, 1994, it gave petitioner good ground for
instituting ejectment proceedings. We reiterate the ruling in T & C Development Corporation, supra, that if ever
petitioner took exception to the unilateral or illegal increase in rental rate, it should not have completely stopped
paying rent but should have deposited the original rent amount with the judicial authorities or in a bank in the name
of, and with notice to, petitioner. This circumstance, i.e., respondent's failure to pay rent at the old rate, does not
appear in G.R. No. 129887. Thus, while we are bound by the findings of this Court's Second Division in that case
under the principle of stare decisis, the fact that respondent's failure to pay any rentals beginning April 1994, which
provided ground for its ejectment from the premises, justifies our departure from the outcome of G.R. No. 129887.
In this case, we uphold petitioner's right to eject respondent from the leased premises."

It bears stressing that the facts of the instant case and those of G.R. Nos. 129887 and 137980 are substantially the
same. The only difference is the site of respondent bank. The opposing parties are likewise the same.
Clearly, in light of the Decisions of this Court in G.R. Nos. 129887 and 137980, which we follow as precedents,
respondent Banco Filipino may not be ejected on the ground of expiration of the lease. However, since it stopped
paying the rents beginning April 1994, its eviction from the premises is justified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No.
44257 is MODIFIED insofar as it denies petitioner Tala's prayer for ejectment of respondent Banco Filipino.

Judgment is rendered ordering respondent Banco Filipino to vacate the subject premises and to restore possession
thereof to petitioner Tala. Respondent is also ordered to pay Tala the monthly rental of P21,100.00 computed from
April 1994 up to the time it vacates the premises.

Costs against respondent.

G.R. NO. 177127 : October 11, 2010

J.R.A. PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.cralaw

DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Stare decisis et non quieta movere.

Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus, once a case has been decided one way, courts have no choice but to
resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner. 1cra1aw We ruled then, as we rule now, that
failure to print the word "zero-rated" in the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input value-added
tax (VAT) on zero-rated sales.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the January 15, 2007
Decision2cra1aw and the March 16, 2007

Resolution3cra1aw of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner J.R.A. Philippines, Inc., a domestic corporation, is engaged in the manufacture and wholesale export of
jackets, pants, trousers, overalls, shirts, polo shirts, ladies wear, dresses and other wearing apparel. 4cra1aw It is
registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a VAT taxpayer 5cra1aw and as an Ecozone Export
Enterprise with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). 6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On separate dates, petitioner filed with the Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 54 of the BIR, Trece Martires City,
applications for tax credit/refund of unutilized input VAT on its zero-rated sales for the taxable quarters of 2000 in
the total amount of P8,228,276.34, broken down as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1st quarter P 2,369,060.97 3rd quarter 1,918,015.38

2nd quarter 2,528,126.02 4th quarter 1,413,073.977y

The claim for credit/refund, however, remained unacted by the respondent. Hence, petitioner was constrained to file
a petition before the CTA.

Proceedings before the Second Division of the Court of Tax Appeals

On April 16, 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for Review8cra1aw with the CTA for the refund/credit of the same
input VAT which was docketed as CTA Case No.

6454 and raffled to the Second Division of the CTA.

In his Answer,9cra1aw respondent interposed the following special and affirmative defenses, to
wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

4. Petitioners alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative routinary investigation/examination by the
Bureau;

5. Being allegedly registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority as an export enterprise, petitioners
business is not subject to VAT pursuant to Section 24 of R.A. No. 7916 in relation to Section 109 (q) of the Tax
Code. Hence, it is not entitled to tax credit of input taxes pursuant to Section 4.103-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-
95;

6. The amount of P8,228,276.34 being claimed by petitioner as alleged unutilized VAT input taxes for the year 2000
was not properly documented;

7. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to refund, and failure to [do so]
is fatal to the claim for refund/ credit;

8. Petitioner must show that it has complied with the provisions of Section 204 (c) and 229 of the Tax Code on the
prescriptive period for claiming tax refund/credit;

9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the same partake the nature of exemption from
taxation.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After trial, the Second Division of the CTA rendered a Decision11cra1aw denying petitioners claim for refund/credit
of input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales due to the failure of petitioner to indicate its Taxpayers
Identification Number-VAT (TIN-V) and the word "zero-rated" on its invoices.12cra1aw Thus, the fallo
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and, accordingly, DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration14cra1aw to which respondent filed an
Opposition.15cra1aw Petitioner, in turn, tendered a Reply.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Second Division of the CTA, however, stood firm on its Decision and denied petitioners Motion for lack of
merit in a Resolution17cra1aw dated October 5, 2005. This prompted petitioner to elevate the matter to the CTA En
Banc.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Ruling of the CTA En Banc

On January 15, 2007, the CTA En Banc denied the petition, reiterating that failure to comply with invoicing
requirements results in the denial of a claim for refund.19cra1aw Hence, it disposed of the petition as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated June
30, 2005 and Resolution dated October 5, 2005 of Second Division of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A Case No.
6454 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta (Presiding Justice Acosta) concurred with the findings of the majority that there
was failure on the part of petitioner to comply with the invoicing requirements; 21cra1aw he dissented, however, to
the outright denial of petitioners claim since there are other pieces of evidence proving petitioners transactions and
VAT status.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner sought reconsideration23cra1aw of the Decision but the CTA En Banc

denied the same in a Resolution24cra1aw dated March 16, 2007. Presiding Justice Acosta maintained his dissent.

Issue
Hence, the instant Petition with the solitary issue of whether the failure to print the word "zero-rated" on the
invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of input VAT on zero-rated sales.

Petitioners Arguments

Petitioner submits that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED BY DECIDING QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, IN THAT:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A. THE INVOICING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE 1997 TAX CODE DO NOT REQUIRE THAT INVOICES AND/OR RECEIPTS
ISSUED BY A VAT-REGISTERED TAXPAYER, SUCH AS THE PETITIONER, SHOULD BE IMPRINTED WITH THE WORD "ZERO-
RATED."

B. THE INVOICING REQUIREMENTS PRESCRIBED BY THE 1997 TAX CODE AND THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE WORDS
"ZERO-RATED" BE IMPRINTED ON THE SALES INVOICES/OFFICIAL RECEIPTS UNDER REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 7-95 ARE
NOT EVIDENTIARY RULES AND THE ABSENCE THEREOF IS NOT FATAL TO A TAXPAYERS CLAIM FOR REFUND.

C. RESPONDENTS REGULATIONS ARE INVALID BECAUSE THEY DO NOT IMPLEMENT THE 1997 TAX CODE BUT INSTEAD,
[EXCEED] THE LIMITATIONS OF THE LAW.

D. PETITIONER PRESENTED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT UNEQUIVOCALLY PROVED PETITIONERS ZERO-RATED

TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 2000.

E. NO PREJUDICE CAN RESULT TO THE GOVERNMENT BY REASON OF THE FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO IMPRINT THE
WORD "ZERO-RATED" ON ITS INVOICES. PETITIONERS CLIENTS FOR ITS ZERO-RATED TRANSACTIONS CANNOT UNDULY
BENEFIT FROM ITS "OMISSION" CONSIDERING THAT THEY ARE NON-RESIDENT FOREIGN CORPORATIONS [that] ARE NOT
COVERED BY THE PHILIPPINE VAT SYSTEM.

F. IN CIVIL CASE[S], SUCH AS CLAIMS FOR REFUND, STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IS NOT
REQUIRED. MOREOVER, A MERE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE WILL SUFFICE TO JUSTIFY THE GRANT OF A CLAIM.

Respondents Arguments

Emphasizing that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions which are strictly construed against the claimant,
respondent seeks the affirmance of the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CTA En Banc. 26cra1aw He insists
that the denial of petitioners claim for tax credit/refund is justified because it failed to comply with the invoicing
requirements under Section 4.108-127cra1aw of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.

Our Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The absence of the word "zero-rated" on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input VAT

The question of whether the absence of the word "zero-rated" on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for
credit/refund of input VAT is not novel. This has been squarely resolved in Panasonic Communications Imaging
Corporation of the Philippines (formerly Matsushita Business Machine Corporation of the Philippines) v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.28cra1aw In that case, we sustained the denial of petitioners claim for tax
credit/refund for non-compliance with Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, which requires the word
"zero rated" to be printed on the invoices/receipts covering zero-rated sales. We explained
that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Zero-rated transactions generally refer to the export sale of goods and services. The tax rate in this case is set at zero.
When applied to the tax base or the selling price of the goods or services sold, such zero rate results in no tax
chargeable against the foreign buyer or customer. But, although the seller in such transactions charges no output tax,
he can claim a refund of the VAT that his suppliers charged him. The seller thus enjoys automatic zero rating, which
allows him to recover the input taxes he paid relating to the export sales, making him internationally competitive.

For the effective zero rating of such transactions, however, the taxpayer has to be VAT-registered and must comply
with invoicing requirements. x x x

Petitioner Panasonic points out, however, that in requiring the printing on its sales invoices of the word "zero-rated,"
the Secretary of Finance unduly expanded, amended, and modified by a mere regulation (Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-
95) the letter and spirit of Sections 113 and 237 of the 1997 NIRC, prior to their amendment by R.A. 9337.
Panasonic argues that the 1997 NIRC, which applied to its payments specifically Sections 113 and 237 required the
VAT-registered taxpayers receipts or invoices to indicate only the following information:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(1) A statement that the seller is a VAT-registered person, followed by his taxpayers identification number (TIN);

(2) The total amount which the purchaser [paid] or is obligated to pay to the seller with the indication that such
amount includes the value-added tax;

(3) The date of transaction, quantity, unit cost and description of the goods or properties or nature of the service; and

(4) The name, business style, if any, address and taxpayer's identification number (TIN) of the purchaser, customer
or client.

Petitioner Panasonic points out that Sections 113 and 237 did not require the inclusion of the word "zero-rated" for
zero-rated sales covered by its receipts or invoices. The BIR incorporated this requirement only after the enactment
of R.A. 9337 on November 1, 2005, a law that did not yet exist at the time it issued its invoices.

But when petitioner Panasonic made the export sales subject of this case, i.e., from April 1998 to March 1999, the
rule that applied was Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95, otherwise known as the Consolidated Value-Added Tax
Regulations, which the Secretary of Finance issued on December 9, 1995 and [which] took effect on January 1,
1996. It already required the printing of the word "zero-rated" on the invoices covering zero-rated sales. When R.A.
9337 amended the 1997 NIRC on November 1, 2005, it made this particular revenue regulation a part of the tax
code. This conversion from regulation to law did not diminish the binding force of such regulation with respect to
acts committed prior to the enactment of that law.

Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95 proceeds from the rule-making authority granted to the Secretary of Finance under
Section 245 of the 1977 NIRC (Presidential Decree 1158) for the efficient enforcement of the tax code and of course
its amendments. The requirement is reasonable and is in accord with the efficient collection of VAT from the
covered sales of goods and services. As aptly explained by the CTAs First Division, the appearance of the word
"zero-rated" on the face of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers from falsely claiming input VAT from
their purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If, absent such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the
government would be refunding money it did not collect.

Further, the printing of the word "zero-rated" on the invoice helps segregate sales that are subject to 10% (now 12%)
VAT from those sales that are zero-rated. Unable to submit the proper invoices, petitioner Panasonic has been
unable to substantiate its claim for refund.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, petitioners claim for credit/ refund of input VAT for the taxable
quarters of 2000 must be denied. Failure to print the word "zero-rated" on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for
credit/ refund of input VAT on zero-rated sales.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated January 15, 2007 and the Resolution
dated March 16, 2007 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 165287 September 14, 2011

ARMANDO BARCELLANO, Petitioner,

vs.
DOLORES BAÑAS, represented by her son and Attorney-in-fact CRISPINO BERMILLO, Respondent.

DECISION PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal by certiorari1 from the Decision2 of the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 67702 dated 26 February 2004, granting the petition of Dolores Bañas, herein respondent, to
reverse and set aside the Decision3 of the lower court.

The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the court a quo is
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and in its stead another one is rendered GRANTING to petitioner-appellants
the right to redeem the subject property for the amount of Php 60,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the finality of
this decision.

The facts as gathered by the court follow:

Respondent Bañas is an heir of Bartolome Bañas who owns in fee simple Lot 4485, PLS-722-D situated in Hindi,
Bacacay, Albay. Adjoining the said lot is the property of Vicente Medina (Medina), covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. VH-9094, with an area of 1,877 square meters. On 17 March 1997, Medina offered his lot for sale to the
adjoining owners of the property, the heirs of Bartolome Bañas, including herein respondent Dolores Bañas,
Crispino Bermillo (Bermillo) and Isabela Bermillo-Beruela (Beruela)4 Crispino Bermillo, as the representative of his
family, agreed to the offer of Medina, the sale to take place after the harvest season. 5

On 3 April 1997, Medina sold the property to herein petitioner Armando Barcellano for ₱60,000.00. The following
day, the heirs of Bañas learned about the sale and went to the house of Medina to inquire about it. 6 Medina
confirmed that the lot was sold to Barcellano. The heirs conveyed their intention to redeem the property but Medina
replied that there was already a deed of sale executed between the parties.7 Also, the Bañas heirs failed to tender the
₱60,000.00 redemption amount to Medina.8

Aggrieved, the heirs went to the Office of the Barangay Council on 5 April 1997. 9 Medina sent only his tenant to
attend the proceeding. On 9 April 1997, the Bañas heirs and Barcellano, with neither Medina nor his tenant in
attendance, went to the Office of the Barangay Council to settle the dispute. According to one of the Bañas heirs,
Barcellano told them that he would be willing to sell the property but for a higher price of ₱90,000.00. 10 Because the
parties could not agree on the price and for failure to settle the dispute, the Lupon issued a Certification to File
Action.11

On 24 October 1997, Dolores Bañas filed an action for Legal Redemption before the Regional Trial Court.
However, on 5 February 1998, the petition was withdrawn on the ground that:

xxx considering the present worse economic situation in the country, petitioner opted that the amount they are
supposed to pay for the redemption be readily available for their immediate and emergency needs.

On 11 March 1998, Dolores Bañas, as represented by Bermillo, filed another action 12 for Legal Redemption. It was
opposed by Barcellano insisting that he complied with the provisions of Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code but Bañas
failed to exercise her right within the period provided by law.

Trial ensued. On 15 March 2000, the trial court dismissed the complaint of the Bañas heirs for their failure to
comply with the condition precedent of making a formal offer to redeem and for failure to file an action in court
together with the consignation of the redemption price within the reglementary period of 30 days. 13 The dispositive
portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower court and granted the heirs the right to
redeem the subject property. The appellate court ruled that the filing of a complaint before the Katarungang
Pambarangay should be considered as a notice to Barcellano and Medina that the heirs were exercising their right of
redemption over the subject property; and as having set in motion the judicial process of legal redemption. 14 Further,
the appellate court ruled that a formal offer to redeem, coupled with a tender of payment of the redemption price,
and consignation are proper only if the redemptioner wishes to avail himself of his right of redemption in the future.
The tender of payment and consignation become inconsequential when the redemptioner files a case to redeem the
property within the 30-day period.15

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

In this petition, Barcellano questions the ruling of the appellate court for being contrary to the admitted facts on
record and applicable jurisprudence.

The Court’s Ruling

Barcellano maintains that the written notice required under Art. 1623 to be given to adjoining owner was no longer
necessary because there was already actual notice. Further, he asserts that the appellate court erred in ruling that the
tender of payment of the redemption price and consignation are not required in this case, effectively affirming that
the respondents had validly exercised their right of redemption. Lastly, he questions as erroneous the application of
Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as "Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the
Barangay Level," thereby ruling that the filing by the heirs of the complaint before the Barangay was an exercise of
right of redemption.

We need only to discuss the requirement of notice under Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code, which provides that:

The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.

Nothing in the records and pleadings submitted by the parties shows that there was a written notice sent to the
respondents. Without a written notice, the period of thirty days within which the right of legal pre-emption may be
exercised, does not start.

The indispensability of a written notice had long been discussed in the early case of Conejero v. Court of
Appeals,16 penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes:

With regard to the written notice, we agree with petitioners that such notice is indispensable, and that, in view of the
terms in which Article of the Philippine Civil Code is couched, mere knowledge of the sale, acquired in some other
manner by the redemptioner, does not satisfy the statute. The written notice was obviously exacted by the Code to
remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not
definitive. The statute not having provided for any alternative, the method of notification prescribed remains
exclusive.

This is the same ruling in Verdad v. Court of Appeals:17

The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding actual
knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove
all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.

Lately, in Gosiengfiao Guillen v. the Court of Appeals,18 this Court again emphasized the mandatory character of a
written notice in legal redemption:

From these premises, we ruled that "[P]etitioner-heirs have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a
written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run." These premises and
conclusion leave no doubt about the thrust of Mariano: The right of the petitioner-heirs to exercise their right of
legal redemption exists, and the running of the period for its exercise has not even been triggered because
they have not been notified in writing of the fact of sale. (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioner argues that the only purpose behind Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code is to ensure that the owner of
the adjoining land is actually notified of the intention of the owner to sell his property. To advance their argument,
they cited Destrito v. Court of Appeals as cited in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where this Court
pronounced that written notice is no longer necessary in case of actual notice of the sale of property.

The Alonzo case does not apply to this case. There, we pronounced that the disregard of the mandatory written rule
was an exception due to the peculiar circumstance of the case. Thus:

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the
sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be
closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the
law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are
satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales
made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.

Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that
sometime between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were
actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could
have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the
properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already
been extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired.

The following doctrine is also worth noting:

While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he
should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should
have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the party
neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts.

It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them,
should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not
the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this
unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily
available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was
already too late.20

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And
there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and
the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These
are the justifications for this exception.

The Court clarified that:

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the
respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had
no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be
clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply
is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case. 21 (Emphasis supplied)

Without the "peculiar circumstances" in the present case, Alonzo cannot find application. The impossibility in
Alonzo of the parties’ not knowing about the sale of a portion of the property they were actually occupying is not
presented in this case. The strict letter of the law must apply. That a departure from the strict letter should only be
for extraordinary reasons is clear from the second sentence of Art. 1623 that "The deed of sale shall not be recorded
in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof
to all possible redemptioners."

Justice Edgardo Paras, referring to the origins of the requirement, would explain in his commentaries on the New
Civil Code that despite actual knowledge, the person having the right to redeem is STILL entitled to the written
notice. Both the letter and the spirit of the New Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope of the
"written notice" by including therein any other kind of notice such as an oral one, or by registration. If the intent of
the law has been to include verbal notice or any other means of information as sufficient to give the effect of this
notice, there would have been no necessity or reason to specify in the article that said notice be in writing, for under
the old law, a verbal notice or mere information was already deemed sufficient. 22

Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation.lawphi1 There is only room for application.23 Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. The
law is clear in this case, there must first be a written notice to the family of Bañas.

Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget, when the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. 24

We find no need to rule on the other issues presented by the petitioner.1âwphi1 The respondent Bañas has a perfect
right of redemption and was never in danger of losing such right even if there was no redemption complaint filed
with the barangay, no tender of payment or no consignation.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 26 February 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
67702, granting to petitioner-appellants the right to redeem the subject property for the amount of Php60,000.00
within thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision is hereby AFFIRMED. No cost.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26551 February 27, 1976

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WENCESLAO ALMUETE FERNANDO FRONDA, FAUSTO DURION and CIPRIANO
FRONDA, defendants-appellees.\

Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Vicente A.
Torres for appellant.

Emiliano D. Castellanes for appellees. AQUINO, J.:

Wenceslao Almuete Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a violation of section
39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the information that in December, 1963, in Muñoz, Nueva
Ecija the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland, without notice to her or without her consent,
pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests of five (5) cavans of palay each to her damage in the amount of
P187.50 at P12.50 a cavan (Criminal Case No. SD-179, Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Sto. Domingo
Branch VI).

Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty. They filed motion for a bill of particulars as to the exact date of
the commission of the offense charged. The lower court denied their motion because they had already entered their
plea.

Thereafter, they -filed a motion to quash the information on that grounds (1) that it does not allege facts sufficient to
constitute the crime charged; (2) that there is no law punishing it, and (3) that the court has, no jurisdiction over the
alleged time The fiscal opposed the motion.

The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the information in its order of August 11, 1966. It held that the
information is basically deficient because it does not describe t lie circumstances under which the cavans of palay
were found in the possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon for the threshing of the
harvests, and it does not allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net share
based on the last normal harvest.

The prosecution appealed from the order of dismissal. The Solicitor General argues in his brief that the information
in this case alleges all the elements of the offense defined in section 39 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended of
Republic Act No. 2263. Sections 39 and 57 of the same law reads as follows:

SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing. — It shall be unlawful for either the tenant or landholder, without mutual
consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the date set for its threshing- That if the tenant
n food for his family and the landholder does not or cannot furnish such and refuses to allow the tenant to reap or
thresh a portion of the crop previous to the date set for its threshing, the tenant can reap or thresh not more than ten
percent of his net share in the last normal harvest after giving notice thereof to the landholder or his representative.
Any violation of this situation by either party shall be treated and penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under
the general provisions of law applicable to that act committed.

SEC. 57. Penal Provision. — Violation of the provisions of ... sections thirty-nine and forty-nine of this Act shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the
discretion of the Court. ... *

We hold that the order of dismissal should be affirmed because as held in People vs. Adillo, L-23M, November 27,
1975, a case similar to the instant case, section 99 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code of
1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389 168 O.G. 915) and as implemented by Presidential Decrees Nos. 2, 27
and 316. That Code was already in force when the act complained of was committed. The repeal may be rationalized
in this manner:

The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is
premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the
landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests.

The Agricultural Land Reform Code superseded the Agricultural Tenancy Law (except as qualified in sections 4 and
35 of the Code). The Code instituted the leasehold system and abolished share tenancy subject to certain conditions
indicated in section 4 thereof. It is significant that section 39 is not reproduced in the Agricultural Land Reform
Code whose section 172 repeals "all laws or part of any law inconsistent with" its provisions.

Under the leasehold system the prohibition against pre-threshing has no, more raison d'etre because the lessee is
obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, or the Code of
Agrarian Reforms, as redesignated in Republic Act No. 6389 which took effect on September 10, 1971. Thus, the
legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases). applies
to this case.

Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy throughout the country as contrary to
public policy and automatically converted it to agricultural leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the
entire country "as a land reform area". Presidential Decree No. 27 emancipated the tenant from the bondage of the
soil. And Presidential Decree No. 316 interdicted the ejectment or removal of the tenant-farmer from his
farmholding until the promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. 27. (See
People vs. Adillo, supra).

The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the
landlord is inferable from the fact that, as already noted, the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of
the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-
reaping and pre-threshing.

All indications point to a deliberate and manifest legislative design to replace the Agricultural Tenancy Law with the
Code of Agrarian Reforms, formerly the Agricultural Land Reform Code, at least as far as ricelands are concerned.

As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord, which is an offense under the
Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it
as an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of
that Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to
landholder.

It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that "an act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain operates as
a repeal of anything omitted which was contain in the old act and not included in the amendatory act" (Crawford,
Construction of Statutes, p. 621 cited in the Adillo case).

A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute, and evidently intended as a substitute for
it, operates to repeal the former statute" (82 C.J.S. 499). 'The revising statute is in effect a 'legislative declaration
that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and whatever is excluded therefrom shall be discarded"
(82 C.J.S. 500).

The repeal of appeal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old
penal law prior to its repeal (People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225; People vs. Sindiong and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000; People
vs. Binuya, 61 Phil. 208; U.S. vs. Reyes, 10 Phil. 423; U.S. vs. Academia, 10 Phil. 431. See dissent in Lagrimas vs.
Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 247, 252, 254).

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is affirmed with costs de oficio.\

G.R. No. 176707 February 17, 2010

ARLIN B. OBIASCA, 1 Petitioner,

vs.
JEANE O. BASALLOTE, Respondent.

DECISION CORONA, J.:

When the law is clear, there is no other recourse but to apply it regardless of its perceived harshness. Dura lex sed
lex. Nonetheless, the law should never be applied or interpreted to oppress one in order to favor another. As a court
of law and of justice, this Court has the duty to adjudicate conflicting claims based not only on the cold provision of
the law but also according to the higher principles of right and justice.

The facts of this case are undisputed.

On May 26, 2003, City Schools Division Superintendent Nelly B. Beloso appointed respondent Jeane O. Basallote
to the position of Administrative Officer II, Item No. OSEC-DECSB-ADO2-390030-1998, of the Department of
Education (DepEd), Tabaco National High School in Albay. 2

Subsequently, in a letter dated June 4, 2003,3 the new City Schools Division Superintendent, Ma. Amy O. Oyardo,
advised School Principal Dr. Leticia B. Gonzales that the papers of the applicants for the position of Administrative
Officer II of the school, including those of respondent, were being returned and that a school ranking should be

accomplished and submitted to her office for review. In addition, Gonzales was advised that only qualified
applicants should be endorsed.

Respondent assumed the office of Administrative Officer II on June 19, 2003. Thereafter, however, she received a
letter from Ma. Teresa U. Diaz, Human Resource Management Officer I of the City Schools Division of Tabaco
City, Albay, informing her that her appointment could not be forwarded to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
because of her failure to submit the position description form (PDF) duly signed by Gonzales.

Respondent tried to obtain Gozales’ signature but the latter refused despite repeated requests. When respondent
informed Oyardo of the situation, she was instead advised to return to her former teaching position of Teacher I.
Respondent followed the advice.

Meanwhile, on August 25, 2003, Oyardo appointed petitioner Arlin B. Obiasca to the same position of
Administrative Officer II. The appointment was sent to and was properly attested by the CSC. 4 Upon learning this,
respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against Oyardo, Gonzales and
Diaz.

In its decision, the Ombudsman found Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable for withholding information
from respondent on the status of her appointment, and suspended them from the service for three months. Diaz was
absolved of any wrongdoing.5

Respondent also filed a protest with CSC Regional Office V. But the protest was dismissed on the ground that it
should first be submitted to the Grievance Committee of the DepEd for appropriate action. 6

On motion for reconsideration, the protest was reinstated but was eventually dismissed for lack of
merit.7 Respondent appealed the dismissal of her protest to the CSC Regional Office which, however, dismissed the
appeal for failure to show that her appointment had been received and attested by the CSC. 8

Respondent elevated the matter to the CSC. In its November 29, 2005 resolution, the CSC granted the appeal,
approved respondent’s appointment and recalled the approval of petitioner’s appointment. 9
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) claiming that the CSC acted without
factual and legal bases in recalling his appointment. He also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction.

In its September 26, 2006 decision,10 the CA denied the petition and upheld respondent’s appointment which was
deemed effective immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority on May 26, 2003. This was because
respondent had accepted the appointment upon her assumption of the duties and responsibilities of the position.

The CA found that respondent possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the position of
Administrative Officer II; that due to the respondent’s valid appointment, no other appointment to the same position
could be made without the position being first vacated; that the petitioner’s appointment to the position was thus
void; and that, contrary to the argument of petitioner that he had been deprived of his right to due process when he
was not allowed to participate in the proceedings in the CSC, it was petitioner who failed to exercise his right by
failing to submit a single pleading despite being furnished with copies of the pleadings in the proceedings in the
CSC.

The CA opined that Diaz unreasonably refused to affix her signature on respondent’s PDF and to submit
respondent’s appointment to the CSC on the ground of non-submission of respondent’s PDF. The CA ruled that the
PDF was not even required to be submitted and forwarded to the CSC.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but his motion was denied on February 8, 2007. 11

Hence, this petition.12

Petitioner maintains that respondent was not validly appointed to the position of Administrative Officer II because
her appointment was never attested by the CSC. According to petitioner, without the CSC attestation, respondent’s
appointment as Administrative Officer II was never completed and never vested her a permanent title. As such,
respondent’s appointment could still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority. Petitioner further argues
that, under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order (EO) No. 292, 13 every appointment is
required to be submitted to the CSC within 30 days from the date of issuance; otherwise, the appointment becomes
ineffective.14 Thus, respondent’s appointment issued on May 23, 2003 should have been transmitted to the CSC not
later than June 22, 2003 for proper attestation. However, because respondent’s appointment was not sent to the CSC
within the proper period, her appointment ceased to be effective and the position of Administrative Officer II was
already vacant when petitioner was appointed to it.

In her comment,15 respondent points out that her appointment was wrongfully not submitted by the proper persons to
the CSC for attestation. The reason given by Oyardo for the non-submission of respondent’s appointment papers to
the CSC — the alleged failure of respondent to have her PDF duly signed by Gonzales — was not a valid reason
because the PDF was not even required for the attestation of respondent’s appointment by the CSC.

After due consideration of the respective arguments of the parties, we deny the petition.

The law on the matter is clear. The problem is petitioner’s insistence that the law be applied in a manner that is
unjust and unreasonable.

Petitioner relies on an overly restrictive reading of Section 9(h) of PD 807 16 which states, in part, that an
appointment must be submitted by the appointing authority to the CSC within 30 days from issuance, otherwise, the
appointment becomes ineffective:

Sec. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The [CSC] shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the
following powers and functions:
 (h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of
presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen and jailguards, and
disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An
appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties
immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the [CSC], if this should take place, without
prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules:
Provided, finally, That the [CSC] shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in the civil
service. All appointments requiring the approval of the [CSC] as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by
the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise the appointment becomes ineffective
thirty days thereafter. (Emphasis supplied)

This provision is implemented in Section 11, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292
(Omnibus Rules):

Section 11. An appointment not submitted to the [CSC] within thirty (30) days from the date of issuance which shall
be the date appearing on the fact of the appointment, shall be ineffective. xxx

Based on the foregoing provisions, petitioner argues that respondent’s appointment became effective on the day of
her appointment but it subsequently ceased to be so when the appointing authority did not submit her appointment to
the CSC for attestation within 30 days.

Petitioner is wrong.

The real issue in this case is whether the deliberate failure of the appointing authority (or other responsible officials)
to submit respondent’s appointment paper to the CSC within 30 days from its issuance made her appointment
ineffective and incomplete. Substantial reasons dictate that it did not.

Before discussing this issue, however, it must be brought to mind that CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005
recalling petitioner’s appointment and approving that of respondent has long become final and executory.

Remedy to Assail CSC Decision or Resolution

Sections 16 and 18, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules provide the proper remedy to assail a CSC decision or resolution:

Section 16. An employee who is still not satisfied with the decision of the [Merit System Protection Board] may
appeal to the [CSC] within fifteen days from receipt of the decision.

The decision of the [CSC] is final and executory if no petition for reconsideration is filed within fifteen days
from receipt thereof.

Section 18. Failure to file a protest, appeal, petition for reconsideration or petition for review within the
prescribed period shall be deemed a waiver of such right and shall render the subject action/decision final
and executory. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, petitioner did not file a petition for reconsideration of the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005
before filing a petition for review in the CA. Such fatal procedural lapse on petitioner’s part allowed the CSC
resolution dated November 29, 2005 to become final and executory. 17 Hence, for all intents and purposes, the CSC
resolution dated November 29, 2005 has become immutable and can no longer be amended or modified. 18 A final
and definitive judgment can no longer be changed, revised, amended or reversed.19 Thus, in praying for the
reversal of the assailed Court of Appeals decision which affirmed the final and executory CSC resolution dated
November 29, 2005, petitioner would want the Court to reverse a final and executory judgment and disregard the
doctrine of immutability of final judgments.
True, a dissatisfied employee of the civil service is not preempted from availing of remedies other than those
provided in Section 18 of the Omnibus Rules. This is precisely the purpose of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which
provides for the filing of a petition for review as a remedy to challenge the decisions of the CSC.

While Section 18 of the Omnibus Rules does not supplant the mode of appeal under Rule 43, we cannot disregard
Section 16 of the Omnibus Rules, which requires that a petition for reconsideration should be filed, otherwise, the
CSC decision will become final and executory, viz.:

The decision of the [CSC] is final and executory if no petition for reconsideration is filed within fifteen days
from receipt thereof. 1avvphi1

Note that the foregoing provision is a specific remedy as against CSC decisions involving
its administrative function, that is, on matters involving "appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service,"20 as opposed to its quasi-judicial function where it adjudicates the rights of persons
before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law. 21

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, for reasons of law, comity and convenience,
where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative
appeal or reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been
resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in
the administrative forum.22 In Orosa v. Roa,23 the Court ruled that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available
within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts. 24 While the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to certain exceptions, 25 these are not present in this case.

Thus, absent any definitive ruling that the second paragraph of Section 16 is not mandatory and the filing of a
petition for reconsideration may be dispensed with, then the Court must adhere to the dictates of Section 16 of the
Omnibus Rules.

Moreover, even in its substantive aspect, the petition is bereft of merit.

Section 9(h) of PD 807 Already Amended by Section 12 Book V of EO 292

It is incorrect to interpret Section 9(h) of Presidential Decree (PD) 807 as requiring that an appointment must be
submitted by the appointing authority to the CSC within 30 days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment would
become ineffective. Such interpretation fails to appreciate the relevant part of Section 9(h) which states that "an
appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his
duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the [CSC]." This provision is reinforced
by Section 1, Rule IV of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, which reads:

Section 1. An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately
upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall
be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission. The
appointment shall remain effective until disapproved by the Commission. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

More importantly, Section 12, Book V of EO 292 amended Section 9(h) of PD 807 by deleting the requirement that
all appointments subject to CSC approval be submitted to it within 30 days. Section 12 of EO 292 provides:

Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service, including
extension of Service beyond retirement age;
(15) Inspect and audit the personnel actions and programs of the departments, agencies, bureaus, offices, local
government units and other instrumentalities of the government including government -owned or controlled
corporations; conduct periodic review of the decisions and actions of offices or officials to whom authority has been
delegated by the Commission as well as the conduct of the officials and the employees in these offices and apply
appropriate sanctions whenever necessary.

As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its
meaning.26 It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made had there been no intention to effect a change
in the meaning of the law or rule.27 The word, phrase or sentence excised should accordingly be
considered inoperative.28

The dissent refuses to recognize the amendment of Section 9(h) of PD 807 by EO 292 but rather finds the
requirement of submission of appointments within 30 days not inconsistent with the authority of the CSC to take
appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters. However, the intention to amend by deletion is
unmistakable not only in the operational meaning of EO 292 but in its legislative history as well.

PD 807 and EO 292 are not inconsistent insofar as they require CSC action on appointments to the civil service.
This is evident from the recognition accorded by EO 292, specifically under Section 12 (14) and (15) thereof, to the
involvement of the CSC in all personnel actions and programs of the government. However, while a restrictive
period of 30 days within which appointments must be submitted to the CSC is imposed under the last sentence of
Section 9(h) of PD 807, none was adopted by Section 12 (14) and (15) of EO 292. Rather, provisions subsequent to
Section 12 merely state that the CSC (and its liaison staff in various departments and agencies)
shall periodically monitor, inspect and audit personnel actions.29 Moreover, under Section 9(h) of PD 807,
appointments not submitted within 30 days to the CSC become ineffective, no such specific adverse effect is
contemplated under Section 12 (14) and (15) of EO 292. Certainly, the two provisions are materially inconsistent
with each other. And to insist on reconciling them by restoring the restrictive period and punitive effect of Section
9(h) of PD 807, which EO 292 deliberately discarded, would be to rewrite the law by mere judicial interpretation. 30

Not even the historical development of civil service laws can justify the retention of such restrictive provisions.
Public Law No. 5,31 the law formally establishing a civil service system, merely directed that all heads of offices
notify the Philippine Civil Service Board "in writing without delay of all appointments x x x made in the classified
service."32 The Revised Administrative Code of 1917 was even less stringent as approval by the Director of the Civil
Service of appointments of temporary and emergency employees was required only when practicable. Finally,
Republic Act (RA) 226033 imposed no period within which appointments were attested to by local government
treasurers to whom the CSC delegated its authority to act on personnel actions but provided that if within 180 days
after receipt of said appointments, the CSC shall not have made any correction or revision, then such appointments
shall be deemed to have been properly made. Consequently, it was only under PD 807 that submission of
appointments for approval by the CSC was subjected to a 30-day period. That, however, has been lifted and
abandoned by EO 292.

There being no requirement in EO 292 that appointments should be submitted to the CSC for attestation within 30
days from issuance, it is doubtful by what authority the CSC imposed such condition under Section 11, Rule V of
the Omnibus Rules. It certainly cannot restore what EO 292 itself already and deliberately removed. At the very
least, that requirement cannot be used as basis to unjustly prejudice respondent.

Under the facts obtaining in this case, respondent promptly assumed her duties as Administrative Officer II when
her appointment was issued by the appointing authority. Thus, her appointment took effect immediately and
remained effective until disapproved by the CSC.34 Respondent’s appointment was never disapproved by the CSC.
In fact, the CSC was deprived of the opportunity to act promptly as it was wrongly prevented from doing so. More
importantly, the CSC subsequently approved respondent’s appointment and recalled that of petitioner, which
recall has already become final and immutable.

Second, it is undisputed that respondent’s appointment was not submitted to the CSC, not through her own fault but
because of Human Resource Management Officer I Ma. Teresa U. Diaz’s unjustified refusal to sign it on the feigned
and fallacious ground that respondent’s position description form had not been duly signed by School Principal Dr.
Leticia B. Gonzales.35 Indeed, the CSC even sanctioned Diaz for her failure to act in the required
manner.36 Similarly, the Ombudsman found both City Schools Division Superintendent Ma. Amy O. Oyardo and
Gonzales administratively liable and suspended them for three months for willfully withholding information from
respondent on the status of her appointment.

All along, [respondent] was made to believe that her appointment was in order. During the same period, respondent
Gonzales, with respondent Oyardo’s knowledge, indifferently allowed [respondent] to plea for the signing of her
[position description form], when they could have easily apprised [respondent] about the revocation/withdrawal of
her appointment. Worse, when [respondent] informed Oyardo on 25 June 2003 about her assumption of office as
[Administrative Officer II], the latter directed [respondent] to go back to her post as Teacher I on the ground that
[respondent] had not been issued an attested appointment as [Administrative Officer II], even when [Oyardo] knew
very well that [respondent’s] appointment could not be processed with the CSC because of her order to re-evaluate
the applicants. This act by [Oyardo] is a mockery of the trust reposed upon her by [respondent], who, then in the
state of quandary, specifically sought [Oyardo’s] advice on what to do with her appointment, in the belief that her
superior could enlighten her on the matter.

It was only on 02 July 2003 when [Gonzales], in her letter, first made reference to a re-ranking of the applicants
when [respondent] learned about the recall by [Oyardo] of her appointment. At that time, the thirty-day period
within which to submit her appointment to the CSC has lapsed. [Oyardo’s] and Gonzales’ act of withholding
information about the real status of [respondent’s] appointment unjustly deprived her of pursuing whatever legal
remedies available to her at that time to protect her interest.37

Considering these willful and deliberate acts of the co-conspirators Diaz, Oyardo and Gonzales that caused undue
prejudice to respondent, the Court cannot look the other way and make respondent suffer the malicious
consequences of Gonzales’s and Oyardo’s malfeasance. Otherwise, the Court would be recognizing a result that is
unconscionable and unjust by effectively validating the following inequities: respondent, who was vigilantly
following up her appointment paper, was left to hang and dry; to add insult to injury, not long after Oyardo advised
her to return to her teaching position, she (Oyardo) appointed petitioner in respondent’s stead.

The obvious misgiving that comes to mind is why Gonzales and Oyardo were able to promptly process petitioner’s
appointment and transmit the same to the CSC for attestation when they could not do so for respondent. There is no
doubt that office politics was moving behind the scenes.

In effect, Gonzales’ and Oyardo’s scheming and plotting unduly deprived respondent of the professional
advancement she deserved. While public office is not property to which one may acquire a vested right, it is
nevertheless a protected right.38

It cannot be overemphasized that respondent’s appointment became effective upon its issuance by the appointing
authority and it remained effective until disapproved by the CSC (if at all it ever was). Disregarding this rule and
putting undue importance on the provision requiring the submission of the appointment to the CSC within 30 days
will reward wrongdoing in the appointment process of public officials and employees. It will open the door for
scheming officials to block the completion and implementation of an appointment and render it ineffective by the
simple expedient of not submitting the appointment paper to the CSC. As indubitably shown in this case, even
respondent’s vigilance could not guard against the malice and grave abuse of discretion of her superiors.

There is no dispute that the approval of the CSC is a legal requirement to complete the appointment. Under settled
jurisprudence, the appointee acquires a vested legal right to the position or office pursuant to this completed
appointment.39 Respondent’s appointment was in fact already approved by the CSC with finality.

The purpose of the requirement to submit the appointment to the CSC is for the latter to approve or disapprove such
appointment depending on whether the appointee possesses the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications and
whether the laws and rules pertinent to the process of appointment have been followed. 40 With this in mind,
respondent’s appointment should all the more be deemed valid.
Respondent’s papers were in order. What was sought from her (the position description form duly signed by
Gonzales) was not even a prerequisite before her appointment papers could be forwarded to the CSC. More
significantly, respondent was qualified for the position. Thus, as stated by the CA:

The evidence also reveals compliance with the procedures that should be observed in the selection process for the
vacant position of Administrative Officer II and the issuance of the appointment to the respondent: the vacancy for
the said position was published on February 28, 2003; the Personnel Selection Board of Dep-Ed Division of Tabaco
City conducted a screening of the applicants, which included the respondent and the petitioner; the respondent’s
qualifications met the minimum qualifications for the position of Administrative Officer II provided by the CSC.
She therefore qualified for permanent appointment.41

There is no doubt that, had the appointing authority only submitted respondent’s appointment to the CSC within the
said 30 days from its issuance, the CSC would (and could ) have approved it. In fact, when the CSC was later
apprised of respondent’s prior appointment when she protested petitioner’s subsequent appointment, it was
respondent’s appointment which the CSC approved. Petitioner’s appointment was recalled. These points were never
rebutted as petitioner gave undue emphasis to the non-attestation by the CSC of respondent’s appointment, without
any regard for the fact that the CSC actually approved respondent’s appointment.

Third, the Court is urged to overlook the injustice done to respondent by citing Favis v. Rupisan42 and Tomali v.
Civil Service Commission.43

However, reliance on Favis is misplaced. In Favis, the issue pertains to the necessity of the CSC approval, not the
submission of the appointment to the CSC within 30 days from issuance. Moreover, unlike Favis where there was an
apparent lack of effort to procure the approval of the CSC, respondent in this case was resolute in following up her
appointment papers. Thus, despite Favis’ having assumed the responsibilities of PVTA Assistant General Manager
for almost two years, the Court affirmed her removal, ruling that:

The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials, resulting in the non-observance of the pertinent rules
on the matter does not render the legal requirement, on the necessity of approval by the Commissioner of Civil
Service of appointments, ineffective and unenforceable.44 (Emphasis supplied)

Taken in its entirety, this case shows that the lack of CSC approval was not due to any negligence on
respondent’s part. Neither was it due to the "tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials."
Rather, the underhanded machinations of Gonzales and Oyardo, as well as the gullibility of Diaz, were the
major reasons why respondent’s appointment was not even forwarded to the CSC.

Tomali, likewise, is not applicable. The facts are completely different. In Tomali, petitioner Tomali’s appointment
was not approved by the CSC due to the belated transmittal thereof to the latter. The Court, citing Favis, ruled that
the appointee’s failure to secure the CSC’s approval within the 30-day period rendered her appointment ineffective.
It quoted the Merit Systems Protection Board’s finding that "there is no showing that the non-submission was
motivated by bad faith, spite, malice or at least attributed to the fault of the newly installed [Office of Muslim
Affairs] Executive Director." The Court observed:

Petitioner herself would not appear to be all that blameless. She assumed the position four months after her
appointment was issued or months after that appointment had already lapsed or had become ineffective by operation
of law. Petitioner's appointment was issued on 01 July 1990, but it was only on 31 May 1991 that it was submitted to
the CSC, a fact which she knew, should have known or should have at least verified considering the relatively long
interval of time between the date of her appointment and the date of her assumption to office. 45

The Court also found that "[t]here (was) nothing on record to convince us that the new OMA Director (had) unjustly
favored private respondent nor (had) exercised his power of appointment in an arbitrary, whimsical or despotic
manner."46
The peculiar circumstances in Tomali are definitely not present here. As a matter of fact, the situation was exactly
the opposite. As we have repeatedly stressed, respondent was not remiss in zealously following up the status of her
appointment. It cannot be reasonably claimed that the failure to submit respondent’s appointment to the CSC was
due to her own fault. The culpability lay in the manner the appointing officials exercised their power with
arbitrariness, whim and despotism. The whole scheme was intended to favor another applicant.

Therefore, the lack of CSC approval in Favis and Tomali should be taken only in that light and not overly stretched
to cover any and all similar cases involving the 30-day rule. Certainly, the CSC approval cannot be done away with.
However, an innocent appointee like the respondent should not be penalized if her papers (which were in the
custody and control of others who, it turned out, were all scheming against her) did not reach the CSC on time. After
all, her appointment was subsequently approved by the CSC anyway.

Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, "[t]he condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily
prevents its fulfillment." Applying this to the appointment process in the civil service, unless the appointee himself
is negligent in following up the submission of his appointment to the CSC for approval, he should not be prejudiced
by any willful act done in bad faith by the appointing authority to prevent the timely submission of his appointment
to the CSC. While it may be argued that the submission of respondent’s appointment to the CSC within 30 days was
one of the conditions for the approval of respondent’s appointment, however, deliberately and with bad faith, the
officials responsible for the submission of respondent’s appointment to the CSC prevented the fulfillment of the said
condition. Thus, the said condition should be deemed fulfilled.

The Court has already had the occasion to rule that an appointment remains valid in certain instances despite non-
compliance of the proper officials with the pertinent CSC rules. In Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr.,47 the CSC
challenged the validity of the appointment of Ong on the ground that, among others, it was not reported in the July
1995 Report of Personnel Action (ROPA), thus making such appointment ineffective. The subject rule provided that
an "appointment issued within the month but not listed in the ROPA for the said month shall become ineffective
thirty days from issuance." Rejecting the CSC’s contention, the Court held that there was a legitimate justification
for such delayed observance of the rule:

We find the respondent's justification for the failure of the POEA to include Ong's appointment in its ROPA for July
1995 as required by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1994 to be in order. The records show that the
[Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)] did not include the contractual appointment of Ong in
its July ROPA because its request for exemption from the educational requisite for confidential staff members
provided in [Memorandum Circular] No. 38 had yet been resolved by the CSC. The resolution of the petitioner
granting such request was received only in November, 1995. The POEA, thereafter, reported the appointment in its
November, 1995 ROPA.48

The Court reached the same conclusion in the recent case of Chavez v. Ronidel49 where there was a similar inaction
from the responsible officials which resulted in non-compliance with the requirement:

Lastly, we agree with the appellate court that respondent's appointment could not be invalidated solely because of
[Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor’s (PCUP’s)] failure to submit two copies of the ROPA as required by
CSC Resolution No. 97368. xxxx

We quote with approval the appellate court's ratiocination in this wise:

To our minds, however, the invalidation of the [respondent's] appointment based on this sole technical ground
is unwarranted, if not harsh and arbitrary, considering the factual milieu of this case. For one, it is not the
[respondent's] duty to comply with the requirement of the submission of the ROPA and the certified true copies
of her appointment to [the Civil Service Commission Field Office or] CSCFO within the period stated in the
aforequoted CSC Resolution. The said resolution categorically provides that it is the PCUP, and not the appointee as
in the case of the [respondent] here, which is required to comply with the said reportorial requirements.
Moreover, it bears pointing out that only a few days after the [petitioner] assumed his new post as PCUP Chairman,
he directed the PCUP to hold the processing of [respondent's] appointment papers in abeyance, until such time that
an assessment thereto is officially released from his office. Unfortunately, up to this very day, the [respondent] is
still defending her right to enjoy her promotional appointment as DMO V. Naturally, her appointment failed to
comply with the PCUP's reportorial requirements under CSC Resolution No. 97-3685 precisely because of the
[petitioner's] inaction to the same.

We believe that the factual circumstances of this case calls for the application of equity. To our minds, the
invalidation of the [respondent's] appointment due to a procedural lapse which is undoubtedly beyond her
control, and certainly not of her own making but that of the [petitioner], justifies the relaxation of the
provisions of CSC Board Resolution No. 97-3685, pars. 6,7 and 8. Hence, her appointment must be upheld based on
equitable considerations, and that the non-submission of the ROPA and the certified true copies of her appointment
to the CSCFO within the period stated in the aforequoted CSC Resolution should not work to her damage and
prejudice. Besides, the [respondent] could not at all be faulted for negligence as she exerted all the necessary
vigilance and efforts to reap the blessings of a work promotion. Thus, We cannot simply ignore her plight. She
has fought hard enough to claim what is rightfully hers and, as a matter of simple justice, good conscience, and
equity, We should not allow Ourselves to prolong her agony.

All told, We hold that the [respondent's] appointment is valid, notwithstanding the aforecited procedural lapse on the
part of PCUP which obviously was the own making of herein [petitioner]. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent deserves the same sympathy from the Court because there was also a telling reason behind the non-
submission of her appointment paper within the 30-day period.

The relevance of Joson and Chavez to this case cannot be simply glossed over. While the agencies concerned in
those cases were accredited agencies of the CSC which could take final action on the appointments, that is not the
case here. Thus, any such differentiation is unnecessary. It did not even factor in the Court’s disposition of the issue
in Joson and Chavez. What is crucial is that, in those cases, the Court upheld the appointment despite the non-
compliance with a CSC rule because (1) there were valid justifications for the lapse; (2) the non-compliance was
beyond the control of the appointee and (3) the appointee was not negligent. All these reasons are present in this
case, thus, there is no basis in saying that the afore-cited cases are not applicable here. Similar things merit similar
treatment.1avvphi1

Fourth, in appointing petitioner, the appointing authority effectively revoked the previous appointment of respondent
and usurped the power of the CSC to withdraw or revoke an appointment that had already been accepted by the
appointee. It is the CSC, not the appointing authority, which has this power. 50 This is clearly provided in Section 9,
Rule V of the Omnibus Rules:

Section 9. An appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing
authority and shall remain in force and effect until disapproved by the [CSC]. xxxx (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Court ruled in De Rama v. Court of Appeals51 that it is the CSC which is authorized to recall an
appointment initially approved when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable
provisions of the civil service law and regulations.

Petitioner seeks to inflexibly impose the condition of submission of the appointment to the CSC by the appointing
authority within 30 days from issuance, that is, regardless of the negligence/diligence of the appointee and the bad
faith/good faith of the appointing authority to ensure compliance with the condition. However, such stance would
place the appointee at the mercy and whim of the appointing authority even after a valid appointment has
been made. For although the appointing authority may not recall an appointment accepted by the appointee, he or
she can still achieve the same result through underhanded machinations that impedes or prevents the transmittal of
the appointment to the CSC. In other words, the insistence on a strict application of the condition regarding the
submission of the appointment to the CSC within 30 days, would give the appointing authority the power to do
indirectly what he or she cannot do directly. An administrative rule that is of doubtful basis will not only produce
unjust consequences but also corrupt the appointment process. Obviously, such undesirable end result could not
have been the intention of the law.

The power to revoke an earlier appointment through the appointment of another may not be conceded to the
appointing authority. Such position is not only contrary to Section 9, Rule V and Section 1, Rule IV of the Omnibus
Rules. It is also a dangerous reading of the law because it unduly expands the discretion given to the appointing
authority and removes the checks and balances that will rein in any abuse that may take place. The Court cannot
countenance such erroneous and perilous interpretation of the law.

Accordingly, petitioner’s subsequent appointment was void. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position.
The incumbent must first be legally removed, or her appointment validly terminated, before another can be
appointed to succeed her.52

In sum, the appointment of petitioner was inconsistent with the law and well-established jurisprudence. It not only
disregarded the doctrine of immutability of final judgments but also unduly concentrated on a narrow portion of the
provision of law, overlooking the greater part of the provision and other related rules and using a legal doctrine
rigidly and out of context. Its effect was to perpetuate an injustice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182434 March 5, 2010

SULTAN YAHYA "JERRY" M. TOMAWIS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMNA A. PUMBAYA, JALILAH A. MANGOMPIA, and RAMLA A.
MUSOR, Respondents.

DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 seeks to nullify the Orders dated July 13,
2005, September 6, 2005, and February 6, 2008 issued by respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong of the Shari’a
District Court (SDC), Fourth Judicial District in Marawi City, in Civil Case No. 102-97 entitled Amna A. Pumbaya,
et al. v. Jerry Tomawis, et al.

The Facts

Private respondents Amna A. Pumbaya, Jalilah A. Mangompia, and Ramla A. Musor are the daughters of the late
Acraman Radia. On February 21, 1997, private respondents filed with the SDC an action for quieting of title of a
parcel of land located in Banggolo, Marawi City, against petitioner Sultan Jerry Tomawis and one Mangoda Radia.
In their complaint, styled as Petition1 and docketed as Civil Case No. 102-97, private respondents, as plaintiffs a
quo, alleged the following:

(1) They were the absolute owners of the lot subject of the complaint, being the legal heirs of Acraman Radia, who
had always been in peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession of the property; (2) Tomawis assumed ownership
of the said property on the claim that he bought the same from Mangoda Radia, who, in turn, claimed that he
inherited it from his late father; (3) in 1996, they "were informed that their land [was] leveled and the small houses
[built] thereon with their permission were removed" upon the orders of Tomawis; and (4) they had been unlawfully
deprived of their possession of the land, and Tomawis’ actions had cast a cloud of doubt on their title.

In his answer, Tomawis debunked the sisters’ claim of ownership and raised, as one of his affirmative defenses
treated by the court as a motion to dismiss, SDC’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.2 As
argued, the regular civil court, not SDC, had such jurisdiction pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129 or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.3

Following the hearing on the affirmative defenses, respondent Judge Rasad Balindong, by Order of April 1, 2003,
denied the motion. Apropos the jurisdiction aspect of the motion, respondent judge asserted the SDC’s original
jurisdiction over the case, concurrently with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by force of Article 143, paragraph 2(b)
of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

On June 16, 2005, Tomawis filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss with Prayer to Correct the Name of Defendants to
Read Sultan Yahya "Jerry" M. Tomawis & Mangoda M. Radia.4 In it, he alleged that title to or possession of real
property or interest in it was clearly the subject matter of the complaint which, thus, brought it within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts in consonance with existing law. 5 On July 13, 2005, the SDC denied this
motion to dismiss.

Unsatisfied, Tomawis later interposed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Cancel and Reset the
Continuation of Trial Until After the Resolution of the Pending Incident. 6 Per Order7 dated September 6, 2005, the
SDC denied Tomawis’ urgent motion for reconsideration and ordered the continuation of trial.

Forthwith, Tomawis repaired to the Court of Appeals (CA), Mindanao Station, on a petition for certiorari,
mandamus, and prohibition under Rule 65 to nullify, on jurisdictional grounds, the aforesaid SDC July 13, 2005 and
September 6, 2005 Orders.
By Resolution8 of February 8, 2006, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground that the CA was "not
empowered to resolve decisions, orders or final judgments of the [SDCs]." Justifying its disposition, the CA held
that, pursuant to Art. 1459 of PD 1083, in relation to Art. VIII, Section 9 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9054,11 the new
organic law of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, final decisions of the SDC are reviewable by the yet
to be established Shari’a Appellate Court. Pending the reorganization of the Shari’a Appellate Court, the CA ruled
that such intermediate appellate jurisdiction rests with the Supreme Court.

Undeterred by the foregoing setback before the CA, Tomawis interposed, on January 29, 2008, before the SDC
another motion to dismiss on the same grounds as his previous motions to dismiss. The motion was rejected by
respondent Judge Balindong per his order of February 6, 2008, denying the motion with finality.

Hence, this recourse on the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION AND
IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION SEEKING RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DENYING HIS
MOTION TO DISMISS.

Simply put, the issue is whether or not the SDC can validly take cognizance of Civil Case No. 102-97.

The Court’s Ruling

Prefatorily, the Court acknowledges the fact that decades after the enactment in 1989 of the law12 creating the
Shari’a Appellate Court and after the Court, per Resolution of June 8, 1999, 13 authorized its creation, the Shari’a
Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the appointment of a Presiding Justice and two Associate
Justices. Until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been organized, however, appeals or
petitions from final orders or decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be referred to a Special Division to
be organized in any of the CA stations preferably composed of Muslim CA Justices.

For cases where only errors or questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to this Court by a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec. 5 of the Constitution and Sec.
2 of Rule 41 of the Rules.

To be sure, the Court has, on several occasions, passed upon and resolved petitions and cases emanating from
Shari’a courts. Among these was one involving the issue of whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the
denial of a motion to implement a writ of execution.14 Still another involved the Shari’a courts’ jurisdiction in
custody and guardianship proceedings,15 nullity of marriage and divorce when the parties were both married in civil
and Muslim rites,16 and settlement of estate proceedings where the deceased was alleged to be not a Muslim, 17 or
where the estate covered properties situated in different provinces.18

The instant petition, involving only a question of law on the jurisdiction of the SDC over a complaint for quieting of
title, was properly instituted before the Court.

Petitioner asserts that Sec. 19(2), in relation to Sec. 33(3) of BP 129, as amended––by vesting original exclusive
jurisdiction to the RTCs or Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), as the case may be, over civil actions that involve the
title to, or possession of, real property––effectively removed the concurrent jurisdiction once pertaining to the SDC
under Art. 143(2)(b) of PD 1083. In fine, petitioner contends that Art. 143 of PD 1083, insofar as it granted the SDC
concurrent jurisdiction over certain real actions, was repealed by the BP 129 provisions adverted to.

Disagreeing as to be expected, private respondents balk at the notion of the implied repeal petitioner espouses,
arguing that PD 1083, being a special, albeit a prior, law, has not been repealed by BP 129. Putting private
respondents’ contention in a narrower perspective, Art. 143(2)(b) of PD 1083 is of specific applicability and, hence,
cannot, under the rules of legal hermeneutics, be superseded by laws of general application, absent an express
repeal.

Petitioner’s claim has no basis.

The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private respondents, the elimination of the "cloud of doubts on the
title of ownership"19 on the subject land, are within the SDC’s jurisdiction to grant.

A brief background. The Judiciary Act of 1948 (RA 296) was enacted on June 17, 1948. It vested the Courts of First
Instance with original jurisdiction:

(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, or the legality
of any tax, impost or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into and detainer on lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act upon city and municipal courts. 20 x x x

Subsequently, PD 1083, dated February 4, 1977, created the Shari’a courts, i.e., the SDC and the Shari’a Circuit
Court, both of limited jurisdiction. In Republic v. Asuncion,21 the Court, citing the Administrative Code of
1987,22 classified Shari’a courts as "regular courts," meaning they are part of the judicial department.

Art. 143 of PD 1083 vests SDCs, in certain cases, with exclusive original jurisdiction and with concurrent original
jurisdiction over certain causes of action. As far as relevant, Art. 143 reads as follows:

ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction.— (1) The Shari’a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:

d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they have not specified which
law shall govern their relations; and

(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:

(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are
Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court. (Emphasis added.)

On August 14, 1981, BP 129 took effect. Sec. 19 of BP 129, as later amended by RA 7691, 23 defining the
jurisdiction of the RTCs, provides:

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980",
is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts." (Emphasis supplied.)

As things stood prior to the effectivity date of BP 129, the SDC had, by virtue of PD 1083, original jurisdiction,
concurrently with the RTCs and MTCs, over all personal and real actions outside the purview of Art. 143(1)(d) of
PD 1083, in which the parties involved were Muslims, except those for ejectment. Personal action is one that is
founded on privity of contracts between the parties;24 and in which the plaintiff usually seeks the recovery of
personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or recovery of damages. 25 Real action, on the other hand, is one
anchored on the privity of real estate,26 where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of ownership or possession of real
property or interest in it.27

On the other hand, BP 129, as amended, vests the RTC or the municipal trial court with exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions that involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest in it, and the
value of the property subject of the case or the jurisdictional amount, determining whether the case comes within the
jurisdictional competence of the RTC or the MTC. Orbeta v. Orbeta 28 differentiated personal action from real action
in the following wise:

A real action, under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or
an interest therein. Such actions should be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. All other actions are personal and may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of
the plaintiff.

Civil Case No. 102-97, judging from the averments in the underlying complaint, is basically a suit for recovery of
possession and eventual reconveyance of real property which, under BP 129, as amended, falls within the original
jurisdiction of either the RTC or MTC. In an action for reconveyance, all that must be alleged in the complaint are
two facts that, admitting them to be true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely: (1)
that the plaintiff is the owner of the land or has possessed the land in the concept of owner; and (2) that the
defendant has illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the land.29 A cursory perusal of private respondents’ complaint
readily shows that that these requisites have been met: they alleged absolute ownership of the subject parcel of land,
and they were illegally dispossessed of their land by petitioner. The allegations in the complaint, thus, make a case
for an action for reconveyance.

Given the above perspective, the question that comes to the fore is whether the jurisdiction of the RTC or MTC is to
the exclusion of the SDC.

Petitioner’s version of the law would effectively remove the concurrent original jurisdiction granted by Art. 143,
par. 2(b) of PD 1083 to civil courts and Shari’a courts over, among others:

All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims
except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Circuit Court. x x x

Petitioner’s interpretation of the law cannot be given serious thought. One must bear in mind that even if Shari’a
courts are considered regular courts, these are courts of limited jurisdiction. As we have observed in Rulona-Al
Awadhi v. Astih,30 the Code of Muslim Personal Laws creating said courts was promulgated to fulfill "the aspiration
of the Filipino Muslims to have their system of laws enforced in their communities." It is a special law intended for
Filipino Muslims, as clearly stated in the purpose of PD 1083:

ARTICLE 2. Purpose of Code. — Pursuant to Section 11 of Article XV of the Constitution of the Philippines, which
provides that "The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs and interests of national cultural communities
in the formulation and implementation of state policies," this Code:

(a) Recognizes the legal system of the Muslims in the Philippines as part of the law of the land and seeks to
make Islamic institutions more effective;

(b) Codifies Muslim personal laws; and

(c) Provides for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims.
A reading of the pertinent provisions of BP 129 and PD 1083 shows that the former, a law of general application to
civil courts, has no application to, and does not repeal, the provisions found in PD 1083, a special law, which only
refers to Shari’a courts.

A look at the scope of BP 129 clearly shows that Shari’a courts were not included in the reorganization of courts that
were formerly organized under RA 296. The pertinent provision in BP 129 states:

SECTION 2. Scope. — The reorganization herein provided shall include the Court of Appeals, the Court of First
Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations,
the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts.

As correctly pointed out by private respondents in their Comment, 31 BP 129 was enacted to reorganize only existing
civil courts and is a law of general application to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies
to Shari’a courts.

We have held that a general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should be read
together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. 32 In the instant case, we apply the
principle generalia specialibus non derogant. A general law does not nullify a special law. The general law will yield
to the special law in the specific and particular subject embraced in the latter. 33 We must read and construe BP 129
and PD 1083 together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to the general law to reconcile the two laws. This is
so since the legislature has not made any express repeal or modification of PD 1083, and it is well-settled that
repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.34 Implied repeals will not be declared unless the intent of the
legislators is manifest. Laws are assumed to be passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all
existing ones on the subject, and it follows that the legislature did not intend to interfere with or abrogate a former
law relating to the same subject matter.35

In order to give effect to both laws at hand, we must continue to recognize the concurrent jurisdiction enjoyed by
SDCs with that of RTCs under PD 1083.1avvphi1

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court below cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a
motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint.36 Jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.37 In the instant case, private respondents’ petition38 in Civil Case No. 102-97 sufficiently alleged the
concurrent original jurisdiction of the SDC.

While we recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of the SDCs and the RTCs with respect to cases involving only
Muslims, the SDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions arising from contracts customary to
Muslims39 to the exclusion of the RTCs, as the exception under PD 1083, while both courts have concurrent original
jurisdiction over all other personal actions. Said jurisdictional conferment, found in Art. 143 of PD 1083, is
applicable solely when both parties are Muslims and shall not be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-
Muslim,40 who may be the opposing party against a Muslim.

Given petitioner’s flawed arguments, we hold that the respondent court did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is present when there is an arbitrary exercise of power owing from passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility; or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to a shirking
from or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross for the act to be held as one made with grave abuse of discretion. 41 We find
respondent court’s issuance of the assailed orders justified and with no abuse of discretion. Its reliance on the
provisions of PD 1083 in asserting its jurisdiction was sound and unassailable.

We close with the observation that what is involved here are not only errors of law, but also the errors of a litigant
and his lawyer. As may have been noted, petitioner Tomawis’ counsel veritably filed two (2) motions to dismiss,
each predicated on the sole issue of jurisdiction. The first may have been understandable. But the second motion was
something else, interposed as it was after the CA, by resolution, denied Tomawis’ petition for certiorari for want of
jurisdiction on the part of the appellate court to review judgments or orders of the SDC. The CA stated the
observation, however, that Tomawis and his counsel may repair to this Court while the Shari’a Appellate Court has
yet to be organized. Petitioner waited two years after the CA issued its denial before filing what virtually turned out
to be his second motion to dismiss, coming finally to this Court after the same motion was denied. The Court must
express disapproval of the cunning effort of Tomawis and his counsel to use procedural rules to the hilt to prolong
the final disposition of this case. From Alonso v. Villamor,42 almost a century-old decision, the Court has left no
doubt that it frowns on such unsporting practice. The rule is settled that a question of jurisdiction, as here, may be
raised at any time, even on appeal, provided its application does not result in a mockery of the basic tenets of fair
play.43 Petitioner’s action at the later stages of the proceedings below, doubtless taken upon counsel’s advice, is less
than fair and constitutes censurable conduct. Lawyers and litigants must be brought to account for their improper
conduct, which trenches on the efficient dispensation of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner Yahya "Jerry" Tomawis and Atty. Edgar A.
Masorong are ADMONISHED to refrain from engaging in activities tending to frustrate the orderly and speedy
administration of justice, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts may result in the imposition of a
more severe sanction.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47796 April 22, 1941

MANILA TRADING & SUPPLY COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE LABOR UNION, respondent.

Rosa, Lawrence, Selph & Carrascoso for petitioner.

Manabat & Fajardo for respondent.

MORAN, J.:

The present case is merely a sequel of a prior case (G.R. No. 47653) between the same parties. The questions here
raised emanate from respondent's petition for the execution of the order of March 20, 1940, of the Court of
Industrial Relations directing the reinstatement of Felix Alcantara. A petition for a writ of certiorari on the aforesaid
case having been given due course by this Court, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order on September
14,1940, requiring petitioner to file a bond in an amount sufficient to cover the back wages of Felix Alcantara during
the pendency of his case. A motion to set aside this order having been denied, petitioner took the instant appeal
by certiorari

Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 559, provides:

Enforcement of awards, orders, and decisions. — At the expiration of ten days from the date of the award,
order, or decision, in cases brought under the provisions of section four hereof, judgment shall be entered in
accordance therewith, unless during said ten days an aggrieved party shall appeal therefrom to the Supreme
Court of the Philippines by writ of certiorari as hereinafter provided. The institution of such appeal shall
not, however, stay execution of the award, order, or decision sought to be reviewed, unless for special
reasons the Court shall order that execution be stayed, in which event the Court, in its discretion, may
require the appellant to deposit with the clerk of the court such amount of salaries or wages due the
employees, laborers, tenants, or farm-laborers concerned under the award, order, or decision appealed from
or require him to give bond in such form and of such amount as to insure compliance with the award, order,
or decision in case the same is affirmed.

It is here contended that as enforcement or execution under section 14 above-quoted, refers to an "award, order, or
decision, in cases brought under the provisions of section four" of said Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is
without power to decree execution of its order under section 19 of the law. In the first place, the ultimate effect of
petitioner's theory is to concede to the Court of Industrial Relations the power to decide a case under section 19 but
deny it the power to execute its decision thereon. The absurdity of this proposition is too evident to require
argument. In the second place, considering that the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations under section 19
is merely incidental to the same jurisdiction it has previously acquired under section 4 of the law, it follows that the
power to execute its orders under section 19 is also the same power that it possesses under section 4.

It is also contended that the order of the Court of Industrial Relations requiring the filing of a bond is null and void it
having been issued after the appeal had already been perfected. It is true that once an appeal has been perfected, the
trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case, where there is no express statutory provision to the contrary. But
section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 559, expressly provides that the
appeal shall not stay the execution of the award, order or decision sought to be reviewed, unless, for special reason,
the Court Industrial Relations shall order that the execution be stayed, in which event said court, in its discretion,
may require the appellant to deposit with the clerk of court such amount of salaries or wages due the employees,
laborers or tenants concerned, or require him to give bond in such form and of such amount as to insure compliance
with the award, order or decision.

It is finally contended that the provisions of section Rule 44, of the new Rule of Court, must prevail over the
provisions of section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 559. Section, 7 of
Rule 44 provides:
 Effect of appeal. — The appeal shall stay the award, order or decision appealed from unless the Supreme
Court shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.

On the other hand, section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 559,
provides that the appeal shall not stay the execution of the award, order or decision appealed from, unless the
industrial court otherwise provides. The new Rules of Court were approved in December, 1939, and made effective
on July 1, 1940. Commonwealth Act No. 559 was approved and made effective on June 7, 1940, or six months after
the Rules of Court were approved and twenty-three days before said rules were made effective. When two Acts are
inconsistent, that which has been made effective in an earlier date. (Goodwin v. Buckley, 54 Cal. 295; San Luis
Obispo County v. Felts, 104 Cal. 66, 37 Pac. 780; Mariposa County v. Madera County, 142 Cal. 55, 75 Pac. 572; Re
K Sohncke, 82 Pac. 956, 2 L. R. A. [NS] 813).

Statutes speak from the time they take effect, and from that time they have posteriority. If passed to take effect at a
future day, they are to be construed, as a general rule, as if passed on that day and ordered to take immediate effect.
But, as between two acts, it has been held that one passed later and going into effect earlier will prevail over one
passed earlier and going into effect later. Thus an act passed April 16th and in force April 21st was held to prevail
over an act passed April 9th and in effect July 4th of the same year. And an act going into effect immediately has
been held to prevail over an act passed before but going into effect later." (1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp.
541-542.)

The question is one purely of legislative intent. The Supreme Court, upon approving the Rules of Court in
December, 1939, could not have possibly intended to amend the procedural provisions contained in Commonwealth
Act No. 559, which was not yet then in existence, for it was approved six months later, that is, on June 7, 1940.
Commonwealth Act No. 559 containing provisions which are repugnant to the Rules of Court, may be presumed to
have intended a repeal to the extent of the repugnance. Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.

Order is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

Imperial, Diaz and Horilleno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

LAUREL, J., concurring:

I concur in the result.

I agree that the rule should be that contained in Commonwealth Act No. 559; but I do not accept the reasoning of the
majority.
 [G.R. NO. 181556 : December 14, 2009]

IN RE: PETITION FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE LIQUIDATION OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC.
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. STOCKHOLDERS OF INTERCITY SAVINGS
AND LOAN BANK, INC., Respondents.

DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, filed on June 17, 1987 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank)
alleging that, inter alia, said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to
depositors, creditors and the general public.1

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave it due course. 2 Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. 3

In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 (RA 9302)4 was enacted, Section 12 of which provides:

SECTION 12. Before any distribution of the assets of the closed bank in accordance with the preferences established by law, the
Corporation shall periodically charge against said assets reasonable receivership expenses and subject to approval by the proper
court, reasonable liquidation expenses, it has incurred as part of the cost of receivership/liquidation proceedings and collect
payment therefor from available assets.

After the payment of all liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal
rate of interest, from date of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the closed bank in accordance with
legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank. (emphasis supplied)

Relying thereon, PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the
Liquidation Proceedings,5 praying that an Order be issued for:

1. The reimbursement of the liquidation fees and expenses incurred and/or advanced by herein petitioner, PDIC, in the amount
of P3,795,096.05;

2. The provision of P700,000.00 for future expenses in the implementation of this distribution and the winding-up of the
liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.;

3. The write-off of assets in the total amount of P8,270,789.99, as set forth in par. 2.1 hereof;

4. The write-off of liabilities in the total amount of P1,562,185.35, as set forth in par. 8 hereof;

5. The Final Project of Distribution of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank as set forth in Annex "Q" hereof;

6. Authorizing petitioner to hold as trustee the liquidating and surplus dividends allocated in the project of distribution for
creditors who shall have a period of three (3) years from date of last notice within which to claim payment therefor. After the
lapse of said period, unclaimed payments shall be escheated to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with Rule 91 of the
Rules of Court;

7. Authorizing the disposal of all the pertinent bank records in accordance with applicable laws, rules and regulations after the
lapse of one (1) year from the approval of the instant Motion.

By Order of July 5, 2006,6 Branch 134 of the Makati RTC granted the motion except the above-quoted paragraphs 5 and 6 of its
prayer, respectively praying for the approval of the Final Project of Distribution and for authority for PDIC "to hold as trustee the
liquidating and surplus dividends allocated . . . for creditors" of Intercity Bank.

In granting the motion, the trial court resolved in the negative the sole issue of whether Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied
retroactively in order to entitle Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends, it otherwise holding that to so resolve would run
counter to prevailing jurisprudence and unduly prejudice Intercity Bank shareholders, the creditors having been paid their
principal claim in 2002 or before the passage of RA 9302 in 2004.

PDIC appealed to the Court of Appeals7 before which respondent Stockholders of Intercity Bank (the Stockholders) moved to
dismiss the appeal, arguing principally that the proper recourse should be to this Court through a Petition for Review
on Certiorari since the question involved was purely one of law.8

By Resolution of October 17, 2007,9 the appellate court dismissed the appeal, sustaining in the main the position of the
Stockholders. Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 24, 2008, 10 PDIC filed the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

PDIC contends that the appellate court disregarded the issue of the trial court's disapproval of the payment of additional
liquidating dividends to Intercity Bank creditors, which involved a question of fact that entailed a review of the evidence; that the
prayer for surplus dividends involved another question of fact as there must first be a factual finding that all claims against
Intercity Bank have been paid; and that there having been previously approved but unclaimed liquidating dividends, the denial of
its prayer for appointment as trustee therefor resulted in an anomalous situation where no one has the authority to handle them
until they are claimed.11

The Stockholders, for their part, maintain that only a question of law was brought to the appellate court, the parties having
stipulated in the trial court that the sole issue for determination was whether RA 9302 may be applied retroactively; that the
payment of additional liquidating dividends should be deemed approved since they never opposed it and the trial court
specifically disapproved only the payment of surplus dividends; and that in any event, RA 9302 cannot be given retroactive effect
absent a provision therein providing for it.12

The petition lacks merit.

Indeed, PDIC's appeal to the appellate court raised the lone issue of whether Section 12 of RA 9302 may be applied retroactively
in order to award surplus dividends to Intercity Bank creditors, which was, as stated above, what the parties had stipulated upon
as the sole legal issue in PDIC's Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation
Proceedings.

Whether a statute has retroactive effect is undeniably a pure question of law. PDIC should thus have directly appealed to this
Court by filing a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, not an ordinary appeal with the appellate court under Rule 41.
The appellate court did not err, thus, in holding that PDIC availed of the wrong mode of appeal. 13

In the interest of justice, however, and in order to write finis to this controversy, the Court relaxes the rules and decides the
petition on the merits.14

A perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause
indicates a clear legislative intent to the contrary:

Section 28. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of its publication in the
Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. (emphasis supplied)

Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past.
Hence, the legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito - the law provides for the future,

the judge for the past, which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided." The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of
its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions. 15

En passant, PDIC's citation of foreign jurisprudence that supports the award of surplus dividends is unavailing. Resort to foreign
jurisprudence is proper only if no local law or jurisprudence exists to settle the controversy. And even then, it is only
persuasive.16

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.