SJS V DDB
before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a
candidate for re - election in the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1)
to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they
impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those
already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the
COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the
Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born
citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least
thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and
a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.
Issue: (1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator?
Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for
candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution?
Held:
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification
requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As
couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for
senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition
to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like
effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes
the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office
shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the
minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the
drug - free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled
be of little value if one cannot assume office for non - compliance with
the drug - testing requirement.
REBUT:
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state that non -
compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or
would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be
accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the
particular section of the law, without exception, made drug - testing on
those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate
ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering
to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with
candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse
consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the
election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any
other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.
~~~~~~SC AFFIRMED COMELEC DECISION~~~~~
The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ refers to an
act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other
groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a
candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding
interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed
to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or
against a candidate
BENGSON V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this
case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall
be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-
born citizen."
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He
was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino
parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the
United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic
of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As
a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose
his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision
of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed
of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the
acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a
Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following
circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive
pact of alliance with said foreign country.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing
margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was
then running for reelection
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam
with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member
of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen
as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET DECISION
the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET
likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision
in its resolution
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: Yes . Cruz is considered a Filipino citizen by the law
Two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the
two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized
citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
***Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship."
****Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization.
To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided by law to
become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship
becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation
when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the
applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to
a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any
offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4)
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary
to any Government announced policies. This is under
Commonwealth Act No. 473
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality.2This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
~~~~~~~~~~~~SC Dismiss the petition~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.
MENDOZA V MANZANO
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a
pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril
who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.
SECOND DIVISION DECISION
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent
admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and
alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a
Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States,
San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in
American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration
as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent
Manzano is born a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds
dual citizenship. DISQUALIFIED
COMELEC DECISION
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935
Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the
time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the
Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His
parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he
did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of
allegiance to the United States (REVERSED)
ISSUE: WON THE COMELEC ERRED IN THEIR DECISION
HELD:
SC DECISION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought
under §40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),
which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local
position.
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco,
California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the
Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United
States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at
least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United
States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in
Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent
"effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so
that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Rebut
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in
Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that,
in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private
respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should
have been made when he reached the age of majority
**On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth
and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt
of his election of Philippine citizenship.
~~~~~~SC AFFIRMED COMELEC DECISION~~~~~
ISSUE: WON COMELEC ERRED IN THEIR DECISION
LOPEZ V COMELEC HELD: NO In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC found that he
was not able to regain his Filipino citizenship in the manner provided
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective
by law. According to the poll body, to be able to qualify as a candidate
public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears
in the elections, petitioner should have made a personal and sworn
to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. This, petitioner failed to
certificate of candidacy.
do.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of
REBUT OF PETIONER:
the Rules on Civil Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution1 and (2)
Omnibus Order2 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
Petitioner argues that his filing of a certificate of candidacy operated
Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from running as Barangay
as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship,
Chairman.
Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections
Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position
In Valles, the candidate, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, was a dual citizen
of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the
by accident of birth on foreign soil. Lopez was born of Filipino
synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on
parents in Australia, a country which follows the principle of jus sol.
October 29, 2007.
As a result, she acquired Australian citizenship by operation of
Australian law, but she was also considered a Filipino citizen under
On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition3
Philippine law. She did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a
before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo,
country other than the Philippines.
praying for the disqualiX fication of petitioner on the ground that he is
SC DECISION:
an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public
** In contrast, Petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately
office. In his Answer,4 petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a
sought American citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship.
Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act
He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
(R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and
**More importantly, the Court’s 2000 ruling in Valles has been
Re-acquisition Act of 2003.5
superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 922510 in 2003. R.A. No.
9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-
He returned to the Philippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay.
acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the
Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay
Philippines.
Chairman.
**This new law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public
After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner
office, he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
emerged as the winner. and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
COMELEC DECISION administer an oath.
**While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue
of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General’s Office in Los
Disqualification is GRANTED and respondent Eusebio Eugenio K. Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a
Lopez is DISQUALIFIED from running as Barangay Chairman of public office.
Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo.
**The provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship
must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
** For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit
duly executed before an officer of law who is authorized to administer
an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he
is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective.
~~~~~~SC AFFIRMED COMELEC DECISION~~~~~
JACOT V DAL
FACT OF THE CASE:
*JACOT was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a
naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. 3
*Jacot sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine
Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California.
*Jacot took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. 5 On 27 September 2006, the
Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019
recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines
*On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for
Disqualification8 before the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin
against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US
citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225,
which reads as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.–Those who retain
or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath
COMELEC SECOND DIVISION DECISION:
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its
Resolution11 disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position
of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the
requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. The COMELEC Second
Division explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 does not automatically bestow upon
any person the privilege to run for any elective public office. It
additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot
be considered as a renunciation of foreign citizenship.
ISSUE: WON THE OATH OF ALLEGANCE IF CONSIDERED AS
RENOUNCITION OF FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP.
Held
This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.
***Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship)
requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the
said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have
presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof
***By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino
swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on
his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might
arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual
citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship,
despite his foreign citizenship.
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate
of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one contained in
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal
and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a
general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in
Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an
additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek
elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having
more than one citizenship.
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign
country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an
authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections
COUNTER ARGUMENT OF THE RESPONDENT
JACOT invoked the doctrine in Valles21 and Mercado,22 wherein the
filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy,
containing an oath of allegiance, was already considered a
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
In Contrary
The ruling of this Court in Valles and Mercado is not applicable to the
present case, which is now specially governed by Republic Act No.
9225, promulgated on 29 August 2003.
~~~~~~SC SUSTAINED COMELEC DECISION~~~~~
JAPZON V COMELEC AND TY
Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent
Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local
elections held on 14 May 2007
Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a
Petition5 to disqualify and/or cancel Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy on
the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his
Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born
on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern
Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to
spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a
Filipino)
Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and
became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last
25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March
2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one
year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country.
Japzon arguments:
While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year
immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section
39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991.
***
In fact, even after filing his application for reacquisition of his
Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most
recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.
Moreover, although Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an
American citizen as proven by his travel records
Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA
to work and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty
claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for
the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts:
(1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine
 Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an
application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship
(2) Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine
Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, US.
(3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application
that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St.,
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty’s
application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005
a Philippine passport
(4) Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate
(CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he
stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar
(5) on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A,
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar
(6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating
therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar
(7) Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship.
COMELEC DECISION
Records showed that after taking an Oath of Allegiance before the
Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General on October 2,
2005, [Ty] applied and was issued a Philippine passport on October
26, 2005; and secured a community tax certificate from the
Municipality of General Macarthur on March 8, 2006. Evidently, [Ty]
was already a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar for more than one (1) year before the
elections on May 14, 2007.10.
PETITION WAS DENIED
SC DECISION:
the COMELEC already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty
was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court
cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without
violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the
COMELEC are binding on the Court.
for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he
must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath
Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving
the issue of whether or not a candidate has complied with the
residency requirement for elective positions. The principle of animus
revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an
"intention to return" to the place where he seeks to be elected.
Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been an
"abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention
to depart therefrom.
The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by
choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the
new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
COUNTER ARGUMENT OF JAPZON:
inarguably, just a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections. Japzon maintains that Ty’s trips abroad during said
period, i.e., to Bangkok, Thailand (from 14 to 18 July 2006), and to
the USA (from 31 October 2006 to 19 January 2007), indicate that
Ty had no intention to permanently reside in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippine.
The COMELEC First Division and en banc, as well as this Court,
however, view these trips differently. The fact that Ty did come back
to the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, after said trips, is a further manifestation of his animus
manendi and animus revertendi.
~~~~~~SC SUSTAINED COMELEC DECISION~~~~~
PUNDAODAYA v COMELEC
Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya (Pundaodaya) is married to Judith
Pundaodaya, who ran against Noble for the position of municipal
mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.
On March 27, 2007, Noble filed his Certificate of Candidacy,
indicating therein that he has been a resident of Purok 3, Barangay
Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental for 15 years.
Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification against Noble
alleging that the latter lacks the residency qualification prescribed by
existing laws for elective local officials; that he never resided nor had
any physical presence at a fixed place in Purok 3, Barangay
Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; and that he does not
appear to have the intention of residing therein permanently.
Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is in fact a resident of Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City, where he also maintains a business called
OBERT Construction Supply.
Noble averred that he is a registered voter and resident of Barangay
Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that on January 18, 1992,
he married Bernadith Go, the daughter of then Mayor Narciso Go of
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that he has been engaged in electoral
activities since his marriage; and that he voted in the said
municipality in the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections
SECOND DIVISION RULING
***Noble failed to show that he has indeed acquired domicile at
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. He failed to prove not only his bodily
presence in the new locality but has likewise failed to show that he
intends to remain at Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental and abandon his
residency at Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.
RESPONDENT WAS DISQUALIFIED
COMELEC RULING:`
The COMELEC En Banc held that when Noble married Bernadith
Go on January 18, 1992, the couple has since resided in Kinoguitan,
Misamis Oriental; that he was a registered voter and that he
participated in the last three elections; and although he is engaged
in business in Cagayan de Oro City, the fact that he resides in
Kinoguitan and is a registered voter and owns property thereat,
sufficiently meet the residency requirement.
REVERSED THE DECISION
SC RULING:
Records show that Noble’s domicile of origin was Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City. However, he claims to have chosen
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental as his new domicile. To convince the
SC he presented his voter’s registration, marriage certificate,
affidavits of residency, receipt in water bills and deeds of sale from a
property
***However, fail to convince us that Noble successfully effected a
change of domicile. As correctly ruled by the COMELEC Second
Division, private respondent’s claim that he is a registered voter and
has actually voted in the past 3 elections in Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental do not sufficiently establish that he has actually elected
residency in the said municipality
in Perez v. Commission on Elections,26 we held that a person’s
registration as voter in one district is not proof that he is not
domiciled in another district. The registration of a voter in a place
other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to
have abandoned or lost his residence.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the
place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It
requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a
declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent
place of abode
it was held that the term "residence" is to be understood not in its
common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but
rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi)
~~~~~~SC REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE COMELEC
DECISION ~~~~~
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES V COMELEC
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills
converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not
act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act
No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a
city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely
to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite
the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,8 which sought to
exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th
Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to
the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100
million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the
cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in
February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7
June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on
various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's
signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to
determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause
petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the
Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285
of the Local Government Code.
Issue: WON the creation of cities are constitutional.
Held: No. The creation of new cities are unconstitutional. The
Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for
the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any
other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
SC RULING:
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All
Criteria
 Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected. The Constitution is clear. The
creation of local government units must follow the criteria established
in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the
income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation
of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment
the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring
to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.
Such exemption clearly violates Section 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
~~~~SC DECISION GRANTED THE PETITION AND DECLARED
CITY LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL~~~~~~
ALDABA V COMELEC
The province of Bulacan was represented in Congress
through four legislative districts. The First Legislative District
comprised of the city of Malolos1 and the municipalities of
Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On 1
May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos’ City
Charter,2 by creating a separate legislative district for the
city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in
Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later
converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986,
the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population
of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is
no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated
certification issued by a Regional Director of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) that "the projected population of the
Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010
using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to
2000
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos
City, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for
failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city
to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) contended that Congress’ use of projected population is non-
justiciable as it involves a determination on the "wisdom of the
standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with [a
constitutional requirement].
ISSUE : WON THE RA 9591 VIOLATED THE SEC5 ART 6 OR
1987 CONSTITUTION.
HELD YES. THE R.A 9591 VOILATED THE CONSTUTION
BECAUSE:
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the
demographic projections he certified have been declared official by
the NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that the
Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic
projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which
states that the population of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year
2010," violates the requirement that intercensal demographic
projections shall be "as of the middle of every year."
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if
such projections are declared official by the National Statistics
Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on
demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal
population projections must be as of the middle of every year which
is cited at Section 6 of Executive Order No. 135.
COUNTER ARGUMENT OF COMELEC
Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG,
representing respondent Commission on Elections

****
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a
legislative district must be based on an official and credible source.
That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the
population projection would be unreliable or speculative.

~~~~ SC GRANTED THE PETION AND THE R.A. 9591 IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL~~~~