Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: Deference, Dependence, and Deterrence

Author(s): Marvin G. Weinbaum and Abdullah B. Khurram

Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 2014), pp. 211-228
Published by: Middle East Institute
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 Pakistan and Saudi Arabia:
Deference, Dependence, and Deterrence
Marvin G. Weinbaum and Abdullah B. Khurram

Many of the transactional features that mark Pakistan 's relations with Saudi Arabia
are familiarly strategic and economic. But there also exists a qualitative dimension
to what draws together these two Islamic states. This article points to how each
country has been able to compensate for the other's resource deficits even when
national interests diverge their unique spiritual bonding ensures a strong measure
of continuity in their relationship . These ties are nonetheless regularly tested by
the difficult choices Saudi Arabia 's Iran-centric policies can create for Pakistan.

P akistanis generally see themselves and their country as part of South Asia. Although
born of the British division of the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan has also valued its links
with other Islamic states, notably those in the northern tier of the Middle East and in
the Gulf. Over time, Pakistan's affinities with Middle Eastern issues have deepened
and the bonds of religion become stronger. Nuclear-armed Pakistan, the home of the
world's second largest Muslim population, commands attention across the region. It
also presents itself to neighbors and others as an economically needy and politically
volatile country, beset by the forces of extremism.
This article focuses on Pakistan's relations with Saudi Arabia, unmistakably the most
significant of Pakistan's linkages to the wider Islamic world. Saudi Arabia figures promi-
nently in Pakistan's unrelenting search for economic benefactors, but no less importantly
as the spiritual center of the Islamic faith. The Kingdom influences Pakistan's domestic
politics and affects its regional policies, especially those involving Afghanistan. Psycho-
logically, at least, Pakistan's links to Saudi Arabia and to other Muslim countries offer
an escape from feared Indian hegemony.1 Ties to the Saudi regime also help to buffer the
demands on Pakistan that come from extra-regional powers and international institutions.
An appreciation of the Pakistan-Saudi relationship also requires a consideration
of how it serves the interests of Saudi Arabia. Since the 1960s, Pakistan's military has
contributed to strengthening Gulf security in general and Saudi security in particular.
As a non- Arab, but Sunni state, Pakistan differs from other possible defense partners
for Saudi Arabia - such as Egypt or Iraq - in that it poses no danger of challenging

Marvin G. Weinbaum is Professor Emeritus at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, former

intelligence analyst for Pakistan at the US Department of State, and currently Scholar-in-Residence at The
Middle East Institute.

Abdullah Khurram is a Research Associate at The Middle East Institute. He has previously conducted
research work at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan, and the Economic Policy Research
Institute, Cape Town, South Africa. Currently at George Mason University, he will be pursuing his graduate
studies in International Relations at the University of Chicago beginning Fall 2014.
1 . M.G. Weinbaum and Gautam Sen, "Pakistan Enters the Middle East," Orbis , Vol. 22, No. 3 (Autumn
1978), pp. 595-612. See also, Aparna Pande, "Is Pakistan a Part of South Asia? Yes!" Huffington Post ,
January 4, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aparna-pande/is-pakistan-part-of-south_b_803654.html.
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ★ VOLUME 68, NO. 2, SPRING 2014
HTTP://DX.DOI.ORG/10.375 1/68.2. 12

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212 ★ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

the Kingdom as a regional rival.2 Useful as a close ally for Saudi ambitions t
regional hegemony, Pakistan is no less valued for dealing with the Kingdom's in
threats. Even if reluctant to join in Saudi Arabia's confrontation with Iran and i
of expansionist Shi 'a Islam, Pakistan has been receptive to the Saudis' missio
seminating their own Wahhabi brand of Sunni Islam.
While the interests of the Pakistani and Saudi governments may not alw
incide, and relations are at times marked by disappointments, their ties have re
remarkably firm over the decades. In describing the multidimensional character
joins them, this article finds that while Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are drawn tog
conventional strategic and economic concerns, the affinity between them rests
ests and sentiments not ordinarily associated with contemporary inter-state beh

HISTORICAL BACKDROP

If secular nationalism offered the dominant unifying theme for most postwa
East states, religious identity served that purpose for the newly independent Mus
of Pakistan.3 Although religion played little part in Arab leaders' struggles agains
ism, invoking Islam became the preferred means in Pakistan to counter ethnic div
to rally the public against the country's nemesis, India. Pakistan expected to receiv
from other Muslim states, especially in its dispute with India over Kashmir. But n
the major Arab regimes' foreign policies were preoccupied with the Palestinian
Cold War alignments, and many were attracted to the Non- Aligned Movement,
India's prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru was a founder at the 1955 Bandung Con
Pakistan's relationship with Saudi Arabia stood apart from the outset. It wa
tined to be a special relationship - with Saudi Arabia as spiritual leader of
Muslim world and Pakistan especially well-suited to compensate for the Ki
deficit of human capital. At first, Saudi Arabia was mainly a destination for Pak
performing the hajj. A largely insulated kingdom, Saudi Arabia was not ye
with the wealth that would motivate its concerns over its defenses, or yet able
regional and extra-regional economic influence. Meanwhile, by the mid-195
stan felt strategically vulnerable and had been drawn mostly into the Western,
viet orbit with its membership in the Baghdad Pact that, with the 1958 fall of
monarchy, became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). That alliance
Iran, and was initially called a "stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim st
press release by the Saudi Embassy in Pakistan.4
Nevertheless, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia saw their strategic imperatives con
during the 1960s. The Kingdom began to send members of its military to Pakis
training. This was a preventative measure that responded to Gamal 'Abd al
strongly socialist regime in Egypt, which overthrew the country's monarchy, a

2. Madawi Al-Rasheed, "Saudi Strategy Includes Alliance with Pakistan," Al-Monitor

8, 20 1 4, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/20 1 4/0 1 /saudi-pakistan-investment-allian
ation-military.html.
3. David O. Smith, "Pakistan and the Middle East Connection, Military Review , Vol.
(October 1982), pp. 42-49.
4. Dawn , September 26, 1955; quoted in, S.M. Burke, Pakistan s toreign Policy: An H
Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 204.

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 PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA *213

part in ousting Yemen's conservative monarchy.5 For Pakistan's pro- Western p

Egypt's military intervention on behalf of the republican forces naturally
cerns. The Saudis and Jordanians were of course giving support to royalists. Th
mated war no doubt exposed the Saudis' military shortcomings and Pakis
have been a logical choice for supplying the training and other forms of
needed. In a mid-1960s agreement, a small number of Pakistani military office
supposedly retired, were sent to assist Saudi Arabia in building its army and ai
Pakistan's military presence abroad gave it an alternative mission following
clusive 1965 war with India. Although Saudi Arabia declined to sever its
India, it did provide moral and material support to Pakistan.
A defense agreement regarding military training and the exchange of
advisors was signed in 1967 that formalized Pakistan's role in the Saudi def
ture.7 In 1969, some of these advisors piloted the first Royal Saudi Air For
jets, which were used to repulse a South Yemeni incursion into the Kingdom's s
border. Pakistanis would fly Saudi fighter planes through the 1970s, and
battalion was also positioned along the Saudi border with Yemen. Througho
cade, up to 15,000 Pakistani troops were stationed in the Kingdom, some in
combat force near the Israeli-Jordanian-Saudi border.8 A personal guard corps
provided for the Saudi royal family.
The two countries became closer with Pakistan's defeat following Indian in
tion in the 1971 conflict that led to the creation of Bangladesh. Financial assist
Saudi Arabia helped Pakistan recover from the trauma of losing its East Wing.9 S
economically, feeling insecure, and incensed by what they viewed as a betrayal
Western allies, Pakistani leaders hoped to tap into wealthy countries like S
for economic and defense needs. Over the next decade, Pakistan became a major
ent of Saudi aid to the region, and the number of Pakistani military adviso
Arabia steadily increased. Through its relationship with the Kingdom, Pakistan
alignment with a group of pro- Western Muslim countries that could substitute
tion - ruled out by Pakistan's membership in CENTO - with an assertive No
Movement (NAM). By strengthening ties with pro- American Saudi Arabia, the
government could also expect to please Washington and lay claim to US arms de
Economic interactions between the two countries increased after 1973, wh
greater oil income for the Middle East vested the Saudi regime with expanded e
and political leverage. As the Shah's Iran pressed to assume the role of the Gulf

5. Zulfikar A. Khalid, "Evolution of Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Relationship, 1947-199

Security and Economic Factors," Strategic Studies , Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn 1989), p. 66
6. Pakistanis served as advisors in Jordan as well. In what was to become known as Blac
ber in 1970, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (and future Pakistani president) helped lead
that crushed the Palestinian nationalist and revolutionary rebels in the Hashemite King
Haq in Jordan (1970)," The Friday Times , May 24-30, 2013, http://www.thefridaytimes
tft/article.php?issue=20 1 30524&page=30.
7. Carol Honsa, "Pakistan Boosting Its Gulf Security Force," The Christian Scienc
March 5, 1981, http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0305/030541.html; Christopher Clary
Karlin, "The Pak-Saudi Nuke and How to Stop it," The American Interest , June 10, 2012, h
the-american-interest.com/articles/2012/06/10/the-pak-saudi-nuke-and-how-to-stop-it/.
8. Khalid, "Evolution of Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Relationship, 1947-1990," p. 66.
9. Khalid, "Evolution of Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Relationship, 1947-1990," p. 62.

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214 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

policeman, Saudi Arabia sought to forge a Sunni bloc to curb Tehran's rising amb
Strengthened defense ties with Pakistan played a central role in this strategy.10
The Afghan war of the 1980s represents the high point in Pakistani-Saud
tegic cooperation. Crown Prince Fahd's visit to Pakistan in December 1980 ce
the ties with President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's military regime (1977-88).
the visit, Fahd openly declared that his country's security was tied to that of Pak
Upwards of 60,000 fighters, mostly Arab, gravitated to Pakistan during the 1980
ticommunist jihad, many from Saudi Arabia. They joined one of the seven mujahi
parties approved by Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). L
Americans, the Saudis acquiesced to ISI demands that it be given the responsibilit
control over distribution of the funds and advising the mujahideen parties.11
In 1990, in the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and at the request of
Arabia, Pakistan sent 5,000 troops to the Kingdom.12 By the middle of the
it was Afghanistan that brought Pakistani and Saudi foreign policies again in
alignment. Along with the United Arab Emirates, both countries extended politic
material support to the fledgling Taliban regime and gave it formal diplomatic re
tion. For Pakistan, a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan beholden to Islamabad fit well
designs for acquiring strategic depth against India and for securing access to com
cial interests in Central Asia. The attraction of having a devout Sunni regime at I
back door drew Saudi Arabia to Pakistan. Only when it became clear in the la
that Mullah Muhammad 'Umar had cemented relations with the Saudi regime
al-Qa'ida leadership did the Taliban lose Riyadh's favor. Pakistan, by contrast
wavered in its backing of the Taliban until September 2001.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have continued to figure prominently in one ano
geostrategic threat calculations. In many respects, they compensate for one
weaknesses. Saudi Arabia cannot help but look at Pakistan - a largely Sunn
country of more than 180 million people with a well-trained army of 550
recognize its potential role as regional gendarme. In turn, Pakistan views Sa
as a valued partner in weathering economic challenges and affirming its p
Muslim world. Each offers the other the belief that it can help check the powe
fluence of a traditional regional and ideological adversary. While neither gover
likely to fall on the proverbial sword to save the other, they are invested in ea

10. Rana Muhammad Awais Anwar, Samia Nasreen, and Muhammad Akram Chaudha
terns of Trade and Its Future Prospects in Pakistan: A Time-Series Analysis," British Jour
and Social Sciences , Vol. 13, No. 2 (May 2013), pp. 228-41.
11. There are numerous sources about Saudi involvement with Pakistan in the 1980s Af
Two books that are particularly informative include, Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret Hi
CIA , Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New Y
guin Books, 2004); and Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanist
Story (London: Leo Cooper, 1992).
12. Barbara Crossette, "Confrontation in the Gulf; Pakistan Agrees to Join Defense of
bia," The New York Times , August 14, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/14/world/
tion-in-the-gulf-pakistanis-agree-to-join-defense-of-saudi-arabia.html.

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 PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA * 215

political stability, sharing a common interest in defending status quo regimes th

suppression of domestic challenges. Their close military relationships with th
constitute an important element in their strategic thinking.
Events in Afghanistan since 2001 highlight the intersection of Pakistani and
di strategic interests. The outcome of the Taliban insurgency, the fate of al-Qa'id
regional stability are issues of deep concern to both countries. Although Sa
bia's policies in Pakistan undoubtedly contributed to Islamic militancy, neither c
would welcome an outright Taliban victory in Afghanistan after the scheduled U
withdrawal in 2014. Over two decades, Pakistan learned the difficulty of trying
the Taliban leadership and fears that were the Taliban to consolidate control in A
stan, its success might energize Pakistan's own Taliban insurgency. Saudi Ara
ordinarily be expected to welcome a conservative Sunni regime in Kabul, bu
the price of provoking an Afghan civil war almost certain to result in a Taliban
dependent on al-Qa'ida and its allies for material support.
For both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, a negotiated political framework aimed
Taliban's inclusion into the Afghan political system would be the preferred outco
an agreement must be one that Pakistan feels reflects its interests, the greatest of
an Afghan government where the Taliban's presence would minimize Indian influ
in the country. A power-sharing arrangement with other Afghan political group
also divert the Taliban from any attempts to export regime change beyond Afgh
Pakistani intelligence services have facilitated various unofficial contacts bet
the Taliban and Western representatives and blocked others. The ISI does not want
of a 2008 Saudi-mediated meeting in Riyadh from which it was excluded.13 Pakis
its blessing when a Taliban office was opened in Qatar in late 201 1 for discussion
American officials. Trying to revive talks, in 2012 and again in 2013, the Islamab
ernment released more than two dozen detained Afghan Taliban leaders. On the oth
the ISI has not hesitated to exclude any Taliban it did not trust as possible interloc
Pakistan has tried to resist involvement in the intractable sectarian rivalry
Saudi Arabia and Iran. While the Pakistani and Saudi governments worry ab
inciting unrest among Shi 'a in their respective countries, the Pakistanis are dete
to avoid getting drawn into a Saudi-Iranian proxy war, in Afghanistan or e
Pakistan cautiously tries to maintain stable relations with its Iranian neighb
which it shares a 550-mile-long border. With Pakistan and Iran eager to suppress
territorially connected, rebellious Baloch populations, both countries have an ince
to keep bilateral relations as tension-free as possible.
There exist some areas where the strategic objectives of the Pakistani an
states do not align. Although anxious to please Saudi Arabia, the Zia regime r
1981 to adhere to the wishes of the Kingdom to support Iraq after the latter's ag
sion against Iran. Nearly a decade later, Pakistan's military was thought likel
support to Saudi Arabia in case of an Iraqi incursion, following Iraq's occup
Kuwait. This was despite considerable support in Pakistani public opinion for
Husayn's defying American pressure. In 2012, Pakistan abstained from participati
an Arab League-sponsored plan promoted by Saudi Arabia that called for inte

13. Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink: the Future of America, Pakistan , and Afg
(New York: Viking, 2012), p. 217.

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216 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

against the Iranian-backed Syrian regime. Although Pakistan has since repo
ceded to a Saudi request to provide instructors to train Salafi Syrian rebel figh
number of trainers is believed to be small, and Islamabad has maintained a low
on Syria.14 Meanwhile, according to a WikiLeaks cable, the Saudi leaders
welcome military action against Iran's nuclear installations, something tha
publicly opposes as regionally destabilizing.15
An overriding concern for Pakistan is that India may establish a foothold
ghanistan to militarily encircle Pakistan and stir up ethnic tensions, particular
and Pashtun nationalism. Indian-Pakistani enmity constitutes a difficult issue f
Arabia, and the Kingdom tries to limit its involvement in their disputes. Saudi
along with the smaller Gulf states and most Arab countries, has in recent year
growing respect for India as a rising economic power offering rich opportunit
eruption of another conflict on the Indian subcontinent would force Riyadh to m
hard choices. Pakistan would view any further warming of relations between I
Muslim countries as coming at its expense. India has worked hard to wean Saud
and other Muslim countries away from Pakistan; the erosion of diplomatic sup
Islamabad, particularly at the United Nations, is a prime Indian objective. T
take pains to not annoy India. Increasingly, Saudi Arabia refrains from being o
on the Kashmir dispute. The Saudis retain their membership in the UN Contact
for Kashmir that meets at every General Assembly session, but have become m
cumspect about what they say publicly on the issue. No recent Saudi governme
has publicly expressed criticism of the Indian occupation of Kashmir or raised
of Kashmiri rights.16 In contrast, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 'Ali Khame
often spoken of the Indians trampling on the rights of the Kashmiris.
Overall, the strategic ties between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have probably
ened since the 1970s and 1980s. Although most Pakistanis believe their country
a solid relationship with Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom is never referred to as an
er friend," as China is. In reality, neither China nor Saudi Arabia has given ma
strong backing to Pakistan in its wars with India, a fact regularly overlooked in
China. And yet, there remains a strong foundation underlying relations betwe
and Saudi Arabia. Not inconsequentially, both countries have refrained from pr
stark "either/or" choices where relations hinge on total fidelity. To a wide deg
has allowed the other to craft policies suiting its perceived national interests.

14. David Kenner, "Saudi Arabia's Shadow War," Foreign Policy , November 6, 2013, htt
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/ll/06/articles/saudi_arabias_shadow_war.
15. Ian Black and Simon Tisdall, "The US Embassy Cables: Saudi Arabia Urges US
Iran to Stop Nuclear Programme" The Guardian , November 28, 2010, http://www.thegua
world/20 1 0/nov/28/us-embassy-cables-saudis-iran.
16. New areas of understanding have developed between India and Saudi Arabia, lhe
of King 'Abdullah to India paved the way for the Delhi Declaration that led to their sig
Memorandum of Understanding on Combating Crime designed to deal with terrorism and t
crime. By 2010, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and King 'Abdullah had issued a Riy
tion that set the stage for the actual cooperation on counter-terrorism and the signing of the
treaty. Saudi Arabia had arrested Zabiuddin Ansari, an Indian Muslim who was travel
Arabia on a Pakistani passport to recruit more people to attack sites in India. While previ
carrying a Pakistani passport would be returned to Pakistan, this time Saudi Arabia transf
to Indian custody, which was a major diplomatic breakthrough in the Saudi-India bilateral

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 PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA * 217

THE ISLAMIC DIMENSION

Pakistan's founding ideology would not have suggested the country

special relationship with Saudi Arabia. While the rights of Muslims were par
justifying the need for creating a new state, nationalism was expected to be
force for Pakistan's citizens. Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah, the founding father o
was an avowed secularist and conceived of Pakistan as an essentially se
Islamic leaders in pre-Partition India stood apart from the independenc
and many actively opposed it. Most religious leaders believed that Muslim
continent should instead consider themselves part of a larger Islamic nation
Elsewhere, Muslims threw off the remnants of colonialism and imperia
concerned not with pan-Islamic unity, but rather with creating or strength
sectarian national identities. The tragic bloodletting that followed Part
drew attention to the subcontinent, but Pakistan and its travails were other
to most Muslims. Similarly, aside from paying homage to the Palestinian ca
fairs of the Arab Middle East had little salience for the Pakistani people.
There was, after all, much that set Pakistanis apart from their Saudi co
The orientations of Pakistan's political leadership were Western both as a m
ticality and taste. Saudi and Pakistani political systems differ, as do much of
culture and tradition. Saudi Arabia is a staunchly conservative hereditary m
Pakistan is a republic; and one that, at least among most of citizenry, aspires t
state. Although populations in both countries are religiously devout, Saudi A
and doctrinal Wahhabi regime contrasts with the more lenient and mystical t
liefs among most Pakistanis. Yet ties to the Saudi kingdom were from the out
be different from those of other Muslim states. Saudi Arabia, as self-appoin
of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, occupies a unique place for Pakistani
as a half million Pakistanis perform 'umra pilgrimages and the hajj every year
Saudi Arabia has long recognized the special role that Pakistan's highly prof
tary can play in the security of the regime, and also how Pakistan can be th
Saudi efforts to spread its brand of Sunni Islam in South Asia.
The watershed event ushering in Pakistan as a full-fledged member of
political community was its joint sponsorship with Saudi Arabia of the
summit in Lahore, attended by 37 countries. It marked the clearest attempt
stani leader to reorient the country toward the Middle East. Prime Minster
Bhutto (1971-77), saw Saudi Arabia and other oil- wealthy Arab states
lifeline to new economic resources and enhanced political stature - much
India's first demonstration of its nuclear capacity in 1974. The Kingdom
portedly willing to help finance a Pakistani military buildup. In the two yea
the Islamic summit, Pakistan received three interest-free soft loans from Sa
to cover its balance of payment deficits, and Saudi Arabia was thought willi

17. Jinnah was not entirely averse to such thinking, at least when it came to the defense
created Pakistan. An American diplomatic cable reported that in response to a suggesti
Gandhi in 1946 that the new state might join in forming a common subcontinent defense pac
that "his people looked to linking up with the Arab states." Telegram from John Winant
the United Kingdom to Secretary of State on Discussion with Sir Paul J. Patrick, Assistant
of State, India Office, February 21, 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, V

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218* MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Pakistan's $200 million purchase of 1 10 A-7 fighter-bombers from the Unit

This period also marked Pakistan's unprecedented opening to Wahhabi influe
The Iranian Revolution had a serious impact in Pakistan. Fearing the pos
Iran's influence would spread to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia began a serious effor
it by patronizing Pakistan's anti-Shi 'a groups. The Saudis found Pakistani pr
hammad Zia-ul-Haq's government amenable. Personally disposed to conse
and the House of Saud, Zia recognized in Saudi Arabia an opportunity to
the legitimacy of his military rule and to cement a close financial relationshi
to Saudi Arabia more than he traveled to any other Middle Eastern country.
it was the Afghan jihad of the 1980s, for which the Saudis (and the Americ
major financial support to Pakistan, that allowed the Saudi relationship to ful
The anti-Shi 'a tone of President Zia's determined program to furth
Pakistan's society was well-fitted to Saudi designs. Exercising soft power, th
funneled large sums toward building mosques and madrasas to counter Shi 'i
and undermine Pakistan's local Sufi groups. Prior to the 1980s, Pakist
were not known for advocating extremist ideologies. Saudi money was aimed
ioning religious schools into what has been called "Weapons of Mass Instruct
distributing a significant portion through charitable organizations, the
ment had plausible deniability that it was funding jihadi missions. Indee
at the Dar-ul-'Ulum Haqqania, Mullah 'Umar's Pakistani alma mater an
of the Taliban, a plaque proclaims the room a gift of the Kingdom of Saudi
The crowning symbol of Pakistan's links to the Saudi royal family cam
financing of the massive Faisal Mosque in Islamabad, named for the late

18. Saudi Arabia pledged an interest-free loan of $100 million, though just more
actually disbursed. In 1975/76, two other Saudi loans totaling $60 million were give
for the American planes broke down when Pakistan refused to agree to drop its plans f
of a $150 million nuclear waste reprocessing plant from France. Anwar H. Syed, "Pa
Business as Usual," Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No.2 (February 1977), pp. 187-88.
19. During the Zia regime, Pakistan-Saudi relations became so close that many even
troops played a role in ending the 1979 seizure of the Great Mosque in Mecca. While the
dence of a French role, the evidence of Pakistani assistance is far less convincing. See, E
the French Liberated Mecca," The Arab Street (blog), Council on Foreign Relations, Nov
http://blogs.cfr.org/husain/2011/ll/22/when-the-french-liberated-mecca/; Frank E. Sm
of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam's Holiest Shrine and the Birth of al Qaeda"
rohistory and World Timeline (blog), http://www.fsmitha.com/review/trofimov2.html
(pseud.), "1979: Pakistani Special Forces (SSG) Cleared the Holy Kaaba of Militants," The
August 2, 201 1, http://muslimglory.blogspot.com/201 1/08/1979-pakistani-special-forces-
20. Paul M.P. Bell, "Pakistan's Madrassahs: Weapons of Mass Instruction?" (PhD
Naval Post Graduate School, 2007), http://handle.dtic.mi1/100.2/ADA467143. By one es
ably at least half of Pakistan's madrasas are funded directly by the Saudi governm
philanthropists. Qasim A. Moini, "Pakistan's Saudi-Iran Balancing Act," Dawn , Jan
http://www.dawn.com/news/1082736/pakistans-saudi-iran-balancing-act.
21. Thomas Friedman. "In Pakistan, It s Jihad 101," The New York limes , November 1J, ZUUl,
http://www.nytimes.eom/2001/l 1/1 3/opinion/l 3FRIE.html.
22. The importance given to the Saudis is illustrated by President Pervez Musharraf declaring one
week of national mourning on the 2005 death of the late Saudi king Fahd, while the Saudis them-
selves, following their Wahhabi teaching, made far less of the event. Agence France-Presse, "Pakistan
Declares Seven Days of Mourning over Saudi King Fahd's Death," Lebanonwire, August 1, 2005,
http://www.lebanonwire.com/0805/05080129AFP.asp.

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 PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA *219

In addition to supporting mosques and madrasas, the Saudi government has

ously funded social welfare, educational, and cultural institutions. These con
are often more than matched by those from private donors in Saudi Arabia an
in the Gulf. Returning from these countries, Pakistani workers often bring back
conservative views of Islam. These influences may help to account for Pak
creasing sectarian violence. Virtually no area of Pakistan has remained entirely
this violence, for which many Pakistanis hold Saudi Arabia partly responsib
are sometimes expressed that targeted killings of Pakistan's Shi 'a could provok
war with Iran fought on Pakistani soil, with the Saudis funding certain militan
groups and the Iranians funding others. In the past, Iran was discovered to
neled arms to Shi 'i extremists. However, a more cautious Iran now seems u
strengthen those groups or to associate itself with the mounting public critici
Pakistan of the government's failure to protect Shi 'i communities.

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE

Pakistan's appetite for economic assistance and Saudi Arabia's willin

its oil wealth to further foreign policy objectives binds the two nations. Th
ernment has bailed Pakistan out of cash flow and balance of payments c
means of providing this assistance has been through deferred payments for
plied oil. The Saudi government has also provided cash transfers, and w
foreign currency reserves were dangerously low, the Kingdom has parked m
the State Bank of Pakistan as a confidence-building measure.
Saudi Arabia views Pakistan as a key Muslim ally, and thus has no
it in a weakened condition, where its reserve value for Saudi security would
ished and it could fall prey to other influences, not the least of which is fr
Arabia plays a critical role in Pakistan's economic and political stability
its energy needs and contributing significantly to remittances that are the
source of Pakistan's national income. In 2013, remittances from Saudi A
a ten-year compound annual growth rate of 24% and reached $3.8 billion
Trade between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is unbalanced, with Pakista
far more goods from Saudi Arabia than vice versa. Annual bilateral trad
two countries totals over $3.3 billion.25 Pakistan's principal exports to the K
rice, cotton yarn, woven fabrics, footwear, and other articles of clothing. Bu
Saudi Arabia ranks among the top 20 markets for all of Pakistan's exports,

23. In the first five months of 2012 alone, 177 people were killed as a result of 51 i
tarian violence that stretched from the areas of Balochistan and northern Gilgit to la
cities like Karachi. See, Huma Yusuf, "Sectarian Violence: Pakistan's Greatest Sec
Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) Report, July 2012, http://ww
no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/949e7f9b2db9f947c95656e5b54e38
24. "New Saudi Tax Measures to Trim Pakistan's Remittances," The News , Decem
http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-3-149501-New-Saudi-tax-measures-
stans-remittances .

25. Noman, "Major Exports of Pakistan to Saudi Arabia and Other Arab Countrie
February 27, 2012, http://pakbiz.com/articles/Major-Exports-of-Pakistan-to-the-S
other-Arab-Countries_AID9.html.

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220 ★ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

the Kingdom were valued in 201 1/12 at only $418 million.26 The far greater and
exports from Saudi Arabia accounted in 2013 for 1 1% of Pakistan's global impo
Arabia's exports consisted almost entirely of oil, organic chemicals, plastic prod
fertilizers.27 Worrisome for Pakistan is that its balance of payments with the K
gone further into deficit every year. This contrasts with Saudi trade with India,
not only risen in absolute terms, but also in the variety of items imported by Sau
including machinery, semifinished iron, and steel. By 2010/1 1, the value of Sa
with India had grown to over $25 billion, while Pakistan's trade with all the co
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) combined was only $1 1 billion.28
Although Saudi Arabia has long been the largest Arab investor in Pakistan
vestments have significantly declined. Overall, foreign direct investment by G
tries, while larger than from elsewhere in the Middle East, is not impressi
been dropping.29 Exacerbating this decline of investment from abroad is t
flight of capital from Pakistan, especially to Dubai, as Pakistan's economy
ened and its political environment has suffered.
During the 1 970s, the $ 1 30 million in economic aid that Pakistan received f
di Arabia was the largest from among the Arab countries, though it was dwarfe
given individually by the United States, Iran, China, the Soviet Union, and sever
European countries.30 While assistance rose sharply in the 1980s, mainly to sup
Afghan jihad, it subsequently declined. From 2006 to 2010, as much as $1.5 billi
into Pakistan from Saudi sources, the bulk of which came from private Saudi d
went not into Pakistani government coffers; but toward supporting religious a
institutions and the insurgencies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Saudi governm
tinues to provide oil on concessionary terms but, overall, many Pakistanis cons
economic assistance as disappointingly low. Following Pakistan's devastating 201
Saudi Arabia's pledge of $44 million in emergency relief compared very favora
China's $9 million, but was half of what the United States offered in cash and se
less than the $50 million promised by the United Kingdom.31

26. "Pakistan's Exports to S Arabia Touches More than US $41 8m Mark," Financ
(Bangladesh), December 29, 2012, http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/old/index.ph
MTJfMjlfMTJfMV85MF8xNTQ4MDI.
27. "Pakistan Imports," Trading Economics website, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/
imports. Pakistan's fertile Indus River valley has long been thought to be, with proper de
potentially a breadbasket for Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries.
28. "Kingdom-Pakistan Trade Surged to SR 18 bn in 2011," Arab News , September
http://www.arabnews.com/economy/kingdom-pakistan-trade-surged-sr-18-bn-2011. See a
try of Commerce and Industry, "India-Saudi Arabia Trade Touches US $ 25,612.46 Milli
1 1" Press Information Bureau, Government of India, pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?reli
29. Azizullah Khattak et al., Handbook of Statistics on Pakistan Economy 2005 (Islam
Bank of Pakistan, 2005), p. 412.
30. Weinbaum and Sen, "Pakistan Enters the Middle East," p. 603.
31. Saeed Shah, "Pakistan Flood Aid: Millions Pledged, but It's Still Not Enough, Chr
ence Monitor , August 18, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2
Pakistan-flood-aid-millions-pledged-but-it-s-still-not-enough. Even stingier was Saudi
manitarian assistance following Pakistan's September 2013 earthquake in Balochistan wh
$200,000 was pledged. "Saudi Arabia pledges Rs. 20 million to Balochistan quake affe
Dawn , October 4, 2013, http://www.dawn.com/news/1047426/saudi-arabia-pledges-rs-
aid-to-balochistans-quake-affected-areas.

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 PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA * 221

The migration of Pakistanis to the Middle East began to grow drastically

1970s, with most finding employment in Saudi Arabia.32 By the mid-1980s, Pakis
working in Saudi Arabia were the largest number of Pakistani expatriates anywhe
their remittances became a major source of foreign exchange. This community of
stanis was mostly employed in the construction sector, but also as accountants, do
and engineers, and would eventually swell to more than a million. Pakistani worke
welcomed because, despite being Muslim, they were thought unlikely to inter
become politically involved with the Saudi population. Yet while still rising elsewh
the Gulf region, Pakistan's share of the Kingdom's expatriate workers has fallen o
last quarter century. Indian workers began replacing Pakistanis, and later Banglad
Nepalis, and Sri Lankans were recruited in favor of Pakistanis and Indians. Telling
Islamabad government has never chosen to take up the cause of Pakistani workers
are widely exploited and abused in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf.33
As in every other aspect of their relationship, economic ties between the two
tries have been affected by regional and global geopolitics. The proposed construct
an Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline offers a prime example. The project, under discussion
the mid-1990s, could, if completed, increase Pakistan's economic dependence on Ira
provide Pakistan an alternative to the Gulf region to meet its energy needs. Despi
di disapproval and objections by the United States, outgoing President Asif 'Ali Za
(2008-13) signed a formal agreement in March 2013 with Iran to build the 600-mil
line.34 The Saudi government expressed its displeasure with Islamabad's agreem
the project. With the May 2013 reelection of Nawaz Sharif as prime minister (prev
served 1990-93, 1997-99), Saudi Arabia had good reason to believe that the new Pak
government would not ignore its wishes on this issue. Yet Pakistan's urgent need
energy sources made it initially difficult for Sharif to back out of this domestically
pipeline deal. By early 2014, however, it was clear that the project was virtually d

DOMESTIC POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

The degree of Saudi engagement in Pakistan's political affairs is su

a cable published by WikiLeaks, in which the Saudi ambassador to Pak

32. The history of Pakistani civilians providing critical services to the Kingdom pr
covery of oil. Doctors with the Royal family were mostly from Pakistan. A Paki
Anwar 'Ali was given the governorship of Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency in 1957
as a confidant of King Faisal until the King's death in 1974.
33. Human Rights Watch, "Bad Dreams: Exploitation and Abuse of Migrant Worker
bia," Human Rights Watch , Vol. 16, No. 5E (July 2004), pp. llff, http://www.hrw.or
saudi0704/saudi0704.pdf.
34. Likely as an incentive not to go ahead with the pipeline deal, the Kingdom
support a free trade agreement for Pakistan with the GCC. Syed Rashid Husain, "P
Arabia Agree to Enhance Ties," Dawn , April 24, 201 1, http://www.dawn.com/news/
and-saudi-arabia-agree-to-enhance-ties. A free trade agreement was also, however, pr
35. Problems financing Pakistan's $1.5 billion share of the proposed pipeline and
sues also contributed to sinking the project. See, Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Uncertainty o
Project," Dawn , August 6, 2013, http://www.dawn.com/news/1034420/uncertaint
line-project; and, "Iran Gas Project off the Table," Dawn , February 25, 2014, https:/
news/1089254/iran-gas-project-off-the-table-minister.

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222 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

as saying, "We in Saudi Arabia are not observers in Pakistan, we are part
Unlike the Chinese and more like the Americans, the Saudis have at times int
normally behind the scenes, as brokers and advocates in Pakistan's domes
Not infrequently, when Saudi officials have become embroiled in Pakista
politics, their involvement has been at the invitation of Pakistani governmen
The Saudis have cultivated and lent financial support to broad sectors of
society, in addition to religious and charitable groups, and well-connected ind
the political and military establishment. Saudi capital has also been heavily inv
private sector industries. Among Pakistan's major political actors, the royal fam
its favorites. As a conservative state, Saudi Arabia has been especially partial t
and culturally conservative governments, as with those headed by General Zia
Sharif. The generosity of Saudi aid has ordinarily been a good measure of its
ward Pakistani regimes. But ultimately, the Saudi government has shown its
to work with any individual or regime, whether democratic or authoritarian,
military, if it contributes to a Pakistan that is a stable, reliable, and trustworthy
It was with some difficulty that the Saudis warmed to Zulfiqar 'Ali
prime minister. Saudi leaders were not pleased by the democratically elec
socialist rhetoric. Bhutto's personal lifestyle made him far from an exemplar
and his alleged Shi 'i lineage would have naturally left him suspect. The count
ing Islamic party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, was bitterly opposed to the Bhutto go
But in seeking to rebalance Pakistan's strategic position, Bhutto worked
warmer relations with Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries than
his predecessors. The Saudis came to appreciate Bhutto's sincerity in reac
the Kingdom. Despite his nationalization of several major industries, Bhut
policies were primarily viewed as political posturing.
Few Pakistanis thought Bhutto sincere when he tried to placate domestic
forces by imposing policies to make Pakistan a more observant Islamic state, w
did only after his seemingly unassailable rule began to dissolve following
Party's tainted election victory in March 1977. The Saudis were deeply concer
the political turmoil in the aftermath of the elections. Emissaries from S
along with those from Kuwait, the UAE, Libya, and the Palestine Liberation O
tion (PLO) arrived in Pakistan to convey their distress and offer their good o
resolving Bhutto's differences with the government's opposition.37 Just days
ousting in the July 5, 1977 military coup, the beleaguered prime minister wa
during visits to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, an
death sentence that the Lahore High Court handed to Bhutto on March 18, 19
ed a flurry of cables from Middle Eastern leaders counseling against an execu
Bhutto's successor, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88), was de
to maintain and improve links forged during the Bhutto years. His initial goo
sions, publicized as get-acquainted visits, were in fact pilgrimages seeking to
his regime's shaky claims to legitimacy while also seeking badly needed f

36. Saba Imtiaz, "External Actors: Saudi Arabia's Convert Role in Pakistan," The Express
cember 8, 201Q, http://tribune.com.pk/story/87373/external-actors-saudi-arabias-covert-role-
37. That Middle Eastern countries loomed large in Pakistan in this penod is evidenc
amination of the May 18, 1977 edition of Dawn. Among 32 news items on its first page,
two of the three lead stories, dealt directly with an event or action by a Middle Eastern

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 PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA * 223

sistance. Zia's decision to vigorously pursue an Islamization program domesti

gether with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, brought unparalleled cooperation
Saudi Arabia that would last until his death in 1988.
After Zia's passing, Saudi leaders were cold to his successor, Benazir Bhutto
during her two interrupted terms as prime minister (1988-90, 1994-96). Although the
Saudis refrained from joining the phalanx of political and religious leaders in Pakistan
who challenged her legitimacy - including those who objected to a woman as head
of government - the Saudi royal family clearly preferred Bhutto's initially army-
sponsored adversary during this period, Nawaz Sharif. While in power, the devout
Sharif sought out the Kingdom's economic assistance and guidance. Sharif's removal
in the 1999 military takeover and coup leader General Pervez Musharraf's plans to
have Sharif tried for treason allegedly led to Saudi threats to cut financial backing.
The Saudi crown prince, 'Abdullah (who is now king), was instrumental in negotiat-
ing the deal that allowed Sharif to take refuge in Saudi Arabia, where he remained as
a pampered guest of the royal family until 2007.
Again, after Musharraf's takeover, with the stability of Pakistan at stake and see-
ing no good alternative to General Musharraf and his military, the Saudis resumed their
assistance to Pakistan. Saudi Arabia could do little, however, to save Musharraf when he
began to lose his grip on power in 2007 following his ill-fated attempt to remove Chief
Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. The Saudi government may have indirectly con-
tributed to hastening Musharraf's downfall by insisting that Sharif be allowed to return
home after, with American pressure, Benazir Bhutto was permitted to return from exile.
However, the Saudis were certainly not pleased to see Asif 'Ali Zardari, husband of the
assassinated Bhutto, assume the presidency in 2008, in part because Zardari, thought
to be a closet Shi 'i, would be inclined to strengthen Pakistan's ties with Iran. The
Zardari government was similarly suspicious of the Saudis' involvement in Pakistan's
domestic affairs. In 2008, Zardari's interior minister, Rehman Malik said, according
to a WikiLeaks cable, that he was "particularly concerned about the role of the Saudi
Ambassador in funding religious schools and mosques." But the Saudis could tolerate
the full term of a Zardari presidency in the knowledge that it was the army, and not the
elected government, that ran foreign policy. In another leaked cable, the Saudi deputy
interior minister, Prince Muhammad bin Nayif (now the interior minister), reportedly
remarked that the army was the Kingdom's "winning horse" in Pakistan. Reflecting on
King 'Abdullah's views, American diplomats concluded that the Saudis "appear to be
looking for 'another' Musharraf: a strong, forceful leader they know they can trust."38
With Pakistan in crisis on several fronts, Saudi leaders feel reasonably com-
fortable with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at the helm. As bluntly stated by Saudi
financier Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, "Nawaz Sharif ... is Saudi Arabia's man in
Pakistan."39 Sharif's business acumen goes beyond his background as a successful
industrialist. Along with other wealthy Pakistanis, the prime minister is known to

38. Declan Walsh, "WikiLeaks Cables: Saudi Arabia wants Military Rule in Pakistan," The
Guardian , December 1, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/01/saudis-distrust-pak-
istan-embassy-cables.
39. Matthew Kaminski, "Prince Alwaleed bin Talal: An Ally Frets About American Retreat," The
Wall Street Journal November 22, 2013, http://online.wsj.eom/news/artides/SB1000142405270230
433740457921 1742820387758.

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224 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

have extensive business investments in the Kingdom. These include a ste

Sharif set up in Jeddah, funded by interest-free loans from the Saudi govern
The new prime minister's economic policies were thought likely to ach
provements in several sectors, including trade and energy. With these as
he is expected to pursue better relations with India, something the Sau
welcome. He is also thought better equipped to reach a political acco
with Pakistan's religious militant groups.
Wide importance was given to the fact that the Saudi ambassador was
foreign ambassador to meet the new prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, following
elections. In a subsequent "private visit" with King 'Abdullah, Sharif wa
saying that their bilateral relationship is not one of "political expediency," bu
in the heart of every Pakistani and Saudi national."41 More tangibly, as an
of support for the Sharif government, Saudi Arabia offered to bail out ca
Pakistan with a loan worth as much as $15 billion. This was promised in t
deferred payment for three years of 100,000 barrels of crude oil and 15,
furnace oil per day to run the country's under-fueled thermal power plants.4
The Kingdom was instrumental in resolving the standoff between Pa
the US over the release of the Central Intelligence Agency contractor Ra
vis, held in March 2011 for fatally shooting two Pakistanis in Lahore. Sa
allegedly invited the victims' families for ' umra , and during their travel to
dom convinced them to receive "blood money" in exchange for Davis's
While Saudi Arabia, at the behest of Washington, has introduced tighte
over financial transactions from the Gulf, little progress has been made
Saudi authorities to stop or better monitor the transfer of funds from wealt
to conservative Islamic groups backing Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. T
government is simultaneously critical of Pakistan's ISI for its continued t
anti-Saudi al-Qa'ida militants on Pakistani soil.44

MILITARY AND NUCLEAR ISSUES

Pakistan's domestic involvement within Saudi Arabia differs from the

dom's wide-ranging, if periodic, interventions in Pakistan. As previously des
Pakistan's role has centered domestically on strengthening the Saudi regime's
ity to confront domestic and foreign enemies and on providing security for the r
family. Pakistani personnel have also continuously worked with Saudi security

40. Ashraf Mumtaz, "Media's Role in Future Pak-Saudi relations," The Nation (Lahore
5, 2013, http://www.nation.com.pk/editors-picks/05-Jul-2013/media-s-role-in-future-pak-sau
tions. See also, "Pakistani Investors Take Ties to New Heights," Arab News , October 9, 2013, h
www.arabnews.com/news/462282.
41. "Private Visit: PM Nawaz Meets Saudi King, Crown Prince," The Express Tribune , August 4,
2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/586206/private-visit-pm-nawaz-meets-saudi-king-crown-prince/.
42. "$15b Saudi Bailout for Pakistan Likely," Asia News Network , May 23, 2013, http://www.
asianewsnet.net/$ 15b-Saudi-bailout-for-Pakistan-likely-47061.html.
43. Nurmomad, "Saudi Arab Played a Key Role in the Release of Raymond Davis: PML(N) Lead-
er," All Voices , March 16, 2011, http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/8492957-saudi-arab-
played-key-role-in-the-release-of-raymond-davis-pml-n-leader.
44. Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink , p. 127.

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 PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA * 225

in advisory and training roles. Much of the training is focused on enhancing the
bat efficiency of troops against terrorist operations in low-intensity conflict
stances. For most of the last decade, the Pakistan Army and Royal Saudi Lan
have conducted joint exercises. As earlier, much of Pakistan's military assis
intended to help Saudis cope with the threats to the Kingdom arising from
ity among its immediate neighbors. Many observers contend, however, that t
family has kept the Saudi regular army deliberately weak and security forces
to minimize the possibility of a coup.
Pakistani troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia during the 1990/91 Gulf
In 2011, Pakistan accepted Prince Bandar bin Sultan's request to help suppr
antigovernment popular uprising in Bahrain, a key ally of Saudi Arabia. Pa
military advisors are believed to have been present during the Saudi milita
cursion in Bahrain, and recruitment efforts have been made to enlist qualifie
stanis in the Bahraini National Guard.45 An active role for Pakistani troop
increase should the US military's presence in the Gulf diminish and as
within states in the region grows. It is unclear whether a Pakistani governme
at the request of the Saudi government, would be willing to deploy troops to
the Gulf monarchies against Iran. Plainly, Pakistan has no desire to be dragg
a major conflict in the Gulf region.
Pakistan has regularly taken criticism for furnishing what are viewed
region's mercenaries. For Pakistan, however, this has been a small price to
the financial gains from its willingness to aid oil rich states. As early as 197
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) declined to provide new loans, and
lamabad government was forced to declare a moratorium on repayment of its
debt, the Gulf states came to its rescue financially. While a $6.6 billion IMF
2013 is encouraging, Pakistan's history of never having completed an IMF a
ment, together with the expected decline in US economic aid, could once aga
to a hard-pressed Pakistani government turning to the Saudis and others in t
to avoid financial collapse. But whatever the importance of economic motives
the deployment of Pakistani military personnel in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere
region, there has always been something more. Pakistani troops have carried
of pride that they were serving abroad as soldiers of Islam.
Probably no aspect of Pakistan's strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia occa
more speculation than how a nuclear-armed Pakistan might figure into Saudi
strategic planning. It is frequently asserted that their defense ties encompass a di
understanding or even formal agreement that provides a nuclear deterrent for th
government.46 Late Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi did little to disguise that he
vesting in an "Islamic bomb" through economic assistance to Pakistan in the mid-1
Zulfiqar 'Ali Bhutto, who announced his intention to build a weapon at any cost afte

45. "Al Khalifah Seeking Legitimacy from Pakistani Citizens," Islam Times , April 1
http://www.islamtimes.org/vdcev78p.jh8neiklbj.html. Ahmed Rashid writes that 3,000 Pak
servicemen were hired to bolster the police force, see Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink , p. 204.
46. Bruce Riedel, "Saudi Arabia: Nervously Watching Pakistan," Brookings Institution,
28, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/01/28-saudi-arabia-riedel.
47. Steve Weismann and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (New York: Times Book
pp. 59-62.

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226 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

revealed its nuclear capability in 1974, is also alleged to have sought Saudi
exchange for providing a nuclear deterrent for the Kingdom.48 No credible evi
however, that the Saudis agreed to a request to help bankroll Pakistan's program
However, Saudi defense minister Prince Sultan bin 'Abd al- 'Aziz inspe
stan's nuclear facilities in the late 1990s - at a time when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
was denied access - and purportedly in later Saudi visits.49 While in charge of Pakistan's
nuclear program, Dr. 'Abd al-Qadir Khan traveled regularly to Saudi Arabia and was al-
ways very well received. It is difficult to assess whether his trips were for nuclear-related
talks or if they were exclusively about his known business investments in the country.
A.Q. Khan shared nuclear secrets with North Korea, Iran, and Libya; but did not appear
to have included Saudi Arabia, which has no known nuclear program of its own.
The Saudi government's approval of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions is not in ques-
tion. Even if not directly backing Pakistan's efforts, Saudi long-term financial assistance
has contributed to the country's ability to produce a bomb. A key factor that encouraged
Nawaz Sharif to go ahead with nuclear tests in 1998 may have been a promise from the
Saudis to provide Pakistan with 50,000 barrels of free oil to soften the expected blow
of US and European Union economic sanctions.50 That Pakistan is presently the only
state in the Muslim world with nuclear weapons capability is a source of pride among
its citizens. Many Muslims outside the country also undoubtedly take great satisfaction
that an Islamic country has been capable of producing a nuclear weapon. However, this
does not carry with it an obligation that Pakistan put its program at the disposal of other
Muslim states, even one so intimately connected as is Saudi Arabia. Pakistan's nuclear
program has from its outset revolved around its rivalry with India.
Even so, the belief widely persists that Saudi Arabia's spiritual guardianship and
decades of assistance to Pakistan have earned the Kingdom the assurance that if in the
future it is faced with serious intimidation or existential threat from Iran, Pakistan will
not let it down. By this reasoning, should Iran emerge as a nuclear-armed power, the
Saudis will be expected to cash in their chips with Pakistan. Saudi Arabia would pre-
sumably request that Pakistan either sell it nuclear weapons - to fit on the Kingdom's
imported Chinese missiles - or extend a protective nuclear umbrella. Such appeal
would severely test the limits of Pakistan's relationship with the Kingdom, resulting
in something that Pakistan has avoided until now: having to visibly choose between
its Saudi mentors-cum-benefactors and Iran, an assertive regional power and neighbor.
While Pakistan would hope to avoid offending the Saudi royals, Iran's ability to retali-
ate, possibly by exacerbating sectarian tensions, is likely to keep Pakistan from acced-
ing to any nuclear requests from the Kingdom.
Notwithstanding Pakistan's desire to avoid openly siding with either Saudi Ara-
bia or Iran, there has been a decided tilt toward the Kingdom under Nawaz Sharif's
new government. In early 2014, an exchange of high-level visits took place, suggest-
ing that the two countries were moving toward formalizing a bilateral strategic secu-

48. Riedel, "Enduring Allies: Pakistan's Partnership with Saudi Arabia Runs Deeper," Brookings
Institution, December 9, 201 1, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/201 1/12/09-saudi-arabia-
pakistan-riedel.
49. Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan : Eye of the Storm (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2003), p. 218.
50. Clary and Karlin, "The Pak-Saudi Nuke and How to Stop it.

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 PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA ★ 227

rity agreement. It was widely believed that the Kingdom was interested in purc
Pakistan-built modern aircraft, tanks, and other weapons.51 While the Pakistan gov
ment repeatedly denied published reports that it was planning to base two div
of Pakistani soldiers on Saudi soil, it readily admitted that it was currently pro
training to the Saudi Armed Forces.52 Other persistent reports, officially denied, i
cated a shift in Pakistan's official policy of noninterference in Syria by sending we
ons to Saudi-backed rebels fighting Bashar Asad's pro-Iranian regime.53 A thick
of Pakistan's relations with Saudi Arabia was clearer with the announcement of
billion Saudi gift to help Pakistan meet pending debt service obligations and f
major energy and infrastructural projects.54 Even if a nuclear deal with the Ki
is off the table, Pakistan seems increasingly willing to put its long-standing de
balancing of relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran at risk.

CONCLUSION

The enduring bilateral relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arab

out of their mostly complementary and convergent national interests. Wh
issues can shape their short-term interactions, relations diverge from fam
forms of state-to-state behavior. Shared religious values explain the bonds
the two countries perhaps as much as their quid pro quos. For most Pakist
country's attachment to Saudi Arabia is sacrosanct and cannot be severed
tounding 95% of Pakistanis have a favorable view of Saudi Arabia, accord
2013 Pew Research Center poll.55 While feelings of respect and admirati
Saudis are not reciprocated toward Pakistan, many feel a sense of obligatio
needy Islamic state. More importantly, Saudi Arabia is drawn to Pakistan
portunity to spread its religious doctrine in so populous a country.
In practice, values and interests frequently commingle. Pakistan is prized b
for its proximity to strategically feared Iran, but must also be protected again
rupting influences of the Shi 'i state. Should Iran move aggressively to extend
and political influence in the aftermath of an international withdrawal from Afg

51. "Saudi Crown Prince to Visit for Business, Defence Cooperation Talks," The Expre
February 13, 2014, http://tribune.com.pk/story/671384/saudi-crown-prince-to-visit-for-b
fence-cooperation-talks/.
52. Maqbool Malik, "Pakistan Plans to Sell JF-17 Jets to KS A," The Nation (Lahore), F
2014, http://www.nation.com.pk/national/14-Feb-2014/pakistan-plans-to-sell-jf-17-jets-
dle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), "Pakistani Dailies: Saudi Arabia Has Asked P
Dispatch Two Army Division to the Kingdom," MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 5639, (F
2014), http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/7820.htm.
53. "Sartaj Dispels Impression of 'Syria policy shift,'" Dawn , February 25, 2014, htt
dawn.com/news/1089405/sartaj-dispels-impression-of-syria-policy-shift.
54. Mehreen Zahra-Malik, "Saudi Arabia Loans Pakistan $1.5 Billion to Shore Up
Reuters, March 13, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/13/us-pakistan-sau
RE A2C 1 3G20 1 403 1 3 .

55. Pew Research Center: "Saudi Arabia's Image Falters among Middle East Neighb
Views of Saudi Influence, Record on Civic Freedoms," Pew Research Global Attitudes P
tober 17, 2013, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/10/17/saudi-arabias-image-falters-amo
east-neighbors/.

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228 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

the policies of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia may again closely converge there.
could also be driven closer to Saudi Arabia as US influence recedes from the
with its withdrawal from Afghanistan, particularly as it also coincides with undi
Saudi disillusionment with the United States as a defense partner. In the case of K
Pakistan's disappointment over Saudi Arabia's reluctance to defend Muslim ri
its behalf is balanced against Pakistan's wish to avoid any issue likely to drive a w
between itself and a country that serves as its spiritual home and economic benef
Over the last five decades, the foundation on which the relationship be
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia rests has remained remarkably unchanged. But wh
architecture of the Kingdom's relationship with Pakistan is essentially political an
ligious, the Saudi relationship with India is built on economics. Pakistan finds its
a position of playing economic catch-up with India in a competition that it is losi
will find difficult to reverse without enacting major structural reforms in its ec
Riyadh's frustrations with the Pakistani leadership's continued inability to manag
country's economy are well known.
India's rising economic power has strengthened its influence in the regional
and on the global stage, which could compel recalculation by the Saudis beca
lationships with their roots in economic realities tend to be the most durab
Arabia would no doubt be relieved to see improvement in Indo-Pakistan rela
radical anti-Saudi elements in Pakistan expand their influence, Saudi Arabia
drawn closer to India. A Pakistan that chooses to link its economy more clos
Iran's could also cause reassessment. Pakistan's importance to the Saudis mi
further affected if Iran was militarily defanged by the West, or a broad rapproc
concluded with Tehran. Still, the resilience of what binds Pakistan and Saud
together should not be underestimated.
For all that draws the two countries together, there are those in Pakistan w
sess the full legacy of Pakistan's long relationship with Saudi Arabia as more
than positive. However valued the Saudi economic lifeline, the Kingdom's i
of Wahhabi influences is seen as a prime contributor to Pakistan's drift toward p
cal extremism and violence.56 Saudi funding of madrasas and mosques stren
an austere school of Islam that is inimical to Pakistan's Islamic traditions as
with more relaxed, syncretistic beliefs. Many of the people who threaten to
Pakistan's constitutional system and revamp its society are inspired by a b
radicalism that the Saudi government has unwittingly launched. Several of th
and sectarian groups that have been its offspring have forged close ties wit
Qa'ida affiliate dedicated not only to overthrowing the Pakistani government
the Saudi royal family. Conceivably, it could be a common threat of terrorism f
regional or global militant Islam that will rival Iran and India as strategic pr
tions for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the future.

56. From 2003 through to February 2014, there were 18,592 fatalities and 5,592 security
killed as a result of terrorist violence. Deaths among terrorists/insurgents over the same per
26,995. See, "Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2014," South Asia Terroris
(SATP), http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm.

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