MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONER

P CLSGIBS06

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF BRAHMASTHAN

IN THE MATTER OF: -

The Brahmasthan Women’s Rights Association.……………………Petitioner

v.

The State of Rajputra and Ors. …………….…………………………Respondent

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SC OF BRAHMASTHAN

UNDER ART.32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAHMASTHAN

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PETITION

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

¶ : Paragraph

AIR : All India Report

All : Allahabad

AP : Andhra Pradesh

Art. : Article

Bom : Bombay

Cal : Calcutta

Del : Delhi

Ed. : Edition

Ker : Kerala

DPSP : Directive Principles of State Policy

HC : High Court

Kar : Karnataka

PIL : Public Interest Litigation

SC : Supreme Court

SCC : Supreme Court Cases

u/s : Under Section

UOI : Union of India

US : United States

UK : United Kingdom

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Index of Authorities ………………………………………………………………………….... iv
Statement of Jurisdiction ..........................................................................................................viii
Statement of Facts ........................................................................................................................ix
Statement of Issues....................................................................................................................... xi
Summary of Arguments .............................................................................................................xii
Arguments Advanced ...................................................................................................................1
1. Whether the petitioner ‘The Brahmasthan Women's Rights Association’ have the locus
to file the present writ petition or not?
1.1. The Ban on Women entry is in violation of Fundamental Rights………………………..1
1.2 That the matter involves issue of general public importance……………………………..1
1.3 That association is public spirited individual or body…………………………………….2
1.4 For Redressal of public wrong or public injury…………………………………………...3
2. Whether the said restriction imposed on the women and children of certain age
amounts to violation of their fundamental rights as enshrined in the constitution,
specifically violation of articles 14, 15(1) and 17?
2.1 Brahmasthan is a secular country…………………………………………………………4
2.2 Equal treatment of all religious groups……………………………………………………4
2.3 Right of women to profess practice and propagate any religion………………………….5
2.4 Article 25(1) is a non- discriminatory right……………………………………………….5
2.5 Article 14- equality among all ……………………………………………………………6
2.5.1 Dualistic approach and an entrenched mindset…………………………………….7
2.5.2 Constitutional object of Justice, Liberty and Equality……………………………..7
2.5.3 That there is no rational nexus with the exclusionary practice and the object sought
to be achieved…………………………………………………………………………….7
2.5.4 That the exclusionary practice per se violates the sacrosanct principle of equality of
women……………………………………………………………………………………8
2.6 No discrimination against the citizen under Article 15 (1)……………………………….9
2.7 Abolition of Untouchability under Article 17……………………………………………10
2.7.1 Undermining the dignity of women………………………………………………..10
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2.8 Violation of Article 19, 21 and 51 A…………………………………………………….11

3. Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an "essential religious
practice" under article 25 and whether a religious institution can indulge in such practices
violating constitutional principles/ morality embedded in articles 14, 15(3), 39(a) and 51-A
(e)?
3.1 Meaning of the essential part of a religion……………………………………………….11
3.2 Only “Essential part of religion” is protected……………………………………………12
3.3 Test to determine an essential part to a religion in the nature of the religion……………12
3.4 Contrary Belief…………………………………………………………………………...12
3.5 That laws in force under Article 13 includes Customary Practices……………………..14

4. Whether a religious institution can assert a claim of right to manage its own affairs in the
matters of religion as it is managed by a statutory board and financed under Article 290-A
of the constitution of Brahmasthan out of consolidated fund of Rajputra?
4.1 Meaning of religious denomination……………………………………………………...16
4.1.1 Places of public worship will be open to all sections and classes of
Hindu……………………………………………………………………………........17
4.2 Satpura Kaliyugvardhan Temple is not separate religious denomination……………….17
4.3 Moreover, Article 26 is subject to Article 25(2) (b)……………………………………..18
4.4 Rule 3 (b) ultra vires of Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Act 1965……………..19
4.5 That constitutional morality must supersede the customary practices…………………...19
4.5.1 Object of Preamble………………………………………………………………...20

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CONSTITUTION

1. Constitution of Brahmasthan………………………………………………………. passim

STATUTES

1. Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.

2. Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965.
3. Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965.
4. Travancore- Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950.

CASES

1. Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan, AIR 2004 SC 561………….1

2. State of Uttaranachal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal &Ors (2010) 3 SCC 402………………...1
3. Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Shri Vardhichand &Ors. 1980 AIR 1622………………….2
4. Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 344……………………..2
5. Majdur KaamgarSabha,Bombay vs Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and ors 1976 AIR 1455…….2
6. Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subbra Chakraborty AIR 1996 SC 722…………………………..2
7. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 813……………………………..2
8. S.P. Gupta v. Union of Indian AIR 1982 SC 149………………………………………….3
9. Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary AIR 1993 SC 892………………………………………….3
10. St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat AIR 1974 SC 1389………………………………4
11. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India 1994 AIR 1918…………………………………………..4
12. N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and Ors (2002) 8 SCC 106……………….5
13. Indra Sawhney v. UOI, AIR 1993 SC 477…………………………………………………6
14. Usha Mehta v State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 12 SCC 419……………………………...6
15. Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC34…………………………………..6
16. M. Nagraj v. UOI (2006) 8 SCC 212………………………………………………………6

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17. Kesavananda Bharti v Stateof Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225……………………………...….6

18. MG Badappanavar v State of Karnataka (2001) 2 SCC 666……………………………….6
19. John Vallamattom v UOI, (2003) 6 SCC 611……………………………………………...6
20. M Jagdish Vyas v. UOI, (2010) 4 SCC 150………………………………………………..6
21. State of Punjab v. Balkaran Singh, (2006) 12 SCC 709…………………………………...6
22. U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra, (2008) 10 SCC 139……………6
23. T MA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481………………………….6
24. S Seshachalam v. Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, (2014) 16 SCC 72………………………...7
25. B.E.M.L Employees House Building Coop. Society v State of Karnataka AIR 2004 SC
5054………………………………………………………………………………………...7
26. Transport & Dock Workers Union v Mumbai Port Trust, (2011) 2 SCC 575……………..7
27. State of Rajasthan v Shankar Lal Parmar, (2011) 14 SCC 235…………………………….7
28. B. Manmad Reddy v Chadra Prakash Reddy, (2010) 3 SCC 314…………………………7
29. R.K. Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar 1958 AIR 538………………………………………….8
30. Laksmi Khandsari v State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 600……………………………………..8
31. State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, (2003) 9 SCC 114………………………………………....8
32. Welfare Association ARP v. Ranjit P Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358………………………….8
33. Javed v. State of Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369…………………………………………..…8
34. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala & Ors , (2018) SCC Online SC
1690………………………………………………………………………………………...8
35. Deepak Sibal & Ors v. Punjab University & Anr 1989 AIR 903………………………….8
36. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1………………………………………….8
37. Anuj Garg and others v. Hotel Association of India and others (2008) 3 SCC 1………….9
38. Charu Khurana and others v. Union of India and others (2015) 1 SCC 192……………….9
39. Navtej Singh v Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 791………………………………………...9
40. Valsamma Paul v Cochin University (1996) 3 SCC 545……. ……………………………9
41. Vishaka and others v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1997 SC 3011………………..10
42. National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others (2014) 5 SCC 438……..10
43. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others (2017) 10 SCC 1…...10
44. Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v Union of India 1970 AIR 564……………………………….11

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45. Maneka Gandhi v Union of India 1978 AIR 597…………………………………………11

46. Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta 1984 AIR 512…….…11
47. The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri
LakshmindraThrithaSwaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt 1954 SCR 1005……………………....12
48. Ajmer v Syed Hussain Ali (1962) 1 SCR 383…………………………………………….12
49. Subramanian Chettiar v. Kumarappa Chettiar AIR 1955 Mad 144. 79…………………..14
50. Hur Prasad v. Sheo Dayal (1876), 3 I.A. 259……………………………………………..14
51. Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh 1961 AIR 564…………………14
52. Sri VenkatramanaDevaru v. State of Mysore and others (1958) SCR 895: 1958 AIR
55………………………………………………………………………………………….16
53. Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar AIR 1954 SC 282 ……………………………...16
54. Riju Prasad Sarma and Ors. v. State of Assam and Ors., (2015) 9 SCC 461 ………….…19
55. Seshammal vs State of T.N. (1972) 2 SCC 11……………………………………………20
56. Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam and others v. Government of Tamil Nadu and
others (2016) 2 SCC 725 …………………………………………………………………20
57. Manoj Narula v. UOI (2014) 9 SCC1…………………………………………………….20

LEGAL DATABASES REFERRED

1. SCC online
2. MANUPATRA

WEBSITES REFERRED

1. www.scconline.com

2. www.manupatra.com

BOOKS

1. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (Lexis-Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa Publications,

Nagpur, 10th ed., 2016)

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2. Justice B.P. Banerjee, Writ Remedies: With Special Chapter on Public Interest Litigation
(Wadhwa and Company Nagpur, 3rd ed., 2002
3. Krishna Pal Malik, Woman and Law (Allahabad Law Agency, Delhi, 1st ed., 2009)
4. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India: A Critical Commentary, Vol. 1(Universal
Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. 3rd ed., 2004)
5. Acharya Shuklendra, Hindu Law (Modern Law Publication, Allahabad, 1st ed., 2004)
6. Durga Das Basu, Commentary on Constitution of India (LexisNexis, Vol. 1, 8th ed.,
2008)
7. Durga Das Basu, Commentary on Constitution of India (LexisNexis, Vol. 2, 8th ed.,
2008)
8. M.C. Jain Kagzi, The Constitution of India( Indian law House, New Delhi, 6th ed.,2004)

INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

1. Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),

1979.
2. Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,1967.

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT HAS BEEN EMPOWERED BY ARTICLE 321

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAHMASTHAN. The counsel on the behalf of petitioner
most humbly and respectfully submits to the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
present matter.

1
Article 32 in The Constitution of Brahmasthan 1950.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS -

BACKGROUND
1. A temple called 'Satpura Kaliyugvardhan' is situated in the state of Rajputra, a state of
diverse culture and tradition, which is further is a part of Brahmasthan. The temple is
considered as a religious denomination of its own.
2. The temple is known for lakhs and lakhs of Devotees visiting the temple throughout the year
after undergoing a 51 days penance, which involves changes in conduct and behavior, also is
a pre-requisite to visit the temple.
RESTRICTION OF WOMEN
3. Lord Kaliyugvardhan is considered as a celibate god. There are 18 steps that lead to Sanctum
Sanctorum. The temple has been maintaining a strict rule of not allowing women aged 10-50,
menstruating age, to enter into the temple, in order to maintain the celibacy of the deity. It is
also considered that if women are allowed the sanctity of the temple will be destroyed.
4. On way to the temple there is a police station, where the women devotees are stopped from
entering and if anyone of them manages to slip by, they are restricted by the Temple Security
staff to proceed further.
PETITION BY ASSOCIATION
5. The Brahmasthan Women Rights Association approached the Supreme Court to get the
directions of the court allowing the entry of women of every age group to enter into the
temple. The Association contended that the entry ban is a clear-cut violation of the
fundamental rights as enshrined under the Constitution of Brahmasthan. They further
contended that the entry ban is neither a ritual nor a ceremony associated with Hindu religion
and there is no temple, except the Satpura Kaliyugvardan, which bans the entry of women
Therefore, the practice is totally Anti-Hindu.
ARGUMENT OF MANAGEMENT BOARD
6. Satpura temple's management board contended that the ban was in accordance with the
tradition and women were not allowed, as they are incapable of undertaking the 51 days
penance. They also argued that Lord Kaliyugvardhan is a celibate god.

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7. The temple's management board argued that it is a part of the usage from time immemorial,
not discriminatory and was for the welfare of people. They brought to the notice of the
Supreme Court that in case of violation of the restriction, 'Purification Ritual' was to be done
on 18 steps that lead to Sanctum-Sanctorum. In January 2010, this ritual was performed as a
34-year-old woman entered the temple. They further contended their right to exclude is
protected by constitution.
8. The Rights Association contended that entry of women folk be allowed and right to equality
to be upheld. They further brought to the notice of the court that there were certain news feed
of women entering in sanctum sanctorum with the permission of temple's management board.

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ISSUES PRESENTED

ISSUE I

Whether the petitioner ‘The Brahmasthan Women's Rights Association’ have the locus to file the
present writ petition or not?

ISSUE II

Whether the said restriction imposed on the women and children of certain age amounts to
violation of their fundamental rights as enshrined in the constitution, specifically violation of
articles 14, 15(1) and 17?

ISSUE III

Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an "essential religious practice" under
article 25 and whether a religious institution can indulge in such practices violating constitutional
principles/ morality embedded in articles 14, 15(3), 39(a) and 51-A (e)?

ISSUE IV

Whether a religious institution can assert a claim of right to manage its own affairs in the matters
of religion as it is managed by a statutory board and financed under Article 290-A of the
constitution of Brahmasthan out of consolidated fund of Rajputra?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1-THAT THE PETITIONER 'THE BRAHMASTHAN WOMEN'S RIGHTS

ASSOCIATION' HAVE THE LOCUS TO FILE THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Brahmasthan that the Petitioners do
have the locus to file the present writ petition. If the Association does not intervenes, it will
result in gross injustice. Therefore, the writ petition of the petitioner must be accepted, so that the
Hon’ble Court can use its wide jurisdiction conferred under Art. 322 of the Constitution of
Brahmasthan, to provide justice to the society. Further, it is in the public interest that equality
should be maintained and the provisions of the constitution be upheld. Therefore, present writ
petition is filed in the form of PIL.

[2] THAT THE SAID RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN
OF CERTAIN AGE AMOUNTS TO VIOLATION OF THEIR FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS AS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION, SPECIFICALLY VIOLATION
OF ARTICLES 14, 15, 17, 19 and 21.

It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the said restriction imposed
on the women and children of certain age amounts to violation of their fundamental rights as
enshrined in the constitution, specifically violation of articles 14, 15 and 17. Further, Article 25
of the constitution also provides the freedom to profess, practice and propagate religion to each
and every individual. In addition to this the Constitution object of Justice, equality and liberty is
negated by the act of respondent. The practice of the respondents attacks the very core of Article
17 which prohibits untouchability in ‘any form’. There is no rational nexus with the
exclusionary practice and the object sought to be achieved.

2
Article 32 in The Constitution of Brahmasthan 1950.

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[3] THAT THE PRACTICE OF EXCLUDING SUCH WOMEN DOES NOT

CONSTITUTE AN "ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE" UNDER ARTICLE 25

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the practice of excluding such
women does not constitute an “Essential Religious Practice”, only such practices are protected
by Article 25. The nature of the religion will not be affected if women are allowed to enter into
the temple. Further, constitutional morality must supersede the customary practices.

[4] THAT A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION CANNOT ASSERT A CLAIM OF RIGHT TO

MANAGE ITS OWN AFFAIRS IN THE MATTERS OF RELIGION AS IT IS
MANAGED BY A STATUTORY BOARD AND FINANCED UNDER ARTICLE 290-A
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAHMASTHAN OUT OF CONSOLIDATED FUND OF
RAJPUTRA.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that religious institution cannot assert
a claim of right to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion as it is managed by a
statutory board and financed under Article 290-A of the constitution of Brahmasthan out of
consolidated fund of Rajputra because Satpura Kaliyugvardhan temple is not a separate religious
denomination.

It is further submitted that a religious denomination cannot completely exclude or prohibit any
class or section for all times. All that a religious denomination may do is to restrict the entry of a
particular class or section in certain rituals.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED –

1-THAT THE PETITIONER 'THE BRAHMASTHAN WOMEN'S RIGHTS

ASSOCIATION' HAVE THE LOCUS TO FILE THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION.

1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Brahmasthan that the
Petitioners do have the locus to file the present writ petition. If the Association does not
intervene, it will result in gross injustice. Therefore, the writ petition of the petitioner must be
accepted, so that the Hon’ble Court can use its wide jurisdiction conferred under Art. 323 of
the Constitution of Brahmasthan, to provide justice to the society.
[1.1] The ban on women entry is violation of fundamental rights.
2. The ban on women entry to the Lord Kaliyugvardhan Temple4 is a violation of fundamental
rights as enshrined under the Article 14, 15, 17 and 25 of the Brahmasthan Constitution.
Therefore, public interest requires that there should be equality, provisions of the constitution
be implemented in letter and spirit, freedom of religion be acknowledged and there should no
discrimination on any ground whatsoever. The application of fundamental rights of women is
a matter of public importance.
[1.2] That the matter involves issue of general public importance.

3. Thus, this writ is in the form of Public Interest Litigation as it is in consonance with the
Public Interest. Public Interest Litigation has been referred to as a new judicial process
introduced by courts to accomplish the social revolution contemplated by the makers of the
Indian Constitution. It represents sustained efforts on the part of judiciary to provide access
to justice for the deprived and vulnerable sections of the humanity.5
4. In the case of State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors6court
has defined `Public Interest Litigation' as under: -"The expression `PIL' means a legal action
initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which

3
Article 32 in The Constitution of Brahmasthan 1949.
4
Moot Proposition, ¶ 3.
5
Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan, AIR 2004 SC 561.
6
State of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors, (2010) 3 SCC 402.
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the public or a class of the community has pecuniary interest or some interest by which their
legal rights or liabilities are affected."
5. In Ratlam Municipality Case7 the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized on the concept of PIL
as follows: “… shifting the center of gravity of justice from the traditional individualism of
locus standi to the community orientation of public interest litigation is a constitutional
mandate enshrined in the preamble.”
6. KRISHNA IYER, J., in a separate opinion explicitly advocated liberalization of the locus
standi to meet the challenge of times. If a plaintiff with a good case is turned away merely
because he is not sufficiently affected personally, that means that some government agency
is left free to violate the law, and this is contrary to public interest.8
[1.3] That association is public spirited individual or body
7. In the case of Majdur Kaamgar Sabha,Bombay vs Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and ors9where J.
Court allowed a group of people to file a petition on behalf of others. If the rights of the
members were violated the court held that either one individual or group of individuals
together can come to the court.
8. The Supreme Court in Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subbra Chakraborty10 has ruled that to
exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 32, it is not necessary that the affected person should
personally approach the Court. The Court can itself take cognizance of the matter and
proceed with suo motu or on a petition of any public spirited individual or body.
9. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India11, court has stated on this point: "A new
dimension has been given to the doctrine of locus standi which has revolutionized the
whole concept of access to justice."
10. Court also pointed out that in the words of Art. 32(1), there is no limitation that the
Fundamental Right sought to be enforced must belong to the person moving the Court. Nor
does Art 32(1) say that the Supreme Court should be moved only by a particular kind of
proceeding.

7
Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Shri Vardhichand & Ors, 1980 AIR 1622.
8
Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344
9
Majdur KaamgarSabha,Bombay vs Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and ors, 1976 AIR 1455.
10
Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subbra Chakraborty, AIR 1996 SC 722.
11
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 813.
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11. The Court then went on to emphasize that "public interest litigation is not in the nature of
adversary litigation but it is a challenge and an opportunity to the Government and its
officers to make basic human rights meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of
the community”12.
12. The principle was enunciated by the Court as early as 1982 in S.P. Gupta v. Union of
India13,: “Any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for
judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some
provision of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and
observance of such constitutional or legal provision.”
[1.4] For redressal of public wrong or public injury-

13. The Supreme Court decision in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary14 is very significant aspect of
the decision is laying the credentials which a writ petitioner filing a PIL should fulfill. The
Court has observed:"....The strict rule of locus standi applicable to private litigation is relaxed
and a broad rule is evolved which gives the right of locus standi to any member of the public
acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in instituting an action for redressal of public
wrong or public injury."
14. A PIL would only be entertained if a segment of the public is interested, and the petitioner is
not aggrieved in his individual capacity alone. And, it is not a charter for ignoring or
supplanting an applicable statutory provision15.
15. The courts exercising their power of judicial review found to its dismay that the poorest of
the poor, deprived, illiterate, urban and rural unorganized labour sector, women, children,
handicapped, by ignorance, indigence and illiteracy and other downtrodden, have either no
access to justice or had been denied justice. New branch of proceedings known as
Social Interest Litigation or Public Interest Litigation was evolved with a view to render
complete justice to aforementioned class of person.16

12
Supra note 11
13
S.P. Gupta v. Union of Indian, AIR 1982 SC 149.
14
Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, AIR 1993 SC 892.
15
Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan ,(2003) 7 SCC 546 AIR 2004 SC 561.
16
Supra note 15.
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16. In the present case also, the petitioners have the locus to file the petition due to absence of
any personal gain or private motivation or any other oblique consideration. Moreover, the
petitioners have approached the Supreme Court of Brahmasthan seeking a direction to allow
entry of women into 'The Satpura Kaliyugvardhan' temple without age restrictions with a
claim that the present restriction on women's entry is violation of the fundamental rights,
which is a matter of public importance.
[2] THAT THE SAID RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN
OF CERTAIN AGE AMOUNTS TO VIOLATION OF THEIR FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS AS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION, SPECIFICALLY VIOLATION
OF ARTICLES 14, 15, 17, 19 and 21.

17. It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the said restriction
imposed on the women and children of certain age amounts to violation of their fundamental
rights as enshrined in the constitution, specifically violation of articles 14, 15,17,19 and 21.

[2.1] Brahmasthan is a Secular Country-

18. It has been made explicit in the Preamble of the Constitution of Brahmasthan that
Brahmasthan is a “Secular State”.
19. “Secularism”, the Supreme Court explained, in St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat17,
“State is neither anti-God, nor pro-God; it treats alike the devout, the agnostic and the
atheist. It eliminates God from the matters of the State and ensures that no one shall be
discriminated against on the grounds of religion”.
[2.2] Equal treatment of all religious groups-
20. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India18, a nine judge Bench of the SC referred to the concept of
secularism in the Indian context as follows: “…religious tolerance and equal treatment of all
religious groups and protection of their life and property and of the places of their worship
are an essential part of secularism enshrined in our constitution.” Henceforth, every person is
free to follow religion of his choice.

17 St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389.

18
S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994 AIR 1918.
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21. But the strict rule19 of prohibiting women folks of specific age group from entering into the
temple is sheer violation of Fundamental Rights as enshrined in the Constitution.
22. Thus, the exclusionary practice which is based upon a physiological factor exclusive to the
female gender amounts to discrimination and thereby violates the very core of Article 14, 15
and 17.

[2.3] Right of women to profess, practice and propagate any religion-

23. Article 25 (1) provides “Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other
provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right
freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.
24. That Article 25(1), by employing the expression 'all persons', demonstrates that the freedom
of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion is available,
though subject to the restrictions delineated in Article 25(1) itself, to every person including
women.
25. Having guaranteed equality before the law and the equal protection of laws in Article 14, the
draft persons specifically continued the theme of an equal entitlement as an intrinsic element
of the freedom of conscience and of the right to profess, practice and propagate religion.
[2.4] Article 25(1) is a non-discriminatory right
26. The Fundamental Right to worship under Article 25(1) is a non-discriminatory right, and is
equally available to both men and women alike.
27. Any relationship with the Creator is a transcendental one crossing all socially created
artificial barriers and not a negotiated relationship bound by terms and conditions. Such a
relationship cannot be circumscribed by dogmatic notions of biological or physiological
factors arising out of rigid socio-cultural attitudes which do not meet the constitutionally
prescribed tests.
28. In N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and Ors.20, the vision of the founding
fathers of the Constitution to liberate the society from blind and ritualistic adherence to mere

19
The Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry Rules, 1965 (Rules 1965).
20
N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and Ors, (2002) 8 SCC 106.
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 MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONER

traditional superstitious beliefs sans reason or rational basis has found expression in the form
of Article 17.
[2.5] Article 14 – Equality among All
29. The Constitution of Brahmasthan guarantees the Right to Equality in Article 14. “Equality is
one of the magnificent corner-stones of the democracy.”21 It provides positive not negative
equality.22
30. The doctrine of equality before law is a necessary corollary of Rule of Law which pervades
the Constitution of Brahmasthan.23
31. Right to equality has been declared by the Supreme Court as a basic feature of the
24
Constitution. Neither Parliament nor any State Legislature can transgress the principle of
equality.25 This principle has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Badappanavar26 in the
following words: Equality is a basic feature of the Constitution and any treatment of equals
unequally or unequals as equals will be violation of basic structure of the Constitution of
Brahmasthan.
32. The postulate of equality is that human beings are created equal. To exclude women from
worship by allowing the right to worship to men is to place women in a position of
subordination.
33. All persons in similar circumstances shall be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities
imposed.27 Henceforth, it means that ‘equals should be treated alike’; it does not mean
unequals ought to be treated equally.28
34. It is submitted that the exclusionary practice of preventing women between the age of 10 to
50 years based on physiological factors exclusively to be founding female gender violates
Article 14 of the Constitution of Brahmasthan, such a classification does not have a

21
Indra Sawhney v. UOI, AIR 1993 SC 477.
22
Usha Mehta v State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 12 SCC 419.
23
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC34.
24
M. Nagraj v. UOI (2006) 8 SCC 212.
25
Kesavananda Bharti v State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
26
MG Badappanavar v State of Karnataka, (2001) 2 SCC 666.
27
John Vallamattom v UOI, (2003) 6 SCC 611.
28
M Jagdish Vyas v. UOI, (2010) 4 SCC 150; State of Punjab v. Balkaran Singh, (2006) 12 SCC 709; U.P. Power
Corporation Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra, (2008) 10 SCC 139; T MA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka,
(2002) 8 SCC 481.
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constitutional object. When there is no reasonable basis for classification, such classification
may be declared discriminatory.29
[2.5.1] Dualistic approach and an entrenched mindset
35. There is inequality on the path of approach to understand the divinity. The dualism that
persists in religion by glorifying and venerating women as goddesses on one hand and by
imposing rigorous sanctions on the other hand in matters of devotion has to be abandoned.
Such a dualistic approach and an entrenched mindset results in indignity to women and
degradation of their status.
[2.5.2] Constitutional object of justice, liberty, equality
36. As per Article 14, any law being discriminatory in nature has to have the existence of an
intelligible differentia and the same must bear a rational nexus with the object sought to be
achieved. The object as has been claimed is to prevent the deity from being polluted, which,
runs counter to the constitutional object of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity as
enshrined in the Preamble to our Constitution. That apart though the classification based on
menstruation may be intelligible, yet the object sought to be achieved being constitutionally
invalid, the question of nexus need not be delved into.
[2.5.3] That there is no rational nexus with the exclusionary practice and the object sought
to be achieved
37. The doctrine of reasonable classification is applied for determining the reasonableness in
State action. The requirement of reasonableness runs like a golden thread through the entire
fabric of fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution. Reasonableness being the core of
Art. 14 would imply that constitutional duties be performed within a reasonable time so as to
satisfy the test of reasonableness.30 Differential treatment does not per se amounts to
violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution and it violates Art. 14 only when there is no
reasonable basis and there are several tests to decide whether a classification is reasonable or
not and one of the test will be as to whether it is conducive to the functioning of the modern
society.31

29
S Seshachalam v. Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, (2014) 16 SCC 72.
30
B.E.M.L Employees House Building Coop. Society v State of Karnataka, AIR 2004 SC 5054.
31
Transport & Dock Workers Union v Mumbai Port Trust, (2011) 2 SCC 575; State of Rajasthan v Shankar Lal
Parmar, (2011) 14 SCC 235; B. Manmad Reddy v Chadra Prakash Reddy, (2010) 3 SCC 314.
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 MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONER

38. The court in the leading judgment, R.K. Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar32, laid down the test to
determine the question of reasonableness of classification. These have been held to be central
tests for permissible classification. These are-
• That, the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
person or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group.
• That the differentia must have a relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute
in question.
39. The Court further expanded this principle in the leading judgments33. It was observed that
reasonable classification should fulfill the following two tests:
• It should not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It should be based on an intelligible
differentia, some real and substantial distinction, which distinguishes person or things
grouped together in the class from others left out of it.
• The differentia adopted as the basis of classification must have a rational or
reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
40. “Staunch Celibate” means that his powers derive specifically from abstention from sexual
activities. Therefore, mere sight of women cannot affect one’s celibacy if one has taken oath
of it.34
[2.5.4] That the exclusionary practice per se violates the sacrosanct principle of equality of
women.
41. Referring to the decision of this Court in Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University and another35,
the petitioner herby submits that the exclusionary practice per se violates the sacrosanct
principle of equality of women and equality before law and the burden of proving that it does
not so violate is on the respondent, which the respondent has not been able to discharge.
42. Thus, the petitioner submits that the exclusionary practice is manifestly arbitrary in view of
the judgment of this Court in Shayara Bano v. Union of India36 and others as it is solely

32
R.K. Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar 1958 AIR 538.
33
Laksmi Khandsari v State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 600; State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, (2003) 9 SCC 114; Welfare
Association ARP v. Ranjit P Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358; Javed v. State of Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369.
34
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala & Ors, (2018) SCC Online SC 1690.
35
Deepak Sibal & Ors v. Punjab University & Anr., 1989 AIR 903.
36
Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1.
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based on physiological factors and, therefore, neither serves any valid object nor satisfies the
test of reasonable classification under Article 14 of the Constitution37.
[2.6] No discrimination against citizens under article 15(1)

43. While guaranteeing equality and the equal protection of laws in Article 14; Article 15
prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth;
44. It has also been put forth by the petitioner that the exclusionary practice per se violates
Article 15(1) of the Constitution which amounts to discrimination on the basis of sex as the
physiological feature of menstruation is exclusive to females alone. In support of the said
submission, petitioner reliance upon the judgments of this Court in Anuj Garg and others v.
Hotel Association of India and others38 and Charu Khurana and others v. Union of India and
others39, to accentuate that gender bias in any form is opposed to constitutional norms.
45. In Navtej Singh v Union of India40 it was held: “A discriminatory act will be tested against
constitutional values. Discrimination will not survive constitutional scrutiny when it is
grounded in and perpetuates stereotypes about a class constituted by the grounds prohibited
in Article 15(1).”
46. While adjudicating a matter pertaining to Art. 15 (1), SC observed41: “Article 15 (1) prohibits
discrimination on grounds of religion or caste identities so as to foster national identity which
does not deny any pluralism of Indian culture rather to preserve it.”
47. Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women42 aims at removing all
kinds discrimination prevailing in the society.

48. That Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)43
emphasized that it is the obligation of the State to eradicate taboos relating to menstruation

37
Supra Note 34.
38
Anuj Garg and others v. Hotel Association of India and others, (2008) 3 SCC 1.
39
Charu Khurana and others v. Union of India and others, (2015) 1 SCC 192.
40
Navtej Singh v Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 791.
41
Valsamma Paul v Cochin University, (1996) 3 SCC 545.
42
Art.1 and 2, Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,1967(adopted on 7 November
1967)
43
Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women,1981 (adopted on 18 December 1979)
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 MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONER

based on customs or traditions and further the State should refrain from invoking the plea of
custom or tradition to avoid their obligation.
49. Also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the international conventions must be followed
when there is a void in the domestic law or when there is any inconsistency in the norms for
construing the domestic law.44

[2.7] Abolition of untouchability under article 17-

50. 'The Satpura Kaliyugvardhan' temple Management Board also points out that there are few
rituals where The Satpura Kaliyugvardhan 'Temple poojari would perform a "purification
ceremony whenever a woman enters into the temple".45.
51. Exclusionary practice has the impact of casting a stigma on women of menstruating age for it
considers them polluted and thereby has a huge psychological impact on them which
resultantly leads to violation of Article 17 as the expression “in any form” in Article 17
includes untouchability based on social factors and is wide enough to cover menstrual
discrimination against women. It has further been submitted that Article 17 applies to both
State and non-State actors and has been made operative through a Central legislation in the
form of Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.

[2.7.1] Undermining the dignity of women-

52. Drawing support from the decisions of this Court in National Legal Services Authority v.
Union of India and others46 and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and
others47, the petitioner has averred that the exclusionary practice pertaining to women is
violative of Article 21 of the Constitution as it impacts the ovulating and menstruating
women to have a normal social day to day rendezvous with the society including their family
members and, thus, undermines their dignity by violating Article 21 of the Constitution.

53. The stigma around menstruation which has been built up around traditional beliefs in the
impurity of menstruating women should have no place in a constitutional order. These

44
Vishaka and others v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1997 SC 3011.
45
Moot Proposition, ¶ 7.
46
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others, (2014) 5 SCC 438.
47
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
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 MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONER

beliefs have been used to shackle women, to deny them equal entitlements and subject them
to the dictates of a patriarchal order.
54. The menstrual status of a woman cannot be a valid constitutional basis to deny her the
dignity of being and the autonomy of personhood. The menstrual status of a woman is
deeply personal and an intrinsic part of her privacy. That the fundamental rights contained in
Part III cannot be exercised in water-tight compartments.48
[2.8] Violation of article 19, 21 and 51-A (e)-
55. The expression 'personal liberty' in Art. 21 is of the widest amplitude and covers a variety of
rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have been raised
to the status of distinct fundamental, rights and given additional protection under Art. 19(1).
56. In Maneka Gandhi v Union of India49, it was expounded that the law must have a content
which is reasonable. The procedure for deprivation must be free of the taint of that which is
arbitrary.
57. That Fundamental Duties under Article 51-A (e) also recognizes that every citizen must
renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women. “Dignity of women” under Article
51A(e) is an essential ingredient of constitutional morality.

[3] THAT THE PRACTICE OF EXCLUDING SUCH WOMEN DOES NOT

CONSTITUTES AN "ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE" UNDER ARTICLE 25
AND A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION CANNOT INDULGE IN SUCH PRACTICES
VIOLATING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES/ MORALITY EMBEDDED.
58. The practice of excluding women of age of 10 to 50 years does not constitute an "essential
religious practice" under article 25.
[3.1] Meaning of the essential part of a religion
59. In Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta50 it was held that
essential part of a religion means the core beliefs upon which a religion is founded. Essential
practice means those practices that are fundamental to follow a religious belief. It is upon the

48
Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v Union of India, 1970 AIR 564.
49
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, 1978 AIR 597.
50
Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta, 1984 AIR 512.
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 MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONER

cornerstone of essential parts or practices that the superstructure of a religion is built,

without which a religion will be no religion.
[3.2] Only “essential part” of religion is protected
60. That while giving freedom under clauses (a) and (b) of Article 26, what is protected is only
the “essential part” of religion or, in other words, the essence of practice practiced by a
religious denomination and, therefore, the petitioners submit that before any religious
practice is examined on the touchstone of constitutional principles, it has to be ascertained
positively whether the said practice is, in pith and substance, really the essence of the said
religion.51
[3.3] Test to determine an essential part to a religion is the nature of the religion
61. Test to determine whether a part or practice is essential to a religion is to find out whether
the nature of the religion will be changed without that part or practice. Such alterable parts
or practices are definitely not the 'core' of religion where the belief is based and religion is
founded upon. It could only be treated as mere embellishments to the non-essential part or
practices.”52
62. In Durgah Committee, Ajmer v Syed Hussain Ali53, it was held that in order that the practices
in question should be treated as a part of religion they must be regarded by the said religion
as its essential and integral part; otherwise even purely secular practices which are not an
essential or an integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may
make a claim for being treated as religious practices within the meaning of Article 26.
63. Similarly, even practices though religious may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs
and may in that sense is extraneous and unessential accretions to religion itself.
[3.4] Contrary belief
64. That Satpura Kaliyugvardhan temple is a Hindu temple and it is an essential part of the
Hindu religion to allow Hindu women to enter into a temple as devotees and followers of
Hindu religion and offer their prayers to the deity.

51
The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri LakshmindraThrithaSwaminar of Sri Shirur
Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005.
52
Supra note 34.
53
Durgah Committee, Ajmer v Syed Hussain Ali, (1962) 1 SCR 383.
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 MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONER

65. There are many Hindu temples in the country of Brahmasthan but none of them except the
Satpura Kaliyugvardhan Temple excludes women from entering the temple. The Devi Sukta
hymn of Rigveda, a scripture of Hinduism, declares the feminine energy as the essence of the
universe, the one who creates all matter and consciousness, the eternal and infinite, the
metaphysical and empirical reality (Brahman), the soul (supreme self) of everything54.
66. In Hinduism, along with Shaivism and Vaishnavism, there is Shaktism as well. Shaktism is a
major tradition of Hinduism, wherein the metaphysical reality is considered metaphorically
feminine and Adi Parashakti is supreme. It includes a variety of goddesses, all considered
aspects of the same supreme goddess55.
67. The Sruti and Smriti texts of Hinduism are an important historical framework of the
Shaktism tradition. In addition, it reveres the texts Devi Mahatmya, the Devi-Bhagavata
Purana, and Shakta Upanishads such as the Devi Upanishad56.
“Yatra naryastupujyanteramantetatra Devata,
yatraitaastunapujyantesarvaastatrafalaahkriyaah”57
It is a famous shloka taken from Manusmruthi which means where Women are honored,
divinity blossoms there, and where women are dishonored, all action no matter how
noble remains unfruitful.
68. So, it is evident from the aforementioned arguments that Hindu religion is not discriminatory
rather women goddesses are worshipped and it is difficult to comprehend that how the
ceremonies or ritual of such a religion can restrict women entry to the temple. Therefore, the
practice is totally anti-hindu.
69. Therefore, the exclusionary practice, which has been given the backing of a subordinate
legislation in the form of Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules, framed by the virtue of the 1965 Act,
is neither an essential nor an integral part of the Hindu religion without which Hindu
religion, of which the devotees of Lord Kaliyugvardhan are followers, will not survive.

54
C Mackenzie Brown. The Devi Gita: The Song of the Goddess: A Translation, Annotation, and Commentary. p. 26
SUNY Press, 1998.
55
Klaus K. Klostermaier. Survey of Hinduism, A: Third Edition. State University of New York Press. pp. 30, 2010
56
Constance Jones; James Ryan . Encyclopedia of Hinduism. Infobase Publishing. p. 399. 2014
57
Manusmriti Chapter-3, Verse 56.
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[3.5] That laws in force under Article 13 includes Customary Practices-

70. In Subramanian Chettiar v. Kumarappa Chettiar58 custom has been defined as, “A
particular rule which has existed from the time immemorial and has obtained the force of
law in a particular locality.” In Hur Prasad v. Sheo Dayal59, custom has been defined as
‘Rule which in a particular family or in a particular district or in a particular sect, class or
tribe, has from long usage obtained the force of law.’
71. That Article 13 per se provides for the power of judicial review of laws. The two definitions
of “law” and “laws in force”, on a bare perusal may seem to be mutually exclusive of each
other, however, in Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh60, the
constitution Bench of the Supreme Court expressed the view that Article 13 (1) which says
that laws in force in India before the commencement of the Constitution shall be void if
inconsistent with fundamental rights “includes custom or usage having the force of law”.
72. The expression “law in force” in that Section was interpreted by the Federal Court in The
United Provinces v Mst. Atiqa Begum61. The Court held: that the legislative powers of the
Provincial Legislature and the Central Legislature apply not only to statutory enactments
then in force, but to all laws, including even personal laws, customary laws, and common
laws.
73. In N. Adithayan v Travancore Devaswom Board62, the Court held that no custom or usage
which is found to be pernicious and considered to be in derogation of the law of the land or
opposed to public policy or social decency can be accepted or upheld by courts in the
country.” This view was previously asserted by the Court in the case of In Dasaratha Rama
Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh.
74. Custom, usages and personal law have a significant impact on the civil status of individuals.
Those activities that are inherently connected with the civil status of individuals cannot be
granted constitutional immunity merely because they may have some associational features

58
Subramanian Chettiar v. Kumarappa Chettiar, AIR 1955 Mad 144. 79.
59
Hur Prasad v. Sheo Dayal (1876), 3 I.A. 259.
60
Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh, 1961 AIR 564.
61
United Provinces v Mst. Atiqa Begum, (1940) 2F CR 110.
62
Supra note 20.
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 MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONER

which have a religious nature. To immunize them from constitutional scrutiny is to deny the
primacy of the Constitution.
The Court held that a temple is a public place and everyone is allowed to go there. If men
can go there, women can also go there. Every woman is a creation of God and all persons
are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and
propagate religion. One’s right as a woman to pray is not dependent on any legislation. It is
a woman’s constitutional right."63
75. In the case of Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerala &Ors.64; it was held
custom or usage irrespective of even any proof of their existence in pre-constitutional days
cannot be countenanced as a source of law to claim any rights when it is found to violate
human rights, dignity, social equality and the specific mandate of the Constitution and law
made by Parliament. CJI Dipak Misra declared in the case that the custom or usage of
prohibiting women between the ages of 10 to 50 years from entering the Sabarimala temple
is violative of Article 25(1).
76. Thus, central to these values is the position of the individual. The fundamental freedoms
which Part III confers are central to the constitutional purpose of overseeing a
transformation of a society based on dignity, liberty and equality. Hence, morality for the
purposes of Articles 25 and 26 must mean that which is governed by fundamental
constitutional principles.

[4] THAT A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION CANNOT ASSERT A CLAIM OF RIGHT

TO MANAGE ITS OWN AFFAIRS IN THE MATTERS OF RELIGION AS IT IS
MANAGED BY A STATUTORY BOARD AND FINANCED UNDER ARTICLE 290-
A OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAHMASTHAN OUT OF CONSOLIDATED
FUND OF RAJPUTRA
77. No, religious institution cannot assert a claim of right to manage its own affairs in the
matters of religion as it is managed by a statutory board and financed under Article 290-A of

63
Supra note 34.
64
Supra at Note 34
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the constitution of Brahmsthan out of consolidated fund of Rajputra because Satpura

Kaliyugvardhan temple is not a separate religious denomination.
78. It is submitted that a religious denomination cannot completely exclude or prohibit any class
or section for all times. All that a religious denomination may do is to restrict the entry of a
particular class or section in certain rituals.65

[4.1] Meaning of religious denomination

79. The term “denomination” is not definite in the Constitution. In Oxford dictionary it means “a
collection of individuals classes together under the same name, religious sect or body having
a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name” (Quoted in
Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar66). Thus, a religious denomination means a
denomination which is based on some particular religion.
80. In Shirur Mutt Case 67 it was held by the court that the words 'religious denomination' in
Article 26 of the Constitution must take their colour from the word 'religion' and if this be
so, the expression 'religious denomination' must also satisfy three conditions:

• It must be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which

they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith
• a common organization.

• designation by a distinctive name

81. As the devotees of Satpura Kaliyugvardhan Temple do not have common religious tenets
peculiar to themselves, which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, other
than those which are common to the Hindu religion. Therefore, the devotees of Lord
Kaliyugvardhan are exclusively Hindus and a minor difference in rituals and ceremonies
does not make them a separate religious denomination.

65
Supra Note 51.
66
Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282.
67
The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri LakshmindraThrithaSwaminar of Sri Shirur
Mutt, [1954] SCR 1005.
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[4.1.1]Places of public worship will be open to all sections and classes of Hindus
82. Further Section 3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry)
Act, 1965, stipulate that-“Section 3: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
any other law for the time being in force or any customer usage or any instrument having
effect by virtue of any such law or any decree or order of court, every place of public
worship which is open to Hindus generally or to any section or class thereof shall be open to
all sections or class shall in any manner be prevented, obstructed or discouraged from
entering such place of public worship or from worshipping or offering prayers threat or
performing any religious service therein , in like manner and to the like extent as any other
Hindu of whatsoever section or class may so enter worship ,pray or perform.
Provided that in the case of place of public worship which is a temple founded for the
benefit of any religious denomination or section thereof the provision of this section shall be
subject to the right of that religious denomination or section as the case may be, to manage
its own affairs in matters of religion.
83. The opening words “Notwithstanding Anything” make it amply clear that the right to entry is
place of public worship is irrespective of any contrary law, custom, usage and the like.

The proviso attached to this section will further not be applicable to the Kaliyugvardhan
Temple devotees as they are not a religious denomination.

[4.2] Satpura Kaliyugvardhan temple is not a separate religious denomination-

84. Satpura Kaliyugvardhan Temple is not a separate religious denomination, for the religious
practices performed in the Temple at the time of Puja and other religious ceremonies are
akin to any other practice performed in any Hindu Temple.
85. “The Travancore Devaswom Board is a statutorily created authority under the “Travancore
– Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950”, and receives an annual payment from
the Consolidated Fund of Brahmasthan under Article 290 A. It would squarely fall within
the ambit of “other authorities” in Article 12, and is duty bound to give effect to the
Fundamental Rights.68

68
The Rules and Regulations and Legislations with respect to Maintenance and administration of temples, of State of
Rajputra are also in parimateria with State of Kerala. (Moot Proposition, Page 2)
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86. As the devotees of Satpura Kaliyugvardhan Temple do not have common religious tenets
peculiar to themselves, which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, other
than those which are common to the Hindu religion. Therefore, the devotees of Lord
Kaliyugvardhan are exclusively Hindus and a minor difference in rituals and ceremonies
does not make them a separate religious denomination.
87. Also, Hindus of all kinds, Muslims, Christians etc., all visit the temple as worshippers,
without, in any manner, ceasing to be Hindus, Christians or Muslims. Religion is not the
basis of the collective of individuals who worship the deity. Bereft of a religious identity, the
collective cannot claim to be regarded as a ‘religious denomination’. To be within the fold of
Article 26, a denomination must be a religious sect or body. Worship of the presiding deity
is not confined to adherents of a particular religion. Coupled with this is the absence of a
common spiritual organization, which is a necessary element to constitute a religious
denomination.
88. Thus, no claim can be asserted under the umbrella of right to manage its own affairs in the
matters of religion.
[4.3] Moreover, Article 26 is subject to Article 25(2)(b) –

89. Referring to the judgment of this Court in Devaru Case the petitioner submits that the right
to manage its own affairs conferred upon a religious denomination under Article 26(b) is
subject to be rights guaranteed to Hindu women under Article 25(2)(b). As per the
applicant/ intervenor, a harmonious construction of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution
reveals that neither Article 26 enables the State to make a law excluding any women from
the right to worship in any public temple nor does it protect any custom = that discriminates
against women and, thus, such exclusion amounts to destruction of the rights of women to
practice religion guaranteed under Article 2569.
90. Article 25(2)(b) is a right conferred on "all classes and sections of Hindus" to enter into a
public temple, and on the unqualified terms of that Article, that right must be available,
whether it is sought to be exercised against an individual under Article 25(1) or against a
denomination under Article 26(b). The fact is that though Article 25(1) deals with rights of

69
Supra at note 34
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individuals, Article 25(2) is much wider in its contents and has reference to the rights of
communities, and controls both Article 25(1) and Article 26(b).”70
91. The words religious institution of the public character in Article 25(2)(b) includes an
institution belonging to a religious denomination and such an institution can thus be thrown
open to all the sections of the Hindus under Article 25(2)(b).
[4.4] Rule 3b ultra vires of Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of
Entry) Act, 1965-
92. After referring to Sections 3 and 4 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship
(Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965 and Rule 3 (b) framed there under, the petitioners have
submitted that the expression ‘at any such time’ occurring in Rule 3(b) violates the
fundamental rights of women. Further, the petitioners have submitted that any other
interpretation of Rule 3(b) would render the said rule open to challenge as it would not only
be violative of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules,
1965 but also of Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution read with Articles 14 and 15.
[4.5] That constitutional morality must supersede the customary practices
93. The characteristics and elements of a valid custom are that it must be of immemorial
existence, reasonable and must pass the test of constitutional morality and constitutional
legitimacy. The term 'morality' occurring in Article 25(1) of the Constitution cannot be
viewed with a narrow lens so as to confine the sphere of definition of morality to what an
individual, a section or religious sect may perceive the term to mean. Public morality in
Article 25 has to be appositely understood as being synonymous with constitutional
morality.
94. Morality for the purposes of Articles 25 and 26 cannot have an ephemeral existence. Popular
notions about what is moral and what is not are transient and fleeting. The Constitution
would not render the existence of rights so precarious by subjecting them to passing fancies
or to the aberrations of a morality of popular opinion. The draftspersons of the Constitution
would not have meant that the content of morality should vary in accordance with the
popular fashions of the day.

70
Riju Prasad Sarma and Ors. v. State of Assam and Ors., (2015) 9 SCC 461.

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95. “Constitutional morality in its strictest sense of the term implies strict and complete
adherence to the constitutional principles as enshrined in various segments of the
document.”
96. That every practice or a custom has to pass the test of constitutional morality and
constitutional legitimacy as held in the cases of Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam and
others v. Government of Tamil Nadu71 and others and Seshammal vs State of T.N.72, It was
also observed that “The requirement of constitutional conformity is inbuilt and if a custom or
usage is outside the protective umbrella afforded and envisaged by Articles 25 and 26, the
law would certainly take its own course. The constitutional legitimacy, naturally, must
supersede all religious beliefs or practices.”
97. In Manoj Narula v. UOI73, the Court has reflected upon the predominant role that the
concept of constitutional morality plays in a democratic set-up and opined that Commitment
to the Constitution is a facet of constitutional morality.
98. Also, stereotypical understandings of sex hold no legitimate claim under our Constitution
was observed by Chandrachud J in Navtej Singh v Union of India.
[4.5.1] Object of preamble
99. The content of morality is founded on the four precepts which emerge from the Preamble:

99.1-The first among them is the need to ensure justice in its social, economic and political
dimensions.
99.2 -The second is the postulate of individual liberty in matters of thought, expression,
belief, faith and worship.
99.3-The third is equality of status and opportunity amongst all citizens.
99.4-The fourth is the sense of fraternity amongst all citizens which assures the dignity of
human life.

Added to these four precepts is the fundamental postulate of secularism which treats all religions
on an even platform and allows to each individual the fullest liberty to believe or not to believe.

71
Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam and others v. Government of Tamil Nadu,(2016) 2 SCC 725.
72
Seshammal vs State of T.N. (1972) 2 SCC 11
73
Manoj Narula v. UOI (2014) 9 SCC1
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PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the legal precedents and principles cited; and in light of the provisions
of the Constitution applied and arguments advanced; it is most humbly pleaded before the
Hon’ble Court that this Court adjudges and declare that:

• The petitioner 'The Brahmasthan Women's Rights Association' have the locus to file the
present writ petition.
• The said restriction imposed on the women and children of certain age amounts to
violation of their fundamental rights as enshrined in the constitution, specifically
violation of articles 14, 15(1) and 17.
• The practice of excluding such women does not constitute an "essential religious
practice" under article 25 and a religious institution cannot indulge in such practices
violating constitutional principles/ morality embedded in articles 14, 15(3), 39(a) and
51-A(e).
• A religious institution cannot assert a claim of right to manage its own affairs in the
matters of religion as it is managed by a statutory board and financed under article 290-A
of the constitution of Brahmasthan out of consolidated fund of Rajputra.

And pass any other order, direction, or relief that it may deem fit in the best interests of justice,
fairness, equity and good conscience.

ALL OF WHICH IS MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Sd-

(COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER )

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