Constitutional Law 1

(Assignment for July 16 & 19, 2019)

I.
a) Read: Sections 1-5, Article VIII (pages 946-1012, Bernas, 2009 ed.)

b) Selected Cases for Digest [due on July 19]:

1. Arroyo vs. People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016

FACTS: In July 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former Pres. GMA and others
with plunder. This was because in 2008, PGMA allowed the release of the CIF fund without a
budget and savings, in contravention of LOI 1282. After the prosecution presented their evidence,
the accused separately filed their demurrers to evidence. The demurrers to evidence of PGMA,
Aguas, and Valencia were denied. Hence, PGMA filed this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Considering Sec. 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, can the Supreme Court review on
certiorari the Sandiganbayan Order denying accused’s Demurrer to Evidence?

RULING: YES. The exercise of the power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot
be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side.
This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of
discretion whenever and wherever it is committed.

Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to
evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when
the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The Sandiganbayan as the trial court was
guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite
the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and
despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict.

2. Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

FACTS: Former CJ Sereno taught as a professor in the UP College of Law over a period spanning
20 years, and was paid monthly by UP. She was appointed as Assoc. Justice, and subsequently as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court by Pres. Aquino after being short listed by the JBC, and despite
her not being able to submit her SALNs for certain years. Atty. Mallari then requested the OSG to
initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno for failing to meet the "integrity" requirement
for the non-submission of all her SALNs.

ISSUE: Is the Supreme Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition violative of
the doctrine of separation of powers?

RULING: The Court's authority to issue a writ of quo warranto is complementary to, and not
violative of doctrine of separation of powers. The Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over quo
warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of
determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft & transmit the Articles of Impeachment,
nor will it preclude the Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of
impeachment. As such, the Court herein did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.

3. FASAP vs. PAL, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018

FACT: FASAP asserts that PAL’s Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22,
2008 was a prohibited pleading; and that the July 22, 2008 decision was not anymore subject to
reconsideration due to its having already attained finality.

ISSUE: May the Court entertain PAL’s second motion for reconsideration?

RULLING: Yes, Under the IRSC, a 2nd motion for reconsideration may be allowed upon a showing
by that the reconsideration of the previous ruling is necessary in the higher interest of justice.
There is higher interest of justice when the decision is not only legally erroneous, but is patently
unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable damage to the parties. In
 the case, the arguments of PAL sufficed to show that the assailed decision contravened settled
jurisprudence on PAL’s precarious financial condition. It cannot be gainsaid that there were other
businesses undergoing rehabilitation that would also be bound or negatively affected by the July
22, 2008 decision. This was the higher interest of justice that the Court sought to address, which
the dissent by Justice Leonen is adamant not to accept. Hence, we deemed it just and prudent to
allow PAL’s Second Motion for Reconsideration

4. Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018 (MR)

FACTS: SEE ITEM # 2

ISSUE: Does the Supreme Court have the authority to decide the quo warranto petition against
Sereno who is an impeachable official?

RULING: Yes. Art. VIII, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution provides for the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto. It does not limit the Court’s quo warranto jurisdiction
to exclude impeachable officials. In fact, the Constitution, in Art. XI, Sec. 2, clearly conveys that
Members of the Supreme Court MAY not only be removed from office by impeachment, but also
through other means provided by law. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto
proceeding involves a judicial determination of the right to the use or exercise of the office. Thus,
a quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to inquire into a public officer’s eligibility
or the validity of his appointment. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over petitions for quo
warranto does not encroach on the Congress’ power to impeach, since impeachment involves a
political process finding cause of action through a different set of grounds, which are clearly
defined by law (impeachable offenses).

5. PHAPI vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 234448, November 06, 2018

ISSUE: In challenging the constitutionality of the Anti-Hospital Deposit Law (R.A. No. 10932), did
the petitioners satisfy the threshold issues of actual controvery and locus standi?

RULLING: As a rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional question when (1) he can show
that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. In this case, while petitioner successfully
averred that it is a non- stock, non-profit organization, existing under the laws of the Philippines
and identified its members being the sole national organization of purely privately owned clinics,
hospitals or other health facilities in the Philippines, dedicated to the management and concerns
of private hospitals in the country, it failed to demonstrate that ample authority had been
extended to it by its members to file the instant petition.

6. GIOS-Samar vs. DOTC, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019

FACTS: The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and Civil Aviation
Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) posted an invitation to bid on airport projects, which were
bundled in two groups. GIOS-SAMAR alleges that the bundling of the projects were
unconstitutional because it will allows companies with questionable background to have direct
access to these projects. CAAP argues that GIOS-SAMAR violated the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts by directly filing their petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: What is the “common thread” for direct recourse to the Court under the Angara model?

RULING: The “common thread” or the common denominator of the cases that applied the
Angara model of direct recourse to the Court is that the threshold questions presented are ones
of law. In this case, the arguments of petitioner failed to sufficiently plead a cause of action. So
while the SC has original and concurrent jurisdiction over writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, direct recourse to the SC is proper only to seek
resolution of questions of law. Therefore, this case is dismissed.

7. Araulo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014

ISSUE: Will the doctrine of operative fact apply to the DAP projects, their proponents and
implementors?
 RULING: I QUALIFY. as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact can apply only
to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the
validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP,
unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining
their criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities.

8. Araulo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, Feb. 03, 2015 [MR]

ISSUE: Will the doctrine of operative fact apply to the DAP projects, their proponents and
implementors?

9. Mandanas vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, April 10, 2019 (MR)

ISSUE: With the declaration of the unconstitutionality of some portions of Section 284 of the
LGC, are the LGUs are entitled to recover the arrears in their just share or should the operative
fact doctrine apply?

RULLING: NO. The proposed nullification of the phrase "internal revenue" in Section 284 of RA
7160 would have served as the basis for the recovery of the LGUs' just share in the tariff and
customs duties collected by the BOC that were illegally withheld from 1991-2012. However in this
case, this entitlement to a share in the tariff collections would have been further compounded by
the LGU's alleged P500-billion share, more or less, in the VAT, Excise Tax, and DST collections of
the BOC. These arrears would be too cumbersome for the government to shoulder, which only
had a budget of P1.8 Trillion in 2012.46 Thus, while petitioners request that the LGU's can still
recover the arrears of the national, it is submitted that this is no longer feasible. This would prove
too much for the government's strained budget to meet, unless paid out on installment or in a
staggered basis.

10. Estipona vs. Judge Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, Aug. 15, 2017

ISSUE: Is Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining in drug cases, unconstitutional
for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme?

RULING: YES. Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-
equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court.

2 0 1 6 B A R Several concerned residents of the areas fronting Manila Bay, among them a group of
students who are minors, filed a suit against the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the Department of Health (DOH), the
Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Education (DepEd), the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG), and a number of other executive agencies, a sking the court to order them to
perform their duties relating to the cleanup, rehabilitation and protection of Manila Bay. The complaint
alleges that the continued neglect by defendants and their failure to prevent and abate pollution in Manila
Bay constitute a violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to life, health and a balanced ecology. In
its decision which attained finality, the Court ordered the defendants to clean up, rehabilitate and sanitize
Manila Bay within eighteen (18) months, and to submit to the Court periodic reports of their
accomplishment, so that the Court can monitor and oversee the activities undertaken by the agencies in
compliance with the Court's directives. Subsequently, a resolution was issued extending the time periods
within which the agencies should comply with the directives covered by the final decision. A view was
raised that the Court's continued intervention after the case has been decided violates the doctrine of
separation of powers considering that the government agencies all belong to the Executive Department
and are under the control of the President. Is this contention correct? Why or why not?

SUGGESTED ANSWER: The order of the Supreme Court to the defendants to clean up, rehabilitate and
sanitize Manila Bay is an exercise of judicial power, because the execution of its decision is an integral
part of its adjudicative function. Since the submission of periodic reports is needed to fully implement
the decision, the Supreme Court can issue writ of mandamus to the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority until full compliance with its order is shown. (Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 643 SCRA 90 [2011])

2 0 1 6 B A R A law is passed intended to protect women and children from all forms of violence. When
a woman perceives an act to be an act of violence or a threat of violence against her, she may apply for a
Barangay Protection Order (BPO) to be issued by the Barangay Chairman, which shall have the force and
effect of law. Conrado, against whom a BPO had been issued on petition of his wife, went to court to
challenge the constitutionality of the law. He raises the following ground: The grant of authority to the
Barangay Chairman to issue a Barangay Protection Order (BPO) constitutes an undue delegation of
judicial power, because obviously, the issuance of the BPO entails the exercise of judicial power. Rule on
the validity of the grounds raised by Conrado, with reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: The grant of authority to the Barangay Chairman to issue a Barangay Protection
Orders is a purely executive function pursuant to his duty to enforce all laws and ordinances and to
maintain public order. (Garcia v. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 [2013]).

2 0 1 6 B A R Under Sec. 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have the power to
"promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts xx x." Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of2002 provides that "any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable
penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining." Patricio, a user who was charged
with alleged sale of shabu but who wants to enter a plea of guilty to a charge of possession, questions the
constitutionality of Sec. 23 on the ground that Congress encroached on the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court under Sec. 5, Article VIII. He argues that plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and is
within the exclusive constitutional power of the Court. Is Patricio correct? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Patricio is not correct. Defining the penalty for criminal offense involves the
exercise of legislative power (People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 [1989]). When Section 23 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act prohibited plea-bargaining, Congress defined what should be the
penalty for the criminal offense. The power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure is
subject to the limitation that it should not modify substantive rights (Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution).
2017 BAR
According to Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the Constitution, the Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
What does the term fiscal autonomy signify? Explain your answer.

2 0 1 8 B A R Under Section 6 of Article V (on Criminal Jurisdiction) of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA), the custody of a United States (US) personnel who becomes subject to criminal prosecution before
a Philippine court shall be with the US military authorities, if the latter so requests. The custody shall
begin from the commission of the offense until the completion of all judicial proceedings. However, when
requested, the US military authorities shall make the US personnel available to Philippine authorities for
any investigative or judicial proceeding relating to the offense with which the person has been charged.
Inthe event that the Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the US shall be
relieved of any obligation under Section 6. The constitutionality of Section 6, Article V of the VFA is
challenged on the ground that it nullifies the exclusive power of the Supreme Court to adopt rules of
procedure for all courts in the Philippines.

2 0 1 8 B A R Are the rules promulgated pursuant to these provisions subject to review and disapproval
by the Supreme Court?
 Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that the Sandiganbayan may adopt internal rules
governing the allotment of cases among its divisions, the rotation of justices among them, and other
matters relating to the internal operations of the court.
 Section 6 of Article IX-A of the Constitution allows each of the Constitutional Commissions "en banc
[to] promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices.
Such rules however shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
 Section 16(3) of Article VI of the Constitution states that "Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings." Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution further provides that "The Senate or the
House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries... in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure."
 Finally, Section 3(8) of Article XI of the Constitution declares that "The Congress shall promulgate
its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purposes of this section."
II
a) Read: Sections 6-16, Article VIII (pages 1012-1034, Bernas, 2009 ed.)

b) Selected Cases for Digest [due on July 19]:

11. Agcaoili vs. Fariñas, G.R. No. 232395, July 03, 2018

ISSUE: Does the Court's administrative supervision over lower courts allow it to assume
jurisdiction over a petition pending before the lower courts?

RULLING:

12. Aguinaldo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, Nov. 29, 2016

ISSUE: Whether or not President Aquino violated the Constitution or committed grave abuse of
discretion in disregarding the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the six
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice?

RULING: NO. President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of
the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the
six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. President Aquino merely maintained the well-
established practice, consistent with the paramount presidential constitutional prerogative, to
appoint the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if
embodied in one JBC list. This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
which requires the President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by the
JBC for every vacancy.

All the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of nomination
by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9, supra. Hence, the appointments are valid and do not
suffer from any constitutional infirmity.

13. Aguinaldo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, Feb. 21, 2017 [MR]

ISSUE: Did the clustering of nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan by the JBC
impair the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary and to determine the seniority
of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices?

RULING: YES. The JBC invokes its independence, discretion and wisdom, and maintains that it
deemed it wiser and more in accord with Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution to cluster
the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into six
separate short lists. The independence and discretion of the JBC, however, is not without limits.
The Court cannot sustain the strained interpretation of Article VIII, Section 9, supra, espoused by
the JBC, which ultimately curtailed the President's appointing power.

The nominees' chance for appointment was restricted to the consideration of the one cluster in
which they were included, even though they applied and were found to be qualified for all the
vacancies. Moreover, by designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC established the
seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, a power which the
law, rules and jurisprudence vest exclusively upon the President.

Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

14. ISSUE: Does compliance with the constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN
intimately relates to a person's integrity?

RULLING: YES. Without submission of such requirement, the JBC and the public are without
opportunity to measure the candidate’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty.
Respondent’s failure to submit her SALNs to the JBC means that she was not able to prove her
integrity at the time of her application as Chief Justice.
15. ISSUE: Can Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity be cured by her nomination and
subsequent appointment as Chief Justice?

RULLING: No. The qualification of proven integrity goes into the barest standards set forth under
the Constitution to qualify as a Member of the Court, the subsequent nomination and
appointment to the position will not qualify an otherwise excluded candidate. In other words, the
inclusion of Respondent in the shortlist of nominees submitted to the President cannot override
the minimum Constitutional qualifications. Such as when the JBC mistakenly or wrongfully
accepted and nominated Respondent, the President, through his alter egos in the JBC, commits
the same mistake and the President’s subsequent act of appointing Respondent cannot have any
curative effect.

16. ISSUE: Can the qualifications under the Constitution be waived by the JBC?

RULLING:

17. Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018 (MR)

ISSUE: Is Sereno eligible to occupy the position of Chief Justice?

RULLING:

18. OCA vs. Judge Ruiz, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361, Feb. 2, 2016

ISSUE: Is respondent judge administratively liable for acts he is alleged to have committed while
he was still the mayor of Dapitan City?

RULLING:

19. Anonymous vs. Judge Buyucan, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1879, July 24, 2018

FACTS: Judge Buyucan denied knowledge of the DA's ownership of the Subject Property and
instead claimed that the land he was occupying was within the road-right-of-way (RR W) of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) beside the Nueva Vizcaya-Isabela National
Road. Respondent Judge Buyucan also claimed that the alleged two (2)-storey house actually
belonged to his nephew and that what he constructed were merely a "temporary Ifugao native
house" and an adjacent shanty. He further stated that he is, in any case, ready to vacate the area
if and when the DPWH needs it.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Buyucan is guilty of gross misconduct?

RULING: Yes. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence,
or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. Pertinently, as with factual findings of trial courts, credence should be accorded to
the findings of the investigating judge who had the opportunity to hear witnesses and observe
their demeanor. In this case, the liability of respondent Judge Buyucan hinges on whether he is in
fact illegally occupying a portion of the Subject Property. The Court finds in the affirmative. The
Court takes note of the undisputed fact that respondent Judge Buyucan is occupying public land.
Thus, while respondent Judge Buyucan denies the DA's ownership, he nevertheless admitted on
record he is encroaching on what he claims to be the RR W of the DPWH beside the Nueva
Vizcaya-Isabela National Road.

20. FASAP vs. PAL, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018

FACTS: FASAP stresses that the October 4, 2011 resolution recalling the September 7, 2011 decision
was void for failure to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; that the
participation of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona who later on inhibited from G.R. No. 178083 had
further voided the proceedings; that the 1987 Constitution did not require that a case should be
raffled to the Members of the Division who had previously decided it; and that there was no error
in raffling the case to Justice Brion, or, even granting that there was error, such error was merely
procedural.
 ISSUE: Is the resolution dated October 4, 2011 in A.M. No. 11-10-1SC (recalling the September 7,
2011 resolution) void for failure to comply with Section 14, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution?

RULING: NO. Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.. The Court sees no justification
for the urging of FASAP that the participation of the late Chief Justice Corona voided the recall
order. The urging derives from FASAP’s failure to distinguish the role of the Chief Justice as the
Presiding Officer of the Banc. The Chief Justice acted only on the recommendation of the ruling
Division, since he had inhibited himself from participation in the case long before. The confusion
on this matter could have been brought about by the Chief Justice's role as the Presiding Officer
ofthe Court en banc (particularly in its meeting of October 4, 2011), and the fact that the four most
senior Justices of the Court (namely, Justices Corona, Carpio, Velasco and Leonardo-De Castro)
inhibited from participating in the case. In the absence of any clear personal malicious
participation, it is neither correct nor proper to hold the Chief Justice personally accountable for
the collegial ruling of the Court en banc.

21. Highpoint Dev. Corp. vs. Republic, G.R. No. 224389, November 07, 2018

ISSUE: Whether or not the pro hac vice ruling in Republic of the Philippines vs. Vega, et al. can
be applied in favor of petitioner.

RULLING:

2 0 1 8 B A R State whether or not the following acts are constitutional:

 A law prescribing as qualifications for appointment to any court lower than the Supreme Court,
Philippine citizenship, whether natural-born or naturalized, 35 years of age on the date of
appointment, and at least eight years as a member of the Philippine Bar?