The Aristotelian Society, Oxford University Press Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes

Symposium: The Relations between Biology and Psychology
Author(s): J. S. Haldane, E. S. Russell and Leslie Mackenzie

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 3,
Relativity, Logic, and Mysticism (1923), pp. 56-94
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Aristotelian Society
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4106457
Accessed: 15-11-2019 13:38 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Aristotelian Society, Oxford University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary Volumes
This content downloaded from 103.255.5.92 on Fri, 15 Nov 2019 13:38:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
56
IV.-SYMPOSIUM: THE RELATIONS BETWEEN

BIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY.
By J. S. HALDANE, E. S. RUSSELL, AND LESLIE IMACKENZ
I.-By J. S. HALDANE.
I AM well aware that in attempting to discuss the rela

between biology and psychology I am dealing with two bra
of knowledge both of which are as yet very ill-defined in
minds of most of us. Almost the only point of real agree
is on the immense practical importance of both subjects. T
main object of this paper is to attempt to define more clearly
nature of psychological and biological phenomena. If w
reach clearness of definition the problem of the relations of bi
to psychology becomes simple.
I shall begin with psychology, as psychological phenom
are evidently more elementary than biological or phy
phenomena. Whatever else it may be, the world of our ex
ence is a perceived world. It is what we perceive; and w
know nothing about it except what is revealed in the psyc
gical process of perception. If, neglecting the reasonin
Berkeley and Hume, we base our treatment of psychology o
assumption that though the physical world is a perceived w
the fact that it is perceived has no bearing on its na
we are simply beating the air. We cannot, therefore, start
the unfounded supposition that there is an independent t
called a mind, associated with another independent thing
a body. We must start from the analysis of psycholo
phenomena themselves.
What, now, are the characters of psychological phenom
Berkeley and Hume assumed that they are a flow of separa
separable sensations, impressions, or ideas: the latter b
RELATIONS BETWEEN BIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 57
fainter species of sensations which occur when previous sensations

are remembered or imagined. On this assumption Hume built
up a representation of psychological phenomena. Kant pointed
out, however, that sensations cannot be regarded as isolable from
one another. Their very existence involves relation to one
another. A sensation or psychological experience, for instance,
exists as something distinguished from past or anticipated sen-
sations. This implies reference to past and anticipated sensations.
That is to say, past and anticipated sensations are also present in
any sensation. Remembering and anticipating are of its essence.
The sensation also exists here, and a sensation which is here
implies the co-presence of what is there. Not even the vaguest
of sensations, such as those of hunger or thirst, are without
localization.
In the sensation there is also the recognition of similarity with

or difference from both previously and simultaneously existing
sensations. They have therefore specific quality, and a system of
qualities exclusive of or identical with other qualities is thus
implied. There is also in the sensation the recognition of influence
upon ourselves or our bodies, or corresponding influence of our-
selves on other bodies. In other words we recognize sensations
definitely as impressions produced by or upon enduring things.
Our psychological experience is thus of a system of things
arranged temporally and spatially, possessing qualities or
properties, and acting on one another. From his analysis or
perception Kant drew the fundamental conclusion that the
ordinary physical conception of the world is already potentially
implied in sensation; and that to attempt to derive this con-
ception from assumed separate sensations is only to deceive
ourselves, since the separate sensations are purely imaginary, and
would not, if they existed, render such derivation possible.
The system of perception thus described in outline is Kant's
phenomenal or psychological world. Our own bodies, along with
58 J. S. HALDANE.
other things, are part of this wor

is simply the physical world lo
theory of relativity. Nothing in
only in its relation to the other
In this sense, but only in this sen
a unity; and the only order pres
exist in a purely physical worl
of things in this world may be
tributed temporally and spatial
physical laws.
For Kant the world of perce
or artificial world. He believed
are due to the action of our mi
impressions on it of a real or n
things. We order these impress
and by means of various genera
the perceived world appears to
in time and space. With Kant's
is unnecessary to deal here. Wha
of psychological phenomena as a
for the moment of whether th
or of the fact that, as was point
no meaning in this distinction.
There are further character
experience which Kant did not
importance. To him as to Locke,
to be prinmrily such a world as
to us. I wish to maintain, as em
in spite of the immense stride f
taken, and that his successors u
greater or less extent shared his
When we perceive things what w
and similarly our reactions to p
interest. This is just an aspect of psychological reality, though

an aspect which, as it seems to me, Kant completely missed in
his analysis of the phenomena of perception. If, moreover, we
assume with Kant that what is revealed to us in perception has
the appearance of what we call the physical world, we must also
admit that this world is coloured in the very peculiar manner
recognized by Locke when he distinguished between the primary
and secondary qualities of things. The things we perceive have
qualities of smell, taste, colour, warmth or coldness, unpleasant-
ness, etc. It is evident that these qualities do not belong to the
physical interpretation of perception. Nevertheless both
" secondary qualities " and " interests " form a part of psychologi-
cal experience, and if we neglect them we are only dealing with
truncated or abstract psychological experience-in other words,
with artificial or fictitious psychology.
As will be shown later, the study of the typical " secondary"
qualities can be included in physiology. What I wish to discuss
now is psychological interest and its implications. The world of
psychological experience is a world of interests. What does this
imply ? It evidently implies that the particular relations involved
in psychological experiences are not a matter of chance or indiffer-
ence. The experiences of hunger or thirst involve a tendency
to eat or drink. The sight of an approaching body involves a
tendency to avoid or repel it. In general the sequence, distribu-
tion, and qualities of psychological experiences tend to be of such
a nature that what we recognize as our interests are maintained :
the fact of interest is expressed in this maintenance, and what is
perceived has " value " in proportion as it embodies interest.
If we put the matter differently, and say that we re-act in such
a manner to physical stimuli that our interests are maintained,
we go beyond the psychological evidence. We are, as it were,
attempting to jump out of our own skins. Psychological experi-
ence does not directly reveal to us a physical world such as is
60 J. S. HALDANE.
described by physical science, bu

through interests. The world of
from that of psychological expe
from such a physical world is a
part of the nature of psychologi
itself in the maintenance of in
fact must be recognized in t
experience.
Interest is not something merely immediate. What is
coming is foreseen and provided for, and what is past is remem-
bered and acted upon. Both the past and the future are thus not
only present in any psychological experience, but they are
present in a form ordered by interest and expressing value. The
world of psychological experience as pictured by Kant is a chaotic
world in detail; in it anything may be anywhere. The world of
actual psychological experience is no chaotic world, but a world
of interests and values realized or in process of realization-a
world of order, however imperfect this order may be. We can
disregard or abstract from the order, and when we do so we have
a chaotic world similar to that which Kant pictured, or to what
the physical sciences ordinarily picture to us, with the principle
of relativity thrown in. But this chaotic world is not what
psychological analysis reveals.
The world as pictured in physical science is a world of things
existing quite apart from our interests, while the psychological
world is a world of interests and values. Although the same
things appear in both of them, these two worlds are very different.
In the physical world there is an apparent endless variety of things,
and corresponding multiplicity of action. In this variety of
things and their actions we can trace the identity of the things,
and of the energy manifested in their action, but we can say
nothing as to why particular things should be present and
associated with particular properties or kinds and amounts of
energy. Events have no values attached to them. In

psychological world of interests and values on the other han
the things and actions are connected together so as to form
persistent organic whole in which each part and action imp
other parts and actions, and so belongs to the whole. T
things and actions we perceive are of significance or value in
interest, as also are our reactions to them. Throughout
perceptions and actions our interests are present. We do
perceive or act upon what is of no interest or value to us. It
world of both spatial and temporal unity, order, and value t
psychological analysis reveals to us, and this is just what we m
when we say that it is personality and not mere physical existen
that is revealed by psychological analysis.
If we start from the assumption that the world of our experi
ence is a physical world, it then appears as if in the proces
perception we were deliberately seeking out, and re-acting
only certain aspects of reality; as if, moreover, we were als
colouring these aspects by the subjective addition of what Lo
called secondary qualities. An ego within us seems to be twis
and adding to physical reality, so that the picture presented
our perceptions and actions has no longer the appearance of
physical world. We may put this down to the action of a so
or mind within us, or to the complexities of structure acqui
by living organisms in the long course of evolution. In eith
case, however, we are confronted by the reasoning of Berk
and Hume. We cannot start our analysis of reality by assum
the existence of a physical world, since, as they pointed out,
assumption contradicts itself. The appearance of a mere phy
world can only be a derivative of perception. The only cour
is to follow in Kant's path and analyse what is implied in per
tion. But when we do this we find that perception implies n
mere physical world, but a world of interests and secon
qualities. The world as a physicist regards it can therefore o
62 J. S. HALDANE.
be derived secondarily from thi

Round this conclusion my main
Let us now consider more cl
interests which psychological an
distinguish between our purely
which we have in common with
common may be those of family,
business, an army, or a state ; or t
humanity; or they may be the s
the conceptions of art, truth, a
purely individual interests may
The perceptions and actions of
tematic unity which, in so fa
interests, expresses his own int
individual interests is attended t
to these perceptions are in our
perceptions and responses are so
bodily integrity, activity, and r
be maintained. Our perceptions
such that the food, drink, air-su
stimuli and exercise which are needed for maintenance in a
" normals" or perfectly healthy state are constantly provided.

Future needs are foreseen and provided for in the light of past
experience.
The perceptions of a mere individual, if we imagined such a
being, might be compared to those which we often attribute to
an animal, though in reality they would be on a lower plane.
Only what affected individual interest would be perceived or
acted upon. The rest of what we ordinarily perceive would
be a mere blank, or totally unheeded. Nevertheless such psycho-
logical experience would constitute abiding unity or personality,
each element in which would be definitely related to the other
elements in order of relative time, position, quality, quantity and
activity. In virtue of activity suitably directed in relation to

time, direction, and amount there would be unity; and
in virtue of the power of prediction implied in perception of
bodily parts and other things as possessing definite and abiding
properties there would be unity of present, past and future.
The interests of such a person would consist in the maintenance
of his body and its environment in their normal relations.
But such a person is a mere figment of imagination. Neither
human interests, nor, as far as we can judge, the interests of
even the most lowly of animals, are confined to individual
requirements. Psychological analysis shows us at once that our
interests are not merely those centred in our individual
requirements. It is a wider world of order, however imperfect,
in which we find ourselves; and our interests are bound up
in that order in so far as we realize it. Our mere individual
interests are subordinated to, though still present in, the wider
interests which embrace them. These wider interests appear
in us under various forms. The form may be interest in
family, or race, or mankind, and may manifest itself, perhaps,
in extreme forms of individual self-sacrifice ; or the form may be
loyalty to some organization such as an existing Church or State.
It may also be interest in the order of Nature as manifested in
what we call beauty.
Psychological experience cannot be described with any
adequacy as the experience of a mere individual person. In the
experience of a duty to fellow men, or a beautiful object, we
identify ourselves with wider interests than that which con-
stitutes our psychological existence as mere individuals. To
attempt to represent the experience of a duty, or of what is
beautiful, as the mere experience of an individual is to attempt
the impossible, and only produces confusion. The experience
is certainly my experience, but the ego to which the experience
belongs is no mere individual ego. This is so because the interest
64 J. S. HALDANE.
which is constitutive of the exper

individual.
We are accustomed to regard

and to approach psychology from
Let us try to trace this mode o
the standpoint of ordinary phy
Newton, a human or animal bod
among other bodies surroundin
common assumption that this p
to reality, it follows that hum
" endowed " with consciousness
an individual mind. All percep
be located in individual bodies,
individuals as such. If we carr
investigation further we seem
volition in the brain, as Descart
beauty must be located there, al
experiences. They are just the exp
But we can press the same lin
When we examine the brain by
it is composed of aggregates
of the brain are thus a sum of
The cells themselves are also ag
the living body are constantly a
or physically, so that we are led
brain as a sum of the activities of countless molecules-in other
words as a sum of what are called bio-chemical processes. We

are thus landed in a region of indefinite complexity and profound
obscurity. The conception of a single person seems to have lost
its meaning. What confronts us is the aggregate of an indefinite
number of individuals.
It was just because this method of reasoning leads nowhere

that I was careful at the outset of this paper to point out that
psychology can only be approached by means of psychologica

analysis. We cannot go back to the reasoning of Descarte
neglecting Hume and Kant. But this is just what we are e
deavouring to do when we apply the conceptions of ordinary
physics to the elucidation of psychological phenomena. We do
so in all innocence, just as in ordinary life we regard the ear
as flat or the sun and stars as revolving round it, thus disregardin
Copernicus as completely as we disregard Hume and Kant whe
we apply physical hypotheses in psychology. It was analys
of the observed facts that led Copernicus and Newton to thei
revolutionary theories and that has led Einstein to his still mo
revolutionary theory of time, space, and the physical world.
was also analysis of the observed facts relating to perception
that led Hume and Kant to their conclusions as to the nature
of those physical objects which to the average man seem so

real and self-existent. We can no more base psychology on
ordinary physical ideas than we can base astronomy on the pre-
Copernican and pre-Newtonian ideas of an uneducated person.
Although I am a physiologist I cannot for a moment agree
with the assumptions on which what is called physiological
psychology is ordinarily based. These assumptions appear to
me as a mixture of very rudimentary physiology with psychology
which has been obsolete since Hume and Kant. It is doubtless
the case that a very wide public is still ready to accept the assump-
tions in question; but a still wider public would accept the
assumption that the sun goes round the earth.
The conclusion of this argument is that only through psycho-
logical analysis can we draw conclusions as to the nature of
personality, and that this analysis shows us that it is impossible
to express the facts of our conscious experience in terms of our
mere individual personalities. In identifying ourselves with far
wider interests than those of our individual personalities we at
the same time transcend the latter. I shall not attempt to
F
66 J. S. HALDANE.
develop here the relations of this

as I must now turn to biology
Here I am in a difficulty as
disagreement as to what disting
sciences. For what may be cal
biologists biology represents no
of physical and chemical analysi
school maintains that though ps
mysterious thing called consc
biology, which deals with what
nothing but applied physics a
regards this attitude as insuffi
bring psychological conceptions
as a physiologist may perhaps b
mediate one. In any case it se
relations of psychology to ph
attempt this task, and from th
with regard to psychology.
The scientific conception of
tively modern. In early times t
spiritual powers, friendly or hos
tion, whereas now we commonl
bodies of living creatures as com
to us. How has this change from
interpretation come about ? The
it is only necessary to look stead
world just as ordinary physi
ancestors had at least as good po
they saw something different.
was different.
It seems to me that the clue t

scientific conceptions of our world
of the different interests realiz
values. To a mere individual regarded as such the value

anything outside his own body and more immediate belongi
is fleeting. The value of food or drink, for instance, depend
on whether he happens to be hungry or thirsty, or is likel
become short of food or drink. From the wider standpoint of
interests of a community food and drink have, however, a
more definite and lasting value. It is the same with the valu
of land and of various other commodities. They thus posses
market value, and it becomes a matter of importance to mea
this value correctly with a view to their proper managemen
allotment or production in the common interest. In their or
the units of measurement are convenient units of value based on
communal interest and in complete abstraction from mere

individual interests. The balance was originally a tool of justice
or fairness and not of physical science. By a still wider process
of abstraction from even mere communal interests man reached
the conceptions of weight, mass, length, extension, movement,

etc., as possessing their modern meaning. In reality that mean-
ing still depends on our interests. The world of physics, if con-
ceived as a world independent of our interests, is only a world
of abstractions, and the applications of the principle of relativity
in physics are awakening us to this fact. We are witnessing the
dissolution of the real physical world of Galileo, Newton, and
the Nineteenth Century. The physical world as still ordinarily
conceived is nothing but an extremely useful abstraction. Its
usefulness will continue and develop in all directions, but it
can never form the basis of psychology, since its own basis is
psychological.
The utility of the physical conception of the world depends
on the fact that we can make use of abstract knowledge in cases
where more complete psychological apprehension is absent.
For many practical purposes there is equivalence between a ton
of coal, a ton of gold and a ton of human beings. It may also be
F2
68 J. S. HALDANE.
a matter of indifference whether

of human beings that is a mile
only need to think of their mass,
away. The faculty of abstracti
or scientific knowledge, and by
knowledge our practical capaci
If, however, we mistake the abs
matical or other science for rea
error.
Scientific knowledge is "objective." What is implied

this description is not that it represents a reality independ
our perception of it (since such reality could never be kn
but that it is communicable to others, and not the privat
ception of a mere individual. In identifying our interests
those of others we transcend our mere individual persona
and are thus in direct communication with others. Scientific
knowledge implies the realization of a common interest. Scientific

conclusions and the modes of representing scientific observation
alter from generation to generation. It is for instance somewhat
difficult for us to realize what Priestley and Cavendish meant by
"phlogisticated air," or what the chemists of a previous generation
meant by " sulphur." But for each generation and community
scientific description expresses a common interpretation which
for the time is " objective," and which is born of common interest.
We can with great practical success apply the abstractions of
ordinary physics and chemistry to the prediction of phenomena
outside the bodies of living organisms. But when we come to
deal with living organisms themselves we encounter the most
formidable obstacles. In the popular accounts which pass
current as representations of biological knowledge these obstacles
are commonly slurred over almost entirely. I must therefore
endeavour to describe them shortly. In a living organism the
response to any stimulus, whether we interpret the stimulus as a
physical or a chemical one, is found to be dependent immediately

on a vast and indefinite number of other conditions. When the
organism is perfectly "normal " these conditions are practically

constant, so that the same response may follow the same stimulus
time after time, just as a tuning-fork responds time after time in
the same way when disturbed in the same way. But an appar-
ently quite trivial physical or chemical disturbance in the organism
may completely alter the response, or entirely prevent it. In
this respect the organism is quite different from the tuning-fork.
On the other hand the organism always tends to maintain or
return to the normal conditions. It maintains or reproduces,
not only its evident structure, but the minutest details of composi-
tion, activity, and relations to environment. How delicate this
maintenance is we are realizing with greater and greater fullness
every year as the delicacy of our methods of investigation
increases. The progress in this direction during the last few years
has been extraordinary.
We are familiar with physical and chemical systems which are
just as sensitive to disturbance as the bodies of living organisms;
but apart from living organisms, we know of no such systems
which possess the characteristic of constantly tending to come back
to a " normal" of structure, activity, and relations to environ-
ment, and to reproduce this normal in spite of disturbances.
I think the nearest approach to such a system is the atom as
conceived by Bohr in the light of the Quantum and General
Relativity theories. The Bohr atom conserves its structure and
energy, but is not yet conceived as capable of reproducing itself.
It is because of the fundamental character which living
organisms possess of maintaining and reproducing their structure,
activities, and relation to environment, that I am quite unable
to accept the mechanistic conception of living organisms as
outlined by Descartes, and generally accepted by the last genera-
tion of biologists. The life of an organism can only be interpreted
70 J. S. HALDANE.
or described as the behaviour of

as we analyse the working of a ma
behaviours of the parts. The c
machine is far more useful than
but seems to me quite insufficient
cient because it gives us a quite
In practical medicine this insuff
than once pointed out elsewhere.
With the conception of life as
what may be called teleology into
structure and activity in the lif
as being determined in referenc
may seem to be contradicted by
since an organism seems to be ex
chance actions on it from outsi
the apparently chance presence
chance sensory stimuli of all
closely, as a physiologist has to
and air are regulated physiologic
their abundance are of relatively s
Moreover, they are stored withi
used so as to steady their suppl
utilized. Similarly the physiolog
regulated physiologically. Thus
ance of brightness in any object de
the physical sense, but on the g
field. An object of which the
constant may be made to appear
but of dazzling brightness in
moreover, all external light stim
off, the visual field remains still i
drink are cut off the supply of
maintained from the stores within
The physiological response to colour stimuli is regulated in

exactly the same way. It is only in general daylight that th
colours seen in objects depend on the wave-lengths of the light
rays proceeding from the objects. With a different kind of illu
mination the colours are all altered; and even with daylight the
depend to a very appreciable extent on the quality of the daylight,
as appears at once when accurate colorimetric measurements ar
made. The same illuminated surfaces, illuminated in exactl
the same way in the physical sense, can be made to appear whit
or black, or blue or green, or red or yellow, according to the
surrounding illumination. Stimulation is thus regulated physio-
logically. When one inquires further into the nature of th
regulation one finds that as regards brightness and colour, whit
being regarded as a balanced mixture of colours, the field o
vision as a whole tends to remain steady, just as the compositio
of the blood plasma tends to remain steady. Into the physiolog
of the senses biological teleology enters at every point an
renders the changes in secondary qualities intelligible. We also
meet with this teleology everywhere else in physiology an
anatomy, while in practical medicine and surgery teleological
conceptions seem to me absolutely essential. If we elimina
them we reduce most of biology and medicine to an unintelligib
chaos.
Not only the teleology of individual lives, but that of communi-

ties of organisms, enters into biology. Many biological
phenomena, including that of death of the individual, would be
quite unintelligible otherwise. For biology the teleology of life
is immanent in the universe. The idea that life might originate
from mechanical conditions in which no life was present has no
meaning from the standpoint of this immanent teleology.
These conclusions are, I am quite well aware, not in accord-
ance with much of the popular science of the present day. But
they are the result of close biological study, and I have no doubt
72 J. S. HALDANE.
that in course of time they w

science.
When one looks more closely into the form of teleology re-
quired in the interpretation of ordinary biological observations
it appears that in what we interpret as mere life, apart from
consciousness, past or anticipated events are not directly involved
in the phenomenon observed. The present of what is conceived
as a mere organism depends, of course, on its past, and its future
depends on its present; but it lives a life of immediacy into
which the past and future do not enter directly, whereas in
conscious experience, looking back and looking forward are
always directly involved, as already pointed out in connexion
with Kant's conclusions. This is what, as it seems to me, dis-
tinguishes biology from psychology. What I wish to maintain is
that for the purposes of scientific biology organisms are not
regarded as conscious, and need not be so regarded. In this
respect I differ from the animistic school of biologists, though
agreeing with their rejection of a mechanistic basis for biology.
I can now come back to the immediate subject of this dis-
cussion and the bearing upon it of what I have been discussing.
At the outset of this paper I pointed out that the perceived world
of our experience can only be a psychological world, and that
it is characteristic of such a world to be a world of interest and
values-in other words a world of personality. On the other

hand it is certainly not a world of mere individual personality.
Psychological analysis reveals to us no such world. I then
pointed out that we reach the scientific conception of a physical
world by a process of abstraction from the individual element
in psychological apprehension, and that by the help of this
process of abstraction we are enabled to extend enormously our
powers of prediction where fuller apprehension is lacking. The
physical world remains, nevertheless, a world of abstractions;
and if we endeavour to apply ordinary physical conceptions to
the phenomena of life the unreality of these abstractions becomes

so evident that they are of very limited practical service. In-
connexion with the phenomena of life we have therefore to mak
use of a more limited abstraction, the conception of life as a
teleological unity manifesting itself spatially, but not also as
regards time. The conception of life represents something
intermediate between the physical and a fuller psychologica
conception of experience, and has the same use as the physical
conception in helping us to predict. It helps us, for instance,
in prediction about Locke's secondary qualities and about in-
numerable biological phenomena; and it furnishes a scientific
basis for practical medicine.
Nevertheless biology is, like physics, an abstract science. It
deals with abstractions from psychological reality, and on this
depends its practical utility, just as in the case of physics. We
can no more base psychology on biology than on physics, since
biological conceptions, like physical conceptions, are only ab-
stractions from full psychological experience. Physiologica
psychology, it seems to me, is just physiology. In observing
our own sensations and emotions from the standpoint of physio-
logical psychology we simply treat them as we might treat any
other form of physiological response to stimuli. We can treat
them from the mere physical standpoint, in which case it is a
very rudimentary form of interpretation that we reach. In othe
words our physiology is very rudimentary. On account of the
complexity of the physiology of the nervous system our inter-
pretation of it is certainly still very rudimentary on the whole
as compared with what we know of other sides of physiology;
but more adequate physiological interpretation of the physiology
of the nervous system is now advancing rapidly. The old purely
anatomical and mechanistic ideas of nervous physiology are
disappearing.
Psychology itself rests on analysis of psychological experience
74 J. S. HALDANE.
as such. This analysis shows us

aggregate of atoms, no mere
also that he is no mere individu
most recesses of his being a me
has been brought up. It also, as
the presence of that supreme p
of religion, God.
But is it not evident, it may be
upon the brain, not to mention
thyroid gland ? A person, for i
gland becomes an idiot unless
stantly ; and the dependence of
in a thousand other ways. This
tude, but is quite misleading. O
cally, or even biologically, are onl
reality. We can regard a man ab
physical sense, or as a mere liv
mediate practical purposes of
in particular is most useful. B
sonality depends on his body am
depends on an abstraction fro
meaning. A man's body or or
regarded abstractly or partia
and mortal personality is his p
For many practical purposes it
as a mere physical body, or as a
must not confuse this abstract po
logy. So-called physiological
not psychology at all, but phys
itself and is for the greater par
My conclusion is that the rela
is the relation of a less abstract
a more abstract form. It also
though in some respects the least palpable, is by far the most

important form of knowledge, and that instruction in it is of
overwhelming importance in education. Why, then, one might
innocently ask, is it not taught in schools, or even to teachers,
except perhaps as so-called physiological psychology ? The
answer is that good schools and good teachers teach it everywhere
and at all times, and teach it, moreover, practically, and par-
ticularly by example. The really good school or university i
that which teaches practical psychology well, and the teacher
who cannot teach practical psychology, whatever else he may
be trying to teach, has missed his vocation. Psychology, as it
seems to me, deals, not with scientific abstractions, but with th
living and concrete personality which is reality, and which is
no mere individual personality.
I have tried, in this contribution to our discussion, to dis-
tinguish psychology from a good deal that has been mistaken
for it, and so to indicate its true position in relation to biology
and other branches of knowledge. In conclusion I should lik
to repeat my conviction that if, neglecting Hume and Kant, we
start from the assumption of a real physical world of self
existent things, we can get into nothing but hopeless confusion
over the relations of psychology to biology and physics.
76 E. S. RUSSELL.
II.-By E. S. RUSSEL
PSYCHOLOGY and physiology ar
of comprehending and rationa
manifestations in the life of
direct touch with this activit
perience of living, and it wou
fully by intellectual process t
ing of life as experienced. Lif
much more fundamental than
vital activity among many
biological science must be to a
possible by suitable concepts
its manifestations. The kno
remain to some extent abstra
activities studied, but the aim
possible, to make our theorie
of all the phenomena of vita
With Dr. Haldane's main con
ordinary sense of the word g
picture of vital activity, I am
point it constitutes a valid an
can study with profit many of
body considered as purely
particularly of the processes
cell or in its vacuoles and its c
of the living organs or cells
interpreted, in terms of ph
of these actions can be reprod
thing, as for instance, the ac
But physiology considered strictly as the physics and

chemistry of the living body either leaves out altogether, or
offers an entirely abstract and unsatisfactory explanation of, th
characteristic activities of living tissue-its power of regulatin
structure and activity to maintain normality, its power of
responding, or doing its best to respond, to unusual conditions, its
power of reproducing, true to pattern, its own structure and
functions. Taking the physiological problem even in its simples
form, that of the working of the animal body in its fully formed
and matured state, when an equilibrium of interaction has been
established both with the external environment and with the
milieu interne, the physiologist is unable, so long as he remains

strictly within the physico-chemical conception of life, to include
in his scheme of explanation all the phenomena manifested.
Regulation, flexibility of response, maintenance of form and
characteristic function, are all outside the scope of his explanatory
principles. He can account for these, in theory, only by assuming
(without any real warrant) that the structure of the living unit is
so complex and so nicely adjusted that it responds automatically
to all or to most stimuli, in such a way as to restore and maintain
its typical action. So far from being simple and direct in applica-
tion, bio-physics and bio-chemistry must invent complexities to
account for the phenomena observed. I need not labour this
point, which has been made with so much more force and authority
by Dr. Haldane on many occasions.
When we consider not the organism in the plenitude of its
powers, when it has, so to speak, settled down in harmonious
interaction with its environment, but the organism in formation
in development, the difficulties of the physical view increase
immensely. No physico-chemical theory of heredity and
development has thrown light upon anything but the incidental
aspects of these mysterious processes. The developing embryo
acts as if it were fulfilling an end or purpose, that of arriving at
78 E. S. RUSSELL.
the typical form and activity

this end in spite of difficulties-
method of reaching it--and it
achieving its end; in the cours
or less closely the ancestral pat
modifications to meet the needs
ment. Environment supplies

provides the means and also a
useless to seek in environment
development. The true cause
may be conceived, must lie in
egg or embryo. How can ph
characteristic features of de
chemical theory is forced to hav
unimaginably complex and
This mechanism constitutes the
miniature to the fully formed
development of each individual,
the structure of some definite
is accounted for by assuming th
down unchanged from one ge
lessly complicated and theore
from experience or observation
ceptions at the base of phys
fares at the hands of acute and
read in the works of Driesch.
We may draw the conclusi

physiological method that it i
an abstract and limited meth
superficial aspects of life and
physical complexity when it a
with the fundamental problem
lessly when applied to the beh
require no elaboration. Here the only adequate method is the

psychological. Under this heading I would not include physi
ological psychology, which with Dr. Haldane I regard as a bran
of physiology.
The psychological conception of human activity appears t
me to be something entirely different from the physical co
ception. It occupies a totally different standpoint. The po
of reference is one's own experience as lived. This is the stand
or model upon which we reconstruct the physical life an
activities of our fellow men. We conceive them as active and
percipient individuals, enduring in time, profiting by experience

and looking towards the future, acting with reference to a per-
ceived world of their own, in consonance with the instincts,
feelings, purposes within them, whether these be purely indi-
vidual or social or derive from some deeper urge. I am not
philosopher enough to know whether this psychological con-
ception of life is, or can be treated as, synonymous with the
monadistic conception, but I find it helpful to consider human
beings and animals as monads, each a centre of perception and
action, each mirroring in its own way that aspect of the universe
which has meaning and significance in relation to its fundamental
conative or hormic tendencies.
That the psychological method is the only one adequate to

the study of human behaviour is the second point on which I am
in agreement with Dr. Haldane, nor have I any criticism to
offer on his further point that personality is something more
than life, in the sense that man has a far richer life than a
dog or a cat, and that personality cannot be exhausted by
concepts which are adequate to account for the life of an
animal.
Where I venture to differ from him is in his view that organism

can be considered as a concept intermediate between those of
personality and material object.
80 E. S. RUSSELL.
It seems to me that a hard and fast line must be drawn
between the physical conception on the one hand and the bio-
logical and psychological conceptions on the other, and that the
biological conception must be derived from the psychological.
My position is, in a way, not very different from Dr. Haldane's, for
I do not think it is either necessary or allowable to import into
the study of plant and animal life psychological conceptions which
are properly applicable only to conscious beings. I agree that it
is futile to talk of the mind of a plant or of a developing embryo,
or to ascribe to will or intelligence any part in the shaping of
organic form. My point is rather that in order to arrive at a
biological conception of the living thing which shall be distinct
from the mechanistic, and shall approximate more closely to the
living reality, it is necessary to consider the living unit as having
properties or powers which, not being explicable mechanically,
we must conceive on the model of psychical activities, though
they be much simpler, vaguer, less explicit than the psychical
activities known to us in our own experience.
As regards the behaviour-life of animals, the vie de relation
of the older biologists, where the living thing responds to a sensed
environment by means of appropriate movements, I see no diffi-
culty in principle in treating this from a psychological standpoint ;
I believe that the study of the simplest forms of life from this
point of view would yield results of greater value than those to be
obtained by treating them arbitrarily as physico-chemical
mechanisms.
Dr. Haldane points out that in psychological experience are

involved interests or values, tendencies, and a reference both to
the past and to the future. It is not, I think, an undue stretch
of interpretation to read all this into the behaviour of Ameba.
An Amoeba retreats from nocuous stimuli and responds positively

to such stimuli as are indicative of food, whether these be chemical
or mechanical. It seems to me clear that it responds not to
stimuli qua physico-chemical but to stimuli as sensed, an

primarily to the meaning or significance, the value or interest, of
these elementary perceptions. We may think of the Amceba
living in a sense world of its own, a most simple, obscure and
elementary world into which we can barely enter by the utmo
stretch of imagination, but still a world of its own, and it is t
this private world and not to the physico-chemical world of ou
conception that it responds in its behaviour-life. Tendency is
shown in the persistence with which it will follow up an escapin
prey or search with diligence for food if none is immediatel
present. Reference to the past is more difficult to demonstrat
but it is essentially implied if it be admitted that the Amceb
responds not to stimuli qua physico-chemical but to stimuli qu
meaningful. Reference to the future is clearly shown whe
response is to a contingency about to arise, as when Amwba, o
more clearly Pelonzyxa, throws out protoplasmic arms aroun
above and below a motile prey. It is unnecessary to make any
hypothesis as to the quality of the Amceba's experience or eve
to discuss to what extent it may be regarded as conscious. Al
one can say is that its behaviour is not fully explicable except o
the hypothesis that it is an active and percipient unity, a mon
of however low degree.
I take it then that the psychological conception need not be
restricted to the study of the behaviour of man and the highe
animals, but can be extended in principle at least to the behavio
of all animals. However different in structure and behaviour
the lower animals may be, one can still trace a fundamental
similarity in their basic impulses and responses to those manifested
by man and the animals which resemble him. Psychology, it
seems to me, should not be limited to the study of conscious
activity, or to the study of personality, but must be extended
right down to the study of the lowest forms of behaviour. That
is one objection I should like to make to Dr. Haldane's proposal
G
82 E. S. RUSSELL.
to establish a hierarchy of l
logical-relating respectively t
and persons-that the psychol
applicable to the behaviour of
The question becomes more
turn to consider the life of p
organic life of animals, the vie
as a rule by movement, but b
modification of metabolic pr
of analogy with the behaviou
which serves to conduct us in
appears to break, and we are l
Dr. Haldane's biological concep
they would-if only he would
more deeply with psychology
regard the living organism
organism," he writes, " can o
the behaviour of a whole. It c
the working of a machine, into
of the parts." The teleology o
different from the teleology
structural unit whose parts ar
action as a whole is completely e
of its parts. If the organism
entitled to assume (if in any
should point that way), tha
purely a matter of physico-
so, do we not open the door to
the future, which Dr. Haldane
The question as to how we ar
organ or the cell, whether as be
implying other factors, se
responses (as distinct from
regarded as following inevitably from the physical effect of

stimulus, then I do not think we advance beyond the materialisti
standpoint in practice, even though we may recognize that
structure and activities of the living organism are teleologi
If on the other hand we refuse to be bound down to this materia
istic interpretation of response, are we to regard it as a form

activity entirely sui generis, neither mechanical nor psychologica
or can we interpret it on the admittedly remote analogy
behaviour-action, that is, psychobiologically, as implying
elementary degree of hormic tendency, perception and unif
action ? I am not quite certain how Dr. Haldane would answ
these questions, or whether he would agree that they are righ
formulated. If he rejects, as I think he does, the materialist
conception of the relation between stimulus and reaction (wh
may even be valid or approximately valid in cases of habitual
automatized response) but considers that the relation has
analogy at all with the perception-response relation in behavio
then the difference between us narrows itself down to a matter
which can perhaps be settled by observation. If it is agreed that

in the study of the responses of the organism and of its parts (in
so far as these show independent response) the materialistic
interpretation is to be rejected, the way is open to a new biological
conception which will take shape gradually from the facts them-
selves. While entirely agreeing with Dr. Haldane that for the
purposes of scientific biology organisms and their subordinate
units need not be regarded as conscious in any fully developed
sense, in any sense that may be rightly treated as psychological,
I yet would hazard the opinion for what it is worth, that once we
drop the materialistic conception we must swing over into the
monadistic theory if we are to do justice to all the characteristics
of vital activity. We both agree that any form of dualistic
vitalism is inadmissible and unhelpful in practice. The only
alternative to the materialistic conception seems then to be a.
G2
84 E. S. RUSSELL.
monadistic theory, and this is

upon immediate experience of ou
Putting the matter rather crud
with which to compare the livi
conscious experience. The fir
second rises above the requirem
from the machine to the living
diminution or simplification
individual to the organism. Wh
of properties one could finally re
inorganic is an interesting theo
have much practical bearing on
monad-organism is a simpler
personality is clear, and it wou
activities as if they were the ac
but the fundamental character
in time, active tendency, unifie
are clearly apparent in organic
The characteristics which show
of the materialistic method ar
show the closest analogy with
Perception, conation, memor
undeveloped counterpart in org
more correct to say that these
functions are merely developmen
are manifested in all living thin
I am a little surprised to find
paper considers that neither th
mere vital activity. "When one
"into the form of teleology re
ordinary biological observati
interpret as mere life, apart fr
pated events are not directlyinvo
The present of what is conceived as a mere organism depends, o

course, on its past, and its future depends on its present; but i
lives a life of blind immediacy into which the past and future d
not enter directly, whereas in conscious experience, looking bac
and looking forward are always directly involved, as already
pointed out in connection with Kant's conclusions. This i
what, as it seems to me, distinguishes biology from psychology
The point of view adopted here appears to differ materially from
that expressed by Dr. Haldane in his book Organism and
Environment (1917), where he writes: "In a living organism
the past lives on in the present, and the stored adaptations of the
race live on from generation to generation, waking up int
response when the appropriate stimulus comes, just as consciou
memory is awakened " (p. 98). Or again: " It is literally tru
of life, and no mere metaphor, that the whole is in each of th
parts, and each moment of the past in each moment of th
present" (p. 92).
To my mind this earlier interpretation of vital activity, which
recognizes that both past and future enter into organic actio
under the form of tendency and of readiness to be awakened b
the appropriate stimulus, approximates much more closely to
true and adequate reading of the facts than Dr. Haldane's late
view. There can be no question, I agree, of conscious memory
intervening in organic activity, but the processes of developme
in particular appear to be inexplicable save on the assumption
that an elementary form of memory is active in the developin
organism. If, as seems undeniable, organic activities show
tendency towards an end and constant readjustment of respon
towards achieving that end, a psychobiological interpretation
appears to be the only adequate one.
86 W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
III.-By W. LESLIE MAicKENZIE

1. Stand-point.-" Our idea of an indi
to Bain, " a conflux of generalities." Thi
purposes of study, an individual can be
classes as he has relations to conditions outside himself. The
human organism can certainly be classified and studied as a

mental organism and as a physical organism. The study of his
mental processes is psychology; of his bodily processes, physio-
logy.
2. By this statement I mean that psychology and physiology
are here to be considered as sciences : psychology being essentially
the study of " the empirical ego " of Kant; physiology, the study
of the physical functions of the given individual. Briefly, the
two sciences might be differentiated as the study of the mind as
" object " and the study of the body as " object."
3. Dr. Haldane develops his study of psychology into a full
philosophy. No real answer to him is possible unless his whole
positions from beginning to end are analysed and counter-argued.
This I do not propose to do. With much of his philosophical
exposition I should not disagree; but, on the scientific level, it
makes no difference whether the ultimate interpretation of the
perceptible world is to be in terms of " realism " or of " idealism."
If the interpretation be, say, in terms of Alexandrian " realism,"
living matter with the quality mind emerges at a certain stage ;
if the interpretation is to be, say, in terms of the " new idealism,"
the mere fact that the interpretation is idealism does not alter
the raw material of experience. The actualities at least in
appearance have to be analysed and studied on the scientific
level precisely as if they were independent. This is my answer
to the first part of Dr. Haldane's exposition. In the subject-

object world, the subject or the object can be, provisionally,
studied apart. This is all that seems to me to be necessary as a
groundwork for psychology and physiology as sciences. What
the ultimate nature of the subject-object world is does not affect
in any way whatever the actualities for those studies.
4. Categories.-As in the discussion of some years ago, Dr.
Haldane still makes the term " category " equivalent to " working
hypothesis." What I said then I repeat now : From his philoso-
phical standpoint, this is a great concession in method. But the
habit of talking about " categories," which is now partly dis-
placed by talk about " concepts," is apt to encourage us to forget
the fact that the categories or concepts must come into existence
somehow. They are not revelations from heaven; they are not
" innate ideas "; they are, in Pringle-Pattison's phrase, " beaten
out in the slow process of experience." If not, what are they ?
All through Dr. Haldane's paper I am conscious of a feeling that
his various levels-mechanical, organic and personal-are
discovered to us as if they were necessarily ultimate. No
doubt Dr. Haldane believes this; but I cannot find that his
argument proves it. If he regards his levels as simply " working
hypotheses " for the purpose of analysis, I see no objection; for
it is quite manifest that a stone and a living cat show different
kinds of activities and we may ultimately call the one " mere
physical " (provisionally) and the other " living " (provisionally).
I am not certain that this is all Dr. Haldane does; but from a
careful reading of other articles of his and his Mechanism, Life
and Personality, I could, I think, defend him from this criticism.
For my own part (and provisionally), I consider every hypothesis
a " working hypothesis." Only Omniscience can declare the
philosophical record closed. When a merely finite philosopher
announces his discovery of final truth, he is only explaining that
he has ceased to grow.
5. Mechanism.-Dr. Haldane does not ex

what " mechanism " means. Perhaps he
the meaning " as read." But it seems to
physics has grown in the last fifty years a
by the cruder conceptions of the early
far as I can judge, the world of physics is i
But even as long ago as 1878, Kingdon C
" Your body is an object in my consciousne
never can be. Being an object, your body fol
science, which deals with the objective order
chemistry is ordinary chemistry, its physics ord
ordinary mechanics, may or may not be tr
exceptional, and it is conceivable (to persons
allowance may have to be made for them, ev
most general laws of nature. But in any case,
body is a question about the physical laws of
else. To say: 'Up to this point science can explain; here the soul
steps in,' is not to say what is untrue, but to talk nonsense. If evidence
were found that the matter constituting the brain behaved otherwise than
ordinary matter, or if it were impossible to describe vital actions as parti-
cular examples of general physical rules, this would be a fact in physics, a
fact relating to the motion of matter; and it must either be explained by
further elaboration of physical science or else our conception of the objective
order of our feelings would have to be changed."
In every activity of the organism, there is motion of matter

somehow and somewhere, whether it be the voluntarv movement
of a hand, or the infinitely subtle changes in the related neurons.
Motions of material particles are motions of material particles
whether the particles move within a living organism or within
an (alleged) dead stone. If we take the electron as (for the
moment) the unit of matter, each organism is an aggregate of
electrons. Why or how the electrons act in a specific " colloca-
tion" is, of course, a profoundly important problem; but I
cannot see why their motions and collocations should not be
exhaustively studied as physics. The physics of living matter
is as important as the physics of (alleged) dead matter and, I

presume, the kind of formulae will be adjusted to the particula
group of moving objects. Dr. Haldane is careful to point ou
the extraordinary subtlety and complication of certain physio-
logical processes, for example, the alterations in gas tension tha
affect the respiratory centre, and he " knocks out " the mechanist
hypothesis on the ground that the mechanism for " regulation
is inconceivably complex. But does the statement that th
process is not " mechanical " but biological get rid of the com-
plexity ? It is still with the material grouping of electrons tha
the investigator is dealing. The electron itself is a very comple
" scientific object." It seems to me that the change of " cate-
gory " here is only another way of saying that the mechanisti
hypothesis has failed. It is no advance in knowledge to say tha
the problem is " biological." We are not told precisely wha
alteration in the material organism occurs when the activitie
are designated " hiological."
I should now like to put to Dr. Haldane in a slightly altere
form the question that I put very crudely at the former dis-
cussion. At that discussion I asked: Does a chemical chang
take place in a living cell (or living organism of any kind) at th
moment of death ? If such change takes place, could i
(theoretically) be ascertained ? If the chemical condition at th
instant before death could be restored, would the cell resume it
pre-mortal activities ? The answer Dr. Haldane gave was-
and his present thesis is an elaboration of it -that he did not
admit that the nature of the living cell could be expressed in
terms of physics or chemistry. I have since put the question t
another distinguished biologist, and I asked him whether the
question was essentially absurd. He assured me that it w
not. I did not then and I do not now regard Dr. Haldane'
answer as satisfying; but I shall try to put the question more
broadly.
Does the matter in a piece of living tissu

(I assume the electron as a convenient u
living tissue do these electrons act in
(I use the word collocation to cover
physical condition the electrons may be
before death.) Are these electrons after
or not ? Are the post-mortal electrons g
than the pre-mortal electrons ? Are th
different in collocation from the pre-m
happen to them at the moment of so-c
post-mortal electrons could be re-arrang
collocation, would the tissue resume th
dropped at the moment of death ?
I am quite aware that this is an unans
our present knowledge; but I wish to kn
absurd question. Why should it be ?
in physics and chemistry and the revolu
both of those sciences give us a hope that,
active substances, so in the chemistry o
we may come on a multitude of new
know, even by the crude methods up t
living tissue shows a multitude of phys
less measurable or describable. Is it to be assumed that hence-
forward we shall simply say: " It is living," and leave it at that ?

Or are we to continue over the whole field of the material world
attempting to establish an analysis of matter that will fit every

variety of matter " living " or " dead " ? The mere fact that
our appliances are fit only for the rough work of to-day is nothing
against them. I am old enough to have heard one of the greatest
physicists of the nineteenth century defend the " vortex ring "
against all attack as the final word in the analysis of matter.
That is nothing. The pathway of every science is paved with
dead hypotheses and the pathway of every philosophy, with dead
categories. To say that the problem is enormously complex

no reply. To say that a mechanism to ground the processes
reproduction, heredity or growth generally, which, as
Haldane says, is reproduction, is inconceivable, is no reply at
The same could have been said about chromosomes forty ye
ago ; but it did not stop the efforts at analysis. It is, I believ
the case (so a distinguished pathologist assures me) that a livi
cell does not stain. Why ? Is it that the known stains a
poisons and stop the physical activities in the cell ? How doe
cell assimilate the elements of its food supply ? Whatever t
answer, it is no answer to say that you cannot express the
of a cell (exhaustively) in terms of physics and chemistry. It
admitted that the dead cell has its own physics and chemist
it has also to be admitted that the living cell has its own phy
and chemistry. This Dr. Haldane would not deny; but wh
cannot understand is why the mere fact that the physics a
chemistry of living organisms has failed in the solution of m
problems should be taken as a reason for saying that the appl
tion of physics and chemistry to those problems is meaningle
Here, perhaps, I misrepresent Dr. Haldane or take advantage
some of his expressions. Probably all that he means is that y
cannot express all the facts by our present physics and chemistry
or by any conceivable physics and chemistry. Even if this b
so, why should it be a reason for alleging that the effort to get
closer quarters with the physics and chemistry of living organis
is futile ? It is all very well to call " mechanism " an " abstra
tion." Of course it is. So is " personality." For at no po
can that way of philosophy stop short of the Absolute.
6. Organism as a whole.----I challenge the validity of thi
expression. When is an organism a " whole " ? I have a v
memory of showing to a group of students the muscle contractio
obtained in a newly amputated arm when the trunk of a ner
was pinchedl. Of course group activities of the muscles wer
disturbed; but with care we might have bee

alive for a considerable period and then sho
This is a detail ; but the point is that here i
cut off from a whole organism and stil
" vital phenomena" for a period. Ther
less " abstract" in the actuality than the
red end of a red-hot poker. On the sc
things are as real and it is on this level t
in his present contribution and in his ot
stresses the phrase " organism as a who
indicates that the major organisms are
aggregated organisms or cells. Which or
Each of the million cells has, no doubt,
affected by and affects the "commu
Haldane's description of the " internal e
the most striking of his many beautiful
and other activities. But I cannot put an
on the " organism as a whole." If matter
if an organism is part of another organis
is a part of personality, and if personali
ance " within the universe, how can we
organism as a " whole " except in the sam
sense as we speak of the " merely physical
7. Inorganic to Organic.-In this con
Mechanism Life and Personality, Dr. Ha
that the conception of organism may u
work backwards into the inorganic world
in the evolution of organisms, the matte
either have been living matter from the
assuming the collocations of living matt
true that, at least in the solar system, th
the maintenance of life in any form are
thousand million years old; but altho
electrons may have been the same, we cannot of course assum

that matter contained living units before that time. But i
evolution is continuous, how best can we imagine life emerging
Is it absurd to suggest, as Professor Alexander does, that, at a
certain stage, so-called dead matter assumes a new quality called
"life " and so-called " living matter" assumes a new quality
called " mind " ?
" It is thus a certain constellation or complex or collocation of physico-

chemical processes which behaves vitally, and the presence of such con-
stellations which makes the structure to which they belong an organism.
To call it organism is but to mark the fact that its behaviour, its response
to stimulation, is, owing to the constellation, of a character different from
those which physics and chemistry are ordinarily concerned with, and in
this sense something new with an appropriate quality, that of life . . .
Until that constellation is known, what is specially vital may elude the
piecemeal application of the methods of physics and chemistry. Accor-
dingly I am prepared in this sense to believe that they may be right who
maintain that biology must be treated as a special science, dealing with
its own particular subject of organic life which is distinguished by its own
delicate capacity of self regulation. This is the position of Mr. Haldane;
who at the same time, admits to the full the triumphant contributions
which have been made to the understanding of life by the physico-chemical
method. There seems to me no more difficulty in believing this than in
believing that psychology is a special science dealing directly and at first
hand with mental process, though all mental process is identical in the end,
when once the constellation is known, with its correspondent neural
process." (Space Time and Deity, vol. II, p. 63.)
The problem here is: How does the given constellation

emerge ? That is certainly beyond our knowledge at present;
but I cannot see anything essentially absurd in attempting to
discover it. In spite of Dr. Haldane's eloquent pleading, I
cannot persuade myself that he has given us a logical basis for
his " Thus far " to the methods of physics.
8. Teleology.-If teleology means only that the functions
within an organism are determined by the fundamental structure
of the organism and its relation to th

objection to this relative use of the wo
" adaptation." Darwin assumed only
selection, resulting in adaptation. The
as if they had been " intended." I do n
ledge is added by calling the result " t
9. Conclusion.-There are many other
but I have taken too many words to d
wish, however, to say with Dr. Russell
and philosophical worlds appreciate Dr
logical researches. In what I have sai
a " consumer " of scientific ideas, anxio
in my own mind for my personal u
equipped to offer a real scientific critic
and that is why I have kept to general
to know from him whether, in his own
contemplate some actual physical "m
extraordinarily delicate business of " p
Psychology and physiology, so far
concerned, seem to me converging scie
of two primary phases of a single or
designate a psycho-physical unity. I am
sets aside physiological psychology; fo
name, the organism must continue to b
two standpoints. To call the whole scie
to expound all the phenomena as " men
alter the facts to be studied in the ord
namely, sensations of vision, of hearing
of organic processes, instincts, emotion
phenomena shown through physical or

The Aristotelian Society, Oxford University Press Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

The Aristotelian Society, Oxford University Press Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Symposium: The Relations between Biology and Psychology

Author(s): J. S. Haldane, E. S. Russell and Leslie Mackenzie

IV.-SYMPOSIUM: THE RELATIONS BETWEEN

By J. S. HALDANE, E. S. RUSSELL, AND LESLIE IMACKENZ

I AM well aware that in attempting to discuss the rela

fainter species of sensations which occur when previous sensations

In the sensation there is also the recognition of similarity with

other things, are part of this wor

interest. This is just an aspect of psychological reality, though

described by physical science, bu

energy. Events have no values attached to them. In

be derived secondarily from thi

" normals" or perfectly healthy state are constantly provided.

activity. In virtue of activity suitably directed in relation to

which is constitutive of the exper

We are accustomed to regard

words as a sum of what are called bio-chemical processes. We

It was just because this method of reasoning leads nowhere

psychology can only be approached by means of psychologica

of those physical objects which to the average man seem so

develop here the relations of this

It seems to me that the clue t

values. To a mere individual regarded as such the value

communal interest and in complete abstraction from mere

the conceptions of weight, mass, length, extension, movement,

a matter of indifference whether

Scientific knowledge is "objective." What is implied

knowledge implies the realization of a common interest. Scientific

physical or a chemical one, is found to be dependent immediately

organism is perfectly "normal " these conditions are practically

or described as the behaviour of

The physiological response to colour stimuli is regulated in

Not only the teleology of individual lives, but that of communi-

that in course of time they w

values-in other words a world of personality. On the other

the phenomena of life the unreality of these abstractions becomes

as such. This analysis shows us

though in some respects the least palpable, is by far the most

But physiology considered strictly as the physics and

milieu interne, the physiologist is unable, so long as he remains

the typical form and activity

ment. Environment supplies

We may draw the conclusi

require no elaboration. Here the only adequate method is the

percipient individuals, enduring in time, profiting by experience

That the psychological method is the only one adequate to

Where I venture to differ from him is in his view that organism

It seems to me that a hard and fast line must be drawn

Dr. Haldane points out that in psychological experience are

An Amoeba retreats from nocuous stimuli and responds positively

stimuli qua physico-chemical but to stimuli as sensed, an

regarded as following inevitably from the physical effect of

istic interpretation of response, are we to regard it as a form

which can perhaps be settled by observation. If it is agreed that

monadistic theory, and this is

The present of what is conceived as a mere organism depends, o

III.-By W. LESLIE MAicKENZIE

human organism can certainly be classified and studied as a

to the first part of Dr. Haldane's exposition. In the subject-

5. Mechanism.-Dr. Haldane does not ex

In every activity of the organism, there is motion of matter

is as important as the physics of (alleged) dead matter and, I

Does the matter in a piece of living tissu