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National Seminar

Contextualizing Mahatma Gandhi Philosophy


In the 21st century: Democracy, Justice, Equality and Non-Violence
(March 29-30, 2019)
Organised by- Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow
Submitted by-
Author: Abhishek Tripathi Co-author: Sushma Thakur
B.A LL.B(3rd year) B.A LL.B(3rd year)
Shri Ramswaroop Memorial University
Phn-7007296134
Email-abhishektripathi917@gmail.com
Email-thakursushma8174@gmail.com

FULL RESEARCH PAPER


Topic-Gandhi Approach to Peacemaking: Satyagraha
Abstract-
Satyagraha consist of two words satya means “truth” and graha means “insistence” or
“holding firmly to.” The term satyagraha was coined and developed by Mahatma Gandhi
(1869–1948).As Martin Luther King, Jr., so aptly said, ‘If humanity is to progress, Gandhi is
inescapable—we may ignore him at our own risk.’ As a major figure of peace in our century,
Mohandas Gandhi warrants serious attention, both for his ideas of nonviolence and for his
courageous translation of these ideas into action.
According to Gandhi, the supreme human endeavour should be the pursuit of Satya, Truth.
Gandhi often quoted the core philosophical assertion from the Bhagavad Gita, satyanasti
paro dharma, ‘there is no higher duty than adherence to Truth.’ This was the Upanishadic
concept of the ultimate, eternal Truth that is akin to self-realization, transcending barriers of
history, time, and culture. However, it was not the eternal Truth that guided Gandhi’s thought
and action, but the idea of relative Truth.
Satyagraha, which literally means ‘clinging to truth’ or ‘holding fast to truth.’ The notion of
satyagraha combines the ideas of truth and nonviolence. In developing the practice of
satyagraha, Gandhi was influenced by the concept of nonviolence. He believed that one could
not find truth without practicing nonviolence.

Gandhi rejected the idea that unjustice should be fought by "any means necessary," because
the philosophy of satyagraha does not separate the means from the ends. Gandhi believed that
nonviolence is infinitely superior to violence and forgiveness is greater than punishment.
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Indian lawyer, politician, social activist, and writer who
became the leader of the nationalist movement against the British rule of India . As such, he
came to be considered the father of his country. Gandhi is internationally esteemed for his
doctrine of non violent protest (satyagraha) to achieve political and social progress.

Satyagraha, (Sanskrit and Hindi: “holding onto truth”) concept introduced in the early 20th
century by Mahatma Gandhi to designate a determined but nonviolent resistance to evil.

According to this philosophy, satyagrahis—practitioners of satyagraha—achieve correct


insight into the real nature of an evil situation by observing a nonviolence of the mind, by
seeking truth in a spirit of peace and Throughout the confrontation with evil,
the satyagrahi must adhere to nonviolence, for to employ violence would be to lose correct
insight. Satyagrahis always warn their opponents of their intentions; satyagraha forbids any
tactic suggesting the use of secrecy to one’s advantage. Satyagraha includes more than civil
disobedience. Satyagraha draws from the ancient Indian ideal of ahimsa (“noninjury”).
Gandhi first conceived satyagraha in 1906 in response to a law discriminating against Asians
that was passed by the British colonial government of the Transvaal in South Africa. In 1917
the first satyagraha campaign in India was mounted in the indigo-growing district of
Champaran. During the following years, fasting and economic boycottswere employed as
methods of satyagraha in India, until the British left the country in 1947.

Not only in the hindu civilization but also in totalitarian civilization there were number of
satyagraha movement took place for protecting the rights and to gain social justice.

From very early period we have many examples of satyagraha movement some are:

1. In South Africa M K Gandhi launched satyagraha against the laws of the Transvaal
government, which required every Indian to procure a certificate of registration or face
deportation. Another set of South African laws declared Hindu, Muslim, and Parsee
marriages illegal.

2. After arriving in India, Gandhi implemented satyagraha in 1916-17 against the British
indigo planters at Champaran in Bihar, where peasant cultivators were unfairly treated and
taxed.

3. In 1918 satyagraha was also brought to bear on the dispute between the textile mill owners
and labourers in Ahmedabad and involved a strike by workers.

4.Satyagraha practiced in 1924 on behalf of the untouchables, who had been forbidden to use
the roads in the vicinity of the Vykom temple in Travancore, South India.

5. After the satyagraha strategy on smaller stage, Gandhi launched a series of satyagraha
campaigns, beginning in 1930, which involved mass participation in civil resistance and non-
co-operation aimed at the British. In the majority of these campaigns Gandhi achieved
remarkable success, gaining ever growing popular participation and support for his declared
objectives.

Now the practice of satyagraha in totalitarian society:

the Danish resistance, 1940-45, including the successful general strike in Copenhagen in
1944; major parts of the Dutch resistance, 1940-45; the last German rising of June 1953, in
which there was massive nonviolent defiance which included women in Jena sitting down in
front of Russian tanks; strikes in political prisoners’ camps in the Soviet Union 1953, which
are credited with being a major influence for improving the lot of prisoners; and the major
aspects of the Hungarian revolution, 1956-57, in which in addition to the military battles
there was demonstrated the power of the general strike, the large-scale popular nonviolent
defiance.

Is satyagraha an adequate substitute for violent conflict, and under what conditions

would this be true?

In the post war world, peace is threatened generally by three kinds of national or international

conflict. The first and most destructive is the arms race, carrying with it the possibility of

nuclear confrontation; the second is that of conventional wars between the states for territory,

resources, honor, or ideological supremacy; the third is a consequence of totalitarian or

authoritarian rule resulting in oppression and denial of equality, freedom, and justice to the

whole population of a state or to distinguishable groups within it.

The wars of national liberation in Latin America and Africa are instances of the third type.

The second and third kinds of threats can become intertwined, as evidenced in such wars as

the one between Ethiopia and Somalia in the late 1970s (in which Somalia put forward claims

to the Ogaden region based on traditional movements of the tribes within its own

jurisdiction), or the disputes between India and Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir. The

war between Iran and Iraq is at once an ideological conflict (where the Shiah fundamentalist

Islam of Iran has set itself against the more secularist, traditional Sunni Islam of the Arabs)

and a dispute over boundaries separating the two states. The conflict between Arab states and

Israel is similarly multilayered. It is about territory, the rights of the Palestinians for a

homeland, and Israel’s right to exist as a state.

There is very little possibility that in the foreseeable future any state will replace arms with

nonviolent means to deter aggression. Indeed, all governments believe that nonviolence is

irrelevant to the problem of defense, and that therefore armed force must be the ultimate

arbiter in human affairs. Against this unqualified faith in the efficacy of force, one must point
out that wars do not always obtain their desired ends, nor does oppression ensure true and

enduring control over peoples and nations. Indeed, Adolph Hitler did not obtain his objective

through force, nor did various imperial nations such as Great Britain and France gain their

ends by employing force in their colonies. The wars of national independence have time and

again proven the impotency of superior force when matched against massive grassroots

violent and nonviolent resistance. Thus, there is no reason to believe that force and violence

will invariably intimidate others and achieve the ends desired of them. By the same token,

nonviolence is not applicable in every situation of potential conflict, although Gandhi and his

supporters claimed that it was.

Horsburg, however, argues that although satyagraha is no substitute for deterrence, the spread

of nuclear weapons to a large number of states will create a situation in which nonviolent

means of resolving conflict will become increasingly relevant. He admits that disagreement

and hostilities will persist: ‘There are bound to be many cases in which negotiations will end

in a deadlock’. However, he claims that ‘it does not seem wildly speculative to predict that in

these circumstances an increasing interest will come to be taken in the possibilities of

nonviolent action.’ He defends his position:

If it is said that those optimistic speculations are absurd, I must insist that they are soundly

based on the logic of deterrence. If the risks that deterrent policies involve must continue to

increase, the use of armed force in the international sphere must become progressively more

dangerous and hence it must eventually become too hazardous to use in the most extreme

national emergencies.

Horsburg describes. Nuclear states often engage in conventional wars and by a tacit

agreement refrain from using their most lethal weapons. For instance, in the conflict over the

Falkland Islands between England and Argentina, England certainly had the capacity to wage

a nuclear war. Similarly, in the 1979 conflict between China and Vietnam, China had an
independent nuclear capacity and Vietnam was under the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Indeed,

one might point out that the rough parity in nuclear weapons has aggravated the competition

for the Third World between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R

SATYAGRAHA AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

If satyagraha is impractical in a situation of nuclear war, does it have any relevance in

negotiations for nuclear disarmament? In other words, can it act as a preventive? Can the

Gandhian principles of steps and stages, sympathetic understanding for one’s adversary,

formulation of minimal demands consistent with truth, refusal to threaten or intimidate the

enemy, and open diplomacy be meaningfully applied to fashion a strategy for gradual nuclear

disarmament?

In principle, the Gandhian framework can be an important guide for negotiations on

disarmament. Indeed, even conventional diplomacy recognizes the need for confidence

building measures and reciprocity. Nor can negotiations be successful unless both sides are

convinced of the sincerity of their opponents.

However, today such settlements are seldom arrived at by open diplomacy or via adherence

to the idea that mutual demands should be consistent with truth. More often than not, open

diplomacy is used to score points with critics at home, to pressure the adversary, or worse

still, to camouflage reluctance to negotiate. The usual practice in arms negotiations is to

demand the maximum, in the hope that the final agreement will ensure more than what is

required for defense.

It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a nuclear power would unilaterally disarm

without an effective substitute strategically equivalent to armed strength. Although some

scholars have postulated the adoption of nonviolence and gradual phasing out of dependence

on arms, it is clear that a nation would have to undergo fundamental structural changes in its

society and politics to accept the Gandhian view of human nature and forego the sense of
security offered by weapons.

There are, however, elements in satyagraha that have an important bearing on the question of

how to engage constructively in bargaining for disarmament. Let us look at some of the

causes of the arms race between superpowers. According to several scholars, the arms race is

a result of certain attitudes common to both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Each country has

dehumanized the other, discounting the fears and concerns of the other’s population and

characterizing the other’s leaders as war mongers. This attitude was evident in Dulles’s

characterization of the Soviet Union as the ‘diabolical enemy,’ as it is in the Reagan

administration’s view of the U.S.S.R. as the ‘evil empire’. And yet, scholars and practitioners

of international diplomacy have pointed out that the situation leading to war or peace is one

of mutual dependencies. For instance, analyzing U.S.—Soviet relationships, Henry Kissinger

contended that ‘both sides had to be aware of this dependency if mutually damaging wars and

costly arms were to be avoided.’ SALT I was based on a successful identification of such

dependencies.The theory power and politics implicit in Gandhian thought rejects this

separation and stresses instead a fundamental continuity between two seemingly opposite

entities.

The Gandhian strategy of action requires that the protagonist attribute an irreducible

minimum humanity to the enemy; to do otherwise is to betray one’s own humanity. The

significance of this premise for reconciliation of conflict and for the process of negotiations

can hardly be over-stressed.

There is one more possibility of applying the Gandhian technique to the problem of

disarmament. This is in mobilizing mass movement against the arms race and building

grassroots support for negotiations. The methodology of mass mobilization in this situation,

however, would be no different from that of other issues. Critics might argue, and with

justification, that peaceful protest would not solve the basic strategic dilemma and might in
fact threaten national security by forcing democratic societies to negotiate away their

advantages. Against this argument, one may point out that acquisition of arms beyond a

certain point is useless, and a peace movement can raise awareness among the masses as well

as generate pressures on governments to devote more money to social advancement rather

than to defence.

CONCLUSION

As per the view of author the countries should stop the arms race and the most important to

stop introducing nuclear weapons and disarmament of nuclear weapons because is the

situation of war arises the no country will and loose because after the nuclear war there will

be nothing according to SIPRI, the worldwide total inventory of nuclear weapons as of 2018

stood at 14,465, of which 3,750 were deployed with operational forces. According to

philosophy of Gandhi ji , the meaning of satyagraha is non violence the nuclear disarmament

is necessary for the peace , harmony of upcoming generations.

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