The Marathas Under the Peshwas

The Marathas emerged as a fierce and potent force over most of the Central
and North India in the 18th century and remained the most prominent political
and military force on the Hindustan from the decline of the Mughals till their
eventual defeat at the hands of the British.
There are various viewpoints on the nature of the Maratha state, polity and
administration. While Vincent Smith characterized the Maratha state as a
“robber state”, Jadunath Sarkar called it a “war state”. In Athar Ali’s view, the
Marathas were primarily landed elements, mere zamindars, who remained so
despite the formal coronation of Shivaji. Irfan Habib sees the Maratha
movement against the broader context of agrarian rebellions facing the
Mughal state in the 17th century. According to him, the Marathas represented
the zamindari element of these rebellions which provided opportunity for the
salvation of the peasantry from oppression by the Mughals. Therefore he
argues that Shivaji did not develop a very evolved administration. Broadly
speaking, those historians who view the rise of the Marathas merely in terms
of the coronation of Shivaji and perceive of them merely as plunderers, deny
an administration and state structure to the Marathas. However, it is
important to note that under the Peshwas significant changes were brought
about in the nature of the Maratha polity.
The Maratha polity, as envisaged by Shivaji was “essentially a centralized
autocratic monarchy” and the Maratha administration was derived from the
Deccani structure and some Mughal derivatives. It is suggested that in Shivaji’s
administrative structure, Sanskrit or Marathi terms replaced the existing
nomenclature of Mughal and Deccani features. Shivaji during his reign, was
assisted by an advisory body of eight ministers or ashtaradhan of non-
hereditary officials including the Peshwa, senapati, sachiva, majumdar, etc, all
of whom were individually responsible to the Chhatrapati. In 1707 Shahu
formally acknowledged the supremacy of the Mughal Emperor, accepting a
mansab of 10,000 and agreeing to pay an annual tribute of Rs. 10 Lakh to the
emperor Farukhiyar. Thus the Maratha empire was not a sovereign state, but a
vassal state owing allegiance to the Mughal empire.
The rise of the Peshwa marked a significant development in Maratha politics
as within a span of a few generations, the Peshwas came to be the de facto
rulers of the Marathas, eclipsing even the position of the Chhatrapati and the
Maratha empire transformed into a loose confederation of Maratha chiefs
under the Peshwas. It was Shahu, who had conferred upon Balaji Vishwanath
the office of Peshwa- a consummation, which soon changed the whole
character of the Maratha administration and government.
Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath came to power in 1713 and became the de facto
ruler of the Maratha empire and it was from this period on that the
Chhatrapati was relegated to the status of a nominal sovereign or a ‘flag king’.
The rise of the Peshwa to the position of supremacy led to the destruction of
the solidarity of the constitution, which Shivaji’s ashtapradhan council had
been designed to maintain. The other ministers now became subordinate to
the Peshwa, who as mentioned earlier, used to be one amongst them, as the
mukhya-pradhan. He now controlled, dominated and supervised the other
ministers as the vice-regent of the Chhatrapati. The office of the Peshwa
became hereditary during the reign of Shahu. The predominance of the
Peshwa also led to the division of Maratha sardars into two distinct categories.
The old nobles such as the Angrias, Bhonsles and Gaikwads regarded the
Peshwa as their equal and obeyed him only as a deputy of the Chhatrapati. On
the other hand the new nobles like the Sindhias and Holkars regarded
themselves as ‘servants of the Peshwa’. Basically in the administrative
structure of the Marathas under the Peshwas, the Chhatrapati was the Head of
the State. He was the sovereign authority in secular and religious matters. The
Peshwa as well as the Maratha chiefs owed him allegiance, though the Peshwa
himself undertook all administrative responsibility and took decisions. All
these inter-relationships form the background of our analysis of the role of the
Peshwa, as well as the various factors which influenced his policies, position
and gave a distinct character to the Maratha administration.
Some important administrative changes took place due to the revival of the
Jagirs or saranjam system by Raja Ram. Maratha chiefs took the responsibility
of the administration of large territories outside Maharashtra. The swarajya
came under the direct control of the Peshwa. The semi-autonomous position
of Maratha chiefs gave rise to what is known as the Maratha “confederacy”.
Nominally, the Maratha state thus became a unitary monarchy in which all
administrative transmission and state policy was carried out in the name of
the Chhatrapati. But practically however, it was a loose and precarious
structure without any cohesion whatsoever.
Stewart Gordon has however refused to see the Maratha state as a
‘confederacy’. This term, according to him, fails to describe many central
aspects of the Maratha polity as it implies a long-term shared power among
groups or individuals of more or less equal power for mutual benefit or gain.
However, in contrast the character of the Maratha polity was such that the
inner circle of power changed after every generation. Moreover, he goes on to
say that the Maratha polity cannot be designated as an ‘Empire’. There was no
graded civilian and military rank with attendant symbols of authority. The
Marathas did not impose a uniform legal or revenue system or a uniform high
quality currency. Finally, he argued that large parts of the Maratha polity were
permanently alienated to military commanders.
Instead, he looks upon the Maratha polity as being a complex phenomenon. He
argued that the Maratha polity was a successor state to the earlier Muslim
Kingdom in the Deccan and was also an ongoing colonial discourse with non-
Marathas and local landed lineages. However, it was a hereditary monarchical
system as stated above. He has tried to analyse the Maratha polity under the
Peshwas under three heads: authority and personal loyalty; Revenue and
administration and military power. If we analyse the continuity and changes in
these aspects of the Maratha polity, we can discern with some satisfaction the
possible changes that may have taken place under the Peshwas.
As far as ‘continuity’ in the first aspect of Maratha polity (authority and
personal loyalty) is concerned, the members of the inner-circle remained
small and select throughout the Peshwa period. Even the rewards for loyalties
were maintained throughout, in the form of rights to a portion of revenue
collected from agricultural production. Another aspect of continuity was
reflected in the fact that rewards did not necessarily imply entrance into the
inner circle. For example, many Deshmukhs were rewarded and sent back to
their homelands. Even the strategies for promoting loyalty remained common
to the whole Maratha period. Young men were especially chosen for
recruitment in the cavalry as they showed loyalty to their patron and not to
senior Generals; marriage into families of the inner circle, which enhanced the
prestige of the particular family, but created rivalries and bred factional
disputes within the inner-circle, rendering the tactic rather unsuccessful.
Importance was given to charismatic speaking abilities.
Reorganization of administration and regulation of Maratha expansion was
done through an elaborate scheme of repartition of revenue, which was
promulgated by Balaji Vishwanath after his return from Delhi in 1719 with the
farman for swarajya chauth and sardeshmukhi. According to this scheme, the
revenues of the state were to be shared by the Chhatrapati and his feudatories.
The royal share was 34% while the lion’s share was taken away by the
feudatories. This system implied the placing on Maratha sardars the entire
responsibility for the collection of Chauth and sardeshmukhi. It made the Raja
virtually a pensioner dependent on his feudatories. The responsibility for the
collection of the Chauth and sardeshmukhi was divided in such a way that no
individual Maratha sardar could dominate a large compact area.
Balaji Vishwanath died in 1720 and was succeeded by his son Bajirao.
Bajirao’s accession saw a change in the character of the Maratha movement
from defensive to offensive, from a struggle for national survival to empire
building. Prominent in his reign was the conquest of Malwa and Gujarat, which
was the first step towards the establishment of a large and powerful Maratha
empire. In an attempt to give legitimacy to Maratha expansion, the Peshwa
made the Emperor grant him a Sanad or established tribute of the Chauth and
Sardeshmukhi of Malwa and Gujarat. Under Shahu’s authority Bajirao granted
Sanads to his Sardars Pawar, Holkar, and Sindhia ,allowing them to levy the
two collections and to retain the mokasa for the payment of their troops. The
conquest ended with the Treaty of Bhopal (1738) – a legal recognition of
Maratha agreement with local Zamindars for yearly tribute; The Marathas
thus made little attempt displace local powers. There were beginnings of a
centralized, performance-based civilian revenue administration, loyal directly
to the Peshwa. Subsequently the Maratha army got larger and stronger.
Moreover, by the 18th century, the Chauth became the fulcrum of Maratha
expansion in the North. The aid that the Marathas provided in return of the
collections, was in the form of political-military intervention in local rivalries,
restraining rival bands of Marathas as well as the coordination of troops. The
Chauth thus became a rakhwali or protection rent and a recognition of
Maratha sovereignty, even though it was partial or shared. The co-sharing of
power was effected in such a way that these rights were given out as rightful
remuneration of zamindari service to the Mughal emperor. The claimant of the
throne had to obtain a zamindari right to become King. In this way, the
swarajya was incorporated within the Mughal universal domain and came to
be known as zamindari-rajya. The Maratha state in effect therefore, was the
legacy of the imperial grant which symbolized Maratha swarajya within the
zamindari domain of the Bhonsle Dynasty in the Western Ghats, along with
the concession of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi rights of 6 subhas of the Mughal
Deccan.
Apart from chauth, Fitna was also used to expand the Maratha influence,
although, this was not a unique or new technique. This has been explained by
Andre Wink, who argued that the Marathas extended their authority through
alliances/conciliation or fitna – wherein they got people to accept their
suzerainty without conquest. This was achieved through conciliation, gift-
giving or sedition. This involved the policy of intervention in local conflicts,
and by coercion and conciliation making use of such conflict to one’s own
political advantage. Through fitna, the Marathas in the 18 th century
established their own sovereignty, i.e. swarajya over a large part of Hindustan,
but they did so without denying the legitimacy of the Mughal universal
domain, not shedding the status of zamindar. Thus fitna came to be coincident
with processes of social mobility and ‘gentrification’ for a variety of groups.
In order to build loyalty and keep the military, administrative and banking
agencies under Central control, Bajirao centralized the rights granting process,
pushing aside families which held previous or alternate authority. He also
tried to scatter and intermix grants so that no leader could use a compact
territory as a basis for rebellion. He deliberately kept the revenue settlement,
collection and division complicated, which placed his Brahmin administrators
in a strong position and made him the supreme arbitrator of disputes. The
Peshwa also centralized the banking system so that administrators would
have to annually come to the capital and pay their advance to the Peshwa
before proceeding to their districts.
Gordon argued that the long-term trend in Maratha polity was this
centralization that was brought in from the time of Bajirao. Independent
bands became parts of larger armies led by the Peshwas. In Bajirao’s period,
all grants were gradually taken over in the name of the Peshwa. From 1740
onwards, the Peshwa asserted his authority even in regions far away from the
Deccan homeland of the Marathas – as seen in his adjudication of disputes in
East Malwa. Bajirao personally led the army and received personal pledges of
loyalty from local zamindars. In the Division of 1738, Gujarat went to Gaikwad
and Malwa to Holkar and Shinde. In Gujarat, the process of centralization was
underway as Gaikwad shared power and control with the Peshwa. Whereas in
Malwa, the beneficiaries of the Division of 1738 were becoming gradually
autonomous; the Peshwa neither received revenue nor information from the
Malwa region controlled by Holkar. By the mid-1770s the balance between the
Centre and these peripheral states had shifted, and the Peshwa held estates
only marginally larger than these two families. Overall, power was
consolidated in three centers under Shinde, Holkar and the Poona court. Yet,
asserts Gordon, that the Centre remained fairly strong and the Peshwa
exercised solid and complete administrative control.
Bajirao died in 1740 and was succeeded by his son Balaji Bajirao who
combined the policy of consolidation with an aggressive forward policy in
North India. Between 1740-48 he organized four expeditions to the North, and
after the death of Shahu, succeeded in dislodging the Raja of Satara and
assuming his sovereignty. The capital shifted from Satara to Poona.
The epicenter of the Peshwa’s administration was his secretariat at Poona,
which was known as the ‘Huzur Daftar’. It was divided into several
departments and bureaus, employing a large army of staff members. Within
the Huzur Daftar were preserved the records of all branches of administration.
The secretariat dealt with matters relating to revenue and expenditures, the
delineation of public revenues and the budget of civil, military and religious
establishments. As the de facto Head of the State, the Peshwa arbitrated upon
a number of social issues affecting religion and social custom such as the
remarriage of widows, dowry, adoption etc. The Peshwas patronized
Chitpawan Brahmins who joined the core of a rapidly expanding literate elite,
fulfilling jobs like those of administrators, tax collectors and also military
leaders (during later years). Another significant step was the introduction of
banking and credit facilities, which were of crucial importance to Shahu’s
administration for military and civil expenditures of a developing state.
Gordon has argued that the most significant long-term social change was
reflected in the rapid social mobility reflected in the replacement of Marathas
by Brahmins as predominant elements in the Central bureaucracy under the
Peshwas. Brahmins dominated the administration at the Centre as well as in
newly conquered areas. They occupied high posts in the military as well, and
even Banking families that loaned heavily to the Maratha government were
mostly Brahmins. Though Hindu temples, priests and festivals were highly
patronized, factional disputes did arise between Brahmans and Marathas.
However, apart from this he doesn’t believe that any major social changes took
place under the Marathas.
The old self-supporting village community did not lose its importance during
the rule of the Peshwas. The most important personality in the village was the
Patil, who acted as the chief Revenue Officer, Chief Police Magistrate as well as
the Chief judicial officer. He also acted as the intermediary between the
villagers and the Peshwa administration. He was assisted by the Kulkarni – the
village clerk and record keeper. The Potedar tested coinage for any illegal
debasement. A group of 12 artisans or Balutas were responsible for the
industrial requirements of the village. In return they received a share of the
crops and other prerequisites in return for their services.
The District and provincial administration under the Marathas was of crucial
importance for the Marathas. Terms like Tara Pargana, Sarkar and Subah have
been used to denote administrative divisions. Mamlatadars were responsible
for bigger divisions, while the kamavisdars were responsible for smaller
divisions. They were directly subordinate to the Huzur Daftar, but in Kandesh,
Gujarat and Karnataka they were subordinate to the Sarsubhadars. The
Sarsubhadar was in charge of all branches of the district administration such
as agriculture, revenue assessment and industries, along with the some social
and religious responsibilities. Some restraint was put on the mamlatadar’s
opportunity for speculation, and maladministration by the Deshmukh and
Deshpande.
The Deshmukhs maintained records relating to estates, alienation and transfer
of property and were called for in all disputes connected with lands. Their
rights were nested rights, also including adjudication, troops, ritual
leadership. Hence the administration wove grantee/holders into the fabric of
rural society.
Deshmukhs ,in peacetime, acted as revenue officials, while in times of
adversity their role enlarged assuming supralocal significance in the form of
kingmakers and key links in factional struggles etc. Darakhdars were used as a
check on the chief officers of every department and couldn’t be removed by
the Mamlatadar.
The principal sources of revenue during the Peshwa period were land revenue,
miscellaneous taxes such as horse tax and marriage tax, custom duties and
income drawn from forests, private mints, and fees for administering justice.
These sources were supplemented by the Chauth and Sardeshmukhi. The
proceeds of the Sardeshmukhi were originally reserved for the state, while the
proceeds from the Chauth were divided into four shares; wherein 25% was
reserved for the Head of the State, 66% was granted to feudal chiefs for
maintenance of troops, 6% was granted to the sachiv and the remaining 3%
was appropriated by various persons who enjoyed the pleasure of the Head of
the State.
The land revenue administration under the Peshwas was carried out with
efficiency and organization. The agricultural lands in the villages were
generally divided between two classes of holders - the mirasdars and the
upris. The assessment on village lands was based on a survey of the area
under cultivation. For purposes of revenue, land was divided into three
categories; the superior, ordinary, and inferior categories. Lenient assessment
was the incentive offered for bringing wastelands under cultivation. It is
important to note that the revenue policy of the Peshwas was based on the
principle of securing the prosperity of the tax payer. This was a major
departure from the past, wherein, the high tax assessments and plunder as
means to ensure the maximum revenue had caused a great deal of distress for
the peasantry. However, Satish Chandra has argued that while the tax
assessments may not have been higher than the time of Shivaji, the burden on
the peasantry was increased through the additional cesses that were imposed
upon them.
There existed a common pattern of revenue collection in the areas of stable
control. The Kamavisdar was appointed to settle and collect taxes, adjudicate
disputes and allocate funds to develop agriculture. His reports were regularly
audited. Administration of revenue was worked on a yearly scale. Firstly, the
Peshwa’s clerk prepared an estimate of the revenue collection for each
Kamavisdar. He did this on the basis of the detailed report provided by the
Kamavisdar. The collector then borrowed money from the Poona Banking
communities for paying the advance to the Peshwas which varied from 1/3 rd
to ½ of the contract. This was known as the Rasad. This money along with its
interest were to be recovered from the Kamavisdar of the district. This was
followed by the regular touring of fields, examination of crops and settling of
taxes. Documents conferring taxes were signed by village headmen who sent
the payments to the local Maratha treasures. At the end of the year, the
collector balanced the receipts against the revenue agreed upon and prepared
a balance sheet for each village.
Gordon believes that there was a good deal of continuity in the revenue
collecting procedures. The Revenue structure came from the Deccan Kingdom
i.e. methods of assessing land, categories of land and so on (as will be
discussed later in the essay). There was also long-term continuity in the
position of Deshmukh families who possessed certain nested rights. Moreover,
he believes that a significant change during this period was the growth of
monetization. Money use moved outwards from Cash crop areas into less
monetized ones. This led to the conversion of money collected in kind into
amounts in Cash, which facilitated the vitality of large-scale markets. Hundis
gained in prominence.
The Maratha judicial system under the Peshwas was rudimentary and simple.
There were no codified laws or rules and procedures. In both civil and
criminal cases, decisions were based upon customs and rules drawn from
ancient smriti works. The judicial officer in the village was the ‘patil’. Above
him were the Mamlatdar and Sarsubhadar, and at the top was the Peshwa who
represented the Chhatrapati. In civil cases, arbitration was the first as it was
most desirable that any dispute be settled amicably. If arbitration failed, the
case was transferred for decision to a panchayat, appointed by the Patil in the
village and by a leading merchant in urban areas.
Capital punishment seems to have been unknown under the reign of the first
three Peshwas. Murder and treason were punished with fines, confiscation of
property and imprisonment. The village police was under the Patil, while the
district police, under the mamlatdar. In big cities, the police was placed under
the Kotwal, whose duties included the regulation of prices and taking the
census. Elphinstone remarks highly of the efficiency of the metropolitan police
at Poona in the days of Baji Rao II
As far as the Maratha army is concerned, its character underwent a total
transformation under the Peshwas. Shivaji’s army had been under strict
central control since he distrusted feudal levies. However, after Sambhaji’s
death in 1689, the central control over the army slackened and almost
disappeared. The Maratha soldiers fighting against the Mughals were now
irregular groups led by different chiefs. The feudalization of the state resulted
in the feudalization of the army as well. Although the Peshwas maintained
some regiments under their immediate control, they relied mainly on the
forces provided by the feudal nobles in terms of contracts relating to their
saranjams.
However, there was a significant change in the scope and strategy of the armed
forces. The change from the warfare of Shivaji’s time to Baji Rao’s is defined as
‘from resistance to conquest’. Shivaji’s strategy was to avoid large battles and
cut-off enemy supplies; the success was a result of his superior knowledge of
the countryside. Baji Rao on the other hand assembled larger armies and there
was a shift from loot to tribute and revenue collection. There was development
of artillery, for the capturing of forts. This was accompanied by increasing
military expenditure. After the death of Bajirao, the pace of change accelerated
and leapt ahead in qualitative bounds. Technical developments as well as the
predominance of the infantry and use of artillery, changed the entire nature of
warfare. Battle tactics, however, did not change, as success or failure largely
depended upon the Commander. If the Commander was killed, the army’s
backbone broke and soldiers would flee from the field. The Battle of Panipat
exposed the emasculation of the army and the incompatibility of the various
modes of warfare artillery, infantry and the cavalry.
The racial composition of the army also underwent a change under the
Peshwas. Shivaji’s officers and soldiers were men of his own race, coupled only
with a few number of Muslims. The Peshwas on the other hand, employed
men of all races and creeds, including foreigners. This heterogeneous army, it
is important to note, could not be inspired by the common ideal which had
inspired Shivaji’s forces. The predominance of non-Marathas in the infantry
reduced the Maratha cavalry to a secondary position.
The Angrias, who were virtually independent of the Peshwas were responsible
for the development of the Maratha navy. After Shivaji, Balaji Baji Rao had
caused irreparable damage to the Maratha naval power by crushing Taalaji
Angria. However, in the second half of the 18th century, concerted efforts were
directed towards the development of a commercial navy.
It has been pointed out by Satish Chandra that the rise of the Peshwas to
supreme power in the state and the gradual eclipse of the Maratha King and
Ashtapradhan did not imply as great a change in Maratha polity as has been
generally assumed. The Zamindars did continue to be a powerful element in
Maratha polity. Under Raja Ram and Shahu the leading officers of the state –
the Paratinidhi and the Pant Sachiv – became practically hereditary. Apart
from this, the general pattern of administration in the ‘swarajya’ territory was
more or less same as in the time of Shivaji.
However, it is imperative to note that the administration under the Peshwas
accelerated and provided momentum to the forces of disintegration. The
administrative machinery exposed the institutional defects in the Maratha
administration and made it vulnerable to the blight of feudalism. In the words
of S.N. Sen, “the Maratha empire ultimately became like the Holy Roman
Empire- a loose confederacy of ambitious feudal chiefs, while the Peshwa
command was met with scant respect”. The government and the army were
more calculated and fashioned to destroy rather than to create an empire.
The abandonment of Shivaji’s administrative system, to whatever extent, and
its gradual replacement by an essentially feudal polity presided over by the
Peshwas, indeed grounded the death knell of the empire. Inspite of the fact
that the Peshwas were successful in relegating the Maratha King to the
background, they could never really consolidate and bring together all the
warring and dissatisfied Maratha chiefs under their control.
They could not indeed plug the loopholes in the administrative system that
they had inherited; their claim to fill the political vaccum created by the
disintegration of the Mughal empire looks preposterous as their
administration was never really nurtured and conditioned to carry forward
the legacy of an administrative structure as strong and long lasting as that of
the Mughals. By the close of the 18th century, the Peshwa’s paramountcy
began to decline and the dominant Maratha families began carving out
independent territories and re-organizing their administrative structures. The
Third Battle of Panipat exposed the weakness of the Marathas and the British
ultimately absorbed their remaining power.
Nonetheless, the legacy of the Marathas themselves includes large-scale
migration into Maharashtra, of diverse social groups. Their heritage in tax
collection and record-keeping was carried on to the Colonial period. Last but
not the least, the stories of heroism and martial traditions fashioned the self-
image of the Marathas to this date.