WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE
MICRO SALES OPERATION NETWORK VS NLRC
Hermosa was unjustly dismissed. For willful disobedience to
be a valid cause for dismissal, the following twin elements
must concur: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have
been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse
attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
Both elements are lacking. We find no hint of perverse attitude
in Hermosa’s written explanation. On the contrary, it appears
that the alleged company procedure for leaving the ignition
key of the company’s vehicles within office premises was not
even made known to him. Petitioners failed to prove Hermosa
willfully disobeyed the said company procedure. At any rate,
dismissal was too harsh a penalty for the omission imputed to
him.
BASCON VS CA
As regards the appellate court’s finding that petitioners were
justly terminated for gross insubordination or willful
disobedience, Article 282 of the Labor Code provides in part:
An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work.
However, willful disobedience of the employer’s lawful orders,
as a just cause for dismissal of an employee, envisages the
concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee’s
assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized
by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated
must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been
engaged to discharge.
In this case, we find lacking the element of willfulness
characterized by a perverse mental attitude on the part of
petitioners in disobeying their employer’s order as to warrant
the ultimate penalty of dismissal. Wearing armbands and
putting up placards to express one’s views without violating
the rights of third parties, are legal per se and even
constitutionally protected. Thus, MCCH could have done well
to respect petitioners’ right to freedom of speech instead of
threatening them with disciplinary action and eventually
terminating them.
Finally, even if willful disobedience may be properly
appreciated, still, the penalty of dismissal is too harsh. Not
every case of willful disobedience by an employee of a lawful
work-connected order of the employer may be penalized with
dismissal. There must be reasonable proportionality between,
on the one hand, the willful disobedience by the employee
and, on the other hand, the penalty imposed therefor. In this
case, evidence is wanting on the depravity of conduct and
willfulness of the disobedience on the part of petitioners, as
contemplated by law. Wearing armbands to signify union
membership and putting up placards to express their views
cannot be of such great dimension as to warrant the extreme
penalty of dismissal, especially considering the long years of
service rendered by petitioners and the fact that they have not
heretofore been subject of any disciplinary action in the course
of their employment with MCCH.
GROSS AND HABITUAL NEGLECT OF DUTIES
JUDY PHILIPPINES VS NLRC
Petitioner anchors its right to terminate the employment of
Virginia Antiola on the ground of “gross neglect of duties,”
under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code. Gross
negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise
slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It
evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them.
We affirm the finding of the NLRC that “Article 282 (b) of the
Labor Code requires that xxx such neglect must not only be
gross, it should be ‘Gross and habitual neglect’ in character.”
As aptly pronounced by the NLRC, “the penalty of dismissal is
quite severe here” noting that the labor arbiter himself admits
that she committed the infraction for the first time.
Considering that private respondent worked with the company
for four years with no known previous bad record, the ends of
social and compassionate justice would be better served if she
was merely suspended from work rather than terminated.
We are not, however, unmindful of the negligence committed
by respondent Antiola. The employer’s obligation to give his
workers just compensation and treatment carries with it the
corollary right to expect from the workers adequate work,
diligence and good conduct. Nonetheless, private
respondent’s wrongdoing does not warrant dismissal
inasmuch as dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be
meted to an employee. In view of the foregoing, We rule that
Judy Philippines, Inc. had no valid cause to dispense with the
services of private respondent.
CHALLENGE SOCKS CORP. VS CA
One of the just causes for terminating an employment under
Article 282 of the Labor Code is gross and habitual neglect by
the employee of her duties. This cause includes gross
inefficiency, negligence and carelessness. Such just causes
is derived from the right of the employer to select and engage
his employees.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that Buguat was
habitually absent, tardy and neglectful of her duties. We agree
with the Court of Appeals that:
“Elvie’s commission of three (3) violations of the company’s
rules and regulations, including her unauthorized absences
and tardiness, all committed in the span of two years, shows
that she did not only fail to observe due diligence in performing
her job, but she has little regard for the consequences of her
acts and inactions. She repeatedly committed error in
counting the socks to be given to the Looping Section. As a
knitting operator, Elvie was required to check the socks she
was working on and to count the bundles of socks she had to
pack to be forwarded to the Looping Section. Elvie did not
question the authenticity of the May 25, 1998 suspension
letter and the February 2, 1999 memorandum….
While a first violation could be considered excusable,
repeated commission of the same offense could be
considered willful disobedience. Elvie, despite the suspension
and warning, continued to disregard the company rules and
regulations….”
Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one’s
duties for a period of time. Buguat’s repeated acts of absences
without leave and her frequent tardiness reflect her indifferent
attitude to and lack of motivation in her work. Her repeated
and habitual infractions, committed despite several warnings,
constitute gross misconduct. Habitual absenteeism without
leave constitute gross negligence and is sufficient to justify
termination of an employee.
We find the penalty of dismissal from the service reasonable
and appropriate to Buguat’s infraction. Her repeated
negligence is not tolerable; neither should it merit the penalty
of suspension only. The record of an employee is a relevant
consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted
out. Buguat committed several infractions in the past and
despite the warnings and suspension, she continued to
display a neglectful attitude towards her work.
BUSINESS JUDGEMENT
WILLSHIRE FILE CO. VS NLRC
We believe that redundancy, for purposes of our Labor Code,
exists where the services of an employee are in excess of
what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of
the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it
is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may
be the outcome of a number of factors, such as overhiring of
workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a
particular product line or service activity previously
manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. The employer
has no legal obligation to keep in its payroll more employees
than are necessary for the operation of its business.
In the third place, in the case at bar, petitioner Wiltshire, in
view of the contraction of its volume of sales and in order to
cut down its operating expenses, effected some changes in its
organization by abolishing some positions and thereby
effecting a reduction of its personnel. Thus, the position of
Sales Manager was abolished and the duties previously
discharged by the Sales Manager simply added to the duties
of the General Manager, to whom the Sales Manager used to
report.
is an exercise of business judgment of the employer. The
wisdom or soundness of this judgment is not subject to
discretionary review of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC,
provided there is no violation of law and no showing that it was
prompted by an arbitrary or malicious act. In other words, it is
not enough for a company to merely declare that it has
become overmanned. It must produce adequate proof that
such is the actual situation to justify the dismissal of the
affected employees for redundancy.
FINANCIAL LOSS
ESCULARIA VS NLRC
While concededly, Article 283 of the Labor Code does not
require that the employer should be suffering financial losses
before he can terminate the services of the employee on the
ground of redundancy, it does not mean either that a company
which is doing well can effect such a dismissal whimsically or
capriciously. The fact that a company is suffering from
business losses merely provides stronger justification for the
termination.
In this regard, it could be concluded that the respondent PRC
was merely in a hurry to terminate the services of the petitioner
as soon as possible in view of the latter’s impending
retirement; it appears that said company was merely trying to
avoid paying the retirement benefits the petitioner stood to
receive upon reaching the age of sixty (60). PRC acted in bad
faith.

The determination of the continuing necessity of a particular

officer or position in a business corporation is management’s
prerogative, and the courts will not interfere with the exercise
of such so long as no abuse of discretion or merely arbitrary
or malicious action on the part of management is shown.

DOLE PHILIPPINES VS NLRC

We held, moreover, that the characterization of an

employee’s services as no longer necessary or sustainable,
and, therefore, properly terminable, is an exercise of business
judgment on the part of the employer. The wisdom or
soundness of such characterization or decision is not subject
to discretionary review provided, of course, that violation of
law or arbitrary or malicious action is not shown.

Dole’s redundancy program does not appear to be tainted by

bad faith. The petition alleges that the redundancy program is
part of a wide-scale restructuring of the company. This
purported restructuring is supported by the company’s
undisputed history towards these ends, which culminated in
the abolition of certain positions and the Special Voluntary
Resignation program in 1990-1991. Among the avowed goals
of such restructuring is the reduction of absenteeism in the
company. The harsh economic and political climate then
prevailing in the country also emphasized the need for cost-
saving measures.

Reorganization as a cost-saving device is acknowledged by

jurisprudence. An employer is not precluded from adopting a
new policy conducive to a more economical and effective
management, and the law does not require that the employer
should be suffering financial losses before he can terminate
the services of the employee on the ground of redundancy.

ASUFRIN VS SMC

The determination that employee’s services are no longer

necessary or sustainable and, therefore, properly terminable