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TITLE: JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs.

THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL


CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents.
G.R. NO. G.R. No. L-45081 DATE: July 15, 1936
PONENTE: LAUREL, J.: TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly
district of the Province of Tayabas.

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National
Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed
before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things,
that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that
the election of said position be nullified
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of
the National Assembly
HOLDING

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming
to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and
that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests
against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the
Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character
to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred
or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is
also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for
the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.

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TITLE: MARIA LOURDES B. LOCSIN , petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and MONIQUE YAZMIN MARIA Q. LAGDAMEO, respondents. DECISION
G.R. NO. . 204123 DATE: March 19, 2013
PONENTE: Leonen, J. TOPIC: Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal, Nature and
Power
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Locsin and private respondent Lagdameo, along with three other candidates, vied for the position to
represent the First Legislative District of Makati in the 2010 national elections.

Respondent Lagdameo was proclaimed winner by the City Board of Canvassers on 11 May 2010 garnering 42,102
votes. Petitioner came in second with 41,860 votes or a losing margin of 242 votes.

Petitioner Locsin instituted an election protest before the HRET impugning the election results in all 233 clustered
precincts in Makati's First District. Petitioner alleged that the results were tainted by election fraud, anomalies, and
irregularities.

The HRET discussed in detail the results of the recount and its appreciation of the contested ballots. The results
showed that Lagdameo's proclamation margin of 242 votes increased to 265 votes after revision proceedings in
the 25% pilot protested clustered precincts. The margin rose to 335 votes after the revision and appreciation of
ballots in the remaining precincts.

On the allegations of fraud and election irregularities, respondent tribunal found no compelling evidence that may
cast doubt on the credibility of the results generated by the (PCOS) electronic system. Locsin alleged that the HRET
committed grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the presence of 2,457 invalid, irregular, and rejectible ballots
for Lagdameo and 663 bona fide claimed ballots for petitioner.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
WON the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's election protest.
HOLDING
NO. This Court finds no grave abuse of discretion by the HRET in its findings after HRET's careful review of the
objected ballots and guided by existing principles, rules and rulings on its appreciation. The Constitution provides
that public respondent, HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their members. This Court's jurisdiction to review HRET's decisions and orders is exercised only upon showing that
HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, this Court will
not interfere with an electoral tribunal's exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction.

In the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent HRET when it dismissed
petitioner's election protest. Public respondent HRET conducted a revision and appreciation of all the ballots from
all the precincts. This was done even though results of initial revision proceedings in 25% of the precincts increased
the winning margin of private respondent from 242 to 265 votes. Out of due diligence and to remove all doubts on
the victory of private respondent, the HRET directed continuation of revision proceedings.
Thus, in reaching the assailed decision, the HRET took pains in reviewing the validity or invalidity of each contested
ballot with prudence. This is evident from the decision's ballot enumeration specifying with concrete basis and
clarity the reason for its denial or admittance. The results, as well as the objections, claims, admissions, and
rejections of ballots were explained sufficiently and addressed by the HRET in its Decision In the absence of any
showing of grave abuse of discretion by the HRET, there is no reason for this Court to annul respondent tribunal's
decision or to substitute it with its own
.

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TITLE: Silverio Tagolino v HRET
G.R. NO. 202202 DATE: 19 Mar 2013
PONENTE: J. Perlas- Bernabe TOPIC: Sec. 17; Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal;
Nature and Power
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the
ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla
(Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of Colgate Street, East Greenhills, San
Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this
regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualifed/ineligible to run for the said office. In
addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard's CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled. On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC
First Division rendered a Resolution granting Juntilla's petition without any qualification.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc through a Resolution dated
May 4, 2010. 7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted the said resolution with finality "in order to
enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for substitution."
On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC together with a Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party's official substitute candidate vice her husband,
Richard, for the same congressional post. In response to various letter-requests submitted to the
COMELEC's Law Department (Law Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued
Resolution No. 8890 11 on May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the recommendation of the said department to allow the
substitution of private respondent.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the substitution of respondent is valid
HOLDING
NO. Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws
or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a CoC to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before
candidate substitution proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a
candidate, the said section unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be
substituted.
As defined under Section 79 (a) of the OEC, the term "candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment,
or coalition of parties. Clearly, the law requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a candidate.
The requirement of having a CoC obtains even greater importance if one considers its nature. In particular, a CoC formalizes
not only a person's public declaration to run for office but evidences as well his or her statutory eligibility to be elected for
the said post. Absent a valid CoC one is not considered a candidate under legal contemplation.
Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as well as the
precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that if a person's CoC
had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The
existence of a valid CoC is therefore a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: JOSE O. VERA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. NO. L-543 DATE: August 31, 1946
PONENTE: BENGZON, J TOPIC: definition of election contest
FACTS OF THE CASE:
By reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija,
Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region during the national elections did not reflect the true and free expression
of the popular will. After such election, dead bodies were found with notes attached to their necks, reading ‘Bomoto
kami kay Roxas’. A resolution was approved thereafter in the Congress ordering that, pending the termination of
protest lodged against their election, of herein petitioners Jose Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero
— who had been included among the sixteen candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes,
proclaimed by the Commission on Elections — shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of that chamber, as if
elections held in the aforementioned provinces were annulled as demanded in the circumstances, these senators
would not and could not have been declared elected.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Petitioners immediately instituted this action against their colleagues responsible for the resolution. They
pray for an order annulling it, and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their seats, and to exercise
their senatorial prerogatives.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Senate has exceeded its powers in not proceeding with the Senate membership of
Vera, Diokno, and Romero.
HOLDING
No. The discussions in the Constitutional Convention showed that the Electoral Commission shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly. The Convention, however, bent on circumscribing the latter's authority to "contests"
relating to the election, etc. altered the draft. The Convention did not intend to give it all the functions of
the Assembly on the subject of election and qualifications of its members. The distinction is not without a
difference. "As used in constitutional provisions", election contest "relates only to statutory contests in
which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also to have himself inducted into the office."

However, the Electoral Tribunal only has jurisdiction when there is such “election contest”. The Senate
has, under parliamentary practice, the power to inquire into the credentials of any member and the latter's
right to participate in its deliberations. However, when a member of the House raises a question as to the
qualifications of another, an “election contest” does not thereby ensue, because the former does not seek
to be substituted for their latter. The power therefore to defer such oath taking therefore belongs to the
House or Senate.

In the case at bar, the resolution recognized, and did not impair, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal
to decide the contest. The Senate had the rightful power to defer the membership of the senators involved
herein.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: Roces v. HRET
G.R. NO. 167499 DATE: September 15, 2005
PONENTE: TOPIC: HRET is the sole judge of all contest relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Miles Roces and former Congressman Harry Ang Ping (Mr. Ang Ping) filed Certificate of Candidacies
(COCs) for the Representative for the 3rd Congressional District of Manila for the 2004 Elections. Mr. Ang Ping was
disqualified due to an Alejandro Gomez’s petition on the ground that Ang Ping misrepresented himself to be a
natural-born citizen. COMELEC First Division Commissioner Garcillano of the issued an order for a resolution to
promulgate the decision, however, it was deferred by Commissioner Resurreccion for lack of quorum. Concurrently,
Mr. Ang Ping submitted his withdrawal from the elections with his wife, Ma. Zenaida Ang Ping (Mrs. Ang Ping)
replacing him per the recommendation of his political party.

Mr. Ang Ping then filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) while the COMELEC dismissed the resolution in view of the pending HRET protest, which eventually
became just a regular protest which was granted. Roces then filed a motion to dismiss which was denied on the
ground that Mr. Ang Ping was a proper party to file a protest against Roces. This prompted Roces to elevate the
case to the Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion regarding their decision
HOLDING
NO. First, HRET is the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members as per Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, hence, the HRET has exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. When Roces also provided the COMELEC’s resolutions as evidence, it was to attest Mr.
Ang Ping’s standing as a candidate, and not to his standing as a petitioner for the election protest. Furthermore,
the COMELEC’s resolutions was declared void ab initio as their decision violated Mr. Ang Ping’s right to due
process when the COMELEC did not give Mr. Ang Ping the opportunity to be heard.

1
TITLE: JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and
RENALD F. VILLANDO, respondents
G.R. NO. G.R. Nos. 178831-32 DATE: July 30, 2009
PONENTE: PERALTA, J TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and
assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of
the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the
citizenship requirement in Section 6, 1 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was
voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed
as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of
Representatives. The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen
because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for
the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET, instead of the COMELEC, should assume
jurisdiction over the disqualification cases
HOLDING
Yes. The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows then
that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before
it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use
of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the
exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

1
TITLE: Robert Z. Barbers V. COMELEC and Rodolfo Biazon
G.R. NO. 165691 DATE: June 22, 2005
PONENTE: CARPIO, J. TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Robert Z. Barbers ("Barbers") and Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate in the 10 May
2004 National and Local Elections.

On 24 May 2004, the COMELEC sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) for the
election of Senators promulgated Resolution No. NBC 04-002 proclaiming the first 11 duly elected Senators in the
elections. The COMELEC declared that it would proclaim the remaining 12th winning candidate for Senator after
canvassing the remaining unsubmitted Certificate of Canvass from parts of the country.

On 2 June 2004, the COMELEC promulgated another resolution proclaiming Biazon as “the 12th ranking
duly elected 12th Senator. According to COMELEC, Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers. The
COMELEC stated that this difference will not materially be affected by the votes in certain precincts where there
was failure of elections.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon as Senator alleging it is void, illegal and
premature being based on an incomplete canvass. Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and
votes and the results of the special elections, would undoubtedly affect the results of the elections.

Biazon asserts that the COMELEC 1st Division has no jurisdiction to review, reverse or modify the
actuations of COMELEC en banc sitting as National Board of Canvassers for Senators and that because he
already took his oath. He also argued that considering his lead over Barbers, the remaining votes in the
uncanvassed COCs would not substantially affect the results as to the 12th senator.

COMELEC denied Barbers’ petition. COMELEC ruled that Barbers’ petition cannot be categorized as a pre-
proclamation controversy since the issues cited are not proper for such nor it can be categorized as an election
protest since the ground cited also does not make it as such. Besides, the COMELEC also found out that
considering Biazon’s lead over that of Barbers, even if those unincluded votes would be counted in favor of
Barbers still it would not affect the results. Motion for Reconsideration denied by COMELEC en banc. Hence, this
petition.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or Not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case at Bar over the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. (NO)
2. Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, after having used Provincial Certificates of
Canvass in the canvass of election results for Senators up to 2 June 2004, the COMELEC used the
Municipal Certificates of Canvass in the final tabulation of the uncanvassed results and that of the special
elections yet to be held in certain parts of the country. (NO)
HOLDING
1. The Court rules in the negative. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal that has the exclusive
jurisdiction to entertain this kind of petition in light of Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
pertinent part of Sec. 17 is “Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members.” Rule 12 of the Revised Senate Tribunal also provides
“Jurisdiction. – The Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the Senate.” These provisions were echoed and affirmed in
the case of Pangilinan v. COMELEC.

But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that “election” referred to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the
votes; “returns” to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions
1
concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and
“qualifications” to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner,
such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

The word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal underscores the exclusivity of the SET’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is
therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barbers contests
Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive
jurisdiction to act on Barbers’ complaint.

2. The Court again rules in the negative. It is a rule that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and
cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation. A canvass is not reflective of the true vote of the
electorate unless the board of canvassers considers all returns and omits none. However, this is true only
where the election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the election. (Sec. 233, Omnibus
Election Code; Sec. 9 COMELEC Resolution No. 6749)

In the present case, the report which the COMELEC Supervisory Committee submitted shows that
Barbers obtained 6,736 votes in areas where results were not included in the national canvass. As for
Biazon, he garnered 2,263 votes. Also, the Supervisory Committee’s report shows that the total number of
registered voters in areas where special elections were still to be conducted was only 2,931, covering only
19 precincts in three municipalities. Since the election returns not included in the national canvass as well
as the results of the special elections to be held would not materially affect the results of the elections, it is
immaterial whether the COMELEC used PCOCs or MCOCs in the subsequent canvass.
notes, if any:

ADDENDUM: I’m not sure if issue 2 is actually part of the topic but I added it nonetheless. Feel free to not
write if you think it’s not part of the case.

2
TITLE: ARNOLD V. GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR., as the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 11th Congress, HON. ROBERTO P. NAZARENO,
as the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, 11th Congress, RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS and
GUILLERMO R. RUIZ, respondents.
G.R. NO. 137004 DATE: July 26, 2000
PONENTE: QUISIMBING, J TOPIC: substitution
FACTS OF THE CASE:
A petition was filed by respondent Ruiz to disqualify to disqualify respondent Fariñas as a candidate for the elective
office of Congressman in the 1st District of Ilocos Norte, claiming that his Certificate of Candidacy was fatally
defective. Ruiz alleged that Fariñas had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman despite his failure to
file a Certificate of Candidacy for said office, violating the Omnibus Elecion Code.

Fariñas then filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC, substituting candidate Chevylle V. Fariñas who
withdrew on April 3, 1998. The Commission then dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Ruiz then filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Fariñas could not validly substitute for Chevylle V.
Fariñas, since the latter was not the official candidate of the Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), but
was an independent candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an independent candidate. Thus, Fariñas'
certificate of candidacy claiming to be the official candidate of LAMMP in lieu of Chevylle V. Fariñas was fatally
defective, according to Ruiz.

Despite the petition, Rodolfo C. Fariñas was elected Congressman in the May 11, 1998 elections. He took his oath
of office as member of the House of Representatives on June 3, 1998.

Petitioner herein then filed his “Petition-in-Intervention”, averring that he was the official candidate of the Liberal
Party (LP) in the said elections, and contended that Fariñas, having failed to file his Certificate of Candidacy on or
before the last day, Fariñas illegally resorted to the remedy of substitution. Thus, Fariñas’ disqualification was in
order. He then asked that the position be declared vacant and special elections called for, but disallowing the
candidacy of Fariñas.

The COMELEC then ruled that the determination of the validity of the Certificate of Candidacy of Fariñas is already
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not it is true that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over election contests.
HOLDING
YES. While the COMELEC is vested with power to declare valid or invalid a Certificate of Candidacy, its refusal to
exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Fariñas is a recognition of the
jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.
Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to
the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Whether respondent Fariñas
validly substituted Chevylle V. Fariñas and whether respondent became a legitimate candidate must be addressed
to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: Villarosa v. HRET
G.R. NO. 143351 DATE: Sept. 14, 2000
PONENTE: Davide, Jr. TOPIC: Election Contest: Disallowing initials of
husband
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Filed with the Court are two petitions for certiorari, assailing, among others, the ruling of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that "JTV" votes should not be counted in favor of petitioner and
declaring that "JTV" votes or votes consisting of variations of "JTV" are stray votes. The HRET held against
petitioner Ma. Amelita C. Villarosa, wife of Jose Tapales Villarosa, then the incumbent Representative of the Lone
Legislative District of Occidental Mindoro, for various reasons.
In her affidavit asking for the insertion of "GIRLIE" between her given name and surname she stated that she was
known as GIRLIE in every barangay of the Province of Occidental Mindoro. This is an admission that, indeed, her
nickname is not "JTV" but "GIRLIE." In fact, votes cast for "GIRLIE" were credited in her favor. Hence, the
counting in her favor of ballots bearing "JTV" votes on the line for Representative would be tantamount to
injustice because that would allow VILLAROSA to use two nicknames, "GIRLIE" and "JTV," which would be in
violation of the second paragraph of Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing candidates to use only
one nickname or stage name by which they are generally or popularly known in the locality.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Petitioner argued that "JTV" was her designated nickname in the official list of candidates submitted by the
provincial election supervisor to the COMELEC in Manila. It was the nickname she used in her posters, handbills
and other election propaganda throughout the campaign period. In her speeches during the rallies, she urged the
voters who might have found her full name difficult to write to simply vote "JTV," as she had decided to use that
nickname as a shortcut of her name as a married woman under Article 370 of the Civil Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in not counting in favor of VILLAROSA the votes
for "JTV" or derivatives thereof.
HOLDING
No. Article 370 of the Civil Code, which petitioner invokes, provides no relief for her. The article enumerates the
names, which a married woman may use. One of them is "her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating
that she is his wife, such as Mrs." If petitioner had availed herself of this, as she suggested in her petition and
during the oral argument, then her name would be "Mrs. Jose Tapales Villarosa." If for expediency and
convenience she would use the initials of her husband, then her name, in initials would be "Mrs. JTV." Even if
petitioner decided to use "JTV" as her nickname for purposes of the 11 May 1998 elections, one must never
forget that she never used it as a nickname before she filed her certificate of candidacy. The nickname which the
second paragraph of Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code allows to be included in the certificate of
candidacy is that "by which the candidate is generally or popularly known." This clearly means the nickname by
which one has been generally or popularly known before the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but not what the
candidate wants to thereafter use. By her own statement under oath in her affidavit of 16 April 1998, petitioner
solemnly declared that she was generally and popularly known in every barangay in Occidental Mindoro as
"GIRLIE" before and after she filed her certificate of candidacy. And, as asserted by her counsel during the oral
argument, her other nickname before she filed her certificate of candidacy was "Mrs. JTV," not "JTV."

1
TITLE: DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DELA
CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, respondents.
G.R. NO. 189466 DATE: February 11, 2010
PONENTE: ABAD, J. TOPIC: Pre-proclamation controversies v. Election
contests; scope of inquiry; When proper
Election Contest
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of Aangat Tayo and Bantay
respectively. Two consolidated cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in
the lower house of Congress.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET assailing the jusridiction of HRET over the Party list nd
its representatives. HRET dismissed the proceeding but upheld the jurisdiction over the nominated
representatives who now seeks certiorari before the SC.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantayparty-list organizations, respectively,
who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.
HOLDING
Yes, HRET has jurisdiction. It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a
nominee, the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list
organization, in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to
Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody. Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House
of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

Hence, respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question
of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: PERLA GARCIA, PAZ CRUZ and GERALDINE PADERNAL, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and REP. HARRY ANGPING (3rd DISTRICT
MANILA), respondents.
G.R. NO. 134792 DATE: August 12, 1999
PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J. TOPIC: Pre-proclamation controversies v. Election
contests; scope of inquiry; When proper
Election Contest
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed ten (10) day period from respondent Harry Angping's proclamation as duly
elected Representative for the 3rd District of Manila, petitioners, all duly registered voters in the district, filed a
petition for quo warranto before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against Congressman
Harry Angping. Petitioners questioned the eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office in the House of
Representatives, claiming that the latter was not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a constitutional
requirement. They prayed that Congressman Angping be declared ineligible to assume or hold office as member
of the House of Representatives and for the candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates to be proclaimed the winner.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Upon filing of their petition, petitioners duly paid the required P5,000.00 filing fee. On June 10, 1998, however the
HRET issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for quo warranto for failure to pay the P5,000.00 cash deposit
required by its Rules. After receiving a copy of the aforesaid Resolution, petitioners paid the P5,000.00 cash
deposit on June 26, 1998 and attached the corresponding receipt to the Motion for Reconsideration they filed with
the HRET on the same day. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied, in view of Rule 32 of
the 1998 HRET Rules which required a P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing fees for quo warranto cases.
Hence this petition.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the HRET has committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for quo warranto
of petitioners even after the payment of deposit fee
HOLDING
No, the HRET did not commit grave abuse in dismissing the petition. The HRET has a judgment call and has the
authority to implement its rules. As long as the exercise of such discretion is based on a well-founded factual and
legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal. In view of the delicate nature
of the charge against Congressman Angpin, the observance of the HRET Rules of Procedure must be taken
seriously if they are to obtain their objective. The petitioners are duty bound to know and are expected to properly
comply with the procedural requirements laid down by the tribunal without being formally ordered to do so.
Imperative justice requires the proper observance of technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper and
swift dispensation.
notes, if any:
“Petitioners cannot righteously impute abuse of discretion to the Tribunal if by reason of the non-observance of
those requirements it decides to dismiss their petition. Imperative justice requires the proper observance of
technicalities precisely designated to ensure its proper and swift dispensation. “
Under the Constitution, the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of its members. This does not, however, bar the Supreme Court from entertaining petitions which
charge HRET with grave abuse of discretion. That the Court may very well inquire into the issue of whether the
complained act of the HRET has been made with grave abuse of discretion may be inferred from Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution. Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET provides that in addition to filing fees, a petitioner
in quo warranto proceedings should make a Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit with the Tribunal.
The cash deposit required in quo warranto cases must be paid together with the filing fee at the time the petition
is filed.

1
TITLE: CHAVEZ v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 105323 DATE: July 3, 1992
PONENTE: TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Court issued a Resolution in disqualifying private respondent Melchor Chavez from running for the Office of
Senator 1992 elections. On the same day when resolution was received by respondent Comelec, petitioner filed a
motion with the Comelec praying that it order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as
printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and "to count all votes cast for the
disqualified Melchor Chavez in favor of Francisco Chavez.

The Comelec issued Resolution which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified
candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner as well as the
cancellation of Melchor Chavez' name in the list of qualified candidates which, according to petitioner, it violates
Sec. 7, RA 7166 which states that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be the duty of the Commission to
instruct without delay the deletion of the name of said candidate. The name of Melchor Chavez remained
undeleted in the list of qualified candidates on election day. Confusion arose as the "Chavez" votes were either
declared stray or invalidated by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent Comelec praying the latter to re-open the ballot boxes in
13 provinces including the NCR involving some 80,348 precincts, to scan for the "Chavez" votes for purposes of
crediting the same in his favor, make the appropriate entries in the election returns/certificates of canvass, and to
suspend the proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain Francisco's petition.
HOLDING

No. A simple reading of the petition would readily show that the controversy presented being one in the nature of
a pre-proclamation. Under Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code, while the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction
over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials, nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are
not allowed in elections for President, VP, Senator and Member of the HOR. Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166
provides that for purposes of the elections for President, VP, Senator and Member of the HOR, no pre-
proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be.

In the case at bar, petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction of "manifest errors in the certificates of
canvass or election returns" before the Comelec but for the re-opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the
ballots contained therein. To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or
election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of
canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings

notes, if any:

1
TITLE: FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, petitioner vs. THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent
G.R. NO. 83767 DATE: October 27, 1988
PONENTE: GANCAYCO J. TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:
This is a petition to nullify the resolution of the SET denying the Motion for Disqualification/ Inhibition against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections
by the Commission on Elections.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
The Petitioners filed with the SET a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senator-Members thereof from
the hearing and resolution of the case on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Senators
Saguisag and Paterno also filed for disqualification of Senator-Members. Senator Enrile voluntary inhibited himself
from performing and the 5 senators were disqualified to be part of the tribunal leaving only the 3 Justices to be part
of the Tribunal. Petitioners argue that the SET cannot make a judgement because there are no senator-members.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the SET can render judgement given a lack of Senator-members.
HOLDING
NO. Art VI Sec 17 is a clear expression of an intent that all contests shall be resolved by a panel or body in which
their (the Senators) peers in that Chamber are represented. The Constitutional provision clearly mandates the
participation in the same process of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court. In this
situation where senators cannot sit in the tribunal due to the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and
ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators. The overriding
consideration is that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform,
the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less
than the fundamental law.
notes, if any:
Related Provision:

Art VI Sec. 17 1987 Constitution – “The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”

1
TITLE: Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, et.al. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal et. al.
G.R. NO. 141489 DATE: Nov. 29, 2002
PONENTE: Carpio, J TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect which seeks to promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system in consonance of Sec. 2
of the Republic Act 7941.
On 11 May 1998, national elections were held, which included for the first time the election of party-list
group through popular vote. Subsequently, the House constituted its House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and Commission of Appointments contingent by electing representatives to these bodies. It appears that no one
from the party-list group was nominated.
On 18 January 2000, Senator Pimentel wrote two letters to Senate President Ople as Chairman of
Commission of Appointments and Justice Melo as chairman of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal to
reorganize both bodies in order to include party-list representative in accordance to Sec. 17 and 18 Art. VI of the
Constitution.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
On 2 February 2000, Petitioners filed a petition in the Supreme Court assailing that party-list
representatives should have at least 1.2 seat in the HRET and 2.4 seats in CA. They assert that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on Senator Pimentel’s letter. Hence, they invoked
section 11 of Republic Act 7941. The Solicitor General’s consolidated comment shows that the party-list group
only constitutes 6.36% of the House.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the present composition of the HRET violates the constitutional requirement of proportional
representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET.
HOLDING
No. Petition is dismissed. The composition of the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal and
Commission of Appointments is within the prerogative of the House of Representative as defined within
constitutional limits. The House of Representatives may choose from among its district and party-list
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted in the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal and
Court of Appeals in pursuant to sections 171 and 182 in the 1987 constitution. Thus, the primary recourse to the
House of Representatives is necessary. The Court cannot resolve and interfere with the issues presented
because it cannot violate the doctrine of separation of powers. The House of Representatives is constitutionally
mandated to govern such matters unless there has been a clear violation of the Constitution. The presence of a
constitutional question needs to have an actual controversy, a substantial interest in the resolution of the
controversy, a controversy has been raised in the earliest reasonable opportunity and resolution must be
indispensable to the final determination of the controversy. Given these circumstances, the instant case has not
alleged that there was an unlawful deprivation on the part of the petitioners. The petitioners must first show that
they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal and Commission of Appointments. However, the Court held that the said case has already become moot
and academic because elections had been held last May 14, 2001. Also, they have refrained from participating in
the election process and designating nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions.

1
TITLE: DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner, vs. REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO
M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice
representative Juanito G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,
respondents.
G.R. NO. 97710 DATE: September 26, 1991
PONENTE: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J TOPIC: INDEPENDENCE
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and
Emigdio Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth
District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining
6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP).
Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP
voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing
him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo
Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the
promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of
the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election
of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered by the Constitution to interfere with the disposition of
an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal on the representation in the tribunal of the majority party.
HOLDING
NO. The Court held that the purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification of
members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the
legislature. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan, expelling Congressman Camasura from
the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination
and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed
a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution.
Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, dictates that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the “sole” judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members, the Court also held that the HRET is a non-political body, the use of the
word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the
exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although
two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier
said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of
Representatives. Hence, the Court declared the decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void abinitio for being violative of the Constitution.
TITLE: REP. VIRGILIO P. ROBLES, petitioner, vs. HON. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and ROMEO L. SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. NO. 86647 DATE: February 5, 1990
PONENTE: NATURE:
FACTS: MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order assailing the resolutions of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET): 1) dated September 19, 1988 granting herein private respondent's
Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, and 2) dated January 26, 1989, denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of
Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Petitioner Robles
was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987. Rep. Virgilio Robles elected to 1st Dist. of Caloocan. Romeo
Santos then filed an elec. contest w/ HRET (electoral fraud & irregularities) & called for re-counting / re-appreciation
of votes. Santos filed Motion to Withdraw Contest but later filed Urgent Motion to Recall/Disregard his Previous
Motion. 1st Motion not acted upon by HRET, 2nd Motion granted. Robles claimed that the 1st motion divested HRET
of jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not HRET acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion thus giving the Supreme
Jurisdiction over the subject matter
DOCTRINES | HELD:
The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any action
on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. It is an
established doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of the parties but continues until the
case is terminated.

Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only
when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already
acquired. Petition is dismissed. Tribunal retains the power and the authority to grant or deny Protestant's Motion to
Withdraw, if only to ensure that the Tribunal retains enough authority to see to it that the will of the electorate is
ascertained. Electoral tribunal has been set up in order that any doubt as to right/mandate to a public office may
be fully resolved vis-a-vis the popular/public will. To this end, it is important that the tribunal be allowed to perform
its functions as a constitutional body, unhampered by technicalities or procedural play of words. ACCORDINGLY,
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in
issuing the assailed resolutions, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

1
TITLE: JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET)
and AUGUSTO L. SYJUCO, JR.
G.R. NO. 118597 DATE: July 14, 1995.
PONENTE: FRANCISCO, J TOPIC: Action, decision: Precinct-level documents
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Congressional candidate private respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., filed an election protest before public
respondent (HRET) five days after the Makati board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner Joker P. Arroyo the duly
elected congressman for the lone district of Makati in the May 1992 synchronized national and local elections.
He alleged irregularities/anomalies in the tabulation and entries of votes and massive fraud, private respondent
Syjuco sought the revision and recounting of ballots cast in 1,292 out of the total 1,714 precincts of Makati from
which result he aimed to be declared as the duly elected congressman of Makati. Petitioner filed a counter-protest
questioning the residence qualification of private respondent Syjuco, but the same was dismissed by public
respondent HRET. As prayed for by private respondent, revision of the ballots was undertaken, but not without
serious irregularities having been unearthed in the course thereof. Tasked by public respondent HRET to
investigate on the matter, now retired Supreme Court Justice Gancayco confirmed the irregularities and anomalies
engineered by some HRET officials and personnel. At the core of Justice Gancayco's findings and evaluation are
protested precincts in this case which exhibited cases of dumping, consistent reduction in Arroyo votes, falsification
of revision reports and pilferage of ballots. Private respondent veered away from his original posture that his protest
should be decided on the basis of a revision and recounting of ballots, and instead called upon public respondent
HRET to decide the case on the basis of what private respondent himself expressly admits as a "truly innovative
and NON-TRADITIONAL process" — the PRECINCT-LEVEL DOCUMENT-BASED EVIDENCES
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
WON HRET commit grave abuse of discretion in proceeding to decide the election protest based on private
respondent's "precinct-level document-based anomalies/evidence" theory
HOLDING
YES. However guised or justified by private respondent, this innovative theory he introduced for the first time in his
addendum indeed broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what he originally sought-the mere revision
of ballots. From his initial prayer for revision which lays primary, if not exclusive emphasis on the physical recount
and appreciation of ballots alone, private respondent's belated attempt to inject this theory at the memorandum
stage calls for presentation of evidence (consisting of thousands of documents) aside from, or other than, the ballots
themselves. By having done so, private respondent in fact intended to completely abandon the process and results
of the revision and thereafter sought to rely on his brainchild process he fondly coined as "precinct-level document-
based evidence." This is clearly substantial amendment of the election protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of
the HRET.

The majority violated with open eyes its own rules when they resolved not to dismiss the protest — a clear indication
of grave abuse of discretion. The least that HRET could have done thereafter was to conduct further hearing so
that petitioner Arroyo may have examined, objected to and adduced evidence controverting private respondent
Syjuco's "precinct-level document-based evidence" despite the time within which the parties are allowed to present
their evidence has already lapsed

Private respondent's "precinct-level document-based anomalies/evidence" theory having been introduced only at
the homestretch of the proceedings, is bound by the issue which he essentially raised in his election protest. For
the rule in an election protest is that the protestant or counter protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had
raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for the filing. Private
respondent is therefore bound by the final results of the revision confirming petitioner's victory over him by a plurality
of 13,092 votes

1
TITLE: ROSETTE YNIGUEZ LERIAS v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ROGER
G. MERCADO
G.R. NO. 97105 DATE: October 15, 1991
PONENTE: PARAS, J TOPIC: Sec. 17; Pre-proclamation controversy; Action/
Decision
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Rosette Y. Lerias filed her certificate of candidacy as the official of the UPP-KBL for the position of
Representative for the lone district of Southern Leyte in the May 11, 1987 elections. In her certificate of candidacy,
she gave her full name as "Rosette Yniguez Lerias". Her maiden name is Rosette Yniguez. Respondent Roger
G. Mercado was the administration candidate for the same position. During the canvass of votes for the
congressional candidates by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Southern Leyte, the candidates who received
the two (2) highest number of votes were Roger G. Mercado and Rosette Y. Lerias. In the provincial board’s copy
of the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Libagon, Lerias received 1,811 votes while Mercado received
1,351. But, the provincial board of canvassers ruled that their copy of the certificate of canvass contained
erasures, alterations and super imposition's and therefore, cannot be used as basis of the canvass. The provincial
board of canvassers rejected the explanation of the members of the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon
that said corrections were made to correct honest clerical mistakes which did not affect the integrity of the
certificate and said corrections were made in the presence of the watchers of all the nine (9) candidates for the
position, including those of Mercado who offered no objection.

Nevertheless, the Comelec, in its Resolution directed the provincial board of canvassers to complete the canvass
by crediting Mercado 1,351 votes and Lerias 1,411 votes, the votes received by them, respectively, as shown in
the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass. Subsquently, the provincial board of canvassers reconvened,
resumed the canvass and proclaimed Mercado, as the winning candidate, having received the highest number of
votes. Lerias contended that in the four (4) protested precincts of Libagon where her votes were determined to be
1,411 only, the same were allegedly reduced by 100 votes in each precinct, thus totalling 400. To prove her
contention, Lerias submitted original copies of the certificate of canvass of the municipal board of canvassers and
the provincial board of canvassers. She also invoked the original copy of the election returns for the municipal
board of canvassers of Libagon.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or Not, the RTC’s decision to affirm the proclamation of Roger G. Mercado as the Winning Representative
of Southern Leyte is unconstitutional?
HOLDING
YES. There was a blatant abuse of discretion when the presentation of the pieces of evidence and the school
teachers as witnesses for the petitioner was ignored and denied, even when they qualify to be the best pieces of
evidence and the most qualified to be a witness for the said litigation. Hence, the decision was politicized and
unmistakably biased for Mercado. The independence of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, (HRET,
for brevity) as a constitutional body has time and again been upheld by this Court in many cases. The power of the
HRET, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of its members is beyond
dispute. (Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution).

Thus, judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the HRET is possible only in the exercise of this Court's so-
called "extra-ordinary jurisdiction" upon a determination that the tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of discretion that there
has to be a remedy for such abuse. Then only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown that the Court
interferes with the HRET's judgment or decision.

1
TITLE: FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
(HRET) and AURORA ROSARIO A. ORETA, respondents.
G.R. NO. 149380 DATE: July 3, 2002
PONENTE: BELLOSILLO, J TOPIC: action/decision - service of summons
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Sandoval and respondent Oreta were candidates for the lone congressional district of Malabon-Navotas
during the 14 May 2001 national elections. The canvass of the election returns yielded a difference of 19,200 votes
with Sandoval on the lead, hence he was proclaimed duly elected representative and assumed post after taking
his oath. Oreta then filed with the HRET an election protest against Sandoval assailing the alleged electoral frauds
and anomalies in 1,308 precincts of the district.

HRET issued corresponding summons for service upon petitioner. HRET Process Server Lim served the summons
by substituted service upon a certain Gene Maga, personnel in petitioner’s office, who signed the process server's
copy of the summons and indicated thereon his position as "maintenance" along with the date and time of his
receipt thereof. HRET then issued a resolution which took note of petitioner Sandoval's failure to file an answer to
the election protest within 10 days from date of service of the summons and entered in his behalf a general denial
of the allegations set forth in the protest.

Petitioner moved to file a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the substituted service of summons upon him
was improperly affected upon a maintenance man Maga who was “neither a regular employee nor responsible
officer.” The Solicitor General found that the substituted service of summons upon petitioner was faulty and thus
recommended favourable action on the petition.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not substituted service of summons was validly affected on herein petitioner Federico S. Sandoval II
in the election protest filed by herein respondent Aurora Rosario A. Oreta before the HRET.
HOLDING
NO. Compliance with the rules on the service of summons is both a concern of jurisdiction as it is of due process.
Sandoval should have been given by public respondent a fair chance to defend the legitimacy of his lead of 19,200
votes over respondent Oreta and dispel any cloud on his election. It is well-established that summons upon a
respondent or a defendant (i.e., petitioner herein) must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if
he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice
desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. If, however efforts to find him
personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service. Substituted
service is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of
a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another whom the law could only presume
would notify him of the pending proceedings.
For service of summons to be valid, it is necessary first to establish the following circumstances:
(a) impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time, (b) efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and,
(c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein or some competent person in charge of
his office or regular place of business.
It is also essential that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or officer's
return itself and only under exceptional terms may they be proved by evidence aliunde. Failure to comply with this
rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the respondent. In the case at hand, the requirement of the service
upon some competent person in charge of his office of regular place of business was not complied with as Maga,
a “maintenance” man, was not tasked to deal with or handle documents flowing in and out of petitioner’s office.
There was no proof that Sandoval received the summons and a copy of the election protest which would have
otherwise satisfied the purpose of giving notice of the pending suit.
TITLE: Lokin v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. DATE:
PONENTE: TOPIC: Article VI, Sec. 17,
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Luis K. Lokin is one of the nominees filed by the Citizens’ Batlle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the 2007
Elections through the party president Emmanuel Jose Villanueva, should CIBAC obtain the required number of
qualifying votes. The complete roster of CIBAC nominees were accepted and was published in two newspapers of
general circulation: The Philippine Star and The Philippine Daily Inquirer. Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC
filed a certificate of nomination, substitution, and amendment of the list of nominees which withdrew the nominations
of Lokin, as well as two (2) others. Following the close of the polls, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC
Chairperson Benjamin Abalos transmitting the signed petitions of more than 81 CIBAC members to confirm the
withdrawals of Lokin and the other nominees, stating that Lokin was not among the nominees presented and
proclaimed by CIBAC in its proclamation rally.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
CIBAC filed with the COMELEC through its counsel a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second
nominee. This motion was opposed by Villanueva and a certain Cruz-Gonzales, one of the replacements in the
earlier amended list of nominees by Villanueva. Notwithstanding Villanueva's filing of the certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the
COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC.

The COMELEC then issued a resolution where it resolved the validity of Lokin and the other nominees’ nominations,
while the COMELEC issued a resolution to partially proclaim the parties that won in the elections which included
CIBAC. The COMELEC issued another resolution stating CIBAC’s entitlement to an additional seat. With this
declaration, CIBAC Secretary-General informed the House of Representatives Secretary-General the promulgation
of the latter resolution on CIBAC’s entitlement to another seat and requested for Lokin to be sworn in to be able to
assume office but was denied due to the pendency of E.M. No. 07-054.

The COMELEC then moved to resolved E.M. No. 07-054 which approved the withdrawal of the first set of nominees
including Lokin. The COMELEC explained that Villanueva’s actions were valid as this was within his capacity as
CIBAC’s president, and officially proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee of CIBAC as a Party-List
Representative. Lokin then filed a petition for mandamus and certiorari to ultimately have him proclaimed as the
second nominee of CIBAC, citing that R.A. 7941, COMELEC’s basis on implementing their decision.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC
without any basis in fact or law and after the close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate
in nature.
HOLDING
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization can substitute
another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the
nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes
incapacitated. Hence, the COMELEC had no authority to expand, extend, or add anything to law it seeks to
implement. Their decisions should remain consistent with the law it intends to carry out not override, supplant or
modify it.

1
TITLE: BAI SANDRA S.A. SEMA, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and DIDAGEN P.
DILANGALEN, respondents
G.R. NO. 190734 DATE: March 26, 2010
PONENTE: PERALTA, J TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On 12 June 2007, protestant Bai Sandra S.A. Sema, a congressional candidate of the Lakas-CMD who obtained
87,237 votes or 18,345-vote difference from protestee Dilangalen, who obtained 105,582 votes, filed an election
protest against the latter. Allegedly, it was on 1 June 2007, when the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Shariff
Kabunsuan proclaimed protestee Didagen P. Dilangalen as Representative of the Lone District of Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City (as no certified true copy of the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of
the Winning Candidate for Member of the House of Representatives was attached to the protest.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
On September 10, 2009, the HRET issued the assailed Decision. The HRET found that majority of the ballots in
the 195 protested precincts of Datu Odin Sinsuat were rejected as fake or spurious ballots since they did not contain
security features described by Commissioner Resurreccion Borra of the COMELEC. It was also pointed out that
"Reports on Revision Results, duly signed by both parties' revisors, showed that during the revision, all the ballot
boxes in the 195 protested precincts of Datu Odin Sinsuat had no self-locking metal seals thus, it cannot be
conclusively stated, that the ballot boxes at the time that they were opened for revision purposes were in the same
condition as they were when closed by the Chairman and Members of the Board of Election Inspectors after the
completion of the canvassing proceedings." On the other hand, only one (1) out of the 248 ballot boxes of the
counter-protested precincts contained ballots. Nevertheless, the HRET ruled that petitioner failed to prove by
convincing evidence that the election itself, conducted on May 14, 2007, was tainted by fraud and irregularities that
frustrated the will of the electorate. The HRET concluded that the ballots and/or ballot boxes must have been
tampered with after the elections and the counting and canvassing of votes. Thus, the HRET relied on the election
returns and other election documents to arrive at the number of votes validly cast for petitioner and respondent
Dilangalen.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by
relying on election returns and other election documents, in determining who won in the May 14, 2007
congressional elections for the Lone District of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City
HOLDING
No. The HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the general rule is, if what is being questioned is
the correctness of the number of votes for each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence is the ballots
themselves. However, this rule applies only if the ballots are available and their integrity has been preserved from
the day of elections until revision. When the ballots are unavailable or cannot be produced, then recourse can be
made to untampered and unaltered election returns or other election documents as evidence.

In Rosal v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled, where a ballot box is found in such a condition as would raise
a reasonable suspicion that unauthorized persons could have gained unlawful access to its contents, no evidentiary
value can be given to the ballots in it and the official count reflected in the election return must be upheld as the
better and more reliable account of how and for whom the electorate voted. Nothing on record shows that the
election returns, tally sheets and other election documents that the HRET had on hand had been tampered or
altered. Since it is undisputed that there are hardly any valid or authentic ballots upon which the HRET could base
its determination of the number of votes cast for each of the parties, the HRET merely acted in accordance with
settled jurisprudence when it resorted to untampered and/or unaltered election returns and other election
documents as evidence of such votes.

1
TITLE: Henry “Jun” Duenas Jr. V. HRET and Angelito "JETT" P. Reyes
G.R. NO. 191550 DATE: May 4, 2010
PONENTE: CORONA, J. TOPIC: HRET Jurisdiction
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Henry "Jun" Dueñas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito "Jett" P. Reyes were rival candidates for the
position of congressman in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national
and local elections. After the canvass of the votes, petitioner was proclaimed the winner, having garnered 28,564
votes as opposed to private respondent’s 27,107 votes.

Respondent filed an election protest to recount 170 of 732 precincts. Not to be outdone, Petitioner counter
protested 560 precincts. Both claimed massive electoral frauds that were in favor of their opponent. After the
issues were joined, the HRET ordered that all ballot boxes and other election materials involved in the protest and
counter-protest be collected and retrieved, and brought to its offices for custody.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
After completing the 170 protested votes and having completed 25% of the counter protested precincts, petitioner
filed a motion to withdraw the remaining 75% contested precincts from the revision of ballots. This was denied by
the HRET. On November 27, 2008, the HRET issued a resolution under Rule 88 of the HRET Rules and settled
jurisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion either to dismiss the protest or counter-protest, or to continue with
the revision if necessitated by reasonable and sufficient grounds affecting the validity of the election. This was
with the end in view of ascertaining the true choice of the electorate.

It was the HRET’s position that the mere motion to withdraw of the petitioner did not suddenly remove their
jurisdiction over the case. It was to complete its task of examining the contested ballots. The will of the electorate
was not confined to the examination of contested ballots. Under its plenary power, it could motu propio review the
validity of every ballot involved in a protest or counter-protest and the same could not be frustrated by the mere
expedient of filing a motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining counter-protested precincts.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or Not HRET committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the petitioner’s motion to withdraw or
abandon his remaining 75% counter-protested precincts. (NO)
HOLDING
The Court finds no merit in the petition. 1st, Indeed, due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as an
independent constitutional body require that any finding of grave abuse of discretion against that body should be
based on firm and convincing proof, not on shaky assumptions. Any accusation of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the HRET must be established by a clear showing of arbitrariness and improvidence. But the Court
finds no evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET. 2nd the Constitution mandates that the HRET
“shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of its members. By
employing the word “sole,” the Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of
election contests involving its members is exclusive and exhaustive. Its exercise of power is intended to be its
own full, complete and unimpaired The Tribunal adopted Rule 7 of the HRET Rules: The Tribunal shall have
exclusive control, direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation.

Finally, it is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated. Thus, in Robles v. HRET, the Court ruled: The mere filing of the motion to
withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal,
does not by itself divests the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon
the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority
to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold
otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.
notes, if any:
• Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodies? (But who is to guard the guardians themselves?) –Corona, J.

1
TITLE: DAZA vs SINGSON
G.R. NO. DATE:
PONENTE: TOPIC: Proportional representation of political parties in the CA is understood
to mean proportional representation of PERMANENT political parties. (political
alignment)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Rep. Daza represents the Liberal Party (LP) in the Commission on Appointments (CA). When
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized, the political realignment resulted in
the swelling of the number of LDP members to 159 and diminishing of that of LP to 17. The
House consequently revised its representation in the CA giving Daza’s seat to Singson as
additional member from the LDP.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Daza now comes to this Court to challenge his removal, arguing that the LDP is not the
permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution because it has not been registered.
However, when LDP was subsequently registered, he then contended that it must still pass the
test of time to prove its permanence.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the replacement of Daza in the CA is in accordance with the
proportional representation of parties contemplated in Art VI, Sec 18 of the Constitution
HOLDING
(1) Yes. Under Daza’s theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the
House would still not be entitled to representation in the CA as long as it was organized
only recently and has not yet “aged.” LP itself would fall in such a category. Yet no
question was raised as to its right to be represented in the CA by virtue of its status as
the majority party. At that time, it was only 4 months old. It is true that there have been,
and there still are, some internal disagreements among the members of LDP, but these
are to be expected in any political organization and it surely cannot be considered
temporary because of such discord. We resolve in favor of the authority of the House of
Reps to change its representation in the CA to reflect at any time the changes that may
transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes
must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances.
TITLE: Coseteng v. Mitra
G.R. NO. 86649 DATE: July 12, 1990
PONENTE: GRIÑO-AQUINO TOPIC: Proportional Representation
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of Representatives of the
candidates of diverse political parties.Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected
under the banner of Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan(KAIBA). On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives,
upon nomination by the Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced Majority,
eleven (11) out of twelve (12) congressmen to represent the House in the Commission on Appointments. On
September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan,
Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the Commission on Appointments, representing the Coalesced Minority in the
House. A year later, the "Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP) was organized as a political party. As 158 out of
202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including
the House representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized. On October 8, 1988,
petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be
appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal. Her request was
endorsed by nine (9) congressmen. After the reorganization, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th
member representing the House minority.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (which may
be considered as a petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying this Court to declare as null and void the
election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat,
Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such
and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments
on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation. Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the Commission on Appointments
as a representative of the Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other congressmen and congresswomen
of the Minority.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
HOLDING
No. The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent
79% of the House membership. Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would
equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were
apportioned to the LP as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL as the principal opposition
party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on
Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein." The other
political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA, are bound by the majority's choices. Even if
KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents only .4% or less than
1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on
Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party
should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership.

1
TITLE: TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA v. GONZALES
G.R. No. 106971 DATE: October 20, 1992
PONENTE: TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:

After the May 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-
NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12
representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party)
x 12 seats) / Total No. of Senators elected. Sen. Romulo in as Majority Floor Leader nominated 8 senators for
membership in the Commission on Appointments (COA). The nomination of the senators was objected to by
Petitioner Sen. Guingona, as Minority Floor Leader, and Sen. John Osmeña, in representation of the NPC.

To resolve the impasse, Sen. Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise to the effect that Senate elect 12
members to the Commission on Appointments, 8 coming from the LDP, 2 coming from NPC, 1 coming from the
Liberal Party, with the understanding that if any party is found to have an excess in representation and if any
party is found to have a deficiency in representation, that party will be entitled to nominate and have elected by
this body its additional representatives.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Sen. Guingona filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit the respondent Senate
Pres. Gonzales from recognizing the membership of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tañada, as the lone
member representing the LP-PDP-LABAN, in the COA on the ground that the proposed compromise of Sen.
Tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional representation consistent with the Constitution.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tañada as members of the Commission
on Appointments is in accordance with the provision of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
HOLDING

No. It is not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution because it is not in
compliance with the requirements that 12 senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of
the resulting fractional membership of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional
membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a
whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the
Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a
representation.

Section 18 also assures representation in the COA of any political party who succeeds in electing members
to the Senate. Drawing from the ruling in Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr., where a political party must have at least 2
senators in the Senate to be able to have a representatives in the COA, the court lay down the ff. guidelines: (1)
In the Senate, political party or coalition must have at least two duly elected senators for every seat in the
Commission on Appointments, (2) Where there are more than two political parties represented in the Senate, a
political party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally claims seat in the Commission.

1
TITLE: B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO GUDANI vs LT./GEN. GENEROSO SENGA AS CHIEF STAFF OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 170165 DATE: August 15, 2006
PONENTE: Tinga, J. TOPIC: Sec 21 - Power of Inquiry
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan, to
appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security to shed light on the
“Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of
Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment
from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two testified before the Senate,
prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost
Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily
retired from military service. After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of
Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be
declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their successors-in-
interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against them,
as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from
testifying before a legislative inquiry.
HOLDING
Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as
a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Our ruling that the
President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before
Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President
as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget
appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the
title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies
of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual
members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the
President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the
President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-
in-chief of the armed forces.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still
subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as
commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite
the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the
right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize. The duty
falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers
before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the
legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

1
TITLE: NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC v. SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD
G.R. No. 72492 DATE: November 5, 1987
PONENTE: TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Assailed is the validity of a subpoena sent by the respondent Committee to the petitioners Paterio Torres
and Arturo Umbac, Chairman of the Board of Directors and the General Manager of petitioner Negros Oriental II
Electric Cooperative NORECO II), requiring their attendance and testimony at the Committee's investigation. The
Committee on the latter date directed said petitioners to show cause why they should not be punished for
legislative contempt due to their failure to appear at said investigation.

The investigation to be conducted by respondent Committee was in connection with pending legislation
related to the operations of public utilities in the City of Dumaguete where petitioner NORECO II, an electric
cooperative, had its principal place of business. Specifically, the inquiry was to focus on the alleged installation
and use by the petitioner NORECO II of inefficient power lines in that city
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Respondent Antonio Uypitching signed both the subpoena and the Order complained of. Petitioners moved
to quash the subpoena on the ground that neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the Local
Government Code grants the Sangguniang Panlungsod any specific power to investigate alleged inefficient
power lines of NORECO II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Sanguniang Panlungsod has the power to mandate the testimony of witnesses and order
arrests who fail to observe the subpoena.
HOLDING

No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local Government Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish
non-members for contempt. Absent of a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only
possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious
behaviour would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But,
the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of
legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions.

Thus, the contempt power, as well as the subpoena power, which the framers of the fundamental law did
not expressly provide for but which the then Congress has asserted essentially for self-preservation as one of
three co-equal branches of the government cannot be deemed implied in the delegation of certain legislative
functions to local legislative bodies.
notes, if any:

1
TITLE: JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., petitioner vs. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS,
respondent
G.R. NO. 89914 DATE: November 20, 1991
PONENTE: PADILLA, J. TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On September 13, 1988, Senate Minority Floor Leader Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech before the
Senate on the alleged take-over of SOLOIL Inc., the flagship of the First Manila Management of Companies
(FMMC) by Mr. Ricardo Lopa. He called upon the Senate to investigate and look into possible violation of R.A.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This allegation was related to the civil and forfeiture case filed by
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) before the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin “Kokoy”
Romualdez for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages for thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39)
companies that were illegally acquired during the term of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Petitioner Jose Bengzon,
et. al. are lawyers under Bengzon’s law firm that were impleaded in the case because they aided and served as
incorporators of the firms which Kokoy and his spouse used in defrauding the Philippine government by using
government money to buy into several big business such as MERALCO, Benguet Consolidated, and PCI Bank.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
The Senate Committee on Public Accountability (Blue Ribbon) acted on Sen. Enrile’s expose and issued subpoena
to petitioners and Mr. Lopa. Mr. Lopa declined to testify since his testimony may “unduly prejudice” the case pending
before the SBN. Petitioner Bengzon likewise declined to testify. Thereupon, petitioner filed before the Supreme
Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief to stop the
Committee from compelling them to attend and testify in its inquiry. Its reasons are as follows: (1) the Committee
inquiry is not in aid of legislation, (2) the sale of the Romualdez corporations is a “purely private matter” outside the
power of the Committee, and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon committee can compel the private respondent from testifying in the inquiry
in aid of legislation.
HOLDING
NO. The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation,
Art VI Sec 21. This power, no matter how broad, is not absolute and unlimited. The exercise of this power is
circumscribed by the provision, to wit: (1) must be in aid of legislation, (2) in accordance with its duly published
rules and procedures, and (3) rights of persons appearing must be respected. The rights referred to are the rights
under the Bill of Rights which include the right to due process and the right against self-incrimination.

The expose of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion of a possible intended legislation. The inquiry is “not in aid of
legislation” but to find out whether Mr. Lopa has violated a law, a matter which is best left to the courts not the
legislature. When the committee decided to inquire into these acts, a civil case was already pending before the
Courts. The Courts have already acquired jurisdiction of the issues to be investigated. Allowing the committee to
tackle the issues will be an encroachment into the exclusive power of the judiciary. It would violate the principle of
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branch of government. Petition is GRANTED. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee can’t compel petitioner from testifying and producing evidence at the said inquiry.

1
TITLE: STANDARD CHARTER BANK et. al. vs SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
AND CURRENCIES
G.R. NO. 167173 DATE: December 27, 2007
PONENTE: Nachura, J TOPIC: Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Standard Chartered Bank (SCB)-Philippines is an institution incorporated in England with limited
liability and is licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other related operations in the Philippines.
On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege speech
entitled "Arrogance of Wealth" before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-
Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No.
8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of
a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred to
respondent.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the initial
hearing on February 28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of the speech and resolution
filed by Senator Enrile. Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the
hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening Statement that brought to the attention of respondent the
lack of proper authorization from affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack
of copies of the accusing documents mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there
were pending court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign
securities.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies can conduct investigation
against SCB despite criminal and civil cases against the pending in courts.
HOLDING
Yes. Central to the Court's ruling in Bengzon — that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was without any
constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative investigation — was the Court's determination that the intended
inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The Court found that the speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such
investigation contained no suggestion of any contemplated legislation; it merely called upon the Senate to look
into possible violations of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, the Court held that the requested probe failed
to comply with a fundamental requirement of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy
is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the
rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be
allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry.

1
TITLE: SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO D. DELA PAZ (Ret.) and MARIA FE C. DELA PAZ, petitioners, vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS and the SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS JOSE
BALAJADIA, JR., respondents.
G.R. NO. 184849 DATE: February 13, 2009
PONENTE: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J TOPIC: IN AID OF LEGISLATION
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner PNP Director Erliseo D. Dela Paz was one of the Philippine delegations of eight (8) senior
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers that attend the 77th General Assembly Session of the International
Criminal Police Organization (ICPO)-INTERPOL in St. Petersburg Moscow, Russia.
2 days after, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities at the Moscow airport departure area
for failure to declare the 105,000 euros found in his luggage and to have in his possession 45,000 euros. Petitioners
were detained in Moscow for questioning. After a few days, Gen. Dela Paz and the PNP delegation were allowed
to return to the Philippines, but the Russian government confiscated the euros.
Petitioners arrived in Manila. Awaiting them were sub poenae issued by respondent Committee for the
investigation on the Moscow incident on. On October 23, 2008, respondent Committee held its first hearing. Instead
of attending the hearing, petitioners filed with respondent Committee a pleading denominated Challenge to
Jurisdiction with Motion to Quash Subpoena. Senator Santiago emphatically defended respondent Committee's
jurisdiction and commanded to arrest the petitioners. Hence, this petition before the court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the said committee has jurisdiction over the matter of state to state relations.
HOLDING
Yes. The Court held that Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:”Each House shall determine
the rules of its proceedings.” This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority
to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. The challenge to the
jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this
Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a
political question. Also, the signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by the approval of the Senate president
and it is shown that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with the Rules. It is also shown that the Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published in two newspapers of general circulation.
REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ, REGHIS M. ROMERO III, MICHAEL L.
ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME R. CANLAS, Petitioners, v. SENATOR JINGGOY E.
ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 174105 DATE: APR 2, 2009
PONENTE: NATURE:
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and compulsory processes issued by the
Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development in connection with its investigation
on the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project.

Pursuant to Resolution No. 537 and 543, Petitioner Reghis Romero II as owner of R-II Builders Inc. was invited by
the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development to attend a public hearing at the Senate
on August 23,2006 regarding the investment of OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare Administration) funds in the
Smokey Mountain project. The investigation is intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments
to the pertinent provisions of RA 8042, The Migrant Workers Act.

Petitioner Romero in his letter-reply requested to be excused from appearing and testifying before the Committee
at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate Resolution Nos. 537 and 543. The
Committee denied his request. On the same date, invitations were sent to the other six petitioners, then members
of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc. requesting them to attend the September 4,2006 Committee hearing.
The next day, Senator Jinggoy Estrada as Chairman of the Committee issued subpoena ad testificandum to
petitioner Romero II directing him to appear and testify before the Committee relative to the aforesaid Senate
resolutions. The Committee later issued subpoenas to the Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc.
ISSUE/S:
Issue: Whether or not the subject matter of the Senate inquiry is sub judice
DOCTRINES | HELD:
NO. The Supreme court held that the sub-judice issue has been rendered moot and academic. An issue or a case
becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the
issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the
petitioner would be entitled, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Thus, there is no more
obstacle-on the ground of sub judice, assuming it is invocable to the continuation of the Committee’s investigation
challenged in this proceeding.

As stated in Arnault vs. Nazareno, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true- recourse must be had to others
who possess it.

The court further held that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear
before it in connection with its investigation of its aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec.21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in
connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected. (Art. VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution)

1
TITLE: VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON
PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS,
respondents.
G.R. NO. 170338 DATE: December 23, 2008.
PONENTE: NACHURA, J TOPIC: Sec. 21, (conduct inquiries in aid of legislation)
Requisites, In accordance with the duly published rules
of procedures.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the
President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They
captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the
present administration on the line and resulted in the near collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously
referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President's instructions to COMELEC Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to
become the subject of heated legislative hearings. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee
members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers
of the House conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. Alarmed by these developments,
petitioner (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be
restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee
reports and for any other purpose. Then the hearings stopped. After more than two years, Senator Lacson roused
the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public the
whole unvarnished truth of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275. It may be noted
that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different objectives — the first is poised at
preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the
second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation. The Court
dismisses the First petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
WON the 14Th SENATE may use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry of the consolidated cases
HOLDING
NO. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. The respondents admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only
in 1995 and in 2006.

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation, while we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry
sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions.

1
TITLE: ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE
ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents
G.R. NO. 180643 DATE: 25 Mar 2008
PONENTE: J. Leonardo-De Castro TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to
push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA, who acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-
government project to be financed through a loan from the Chinese Government.

Petitioner testified on September 26 where he disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered
him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He informed then Pres. Arroyo about the
bribery attempt and that she instructed him to not accept the bribe. However, when he probed further on what
they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive “privilege”. In particular,
he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not Pres. Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether
or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege.
HOLDING
YES. Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President. It exists to
protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the
nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of information
between the President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions
in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the president's
conversations and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses
the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the
constitutionally ordained separation of governmental powers.

The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the government may
withhold from the public," that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters"; and that "the right to information does
not extend to matters recognized as 'privileged information' under the separation of powers, by which the Court
meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings".

1
TITLE: ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO
G.R. NO. DATE:
PONENTE: TOPIC: Power to punish a person under investigation (SUBJECT OF
INQUIRY
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The Government, through the Rural Progress Administration bought the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates. The entire amount allocated to buy said estates was given to a certain
Burt, through his representative petitioner Arnault. Because of the anomalies regarding the
sale of said estates, the Senate created a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates deal. Arnault was called as a witness. The committee sought to determine
who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Govt.
Arnault testified that he delivered 2 checks amounting to P1.5 million to Burt and deposited it
in an account. Further, he testified that he drew on said account 2 checks: one P500,000
which he transferred to another account, and another P440,000 payable to cash, which he
himself cashed. When asked by the Senate committee to reveal the name to whom he gave
the P440,000, he refused and asserted that all the transactions were legal but refuses to
answer because it may be later used against him. In other words, he invoked his right against
self-incrimination. Senate committee cited Arnault in contempt and ordered him imprisoned at
New Bilibid Prison until such time he reveals the name sought.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Arnault now petitions for habeas corpus. He avers the Senate has no power to punish him for
contempt because such information is immaterial to and will not serve any intended or
purported legislation.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not Senate has the power to cite Arnault in contempt and order his
imprisonment
HOLDING
(1) Yes. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative
body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer
any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make,
must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution,
such as to legislate, and every question must be material or pertinent to the subject of the
inquiry or investigation. So, a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that
obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But it does not follow that every
question must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. The necessity or lack
of necessity for legislative action and the character of the action itself are determined by
the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by
a fraction of such information elicited from a single question. The question which Arnault
refused to answer is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. The Special Committee, under
the Senate Resolution creating it, is required to determine the parties responsible for the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to
whom Arnault gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination.
It is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. It is not necessary, as Arnault
contends, for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is
material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be
pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
TITLE: Sabio v. Gordon
G.R. NO. 174340 DATE: October 17, 2006
PONENTE: TOPIC: Article VI, Sec. 21 on the power to punish a
person under investigation
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Former President Corazon Aquino, by virtue of E.O. No. 1, created the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to reclaim all the ill-gotten wealth accumulated and deposed by Former President Ferdinand
Marcos and his allies during the regime. Also stated in E.O. No. 1 in its Section 4(b) that "no member or staff of
the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance" to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of
their function. The constitutionality now of Sec. 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples upon the
senate’s power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Sec. 21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
states that:

“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.”

Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago then introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 which directs an inquiry
in aid of legislation on anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the improprieties in the operations conducted by their Board of Directors. With this,
Senator Richard Gordon then requested the PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and his commissioners to appear as
resource persons in the public meeting by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Service. Sabio declined the invitation invoking sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Senator Gordon then issued an order requiring Sabio to show cause of non-appearance and why they should not
be cited in contempt of the senate. Sabio issued a reply, but the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises, as well as the Committee on Public Services still unconvinced, ordered for his arrest. Hence,
Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P.
Arroyo and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174340.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is unconstitutional
HOLDING
Yes. The 1987 Philippine Constitution recognizes the power of investigation of the congress and any of its
committee because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the bodies. Hence, sec. 4(b) of E.O.
No. 1 is not in line with article VI, sec. 21 of the constitution, invalidating the said statute which makes the exemption
of PCGG members and staff as invalid. The congress’ power of inquiry encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws, as well as proposed and/or possibly needed statutes, and extends to government
agencies created by the congress.

Furthermore, the SC also cited two (2) cases in the issue at bar. In the case of Briggs v. McKellar that the power of
inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. In the case of Arnault v. nazareno, it was stated that the power of inquiry
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to legislative function.

1
TITLE: SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP.
RENATO MAGTUBO, petitioners,vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN.
HERMOGENES EBDANE, respondents
G.R. NO. 159085 DATE: February 3, 2004
PONENTE: TINGA, J TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:

In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, both declaring "a state of rebellion" and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. By
the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers
agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of
rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

In Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et al, party-list organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa
(PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of
rebellion to call out the armed forces. They further submit that, because of the cessation of the Oakwood
occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for
an indefinite period.

Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the
declaration. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation No. 435, declaring that
the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot
cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of "actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decide
a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading review." The case at bar is one such case.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the President attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as
Commander-in-Chief in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces
HOLDING
No. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising her
Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President
by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2),
Article VI. Sec 18, Article VII grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated powers."
From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution
requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires
the exercise of such power. However, as the Court observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
"These conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it
becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.'"

It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by
way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis.

1
TITLE: AMPATUAN V. HON. DILG SEC. PUNO
G.R. NO. 191550 DATE: May 4, 2010
PONENTE: ABAD, J. TOPIC: Executive Power; Local Autonomy
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such
measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence” in the named places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM
from the Office of the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO
by changing the word “transfer” to “delegate”.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy
Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition
under Rule 65. They alleged that the President’s proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy
as these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and to seize the regional
government’s powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of
emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent
incidents occurred and that the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid
exercise of the President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and
273-A be declared unconstitutional.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy
under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the Expanded ARMM
Organic Act; (NO)

2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the
AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City; and (YES)
HOLDING
The Court finds the petition without merit.

1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG
Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the
respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM
Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule on
succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of
the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali‐Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary
therefore did not take over the administration or the operations of the ARMM.

2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution, which provides: SECTION 23: “In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy” The President did
not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not
act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling
out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution
directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

1
TITLE: ALVAREZ vs. GUINGONA
G.R. NO. DATE:
PONENTE: TOPIC: conversion of a municipality into a city
FACTS OF THE CASE:

RA 7720 is “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago.” Its legislative history is as follows.
The public hearings on (HB) House Bill 8817 were under way in the House of Reps when (SB)
Senate Bill 1243, a bill of the same import as the former, was filed in the Senate. The Senate
conducted public hearings on SB 1243 a little less than a month after the HB was passed by
the House of Reps and transmitted to them. The Senate realizing the HB was on all fours with
SB 1243, approved it. The enrolled bill was subsequently passed into law as RA 7720
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Petitioners assail the validity of RA 7720 on the grounds that the act did not exclusively
originate in the House of Reps as mandated by Sec. 24, Art VI of the Constitution and the said
municipality did not reach the minimum average income required under Sec 450 of the Local
Government Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not RA 7720 that originated exclusively in the House of Reps is in
accordance with Sec 24, Art VI of the Constitution
HOLDING
(1) Yes. Although a bill of local application like HB 8817 should xxx originate exclusively in
the House of Reps, the claim of petitioners that RA 7720 did not originate exclusively in
the House of Reps because a bill of the same import SB 1243, was passed in the Senate
is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB 8817 was filed before SB 1243. Thus,
HB 8817 was the bill that initiated the legislative process. Furthermore, the Senate held in
abeyance any action on SB 1243 until it received HB 8817. The filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene
the constitutional requirement that such bill should originate from the Lower House, for as
long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the HB. “What the Constitution
simply means is that the initiative for filing bills of local application must come from the
House of Reps”
TITLE: Southern Cross Cement v. Phil. Cement
G.R. NO. 158540 DATE: July 8, 2004
PONENTE: Tinga TOPIC: Bills of Local Application - Origin
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of cement manufacturing, production, importation and exportation. Private respondent Philippine Cement
Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor) is an association of domestic cement manufacturers. DTI accepted an
application from Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray Portland cement in increased quantities has
caused declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment; as well as
caused depressed local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition a definitive safeguard measures on
the import of cement pursuant to the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
The Tariff Commission received a request from the DTI for a formal investigation to determine whether to impose
a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement. Tariff Commission’s report recommended that
no definitive general safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of the gray cement. After reviewing the
report, then DTI Secretary Manuel Roxas II disagreed with the conclusion of the Tariff Commission that there was
no serious injury to the local cement industry caused by the surge of imports.

In view, the DTI requested an opinion from the Department of Justice. Subsequently, then DOJ Secretary Hernando
Perez rendered an opinion stating that Section 13 of the SMA precluded a review by the DTI Secretary of the Tariff
Commission's negative finding or finding that a definitive safeguard measure should not be imposed. DTI then
denied application for safeguard measures against the importation of gray Portland cement. Subsequently,
respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to set aside
the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions Report. On the other hand, petitioner filed its Comment arguing
that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over Philcemcors Petition.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over the case which is concerned with imposition of safeguard measures.
HOLDING
Yes. Contrary to the stance of the public respondents and Philcemcor, in this case where the DTI Secretary decides
not to impose a safeguard measure, it is the CTA which has jurisdiction to review his decision. The reasons are as
follows: First. Split jurisdiction is abhorred. The law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized
competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review without mention of any other court that may
exercise corollary or ancillary jurisdiction in relation to the SMA. Second. The interpretation of the provisions of the
SMA favors vesting untrammeled appellate jurisdiction on the CTA.

A plain reading of Section 29 of the SMA reveals that Congress did not expressly bar the CTA from reviewing a
negative determination by the DTI Secretary nor conferred on the Court of Appeals such review authority.
Respondents note, on the other hand, that neither did the law expressly grant to the CTA the power to review a
negative determination. However, under the clear text of the law, the CTA is vested with jurisdiction to review the
ruling of the DTI Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. Had the law been couched
instead to incorporate the phrase the ruling imposing a safeguard measure, then respondents claim would have
indisputable merit. Undoubtedly, the phrase in connection with not only qualifies but clarifies the succeeding phrase
imposition of a safeguard measure. As expounded later, the phrase also encompasses the opposite or converse
ruling which is the non-imposition of a safeguard measure. Even assuming arguendo that Section 29 has not
expressly granted the CTA jurisdiction to review a negative ruling of the DTI Secretary, the Court is precluded from
favoring an interpretation that would cause inconvenience and absurdity. Adopting the respondents position
favoring the CTAs minimal jurisdiction would unnecessarily lead to illogical and onerous results.

1
TITLE: WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioner-appellant, vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
G.R. NO. L-10405 DATE: December 29, 1960
PONENTE: CONCEPCION, J. TOPIC:
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground
that RA No. 920, which appropriates funds for public works particularly for the construction and improvement of
Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings
attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the
Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder
roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway. The respondents'
contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from
the construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied
by the streets, made by its owner to the government.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
Whether or not incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of justifying an
expenditure of the government?
HOLDING
NO. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public
purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as
justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage
of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the
public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises
or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.

The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to
promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage
to individuals might incidentally serve the public.