VILLAFLOR v CA & NASIPIT LUMBER CO.
 Having 'made some sort of agreement for the occupancy (of the property at
Rule 133 Section 5 – Substantial Evidence | Oct. 9, 1997 | J. Panganiban
Nature of Case: Petition for review on certiorari
Digest maker: IT
DOCTRINE: The findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected as
long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Even if such evidence might not
be overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court to weigh
once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its
own judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect of sufficiency of
evidence.
FACTS:
 Nov. 8, 1946: Villaflor, in a Lease Agreement. leased to Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. a
parcel of land, containing an area of two (2) hectares
 July 7, 1948: In an 'Agreement to Sell”, Villaflor conveyed to Nasipit Lumber, two (2)
parcels of land
 The parties agreed that Nasipit Lumber shall continue to occupy the property
not anymore in concept of lessee, but as prospective owners
 Dec. 2, 1948: Villaflor filed Sales Application No. V-807 8 with the Bureau of Lands,
Manila, 'to purchase under the provisions of Chapter V, XI or IX of Commonwealth
Act. No. 141 (The Public Lands Act), as amended, a tract of public lands
 Dec. 7 1948, Villaflor and Nasipit Lumber executed an “Agreement,” confirming the
Agreement to Sell, but with reference to the Sales Application filed with the Bureau of
Land
 Dec. 31, 1949: In a report by the public land inspector, District Land Office, Bureau of
Lands, in Butuan, there was an Indorsement of the aforesaid District Land Officer
recommending rejection of the Sales Application of Villaflor
 For having leased the property to another even before he had acquired
transmissible rights thereto
 January 23, 1950: In a letter by Villaflor, addressed to the Bureau of Lands, he
informed the Bureau Director that he was already occupying the property when the
Bureau's Agusan River Valley Subdivision Project was inaugurated
 The property was formerly claimed as private property
 Therefore, the property was segregated or excluded from disposition because
of the claim of private ownership
 July 24, 1950: On the scheduled date of auction of the property covered by the Sales
Application, Nasipit Lumber offered the highest bid of P41.00 per hectare
 But since an applicant under CA 141, is allowed to equal the bid of the highest
bidder, Villaflor tendered an equal bid, deposited the equivalent of 10% of the
bid price and then paid the assessment in full.
 August 1950: Villaflor executed a document, denominated as a “Deed of
Relinquishment of Rights,” in favor on Nasipit Lumber, in consideration of the amount
of P5,000
 This is in light of Villaflor’s difficulty to develop the land, as he has moved to
Manila
 On the same day, pursuant to said Deed, Nasipit Lumber filed a Sales
Application over the 2 parcels of land.
 Aug. 17, 1950: “Order of Award” was then issued in favor of Nasipit Lumber.
 November 27, 1973: Villaflor wrote a letter to Mr. G.E.C. Mears of Nasipit Lumber
 Reminding him of their verbal agreement in 1955, in connection with the Deed
of Relinquishment of Rights (i.e. payment of P5K)
 Dec. 3, 1973: Nasipit’s field manager, replied in a letter, and stated recalling:
Acacia, San Mateo), but I no longer recall the details and I had forgotten
whether or not we did occupy your land. But if, as you say, we did occupy it,
then (he is) sure that the company is obligated to pay the rental.'
 Jan. 16, 1974: After his arrival to the Philippines, coming from Indonesia, where he
stayed for more than ten (10) years, Villaflor went to Butuan City and learned that
Nasipit Lumber had failed and refused to pay the agreed rentals
 Although his brother was able to collect during the early years
 Jan. 31, 1974: Villaflor filed a formal protest with the Bureau of Lands, wherein he
protested the Sales Application of Nasipit Lumber
 Claimed that the company has not paid him P5,000.00 as provided in the Deed
of Relinquishment of Rights dated August 16, 1950.
 Aug. 8, 1977: The Director of Lands made the ff. findings:
 That payment of the amount of P5,000.00 in the Deed of Relinquishment, and
the consideration in the Agreement to Sell were duly proven
 Ordered the dismissal of Villaflor's protest
 Gave due course to the Sales Application of Nasipit Lumber
 That Villaflor’s Sales application in 1948 was rejected for leasing the same to
another even before he had acquired transmissible rights thereto
 That Villaflor recognized the public character of the land in his Sales
Application and via the Deed of Relinquishment of Rights, he relinquished any
and all rights he may have by virtue of continuous occupation and cultivation
thereon
 From the decision of the Director of Lands, Villaflor filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was considered as an Appeal M.N.R. Case 4341, to the Ministry of Natural
Resources.
 July 6, 1978: Villaflor filed a complaint in the TC for "Declaration of Nullity of Contract
(Deed of Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two parcels of land
subject of the contract), and Damages"
 June 6, 1979: The Minister of Natural Resources rendered a Decision,
dismissing the appeal and affirming the decision of the Director of Lands
 Villaflor appealed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources to the Office
of the President
 Jan. 28, 1983: Villaflor died
 The TC ordered his widow, Lourdes D. Villaflor, to be substituted as petitioner.
 After trial in due course, the TC dismissed the complaint on the grounds that:
 (1) petitioner admitted the due execution and genuineness of the contract and
was estopped from proving its nullity,
 (2) the verbal lease agreements were unenforceable under Article 1403 (2)(e)
of the Civil Code, and
 (3) his causes of action were barred by extinctive prescription and/or laches.
 The heirs of Villaflor appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals
 September 27, 1990: CA, however, rendered judgment against Villaflor via the
assailed Decision dated finding petitioner's prayers to be without basis
 Dec. 7, 1990: Villaflor's heirs filed the instant 57-page petition for review with the SC
 Assailed the findings of the Bureau of Lands and the capacity of corporations to
acquire public lands
 June 23, 1991: SC denied this petition "for being late."
 On reconsideration — upon plea of counsel that petitioners were "poor" and that a
full decision on the merits should be rendered — the Court reinstated the petition
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. W/N the CA erred in adopting or relying on the factual findings of the Bureau of  The issue, rather, is whether the land covered by the sales application is
Lands, especially those affirmed by the Minister (now Secretary) of Natural private or public land.
Resources and the trial court – NO o In his sales application, petitioner expressly admitted that said
 Reliance by the trial and the appellate courts on the factual findings of the property was public land.
Director of Lands and the Minister of Natural Resources is not misplaced o This is formidable evidence as it amounts to an admission against
 In the exercise of his primary jurisdiction over the issue, Director of Lands interest.
Casanova found that the land covered by the Sales Application was public  Clearly, the issue falls under the primary jurisdiction of the Director of Lands
 Such finding was affirmed by the Minister of Natural Resources because its resolution requires "survey, classification, . . . disposition and
 By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies management of the lands of the public domain."
over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass  It follows that his rulings deserve great respect.
judgment thereon  CONCLUSION: As petitioner failed to show that this factual finding (i.e. that the
 Thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great land in question is public) of the Director of Lands was unsupported by substantial
respect, if not finality, by the courts evidence, it assumes finality.
 GENERAL RULE: The findings of fact of an administrative agency must be  Thus, both the trial and the appellate courts correctly relied on such
respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence finding. We can do no less.
 Even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant
 It is not the task of an appellate court to weigh once more the evidence RULING: All in all, petitioner has not provided us sufficient reason to disturb the cogent
submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own findings of the Director of Lands, the Minister of Natural Resources, the trial court and the
judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect of sufficiency of Court of Appeals.
evidence. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
 EXCEPTION: However, the rule that factual findings of an administrative agency
are accorded respect and even finality by courts admits of exceptions.
 This is true also in assessing factual findings of lower courts
 It is incumbent on the petitioner to show that the resolution of the factual
issues by the administrative agency and/or by the trial court falls under
any of the exceptions.
 Otherwise, this Court will not disturb such findings
APPLICATION: In the case at bar, the resolution of factual issues by the administrative
agency DOES NOT fall under any of the exceptions
 The SC mentioned and quoted extensively from the rulings of the Bureau of
Lands and the Minister of Natural Resources because the points, questions and
issues raised by petitioner before the trial court, the appellate court and now
before this Court are basically the same as those brought up before the aforesaid
specialized administrative agencies.
 As held by the CA, the SC finds that:
 The contentious points raised by appellant in this action, are substantially
the same matters he raised in Bureau of Lands Claim No. 873 (N).
 In both actions, he:
o Claimed private ownership over the land in question,
o Assailed the validity and effectiveness of the Deed of Relinquishment
of Rights he executed in August 16, 1950
o Claimed that he had not been paid the P5,000.00 consideration, the
value of the improvements he introduced on the land and other
expenses incurred by him
 In this instance, both the principle of primary jurisdiction of administrative
agencies and the doctrine of finality of factual findings of the trial courts,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, militate against
petitioner's cause.
 Indeed, petitioner has not given us sufficient reason to deviate from them.
 The lack of technical description did not prove that the finding of the Director of
Lands lacked substantial evidence
 Here, the issue is not so much whether the subject land is identical with
the property purchased by petitioner.