V.
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
A. Definition, nature and purpose
1. Nature and views
Rule 112, Sec 1
Preliminary investigation = inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there
is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial.
General Rule: Preliminary
investigation is required to be
conducted before filing a complaint or
information for an offense where the
penalty prescribed by law is at least
4y2m1d without regard to fine.
Exception: Not required if lawfully
arrested without a warrant (Sec 6 Rule
112).
DOJ-NPS Manual, Part IIi
(DIGESTED)
Sec 1: Definition of preliminary
Investigation
= an inquiry or proceeding to determine
whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the RTC has been
committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial.
Sec 2: Purpose of preliminary
investigation
a) to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution and to protect him
from an open and public
accusation of a crime and from
the trouble, expense and
anxiety of a public trial; and
b) to protect the State from having
to conduct useless and
expensive trials.
Sec 3: Nature of preliminary
investigation
- A substantive right
- Accused may invoke prior to or
at least the time of plea
- Deprivation of which would be a
denial of right to due process
Sec 7: Commencement of
preliminary investigation
a) By filing of a complaint by the
offended party or any
competent person directly with
the Office of the Investigating
Prosecutor or Judge;
b) By referral from or upon request
of the law enforcement agency
that investigated a criminal
incident;
c) Upon request of a person
arrested or detained pursuant to
a warrantless arrest who
executes a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code
d) By order or upon directive of the
court or other competent
authority
e) For election offenses, upon the
initiative of the Commission on
Elections, or upon written
complaint by any citizen,
candidate, registered political
party, coalition of registered
parties or organizations under
the party- list system or any
accredited citizen arm of the
Commission on Elections.
RJCL
Sec 13. Taking Custody of a Child
Without a Warrant.
- Shall observe the provisions of
Sections 5, 8, 9 of Rule 113
 - Shall forthwith deliver the child
to the nearest police station
- Child shall be proceeded
against in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 112
Sec 19. Preliminary Investigation. -
As far as consistent with this Rule, the
preliminary investigation of a child
conflict with the law shall be governed
by Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. A
specially trained prosecutor shall be
assigned to conduct the inquest,
preliminary investigation and
prosecution of the case involving a child
in conflict with the law. The child, on the
other hand, shall be assisted by a
private lawyer or if none, a lawyer from
the Public Attorney's Office. If there is
an allegation or evidence of torture or
ill-treatment of a child in conflict with the
law during custody or detention, it shall
be the duty of the prosecutor to
investigate the same.
::::RIANO::::
Right to a preliminary investigation
-statutory, may be invoked only when
specifically created by statute
- WAIVABLE- may be waived for failure
to invoke the right prior to or at the time
of the plea
-it requires more than bare suspicion
- it need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither
evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and definitely not on
evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt
KINDS OF DETERMINATION OF
PROBABLE CAUSE
1. Preliminary Investigation - by the
executive department
- function that properly pertains to the
public prosecutor who is given a broad
discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge as
defined by law and thus, should be held
for trial.
-WHETHER there is enough evidence
to support an information being filed
2. Preliminary Examination or
Preliminary Inquiry - by the judicial
department
- one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused.
- the judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted, there
is necessity for placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice
- if the judge finds no probable cause,
the judge cannot be forced to issue the
arrest warrant.
-WHETHER a warrant of arrest should
be issued against the accused
COURTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM
REVIEWING FINDINGS OF
PROSECUTORS; EXCEPTION
General Rule: Courts of law are
precluded from disturbing the findings
of public prosecutors on the existence
or non-existence of probable cause.
*rationale- separation of
powers; prosecutor and the
Secretary of Justice have wide
latitude of discretion in the
conduct of preliminary
investigation
Exception: -Grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction
- When he grossly misapprehends the
facts
- acts in a manner so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by law
- acts outside the contemplation of law
4 INSTANCES WHEN PROBABLE
CAUSE NEEDS TO BE
ESTABLISHED
1. By the investigating officer - whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial.
2, By the judge - whether a warrant of
arrest or a commitment order, if the
accused has already been arrested,
shall be issued and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent
under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice
3. By a peace officer or a private person
making a warrantless arrest when an
offense has just been committed, and
he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it
4. By the judge, to determine whether a
search warrant shall be issued, and
only upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complaint and the
witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
3. Persons authorized to conduct
Rule 112, Sec 2.
Officers authorized to conduct
preliminary investigations:
a) Provincial or City Prosecutors
and their assistants
b) National and Regional State
Prosecutors
c) Other officers as may be
authorized by law
Their authority to conduct preliminary
investigations shall include all crimes
cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions.
DOJ NPS Manual Part Iii, Sec 6
Officers Authorized to Conduct
Preliminary Investigation:
a) Provincial or City Prosecutors
and their assistants;
b) Judges of Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
c) National and Regional State
Prosecutors; and
d) Other officers as may be
authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary
investigation shall include all crimes
cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdiction.
ALSO AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT A
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
1. COMELEC - under the amendments
to the Omnibus Election Code,
COMELEC, through its duly authorized
legal officers, has the power,
concurrent with the other prosecuting
arms of the government, to conduct
1. 1
preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under the
Omnibus Election Code and to
prosecute the same.
2. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN -
has the authority to investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take
over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of the
government, the investigation of such
cases.
3. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNANCE (PCGG) - with
the assistance of the Office of the
Solicitor General and other government
agencies is empowered to investigate,
file and prosecute cases investigated
by it.
In case of clash between public
prosecutor and the court
Lack of authority
B. PROCEDURE IN CASES WHERE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
REQUIRED
- required to be conducted before the
filing of a complaint or information for an
offense where the law prescribes a
penalty of at least 4 years, 2 months,
and 1 day without regard to the fine
-Some offenses which before were not
covered by the required preliminary
investigation are now subject to
preliminary investigation even if such
offenses are cognizable by the MTC as
long as the same are punishable by at
least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day.
PROCEDURE FOR CASES NOT
REQUIRING A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
2 ways of initiating a criminal action:
1. by filing the complaint directly with
the prosecutor
by filing the complaint or information
with the MTC
1. In cases cognizable by RTC
DIRECT FILING WITH THE
PROSECUTOR
-procedure prescribed in Sec 3(a) of
Rule 112
1. the prosecutor shall act on the
complaint based on the affidavits and
other supporting documents submitted
by the complainant within 10 days from
its filing.
2. Respondent need not be issued a
subpoena or required to submit
counter-affidavits (required only in a
preliminary investigation)
Rodil v Garcia
Allada v Diokno
2. In cases cognizable by MTC
- complaint or information is filed
directly with the MTC because the
complaint involves an offense
punishable by imprisonment of less
than 4years, 2 months and 1 day.
- need not issue a subpoena to the
respondent in the same way as when
the complaint is filed directly with the
prosecutor
-if within 10 days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge
finds no probable cause, he shal
DISMISS the same.
BEFORE THE DISMISSAL, the judge
has several options:
1. To personally evaluate the evidence
submitted to the court
2. To personally examine in writing and
under oath the complaint and his
witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers
*above options are not exclusive
If the judge desires to further examine
the existence of probable case, he may
require the submission of additional
evidence within 10 days from notice.
If the judge still finds no probable cause
(despite additional evidence), the judge
shall dismiss the case within 10 days
from the submission of additional
evidence or expiration of said period.
If the judge finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest.
If the accused has already been
arrested, the court shall instead issue a
commitment order.
A warrant of arrest may not also be
issued if the judge is satisfied that there
is no necessity for placing the accused
under custody, in which case, the court
may issue summons instead of a
warrant of arrest. However, failure to
appear when so required may be a
ground for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.
a. conducted by prosecutor
3. In cases cognizable by
Sandiganbayan
a. conducted by prosecutor
b. conducted by Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor
Perez v Sandiganbayan
C. PROCEDURE IN CASES NOT
REQUIRING A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
Verzano v Paro
Borlongan v Pena
1. MTC cases or those covered by
summary procedure
Rule 112, Sec. 9
2. When personally lawfully arrested
without warrant
Rule 112, sec 7
WHEN PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS NOT REQUIRED
EVEN IF THE OFFENSE IS ONE
WHICH NORMALLY REQUIRES A
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
(required to go under INQUEST)
1. If a person is arrested lawfully without
a warrant involving an offense which
requires a preliminary investigation.
Instead, the person arrested shall be
required to undergo an INQUEST
(required before a complaint or
information may be filed against the
person arrested.
INQUEST PROCEEDINGS - proper
only when the accused has been
lawfully arrested without a warrant.
In the absence or unavailability of an
inquest prosecutor, an inquest may be
dispensed with. The rule, hence, allows
the filing of the complaint DIRECTLY
with the proper court by the proper party
or a peace officer on the basis of the
affidavit of the offended party or
arresting officer or person.
Person lawfully arrested without a
warrant may ask for a preliminary
investigation
- *before the complaint or information is
filed
- must sign a waiver of the provision of
*Art. 125 of the RPC, in the presence of
his counsel.
- preliminary investigation must be
terminated within 15 days from its
inception
*if an information or complaint has
already been filed, the person arrested
who is now an accused, may still ask for
a preliminary investigation within 5 days
from the time he learns of its filing, with
the same right to adduce evidence in
his defense.
*Art 125, RPC - imposes a penalty upon
a public officer or an employee who,
although having detained a person for
some legal ground, fails to deliver the
person arrested to the proper judicial
authorities within the periods of 12, 18,
or 36 hours as the case may be.
3. Remedies of the accused if there was
no preliminary investigation
BAIL FOR A PERSON LAWFULLY
ARRESTED DURING THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
- waiver of Art 125 of RPC does NOT
preclude him from applying for bail
- while a preliminary investigation is
undertaken, the person arrested is still
under detention. To effect his release,
he may apply for bail notwithstanding
the waiver of Art 125 and even if no
information has yet been filed against
him.
- bail must be applied for and issued by
the court in the province, city or
municipality where the person arrested
is held
QUESTIONING THE ABSENCE OF A
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
- an accused who want to question the
regularity or absence of a preliminary
investigation must do so before he
enters his plea.
- court must resolve the matter as early
as practicable but not later than the
start of the trial
- an application for or admission of the
accused to bail does not bar him from
raising such question
-failure to invoke the right before
entering the plea will amount to a
waiver
ABSENCE OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION EFFECT ON
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
- does not affect the court’s jurisdiction
over the case nor does it impair the
validity of the information or otherwise,
renders it defective
ABSENCE OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS NOT A GROUND
FOR MOTION TO QUASH
- the court should remand the case to
the prosecutor so that the investigation
may be conducted
San Agustin v People
PROCEDURE FOR PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION MUST BE
STRICLTY FOLLOWED
INITIAL STEPS IN PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION; FIING OF THE
COMPLAINT FOR PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
- it is the FILING OF THE COMPLAINT
with the investigating prosecutor that
starts the preliminary investigation. In
actual application, the complaint tis
normally initiated through an affidavit of
complaint.
- the complaint is required to state the
address of the respondent and shall be
accompanied by:
a) affidavits of the complainant
b) affidavits of his witnesses; and
c) other supporting documents
*these affidavits and supporting
documents are required in order to
establish probable cause
*number of copies to be filed shall be in
such number as there are respondents
plus 2 copies for the official file
*complaint filed for the purpose of
preliminary investigation DIFFERS
from the complaint filed for the purpose
of instituting a criminal prosecution
(complaint defined in Sec 3 of Rule 110
and which is in the name of the People
of the Philippines)
-his affidavit is merely treated as a
component of the complaint
- all necessary allegations need not be
contained in a single document
-the rule establishes a HIERARCHY
with respect to the persons before
whom the affidavits may be subscribed
and sworn to
THE AFFIDAVITS THAT SHALL
ACCOMPANY THE COMPLAINT
SHALL BE:
1) subscribed and worn to before any
prosecutor and not necessarily before
the investigating prosecutor
2) before nay government official
authorized to administer oaths
3) in their absence or in case they are
unavailable, the affidavits may be
subscribed and sworn to before a
notary public
- prosecutor, official, or notary public -
before whom the affidavits were
subscribed and sworn to does not
perform a mere perfunctory or
mechanical duty; obligated to conduct a
personal examination of the affiants
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT or
ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA
1. From the filing of the complaint, the
investigating officer has 10 days within
which to decide:
a) To dismiss the complaint if he finds
no ground to conduct the investigation
b) To issue a subpoena to the
respondent in case he finds the need to
continue with the investigation, in which
case the subpoena shall be
accompanied with a copy of the
complaint and its supporting affidavits
and documents
- the rule does not require the
investigating officer to furnish the
respondent with the copies of the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents
- respondent’s right to examine refers
only to “the evidence submitted by the
complainant”
- respondent shall have the right to
examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant and to copy them at his
expense. If the evidence is voluminous,
the complainant may be required to
specify those which he intends to
present against the respondent, and
these shall be available for examination
or copying by the respondent at his
expense. Objects as evidence need not
be furnished to a party but shall be
made available for examination,
copying or photographing
FILING OF COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT BY
THE RESPONDENT; NO MOTION TO
DISMISS
- respondent who receives the
subpoena, complaint, affidavit and
other supporting documents, is not
allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu
of a counter-affidavit.
-Instead within 10 days from receipt of
the subpoena, he is required to submit
his counter-affidavit, the affidavits of his
witnesses and the supporting
documents relied upon for his defense
- counter-affidavits shall be subscribed
and sworn to before any prosecutor,
government official or before a notary
public
- complainant has the right to receive a
copy of the respondent’s counter-
affidavit. Failure of which is a
procedural defect
ACTION TO BE TAKEN IF THE
RESPONDENT DOES NOT SUBMIT
HIS COUNTER AFFIDAVIT
Sec 3(d) of Rule 112: “If the respondent
cannot be subpoenaed, or if
subpoenaed, does not submit counter-
affidavits within 10 day period, the
investigating officer shall resolve the
complaint based on the evidence
presented by the complainant”
-the situation would have the ffect of an
ex parte investigation because the
respondent cannot or does not
participate in the proceedings
CLARIFICATORY HEARING IF
NECESSARY, NO RIGHT OF CROSS-
EXAMINATION
- a hearing may be set by the
investigating officer, if there are facts
and issues to be clarified either from a
party or a witness
- parties can be present at the hearing
but do not have the right to examine or
cross-examine each other or the
witnesses
-if they have questions, they shall
submit the questions
-clarificatory hearing is not
indispensable; within the discretion of
the investigating officer
NO RIGHT TO CROSS EXAMINE IN
A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
- accused in a preliminary investigation
has no right to cross-examine the
witnesses which the complainant may
present
- only have the right to submit a
counter-affidavit, to examine all other
evidence submitted by the complainant
and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the
parties or their witnesses, to be
afforded an opportunity to be present
but without the right to examine or cross
examine.
DETERMINATION BY THE
INVESTIGATING OFFICER
-within 10 DAYS from the termination of
the investigation, the investigating
prosecutor shall determine whether or
not there is sufficient ground to hold the
respondent for trial
- if he does not find probable cause, he
shall recommend the dismissal of the
complaint
- information shall contain a - they shall act on the resolution within
CERTIFICATION by the investigating
officer under oath in which he will certify
the following:
a) he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his
witnesses
b) there is a reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been
committed
c) the accused is probably guilty thereof
d) the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and
e) he was given an opportunity to
submit controverting evidence
EFFECT OF THE ABSENCE OF THE
REQUIRED CERTIFICATION
- the information is, nonetheless,
considered valid for reason that such
certification is not an essential part of
the information itself
-what is now allowed is the filing of the
information without a preliminary
investigation having been previously
conducted
FORWARDING OF THE RECORDS
OF THE CASE FOR ACTION; NEED
FOR APPROVAL BEFORE FILING OR
DISMISSAL
- within 5 DAYS from his resolution, he
shall forward the record of the case to
the:
1. provincial or city prosecutor
2. chief state prosecutor; or
3. Ombudsman or his deputy in
cases of offenses cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan in the
exercise of its original
jurisdiction.
10 DAYS from their receipt thereof and
shall immediately inform the parties of
such action
*REASON- no complaint or information
may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor WITHOUT the
prior written authority or approval of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or
his deputy.
- the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor may be REVERSED or
AFFIRMED by the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or
the Ombudsman
WHEN RECOMMENDATION FOR
DISMISSAL IS DISAPPROVED
- where the investigating prosecutor,
recommends the dismissal of the
complaint but his recommendation is
disapproved by the [provincial or city
prosecutor/ chief state prosecutor/the
Ombudsman or his deputy] on the
ground that a probable cause exists,
the latter, may by himself, file the
information against the respondent, or
direct another assistant prosecutor or
state prosecutor to do so without
conducting another preliminary
investigation
D. REMEDIES FROM PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
1. APPEAL
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
-WITHIN 15 DAYS from the receipt of
the resolution (MR)
-WITHIN 15 DAYS from the denial of
the motion for reconsideration (appeal)
APPEALS TO THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE
1.) -period to file: 15 days from receipt
of the assailed resolution/denial of
MR/denial of motion for reinvestigation
-you cannot appeal to Sec of Justice if
there was no preliminary investigation
- prosecutor’s ruling is reviewable by
the Secretary of Justice who has the
power to reverse, modify or affirm the
prosecutor’s determination
- action of the provincial/city
prosecutor/chief state prosecutor is not
the final say on the case
- in cases subject of preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation, an
appeal may be brought to the Secretary
of Justice from the resolutions of the
Chief State Prosecutor / Regional State
Prosecutors / Provincial or City
Prosecutor
2.) DOJ SECRETARY’s POWER OF
CONTROL OVER THE AUTHORITY
OF A STATE PROSECUTOR TO
CONDUCT PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION ON CRIMINAL
ACTIONS:
- Secretary of justice is not precluded
from considering errors, although
unassigned, for the purpose of
determining whether there is probable
cause for filing cases in court
- he must make his own finding of
probable cause
- not confined to the issues raised by
the parties during preliminary
investigation
- his findings are not subject to review
unless shown to have been made with
grave abuse
3.) EFFECT OF APPEAL
- the appeal does not hold or prevent
the filing of the corresponding
information in court based on the
finding of probable cause in the
appealed resolution, unless the
Secretary of Justice directs otherwise,
but the appellant and prosecutor shall
see to it that, pending resolution of the
appeal, the proceedings in court are
held in abeyance.
4.) MOTION FOR THE SUSPENSION
OF THE ARRAIGNMENT
- the party filing for a petition for review
is allowed to file a motion for the
suspension of the arraignment.
-Under Sec 11(c) of Rule 116, upon
motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended,
among others, if a petition for review of
the resolution of the prosecutor is
pending
*FILING OF PETITION FOR REVIEW -
does NOT SUSPEND the ISSUANCE
OF WARRANT OF ARREST
ACTION OF THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE
He may either:
1. DISMISS the petition outright - if he
finds the same to be patently without
merit or manifestly intended for delay,
or when the issues raised therein are
too unsubstantial to require
consideration
2. AFFIRM the decision of the
prosecutor and DISMISS the petition,
based on the following grounds:
a.) petition for review was filed
beyond the period prescribed
b.) the prescribed procedure
and requirements provided in
Dept. Circular 70 were not
complied with
c.) there is no showing of any
reversible error or that the
accused was already arraigned
when the appeal was taken
d.) the appeal resolution is
interlocutory in nature, except
when it suspends the
proceedings based on the
alleged existence of a APPEAL TO THE OFFICE OF THE
prejudicial question
e) that the offense has already
prescribed
f) that there are other legal and
factual grounds that exist to
warrant a dismissal
3. Give due course to the petition and
reverse or modify the resolution of the
prosecutor
4. Order the reinvestigation of the case
ASSAILING THE RESOLUTION OF
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Rule: action of the Secretary of Justice
is not subject to the review of the courts
unless there is a showing that he
committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the challenged
resolution (JUDICIAL APPEAL)
- CERTIORARI will lie to correct errors-
where the findings of the investigating
prosecutor or the DOJ Secretary as to
the existence of probable cause are
equivalent to a gross misapprehension
of facts
HOW CAN THE RESOLUTION OF
DOJ SECRETARY BE REVIEWED?
- COURT OF APPEALS is clothed with
the jurisdiction to review the resolution
issued by the Secretary of Justice
through a PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI under Rule 65.
-ground: Secretary committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction
RESOLUTION IN TAX AND TARIFF
CASES
- Court of TAX APPEALS
PRESIDENT
- ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL
-judicial pronouncements do not allow
an appeal to CA under Rule 43 from the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
(JUDICIAL APPEAL)
- Appeals from or petition for review of
“decisions/orders/resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on preliminary
investigations of criminal cases are
entertained by the Office of the
President” under the following
conditions which have to be established
as jurisdictional facts:
a) offense involved is
punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death
b) new and material issues are
raised which were not
previously presented before the
DOJ and were not, hence, ruled
upon;
c) prescription of the offense is
not due to lapse within 6 months
 from notice of the questioned
resolution
d) appeal or petition for review
is filed within 30 days from
notice
IF APPEAL DOES NOT
CLEARLY FALL within the
jurisdiction of the Office of the
President, the appeal shall be
DISMISSED outright.
-Adverse decision against the
appellant,
a) verified petition for review
under Rule 43 may be taken to
the Court of Appeals
b) within 15 days from notice of
the final order of the Office of
the President
APPEALS UNDER RULE 43 AND
RULE 45
1.) FROM THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT - the aggrieved party may
file an appeal with the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Rule 43
-Under Sec. 1 of Rule 43, the final
orders or resolutions of the Office of the
President is appealable to the Court of
Appeals by filing a VERIFIED
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON
CERTIORARI following the procedure
set by Secs. 5 & 6 of Rule 43.
2.) PARTY AGGRIEVED BY THE
JUDGMENT, FINAL ORDER OR
RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS - may avail of an appeal by
certiorari (petition for review on
certiorari) to the Supreme Court under
Rule 45.
REVIEW OF THE RULINGS OF THE
OMBUDSMAN IN CRIMINAL CASES
- shall be elevated to the Supreme
Court by way of RULE 65.
- SC’s power of review (over resolutions
and orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman) is restricted only to:
determining whether grave abuse of
discretion has been committed by it
-The Court is not authorized to correct
every error or mistake of the Office of
the Ombudsman other than grave
abuse of discretion.
RECORDS SUPPORTING THE
INFORMATION OR COMPLAINT
FILED IN COURT
1.) It is not only the complaint or
information that is filed in court
2) Information or complaint shall be
supported by the affidavits and counter-
affidavits of the parties and their
witnesses, together with the other
supporting evidence and the resolution
of the case.
3) record of the preliminary
investigation shall not form part of the
record of the case.
4) although not part of the record of the
case, the court, on its own initiative or
on motion of any party, may order the
production of the record or any of its
part when the court considers it
necessary in the resolution of the case
or any incident therein, or when it is
introduced as an evidence in the case
by the requesting party.
ACTIONS OF THE JUDGE UPON THE
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION
- within 10 DAYS from the filing, the
JUDGE shall personally evaluate the
RESOLUTION of the PROSECUTOR.
- judge may find that the evidence:
a) fails to establish probable
cause
 b) establishes probable cause;
or
c) engenders a doubt as to the
existence of probable cause
OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO RTC UPON
FILING OF AN INFORMATION
BEFORE IT BY THE PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR/ANY PROSECUTOR
OF SECRETARY OF JUSTICE:
a) dismiss the case, if the
evidence on record clearly
failed to establish probable
cause
b) issue a WARRANT OF
ARREST if it finds probable
cause
- issue a COMMITMENT
ORDER, if a complaint
or information was
already filed pursuant to
a lawful warrantless
arrest, or if the accused
has already been
previously validly
arrested pursuant to
other legal processes
-***Note that under Sec
5 of Rule 112, the court,
where a preliminary
investigation has
previously been
conducted, does not
have the duty to
personally examine the
complainant and his
witnesses in writing and
under oath and in the
form of searching
questions and answers
(this type of examination
of the complainant and
his witnesses applies,
as an option to the court,
only in case where there
is a direct filing of the
complaint or information
with the MTC since no
preliminary investigation
has been conducted)
c) order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence
within 5 days from notice, in
case of doubt as to the
existence of probable cause
-not mandatory; court’s
first option is for it to
“immediately dismiss”
-trial courts may still independently
determine probable cause. They are
not bound to the determination of
probable cause of the prosecutor.
DISMISSAL OF A CASE FOR LACK
OF PROBABLE CAUSE, A FINAL
ORDER
- the order of the court, dismissing a
case for lack of probable cause, is a
“final order since it disposes of the
case, terminates the proceedings, and
leaves the court with nothing further to
do with respect to the case”
-PROPER REMEDY is APPEAL
WHEN WARRANT OF ARREST IS
NOT NECESSARY
a) When a complaint or information has
already been filed pursuant to a lawful
warrantless arrest; when a warrant has
already been issued by the MTC judge
pursuant to Sec 5(b) of Rule 112 and
the accused is already detained
b) When the accused is charged for an
offense punishable only by fine
c) when the case is subject to the Rules
on Summary Procedure unless he fails
to appear whenever required
WITHDRAWAL OF THE
INFORMATION ALREADY FILED IN
COURT
- rule in this jurisdiction is that, once a
criminal complaint or information is filed
in court, any disposition of the case or
dismissal or acquittal or conviction of
the accused rests within the exclusive
jurisdiction, competence, and discretion
of the trial court.
- when confronted with a motion to
withdraw an Information on ground of
lack of probable cause based on a
resolution of the Secretary of Justice,
the bounden duty of the trial court is to
make an independent assessment of
the merits of such motion. Having
acquired jurisdiction over the case the
trial court is not bound by such
resolution but is required to evaluate it
before proceeding farther with the trial.
While the Secretary’s ruling is
persuasive, it is not binding on the
courts. When the trial court’s order rests
entirely on the assessment of the DOJ
without doing its own independent
evaluation, the trial court effectively
abdicates its judicial power and refuses
to perform a positive duty enjoined by
law; the assessment must be embodied
in a written order disposing of the
motion
NO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
UNDER THE REVISED RULES ON
SUMMARY PROCEDURE
- a criminal case within the scope of the
Rule, shall be commenced by the
FILING OF A COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION IN THE MTC.
- However, in Metro Manila and other
chartered cities, such case shall be
commenced only by information,
except when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de officio.
156 Dimatulac v Villon
SP03 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead
when several men of Mayor Yabut went
to the Dimatulac residence
complaint for murder was filed before
the MCTC against 17 (including the
Yabut).
Upon a Reinvestigation, the Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor issued a
Resolution, recommending the filing of
an Information for Homicide against the
Yabut’s and an alias Danny.
Petitioners thus filed an appeal before
the DOJ, assailing the said resolution.
An information for Homicide was
subsequently filed before the RTC, to
which the petitioners opposed, by filing
a Motion to Defer Proceedings (ground:
pending appeal before the DOJ)
The said motion was denied, and the
accused were arraigned for Homicide,
to which they pleaded not guilty.
The petitioners filed a Motion to Set
Aside Arraignment, which was denied
by Judge Villon.
The Secretary of Justice initially
resolved the appeal in favor of the
petitioners, recommending the
amendment of the information from
Homicide to Murder. However, the SOJ
later on reversed the earlier order, on
the ground that the appeal has been
rendered moot and academic by the
earlier arraignment.
WON the provincial prosecutor, RTC
judges, and the DOJ Secretary
committed GAD? YES
The Court ruled that DOJ Order No.
223 recognizes the right of both the
offended parties and the accused to
appeal from resolutions in
preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations.
Rule (Section 1) Only resolutions
dismissing a criminal complaint may
be the subject of an appeal to the
Secretary of Justice
In the case, petitioners were not barred
from appealing from the resolution that
only homicide was committed. The
appeal is cognizable by the DOJ
Secretary, even if the arraignment
already took place, as the Provincial
Prosecutor “effectively dismissed” the
complaint for murder.
The Court reiterated that nothing in the
Crespo ruling prohibits the DOJ from
reviewing resolutions made by the
prosecutors after an information has
been filed.
The Court also noted the attendance of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC
judges, and the Secretary of Justice,
which warrants the nullification of the
earlier denials of the motions of the
petitioners, the earlier arraignment of
the accused, and their plea of not guilty.
Thus, the Provincial Prosecutor was
ordered to file an amended information
for Murder.
2.REINVESTIGATION/PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
157 Crespo v Mogul
An information for Estafa was filed
against Crespo. -When the case was
set for arraignment, the accused filed a
motion to defer arraignment (ground
that the there was a pending petition
for review with the Secretary of
Justice)
The presiding judge, Mogul, denied the
motion.
The accused filed for certiorari and
prohibition with a preliminary writ of
injunction with the CA, which was
granted, restraining the Judge from
proceeding until the petition for review
is resolved.
The Usec of Justice then resolved the
petition and directed the fiscal to move
for immediate dismissal of the
information.
A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence was filed by the Provincial
fiscal, but was denied by Judge Mogul
who set the arraignment.
WON the trial court acting on a
motion to dismiss a criminal case
filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of
Justice to whom the case was elevated
for review, may refuse to grant the
motion and insist on the arraignment
and trial on the merits. (YES)
Once an information has been filed with
the court, the court acquires jurisdiction
over the case. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases, even
while the case is already in Court, he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case
is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It
does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused, or
that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation, or upon instructions of
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records of the investigation.
DOCTRINE: It is through the conduct of
a preliminary investigation that the
fiscal determines the existence of a
prima facie case that would warrant the
prosecution of a case. The Courts
cannot interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of the criminal
prosecution. However, the action of the
fiscal or prosecutor is not without any
limitation or control. The same is
subject to the approval of the provincial
or city fiscal or the chief state
prosecutor as the case maybe and it
may be elevated for review to the
Secretary of Justice who has the power
to affirm, modify or reverse the action or
opinion of the fiscal. Consequently, the
Secretary of Justice may direct that a
motion to dismiss the case be filed in
Court or that an information be filed in
Court.
158 Roberts v CA
This case is about several thousand
holders of 349 pepsi crowns Number
Fever promo.
Complaints against Petitioners were
filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor
Investigating Prosecutor released a
Joint Resolution wherein he
recommended the filing of an
information against the petitioners for
violation of Art 318 of the RPC and the
dismissal of the complaints for the
violation of Article 315, 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code;
Petitioners filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor an MR of the Joint
Resolution. They also filed with the DOJ
a Petition for review. This petition
prayed that the Joint Resolution be
reversed and the complaints dismissed.
Assistant City Prosecutor filed with the
trial court a Motion to Defer
Arraignment. Prayed that further
proceedings be held in abeyance
Judge denied the petitioners and
directed the issuance of the warrants of
arrest and set the arraignment. He cited
Crespo v Mogul.
Petitioners then filed with the CA
special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition. This was denied.
Subsequently, an MR was filed. Public
respondents filed motion to dismiss as
it is moot given the dismissal of the DOJ
of the petitioner’s petition for review.
WON Judge Asuncion committed
GADALEJ for denying the motions to
suspend proceedings and hold in
abeyance the issuance of warrants of
arrest and to defer arraignment. YES!
There is nothing in Crespo v. Mogul
which bars the DOJ from taking
cognizance of an appeal by way of
petition for review, by an accused in a
criminal case from an unfavorable
ruling of the investigation prosecutor.
The ruling in Crespo v. Mogul merely
advised the DOJ to “As far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a
petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint
or information has already been filed in
Court”
Sec 4 Rule 112 of ROC recognizes the
authority of the Secretary of Justice to
reverse the resolution of the provincial
or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor upon petition by a proper
party.
159 Velasquez v Undersecretary of
Justice
DOCTRINE: Once the information is
filed, the court acquires complete
jurisdiction over the case. A motion
for reinvestigation should, after the
court had acquired jurisdiction over
the case, be addressed to the trial
judge and to him alone. Neither the
Secretary of Justice, the State
Prosecutor, nor the Fiscal may
interfere with the judge’s disposition
of the case, much less impose upon
the court their opinion regarding the
guilt or innocence of the accused, for
the court is the sole judge of that.
Petition for certiorari to annul and/or set
aside the resolution of the public
respondent, Undersecretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero, ordering a
reinvestigation of the case.
Edgardo Avila, a Cash and Business
Devt Consultant of Techtrade was
authorized to follow-up business
transactions, had previously informed
the company that he had a borrower for
P200,000. The company approved this
and issued to him a pay-to-cash check.
Instead of returning the borrowed
amount, Avila resigned from the
company.
Petitioner Felix Velasquez, as the Exec
VP of Techtrade, filed a complaint for
estafa against Avila in the Manila City
Fiscal’s Office. Assistant Fiscal Lopez
dismissed the complaint.
Upon review by the Chief Investigation
Division of the City Fiscal’s Office, a
resolution was issued ordering the filing
of an Information for estafa against
Avila in the RTC.
Avila sought a reconsideration of the
resolution twice, both motions were
denied.
Before arraignment, Avila filed in the
DOJ a petition for review. Justice
Undersecretary Bello denied the
petition. Avila’s MR was likewise
denied.
A year later, Avila filed another MR with
the Undersecretary of Justice.
Undersecretary of Justice Tuquero
granted the motion, and directed the
City Fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation
of the case.
Velasquez filed an MR but it was
denied.
WON the Undersecretary of Justice can
order the reinvestigation– NO
The Undersecretary of Justice gravely
abused his discretion in ordering the re-
investigation of the criminal case
against Avila after it had been filed in
court.
Crespo v Mogul - once the information
is filed in court, the court acquires
complete jurisdiction over it.
A motion for reinvestigation should,
after the court had acquired jurisdiction
over the case, be addressed to the trial
judge and to him alone.
The avowed purpose of the
reinvestigation “to give an opportunity
to the private respondent to present an
authentic copy of the board resolution
of the offended party (Techtrade) which
allegedly had authorized him to deal
and otherwise dispose of the funds of
the corporation”, can also be achieved
at the trial in the lower court where that
piece of evidence may be presented by
the accused as part of his defense.
160 People v Beriales
in a Criminal Case the herein appellants
were charged with the crime of murder
of Saturnina Porcadilla.
At the hearing, appellants' counsel
moved for a reinvestigation, which the
court a quo granted.
The arraignment and trial were
postponed until December 5 and 6,
1974, which is later postponed to Dec.
17 and 18.
However, the trial court motu proprio
cancelled the aforesaid hearings and,
instead, set the arraignment and trial of
the case to December 10 and 11, 1974,
but the reinvestigation would finish by
Dec. 12.
The case was then postponed the next
day (13th).
The appellants did not plead and
present evidence during the
arraignment and trial because of the
absence of the fiscal.
Only the private prosecutor authorized
by the fiscal prosecuted this criminal
case.
WON a public prosecutor can be totally
absent in trial where a private
prosecutor was authorized to prosecute
the case? NO
All criminal actions either commenced
by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal."
While there is nothing in the rule of
practice and procedure in criminal
cases which denies the right of the
fiscal, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, to turn over the active
conduct of the trial to a private
prosecutor, nevertheless, his duty to
direct and control the prosecution of
criminal cases requires that he must be
present during the proceedings.
In the present case, although the
private prosecutor had previously been
authorized by the special counsel
Polines to present the evidence for the
prosecution, nevertheless, in view of
the absence of the City Fiscal at the
hearing on December 13, 1974, it
cannot be said that the prosecution of
the case was under the control of the
City Fiscal.
161 Santo v Orda, Jr. (2004)
DOCTRINE: Once a criminal
complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case or
dismissal or acquittal or conviction of
the accused rests within the
exclusive jurisdiction, competence,
and discretion of the trial court. The
rule applies to a motion to withdraw
the Information or to dismiss the case
even before or after arraignment of
the accused. The only qualification is
that the action of the court must not
impair the substantial rights of the
accused or the right of the People or
the private complainant to due
process of law.
Francis Orda, the son of respondent
Domingo Orda Jr., was shot to death in
Paranaque City.
Ernesto and Dennis Regala testified
that they saw and heard a conversation
between the petitioner and several
others wherein Santos ordered the
killing of respondent. However, it was
his son Francis who was killed.
Orda filed an affidavit-complaint in the
Office of the City Prosecutor, charging
petitioner with murder.
The investigating prosecutor issued a
Resolution finding probable cause. An
Information was filed against petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition for review of
the resolution of the prosecutor in the
DOJ.
On the motion, the RTC suspended the
proceedings, and the issuance of
warrants for their arrest.
Witnesses Azarcon and Frias both
executed affidavits implicating Santos
and several others, including the
Castillo brothers and Bunda, in the
killing of Francis.
Azarcon later recanted her statement
against the Castillo brothers and
Bunda.
The public prosecutor issued a
Resolution finding probable cause for
murder against the Castillo brothers
and Bunda, and filed a motion to amend
information and to admit amended
information against them as additional
accused.
The accused filed a petition for review
of the resolution with the DOJ. They
also filed a motion to suspend
proceedings and the issuance of
warrants of arrest.
The RTC ordered the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of petitioner and
another accused, Cortez, based on its
finding of probable cause against them
for lack of probable cause to recall the
warrants of arrest, and to examine the
witnesses. However, the RTC denied a
motion filed by the others accused on
the ground that it had not yet acquired
jurisdiction over their persons and it had
not yet received any resolution from the
Secretary of Justice.
Witnesses Ernesto and Dennis Regala
later recanted their testimonies.
The RTC issued an Order admitting the
amended information and ordered the
issuance of warrants for their arrest.
The Sec of Justice issued a Joint
Resolution reversing the resolution of
the public prosecutor and directed the
withdrawal of the Informations, and
held that the witnesses were not
credible because of their recantation.
Respondent filed an MR, however the
public prosecutor filed a motion to
withdraw the Informations.
The RTC granted the motion to
withdraw the Informations.
The RTC denied the MR on the ground
that it could not order the refiling of the
Informations if the DOJ and the public
prosecutor refused to do so.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and
ruled that the RTC abused its discretion
in granting the withdrawal without
making an independent evaluation.
WON the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in granting the withdrawal
of the Informations - YES
In granting the motion of the public
prosecutor to withdraw the
Informations, the trial court relied solely
on the joint resolution of the Secretary
of Justice.
Had the trial court bothered to review its
records before issuing its assailed
order, it would have recalled that aside
from the affidavits of Azarcon, Ernesto
and Dennis, there was also the affidavit
of Frias implicating the petitioner and
the other accused.
Moreover, the trial court found probable
cause against the petitioner and issued
a warrant for Santos’ arrest despite
pendency of her petition for review in
the DOJ.
The bare fact that the trial court had
issued warrants of arrest against
Santos, Cortez, the Castillo brothers,
and Bunda, who were the petitioners in
the DOJ, did not warrant an outright
grant of the motion to withdraw the
Informations.
The court had already acquired
jurisdiction over the cases when the
Informations were filed; hence, it had
jurisdiction to resolve the motion of the
public prosecutor, one way or the other,
on its merits.
Moreover, the petitioner had submitted
herself to the jurisdiction of the court
when she filed her motion to examine
the witnesses, and suspend the
proceedings and the issuance of a
warrant for her arrest.
Petition is denied due course; CA
decision is affirmed.
161 Santo v Orda, Jr. (2010)
The task of the Presiding Judge
when an Information is filed with the
court is first and foremost to
determine the existence or non-
existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused. The purpose of
the mandate of the judge to first
determine probable cause is to
insulate from the very start those
falsely charged with crimes from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of
a public trial.
After the SC held that the RTC must
make an independent evaluation of the
records before allowing the withdrawal
of the Informations, Santos filed before
the RTC an Urgent Motion to Resolve
Anew and on the Merits Previous
Motion to Withdraw Criminal
Informations Pursuant to the DOJ
Finding on Lack of Probable Cause.
The RTC issued an Order dismissing
the case for murder and held that no
probable cause existed to indict them
for their crime. The warrants for their
arrests were also lifted.
The prosecution’s MR was denied.
Respondent filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA, claiming that
the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding that no probable
cause existed.
The CA granted the petition and
reversed the RTC decision, concluding
that the RTC turned a deaf ear to the
crucial testimonial evidence of the
prosecution that, more likely than not,
the crime charged was committed by
the accused.
WON the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion upon finding no probable
cause to indict the accused - NO
The task of the Presiding Judge when
an Information is filed with the court is
first and foremost to determine the
existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused.
Pursuant to the Court’s 2004 Decision,
the RTC reviewed anew the records of
the case and made an independent
evaluation of the evidence presented to
ascertain the existence or nonexistence
of probable cause to indict the
petitioners.
The Presiding Judge allowed the
withdrawal of the Informations on the
following grounds:
-the incredibility of the earlier
statements of Gina, Ernesto
and Dennis because of their
subsequent recantation;
-the improbability that Dennis
and Ernesto saw and heard the
conversations of the accused in
view of the counter-evidence
submitted by Ligaya, showing
the physical set-up of her
residence or building, the kind of
door she maintained thereat,
and the inner private room she
had;
-the lack or insufficiency of
evidence at the level of
prosecution for purposes of
determining probable cause;
and
-the incredibility of the
testimonies of Sabino and
Jonas because of the absence
of corroborating evidence.
There was no hint of whimsicality, nor
of gross and patent abuse of discretion
as would amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of law on the part
of the Presiding Judge.
3. INJUNCTION AND WRITS OF
RESTRAINT IN PROPER CASES
162 Brocka v Enrile
Jan 28, 1985 - Lino Brocka, Benjamin
Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and
Rodolfo Santos (Brocka, et. al) were
arrested by the police after a violent
dispersal of a demonstration with the
jeepney strike by the Alliance of
Concerned Transport Organization
(ACTO)
● They were charged with Illegal
Assemby
Except for Brocka, et al. who were
charged as leaders of the offense and
for whom no bail was recommended,
the other petitioners were released on
bail of P3,000 each.
Feb 09, 1985 - Brocka, et.al’s
provisional release was ordered, upon
an urgent petition for bail.
However, despite service of the
order of release, Brocka, et al.
remained in detention.
● Respondents invoked a Preventive
Detention Action (PDA) issued on
January 28, 1985.
● No copy, whether original, duplicate
original or certified true copy of the
PDA, was presented to the
petitioners
Feb 11, 1985 – Brocka, et. al were
charged with Inciting to Sedition
● The utterances of the petitioners,
which the respondents allege as
constitute inciting to sedition, were
almost verbatim same utterances
which are subject of the charge of
illegal assembly
Feb 14, 1985 – Brocka, et. al were
released provisionally by virtue of the
orders of President Marcos.
The petitioners filed a petition to
implead Presiding Judge Ricardo
Tensuan (RTC QC) and to enjoin the
prosecution of the criminal cases for
Inciting for Sedition.
WON the prosecution of the criminal
cases for Inciting to Sedition may be
lawfully enjoined – YES
RATIO: The hasty filing of the second
offense, premised on a spurious and
inoperational PDA, certainly betrays
respondent's bad faith and malicious
intent to pursue criminal charges
against Brocka, et al.
GENERAL RULE is that criminal
prosecution may not be restrained or
stayed by injunction, preliminary or
final, EXCEPT in certain cases:
 To afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused
 When necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions
 When there is a pre-judicial
question which is subjudice
 When the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority
 Where the prosecution is under an
invalid law, ordinance or regulation
 When double jeopardy is clearly
apparent
 Where the court has no jurisdiction
over the offense
 Where it is a case of persecution
rather than prosecution
 Where the charges are manifestly
false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and
 When there is clearly no prima facie
case against the accused and a
 motion to quash on that ground has
been denied
CASE AT BAR, Brocka, et. al have
cited circumstances to show that the
criminal proceedings had become a
case of persecution, rather than a
prosecution.
● Respondents acted in bad faith
when they refused Brocka, et al.'s
release from detention invoking a
PDA. This PDA was issued on
January 28, 1985, but was
invoked only on February 9, 1985
(upon receipt of RTC’s order of
release).
o Under the guidelines issued,
PDAs shall be invoked
within 24 hours (in Metro
Manila) or 48 hours (outside
Metro Manila).
● Noteworthy also is Brocka, et al.'s
claim that, despite subpoenas for its
production, the prosecution
merely presented a purported
xerox copy of the invoked PDA.
o individuals against who
PDAs have been issued
should be furnished with the
original and duplicate
original and a certified true
copy issued by the official
having official custody of the
PDA at the time of the
apprehension
● Second offense is illegal as it was
premised on the same act of
attending and participating in the
strike.
“The tenacious invocation of a spurious
and inoperational PDA and the sham
and hasty preliminary investigation
were clear signals that the prosecutors
intended to keep Brocka, et. al in
detention until the second offense of
Inciting to Sedition could be facilitated
and justified without need of issuing a
warrant of arrest anew.”
Petition GRANTED
163 Guingona Jr. v City Fiscal
Summary: David and his sister
Kuhne had investments in Nation
Savings. Nation Savings was placed
under receivership (nabankrupt sila)
because of the bank’s officers
misuse of the funds. Guingona,
Martin and Santos were officers of
the bank. Guingona and Martin
assumed as their personal debt the
investments David and his sister
made with the bank. After that, they
found out that only a small part of
David’s investments were put on the
banks record. Guingona filed a case
against David because David won’t
accept the payment Guingona was
giving to him. (The amount is smaller
than the real debt) So David filed a
case against of Estafa and other
related violations against the bank
officers. Guingona and the other
officers filed for a writ of prohibition to
prohibit the Fiscal of Manila from
conducting a preliminary
investigation. The Court held that the
writ of prohibition was improper
because it is within the City Fiscal’s
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation. Thus the filing of the
writ of prohibition is premature.
David and his sister Kuhne had
investments in Nation Savings.
Nation Savings was placed under
receivership (nabankrupt sila) because
of the bank’s officers misuse of the
funds. Guingona, Martin and Santos
were officers of the bank.
Guingona and Martin assumed as their
personal debt the investments David
and his sister made with the bank.
After that, they found out that only a
small part of David’s investments were
put on the banks record.
Guingona filed a case against David
because David won’t accept the
payment Guingona was giving to him.
(The amount is smaller than the real
debt)
December 22, 1981: David filed with
CFI Manila a complaint for estafa and
violation of CB Circular No 364 and
related regulations. He claimed that the
difference between his placements and
the sum entered into the Nation
Savings’ books constitutes the
defraudation against him.
WON petition for writ of prohibition is
proper in this case? NO.
The prohibition petition should be
dismissed.
City Fiscal has jurisdiction to conduct
the preliminary investigation.
-PI was not yet finished.
-The filing of the petition is
premature.
The case does not fall within any of the
exceptions when prohibition lies to stop
the PI
“As a general rule, an injunction will not
be granted to restrain a criminal
prosecution”. With more reason will
injunction not lie when the case is still
at the preliminary investigation stage.
This Court should not usurp the primary
function of the City Fiscal to conduct the
preliminary investigation of the estafa
charge and of the petitioners’
countercharge for perjury, which was
consolidated with the estafa charge.
The petition is dismissed and the City
Fiscal of Manila is directed to finish the
preliminary investigation.
164 Ladlad v Velasco
These are consolidated petitions for the
writs of prohibition and certiorari to
enjoin petitioners’ prosecution for
Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of
the DOJ and the RTC Makati on the
investigation and prosecution of
petitioners’ cases. Petitioners in these
cases are members of the House of
Representatives representing various
party-list groups and private individuals,
all of whom face the charge of
Rebellion.
The DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a
Resolution finding probable cause to
indict Beltran and San Juan as
"leaders/promoters" of Rebellion.
Beltran was contending that there was
no probable cause against him. The
other petitioners were contending that
there were irregularities which attended
the preliminary investigation done in
their cases.
The SC held that the inquest
proceeding against Beltran for
Rebellion is void. There is also no
probable cause to indict him for
Rebellion. The preliminary investigation
on the cases of Maza and Ladlas were
also tainted with irregularities.
4. BAIL
Sec 26, Rule 114 - Bail not a bar to
objections on illegal arrest, lack of or
irregular preliminary investigation -
An application for or admission to bail
shot not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest
or the legality of the warrant issued
therefor, or from assailing the
regularity or questioning the absence
of a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided that he
raised them before entering his plea.
The court shall resolve the matter as
early as practicable but not later than
the start of the trial of the case.
Bail is the security given for the release
of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, to
guarantee his appearance before any
court as required under the conditions
hereinafter specified
Purpose: It is a guarantee the
appearance of a person before any
court when so required. Bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused’s
interest in pretrial liberty and society’s
interest in assuring the accused’s
presence at trial.
165 Go v CA
An unidentified assailant and Eldon
Maguan’s cars almost bumped into
each other. The assailant alighted from
his car, shot Eldon and drove away. A
policeman in a nearby restaurant took
down the assailant’s plate number,
police verified the car as belonging to
Elsa Ang Go and were able to positively
identify her using the staff in Cravings
Bakeshop which she was traced to
have been shortly before the shooting.
A manhunt ensued and 6 days in, Rolito
Ang Go went to the police station with
two lawyers after having been informed
of the hunt for him. The police detained
him and filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide with the Provincial Prosecutor
of Rizal. He refused to sign a waiver of
Art . 125 which the Prosecutor required
him to do before he can avail of a
preliminary investigation. Eldon died,
and the information was amended to
murder and filed before the RTC.
1. Go filed for immediate release and
proper preliminary investigation with
the Prosecutor, saying that there was
no preliminary investigation and prayed
for release on bail. Granted bail, cash
bond P100,000.
2. Go filed an urgent ex parte motion for
special raffle to expedite the bail
recommendation. Respondent judge
granted it and released him.
3. 5 days later Prosecutor filed w/ the
RTC a motion for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation and prayed to
suspend proceedings. They attached to
the motion for leave the copy of
petitioner’s motion with the PI.
4. The Judge recalled the order for
release giving Go 48 hours to surrender
himself to the Court, the petition for
immediate release and PI was treated
as a petition for bail and set for hearing,
and the leave to the prosecutor to
conduct PI was cancelled
 Go filed for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, his due
 process was violated because
there was no PI
o Denied by Respondent
judge
o Go surrendered to the
police. His petitions
were remanded to the
CA
 Go filed w/ CA
motion to
restrain his
arraignment
 Hon. Pelayo issued a has escaped while being transferred
Commitment Order and entered
a not guilty plea for Go. Trial
wasset.
5. Go filed petition for habeas corpus
(+certiorari, prohibition, mandamus) to
the CA. Trial commenced. 3 days later,
CA decided that his warrantless arrest
was valid because the offense was
“freshly committed”, his act of posting
bail was a waiver of irregularity, the
court has the discretion to amend and
control its processes and there was a
valid commitment order and information
for murder, thus no HC.
ISSUE:
1. W/N there was a valid warrantless
arrest
2. W/N Go had waived his right to
preliminary investigation
HELD:
As to warrantless arrest w/n lawful
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a)
and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceed against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested
without warrant. — When a person is
lawfully arrested without a warrant for
an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court the complaint or information
may be filed by the offended party,
peace officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having been
first conducted, on the basis of the
affidavit of the offended party or
arresting office or person
However, before the filing of such
complaint or information, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this Rule, but he must
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, with the assistance of a
lawyer and in case of non-availability of
a lawyer, a responsible person of his
choice. Notwithstanding such waiver,
he may apply for bail as provided in the
corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within
fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court
without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, the
accused may within five (5) days from
the time he learns of the filing of the
information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to
adduce evidence in his favor in the
manner prescribed in this Rule.
1. There was no valid warrantless arrest
because the “arrest” took place 6 days
after the shooting, and the “arresting
officers” were not present neither did
they have “personal knowledge” since
the information was written based on
eyewitnesses. S7R112 does not apply
because there was no arrest at all. He
walked in the police station with no
intention of surrendering himself.
The police should have immediately
scheduled a preliminary investigation
unconditionally because he was not
lawfully arrested. It was a substantive
error to rely on S7 R112 that requires
the waiver of Article 125.
2. Go did not waive his right to a
preliminary investigation because
from the beginning he demanded one
and the same day the information for
murder was filed, an omnibus motion
for immediate release and preliminary
investigation was filed with the
Prosecutor, which is erroneous since
Crespo v. Mogul said that upon the
filing with the trial court, the trial
court has discretion over all
acquittal or convictions. However, it
is not clear if Go knew that the
information was filed with the RTC at
that time. Moreover, the omnibus
motion was about preliminary
investigation (Crespo v. Mogul was
about reinvestigation) and the
Prosecutor filed with the TC a motion
for leave to conduct a preliminary
investigation 5 days after the
information, thus, the court considered
Go to have filed his omnibus motion
with the TC.
The right to a preliminary
investigation is statutory and a
substantive right, thus it is a
component part of due process in
criminal justice. This is to protect the
accused from the prolonged anxiety,
humiliation, expense and pain.
CASE AT BAR: Go deserves to have a
preliminary investigation despite
posting bail. In People v. Selfaison, the
court held that appellants there had
waived their right to preliminary
investigation because immediately after
their arrest, they filed bail and
proceeded to trial "without previously
claiming that they did not have the
benefit of a preliminary investigation."
In the instant case, Go asked for
release on recognizance or on bail and
for preliminary investigation in one
omnibus motion. He had thus claimed
his right to preliminary investigation
before respondent Judge approved the
cash bond posted by petitioner and
ordered his release on 12 July 1991.
Despite the absence of preliminary
investigation, the information was
valid as well as the court’s
jurisdiction. The Prosecutor had
actually agreed he was entitled to bail
which means that the evidence of guilt
on his hands is not strong. The Judge
was erroneous to recall his order to his
order granting bail and requiring Go to
surrender since there was no new or
additional evidence to justify his recall.
As to the effect of the
commencement of trial and
presentation of evidence
Go is still entitled to a preliminary
investigation, despite the Prosecutor
already having additional evidence,
because what matters is that his
constitutional due process must be
afforded to him. Go was pushed to trial
with extraordinary haste “to the
applause of the audience in the court”
and he submitted to arraignment and
trial “kicking and screaming”. The
counsel vigorously argued against the
arraignment, and during the trial so
much so that he court was angered and
he was dared to walk out and promised
to replace him with a counsel de oficio.
He promptly filed for certiorari. If the
counsel did not walk out, it was
because he loathed the idea of being
replaced with a counsel de oficio.
Re bail, he is entitled. If the evidence
already on record accords the
Prosecutor reasonable belief that he is
guilty, the Prosecutor can move in the
trial court cancellation of bail. Despite
the presentation of evidence, it It would
not be idle ceremony to afford him his
rights to due process and instead it
would be a celebration by the State of
the rights of the accused.
DISPO: Grant preliminary investigation.
166 Larranaga v CA
Petitioner Francisco Juan Larranaga
is charged with two counts of
kidnapping and serious illegal
detention RTC Cebu City. He is
presently detained at the Bagong
Buhay Rehabilitation Center.
Represented by his mother, Margarita,
he filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with writs of preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction.
Larranaga alleged that he was denied
the right to preliminary investigation
and sought to annul the informations
as well as the warrant of arrest
issued in consequence thereof. In the
alternative, he prayed that a
preliminary investigation be
conducted and that he be released
from detention pending the
investigation. He filed a
supplemental petition for habeas
corpus or bail.
The Solicitor General recommended
that petitioner be accorded his right to
preliminary investigation and that he be
released from detention during the
pendency thereof.
The Court issued a resolution: setting
aside the inquest investigation of the
Larranaga and ordering the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct
a regular preliminary investigation;
ordering the immediate release of
Larranaga pending his preliminary
investigation; and ordering Judge
Ocampo to cease and desist from
proceeding with arraignment and trial.
The counsels for the prosecution filed a
motion for reconsideration, arguing that
Larranaga was charged with a
continuing offense, thus, he was
lawfully arrested without warrant and
only entitled to an inquest investigation.
1. W/N Larranaga should be
released pending the preliminary
investigation – NO
The records show that two informations
were filed against petitioner for
kidnapping and serious illegal
detention.
Executive Judge Priscila Agana
issued a warrant of arrest, and
petitioner was arrested by virtue of
said warrant.
The Court held in Sanchez v.
Demetriou that the filing of charges
and the issuance of the warrant of
arrest against a person invalidly
detained will cure the defect of that
detention or at least deny him the
right to be released because of such
defect.
 In Sanchez, the Court ruled that
the warrantless arrest of the
petitioner was illegal; however,
the trial court still lawfully
acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner by virtue
of the warrant of arrest it issued.
 The rule is that if the accused
objects to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, he may
move to quash the information,
but only on that ground. If, as in
this case, the accused raises
other grounds in the motion to
quash, he is deemed to have
waived that objection and to
have submitted his person to
the jurisdiction of the court.
Therefore, the Court held that
petitioners detention at the Bagong
Buhay Rehabilitation Center is legal in
view of the information and the warrant
of arrest against him. The absence of a
preliminary investigation will not justify
petitioners release because such
defect did not nullify the information and
the warrant of arrest against him.
2. W/N Larranaga is entitled to a
preliminary investigation – YES
Inquest investigations applies
only to those lawfully arrested without a
warrant. The facts show that some
members of the Philippine National
Police Criminal Investigation Group
(PNP CIG) went to the Center for
Culinary Arts in Quezon City to arrest
Larranaga, albeit without warrant.
Sec 5, Rule 113 enumerates the
circumstances when a warrantless
arrest is deemed lawful. This case at
bar does not fall under any of those
circumstances.
 It does not appear that
Larranaga has just committed,
is actually committing or is
attempting to commit an offense
when the police officers tried to
arrest him. In fact, petitioner
was attending classes at the
Center for Culinary Arts at that
time.
The Court also rejected the
prosecutors' argument that petitioner
was actually committing a crime at the
time of the arrest since kidnapping with
serious illegal detention is a continuing
crime.
 One of the victims, Marijoy
Chiong, was found dead in Sitio
 Tanawan, Barangay
Guadalupe, Carcar, Cebu while
the other victim, Jacqueline
Chiong, remains missing to
date.
The Court rejected also the assertion
that petitioner is no longer entitled to a
preliminary investigation because he
had waived his right when he failed to
appear during the preliminary
investigation set by the City Prosecutor.
 A waiver, whether express or
implied, must be made in clear
and unequivocal manner. Mere
failure of petitioner and his
counsel to appear before the
City Prosecutor cannot be
construed as a waiver of his
right to preliminary
investigation, considering that
he has been vigorously invoking
his right to a regular preliminary
investigation since the start of
the proceedings.
E. INQUEST
INQUEST PROCEEDINGS
-proper when the accused has been
lawfully arrested without a warrant
-not a preliminary investigation
- a summary investigation and which
does not follow the procedures set forth
it Sec 3 of Rule 112
-PURPOSE: to determine whether or
not the person detained should remain
under custody and then charged in
court
-CONDUCTED BY: a public prosecutor
who is assigned inquest duties as an
Inquest Officer and is to discharge his
duties, unless otherwise directed, only
at the police stations/headquarters of
the PNP in order to expedite and
facilitate the disposition of inquest
cases.
-DEEMED COMENCED: from the time
the Inquest Officer receives the
complaint and referral documents from
the law enforcement authorities;
documents include:
a) affidavit of arrest
b) investigation report
c) statements of the
complainant and the witnesses;
and
d) other supporting evidence
gathered
-the affidavit of arrest and the
statements of affidavits of the
complainant and the witnesses shall be
subscribed and sworn to before the
Inquest Officer by the affiants
-detained person should be present
during the inquest proceedings
UNLESS: reasons exist that would
dispense with his presence like
confinement in a hospital detention in a
place requiring maximum security or his
presences is not feasible by reason of
age, health or similar factors
-if necessary, the Inquest Officer shall
require the presence of the complaining
witnesses and subject them to an
informal and summary investigation or
examination for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable
cause
POSSIBLE OPTIONS OF THE
INQUEST PROSECUTOR
-Inquest officer has an initial duty - to
determine if the detained person has
been arrested lawfully in accordance
with Sec. 5(a) and (b) of Rule 113. For
this purpose, the Inquest Officer may
summarily examine the arresting
officers on the circumstances
surrounding the arrest or apprehension
on the detained person.
a) IF FOUND THAT THE
ARREST WAS NOT MADE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE
ROC - the inquest prosecutor
shall not proceed with the
inquest proceedings. Instead,
he shall recommend the release
of the detainee, not down the
disposition on the referral
document, prepare a brief
memorandum indicating the
reasons for the action he took
and forward the same together
with the record of the case, to
the City or the Provincial
Prosecutor for appropriate
action.
- when the
RECOMMENDATION IS
APPROVED, the order of
release shall be served on the
officer having custody of said
detainee so the latter may be
released. The officer shall also
serve upon the detainee a
notice of preliminary
investigation if the evidence on
hand warrants the conduct of a
regular preliminary
investigation. In such an even,
the detainee shall also be
released for further
investigation. The detainee
shall be furnished copies of the
charge sheet or complaint,
affidavits or sworn statements
of the complainant and his
witnesses and other supporting
evidence.
2. IF FOUND THAT ARREST
WAS PROPERLY EFFECTED -
the inquest shall proceed but
the Inquest Officer shall first ask
the detained person if he
desires to avail himself of a
preliminary investigation and if
he does, he shall be made to
execute a waiver of the
provisions of Art. 125 of the
RPC with the assistance of a
lawyer. The preliminary
investigation may be conducted
by the Inquest Officer himself or
by any other Assistant
Prosecutor to whom the case
may be assigned.
-IF INQUEST PROSECUTOR
FINDS THAT PROBABLE
CAUSE EXISTS - he shall
prepare the corresponding
information with the
recommendation that the same
be filed in court
-IF NO PROBABLE CAUSE
FOUND - he shall recommend
the release of the detained
person
INQUEST MUST PERTAIN TO
THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH
THE ARREST WAS MADE
- inquest conducted must be for
the offense for which the
detainee was arrested
167 Leviste v Alameda
Jose Leviste was charged with
Homicide. Later, he was placed in
police custody while confined in the
hospital, and after he posted bond,
which the court approved, he was
released from detention and his
arraignment was set.
Thereafter, the victim’s heirs, with
conformity of the public prosecutor,
filed a motion to defer the
proceeding to allow the public
prosecution to conduct a purpose of determining whether said
reinvestigation to determine the
proper offense.
The RTC ordered the deferment of
Leviste’s arraignment and allowed
prosecution to conduct a the arrested person has the option to
reinvestigation to determine the
proper offense. Subsequently, the
charge against Leviste was amended to
murder, a warrant of arrest against him
was issued, and his arraignment was
set where he refused to plead. Leviste
petitioned against the reinvestigation
and other orders, primarily contending
that the prosecution has no right to seek
reinvestigation of the case, since such
remedy belongs exclusively to an
accused arrested without a warrant.
Whether or victim’s heirs have the right
to cause the reinvestigation of the
criminal case when the criminal
information had already been filed with
the lower court? YES
The Court ruled that the private
party/prosecution can seek
reinvestigation of the case.
Generally, a preliminary investigation is
required before a complaint for an
offense penalized with at least 4 years,
2 months and 1 day is filed.
As an exception, there is no need for
a preliminary investigation in cases
of lawful warrantless arrests for
such offense so longs as an inquest,
where available, has been
conducted. Inquest is defined as an
informal investigation conducted by
a public prosecutor involving
persons arrested and detained
without the benefit of a warrant of
arrest issued by the court for the
persons should remain under
custody and correspondingly be
charged in court.
Before a complaint is filed in court, only
avail of a 15-day preliminary
investigation, provided he signs the
waiver required under Article 125of the
RPC. For obvious reasons, this remedy
is not available to the private
complainant since he cannot waive
what he does not have. After a
complaint is filed in court, the accused
may still ask for a preliminary
investigation.
However, the Rules is silent on whether
the private complainant has a right to
ask for a reinvestigation.
Nonetheless, the Court found that a
private complainant can move for
reinvestigation provided that public
prosecutor grants him authority to
prosecute, and with conformity of the
public prosecutor such complainant can
file a motion for reinvestigation.
With regard to amendment, the court
found it was a substantial amendment
which means a preliminary
investigation should be conducted.
However, since there is no
substantial distinction between a
preliminary investigation and a
reinvestigation because both are
conducted in the same manner, the
fact that only a reinvestigation was
made, the substantial amendment of
the information is not rendered
invalid.
DOCTRINE: Inquest is defined as an
informal investigation conducted by a
public prosecutor involving persons
arrested and detained without the
benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by
the court for the purpose of determining
whether said persons should remain
under custody and correspondingly be
charged in court.
168 People v Court of Appeals
Respondent Esam Gadi is a national of
Saudi Arabia, apprehended at the
Manila Internaitonal Airport and
subsequently detained for possession
of marijuana
An information was filed for voilcation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Gadi filed and Ex Parte Motion to
Reduce Bail form 90k to 30k. This was
denied. Gadi then posted cash bond of
90k which was approved by RTC
Gadi filed a motion for reinvestigation,
claiming that the seriousness of the
offense charged warranted the grant of
his motion. This motion was filed
beyond 5 day period but he claimed that
the reglementary 5 day period was not
mandatory. This was denied, along with
the MR.
He challenged the denial of motion for
reinvestigation in the CA which granted
the petition and reversed the RTC
Order.
CA agreed that 5 day period was not
mandatory and that preliminary
investigation may be conducted even
after trial on the merits has begun, as
long as the motion was filed before
arraignment.
WON the motion for reinvestigation
should be granted? NO
Period for filing motion for preliminary
investigation after information has been
filed against an accused who was
arrested without a warrant has been
characterized as mandatory by the
Court. The accused has the right to ask
for preliminary investigation within a
period of 5 days from the time he
learned of the filing of the information.
This is in accord with the intent of the
Rules on CrimPro to make preliminary
investigation simple and speedy. The
investigation is advisedly preliminary, to
be followed by the trial proper. The
investigating judge or prosecuting
officer acts upon probable cause and
reasonable belief, not upon proof
beyond reasonable doubnt. The
occasion is not for full and exhaustive
display of the parties’ evidence; it is for
the presentation of such evidence only
as may engender well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed
and tht the accused is probably guilty
thereof. When all this is fulfilled, the
accused will not be permitted to cast
about for fancied reasons to delay the
proceedings; the time to ask for more is
at the trial.
The case cited by CA to justify that the
5 day period was not mandatory (Tan v.
SEC) is not applicable because it is
concerned with the Corporation Code.
But in the present case, the word “may”
refers only to the option of filing a
motion for preliminary investigation; it
does not refer to the filing of the motion
after the expiration of the 5 day period.
Esam Gad had the option or faculty of
demanding preliminary investigation; if
he wanted to exercise that option,
however, he had to exercise it within the
reglementary period. Upon expiration of
that period, his option lapsed.
The comparison with Go v. CA was also
misplaced. In the present case,
accused was arrested without a
warrant. In Go, the accused
surrendered to the police station. In the
present case, the accused filed a
motion for investigation only 1 month
after an information was filed against
him. In Go, he filed a motion for
investigation on the same day the
information was filed against him.
When Gadi failed to file the motion
within the 5 day period, he waived his
right to a preliminary investigation. He
is also waived it by posting a cash bail
bond without previously or
simultaneously demanding a PP 1017:
preliminary investigation.
VI. ARREST
A. NATURE AND DEFINITION
1. DEFINITION
Rule 113, Sec 1&2
SECTION 1. Definition of Arrest—
Arrest is the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be
bound to answer for the commission
of an offense.
SECTION 2. Arrest; How Made. —
An arrest is made by an actual
restraint of a person to be arrested,
or by his submission to the custody of
the person making the arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force
shall be used in making an arrest.
The person arrested shall not be
subject to a greater restraint than is
necessary for his detention.
169 David et al v Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo et al.
On Feb. 24, 2006, PGMA issued
Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017
declaring a state of national
emergency, citing as basis the threats
from extremists. The threats were from
both the Left and Right Movements, as
magnified by the mass media.
 PGMA also issued General
Order (GO) 5 implementing PP
1017, calling out the AFP and
the PNP to prevent and
suppress acts of terrorism and
lawless violence.
 On March 3, 2006, PGMA
issued PP 1021 lifting the state
of national emergency.
The following are the events that led to
 On Jan. 17, 2006, members of
the Magdalo group who were
indicted for the Oakwood Mutiny
escaped their detention cell and
issued a public statement
calling people to protest
 On Feb.17, authorities
discovered plans of bombing
the PMA Homecoming which
was supposed to be attended by
PGMA. PGMA did not attend
the said event. A bomb was
indeed found and detonated.
 Minutes of meetings between
the Magdalo group and the NPA
were captured.
 There was an announcement in
DZRH that Magdalo’s D-Day
would be on Feb.24, 2006.
 NPA’s Ka Roger also declared
their vow to bring down the
Arroyo government.
After the issuance of PP 1017 and
GO 5:
 Permits of groups like KMU to
hold rallies were revoked
 Warrantless arrests were
implemented
 Randy David and Ronald
Llamas of Akbayan were
arrested without warrant
o Brought to Camp
Karingal where
petitioner David was
fingerprinted,
photographed and
booked like a criminal
suspect
o Treated brusquely by
policemen who “held his
head and tried to push
him” inside an unmarked
car
o Charged with violation of
BP 880 and Inciting to
Sedition
o Detained for 7 hours
o Eventually released for
insufficiency of evidence
 The offices of the Daily Tribune,
Malaya, and Abante were
raided.
 The takeover of news outfits
that would not follow the
standards of GO 5 was also
ordered.
 The National Communications
Commission also warned media
outfits that they may be closed if
they violate PP1017 and GO 5.
 Representatives Beltran
(Anakpawis), Ocampo (Bayan
Muna), and Maza (Gabriela)
were also arrested.
WON the arrests done in pursuant to
PP 1107 are valid? NO
Arrests of David and Llamas were
illegal
Constitution provides that searches and
seizures are normally unreasonable
unless authorized by a validly issued
search warrant or warrant of arrest.
 Fundamental protection given is
that between person and police
must stand the protective
authority of a magistrate
clothed with power to issue or
refuse search warrants or
warrants of arrest.
The arrest of petitioners didn’t fall under
the exceptions of Rule Sec 5, Rule 113
(When warrantless arrest is lawful)
During the inquest, all the arresting
officers could invoke was their
observation that some rallyists were
wearing t-shirts with the words “Oust
Gloria Now” and they assumed that
David was the leader of the rally
 Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the
ground of insufficiency of
evidence
 David was not wearing the shirt,
and even if he was, it’s
insufficient to charge him with
inciting to sedition
 There’s also insufficient
evidence for the charge of
violation of BP 880 because it
 wasn’t even known if David was
the leader of the rally
Right to peaceably assemble was also
violated
 Cannot be denied except on a
showing of a clear and present
danger
Petitioners were arrested while they
were exercising their right to peaceful
assembly
They were not committing any crime,
and neither was there a showing of a
clear and present danger that
warranted the limitation of that right
 The charges of inciting to
sedition and violation of BP 880
were mere afterthought
170 People v Sequino
Accused-appellants Ermelindo
Sequiño, Vicente Tumangan, and
Nenito Melvida are appealing from the
decision of the RTC, finding them guilty
of robbery with homicide.
On Apr. 24, 1991, Eugenio Godinez,
overseer of Hacienda Jose Ancajas in
Medellin, Cebu. and Pedro Broniola,
the hacienda’s bookkeeper, went to the
Medellin Rural Bank to withdraw
Php50,557.17 to pay wages of
hacienda workers. They were with
Jimmy Serafin, janitor and motorcycle
driver of the bank. After the withdrawal
and when they were near the hacienda,
armed men blocked their path. When
they didn’t stop, they fired on them, and
in the ensuing chaos, took the money.
Broniola died as a result of a gunshot
wound.
SPO Elpidio Luna received a report
about the robbery. Luna went to the
crime scene and found an abandoned
motorcycle. The people around said
that the culprit already fled. However,
Luna found a bio-data sheet allegedly
belonging to Melvida. Luna then went
to Melvida and asked him to go to the
barangay captain’s house. Melvida
hesitated at first, but he eventually
agreed. Since the barangay captain
wasn’t home, Luna took Melvida to the
police station.
Melvida was KEPT in the station the
whole evening for investigation to be
conducted. Melvida was released the
next day, only after the police filed
criminal charges against him and after
posting bail. Melvida was not assisted
by counsel during the police
investigation. During the investigation,
Melvida admitted that he kept Php9,000
from what has been stolen.
WON the police violated the
constitutional rights of Melvida. – YES
(the accused alleged that the trial court
failed to consider this, but the trial court
expressed dismay at the policemen not
following the Constitution)
The admission of Melvida was made in
violation of Section 12(1), Article III of
the Constitution and is therefore
inadmissible as evidence pursuant to
Section 12(3). The lack of counsel
during the custodial investigation
makes it inadmissible.
Luna also claims that Melvida was not
arrested. However, Melvida’s voluntary
going with Luna upon the latter’s
“invitation” was a submission to Luna’s
custody. Luna also believed Melvida
was a suspect in the robbery charaged.
Hence, Melvida was held to answer for
the commission of the offense.
Additionally, Melvida’s arrest does not
fall under the lawful arrests without
warrant. Luna did not have personal
knowledge of the crime, only having an
unreasonable suspicion due to seeing
the bio-data sheet of Melvida in the
crime scene. There was also no
showing that Melvida was informed of
his constitutional rights, and Luna
admitted Melvida was without counsel
during custodial investigation.
The Court, however, ruled that the
accused are guilty of robbery with
homicide.
DOCTRINE: An arrest "is the taking
of a person into custody in order that
he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense," and it is
made "by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest."
171 Cojuangco v Sandiganbayan
PCGG filed a complaint for violation of
RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act against Cojuangco. This
was in connection to his donation of P2
Million to the Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation (COCOFED)
using PCA special fund.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan issued
a warrant of arrest based on two
pieces of documents:
(1) 1992 Resolution of the
Ombudsman, recommending
the filing of the information
(2) 1995 Memorandum of the
Office of the Special
Prosecutor denying the
existence of a prejudicial
question
Aside from these, SB had nothing
more to support its resolution to issue
the warrant.
1. Whether the warrant of arrest is null
and void
2. Whether SB can still exercise
jurisdiction over Cojuangco
Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution:
No search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon a probable
cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
In the case at bar, SB failed to abide by
the constitutional mandate of
personally determining the existence of
probable cause before issuing a
warrant of arrest. The 2 afore-cited
documents were the product of
somebody else’s determination,
insufficient to support a finding of
probable cause by the SB itself. Hence,
the warrant of arrest is palpably invalid.
There was no existence of probable
cause because there was no personal
determination by the judge.
As to the second issue, despite the
nullity of the warrant of arrest, the Court
held that SB can still exercise
jurisdiction over Cojuangco and
proceed with the trial.
The giving or posting of bail by
Cojuangco is tantamount to
submission of his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Even though the warrant issued in this
case was void, Cojuangco nevertheless
waived all his rights to object to its
invalidity by appearing and giving a
bond.
Lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. When a
defendant voluntarily appears, he is
deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court.
have not been lawfully arrested since
the warrantless arrest is not valid – the
police officers that arrested them lack of
personal knowledge that they were the
perpetrators of the crime (2) they were
just “invited to the police station. Thus
the inquest proceeding is invalid and a
regular inquest proceeding should be
conducted in accordance w/ Rule 112
ROC. RTC denied the petition and MR.
CA likewise denied the appeal and MR
due to lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, petition is DISMISSED. W/N the petitioners were validly

arrested w/o a warrant? YES
Elements of Sec.5(b) Rule 113:
172 Pestilos v Generoso  Probable cause
This is a petition for certiorari under o actual belief or reasonable
Rule 45. grounds of suspicion
o based on actual facts e.g.
On Feb. 25, 2005, at around 3:15 am, supported by circumstances
an altercation ensued between Atty. sufficiently strong to create
Generoso and petitioners in Brgy. Holy probable cause of the
Spirit, Q.C. Atty. Generoso called person to be arrested
Central Police District Station 6 Probable Probabl Probable
(Batasan Hills Police Station) to report cause by e cause cause by
the incident. SPO1 Monsalve prosecutor by the the arresting
dispatched SPO2 Javier and others to judge officer
go to the crime scene and render W/N the W/N W/N a crime
assistance. accused is offense has been
guilty of has committed
Upon arrival less than an hour after the the crime been and person
alleged altercation, SPO2 Javier saw and should committ to be
Atty. Generoso badly beaten. After Atty. be held for ed by arrested
Genoroso pointed to the police that it is trial person committed it
the petitioners who mauled him, the sought
police “invited” the petitioners to go to to be
the police station. After which, an arrested
inquest proceeding was conducted. In Based on Personal Based on
the information filed by the prosecutor, submitted evaluati his personal
the petitioners were indicted w/ document on by knowledge
frustrated murder. s of the of facts and
complaina judge of circumstanc
Petitioners then filed a motion for nt, the es that the
regular PI upon the ground that: (1) they responden person
 t and evidenc sought to be
witnesses e arrested
committed
the crime
e.g. actual
facts/ raw
evidence
 Crime has just been committed/
personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it
In the case at bar:
o Probable cause that petitioner
committed the offense:
(1) William Sia implicated J.
Abelinta III
(2) When police officer “invited”
Abelinta, he initially agreed but
suddenly sped up and
proceeded to his residence but
was caught up by the police
(3) The police saw a gun in the front
seat and a shot gun at the back
o Crime has been committed: when
the police officers arrived at the
crime scene, they saw William Sia
wounded
o Also, there was immediacy w/ the
acts of the police because they
arrived in less than an hour
sufficient to establish circumstance
under Sec. 5(b).
W/N the term “invited” is construed as
an authoritative command? YES
Arrest is taking of a person into custody
in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the
offense. It is made by actual restraint of
the person to be arrested or by his
submission to the person making the
arrest.
 Application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, physical
restraint or formal declaration of
arrest is unnecessary.
 It is enough that there is intent to
arrest and intent to submit.
In the case at bar:
o SPO2 Javier undeniably have the
intention to arrest the petitioner and
need not apply violent physical
restraint when the petitioner in fact
followed him. Employment of force
is only an alternative in case of
resistance.
Cf. Diplomatic and parliamentary
immunities from arrest
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec 11
A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.
RPC, Art 145
Art. 145. Violation of parliamentary
immunity. — The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall use force,
intimidation, threats, or fraud to
prevent any member of the National
Assembly (Congress of the
Philippines) from attending the
meetings of the Assembly
(Congress) or of any of its
committees or subcommittees,
constitutional commissions or
committees or divisions thereof, from
expressing his opinions or casting his
vote; and the penalty of prision
correccional shall be imposed upon
any public officer or employee who
shall, while the Assembly (Congress)
is in regular or special session, arrest
or search any member thereof,
except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable under
this Code by a penalty higher than
prision mayor.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, Arts. 31 & 37
Article 31
1.A diplomatic agent shall enjoy
immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving State. He
shall also enjoy immunity from its civil
and administrative jurisdiction,
except in the case of:
(a) A real action relating to private
immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving State, unless
he holds it on behalf of the sending
State for the purposes of the mission;
(b) An action relating to succession in
which the diplomatic agent is
involved as executor, administrator,
heir or legatee as a private person
and not on behalf of the sending
State;
(c) An action relating to any
professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in
the receiving State outside his official
functions.
2.A diplomatic agent is not obliged to
give evidence as a witness.
3.No measures of execution may be
taken in respect of a diplomatic agent
except in the cases coming under
subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of
paragraph 1 of this article, and
provided that the measures
concerned can be taken without
infringing the inviolability of his
person or of his residence.
4.The immunity of a diplomatic agent
from the jurisdiction of the receiving
State does not exempt him from the
jurisdiction of the sending State.
Article 37
1.The members of the family of a
diplomatic agent forming part of his
household shall, if they are not
nationals of the receiving State, enjoy
the privileges and immunities
specified in articles 29 to 36.
2.Members of the administrative and
technical staff of the mission,
together with members of their
families forming part of their
respective households, shall, if they
are not nationals of or permanently
resident in the receiving State, enjoy
the privileges and immunities
specified in articles 29 to 35, except
that the immunity from civil and
administrative jurisdiction of the
receiving State specified in
paragraph 1 of article 31 shall not
extend to acts performed outside the
course of their duties. They shall also
enjoy the privileges specified in
article 36, paragraph 1, in respect of
articles imported at the time of first
installation.

3.Members of the service staff of the
mission who are not nationals of or
permanently resident in the receiving
State shall enjoy immunity in respect
of acts performed in the course of
their duties, exemption from dues
and taxes on the emoluments they
receive by reason of their
employment and the exemption
contained in article 33.
4.Private servants of members of the
mission shall, if they are not nationals
of or permanently resident in the
receiving State, be exempt from dues
and taxes on the emoluments they
receive by reason of their
employment. In other respects, they
may enjoy privileges and immunities
only to the extent admitted by the
receiving State. However, the
receiving State must exercise its
jurisdiction over those persons in
such a manner as not to interfere
unduly with the performance of the
functions of the mission.
Visiting Forces Agreement, Art. VII
Article VII
Importation and Exportation
1. United States Government
equipment, materials, supplies, and
other property imported into or
acquired in the Philippines by or on
behalf of the United States armed
forces in connection with activities to
which this agreement applies, shall
be free of all Philippine duties, taxes
and other similar charges. Title to
such property shall remain with the
United States, which may remove
such property from the Philippines at
any time, free from export duties,
taxes, and other similar charges. The
exemptions provided in this
paragraph shall also extend to any
duty, tax, or other similar charges
which would otherwise be assessed
upon such property after importation
into, or acquisition within, the
Philippines. Such property may be
removed from the Philippines, or
disposed of therein, provided that
disposition of such property in the
Philippines to persons or entities not
entitled to exemption from applicable
taxes and duties shall be subject to
payment of such taxes, and duties
and prior approval of the Philippine
Government.
2. Reasonable quantities of personal
baggage, personal effects, and other
property for the personal use of
United States personnel may be
imported into and used in the
Philippines free of all duties, taxes
and other similar charges during the
period of their temporary stay in the
Philippines. Transfers to persons or
entities in the Philippines not entitled
to import privileges may only be
made upon prior approval of the
appropriate Philippine authorities
including payment by the recipient of
applicable duties and taxes imposed
in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. The exportation of such
property and of property acquired in
the Philippines by United States
personnel shall be free of all
Philippine duties, taxes, and other
similar charges.
Visiting Forces Agreement, Article
V
Criminal Jurisdiction
1. Subject to the provisions of this
article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have
jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses
committed within the Philippines and
punishable under the law of the
Philippines.
(b) United States military authorities
shall have the right to exercise within
the Philippines all criminal and
disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on
them by the military law of the United
States over United States personnel
in the Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over United
States personnel with respect to
offenses, including offenses relating
to the security of the Philippines,
punishable under the laws of the
Philippines, but not under the laws of
the United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over United
States personnel with respect to
offenses, including offenses relating
to the security of the United States,
punishable under the laws of the
United States, but not under the laws
of the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this
paragraph and paragraph 3 of this
article, an offense relating to security
means:
(1) treason;
(2) sabotage, espionage or
violation of any law relating to
national defense.
3. In cases where the right to
exercise jurisdiction is concurrent,
the following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have
the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over all offenses
committed by United States
personnel, except in cases provided
for in paragraphs l (b), 2 (b), and 3 (b)
of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities
shall have the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over United
States personnel subject to the
military law of the United States in
relation to:
(1) offenses solely against the
property or security of the
United States or offenses
solely against the property or
person of United States
personnel; and
(2) offenses arising out of any
act or omission done in
performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either
government may request the
authorities of the other government to
waive their primary right to exercise
jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of
the United States military authorities
to maintain good order and discipline
among their forces, Philippine
authorities will, upon request by the
United States, waive their primary
right to exercise jurisdiction except in
cases of particular importance to the
Philippines. If the Government of the
Philippines determines that the case
is of particular importance, it shall
communicate such determination to
the United States authorities within
twenty (20) days after the Philippine
authorities receive the United States
request.
(e) When the United States military
commander determines that an
offense charged by authorities of the
Philippines against United States
personnel arises out of an act or
omission done in the performance of
official duty, the commander will
issue a certificate setting forth such
determination. This certificate will be
transmitted to the appropriate
authorities of the Philippines and will
constitute sufficient proof of
performance of official duty for the
purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this
article. In those cases where the
Government of the Philippines
believes the circumstances of the
case require a review of the duty
certificate, United States military
authorities and Philippine authorities
shall consult immediately. Philippine
authorities at the highest levels may
also present any information bearing
on its validity. United States military
authorities shall take full account of
the Philippine position. Where
appropriate, United States military
authorities will take disciplinary or
other action against offenders in
official duty cases, and notify the
Government of the Philippines of the
actions taken.
(f) If the government having the
primary right does not exercise
jurisdiction, it shall notify the
authorities of the other government
as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines
and the United States shall notify
each other of the disposition of all
cases in which both the authorities of
the Philippines and the United States
have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal
competence, the authorities of the
Philippines and the United States
shall assist each other in the arrest of
United States personnel in the
Philippines and in handing them over
to authorities who are to exercise
jurisdiction in accordance with the
provisions of this article.
5. United States military authorities
shall promptly notify Philippine
authorities of the arrest or detention
of United States personnel who are
subject to Philippine primary or
exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine
authorities shall promptly notify
United States military authorities of
the arrest or detention of any United
States personnel.
6. The custody of any United States
personnel over whom the Philippines
is to exercise jurisdiction shall
immediately reside with United
States military authorities, if they so
request, from the commission of the
offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings. United States military
authorities shall, upon formal
notification by the Philippine
authorities and without delay, make
such personnel available to those
authorities in time for any
investigative or judicial proceedings
relating to the offense with which the
person has been charged. In
extraordinary cases, the Philippine
Government shall present its position
to the United States Government
regarding custody, which the United
States Government shall take into full
account. In the event Philippine
judicial proceedings are not
completed within one year, the
United States shall be relieved of any
obligations under this paragraph. The
one year period will not include the
time necessary to appeal. Also, the
one year period will not include any
time during which scheduled trial
procedures are delayed because
United States authorities, after timely
notification by Philippine authorities
to arrange for the presence of the
accused, fail to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal
authority, United States and
Philippine authorities shall assist
each other in the carrying out of all
necessary investigations into
offenses and shall cooperate in
providing for the attendance of
witnesses and in the collection and
production of evidence, including
seizure and, in proper cases, the
delivery of objects connected with an
offense.
8. When United States personnel
have been tried in accordance with
the provisions of this article and have
been acquitted or have been
convicted and are serving, or have
served their sentence, or have had
their sentence remitted or
suspended, or have been pardoned,
they may not be tried again for the
same offense in the Philippines.
Nothing in this paragraph, however,
shall prevent United States military
authorities from trying United States
personnel for any violation of rules of
discipline arising from the act or
omission which constituted an
offense for which they were tried by
Philippine authorities.
9. When United States personnel are
detained, taken into custody, or
prosecuted by Philippine authorities,
they shall be accorded all procedural
safeguards established by the law of
the Philippines. At the minimum,
United States personnel shall be
entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy
trial;
(b) To be informed in advance
of trial of the specific charge
or charges made against
them and to have reasonable
time to prepare a defense;
(c) To be confronted with
witnesses against them and
to cross examine such
witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in
their defense and to have
compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted
legal representation of their
own choice on the same
 basis as nationals of the  US civilian personnel
Philippines; connected to the US military
operations
(f) To have the services of a
competent interpreter; RULES ON JURISDICTION

(g) To communicate promptly Crime Jurisdiction

with and to be visited Crimes PH has exclusive
regularly by United States punishable jurisdiction
authorities, and to have such under PH laws
authorities present at all but not under
judicial proceedings. These US laws
proceedings shall be public Crimes US has exclusive
unless the court, in punishable jurisdiction
accordance with Philippine under US law
law, excludes persons who but not under
have no role in the PH laws
proceedings. Crimes There is concurrent
10. The confinement or detention by punishable jurisdiction but the
Philippine authorities of United under BOTH PH has the right to
States personnel shall be carried out PH and US primary jurisdiction
in facilities agreed on by appropriate laws especially when it
Philippine and United States is a threat to PH’s
authorities. United States personnel security:
serving sentences in the Philippines  Treason
shall have the right to visits and  Espionage
material assistance.  Sabotage
Crimes PH has no
11. United States personnel shall be committed by jurisdiction
subject to trial only in Philippine a US
courts of ordinary jurisdiction, and personnel
shall not be subject to the jurisdiction against the
of Philippine military or religious security and
courts. propery of the
US alone

-in determining whether one can be

prosecuted or not, the citizenship is
immaterial, what is material is one’s
membership on the U.S. Armed
Forces
One is a member of the US armed
forces either as:
 US. Milatary personnel
B. TYPES
1. WITH WARRANT OF ARREST
a. WHEN AND HOW WARRANT
ISSUED
Constitution, Art III, Sec. 2
Section 2. The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
173 People v Inting
Mrs. Bartha filed a letter-complaint to
COMELEC against respondent with the
COMELEC because he allegedly
transferred her, a permanent Nursing
Attendant, Grade I, to a very remote
barangay and without obtaining prior
permission or clearance from
COMELEC as required by law.
COMELEC then directed Atty.
Lituanas, Provincial Election
Supervisor to conduct a preliminary
investigation. After the preliminary
investigation, he found a prima facie
case and filed with the trial court a
criminal case for violation of section 261
(h) of the Omnibus Election Code
against respondent. The respondent
court issued a warrant of arrest and
fixed bail. However, the court set aside
its order on the ground that Atty.
Lituanas was not authorized to
determine probable cause pursuant to
Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution. The
court then gave Atty. Lituanas 15 days
from the receipt to file another
information charging the same offense
and with the written approval of the
Provincial Fiscal. Atty. Lituanas did not
comply. The trial court quashed the
information.
ISSUES
WON a preliminary investigation
conducted by a Provincial Election
Supervisor involving election offenses
have to be coursed through the
Provincial Fiscal/Prosecutor, before the
RTC may take cognizance of the
investigation and determine WON
probable cause exists – NO. A
preliminary investigation is executive in
nature whereas a preliminary inquiry
(which determines probable cause to
issue a search warrant) is judicial.
Furthermore, the Constitution
mandates the COMELEC to investigate
and prosecute cases of violation of
election laws.
The Court: “We emphasize important
features of the constitutional mandate
that " ... no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by
the judge ... " (Article III, Section 2,
Constitution)
First, the determination of probable
cause is a function of the Judge. It is not
for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor
nor for the Election Supervisor to
ascertain. Only the Judge and the
Judge alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made
by a Prosecutor does not bind the
Judge. It merely assists him to make
the determination of probable cause.
The Judge does not have to follow what
the Prosecutor presents to him. By
itself, the Prosecutor's certification of
probable cause is ineffectual. It is the
report, the affidavits, the transcripts of
stenographic notes (if any), and all
other supporting documents behind the
Prosecutor's certification which are
material in assisting the Judge to make
his determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors
alike should distinguish the preliminary
inquiry which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries are
conducted in the course of one and the
same proceeding, there should be no
confusion about the objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge.
The preliminary investigation proper-
whether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and,
therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial is the function of
the Prosecutor.”
On COMELEC’s mandate to
investigate and prosecute cases of
violation of election laws: Article IX-C
Section 2 of the Constitution -
COMELEC is mandated not only to
investigate but also to prosecute cases
of violation of election laws. Hence, the
Provincial Fiscal assumes no role in the
prosecution of election offenses. If the
Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information
charging an election offense or
prosecutes a violation of election law, it
is because he has been deputized by
the COMELEC and does not do so
under the sole authority of his office.
>Also, on Feb 1987, the
President issued EO 134 which said
that:
“Prosecution. The Commission shall,
through its duly authorized legal
officers, have exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable as
provided for in the preceding section,
and to prosecute the same: Provided,
That in the event that the Commission
fails to act on any complaint within two
(2) months from filing, the complainant
may file the complaint with the Office of
the Fiscal or with the Department of
Justice for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted.
The Commission may avail of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of
the government.”
In this case, the trial court misconstrued
the constitutional provision when it
quashed the information. What the trial
court should have done was enforce its
order issuing a warrant of arrest. The
order to get approval of Provincial
Fiscal is not only superfluous but
unwarranted.
Petition GRANTED
174 Allado v Diokno
175 Pangandaman v Casar
FACTS
A shooting incident occurred in Pantao,
Masiu, Lanao del Sur. At least 5 people
died and 2 other wounded. Atty.
Batuampar, claimed to represent the
widow of one of the victims, filed a
letter-complaint with the Provincial
Fiscal at Marawi City asking for a “full
blast preliminary investigation”. The
Provincial Fiscal then addressed a “1st
Indorsement” to the respondent judge,
transmitting Atty. Batuampar’s letter
and requesting that all cases related to
the incident must be forwarded to his
office which has “first taken cognizance
of said cases”. A criminal complaint for
multiple murder was filed before the
judge by P.C. Sgt. Laruan. The judge
then examined personally 3 witnesses
under oath thru his closed and direct
supervision, reducing to writing the
questions to the witnesses and the
latter’s answers. The judge then
approved the complaint and issued the
corresponding warrant of arrest against
the 14 petitioners and 50 John Does. In
an ex-parte motion, Atty Batuampar
sought the recall of the WOA and
subsequent holding of a thorough
investigation because the judge’s intial
investigation was “hasty and manifestly
haphazard” with “no searching
questions”. Judge denied the motion.
In view of the said case, petitioners and
the Solicitor General both argued that
the judge failed to conduct the
investigation in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in Sec 3 Rule 112
of RoC. Petitioners further argued that
the judge conducted a preliminary
investigation of the charges in total
disregard of the Provincial Fiscal who
had already taken cognizance of the
matter.
ISSUES
WON the respondent Judge had the
power to issue the warrant of arrest
without completing the entire
prescribed procedure for preliminary
investigation – YES - The rule is and
has always been that such issuance
need only await a finding of probable
cause, not the completion of the entire
procedure of preliminary investigation.
Former Section 6 of Rule 112 only
states that: " Warrant of arrest, when
issued. — If the judge be satisfied from
the preliminary examination conducted
by him or by the investigating officer
that the offense complained of has
been committed and that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the
accused has committed it, he must
issue a warrant or order for his arrest."
Said section was modified somewhat
but only to include the “searching
questions and answers” requirement.
2 phases of preliminary investigation:
The first phase consists of an ex-parte
inquiry into the sufficiency of the
complaint and the affidavits and other
documents offered in support thereof.
And it ends with the determination by
the Judge either: (1) that there is no
ground to continue with the inquiry, in
which case he dismisses the complaint
and transmits the order of dismissal,
together with the records of the case, to
the provincial fiscal; or (2) that the
complaint and the supporting
documents show sufficient cause to
continue with the inquiry and this
ushers in the second phase.
This second phase is designed to give
the respondent notice of the complaint,
access to the complainant’s evidence
and an opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits and supporting documents. At
this stage also, the Judge may conduct
a hearing and propound to the parties
and their witnesses questions on
matters that, in his view, need to be
clarified. The second phase concludes
with the Judge rendering his resolution,
either for dismissal of the complaint or
holding the respondent for trial, which
shall be transmitted, together with the
record, to the provincial fiscal for
appropriate action.
WON completion of the procedure laid
down in Sec 3 of Rule 112 a condition
sine qua non for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest? NO - There is no
requirement that the entire procedure
for preliminary investigation must be
completed before a warrant of arrest
may be issued. What the Rule 20
provides is that no complaint or
information for an offense cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court may be filed
without completing the procedure. But
nowhere is it provided that the
procedure must be completed before a
warrant of arrest may issue.
On the respondent judge’s failure to ask
searching questions
Court: The record must be accepted as
an accurate chronicle of the questioned
proceedings, shows prima facie that the
respondent judge had personally
examined the witnesses to the
complaint. A consideration of the
latter’s sworn answers to his questions
satisfies the Court that the finding of
probable cause against the petitioners
was neither arbitrary nor unfounded.
Luna v Plaza: the term
“searching questions and answers”
means – “only, taking into consideration
the purpose of the preliminary
examination which is to determine
"whether there is a reasonable ground
to believe that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest
may be issued and the accused held for
trial," such questions as have tendency
to show the commission of a crime and
the perpetuator thereof. What would be
searching questions would depend on
what is sought to be inquired into, such
as: the nature of the offense, the date,
time, and place of its commission, the
possible motives for its commission; the
subject, his age, education, status,
financial and social circumstances, his
attitude toward the investigation, social
attitudes, opportunities to commit the
offense; the victim, his age, status,
family responsibilities, financial and
social circumstances, characteristics,
etc. The points that are the subject of
inquiry may differ from case to case.
The questions, therefore must to a
great degree depend upon the Judge
making the investigation”
On the fiscal’s announcement of his
intention of investigating the incident
himself
The fact that the Provincial Fiscal may
have announced his intention of
investigating the incident himself did
not, in the view of the Court, legally
inhibit the respondent Judge from
conducting his own inquiry into the
matter if, as is made to appear here, it
was regularly brought before him and
no formal complaint was filed before the
Fiscal. Courtesy may have dictated that
in those circumstances he leave the
investigation to the Fiscal and simply
endorse to the latter the complaint filed
with him; duty did not, and if he
nonetheless chose to conduct his own
investigation, nothing in the rules states
or implies that he could not do so.
Since the action and final resolution of
the respondent Judge after completing
the second stage of the preliminary
investigation are subject to review by
the Provincial Fiscal, practical
considerations of expediency and the
avoidance of duplication of work dictate
that the latter official be permitted to
take over the investigation even in its
present stage.
WOA declared valid but is
voided to the extent it is issued against
the 50 John Does for having the nature
of a general warrant which is
unconstitutional.
176 People v Yadao
177 Delos Santos-Dio v Caguioa
Facts:
● Petitions for review on certiorari
assailing CA resolution affirming RTC
decision to dismissing criminal charges.
● Charges: 1) estafa through false
pretenses and 2) estafa with abuse of
confidence through misrepresentation
● In 2001, petitioner Virginia De
Los Santos-Dio the majority
stockholder of H.S. Equities, Ltd. and
authorized representative of Westdale
Assets, was introduced to Desmond,
the Chairman and CEO of the Subic
Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc.
(SBMEI), and the authorized
representative of Active Environments,
Inc. and JV China, Inc. (JV China), the
majority shareholder of SBMEI.
● After some discussion on
possible business ventures, Dio, on
behalf of HS Equities, decided to invest
a total of US$1,150,000.00 in SBMEI’s
Ocean Adventure Marine Park, a theme
park to be constructed at the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone which, when
operational, would showcase live
performances of false-killer whales and
sea lions.
● Regarding this Dio claimed that
Desmond led her to believe that SBMEI
had a capital of US$5,500,000.00,and
also guaranteed substantial returns on
investment—Desmond even presented
a Business Plan to show this.
● In June 2002, Dio, this time on
behalf of Westdale, invested another
US$1,000,000.00 in a separate
business venture, called the Miracle
Beach Hotel Project, which involved the
development of a resort owned by
Desmond adjoining Ocean Adventure.
● Dio further claimed that she
found out that, contrary to Desmond’s
representations, SBMEI actually had no
capacity to deliver on its guarantees,
and that in fact, as of 2001, it was
incurring losses amounting to
P62,595,216.00.
● She likewise claimed to have
discovered false entries in the
company’s books and financial
statements which prompted her to call
for an audit investigation.
● Consequently, Dio discovered
that, without her knowledge and
consent, Desmond made certain
disbursements from Westdale’s special
account, meant only for Miracle Beach
expenditures, for the operating
expenses of Ocean Adventure.
● When Desmond refused to
execute an undertaking to return the
diverted funds, Dio, in her capacity as
Treasurer of SBMEI, suspended the
release of the remaining funds in the
aforesaid special account.
● Eventually, after Dio was ousted
as Treasurer of SBMEI, she filed 2
criminal complaints for estafa (a)
through false pretenses and (b) with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence
through misappropriation or
conversion, both against Desmond
before the Olongapo City Prosecutor’s
Office.
● After the preliminary
investigation, the City Prosecutor
issued a Resolution dated August 26,
2004, finding probable cause against
Desmond for the abovementioned
crimes.
● Desmond filed a MR and Motion
to withdraw filed informations against
the prosecutor. He also filed before the
MTC a Motion to defer proceedings and
issuance of warrant of arrest but
subsequently withdrew and filed
instead a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause.
● RTC: dismissed complaints,
declared that no probable cause exists
because the element of deceit and
personal misappropriation are lacking.
● CA: upheld the RTC’s authority
to dismiss a criminal case if in the
process of determining probable cause
for issuing a warrant of arrest, it also
finds the evidence on record insufficient
to establish such.
○ It explained that such dismissal
is an exercise of judicial discretion
sanctioned under Section 6(a), Rule
112.
○ On this score, the CA evaluated
the evidence presented and agreed
with the RTC’s conclusions that there
was no sufficient basis showing that
Desmond committed estafa by means
of false pretenses.
○ Neither was it established that
the money sourced from petitioner Dio
was converted by respondent
Desmond for some other purpose other
than that for which it was intended.
Issue: WoN CA erred in finding no
grave abuse of discretion on part of
RTC in dismissing the informations for
lack of probable cause.
Held: Yes. Determination of probable
cause may be either executive or
judicial.
● In the case of Co v. Republic,
the Court emphasized the settled
distinction between an executive and a
judicial determination of probable
cause:
○ We reiterate that preliminary
investigation should be distinguished
as to whether it is an investigation for
the determination of a sufficient ground
for the filing of the information or it is an
investigation for the determination of a
probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The first kind of
preliminary investigation is executive in
nature. It is part of the prosecution's job.
The second kind of preliminary
investigation which is more properly
called preliminary examination is
judicial in nature and is lodged with the
judge.
A judge is not bound by the resolution
of the public prosecutor who conducted
the preliminary investigation and must
himself ascertain from the latter’s
findings and supporting documents
whether probable cause exists for the
purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest.
This prerogative is granted by no less
than the Constitution.
While a judge’s determination of
probable cause is generally confined to
the limited purpose of issuing arrest
warrants, Section 5(a),Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
explicitly states that a judge may
immediately dismiss a case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may
issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court.
– Within ten (10) days from the filing of
the complaint or information, the judge
shall personally evaluate the resolution
of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss
the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable
cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused had
already been arrested, pursuant to a
warrant issued by the judge who
conducted preliminary investigation or
when the complaint or information was
filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule.
In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order
the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from
notice and the issue must be resolved
by the court within thirty (30) days from
the filing of the complaint or information.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this regard, so as not to transgress
the public prosecutor’s authority, it must
be stressed that the judge’s dismissal of
a case must be done only in clear-cut
cases when the evidence on record
plainly fails to establish probable cause.
On the contrary, if the evidence on
record shows that, more likely than not,
the crime charged has been committed,
the judge should not dismiss the case
but order the parties to proceed to trial.
In doubtful cases, judge should order
the presentation of additional evidence.
Applying these principles, the Court
finds that the RTC’s immediate
dismissal, as affirmed by the CA, was
improper as the standard of clear lack
of probable cause was not observed. In
this case, records show that certain
essential facts – namely, (a) whether or
not Desmond committed false
representations that induced Dio to
invest in Ocean Adventure; and (b)
whether or not Desmond utilized the
funds invested by Dio solely for the
Miracle Beach Project for purposes
different from what was agreed upon –
remain controverted, thereby rendering
the RTC’s immediate dismissal of the
case highly improper.
Verily, a judge's discretion to dismiss a
case immediately after the filing of the
information in court is appropriate only
when the failure to establish probable
cause can be clearly inferred from the
evidence presented and not when its
existence is simply doubtful. After all, it
cannot be expected that upon the filing
of the information in court the
prosecutor would have already
presented all the evidence necessary to
secure a conviction of the accused, the
objective of a previously-conducted
preliminary investigation being merely
to determine whether there is sufficient
ground, to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed
and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. In this light, given that the lack of
probable cause had not been clearly
established in this case, the CA erred,
and the RTC gravely abused its
discretion, by ruling to dismiss the
criminal cases.
WHEREFORE petitions granted,
judgement and resolution set aside.
178 Young v People
Doctrine: A judge may dismiss the
case for lack of probable cause only
in clear-cut cases when the evidence
on record plainly fails to establish
probable cause — that is when the
records readily show uncontroverted,
and thus, established facts which
unmistakably negate the existence of
the elements of the crime charged
Facts:
- A criminal complaint for
violation of RA 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act) was filed against
Petitioners
- OCP found probable cause;
corresponding information was filed
- petitioners filed an omnibus
motion for a judicial determination of
probable cause, praying that the
issuance of the corresponding warrants
of arrest be held in abeyance pending
resolution thereof, and for the case
against them to be dismissed for lack of
probable cause
- RTC granted and dismissed the
case for lack of probable cause
- CA reversed and reinstated the
information
ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing
RTC’s decision – NO
- A judge may dismiss the case
for lack of probable cause only in clear-
cut cases when the evidence on record
plainly fails to establish probable cause
— that is when the records readily show
uncontroverted, and thus, established
facts which unmistakably negate the
existence of the elements of the crime
charged
o Applying the standard set forth
in De Los Santos-Dio, the evidence on
record herein does not reveal the
unmistakable and clear-cut absence of
probable cause against petitioners.
Instead, a punctilious examination
thereof shows that the prosecution was
able to establish a prima facie case
against petitioners
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE
CAUSE
179 Soliven v Makasiar
BRIEF
Pres. Corazon Aquino filed a complaint
against Luis Beltran for libel. Luis
Beltran claims that the President may
not file a complaint since it would go
against the presidential immunity from
suit. The Court ruled that the President
may waive her right, but that it cannot
be invoked by any other person on her
behalf.
FACTS
52. Luis Beltran together with others,
was charged with libel by the then
president Corzaon Aquino.
53. Cory herself filed a complaint-
affidavit against him and others.
54. It was averred that Cory cannot file
a complaint affidavit because this would
defeat her immunity from suit.
55. March 30, 1988: Secretary of
Justice denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration
56. April 7, 1988: A second motion for
reconsideration filed petitioner Beltran
was denied by Secretary of Justice
57. May 2, 1988: On appeal, the
President, through Executive
Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice
58. May 16, 1988: Motion for
reconsideration was denied by the
Executive Secretary
Supreme Court: ISSUES of the CASE
ISSUE:WON petitioners were denied
due process when informations for libel
were filed against them although the
finding of the existence of a prima facie
case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently,
by the President? (MOOT)
RATIO
46. Issue is moot and academic
47. Instead of submitting his counter-
affidavits, petitioner filed a "Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect
waiving his right to refute the complaint
by filing counter-affidavits.
48. Due process of law does not require
that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file his counter-affidavits before
the preliminary investigation is deemed
completed. All that is required is that the
respondent (herein petitioner) be given
the opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits if he is so minded.
ISSUE: WON the constitutional rights of
Beltran were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his
arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any,
to determine probable cause (NO [all
caps])
RATIO
15. Art 3 Sec 2 of the Constitution48
provides for the issuance of warrants of
arrest
16. The Constitution does not require
the judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses
17. The judge is, however, required to
a. personally evaluate the report and
the supporting documents submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
b. he may disregard the fiscal’s report
and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause if he finds
no probable cause
18. On June 30, 1987, the Supreme
Court unanimously adopted Circular
No. 12, setting down guidelines for the
issuance of warrants of arrest
19. It has not been shown that
respondent judge has deviated from the
prescribed procedure.
48 Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the
people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
ISSUE: WON the President of the
Philippines, under the Constitution,
may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the filing
of a complaint-affidavit, (YES)
RATIO
1. The rationale for the grant to the
President of the privilege of immunity
from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free
from any hindrance or distraction
2. Petitioner Beltran argues that
a. “the reasons which necessitate
presidential immunity from suit impose
a correlative disability to file suit”
b. if criminal proceedings ensue by
virtue of the President's filing of her
complaint-affidavit, she may have to be
a witness for the prosecution, bringing
her under the trial court's jurisdiction.
This would be an indirect way defeat
her privilege of immunity from suit, as
by testifying on the witness stand, she
would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury
3. The Court ruled that the immunity
from suit may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other
person in the President's behalf.
4. An accused in a criminal case in
which the President is complainant
cannot raise the presidential privilege
as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.
5. The President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court's jurisdiction.
6. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative.
Obiter Dictum:
1. The court is not a trier of facts and
the issue of whether Beltran could be
held liable for libel is best left to the trial
court
2. The Court also finds no basis to rule
on Beltran’s claim that to allow the libel
case to proceed would produce a
“chilling effect” on press freedom
RULING: Petitions DISMISSED, The
Order to maintain the status quo
contained in the Resolution of the Court
en banc dated April 7, 1988 and
reiterated in the Resolution dated April
26, 1988 is LIFTED.
180 Okabe v Gutierrez
FACTS
Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint with
the Pasay City Prosecutor on Dec. 29,
1999 charging Teresita “Shiela” Okabe
with estafa.
After the preliminary investigation, 2nd
Asst. City Prosecutor Vibandor came
out with a resolution finding probable
cause for estafa against Okabe.
Attached to the resolution was the
Information against Okabe and
Maruyama’s affidavit complaint. The
City Prosecutor approved the resolution
and the Information.
On May 15, 2000, an Information
against Okabe was filed with RTC
Pasay. The case was raffled to Judge
Gutierrez.
Appended to the Information was the
complaint of Maruyama and the
resolution of Prosecutor Vibandor.
Basing probable cause solely on
Maruyama’s complaint and the
resolution of Prosecutor Vibandor, the
RTC issued a warrant of arrest against
Okabe. On June 15, 2000, Okabe
posted bail.
For her part, Okabe filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable
cause and to defer
proceedings/arraignment, alleging that
the only documents appended to the
Information submitted by the
investigating prosecutor were
Maruyama’s complaint for estafa and
the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor, the witnesses’ affidavits,
and other evidence were not attached
thereto. Okabe further alleged that the
documents submitted by the
investigating prosecutor were not
enough on which the RTC could base a
finding of a probable cause for estafa
against her.
Okabe did not enter any plea. The RTC
then entered a not guilty plea for
Okabe.
As such, Okabe filed a case against the
RTC for issuing a warrant of arrest
despite lack of probable cause and
committing GAOD when it issued its
Orders.
The CA ruled that, by posting bail and
praying for reliefs from the RTC, Okabe
waived her right to assail Judge
Gutierrez’ finding of the existence of
probable cause. Thus, the CA affirmed
the assailed order of the RTC.
Hence, the instant petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 for the reversal
of the CA resolution.
ISSUE
WON the RTC complied with the
constitutional requirements, such that
there was probable cause, when it
issued a warrant of arrest – NO
RATIO
Okabe asserts that Judge Gutierrez
could not have determined the
existence of probable cause for her
arrest solely on the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor and the
complaint of respondent Maruyama.
Okabe posits that Judge Gutierrez
should have ordered the investigating
prosecutor to submit witnesses’
affidavits as well as her counter-
affidavit and the transcripts of the
stenographic notes taken during
preliminary investigation. Okabe adds
that Judge Gutierrez should have
personally reviewed said documents.
Okabe further asserts that the CA erred
in holding that by posting bail and
praying for relief, she voluntarily
submitted herself to the RTC and
waived her right to assail the infirmities
in the RTC’s issuance of the warrant of
arrest.
The SC agrees with Okabe’s contention
that the CA erred in not applying Rule
114, Sec. 26 of the RRCP. (Bail not a
bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack
of or irregular preliminary investigation)
The SC also agrees that before the
RTC judge issues a warrant of arrest,
the judge must make a personal
determination of the existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the
accused. This duty is personal and
exclusive to the issuing judge. He
cannot abdicate this duty and rely on
the certification of the investigating
prosecutor.
If the investigating prosecutor finds
probable cause, he executes a
certification. Such certification is not
binding on the RTC. Nor may the RTC
rely on said certification as basis for a
finding of probable cause.
The purpose of the mandate of the
judge to first determine probable cause
for the arrest of the accused is to
insulate from the very start those falsely
charged of crimes rom tribulations,
expenses, and anxiety of a public trial.

Aside from the investigating
prosecutor’s report, the judge should
consider the counter-affidavit of the
accused and his witnesses as well as
transcript of stenographic notes taken
during preliminary investigation.
Rule 112, Sec. 8 (a) of the RRCP
provides that an Information or
complaint shall be supported by the
affidavits and counter-affidavits of the
parties and their witnesses, together
with other supporting evidence.
If the judge is also able to determine the
existence of probable cause on the
basis of the records submitted by the
investigating prosecutor, there would
no longer be a need to order the
elevation of the rest of the records of
the case. However, if the judge finds the
records submitted by the investigating
prosecutor to be insufficient, he may
order the dismissal of the case or direct
the submission of more evidence. The
judge may even call the complainant
and his witnesses themselves to
answer the courts probing question to
determine the existence of probable
cause.
Here, the investing prosecutor
submitted to Judge Gutierrez only his
resolution and the complaint of the
private complainant without the
witnesses’ affidavits and Okabe’s
counter-affidavit as well as the
evidence adduced by complainants as
required by law. The aforecited
affidavits are of vital importance as they
would enable Judge Gutierrez to
properly determine the existence of
probable cause.
In sum, the SC declares that Judge
Gutierrez committed GAOD in finding
probable cause for Okabe’s arrest in
the absence of copies of affidavits of
the private complainant’s witnesses
and her reply affidavit, Okabe’s
counter-affidavit, and the evidence
adduced during the preliminary
investigation before the investigating
prosecutor.
DISPOSITIVE
PETITION GRANTED.
CA REVERSED.
CASE REMANDED TO RTC.
JUDGE GUTIERREZ DIRECTED TO
DETERMINE PROBABLE CAUSE
BASED ON COMPLETE RECORDS,
AS REQUIRED UNDER RULE 112,
SEC. 8 (A) OF RRCP
181 People v Grey
FACTS:
• An Information for Murder was
filed before RTC of Gandara, Samar
against Joseph Grey, Francis Grey,
and two others, for the death of
Rolando Diocton.
o The respondents, in turn, filed a
petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice (SOJ).
• The Presiding Judge of RTC
(Judge Bandal) denied the motion for
the issuance of warrant of arrest,
because the evidence of the
prosecution was insufficient to link the
respondents to the crime charged.
o The prosecution, in turn, filed an
Omnibus MR and a motion for the
inhibition of Judge Bandal
o Judge Bandal denied the MR
but inhibited herself. As a result, Judge
Navidad took over.
• The SOJ dismissed the petition
for review, finding that the evidence of ISSUE/ HELD:
the prosecution was sufficient to WON there was personal determination
establish probable cause. of probable cause – YES
• The respondents filed a petition RATIO:
for change of venue, alleging that the • The language of the Order
prosecution was politically motivated in shows that the judge made his personal
order to prevent Joseph Grey from determination of the existence of
running for a congressional seat. This probable cause, upon examination of
was denied by SC. the prosecutor’s report and the
• Judge Navidad proceeded with supporting evidence.
the preliminary inquiry on the existence • The Court noted the distinction
of probable cause, and eventually ruled between preliminary inquiry and
that the finding of probable cause was preliminary investigation.
supported by the evidence. Preliminary Preliminary
o Warrants of arrest were issued Inquiry Investigation
• The respondents filed a petition Determines Ascertains
for certiorari and prohibition before the probable whether the
CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion cause for the offender should
on the part of Judge Navidad. issuance of a be held for trial
o They alleged that perjured warrant of or should be
statements served as basis of the arrest released;
murder charges filed by their political whether there is
opponents. a reasonable
• CA ruled in favor of the ground to
respondents, holding that Judge believe that the
Navidad failed to personally determine accused is
the existence of probable cause. guilty
o Judge Navidad did not state his Made by the Function of the
personal justification for the finding of judge investigating
probable cause. He extensively quoted prosecutor
the resolutions of the Provincial
Prosecutor and the SOJ, and • Article III Section 2 of the
eventually concluded that there was Constitution serves as the basis of the
sufficient evidence to support the duty of the judge to determine probable
finding of probable cause. cause to issue a warrant of arrest.
o CA also found that the o Cites Soliven v. Makasiar ruling
allegations in the affidavits were that the provision does not mandatorily
insufficient to establish probable cause require the judge to personally examine
(as there were no acts shown to support the complainant and his witnesses, as
the claim that they were principals by the judge may opt to personally
conspiracy). evaluate the report and supporting
• Hence, the present petition for evidence submitted by the prosecutor.
review under Rule 45, filed by the • What the law requires as
People through OSG. personal determination on the part of a
judge is that he should not rely solely on
the report of the investigating
prosecutor.
o The judge should also consider
the affidavits of the parties, and the
stenographic notes taken during the
preliminary investigation.
o Personal examination of the
complainant and the witnesses is only
necessary if there is an utter failure of
evidence to show the existence of
probable cause.
• In the case at bar, Judge
Navidad did not gravely abuse his
discretion in issuing warrants of arrest:
o He reviewed not only the
records but also the evidence adduced
by the prosecution, particularly the
sworn statements of the three
witnesses.
o To arrive at the conclusion that
the accused was given enough
opportunity to challenge the charge
against him, he would have reviewed
the proceedings before the
prosecution.
o There was also no
circumstance which would overturn the
presumption of regularity.
o The allegation that the filing of
the charge was politically motivate was
not supported by evidence.
• Thus, the CA order was
reversed and set aside by the Court.
OTHER ISSUE: WON there was forum
shopping – NO
• The reliefs sought in the petition
to change venue and the petition for
certiorari before CA were different,
although based on the same set of facts
• In the petition for change of
venue, respondents allege that the
court is being used as a tool for political
prosecution. In the petition for certiorari,
the respondents were alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Judge
Navidad.
182 Leviste v Alameda
183 Comerciante v People
FACTS:
• An Information for violation of
RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous
Act of 2002) was filed before the RTC
against Comerciante.
o IMPORTANT FACTUAL
DETAILS: While he was patrolling at 30
kph, at a distance of around 10 meters,
PO3 Calag spotted Comerciante and
Dasilla standing around and showing
“improper and unpleasant movements”,
with one handing plastic sachets to the
other. He decide to effect and arrest,
and was able to confiscate two sachets
of shabu.
• Dasilla was able to file a
demurrer to evidence, which was
granted, resulting to his acquittal. On
the other hand, Comerciante was not
able to file his own demurrer to
evidence, thus RTC considered his
right to do so waived.
• RTC found Comerciante guilty,
ruling that PO3 Calag conducted a valid
warrantless arrest on Comerciante.
o There was a probable cause to
justify the warrantless arrest, as PO3
saw the accused in plain view that
Comerciante was carrying the sachets
of shabu.
• CA affirmed Comerciante’s
conviction.
o Comerciante was committing a
crime in flagrante delicto (by
exchanging plastic sachets with
Dasilla).
• Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari, where Comerciante
argues that there was no valid
warrantless arrest, which then warrants
the inadmissibility of the evidence and
his acquittal.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid warrantless
arrest- NO
RATIO:
• A search warrant must be
carried out through or on the strength of
a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause (Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution).
o General rule (“Exclusionary
Rule”): In the absence of such warrant,
the search and seizure becomes
unreasonable. Evidence obtained on
such occasion should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree.
o One exception is when the
search is incident to a lawful arrest. In
this case, the law requires that there
first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made.
• The lawful arrests without
warrant are enumerated in Section 5,
Rule 113:
o (a) Arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto,
o (b) Arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable
cause that said suspect was the
perpetrator of a crime which had just
been committed,
o (c) Arrest of prisoner who has
escaped from custody
• Section 5(a), Rule 113 requires
that there must be an overt act, and
such was committed in the presence of
the arresting officer. Under Section
5(b), the personal knowledge of the
arresting officer that a crime was
committed is required.
• In the case at bar, the Court
held that there was no lawful
warrantless arrest.
o It was impossible for POS Calag
to identify with reasonable accuracy the
substance inside the two small sachets.
o There was no showing that PO3
Calag had personal knowledge that the
crime had been committed.
o The allegation that Comerciante
and his companions were showing
improper and unpleasant movements
was not sufficient.
• The Court also rejected the
claim that there was a valid “stop and
frisk” search made on Comerciante.
That Comerciante was standing and
handing over something to his
companion does not create a
reasonable inference of criminal activity
to justify a stop and frisk search.
o There must be suspicion of an
illicit act
o For warrantless searches,
probable cause was defined as a
reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense
charged.
o Jurisprudence clarifies that for
there to be a valid stop and frisk search,
the requirement does not have to be
probable cause but cannot be mere
suspicion.
• As there was no valid
warrantless arrest and no valid stop and
frisk search, the evidence is
inadmissible. Thus, the SC acquitted
Comerciante.
b. HOW EFFECTED
Rule 113, Secs. 2,3,4,6&7
SECTION 2. Arrest; How Made. —
An arrest is made by an actual
restraint of a person to be arrested,
or by his submission to the custody of
the person making the
arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force
shall be used in making an arrest.
The person
arrested shall not be subject to a
greater restraint than is necessary for
his detention.
SECTION 3. Duty of Arresting Officer
— It shall be the duty of the officer
executing the warrant to arrest the
accused and deliver him to the
nearest police
station or jail without unnecessary
delay.
SECTION 4. Execution of Warrant.
— The head of the officer to whom
the warrant of arrest was delivered
for execution shall cause the warrant
to be executed within ten (10) days
from its receipt. Within ten (10) days
after the expiration of the period, the
officer to whom it was assigned for
execution shall make a report to the
judge who issued the warrant. In
case of his failure to execute the
warrant, he shall state the reasons
therefor.
SECTION 6. Time of Making Arrest.
— An arrest may be made on any day
and
at any time of the day or night.
SECTION 7. Method of Arrest by
Officer by Virtue of Warrant. — When
making an arrest by virtue of a
warrant, the officer shall inform the
person to be arrested of the cause of
the arrest and the fact that a warrant
has been issued for his arrest, except
when he flees or forcibly resists
before the officer has opportunity to
so inform him, or when the giving of
such information will imperil the
arrest. The officer need not have the
warrant in his possession at the time
of the arrest but after the arrest, if the
person arrested so requires, the
warrant shall be shown to him as
soon as practicable
184 People v Lumayok
185 People v Albior
Facts:
Francisco Albior was one of those
charged with robbery with homicide
with rape.
- Albior pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment
Trial court found Albior guilty beyond
reasonable doubt
- Police traced the stolen
typewriter to one of the accused
Vasquez. After they “confronted” the
accused Vasquez at his house police
“invited” him along with the petitioner for
questioning. At the Police
Headquarters Albior signed a sworn
statement that he participated as a look
out in the crime.
WON the extra-judicial confession is
admissible.
No. Not admissible. The arresting
officer did not follow proper procedure.
At the time a person is arrested, it shall
be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against
him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means — by telephone
if possible — or by letter or messenger.
It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless
it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any
person on his behalf, or appointed by
the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself of by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel stay be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid
down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence
Investigating Officer testified the
sequence of Albior’s arrest which
shows that Albior did not have
assistance of counsel when he waived
his right to counsel
Albior is a native Cebuano speaker, the
sworn statement he executed was in
Tagalog, it was not shown there was an
interpreter given.
Albior testified that he signed the sworn
statement merely because he was
promised he would be released
afterwards.
WON Albior is guilty
No. Not guilty, it was only through the
sworn statement that his participation
was established
c. ASSISTANCE; BREAKING INTO
AND OUT OF BUILDING OR
ENCLOSURE
Rule 113, Secs. 10,11 & 12
SECTION 10. Officer May Summon
Assistance . — An officer making a
lawful arrest may orally summon as
many persons as he deems
necessary to assist him in effecting
the arrest. Every person so
summoned by an officer shall assist
him in effecting the arrest when he
can render such assistance without
detriment to himself.
SECTION 11. Right of Officer to
Break into Building or Enclosure . —
An officer, in order to make an arrest
either by virtue of a warrant, or
without a warrant as provided in
section 5, may break into any
building or enclosure where the
person to be arrested is or is
reasonably believed to be, if he is
refused admittance thereto, after
announcing his authority and
purpose.
SECTION 12. Right to Break Out
from Building or Enclosure. —
Whenever an officer has entered the
building or enclosure in accordance
with the preceding section, he may
break out therefrom when necessary
to liberate himself.
2. WARRANTLESS
a. WHEN JUSTIFIED
Rule 113, Sec 5
SECTION 5. Arrest Without Warrant;
When Lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is
a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a)
and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112.
186 People v Tudtud
FACTS:
• Aug 1999 Toril Police Station,
Davao City received a tip from a civilian
(Solier) about Tudtud. He said that his
neighbors have been complaining
about Tudtud because he was a
pusher.
• By virtue of the tip, the police
officers conducted surveillance for 5
days around Tudtud’s neighborhood.
• Solier gave another tip – that
Tudtud is headed for a drug run at
Cotabato, coming back at 8:00pm with
the drugs.
• The police stationed
themselves at the bus station, wearing
civilian clothes, waiting for Tudtud to
disembark.
Prosecution’s Version
• Two men disembarked from the
bus helping each other carry a carton.
One of the men is Tudtud. The police
approached and identified themselves.
• The police informed Tudtud that
they were expecting a shipment of
drugs and asked if they could see what
was inside the carton. Tudtud obliged.
• Inside the box were dried fish,
beneath the fish were two wrapped
bundles. They contained what seemed
to the police officers as Marijuana
leaves.
• The police arrested Tudtud and
his companion and charged with illegal
possession.
Tudtud’s Version
• As he disembarked from the
bus, a man, identifying himself to be a
police officer, pointed a gun at him and
told him not to run.
• The officer told Tudtud to open
a box, which, according to Tudtud, was
already there when he disembarked.
• Tudtud obeyed and found that
inside the box were dried fish, beneath
the fish were two wrapped bundles.
• Without even unwrapping the
bundles, the man said it was Marijuana
and abruptly handcuffed Tudtud.
• Another man (Bolong) was
arrested. Bolong asked why he was
being arrested but the man just told him
to go with them.
• The suspects were then taken
to the police station where, they would
later claim, they met each other for the
first time.
• RTC convicted them as
charged. Hence.
PRIME ISSUE – WON the evidence
obtained is admissible – NO
1.) WON the warrantless search was
incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. –
NO
The search in question
preceded the arrest. The arrest must
precede the search; unless the officer
has probable cause to make the arrest
at the outset of the search.
The general rule: reliable
information alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest. The officer
arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact. Notwithstanding
tips from confidential informants and
regardless of the fact that the search
yielded contraband, this does not justify
a warrantless arrest.
Appellants in this case were
neither performing any overt act or
acting in a suspicious manner that
would hint that a crime has been, was
being, or was about to be, committed. If
the arresting officer’s testimonies are to
be believed, appellants were merely
helping each other carry a carton box.
In no sense can the knowledge
of the herein arresting officers that
appellant Tudtud was in possession of
marijuana be described as personal,
having learned the same only from their
informant Solier. Solier, for his part,
testified that he obtained his
information only from his neighbors and
the friends of appellant Tudtud. Solier’s
information itself is hearsay.
2.) WON Tudtud waived his right
against unreasonable searches and
seizures. – NO
Requisites of an effective
waiver:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence
of such right;
3. Said person had an actual intention
to relinquish the right.
Prosecution failed to establish
the second and third requisites. When
the police officers introduced
themselves as such and requested
appellant that they see the contents of
the carton box supposedly containing
the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it
was alright. He did not resist and
opened the box himself. Law and
jurisprudence require more than the
presence of these circumstances to
constitute a valid waiver of the
constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights;
acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights is not to be
presumed. The fact that a person failed
to object to a search does not amount
to permission thereto. (Katipunan tips)
Tudtud’s consent was forced
and coerced out of him because he had
a gun against his back. There was no
waiver.
(The Court cited tons of jurisprudence –
from unlawful searches and seizure to
formation of probable cause to urgency
as ground for not obtaining a warrant.
Bare minimum lang andito sa digest)
187 People v Chua
SUMMARY: Accused was charged with
violation of RA 6425 (Anti-Dangerous
Drugs Act) and Illegal Possession of
ammunition. The police apprehended
him when he alighted from his car
carrying a sealed Zest-o juice box.
Shabu and several live .22 caliber
firearm bullets were obtained from him
after the police subjected him to a body
search. Accused questioned the validity
of the arrest because of the lack of an
arrest and search warrant. The Court
held that the search and arrest were
void because the police officers were
not able to establish the requisites
needed for a valid warrantless arrest.
Chua was acquitted.
FACTS:
• Accused-appellant Binad Sy
Chua was charged with violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal
Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal
Possession of Drugs in two separate
Informations.
• The informant of the police
officers pointed to a car driven by
accused which just arrived and parked
near the entrance of the hotel. After
accused-appellant alighted from the car
carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, the
police officers hurriedly accosted him
and introduced themselves. As
accused-appellant pulled out his wallet,
a small transparent plastic bag with a
crystalline substance dropped from his
right back pocket. He was subjected to
a body search which yielded 20 pieces
of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from
his left back pocket. When SPO2
Nunag peeked into the contents of the
Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a
crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud
instantly confiscated the small
transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O
juice box, the 20 pieces of .22 caliber
firearm bullets and the car.
• Accused was brought to a police
station and was held inside a bathroom
for about fifteen minutes. In the
presence of reporters, accused-
appellant was made to hold the box
while pictures were being taken.
ISSUES: (1) WON the arrest of
accused-appellant was lawful; and (2)
WON the search of his person and the
subsequent confiscation of shabu
allegedly found on him were conducted
in a lawful and valid manner.
RULING: NO, and NO.
• In a search incidental to a lawful
arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental
search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was
merely used as a pretext for conducting
a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be arrest before
a search can be made—the process
cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for
this exception to apply, two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
• The two elements are lacking in
the case at bar. Accused-appellant did
not act in a suspicious manner. There
was no overt manifestation that
accused-appellant has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime. “Reliable
information” alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in
the presence and within the view of the
arresting officers, is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
• With regard to the concept of
“stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a “stop-and-
frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in
light of the police officer’s experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant
the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally,
a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold
interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and
detection for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the interest of
safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against the police
officer.
• A stop-and-frisk was defined as
the act of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him,
and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband. It should also be
emphasized that a search and seizure
should precede the arrest for this
principle to apply. The foregoing
circumstances do not obtain in the case
at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant
was first arrested before the search and
seizure of the alleged illegal items
found in his possession. The
apprehending police operative failed to
make any initial inquiry into accused-
appellant’s business in the vicinity or
the contents of the Zest-O juice box he
was carrying. The apprehending police
officers only introduced themselves
when they already had custody of
accused-appellant.
• In the case at bar, neither the in
flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk”
principles is applicable to justify the
warrantless arrest and consequent
search and seizure made by the police
operatives on accused-appellant.
• Wherefore, accused-appellant
Binad Sy Chua is hereby ACQUITTED.
188 People v Mendez
Doctrine: Personal knowledge of
facts in arrests without warrant under
5(b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure must be based
upon probable cause, which means
an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when it is
based on actual facts, i.e., when it is
supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested.
Facts
• Renante Mendez and Baby
Cabagtong were arrested without
warrant following the rape and murder
of 13-year old Candy Dolim. They were
subsequently convicted by RTC
Laoang, Northern Samar for the same
o Cabagtong was arrested by
barangay tanod Mejica under the
Citizen’s Arrest law. He was taken to
the municipal hall where he was
investigated by policeman SPO2
Cernio. He was asked to implicate
Mendez, but he refused.
o Mendez was arrested four days
after the crime was committed as a
suspect in this case. SPO2 Cernio
claimed he was arrested based on the
knowledge of his guilt.
• SPO2 Cernio said that the Chief
of Police had ordered the arrest of
accused-appellants on the basis of
information given by Aurea Cabagtong,
mother of Ronnie Cabagtong who was
arrested as suspect (but later released
when he agreed to testify against the
two accused-appellants) for the rape-
slay of Candy.
Issue: W/N the arrests without a
warrant of both Mendez and Cabagtong
were valid - NO
• Following the doctrine above
cited, SPO2 Cernio did not have
personal knowledge of the commission
of the crime so as to justify the
warrantless arrest of Mendez.
o The only time the police had
evidence against Mendez was when
Aurea came forward after her son
Ronnie’s arrest and pointed to Mendez
and Cabagtong as the perpetrators.
However, it was only four days after the
commission of the crime, and it could
not justify the arrest of accused-
appellants without a judicial warrant.
• Cabagtong, on the other hand,
was arrested by Mejica on the basis of
the citizen’s arrest law. Mejica was
neither a police officer nor a witness to
the incident. He was not a member of
the investigating team. He did not have
any personal knowledge of the incident.
He admitted that he merely based his
arrest on the information supplied by
Aurea Cabagtong to the police. This
does not constitute personal knowledge
to warrant a citizen’s arrest.
Ruling: RTC decision REVERSED and
Accused-appellants ACQUITTED on
the ground of reasonable doubt
189 People v Delos Reyes
FACTS:
• The accused De Claro, de los
Reyes, and Reyes were found guilty in
violation of Dangerous Drug Acts of
1972 @ RTC Mandaluyong regarding
an incident involving shabu. De Claro
was later acquitted.
• The testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses who were
policemen did not match the
testimonies of the accused.
• CA upheld the conviction of
delos Reyes and Reyes
• Accused-appellant Reyes cited
these errors in his Appellants Brief: that
the trial court erred in not finding the
warrantless arrest over him as unlawful
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest over
him was lawful — NO
• As a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a
valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of
Court, however, recognizes permissible
warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace
officer or a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto);
(b) when an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has
committed it (arrest effected in hot
pursuit)
(c) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another (arrest
of escaped prisoners)
• As applied to in flagrante delicto
arrests, it is settled that "reliable
information" alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in
the presence and within the view of the
arresting officers, are not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest
• Clearly, to constitute a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites
must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime
(2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the
arresting officer
• Testimonies of SPO1 Lectura,
PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul reveal
that they simply relied on the
information provided by their
confidential informant that an illegal
drug deal was to take place. Without
any other independent information, and
by simply seeing the suspects pass
from one to another a white plastic bag
with a box or carton inside, the police
team was already able to conclude that
the box contained shabu and sensed
that an illegal drug deal took place.
• The suspects were arrested
without warrants based on a mere tip
from a confidential informant and not
because of any apparent criminal
activity. A tip does not constitute
probable cause for a warrantless arrest
or search and seizure incidental
thereto. (Thus, the shabu allegedly
seized from accused-appellants is
inadmissible in evidence.)
CA REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
ACCUSED ACQUITTED FOR
REASONABLE DOUBT.
190 People v Racho
• May 19, 2003 – confidential
agent of the police transacted through
phone with Racho for the purchase of
shabu
o The transaction was then
reported to the police who then formed
a team of PDEA members, Intelligence
group of the Army and local police to
apprehend Racho
o The confidential agent told the
authorities that Racho would arrive in
Baler the next day with shabu
• May 30, 3004 – Upon
identification by the confidential agent,
Racho was invited to the police station
on suspicion of carrying shabu
(Note, at this time he was just waiting
for a tricycle. He wasn’t doing anything
suspicious)
o He immediately denied the
accusation
o However, when he pulled out
his hands from his pants pocket, a white
envelope slipped therefrom which,
when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug
• He was brought to the police
station for investigation
o The field test and laboratory
examinations on the contents of the
confiscated sachet yielded positive
results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride
• Two separate informations (one
for violation of Sec 5 – transporting and
delivering and another Sec 11 RA 9164
– possessing dangerous drugs) were
filed with RTC
• During arraignment, Racho
pleaded not guilty to both charges
o He alleged that charges were
false and that no shabu was taken from
him
o He said that the police officers
brought him to Sra Breeze Lodged,
stripped his clothes and underwear
then brought him to the police station
• RTC convicted him of violation
of Section 5 Art II of RA 9165 but
acquitted him of violation of Sec 11
o Life imprisonment + 500,000
fine
• Court of Appeals affirmed RTC.
• Hence the appeal to the
Supreme Court
o In the supplemental brief,
Racho assails for the first time the
legality of his arrest and the warrantless
search
o He questions the admissibility of
the sachet on the ground that it was fruit
of the poisonous tree.
W/N RACHO CAN IMPUGN THE
VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS
ARREST– NO
• Racho never objected to the
irregularity of his arrest prior to
arraignment
o This issue was raised for the
first time on appeal
o Considering the time lapsed
and his active participation in the trial,
he has voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Hence, he
is deemed to have waived the right to
question validity of the arrest.
o This cures whatever defect may
have attended the arrest.
The legality of the arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over his person.
Appellants warrantless arrest therefore
cannot, in itself, be the basis of his
acquittal.
W/N SEIZED DRUG IS ADMISSIBLE
IN EVIDENCE – NO
• The RTC contends that he was
caught in flagrante delicto, hence the
warrantless search was valid
• Jurisprudence holds that in
searches incident to a lawful arrest, the
arrest must precede the search
o Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the
police have probable cause to make the
arrest at the outset of the search.
Did the police officers have probable
cause to arrest the appellant? NO
(was the warrantless arrest valid? No)
• What prompted the police to
apprehend appellant, even without a
warrant, was the tip given by the
informant that appellant would arrive in
Baler, Aurora carrying shabu.
• Reliable information is not
sufficient to justify warrantless arrest
• For it to be justified, accused
must perform some overt act that would
indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
o At the time of the arrest, he was
just waiting for a tricycle. He was not
acting in any suspicious manner that
would engender a reasonable ground
for the police officers to suspect and
conclude that he was committing or
intending to commit a crime.
• Circumstances also do not
indicate urgency that would allow
officers to forgo the warrant
Hence, the confiscated item is a fruit of
the poisonous tree and inadmissible.
Without the confiscation of the shabu,
the conviction would not be sustained.
Hence, acquittal warranted.
A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest
does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest
191 Miclat v People
Petition for review on certiorari seeking
to reverse and set aside the Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) which
affirmed in toto the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, convicting
petitioner of Violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165,
or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
FACTS:
• Caloocan City Police received
an INFOREP Memo from Camp Crame
relative to the illicit and down-right drug-
trading activities being undertaken
involving Abe Miclat.
• They were led by their informant
to the house of one Alias Abe.
• Thru a small opening in the
curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio
peeped inside and there at a distance
of 1 meter, he saw Abe arranging
several pieces of small plastic sachets
which he believed to be containing
shabu.
• PO3 Antonio gained entrance,
he forthwith introduced himself as a
police officer. Abe voluntarily handed
over four pieces of small plastic sachets
the latter was earlier sorting out. PO3
Antonio immediately placed the
suspect under arrest and brought him
and the four (4) pieces of plastic
sachets containing white crystalline
substance to their headquarters and
turned them over to PO3 Fernando
Moran for proper disposition.
• Petitioner is assailing the
legality of his arrest and the subsequent
seizure of the arresting officer of the
suspected sachets of dangerous drugs
from him.
• Abe argues that the act of
arranging several plastic sachets by
and in itself is not a crime per se,
petitioner maintains that the entry of the
police surveillance team into his house
was illegal, and no amount of
incriminating evidence will take the
place of a validly issued search warrant.
Moreover, peeping through a curtain-
covered window cannot be
contemplated as within the meaning of
the plain view doctrine, rendering the
warrantless arrest unlawful.
• RTC found him guilty. CA
affirmed.
• Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WoN the warrantless arrest
was lawful? YES
RATIO:
• The exception in Section 5 (a),
Rule 113 to operate, this Court has
ruled that two (2) elements must be
present: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
• In the instant case, contrary to
petitioners contention, he was caught in
flagrante delicto and the police
authorities effectively made a valid
warrantless arrest.
• The plastic sachets and its
suspicious contents were plainly
exposed to the view of PO3 Antonio,
who was only about one and one-half
meters from where petitioner was
seated.
192 Antiquera v People
This case is about a supposed
warrantless arrest and a subsequent
search prompted by the police officers'
chance sighting through an ajar door of
the accused engaged in pot session.
FACTS:
• Three police officers, and two
civilian operatives on board a patrol car
and a tricycle were conducting a police
visibility patrol when they saw two
unidentified men rush out of a house
and immediately boarded a jeep.
• Suspecting that a crime had
been committed, the police officers
approached the house from where the
men came and peeked through the
partially opened door, and saw
Antiquera having a pot session with his
live-in partner.
• This prompted the police
officers to enter the house, introduce
themselves, and arrest Antiquera and
Cruz.
ISSUES: WoN the warrantless arrest
was lawful?
RATIO:
• Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a "peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense." This is an arrest in
flagrante delicto. The overt act
constituting the crime is done in the
presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
• Court held that the
circumstances here do not make out a
case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.
• No crime was plainly exposed to
the view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused
Antiquera without warrant under the
above-mentioned rule. The olice
authorities had to push open the door to
see the illegal activity being conducted.
• Considering that his arrest was
illegal, the search and seizure that
resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the various drug
paraphernalia that the police officers
allegedly found in the house and seized
are inadmissible, having proceeded
from an invalid search and seizure.
Since the confiscated drug
paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti
of the crime charged, the Court has no
choice but to acquit the accused.
b. METHOD OF ARREST BY
OFFICER
Rule 113, Sec 8
SECTION 8. Method of Arrest by
Officer Without Warrant— When
making an arrest without a warrant,
the officer shall inform the person to
be arrested of his authority and the
cause of the arrest, unless the latter
is either engaged in the commission
 of an offense, is pursued immediately
after its commission, has escaped,
flees, or forcibly resists before the
officer has opportunity to so inform
him, or when the giving of such
information will imperil the arrest.
RA 10586 Anti-Drunk and Drugged
Driving Act
193 Luz v People
FACTS:
• Around 3 AM, PO2 Emmanuel
L. Alteza, saw the accused Rodel Luz
driving a motorcycle without a helmet.
• He flagged down the accused
for violating a municipal ordinance
which requires all motorcycle drivers to
wear helmets while driving.
• Alteza then invited Luz to come
inside their sub-station since the place
where he flagged down the accused is
almost in front of it.
• While he and SPO1 Brillante
were issuing a citation ticket for
violation of municipal ordinance, he
noticed that the accused was uneasy
and kept on getting something from his
jacket.
• Alteza told the accused to take
out the contents of the pocket of his
jacket as the latter may have a weapon
inside it.
• The accused slowly put out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket
which were:
o a nickel-like tin or metal
container about 2-3 inches in size
o two (2) cellphones
o one (1) pair of scissors
o one (1) Swiss knife
• Alteza asked the accused to
open the said container. Upon opening,
he noticed a cartoon cover and
something beneath it. The accused
spilled out the contents of the container
on the table which turned out to be four
(4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which
were empty while the other two (2)
contained suspected shabu.
• RTC Naga convicted Luz of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE/S AND RULING:
1. W/N there was a valid arrest of
Luz – NO
• Under R.A. 4136, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, the
general procedure for dealing with a
traffic violation is not the arrest of the
offender, but the confiscation of the
driver’s license of the latter.
• Similarly, the PNP Operations
Manual provides the following
procedure for flagging down vehicles
during the conduct of checkpoints:
o SECTION 7. Procedure in
Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles
While in Mobile Car. This rule is a
general concept and will not apply in hot
pursuit operations. The mobile car crew
shall undertake the following, when
applicable: x x x
o m. If it concerns traffic
violations, immediately issue a Traffic
Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation
Report (TVR). Never indulge in
prolonged, unnecessary conversation
or argument with the driver or any of the
vehicles occupants
• At the time that Luz was waiting
for PO3 Alteza to write his citation
ticket, he could not be said to have
been under arrest. There was no
intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to
arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or
take him into custody. Prior to the
issuance of the ticket, the period during
which Luz was at the police station may
be characterized merely as waiting
time. In fact, PO3 Alteza testified that it
was only for the sake of convenience
that they were waiting there.
• It also appears that, according
to City Ordinance No. 98-012, the
failure to wear a crash helmet while
riding a motorcycle is penalized by a
fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a
warrant of arrest need not be issued if
the information or charge was filed for
an offense penalized by a fine only. It
may be stated as a corollary that neither
can a warrantless arrest be made for
such an offense.
• This ruling does not imply that
there can be no arrest for a traffic
violation. When there is an intent on the
part of the police officer to deprive the
motorist of liberty, or to take the latter
into custody, the former may be
deemed to have arrested the motorist.
In this case, however, the officer’s
issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic
citation ticket negates the possibility of
an arrest for the same violation.
2. W/N the warrantless search on
Luz was valid – NO
• There being no valid arrest, the
warrantless search that resulted from it
was likewise illegal.
• The search did not fall under the
instances when a warrantless search
may be allowed.
• The evidence seized, although
alleged to be inadvertently discovered,
was not in plain view. It was actually
concealed inside a metal container
inside Luz’s pocket. Clearly, the
evidence was not immediately
apparent.
• Neither was there a consented
warrantless search. Consent to a
search must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. The consent must
be unequivocal, specific, intelligently
given and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion.
o While the prosecution claims
that petitioner acceded to the
instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged
accession does not suffice to prove
valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the
RTC found that Luz was merely told to
take out the contents of his pocket.
• Neither does the search qualify
under the stop and frisk rule. While the
rule normally applies when a police
officer observes suspicious or unusual
conduct, which may lead him to believe
that a criminal act may be afoot, the
stop and frisk is merely a limited
protective search of outer clothing for
weapons.
Petition GRANTED. RTC decision
REVERSED.
Luz ACQUITED.
194 Comerciante v People***
FACTS:
• An Information for violation of
RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous
Act of 2002) was filed before the RTC
against Comerciante.
o IMPORTANT FACTUAL
DETAILS: While he was patrolling at 30
kph, at a distance of around 10 meters,
PO3 Calag spotted Comerciante and
Dasilla standing around and showing
“improper and unpleasant movements”,
with one handing plastic sachets to the
other. He decide to effect and arrest,
and was able to confiscate two sachets
of shabu.
• Dasilla was able to file a
demurrer to evidence, which was
granted, resulting to his acquittal. On
the other hand, Comerciante was not
able to file his own demurrer to
evidence, thus RTC considered his
right to do so waived.
• RTC found Comerciante guilty,
ruling that PO3 Calag conducted a valid
warrantless arrest on Comerciante.
o There was a probable cause to
justify the warrantless arrest, as PO3
saw the accused in plain view that
Comerciante was carrying the sachets
of shabu.
• CA affirmed Comerciante’s
conviction.
o Comerciante was committing a
crime in flagrante delicto (by
exchanging plastic sachets with
Dasilla).
• Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari, where Comerciante
argues that there was no valid
warrantless arrest, which then warrants
the inadmissibility of the evidence and
his acquittal.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid warrantless
arrest- NO
RATIO:
• A search warrant must be
carried out through or on the strength of
a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause (Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution).
o General rule (“Exclusionary
Rule”): In the absence of such warrant,
the search and seizure becomes
unreasonable. Evidence obtained on
such occasion should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree.
o One exception is when the
search is incident to a lawful arrest. In
this case, the law requires that there
first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made.
• The lawful arrests without
warrant are enumerated in Section 5,
Rule 113:
o (a) Arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto,
o (b) Arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable
cause that said suspect was the
perpetrator of a crime which had just
been committed,
o (c) Arrest of prisoner who has
escaped from custody
• Section 5(a), Rule 113 requires
that there must be an overt act, and
such was committed in the presence of
the arresting officer. Under Section
5(b), the personal knowledge of the
arresting officer that a crime was
committed is required.
• In the case at bar, the Court
held that there was no lawful
warrantless arrest.
o It was impossible for POS Calag
to identify with reasonable accuracy the
substance inside the two small sachets.
o There was no showing that PO3
Calag had personal knowledge that the
crime had been committed.
o The allegation that Comerciante
and his companions were showing
improper and unpleasant movements
was not sufficient.
• The Court also rejected the
claim that there was a valid “stop and
frisk” search made on Comerciante.
That Comerciante was standing and
handing over something to his
companion does not create a
reasonable inference of criminal activity
to justify a stop and frisk search.
o There must be suspicion of an
illicit act
o For warrantless searches,
probable cause was defined as a
reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense
charged.
o Jurisprudence clarifies that for
there to be a valid stop and frisk search,
the requirement does not have to be
probable cause but cannot be mere
suspicion.
• As there was no valid
warrantless arrest and no valid stop and
frisk search, the evidence is
inadmissible. Thus, the SC acquitted
Comerciante.
195 Ongcoma Hadji Homar v People
• PO1 Tan, together with C/A
Ronald Tangcoy, onboard a mobile
hunter, saw Homar crossing a “No
Jaywalking” portion of Roxas Boulevard
o They accosted Homar and told
him to cross at the pedestrian area
o Homar picked up something
from the ground. They frisked him and
recovered a knife. They then searched
his body and found shabu.
• RTC convicted Homar for
violation of RA 9165 (Dangerous Drug
Act)
o CA affirmed RTC
• Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari
o Homar alleges that the shabu is
inadmissible as it was obtained from an
unlawful arrest
W/N THE EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE
- NO
Prosecution failed to prove that a lawful
warrantless arrest preceded the search
• To constitute a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur:
1. Overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime
2. Such overt act is done in the
presence of or within the view of the
arresting officer.
• In the case at hand, the
prosecution failed to prove that Homar
was committing a crime
o Tan merely stated that Homar
was crossing a street not designated for
crossing
o Aside from this, there was no
proof showing that Homar was crossing
in a no jaywalking area.
o He was not even charged of
jaywalking.
o Presumption of regularity
cannot trump presumption of
innocence.
• Furthermore, Tan and Tangcoy
did not intend to arrest Homar for
jaywalking
o The application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, or a formal
declaration of arrest are required
o It is sufficient that there be an
intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that
there be an intent on the part of the
other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is
necessary.
o In this case, Tan and Tangcoy
accosted him and told him to cross in
the proper area. They did not intend to
arrest him for the alleged jaywalking.
o The intent to arrest only came
after they confiscated the shabu.
Given that there was no proper arrest,
the search incident to that arrest is also
not valid.
The waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest does not also mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest.
Homar acquitted.
196 People v Mahinay
SUMMARY: Mahinay was arrested for
the rape with homicide of Ma. Victoria
Chan. He was informed of his
constitutional rights. He, assisted by
counsel gave an extrajudicial
confession, admitting to the crime. This,
along with other circumstantial
evidence, was appreciated by the Court
to sustain his conviction. The Court also
gave guidelines for law enforcement
regarding the observance of accused’s
Miranda Rights.
FACTS:
• Mahinay, Maria Isip’s
houseboy, was in a drinking spree with
Gregorio Rivera
• Ma. Victoria Chan (12 y.o. and
neighbor of Isip) went missing
• The next morning (June 26,
1995), at around 7:30, a certain Boy
found the dead body of Ma Victoria
inside a septic tank
• At the scene of the crime, a pair
of blue slippers, underwear, leather
wallet, dirty long pants, and pliers were
found. Isip indentified them as
Mahinay’s belongings.
• Mahinay was then arrested in
Batangas. He was brought to
Valenzuela Police Station.
o With the assistance of Atty.
Restituto Viernes, Mahinay executed
an extra-judicial confession wherein he
narrated in detail how he raped and
killed the victim
• Mahinay was charged with rape
with homicide.
o He pleaded not guilty
• Lower court convicted Mahinay
of the crime charged (death penalty)
• Hence, this automatic review.
W/N MAHINAY IS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT – YES
In the case at hand, there are several
circumstantial evidence establishing
the crime of rape with homicide:
1. Witness Norgina Rivera, owner
of the house where the crime happened
and the septic tank, testified that she
saw Mahinay the evening on June 25,
1995 in front of the house.
2. Sgt. Roberto G. Suni testidied
that he met accused Larry Mahinay that
same night walking on the road leading
said house. He also saw victim Maria
Victoria Chan standing at the gate of
the same house in the same evening.
3. Maria Isip testified that Larry
Mahinay is her houseboy asked
permission from her to leave but he
never returned until he was arrested in
Batangas.
4. Fernando Trinidad, jeepney
driver, pinpointed Mahinay as one of his
passengers at 2am on June 26, 1995.
5. Personal belongings of the
victim were found in the house where
accused Larry Mahinay slept on the
night of the incident.
6. Larry Mahinay during the
custodial investigation and after having
been informed of his constitutional
rights with the assistance of Atty.
Restituto Viernes of the Public
Attorneys Office voluntarily gave his
statement admitting the commission of
the crime.
• Atty. Viernes informed and
explained to him his rights and was
present all throughout the giving of
testimony.
• There being no evidence
presented to show that said confession
were obtained as a result of violence,
torture, maltreatment, intimidation,
threat or promise of reward or leniency
nor that the investigating officer could
have been motivated to concoct the
facts narrated in said affidavit; the
confession of the accused is held to be
true, correct and freely or voluntarily
given.
7. If Mahinay did not commit the
crime and was only forced to
disposed/dumped the body of the victim
in the septic tank (as he testified in open
Court), he could have apprise Col.
Maganto, a high ranking police officer
or the lady reporter who interviewed
him. His failure and omission to reveal
the same is unnatural
8. Circumstance of flight of the
accused strongly indicate his
consciousness of guilt.
9. From the wounds, contusions
and abrasions suffered by the victim,
force was indeed employed upon her to
satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from
appellants own account, he pushed the
victim causing the latter to hit her head
on the table and fell unconscious. It was
at that instance that he ravished her
and satisfied his salacious and prurient
desires. Considering that the victim, at
the time of her penile invasion, was
unconscious, it could safely be
concluded that she had not given free
and voluntary consent to her
defilement, whether before or during
the sexual act.
COURT UPHELD THE RTC BUT
GAVE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES
FOR LAW ENFORMENT:
1. The person arrested, detained,
invited or under custodial investigation
must be informed in a language known
to and understood by him of the reason
for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any; Every other
warnings, information or
communication must be in a language
known to and understood by said
person;
2. He must be warned that he has
a right to remain silent and that any
statement he makes may be used as
evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he
has the right to be assisted at all times
and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer,
preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he
has no lawyer or cannot afford the
services of a lawyer, one will be
provided for him; and that a lawyer may
also be engaged by any person in his
behalf, or may be appointed by the
court upon petition of the person
arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person
arrested has a lawyer, he must be
informed that no custodial investigation
in any form shall be conducted except
in the presence of his counsel or after a
valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be
informed that, at any time, he has the
right to communicate or confer by the
most expedient means telephone,
radio, letter or messenger with his
lawyer (either retained or appointed),
any member of his immediate family, or
any medical doctor, priest or minister
chosen by him or by any one from his
immediate family or by his counsel, or
be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-
government organization. It shall be the
responsibility of the officer to ensure
that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he
has the right to waive any of said rights
provided it is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently and ensure
that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person
arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he
must be informed that it must be done
in writing AND in the presence of
counsel, otherwise, he must be warned
that the waiver is void even if he insist
on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must
be informed that he may indicate in any
manner at any time or stage of the
process that he does not wish to be
questioned with warning that once he
makes such indication, the police may
not interrogate him if the same had not
yet commenced, or the interrogation
must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be
informed that his initial waiver of his
right to remain silent, the right to
counsel or any of his rights does not bar
him from invoking it at any time during
the process, regardless of whether he
may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that
any statement or evidence, as the case
may be, obtained in violation of any of
the foregoing, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
(Guidelines, procedures and duties of
officers arresting, detaining, inviting or
investigating at the time of arrest or at a
custodial investigation)
c. METHOD OF ARREST BY
PRIVATE PERSON
Rule 113, Sec 9
SECTION 9. Method of Arrest by
Private Person. — When making an
arrest, a private person shall inform
the person to be arrested of the
intention to arrest him and the cause
of the arrest, unless the latter is either
engaged in the commission of an
offense, is pursued immediately after
its commission, or has escaped,
flees, or forcibly resists before the
person making the arrest has
opportunity to so inform him, or when
the giving of such information will
imperil the arrest.
197 People v Nuestro
198 People v Mendez
Doctrine: Personal knowledge of
facts in arrests without warrant under
5(b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure must be based
upon probable cause, which means
an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when it is
based on actual facts, i.e., when it is
 supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested.
Facts
• Renante Mendez and Baby
Cabagtong were arrested without
warrant following the rape and murder
of 13-year old Candy Dolim. They were
subsequently convicted by RTC
Laoang, Northern Samar for the same
o Cabagtong was arrested by
barangay tanod Mejica under the
Citizen’s Arrest law. He was taken to
the municipal hall where he was
investigated by policeman SPO2
Cernio. He was asked to implicate
Mendez, but he refused.
o Mendez was arrested four days
after the crime was committed as a
suspect in this case. SPO2 Cernio
claimed he was arrested based on the
knowledge of his guilt.
• SPO2 Cernio said that the Chief
of Police had ordered the arrest of
accused-appellants on the basis of
information given by Aurea Cabagtong,
mother of Ronnie Cabagtong who was
arrested as suspect (but later released
when he agreed to testify against the
two accused-appellants) for the rape-
slay of Candy.
Issue: W/N the arrests without a
warrant of both Mendez and Cabagtong
were valid - NO
• Following the doctrine above
cited, SPO2 Cernio did not have
personal knowledge of the commission
of the crime so as to justify the
warrantless arrest of Mendez.
o The only time the police had
evidence against Mendez was when
Aurea came forward after her son
Ronnie’s arrest and pointed to Mendez
and Cabagtong as the perpetrators.
However, it was only four days after the
commission of the crime, and it could
not justify the arrest of accused-
appellants without a judicial warrant.
• Cabagtong, on the other hand,
was arrested by Mejica on the basis of
the citizen’s arrest law. Mejica was
neither a police officer nor a witness to
the incident. He was not a member of
the investigating team. He did not have
any personal knowledge of the incident.
He admitted that he merely based his
arrest on the information supplied by
Aurea Cabagtong to the police. This
does not constitute personal knowledge
to warrant a citizen’s arrest.
Ruling: RTC decision REVERSED and
Accused-appellants ACQUITTED on
the ground of reasonable doubt
d. POST-ARREST PROCEDURE
Rule 112, Sec 7
SECTION 7. When Accused Lawfully
Arrested Without Warrant. — When a
person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant involving an offense which
requires a preliminary investigation,
the complaint or information may be
filed by a prosecutor without need of
such investigation provided an
inquest has been conducted in
accordance with existing rules. In the
absence or unavailability of an
inquest prosecutor, the complaint
may be 􀀽led by the offended party or
a peace officer directly with the
proper court on the basis of the
a􀀽davit of the offended party or
arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is
filed, the person arrested may ask for
a preliminary investigation in
 accordance with this Rule, but he
must sign a waiver of the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, in the presence
of his counsel. Notwithstanding the
waiver, he may apply for bail and the
investigation must be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its
inception.
After the filing of the complaint or
information in court without a
preliminary investigation, the
accused may, within five (5) days
from the time he learns of its 􀀽ling,
ask for a preliminary investigation
with the same right to adduce
evidence in his defense as provided
in this Rule. (7a; sec. 2, R.A. No.
7438)
e. EXCEPTIONS CONSTRUED
STRICTLY
199 David et al v Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo et al
Facts
• On Feb. 24, 2006, PGMA
issued Presidential Proclamation (PP)
1017 declaring a state of national
emergency, citing as basis the threats
from extremists. The threats were from
both the Left and Right Movements, as
magnified by the mass media.
o PGMA also issued General
Order (GO) 5 implementing PP 1017,
calling out the AFP and the PNP to
prevent and suppress acts of terrorism
and lawless violence.
o On March 3, 2006, PGMA
issued PP 1021 lifting the state of
national emergency.
• The following are the events
that led to PP 1017:
o On Jan. 17, 2006, members of
the Magdalo group who were indicted
for the Oakwood Mutiny escaped their
detention cell and issued a public
statement calling people to protest
o On Feb.17, authorities
discovered plans of bombing the PMA
Homecoming which was supposed to
be attended by PGMA. PGMA did not
attend the said event. A bomb was
indeed found and detonated.
o Minutes of meetings between
the Magdalo group and the NPA were
captured.
o There was an announcement in
DZRH that Magdalo’s D-Day would be
on Feb.24, 2006.
o NPA’s Ka Roger also declared
their vow to bring down the Arroyo
government.
• After the issuance of PP 1017
and GO 5:
o Permits of groups like KMU to
hold rallies were revoked
o Warrantless arrests were
implemented
o Randy David and Ronald
Llamas of Akbayan were arrested
without warrant
Brought to Camp Karingal
where petitioner David was
fingerprinted, photographed and
booked like a criminal suspect
Treated brusquely by policemen
who “held his head and tried to push
him” inside an unmarked car
Charged with violation of BP
880 and Inciting to Sedition
Detained for 7 hours
Eventually released for
insufficiency of evidence
o The offices of the Daily Tribune,
Malaya, and Abante were raided.
o The takeover of news outfits
that would not follow the standards of
GO 5 was also ordered.
o The National Communications
Commission also warned media outfits
that they may be closed if they violate
PP1017 and GO 5.
o Representatives Beltran
(Anakpawis), Ocampo (Bayan Muna),
and Maza (Gabriela) were also
arrested.
Relevant Issue: WN the arrests done in
pursuant to PP 1107 are valid – NO
Ratio
• Arrests of David and Llamas
were illegal
• Constitution provides that
searches and seizures are normally
unreasonable unless authorized by a
validly issued search warrant or warrant
of arrest.
o Fundamental protection given is
that between person and police must
stand the protective authority of a
magistrate clothed with power to issue
or refuse search warrants or warrants of
arrest.
• The arrest of petitioners didn’t
fall under the exceptions of Rule Sec 5,
Rule 113 (When warrantless arrest is
lawful)
• During the inquest, all the
arresting officers could invoke was their
observation that some rallyists were
wearing t-shirts with the words “Oust
Gloria Now” and they assumed that
David was the leader of the rally
o Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence
o David was not wearing the shirt,
and even if he was, it’s insufficient to
charge him with inciting to sedition
o There’s also insufficient
evidence for the charge of violation of
BP 880 because it wasn’t even known
if David was the leader of the rally
• Right to peaceably assemble
was also violated
o Cannot be denied except on a
showing of a clear and present danger
• Petitioners were arrested while
they were exercising their right to
peaceful assembly
• They were not committing any
crime, and neither was there a showing
of a clear and present danger that
warranted the limitation of that right
o The charges of inciting to
sedition and violation of BP 880 were
mere afterthought
Other issues:
1. WoN PP1017 is void on its face
because of its “overbreadth” and “void-
for-vagueness” - NO
• Petitioners claimed that the
enforcement of PP 1017 encroached
on both protected and unprotected
rights under Sec.4, Art.III of the
Constitution and sent a “chilling effect”
to the citizens.
• A plain reading of PP1017
shows that it is not primarily directed to
speech or speech-related conduct.
Rather, it pertains to lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion, which are
considered “harmful” and
“constitutionally unprotected conduct”
that is subject to state regulation. The
overbreadth doctrine is not recognized
outside the limited context of freedom of
speech.
• Facial invalidation of laws is
generally disfavored. In this case, the
petitioners also failed to justify the facial
challenge of PP 1017 based on the two
doctrines used to analyze facial
challenges to free speech cases:
overbreadth and void-for-vagueness.
• On overbreadth: Overbreadth
analysis is an exception to the general
rule.
o General rule: ordinarily, a
particular litigant can only claim that a
statute is unconstitutional as applied to
him or her; challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third
parties and can only assert their own
interests.
o Exception: In overbreadth
analysis, challengers are permitted to
raise the rights of third parties and the
court invalidates the entire statutes “on
its face”, not merely “as applied”.
Ratio behind the exception: the
possibility of a “chilling effect”
deterrent effect of the overbroad statute
on third parties not courageous enough
to bring the suit.
The court assumes that an
overbroad law’s “very existence may
cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or expression”.
o In a facial challenge on the
ground of overbreadth doctrine, the
challenger must establish that there
can be no instance when the assailed
law may be valid. In the present case,
the petitioners did not even attempt to
show whether this situation exists.
• On void-for-vagueness:
o The void-for-vagueness
doctrine holds that “a law is facially
invalid if men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application”.
o A litigant may challenge a
statute on its face only if it is vague in
all its possible applications. Petitioners
also failed to establish this.
2. WoN PP 1017 is unconstitutional for
violating the freedom of speech, of
expression, of the press, of assembly
as well as the right against
unreasonable search and seizure and
against warrantless arrest (as-
challenge, based on injuries suffered by
petitioners David, Llamas, Daily
Tribune, KMU) - YES
• The validity of a statute is to be
determined from its general purpose
and its efficiency to accomplish the end
desired, not from its effects in a
particular case. The criterion by which
the validity of a statute is to be
measured is the essential basis for the
exercise of power, and not a mere
incidental result arising from its
exertion.
• PP 1017 is merely an invocation
of the President’s calling-out power. Its
general purpose is to command the
AFP to suppress all forms of lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. It had
accomplished the end desired. There is
nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police,
expressly or impliedly to conduct illegal
arrest, search or violate the citizens’
constitutional rights.
• The Court declared
unconstitutional the provision of GO 5
referring to “acts of terrorism”. Because
of the absence of a law defining said
acts, it could be a catch-all provision
prone to abuse and oppression by the
police or military.
• In the case of David, et.al.:
o The right to peaceably
assemble is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil
that Congress has a right to prevent.
o The right to assemble is not
subject to previous restraint or
censorship. It may not be conditioned
upon the prior issuance of a permit or
authorization from the government
authorities except, of course, if the
assembly is intended to be held in a
public place, a permit for the use of
such place, and not for the assembly
itself, may be validly required.
o David et.al. were arrested while
they were exercising their right to
peaceful assembly. They were not
committing any crime, neither was there
any showing of a clear and present
danger that warranted the limitation of
that right.
• In the case of KMU, et.al.:
o Malacanang made a wholesale
cancellation of permits previously
issued by local government units. This
is arbitrary.
o Only the LGUS have the power
to issue permits and to revoke such
permits after due notice and hearing on
the determination of clear and present
danger.
o KMU, et.al. were not even
notified and heard on the revocation of
their permits. Such absence of notice is
a fatal defect. Hence, the dispersal and
arrest of the members of KMU, et.al.
were unwarranted.
• In the case of The Daily Tribune,
et.al.:
o The search and seizure of
materials for publication, the stationing
of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily
Tribune offices, and the arrogant
warning of government officials to
media, are plain censorship.
o Undoubtedly, The Daily Tribune
was subjected to these arbitrary
intrusions because of its anti-
government sentiments. Freedom to
comment on public affairs is essential to
the vitality of a representative
democracy.
• PP 1017 is limited to the calling
out power of the President on the
military to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. When in
implementing its provisions, the military
and police committed acts which violate
the citizens’ rights under the
Constitution, this Court has to declare
such acts unconstitutional and illegal.
200 People v Valdez
• The RTC found Samuel Valdez
guilty of the crime of illegal transport of
marijuana buds/leaves.
o SPO1 Bernardo Mariano was
approached by a civilian asset and was
told that an Ilocano person was ready to
transport marijuana. The asset
described to him the physical
appearance of the suspect as thin and
possessing a green bag.
o Together with the asset, SPO1
Mariano waited for an air-conditioned
Dangwa bus bound for Manila. Mariano
boarded the bus and found the person
the civilian asset had described.
o After ordering Valdez to exit the
bus, SPO1 Mariano ordered Valdez to
open his bag, his water jug, and a lunch
box, where he saw marijuana leaves as
contents. Valdez was then escorted to
the PNP Provincial HQ at Lagawe.
• Valdez contends that the
marijuana allegedly seized from him
was a product of an unlawful search,
and hence, inadmissible in evidence.
ISSUE
W/N Valdez was legally searched and
arrested – YES
RATIO
• No arrest, search and seizure
can be made without a valid warrant
issued by a competent judicial
authority, however, the constitutional
proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certain
legal and judicial exceptions, as
follows:
1. Warrantless search incidental to
a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain
view;
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances
• A lawful arrest without a warrant
may be made by a peace officer or a
private person under the following
circumstances:
a. When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
b. When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
and
c. When the person to be arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
• Appellant was caught in
flagrante since he was carrying
marijuana at the time of his arrest. A
crime was actually being committed by
the appellant, thus, the search made
upon his personal effects falls squarely
under paragraph (a) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to lawful
arrest.
• While it is true that SPO1
Mariano was not armed with a search
warrant when the search was
conducted, under the circumstances of
the case, there was sufficient probable
cause for Mariano to believe that
appellant was then and there
committing a crime.
• Probable cause – reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man’s
belief that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he is charged;
or the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been
committed and that the items, articles or
objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be
searched
• Jurisprudence is replete with
instances where tipped information has
become a sufficient probable cause to
effect a warrantless search and
seizure. SPO1 Mariano was tipped the
same morning he was waiting for a ride
to report for work. As he had to respond
quickly to the call of duty, there was not
enough time to secure a search
warrant. In view of the urgency, SPO1
Mariano immediately proceeded to
pursue the trafficker.
• There was definite information
of the identity of the person engaged in
transporting prohibited drugs at a
particular time and place. No search
was conducted on the baggage of other
passengers.
RULING
Appeal is denied, RTC ruling is
affirmed.
201 People v Burgos
Facts:
According to the prosecution, Pat.
Bioco and Sgt. Taroy obtained
intelligent information during the
surrender of Cesar Masamlok.
According to Masamlok, he was forcibly
recruited by Burgos as a member of
NPA threatening him w/ the used of
firearm if he refused. Upon the receipt
of such information, PC-INP was
dispatched to arrest Ruben Burgos.
The team was able to locate the
accused plowing his field.
While they were in the house of the
accused, Pat. Bioco ask the accused
about the firearm. The accused initially
denied knowledge about it but his wife
later on pointed to a place below their
house where the gun was buried in the
ground. Pat. Bioco then recovered a .38
caliber revolver, subversive materials,
pamphlets which among others include
‘Ang Bayan,’ ‘Pahayagan ng Partido
Komunista ng Pilipinas,’and the like.
Furthermore, Masamlok said that he
really saw the revolver from the
accused at the time the latter invited
him to attend a seminar because he
was just 2m away. Also, Masamlok
further testified that the accused was
the first speaker in the seminar and that
he encouraged the group to overthrow
the government emphasizing that those
who attended are already members of
the NPA. Masamlok and others were
also threatened that if they reveal to the
authorities they will be killed.
Lastly, to prove illegal possession of
firearm, the prosecution proved that the
accused was not listed among the lists
of firearm holders and neither was his
name included among the list of
persons who applied for the licensing of
the firearm.
The defendant however averred that he
was tortured and was threatened to be
salvage if he did not admit ownership of
subject firearm. Moreover, her wife
testified that the firearm was actually
left by Cesar Masamlok the day before
the search. She said that her husband
was not in the house at that time and
hence she did not inform him nor report
it to authorities for fear of life of her
husband.
The RTC then convicted the accused
Ruben Burgos of the crime Illegal
Possession of Firearm in Furtherance
of Subversion.
Issue: W/N the arrest of Ruben Burgos
lawful which then makes the search of
his house subsequent confiscation of
firearm and documents lawful and
valid? NO
● When the police authorities
went to the house of Burgos for
purpose of arresting him, upon
the information of Masamlok,
they did not have any warrant of
arrest or search warrant w/
them.
● The TC rationated that the
authorities received an urgent
report of accused’s involvement
from a reliable source falls w/in
the ambit of Sec. 6A Rule 113.
● If the arrest is valid, the firearm
and alleged subversive
documents would become
 incident to a lawful arrest as
provided by Rule 126, Sec. 12.
● Sec. 6A Rule 113 requires
‘personal knowledge’ of that
fact.
o There is no such
personal knowledge in
this case, because
whatever knowledge
was possessed by the
arresting officer came
from the information
furnish by Cesar
Masamlok. The location
of the firearm was given
by the appellant’s wife.
o ALSO, at the time of the
arrest he was not in
actual possession of any
firearm or subversive
document. Neither was
he committing any act
w/c could be subversive
and in fact he was
plowing his field.
● The exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of
arrest should be strictly
construed. Any exception must
clearly fall w/in the situations
when securing a warrant would
be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally
construe the rule on arrests
without warrant or extend its
application beyond the cases
specifically provided by law. To
do so would infringe upon
personal liberty and set back a
basic right so often violated and
so deserving of full protection.
● It likewise does not fall w/in Sec.
6B Rule 113 as the crime must
in fact or actually have been
committed first. It is not enough
to suspect that a crime may
have been committed. The test
of reasonable ground only
applies to the identity of the
accused.
o In this case, the accused
was arrested solely on
the basis of Masamlok’s
verbal report.
● The arrest being unlawful, the
search and seizure which
transpired afterwards could not
likewise be deemed legal as
being mere incidents to a valid
arrest. Hence, firearm and
alleged subversive documents
are inadmissible as evidence.
● Ruling: The court reversed the
TC and accused-appellant is
acquitted on the basis of
reasonable doubt.
f. SPECIAL RULE FOR JUVENILE IN
CONFLICT WITH LAW (RJCL), SECS.
6&7
Section 6. Burden of Proof of
Age. - Any person alleging the age of
the child in conflict with the law has
the burden of proving the age of such
child.
If the age of the child is contested
prior to the filing of the information in
court, a case for determination of age
under summary proceeding may be
filed before a court which shall render
its decision within 24 hours from
receipt of the appropriate pleadings
of all the parties. (n)
In all cases involving a child, the
court shall make a categorical finding
as to the age of the child.
 Section 7. Exemption from
Criminal Liability. - A child fifteen
years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall
be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected
to an intervention program as
provided for in Republic Act No. 9344
when consented to by the child and
the parents
g. “JOHN DOE WARRANTS”
DOJ Circular No. 50
RA 7438; Proclamation 1017
202 People v Veloso
Doctrine:
The rule does not prevent the
issuance and service of a warrant
against an unknown party. In such
case the best description possible
of the person to be arrested is to be
given in the warrant; but it must be
sufficient to indicate clearly on
whom it is to be served, by stating his
occupation, his personal appearance
and peculiarities, the place of his
residence, or other circumstances by
which he can be identified.
FACTS:
 No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila – used as a Gambling
den under the name of
“Parliamentary Club”
 Relying on reliable information,
Detective Geronimo applied for,
and obtained a search warrant.
 The warrant addressed a John
Doe and described him to be the
one in control of the gambling
den and having possession of
certain devices and effects used
in violation of the Gambling
Law.
 The police raided the gambling
den and found, among many
others, Jose Ma. Veloso.
Veloso resisted arrest because
the warrant was named “John
Doe.”
 Despite heavy resistance from
Veloso, police succeeded in
taking him to custody. The
police also found money, chits,
gambling stubs etc. in Veloso’s
pockets.
 Veloso was found guilty of
resistance of the agents of the
authority. Veloso appeals and
mainly contends that the
warrant is void for being a John
Doe warrant.
ISSUE: WON the warrant is void – NO
RATIO:
 The placing of the address in
the search warrant sufficiently
describes the place to be
searched.
 The warrant also describes
John Doe to be the one in
control of the gambling den and
also possesses various
gambling shit.
 It is recognized that the warrant
for the apprehension of an
unnamed party is void, "except
in those cases where it contains
a description personae such as
will enable the officer to identify
the accused." As the search
warrant stated that John Doe
had gambling apparatus in his
possession in the building
 occupied by him at No. 124
Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
and as this John Doe was Jose
Ma. Veloso, the manager of the
club, the police could identify
John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso
without difficulty.
203 Pangandaman v Casar
FACTS
A shooting incident occurred in Pantao,
Masiu, Lanao del Sur. At least 5 people
died and 2 other wounded. Atty.
Batuampar, claimed to represent the
widow of one of the victims, filed a
letter-complaint with the Provincial
Fiscal at Marawi City asking for a “full
blast preliminary investigation”. The
Provincial Fiscal then addressed a “1st
Indorsement” to the respondent judge,
transmitting Atty. Batuampar’s letter
and requesting that all cases related to
the incident must be forwarded to his
office which has “first taken cognizance
of said cases”. A criminal complaint for
multiple murder was filed before the
judge by P.C. Sgt. Laruan. The judge
then examined personally 3 witnesses
under oath thru his closed and direct
supervision, reducing to writing the
questions to the witnesses and the
latter’s answers. The judge then
approved the complaint and issued the
corresponding warrant of arrest against
the 14 petitioners and 50 John Does. In
an ex-parte motion, Atty Batuampar
sought the recall of the WOA and
subsequent holding of a thorough
investigation because the judge’s intial
investigation was “hasty and manifestly
haphazard” with “no searching
questions”. Judge denied the motion.
In view of the said case, petitioners and
the Solicitor General both argued that
the judge failed to conduct the
investigation in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in Sec 3 Rule 112
of RoC. Petitioners further argued that
the judge conducted a preliminary
investigation of the charges in total
disregard of the Provincial Fiscal who
had already taken cognizance of the
matter.
ISSUES
WON the respondent Judge had the
power to issue the warrant of arrest
without completing the entire
prescribed procedure for preliminary
investigation – YES - The rule is and
has always been that such issuance
need only await a finding of probable
cause, not the completion of the entire
procedure of preliminary investigation.
Former Section 6 of Rule 112 only
states that: " Warrant of arrest, when
issued. — If the judge be satisfied from
the preliminary examination conducted
by him or by the investigating officer
that the offense complained of has
been committed and that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the
accused has committed it, he must
issue a warrant or order for his arrest."
Said section was modified somewhat
but only to include the “searching
questions and answers” requirement.
2 phases of preliminary investigation:
The first phase consists of an ex-parte
inquiry into the sufficiency of the
complaint and the affidavits and other
documents offered in support thereof.
And it ends with the determination by
the Judge either: (1) that there is no
ground to continue with the inquiry, in
which case he dismisses the complaint
and transmits the order of dismissal,
together with the records of the case, to
the provincial fiscal; or (2) that the
complaint and the supporting
documents show sufficient cause to
continue with the inquiry and this
ushers in the second phase.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
This second phase is designed to give
the respondent notice of the complaint,
access to the complainant’s evidence
and an opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits and supporting documents. At
this stage also, the Judge may conduct
a hearing and propound to the parties
and their witnesses questions on
matters that, in his view, need to be
clarified. The second phase concludes
with the Judge rendering his resolution,
either for dismissal of the complaint or
holding the respondent for trial, which
shall be transmitted, together with the
record, to the provincial fiscal for
appropriate action.
WON completion of the procedure laid
down in Sec 3 of Rule 112 a condition
sine qua non for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest? NO - There is no
requirement that the entire procedure
for preliminary investigation must be
completed before a warrant of arrest
may be issued. What the Rule 20
provides is that no complaint or
information for an offense cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court may be filed
without completing the procedure. But
nowhere is it provided that the
procedure must be completed before a
warrant of arrest may issue.
On the respondent judge’s failure to ask
searching questions
Court: The record must be accepted as
an accurate chronicle of the questioned
proceedings, shows prima facie that the
respondent judge had personally
examined the witnesses to the
complaint. A consideration of the
latter’s sworn answers to his questions
satisfies the Court that the finding of
probable cause against the petitioners
was neither arbitrary nor unfounded.
Luna v Plaza: the term
“searching questions and answers”
means – “only, taking into consideration
the purpose of the preliminary
examination which is to determine
"whether there is a reasonable ground
to believe that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest
may be issued and the accused held for
trial," such questions as have tendency
to show the commission of a crime and
the perpetuator thereof. What would be
searching questions would depend on
what is sought to be inquired into, such
as: the nature of the offense, the date,
time, and place of its commission, the
possible motives for its commission; the
subject, his age, education, status,
financial and social circumstances, his
attitude toward the investigation, social
attitudes, opportunities to commit the
offense; the victim, his age, status,
family responsibilities, financial and
social circumstances, characteristics,
etc. The points that are the subject of
inquiry may differ from case to case.
The questions, therefore must to a
great degree depend upon the Judge
making the investigation”
On the fiscal’s announcement of his
intention of investigating the incident
himself
The fact that the Provincial Fiscal may
have announced his intention of
investigating the incident himself did
not, in the view of the Court, legally
inhibit the respondent Judge from
conducting his own inquiry into the
matter if, as is made to appear here, it
was regularly brought before him and
no formal complaint was filed before the
Fiscal. Courtesy may have dictated that
in those circumstances he leave the
investigation to the Fiscal and simply
endorse to the latter the complaint filed
with him; duty did not, and if he
nonetheless chose to conduct his own
investigation, nothing in the rules states
or implies that he could not do so.
Since the action and final resolution of
the respondent Judge after completing
the second stage of the preliminary
investigation are subject to review by
the Provincial Fiscal, practical
considerations of expediency and the
avoidance of duplication of work dictate
that the latter official be permitted to
take over the investigation even in its
present stage.
WOA declared valid but is
voided to the extent it is issued against
the 50 John Does for having the nature
of a general warrant which is
unconstitutional.
C. CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
1. SOURCE, DEFINITION, SCOPE
AND PROCEDURE
a. DEFINITION
RA 7438, Sec 2(f), Par 2
204 People v Pasudag
DOCTRINE: Custodial investigation
commences when a person is taken
into custody and is singled out as a
suspect in the commission of a crime
under investigation and the police
officers begin to ask questions on the
suspect’s participation therein and
which tend to elicit an admission.
FACTS
APPEAL FROM RTC DECISION.
SPO2 Calip was conducting anti-
jueteng operations in Brgy. Artacho.
When he urinated behind a public
school, he saw a garden 5m away with
marijuana plants in between corn plants
and camote tops. After learning from a
storekeeper that Pasudag owned it, he
reported it to Chief of Police Romeo
Astrero. A team was dispatched to the
house of Pasudag. SPO3 Fajarito
looked for accused Pasudag and asked
him to bring the team to his backyard
garden 5m away. They saw marijuana
plants. A photographer took pictures of
accused standing behind the plants.
They uprooted 7 plants and brought
them to the police station. There,
Pasudag admitted that he owned the
plants. He signed a confiscation report
prepared by SPO3 Fajarito. One plant
was brought for examination and it was
confirmed to be marijuana.
Accused was charged and convicted
with violation of RA6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) before the RTC.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest,
search and seizure were valid? NO
RATIO:
ITC, the police authorities had ample
opportunity to secure a search warrant
from the court. Time was not of the
essence to uproot and confiscate the
plants. They were three months old and
there was no sufficient reason to
believe that they would be uprooted on
the same day.
Pasudag’s arrest was also invalid. In
both the interrogation and the signing of
the confiscation report, no counsel
assisted him. He was the only civilian
present in the Office of the Chief of
Police.
He was already under custodial
investigation when he signed the
confiscation receipt. (SEE
DOCTRINE). Obviously, Pasudag was
a suspect from the moment the police
team went to his house and ordered the
uprooting of the marijuana plants in his
backyard garden.
ACQUITTED. Lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
205 People v Valdez
DOCTRINE: The moment the police
tries to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information
from a person suspected of having
committed an offense, he should at
that juncture be assisted by counsel,
unless he waives the right in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
SUMMARY: The police received a tip
from an informant that a marijuana
plantation was being cultivated by
accused-appellant. The police formed a
team to verify said information. The
team was given specific instructions to
“uproot said marijuana plants and
arrest the cultivator of same”. They
eventually found appellant’s hut and
planted nearby were the marijuana
plants. Accused argues that he was
questioned and later on forced by the
police officers to admit ownership of the
plants. On appeal, the accused
questions the validity of the search and
arrest. The Court held that the
extrajudicial confession made by the
accused cannot be admissible as
evidence, citing the doctrine stated
above.
FACTS:
• For automatic review is the
decision by the RTC of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya. It found appellant Abe
Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as
amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death
by lethal injection. In the Information,
appellant was charged, saying that he
was caught in flagrante delicto planting
7 fully grown marijuana plants.
• He was weeding his vegetable
farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called
by a person whose identity he does not
know. He was asked to go with the
latter to “see something.” This unknown
person then brought appellant to the
place where the marijuana plants were
found, approximately 100 meters away
from his nipa hut. Five armed
policemen were present and they made
him stand in front of the hemp plants.
He was then asked if he knew anything
about the marijuana growing there.
When he denied any knowledge
thereof, a police officer poked a fist at
him and told him to admit ownership of
the plants. Appellant was so nervous
and afraid that he admitted owning the
marijuana.
• The police then took a photo of
him standing in front of one of the
marijuana plants. He was then made to
uproot five of the cannabis plants, and
bring them to his hut, where another
photo was taken of him standing next to
a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants.
The police team then brought him to the
police station at Villaverde. On the way,
a barangay peace officer of Barangay
Sawmill, accompanied the police
officers. Said officer who bore a grudge
against him because of his refusal to
participate in the former’s illegal logging
activities, threatened him to admit
owning the marijuana, otherwise he
would “be put in a bad situation.” At the
police headquarters, appellant
reiterated that he knew nothing about
the marijuana plants seized by the
police.
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial
confession made by the appellant may
be relied upon by the Court
RULING: NO
• In the instant case, a tipster had
furnished the police with appellant’s
name as well as the location of
appellant’s farm, where the marijuana
plants were allegedly being grown.
While the police operation was
supposedly meant to merely “verify”
said information, the police chief had
likewise issued instructions to arrest
appellant as a suspected marijuana
cultivator. Thus, at the time the police
talked to appellant in his farm, the latter
was already under investigation as a
suspect. The questioning by the police
was no longer a general inquiry.
• In trying to elicit information
from appellant, the police was already
investigating appellant as a suspect. At
this point, he was already under
custodial investigation and had a right
to counsel even if he had not yet been
arrested. Custodial investigation is
“questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.”
• Moreover, we find appellant’s
extrajudicial confession flawed with
respect to its admissibility. For a
confession to be admissible, it must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it
must be voluntary; (2) it must be made
with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be
express; and (4) it must be in writing.
• The records show that the
admission by appellant was verbal. It
was also uncounselled. A verbal
admission allegedly made by an
accused during the investigation,
without the assistance of counsel at the
time of his arrest and even before his
formal investigation is not only
inadmissible for being violative of the
right to counsel during criminal
investigations, it is also hearsay. Even
if the confession or admission were
“gospel truth,” if it was made without
assistance of counsel and without a
valid waiver of such assistance, the
confession is inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion
or even if it had been voluntarily given.
• Decision REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant ACQUITTED.
206 People v Rodriguez
FACTS:
● A messenger discovered the
lifeless body of the bank security guard
Matias, inside the bank premises.
● The police learned that there
was an on-going construction on the
upper floors of the bank, and that
appellant and his co-accused had
access to the bank after office hours.
● The police went to see
Rodriguez who was working on the
construction site and noticed blood
stains on his shirt and pants.
● The police then arrested
Rodriguez and Artellero and brought
them to the police station for
interrogation.
● 4 days after the arrest,
Rodriguez executed a sworn statement
confessing that he and appellant
together with one Rading Mendoza,
and two other men whose names he did
not know, killed Matias. Rodriguez was
assisted by Atty. Procopio Lao III, of the
Public Attorneys Office.
● After, trial the 2 accused were
found guilty.
● On appeal, the OSG points out
that the prosecution failed to prove the
existence of a conspiracy between
appellant and Rodriguez independent
of the extrajudicial confession of the
latter.
ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial
confession of accused Rodriguez is
admissible not only against him but also
against appellant.
HELD:
● SC finds that Rodriguez’s
confession is constitutionally flawed so
that it could not be used as evidence
against them at all.
● The four fundamental requisites
for the admissibility of a confession are
(1) the confession must be voluntary;
(2) the confession must be made with
the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) the
confession must be express; and (4)
the confession must be in writing.
● The moment accused and
appellant were arrested and brought to
the police station, they were already
under custodial investigation.
● Custodial investigation refers to
the critical pre-trial stage when the
investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular person
as a suspect.
● When Rodriguez and appellant
were arrested by they were already the
suspects in the slaying of the security
guard, Ramon Matias, and should have
been afforded the rights guaranteed by
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution, particularly the right to
counsel. They were not provided with
competent and independent counsel
during the custodial investigation prior
to the execution of the extrajudicial
confession.
● The extrajudicial confession
executed by Rodriguez was given in
violation of Art. III, Sec. 12 of the 1987
Constitution, we hold that Rodriguezs
confession is inadmissible, and it was
error for the trial court to use it in
convicting Rodriguez and appellant.
207 People v Del Rosario
FACTS
Del Rosario was found guilty by the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan as
a co-principal in the crime of Robbery
with Homicide and sentenced him to
death. He and 3 other men were
charged with the special complex crime
for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66
year old business woman, of P 200k in
cash and jewelry and on the occasion
thereof shot and killed her. Del Rosario
was a tricycle driver parked near the
scene. One of the accused took the bag
and brought it to the tricycle of Del
Rosario and someone inside received
the bag. Del Rosario then sped away.
When the authorities found the name of
the owner of the tricycle, they
proceeded to Bakod Bayan to the
owner’s house. The owner revealed
that the driver was Del Rosario. Del
Rosario was “invited for interview”. He
volunteered to name his passengers.
He also informed the policemen of the
bag’s location and where the hold-
uppers may be found. When they were
at Brgy Dicarma (hold-uppers’
location), there was a shoot-out and
one of the accused died. Del Rosario
was then arrested and detained. He
executed a waiver of his detention. His
Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with
the assistance of a former judge.
The case was for automatic review.
ISSUES
WON Del Rosario’s Miranda rights
were violated – YES, the “invitation” for
interview was already considered as
custodial investigation. His verbal
admissions were thus inadmissible
against him.
A further perusal of the transcript
reveals that during the encounter at
Brgy. Dicarma, del Rosario was
handcuffed by the police because
allegedly they had already gathered
enough evidence against him and they
were afraid that he might attempt to
escape.
Custodial investigation is the stage
where the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect taken into
custody by the police who carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself
to elicit incriminating statements. It is
well-settled that it encompasses any
question initiated by law enforcers after
a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. This
concept of custodial investigation has
been broadened by RA 7438 to include
"the Practice of issuing an 'invitation' to
a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed." Section
2 of the same Act further provides that
–
x x x x Any public officer or employee,
or anyone acting under his order or in
his place, who arrests, detains or
investigates any person for the
commission of an offense shall inform
the latter, in a language known and
understood by him of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his
own choice, who shall at all times be
allowed to confer privately with the
person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation. If such person
cannot afford the services of his own
counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by
the investigating officer.
ITC, it is clear that del Rosario was
deprived of his rights during custodial
investigation. From the time he was
"invited" for questioning at the house of
the barangay captain, he was already
under effective custodial investigation,
but he was not apprised nor made
aware thereof by the investigating
officers. The police already knew the
name of the tricycle driver and the latter
was already a suspect in the robbing
and senseless slaying of Virginia
Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to
establish that del Rosario had waived
his right to remain silent, his verbal
admissions on his participation in the
crime even before his actual arrest
were inadmissible against him, as the
same transgressed the safeguards
provided by law and the Bill of Rights.
>Del Rosario was also unlawfully
arrested. See Sec 5 of Rule 113. He
was only arrested during the raid (shoot
out) at Brgy Dicarma. He was not
caught in flagrante delicto nor did his
case fall under any of the
circumstances in Sec 5. Thus, his arrest
was outside the purview of the rule.
RTC decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accused is
ACQUITTED.
208 People v Guting
FACTS:
• An Information for Parricide was
filed against Adrian Guting, for killing
his father. He pleaded not guilty.
• PO1 Torre testified that he and
PO1 Macusi were standing in front of
the police station when Guting, with a
bladed weapon in his hand, suddenly
approached them and told them that he
stabbed his father.
o Adrian Guting first proclaimed
that his father was already dead.
Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi asked who
killed Guting’s father, to which Guting
answered “Sinaksak ko po yong tatay
ko! Napatay ko na po”
• RTC found Guting guilty of
Parricide, based on his verbal
admission that he killed his father. CA
affirmed his conviction.
• Hence, this instant appeal
before the SC.
o Guting argues that his oral
confession to PO1 Torre and PO1
Macusi, without the assistance of
counsel, is inadmissible in evidence for
violating his constitutional right (Article
III, Section 12)
ISSUE:
WON the verbal admission of Guting is
inadmissible — NO
RATIO:
• The “investigation” in Section
12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution pertains to custodial
investigation.
o Custodial investigation
commences when a person is taken
into custody and is singled out as a
suspect in the commission of a crime
under investigation and the police
officers begin to ask questions on the
suspect’s participation therein and
which tend to elicit an admission.
o As held in People v. Marra,
custodial investigation happens when
the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unresolved crime and
begins to focus on a particular suspect.
• In the case at bar, Guting was
not under custodial investigation when
he admitted without assistance of
counsel to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi
that he stabbed his father to death. It
was spontaneously and voluntarily
given by the accused, without any
questioning performed by the police
officers.
o Guting cites the case of People
v. Cabintoy to support his claim. But the
said case involves a different set of
facts, because the accused there were
already suspects under custodial
investigation when they executed their
extrajudicial confessions without
assistance of counsel.
o In the case at bar, Guting was
arrested and subjected to custodial
investigation after his confession.
• As held in People v. Andan,
constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities,
but given in an ordinary manner,
whereby appellant orally admitted
having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions.
• Guting’s verbal confession falls
under Rule 130, Sec. 26: The act,
declaration or omission of a party as to
a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him
o Three requisites must concur in
order for a declaration to be deemed
part of the res gestae:
(1) The principal act, the res
gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(2) The statements were made
before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and
(3) The statements concern the
occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
• The confession was also
corroborated by circumstantial
evidence.
• Thus, the SC affirmed Guting’s
conviction.
209 Babst v NIB
FACTS:
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION WITH
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO
REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
In 1980, petitioners (columnists,
writers, and reporters of local
publications) were allegedly summoned
on different dates by military authorities
who have subjected them to sustained
interrogation on various aspects of their
work, personal, and private lives. In the
letters received by them, there is a
clause which reads that their “failure to
appear on the specific date and place
shall be considered as a waiver on
[their] part and this Committee will be
constrained to proceed in accordance
with law.”
Aside from the interrogations, a criminal
complaint for libel was also filed before
the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila by
Brig. Gen. Tadiar Jr. against two of the
petitioners for writing an article on the
interrogation by respondents in 1982.
Complaint included a P10M claim for
damages.
Petitioner argues:
- Respondents have no
jurisdiction over the proceedings which
are violative of the constitutional
guarantee on free expression
- Filing of libel had intent to
intimidate based on illegally obtained
evidence

Respondent argues:
- No issue of jurisdiction exists
since they do not pretend to exercise
jurisdiction over petitioners; there were
no subpoenas nor summonses issued,
but mere invitations to dialogues which
were completely voluntary and without
any compulsion.
- No cause of action against
Board because Tadiar is not member of
Board and it was filed in his personal
capacity
ISSUE: W/N the letters of invitation,
subsequent interrogation, and filing of
libel suit illegal and unconstitutional?
NO
*BUT PETITION IS ALREADY MOOT
because the interrogations have
already been ordered terminated by
General Fabian as Director General
and Chairman of NIB. (But the Court
still discussed the issues)
RATIO:
1. RE: LETTER OF INVITATION
(relevant)
Ordinarily, an invitation to attend a
hearing and answer some questions,
which the person invited may heed or
refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or
constitutionally objectionable. Under
certain circumstances, however, such
an invitation can easily assume a
different appearance, such as in this
case where
• Invitation comes from a the prosecution, on the same night the
powerful group of military officers
• At a time when country is in
martial law
• Privilege of WOHC suspended
• Designated interrogation site is
a military camp
• Last clause of the letter contains
an ominous warning
the same can easily be taken not as a
strictly voluntary invitation but as an
authoritative command which one can
only defy at his peril. Fortunately, the
NIB Director General and Chairman
saw the wisdom of terminating the
proceedings and the unwelcome
interrogation.
2. RE: LIBEL (not relevant but
lagay ko na rin)
Prohibition will not issue because first,
the libel cases are not pending before
respondent NIB or any other
respondent; second, the issue of
validity of libel is a matter that should be
raised in the proper forum; third, Tadiar
has filed the libel case in his personal
capacity and is not even a member of
NIB, hence NIB does not have anything
to do with Tadiar’s private right to
complain for libel.
PETITION DISMISSED.
210 People v Muleta
FACTS
RTC found the accused guilty of rape
with homicide for raping and killing his
niece and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua. This finding was based on
circumstantial evidence and his
extrajudicial confession. According to
offense took place, the accused did not
go home to his house in Tondo, Manila.
Also, he was familiar with the place in
Malolos, Bulacan where the crime
occurred. During the wake of his niece,
he also made comments like went wild
and hysterical and uttered these words:
"Patawarin mo ako Charito, ikaw kasi
lumaban pa, nakakahiya ako, mabuti
pang mamatay na.” The RTC gave
credence to these as well as the sworn
statement executed by the accused
contains details of the manner in which
the crime was committed which only he
could have known.
According to the RTC, it admitted the
extrajudicial confession as evidence
because the presumption that it was
made voluntarily was not overcome.
Also, in making the confession, the
accused was accused was assisted by
Atty. Deborah Daquis who even signed
the statement; that before accused
made his extrajudicial confession he
was first asked if he was amenable to
the services of Atty. Daquis to which
query he answered affirmatively.
Finally, while accused recited a litany of
alleged acts of maltreatment, no
medical certificate had been shown to
prove that he did suffer inhuman
treatment.
ISSUE: WoN the RTC correctly
admitted the extrajudicial confession as
evidence NO
RATIO:
• To be acceptable, extrajudicial
confessions must conform to
constitutional requirements. A communication
confession is not valid and not
admissible in evidence when it is
obtained in violation of any of the
following rights of persons under
custodial investigation: to remain silent,
to have independent and competent
counsel preferably of their own choice,
to be provided with counsel if they are
unable to secure one, to be assisted by
such counsel during the investigation,
to have such counsel present when
they decide to waive these rights, and
to be informed of all these rights and of
the fact that anything they say can and
will be used against them in court.
o If the extrajudicial confession
satisfies these constitutional standards,
it is subsequently tested for
voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely
— without coercion, intimidation,
inducement, or false promises; and
credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with
the normal experience of mankind.
o A confession that meets all the
foregoing requisites constitutes
evidence of a high order because no
person of normal mind will knowingly
and deliberately confess to be the
perpetrator of a crime unless prompted
by truth and conscience. Otherwise, it is
disregarded in accordance with the cold
objectivity of the exclusionary rule
• IN THIS CASE, flagrantly
violated were the appellant's right to be
informed of his rights under custodial
investigation, his right to counsel, as
well as his right to have said counsel
present during the waiver of his rights
under custodial investigation.
On the right to be apprised of
constitutional rights
• The right to be informed of one's
constitutional rights during custodial
investigation refers to an effective
between the
investigating officer and the suspected
individual, with the purpose of making
the latter understand these rights.
Understanding would mean that the
information transmitted was effectively
received and comprehended. Hence,
the Constitution does not merely
require the investigating officers to
"inform" the person under investigation;
rather, it requires that the latter be
"informed."
• IN THIS CASE, what happened
was a superficial reading of the rights of
the accused, without the slightest
consideration of whether he understood
what was read to him. It just followed a
legal form or model with the words
“opo” automatically typed by the police
investigator. It does not create an
impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the
accused. The showing of a •
spontaneous, free and unconstrained
giving up of a right is missing.
On the right to counsel
• the purported sworn statement
of the appellant was prepared prior to
the arrival of his NBI-procured counsel.
It was executed and completed on
September 19, 1993, while Atty. Daquiz
arrived only the following day,
September 20, 1993. Thus, when the
appellant executed and completed his
purported extrajudicial confession on
September 19, 1993, he was not
assisted by counsel.
• When accused was “invited” by
NBI agent Tolentino in Mindoro to the
NBI office in Manila, it was in reality a
custodial investigation targeting the
accused for the purpose of procuring a
confession. Domingo Muleta should
have been accorded the right to
counsel (and all the constitutional rights
of the accused), from the time that he
was brought to the NBI office in Manila.
On the waiver of the rights
• appellant exercised no
satisfactory waiver of his rights. As
stated in our earlier discussions, since
he was not assisted by a lawyer when
the waiver was made, there was no
valid waiver to speak of.
• After Atty. Daquiz was allegedly
called to assist the appellant, she
posited this question: "Gusto mo bang
talikdan ang iyong mga karapatan na
ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating
Konstitusyon?" To this appellant
replied: "Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon
dahil gusto ko nang ipagtapat ang
pangyayari kay CHARITO DELGADO
na pamangkin ko."
Such waiver failed to show his
understanding of his rights, his waiver
of those rights, and the implications of
his waiver. The waiver, in order to be
valid, should have been in a language
that clearly manifested his desire to do
so. The part of the sworn statement in
which the accused "waived" his rights
referred to them as "mga karapatan na
ibinigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon"
and "iyon" — words that were utterly
vague and insufficient to satisfy the
Constitutional requirements.
• Moreover, Atty. Daquiz raised
only one question: whether appellant
would like to waive his rights. This was
odd, because she had been called to
assist appellant in making his
confession, not his waiver. Atty. Daquiz
made no effort to determine whether
the accused was treated well, or the
understood his rights.
RULING: PETITIONER ACQUITTED
(the circumstantial evidence were also
not enough to convict him)
211 People v Tan
• The lifeless body of tricycle
driver Freddie Saavedra was found
sprawled on the ground with fourteen
stab wounds in different parts of his
body
• Relying on the information that
an abandoned sidecar of a tricycle was
sighted, the police proceeded to the
scene of the crime and recovered a
blue sidecar which they brought back
with them to their headquarters.
Subsequently, they invited Tan in
connection with the instant case and
with respect to two other robbery cases
reported in Lucena City. During their
conversation, Tan allegedly gave an
explicit account of what actually
transpired in the case at bar. He
narrated that he and co-accused Amido
were responsible for the loss of the
motorcycle and the consequent death
of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that
they sold the motorcycle and left behind
the sidecar.
• When Tan was invited to the
police station, there was no warrant for
his arrest. However, he was informed
that he was a suspect, not only in the
instant case, but also in two other
robbery cases allegedly committed in
Lucena City. The investigation officer
thought that they were merely
conversing inside the police station;
hence, he did not inform Tan of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and
to the assistance of counsel; nor did he
reduce the supposed confession to
writing
• Trial court convicted Tan of
highway robbery with murder and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: WoN the RTC correctly
admitted the extrajudicial confession as
evidence NO
RATIO:
• Custodial investigation shall
include the practice of issuing an
invitation to a person who is
investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have
committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the inviting officer for any
violation of law. It involves any
questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person
is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. The rules on
custodial investigation begin to operate
as soon as the investigation ceases to
be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and begins to focus a particular
suspect, the suspect is taken into
custody, and the police carries out a
process of interrogations that tends
itself to eliciting incriminating
statements that the rule begins to
operate
• Furthermore, not only does the
fundamental law impose, as a requisite
function of the investigating officer, the
duty to explain those rights to the
accused but also that there must
correspondingly be a meaningful
communication to and understanding
thereof by the accused. A mere
perfunctory reading by the constable of
such rights to the accused would thus
not suffice
• Under the Constitution and
existing law and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible must
satisfy the following requirements:
1. it must be voluntary
2. it must be made with the
assistance of competent and
independent counsel
3. it must be express
4. it must be in writing
• While the Constitution sanctions
the waiver of the right to counsel, it
must, however, be voluntary, knowing
and intelligent, and must be made in the
presence and with the assistance of
counsel
• any statement obtained in
violation of the constitution, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or
in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. Even if the confession
contains a grain of truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it
becomes inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion
or even if it had been voluntarily given.
• The records of this case do not
indicate that appellant was assisted by
counsel when he made such waiver
• The evidence for the
prosecution shows that when appellant
was invited for questioning at the police
headquarters, he allegedly admitted his
participation in the crime. This will not
suffice to convict him, however, of said
crime. The constitutional rights of
appellant, particularly the right to
remain silent and to counsel, are
impregnable from the moment he is
investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have
committed, even if the same be initiated
by mere invitation. This Court values
liberty and will always insist on the
observance of basic constitutional
rights as a condition sine qua non
against the awesome investigative and
prosecutory powers of government
RULING: PETITIONER ACQUITTED
(the remaining evidence were also not
enough to convict him)
b. Duty of police during custodial
investigation; procedure
Constitution, Art III, Sec 12
RA 7438, Sec 2 (b)(c)(d)
212 Miranda v Arizona
213 People v Obrero
214 People v Duero
Cf 215 People v Ordono
2. Rights involved and consequences
of violation
a. Rights involved
CONSTITUTION
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
RA 7438
Section 2. Rights of Persons
Arrested, Detained or Under
Custodial Investigation; Duties of
Public Officers.–
(a) Any person arrested detained or
under custodial investigation shall at
all times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or
anyone acting under his order or his
place, who arrests, detains or
investigates any person for the
commission of an offense shall
inform the latter, in a language known
to and understood by him, of his
rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who
shall at all times be allowed to confer
privately with the person arrested,
detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot
afford the services of his own
counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel
by the investigating officer.lawphi1Ÿ
(c) The custodial investigation report
shall be reduced to writing by the
investigating officer, provided that
before such report is signed, or
thumbmarked if the person arrested
or detained does not know how to
read and write, it shall be read and
adequately explained to him by his
counsel or by the assisting counsel
provided by the investigating officer
in the language or dialect known to
such arrested or detained person,
otherwise, such investigation report
shall be null and void and of no effect
whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession
made by a person arrested, detained
or under custodial investigation shall
be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel
or in the latter's absence, upon a
valid waiver, and in the presence of
any of the parents, elder brothers and
sisters, his spouse, the municipal
mayor, the municipal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel as chosen by
him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as
evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested
or detained under the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, or under custodial
investigation, shall be in writing and
signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel; otherwise
the waiver shall be null and void and
of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or
under custodial investigation shall be
allowed visits by or conferences with
any member of his immediate family,
or any medical doctor or priest or
religious minister chosen by him or
by any member of his immediate
family or by his counsel, or by any
national non-governmental
organization duly accredited by the
Commission on Human Rights of by
any international non-governmental
organization duly accredited by the
Office of the President. The person's
"immediate family" shall include his
or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée,
parent or child, brother or sister,
grandparent or grandchild, uncle or
aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian
or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial
investigation" shall include the
practice of issuing an "invitation" to a
person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the
"inviting" officer for any violation of
law.
216 People v Obrero
This is an appeal from the RTC decision
finding Jimmy Obrero guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide.
Only Obrero had been apprehended.
His co-accused has been at large.
When arraigned, Obrero pleaded not
guilty, whereupon, trial ensued.
Angie Cabosas (Obrera’s employer)
received a call from Emma that
informing Angie that her house had
been robbed and her 2 maids killed.
When Pat. Ines and his group received
information that Obrera was in
Pangasinan, they went to place and
apprehended Obrero whom they
brought to Manila. He was positively
identified by a witness who saw him
running down the stairs with blood in his
hands.
On the same day, Obrero gave a
confession in writing with the
assistance of counsel, Atty. Bienvenido
De los Reyes, in which he admitte
participation in the killing. Pat. Ines
himself executed an affidavit stating the
circumstances of Obrera’s arrest.
Obrera refused to sign the booking and
information sheet.
Obrera’s extrajudicial confession was
presented in evidence. It was in
Tagalog and signed by Obrera in the
presence of Atty. De los Reyes.
Atty De los Reyes happened to be at
Station 7 of WPD, representing a client
when he was asked to assist Obrero in
executing an extrajudicial confession.
He apprised Obrero of his constitutional
rights, explaining to him that any
statement made by him could be used
against him in court, but Obrero said he
was willing to give a statement as in fact
he did, confessing to the commission of
the crime of robbery with homicide.
Obrero denied participation in the
crime. He claimed that he was arrested
without a warrant and after being
informed of the charges against him, he
was beaten and detained and made to
execute an extrajudicial confession
which he signed because he does not
know how to read.
WON the confession is
inadmissible? YES
What renders the confession of Obrera
inadmissible is the fact that he was not
given the Miranda warnings effectively.
Under the Constitution, an uncounseled
statement is presumed to be
psychologically coerced. Swept into an
unfamiliar environment and surrounded
by intimidating figures typical of the
atmosphere of police interrogation, the
suspect really needs the guiding hand
of counsel.
Under the Art. III, Sec 12(1), it is
required that the suspect in custodial
interrogation must be given the
following warnings:
(1) He must be informed of his right to
remain silent;
(2) he must be warned that anything he
says can and will be used against him;
and
(3) he must be told that he has a right
to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a
lawyer will be appointed to represent
him.
There was thus only a perfunctory
reading of the Miranda rights to Obrera
without any effort to find out from him
whether he wanted to have counsel
and, if so, whether he had his own
counsel or he wanted the police to
appoint one for him. This kind of giving
of warnings has been found to be
merely ceremonial and inadequate to
transmit meaningful information to the
suspect. Especially in this case, care
should have been scrupulously
observed by the police investigator that
he was specifically asked these
questions considering that he only
finished the fourth grade of the
elementary school.
Moreover, Art. III, §12(1) requires that
counsel assisting suspects in custodial
interrogations be competent and
independent.
Obrera was assisted by Atty. De los
Reyes, who, though presumably
competent, cannot be considered an
"independent counsel" as
contemplated by the law for the reason
that he was station commander of the
WPD at the time he assisted accused-
appellant.
As observed in People v. Bandula, the
independent counsel required by Art.
III, Sec.12(1) cannot be:
-a special counsel
-public or private prosecutor
-municipal attorney
-counsel of the police whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused.
In this case, Atty. De los Reyes, as PC
Captain and Station Commander of the
WPD, was part of the police force who
could not be expected to have
effectively and scrupulously assisted
accused-appellant in the investigation,
his claim to the contrary
notwithstanding. To allow such a
happenstance would render illusory the
protection given to the suspect during
custodial investigation.
For these reasons, we hold that
Obrero’s extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence.
b. Consequences of violation
Constitution
Section 12(3) Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this
or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
RA 7438, Sec 4
Section 4. Penalty Clause. – (a)
Any arresting public officer or
employee, or any investigating
officer, who fails to inform any person
arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of
his own choice, shall suffer a fine of
Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a
penalty of imprisonment of not less
than eight (8) years but not more than
ten (10) years, or both. The penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification
shall also be imposed upon the
investigating officer who has been
previously convicted of a similar
offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed
upon a public officer or employee, or
anyone acting upon orders of such
investigating officer or in his place,
who fails to provide a competent and
independent counsel to a person
 arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation for the commission of
an offense if the latter cannot afford
the services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs,
prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any
member of the immediate family of a
person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation, or any
medical doctor or priest or religious
minister chosen by him or by any
member of his immediate family or by
his counsel, from visiting and
conferring privately with him, or from
examining and treating him, or from
ministering to his spiritual needs, at
any hour of the day or, in urgent
cases, of the night shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less
than four (4) years nor more than six
(6) years, and a fine of four thousand
pesos (P4,000.00).lawphi1©
The provisions of the above Section
notwithstanding, any security officer
with custodial responsibility over any
detainee or prisoner may undertake
such reasonable measures as may
be necessary to secure his safety
and prevent his escape.
Cf. 225 People v Bacor
226 People v Quidato Jr.
b. counsel of choice during custodial
investigation
227 People v Obrero
228 People Labtan
229 People v Samolde
230 People v Gallardo
c. compliance with requirement to
inform person detained of rights
231 People v Manriquez
232 People v Sapal
233 People v Jara
234 People v Nicandro
235 People v Continente
d. Police line-up
236 Gamboa v Cruz
237 United Sates v Wade
238 People v Pavillare
239 People v Escordial

217 Harris v New York

218 New York v Quarles
219 People v Duero
220 People v Figueroa
221 Gumabon v Director of Prisons

3. Specific requirements in case law

a. waiver of right to counsel

222 People v Caguioa

223 People v Galit
224 People v Continente
FINALS
VII. BAIL
A. Nature and Definition
a. Definition; persons covered or
required to post bail
Rule 114
Sec 1 Bail defined. - Bail is the
security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, to
guarantee his appearance before
any court as required under the
conditions hereinafter specified. Bail
may be given in the form of corporate
surety, property bond, cash deposit
or recognizance.
Sec 3 No release or transfer except
on court order or bail - No person
under detention by legal process
shall be released or transferred
except upon order of the court or
when he is admitted to bail.
Purpose of bail: to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial
- not intended to cover the civil liability
of the accused in the same criminal
case
-money deposited as bail: may be
applied to the payment of fines and
costs while the excess, if any, shall be
returned to the accused or to whoever
made the deposit
- question of granting bail to the
accused is but an aspect of the criminal
action, preventing him from eluding
punishment in the event of conviction
- no impact on the civil liability
Defensor-Santiago v Vasquez
Information was filed against
People v Manalo
People v Hu Ruey Chun
Enrile v Sandiganbayan
2. Nature
a. matter of right
Constitution Art. III, Sec 13
Sec 13. All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.
Rule 114
Sec 4. Bail, a matter of right;
exception. - All persons in custody
shall be admitted to bail as a matter
of right, with sufficient sureties, or
released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule
(a) before or after conviction by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, and
(b) before conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment.
Guidelines for Decongesting Holding
Jails by Enforcing Rights of the
Accused Persons to Bail and to Speedy
Trial
 RJCL, Sec. 15 & 16
Sec 15. Recognizance. – Before
final conviction, all juveniles charged
with offenses falling under the
Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure shall be released on
recognizance to the custody of their
parents or other suitable person who
shall be responsible for the juveniles’
appearance in court whenever
required.
Sec 16. When Bail a Matter of
Right. – All juveniles in conflict with
the law shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right before final conviction
of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.
In the event the juvenile cannot post
bail for lack of financial resources,
the Family Court shall commit the
juvenile pursuant to Section 18 of this
Rule.
However, where the juvenile does
not pose a threat to public safety, the
Family Court may, motu proprio or
upon motion and recommendation of
the DSWD, release the juvenile on
recognizance to the custody of his
parents or other responsible person.
People v. Donato
Jimenez v. Sorongon
Special Issues
Arraignment not pre-requisite to bail
Lavides v. Court of Appeals
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan
Can an accused charged with a non-
bailable offense not be detained in
jail?
People v. Judge Maceda
Can an accused charged with a non-
bailable offense be released without
the requisite bail hearing?
Ocampo v. Abando
Can an accused post bond even if
the court has not issued a warrant of
arrest?
Redondo v. Judge Dimaano, 71 SCRA
543 (1976), read concurring opinion
of J. Barredo
Enrile v. Sandiganbayan
Can an accused post bail even if he
has not been charged in court?
Ruiz v. Beldia
Jorda v. Judge Bitas
b. Discretionary
Constitution Art. III, Sec 13
Sec 13. All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.
Rule 114, Secs. 5,6,7,8 & 24
Sec 5. Bail, when discretionary -
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for
bail may be filed and acted upon by
the trial court despite the filing of a
notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting
the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to
bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed with and resolved by the
appellate court.
Should the court grant the
application, the accused may be
allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the
appeal under the same bail subject to
the consent of the bondman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial
court is imprisonment exceeding 6
years, the accused shall be denied
bail, or his bail shall be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-
recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped
from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense
while under probation, parole, or
conditional parole;
(d) That the circumstances of his
case indicate the probability of flight
if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he
may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal
The appellate court may, moto
proprio or on motion of any party,
review the resolution of the Regional
Trial Court after notice to the adverse
party in either case.
Sec 6 Capital offense defined. - A
capital offense is an offense which,
under the law existing at the time of
its commission and of the application
for admission to bail, may be
punished with death.
Sec 7 Capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, not bailable -
No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
Sec 8 Burden of proof in bail
application. - At the hearing of an
application for bail filed by a person
who is in custody for the commission
of an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, the prosecution has
the burden of showing that evidence
of guilt is strong. The evidence
 presented during the bail hearing
shall be considered automatically See also Interim Bail
reproduced at the trial but, upon
motion of either party, the court may
recall any witness for additional
examination unless the latter is dead,
outside the Philippines, or otherwise
unable to testify.

Sec 24. No bail after final

judgment; exception - No bail shall
be allowed after a judgment of
conviction has become final. If before
such finality, the accused applies for
probation, he may be allowed
temporary liberty under his bail.
When no bail was filed or the
accused is incapable of filing one the
court may allow his release on
recognizance to the custody of a
responsible member of the
community. In no case shall bail be
allowed after the accused has
commenced to serve sentence.

RJCL, Sec. 17
Sec 17. When Bail Not A Matter of
Right. – No juvenile charged with an
offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong.

Pareja v. Gomez
People v. San Diego
People v. Cabral
Santos v. How
Qui v. People

Cf. Duties of Judge

Cortes v. Catral
People v. Tuppal