Jacinto vs.

People

G.R. No. 162540

July 13, 2009

FACTS:

Baby Aquino handed petitioner Jacinto with a postdated BDO Check in the amount of P10,000.00 as payment
for Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc. (petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam).
Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline
Capitle, the sister of petitioner. Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received
a phone call from Land Bank looking for Generoso Capitle to inform him that the BDO check deposited in his
account had been dishonored. Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia asking her to inform
Jacqueline Capitle about the bounced check. Valencia told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and invited
Ricablanca to join the scheme. Ricablanca, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph
Dyhengco.

Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam.
However, Baby Aquino had already paid Mega Foam in cash as replacement for the dishonored check.

Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the NBI and worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. With the
help of Ricablanca, petitioner and Valencia were arrested upon receiving the marked money. The NBI filed a
criminal case for qualified theft against the two. The RTC found the accused guilty of qualified theft. The CA
modified the judgment by reducing the sentence of Valencia and Capitle but Jaconto’s sentence remained.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of Impossible Crime.

RULING:

Yes. In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was
apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime
of qualified theft was actually produced. The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.

The requisites of an impossible crime are:

1. that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property;

2. that the act was done with evil intent; and

3. that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual.

In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime
against property. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value
thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check
being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The
thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.

There can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega
Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of
accomplishment in this case. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving
the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner
was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent
to gain.

Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto was found guilty of impossible crime.

People v. Kalalo

GR Nos. L-39303-39305

March 17, 2009

FACTS:

On November 10, 1932, the appellants, namely, Felipe Kalalo, Marcelo Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio
Ramos, were tried in the Court of First Instance of Batangas, together with Alejandro Garcia, Fausta
Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica in criminal cases Nos. 6858, 6859 and 6860, the first two for murder, and the
last for frustrated murder. Upon agreement of the parties said three cases were tried together and after the
presentation of their respective evidence, the said court acquitted Alejandro Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and
Alipia Abrenica, and sentenced the other appellants.

Prior to the commission of the three crimes, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo and Isabel Holgado, the latter being
the sister of one of the deceased, had a litigation over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Calumpang in
the municipality of San Luis, Batangas. Kalalo filed two complaints against the said woman in the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, alleging that he, Kalalo cultivated the land in question during 1931 and 1932 but that,
when harvest time came Isabela Holgado reaped all that had been planted thereon. Both complaints were
dismissed.

On October 1, 1932, Isabela Holgado and her brother Arcadio Holgado, one of the deceased, ordered the plowing of
the disputed land and employed several laborers for that purpose. Marcelo Kalalo, upon learning about it,
went to the place accompanied by his brothers and Felipa and Juan, his brother-in-law Gregorio Ramos and by
Alejandro Garcia. They were all armed with bolos and upon arriving at the place, they ordered the workers to stop.
Having been informed of the cause of the suspension of the work, Marcelino Panaligan, one of the deceased,
ordered the laborers to continue the work. At this point, Marcelo Kalalo approached Arcadio and the other
appellants approached Marcelino Panaligan and they all simultaneously struck with their bolos. Arcadio
Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan died instantly from the wounds received. After the two had fallen, Marcelo
Kalalo took the revolver that Marcelino Panaligan carried, and fired four shots at Hilarion Holgado who was then fleeing
from the scene in order to save his own life.

ISSUE:

1. WON the appellants are guilty of simple homicide in the first two cases

2. WON the appellants are guilty of murder in the third case

HELD:

Yes. It is true that under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines murder, the circumstance
of “abuse of superior strength”, if proven to have been presented, raises homicide to the category
of murder;but it is also to be borne in mind that the deceased were also armed, one of them with a bolo,and
the other with a revolver. The risk was even for the contending parties and their strength was almost
balanced because there is no doubt but that, under circumstances similar to those of the present case, a
revolver is as effective as, if not more than three bolos. For this reason, this court is of the opinion that the
acts established in cases Nos. 6858 and 6859, merely constitute two homicides.

No. As to the third case, the evidence shows that Marcelo fired four successive shots at Hilarion while the
latter was fleeing from the scene of the crime in order to be out of reach of the appellants and their
companions and save his own life. The fact that the said appellant, not having contended himself with firing only
once, fired said successive shots at Hilarion, added to the circumstance that immediately before doing so he and
his co-appellants had already killed Arcadio and Panaligan, cousin and brother-in-law, respectively, of the former,
shows that he was then bent on killing said Hilarion. He performed everything necessary on his pat to commit
the crime that he determined to commit but he failed by reason of causes independent of his will, either
because of his poor aim or because his intended victim succeeded in dodging the shots, none of which found
its mark.

Thus, acts committed by the said appellant Marcelo Kalalo constitute attempted homicide.
Valenzuela vs. People
G. R. No. 160188
June 21, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were spotted by Lorenzo Lago on an afternoon on May 19, 1994
outside a supermarket along North Edsa. Lago saw Valenzuela, wearing an I.D with “Receiving Dispatching Unit” label,
hauling push cart with cases of “Tide” detergent soap and unloaded them in the parking space were Calderon was
waiting. After five minutes, the petitioner emerged again with more cartons of the said brand of detergent soap.

After that, the two hailed a taxi and loaded the cartons inside the taxi then boarded in the vehicle. All acts were sighted
by Lago, hence, stopped the taxi and asked the two for the receipt of the merchandise, however, the two fled fast. Lago
made a warning shot to alert his fellow guards, causing the apprehension of the two and recovery of the stolen
merchandise.

The petitioner insists that he should be guilty of only frustrated theft and not of consummated theft.

Issue:

WON there is a crime of frustrated theft

Ruling:

No. As provided for in the Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of theft are as follows:

(1) that there be taking of personal property;

(2) that said property belongs to another;

(3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;

(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and

(5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

Hence, it is not necessary for the offender to freely dispose of the stolen property to be considered consummated theft.

Secondly, the court was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed in this case.
Intent to gain was present when he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for considerable
period of time – be able to drop these off at a parking lot and long enough to load in the taxicab. The court held
that unlawful taking is completed in this case, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of such.
“Unlawful taking” is most material in this respect – as unlawful taking means deprivation of one’s personal property
which produces the felony in its consummated stage. Moreover, without unlawful taking as the act of execution, the
offense could only be attempted theft, at the very least.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED in consideration with the Article 308 of the RPC stating that there can be no
frustrated stage in the crime of theft.
People vs. Lizada

G.R. Nos. 143468-71

January 24, 2003

FACTS:

Lizada was charged with 4 counts of qualified rape under 4 different occasions (August “First Case”,
November 5 “Second Case”, October 22 “Third Case”, and September 15 “Fourth Case” of 1998), with lewd
designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with the victim against
her will and consent.

EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION:

Rose Orillosa had 3 children, Analia, Jepsy, and Rossel. Orillosa after being separated to her husband, met
Lizada and lived together as husband and wife.

Sometime in 1996, Analia was in her room when Lizada entered, laid on top of her, removed her T-shirt and
underwear. Lizada then inserted his finger and then his penis in her vagina. She felt a sticky substance
coming out from his penis. Accused-appellant threatened to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did to
her. The incident lasted less than one hour. Petrified by the threats on her life, Analia kept to herself what
happened to her.

Sometime in August 1997, accused-appellant entered again the room of Analia, accused-appellant sexually
abused private complainant two times a week.

On November 5, 1998, Analia went into her room and lay down in bed. She did not lock the door of the room.
Lizada entered the room of Analia and removed her panty, inserted his finger and then inserted his penis into
her vagina. Momentarily, Rossel passed by the room and peeped through the door. He saw Lizada on top of
Analia. Lizada saw Rossel and dismounted. Lizada berated Rossel and ordered him to go to his room and
sleep.

On November 9, 1998, a heated argument ensued between Lizada and Analia. Rose sided with her paramour
and hit Analia. This prompted Analia to shout. "Ayoko na, ayoko na." When Rose inquired from her daughter
what she meant by her statement, "ayoko na, ayoko na," she told her mother that accusedappellant had
been touching the sensitive parts of her body. Rose was shocked and incensed.

Analia and her mother went to the Police Station where Analia gave her Affidavit-Complaint. Analia was also
examined by the medico-legal officer. The following is the conclusion made by the officer:

1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of
examination.
2. Hymen, intact and its orifice small (1.5 cms. in diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by an
averagesized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury.

DEFENSES AND EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED:

Lizada denied any allegations and claimed that Rose actually coached her children to testify against him
because Rose wanted to manage their business and take control of all the properties they acquired during
their coverture. Also, Rose was so exasperated because he had no job.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the information was defective because the date of the offense “on or about August 1988” is too
indefinite
2. W/N Lizada is guilty of attempted rape, as amended in relation to the last paragraph of Article
6 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. W/N Lizada is guilty beyond reasonable doubt and also W/N Lizada is guilty of qualified rape.

HELD:

1. NO.
2. Attempted Rape.
3. YES. NO, 2 counts of simple rape.

Summary:
First Criminal Case: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape.
Second Criminal Case: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape.
Third and Fourth Criminal Case: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 2 counts of simple rape.

FIRST CRIMINAL CASE: SIMPLE RAPE

Lizada avers that the Information for this Case is defective because the date of the offense "on or about
August 1998" alleged therein is too indefinite, in violation of Rule 110, Section 11 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure which reads:

"Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. — It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information
the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The
offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
commission.”

Lizada further asserts that the prosecution failed to proved that he raped Analia in August 1988. The OSG
argued that that the date "on or about August 1998" is sufficiently definite. After all, the date of the
commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. Failure to specify the exact dates
or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason
is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The
gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as
near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient.

SECOND CRIMINAL CASE: ATTEMPTED RAPE

Lizada avers that he is not liable for rape. His contention is correct. The collective testimony of Analia and her
younger brother Rossel was that on November 5, 1998, Lizada went on top of her, removed her panty,
mashed her breasts and touched her sex organ. In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no
introduction of the penis of Lizada into the vagina of private complainant. Hence, Lizada is not criminally
liable for consummated rape.

In light of the evidence on record, we believe that Lizada is guilty of attempted rape and not of acts of
lasciviousness. Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

"Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness. — Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other
persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished
by prision correccional."

For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence
of the following essential elements:
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness.
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a) By using force or intimidation; or
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c) When the offended party is under 12 years of age.

"Lewd" is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has
relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.

The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

"There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance."

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous
desistance.

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.

Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from preparatory acts which
consist of devising means or measures necessary for accomplishment of a desired object or end. One
perpetrating preparatory acts is not guilty of an attempt to commit a felony. However, if the preparatory acts
constitute a consummated felony under the law, the malefactor is guilty of such consummated offense. It
must be borne in mind, however, that the spontaneous desistance of a malefactor exempts him from criminal
liability for the intended crime but it does not exempt him from the crime committed by him before his
desistance.

In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that Lizada intended to have carnal knowledge
of private complainant. The overt acts of Lizada proven by the prosecution were not mere preparatory acts.
By the series of his overt acts, Lizada had commenced the execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous
desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although Lizada desisted from performing all the acts of
execution, his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the sudden and
unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, Lizada is guilty of attempted rape.

THIRD AND FOURTH CRIMINAL CASES: 2 counts of SIMPLE RAPE

Lizada avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The physical evidence
belies Analia’s claim of having been deflowered by Lizada on four different occasions. The contention of
Lizada, however, does not persuade the Court. Whether or not the hymen of private complainant was still
intact has no substantial bearing on Lizada's commission of the crime. Even, the slightest penetration of the
labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the penis into the aperture constitutes consummated rape. It
is sufficient that there be entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum.

SC agree with Lizada, however, that he is guilty only of 2 counts of simple rape, instead of qualified rape. The
evidence on record shows that Lizada is the commonlaw husband of Rose, the mother of private complainant,
Analia. As of October 1998, Analia was still 13 years old, and under Article 335 as amended by Republic Act
7659, the minority of the private complainant, concurring with the fact that accused-appellant is the
common-law husband of the victim's mother, is a special qualifying circumstance warranting the imposition
of the death penalty. However, said circumstance was not alleged in the Informations as required by Section
8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which was given retroactive effect by this Court
because it is favorable to the accused. Hence, even if the prosecution proved the special qualifying
circumstance of minority of private complainant and relationship, the Lizada being the common-law husband
of her mother, Lizada is guilty only of simple rape.