LANSANG VS GARCIA
Now the Court resolves after conclusive
Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal
Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda,
Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections
scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the
platform where said candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were
killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the President
suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a
conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political
power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who
have been arrested without a warrant.
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to
be applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A
was issued as an amendment, inserting the word “actually staging”. Proc.
889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-
provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13
provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the
suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces
and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that
Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion
insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became
moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that
public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that
there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of
the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts;
(c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan,
has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged
apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e)
that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to
jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at
a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the
factual bases for the proclamations.
decision reached by majority.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen
requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs
to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and
upon all other persons.
(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.
Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two
conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the
privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or
"imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the
suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to
call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two
other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing
of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were
fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in
1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor
organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations;
about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 1 | P a g e
REPUBLIC VS SAGUN
Facts:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was
held.Among the candidate is herein respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong
was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the citizenship of respondent Ong
since Ong’s father was only a naturalized Filipino citizen and questioned Ong’s
residence qualificationsince Ong does not own any property in Samar.
ISSUE/s:
1.) Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;
2.) Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and
3.) WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.
RULING:
1.) Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. In the case at bar, the Court
finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of
the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review
by the Supreme Court.
2.) Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondent’s father, an
immigrant from China was declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At
the time Jose OngChuan took his oath, the private respondent then is a minor
of nine years, was finishing his elementary education in the province of
Samar. Hence, there is no ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of
respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-born Filipino
mother, thus the issue of citizenship is immaterial.
3.) Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition
given to the word residence which regarded it as having the same meaning
as domicile. The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the
domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners'
imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed
therein even up to the present. Hence, the residency of respondent Ong has
sufficiently proved.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SINACA VS MULA
In this case, assailed was the COMELEC Resolution on Oct. 6, 1998 in SPA No.
98-292, declaring the substitution of mayoralty candidate Teodoro Sinaca, Jr.
by petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca as invalid.
Facts:
In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinica was a substitute
candidate for the mayoral post of the Matugas Wing after their original
candidate, Teodoro Sinica, Jr., was disqualified for being convicted of bigamy.
He was proclaimed winner after the canvassing.
(Matugas Wing was a faction in the LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD party, as well as the
Barbers Wing. Each faction has separate candidates for the mayoral post in
the Municipality of Malimono , Surigao del Norte.)
Respondent Mula (who got Sinica, Jr. disqualified) filed a disqualification case
against Emmanuel Sinica before the COMELEC. He alleged that said
substitution was invalid because:
a) Sinica was not member of the LAKAS party when he was nominated as a
substitute; and
b) it lacks approval of Sen. Barbers as a joint signatory of the substitution.
The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification case. However,
when respondent Mula filed a Motion for Reconsideration, COMELEC en banc
set aside the resolution of the Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL
asserting that the substitution violated the provisions of Sec. 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code that the substitute must belong to the same political
party as the substituted candidate. Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid
because he was an independent candidate for councilor prior to his
nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate
who was a Lakas party member.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 2 | P a g e
Therefore, this case before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON the substitution of Emmanuel Sinica was against the provisions of
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution of 6 October
1998 of the COMELEC en banc is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
another one rendered declaring EMMANUEL SINACA as having been duly
elected mayor of the Municipality of Malimono , Surigao del Norte.
Ratio Decidendi:
NO. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute
candidate should be a person belonging to and certified by the same political
party as the candidate to be replaced.
Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca, an independent candidate, had first withdrawn
his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member before he joined
the LAKAS party and nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the
substitute candidate. He had filed his certificate of candidacy and his
certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Gov.
Matugas with his written acceptance of the party's nomination. Therefore, he
is a bona fide LAKAS member.
There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a
condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a member
of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be
nominated as such.
DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking ti enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action
implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior
courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and
the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act,
would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of
their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being
alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has
been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUES: W/N BP 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure
of the justices and judges in this case?
RULING: It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither
removal nor separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void,
the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The rule that
the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its
incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition
of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office
with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that
from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security
of tenure does not arise.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 3 | P a g e
RADIOWEALTH INC VS AGREGADO
The “preservation of Judiciary’s integrity and effectiveness is necessary”.
Corollary to this is the power of judiciary to maintain its existence. The quality
of the government depends upon the independence of judiciary and the
officials of the government cannot deprive the courts of anything which is
vital to their functions. Furthermore, the prerogatives of this court which the
Constitution secures against interference include not only the powers to
adjudicate cases but all things that are REASONABLY necessary for the
administration of justice. The purchase of the necessary equipment would
contribute to a more effective judiciary. Lastly, these are implied and
incidental powers that are as essential to the existence of the court as the
powers specifically granted to it.
FACTS:
1. Questioned purchase and installation:
a. Webster Teletalk, Model 206 MA
b. Webster Telehome speakers
2. Clerk of SC: certified purchase/installation on 2ND and 3RD flr of
Malacanan Annex, where SC is (“urgent/necessary to pub service”)
a. Dacanay (Property Requisition Committee): disapproved
i. Contrary to EO 302 PAR 4
ii. Contrary to policy adopted by Cabinet, discontinuing
open market purchase
iii. Contrary to EO 298
3. Radiowealth, Inc: vendor of equip and accessories requested
approval from Auditor General, that Treasury Warrant in process of
issuance to cover amount but auditor for SC refused to countersign
4. Auditor General comments to Chief Justice:
a. Purchase of emergency supplies, materials, furniture, &
equip for use of nat’l govt governed by SEC 2044 of Revised
Admin Code (RAC), EO 298, EO 302, and Dept of Finance
Order #7
b. No evidence to show that reqs of law and/or regulations had
been complied with.
c. Disclaims that decision is any way premised on or influenced
by PRC Chairman’s action
i. “PRC actuation irrelevant to disposal of this case and
that it is only the Auditor General’s ruling which
should be reviewed”
ISSUES: Who has authority to pass upon court’s requisition for supplies SC
NOTE: Auditor Gen and PRC invoke same legal provisions/Eos/AOs re who has
authority to pass on requisition for supplies (both also ruled the same this is
literally just a huge pissing contest on who has the real final say)
RULING:
1. SC is independent of exec/legis control (separation of powers)
a. Auditor General authority to audit and disapprove court’s
expenditures has to be limited to conditions prescribed by
law which do not invade court’s independence
i. Authority is NOT absolute.
ii. Auditor Gen may not question the court’s
expenditures except when they are “irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, and extravagant”
b. TARLAC, ETC v GALE (ponente Justice Moreland):
i. “Under the acts of legislature of the PH, the judiciary
has the power to maintain its existence, and
whatever is reasonably necessary to that end courts
constituting judiciary may do/order done. They have
power to preserve their integrity, maintain their
dignity, and to insure effectiveness in admin of
justice
ii. “Officials of the govt who owe a duty to the courts
under the law cannot deprive the courts of anything
which is vital to their functions, nor can such officials
by the exercise of any judgment or discretion of their
own escape an obligation to the courts which the law
lays down.”
Consti – Judiciary Cases 4 | P a g e
 c. Prerogative of court includes not only powers to adjudicate
cases but all things reasonably necessary for admin of justice
i. Incidental powers are as necessary to existence of
court as the powers specifically granted
ii. Court could not maintain its independence/dignity as
the Consti intends if exec personably or through
subordinate officials could determine for court what
it should have or use in discharge of functions, and
when and how it should be obtained
d. Exec and Judic on same footing in requisition of fixtures,
equipment, and supplies
i. Chief Exec has no more authority to encroach on SC
in choice of instruments needed to carry on its
functions than the court has to dictate to exec what,
when, and how to get his
2. SEC 2041-2044 of RAC speak of depts., bureaus, and offices, and not
the legislature or SC :. not intended to embrace them
a. Not true that enforceable on clerk on court since clerk is not
an officer separate and distinct but a subordinate of court
b. SEC 2041: regulates purchase of govt supplies and directs
that such purchase should be effected through Bureau of
Supplies
c. SEC 2044: general exceptions by authorizing purchase in
open market without interference of BOS when materials or
supplies are to be used in construction, repair, maintenance
of a public work upon the occasion of any emergency
involving danger to life or property, or in any case where the
location of the work is remote from Manila
3. No denial of power of Auditor Gen to audit in accordance with law
and admin regulations, expenditures of funds or property
pertaining to or held in trust by govt or provinces or municipalities.
Neither does the court claim exemption from authority vested in
Auditor General by Consti to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
of govt or to bring the attention expenditures of funds or property
which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive and
extravagant.
MARBURY VS MADISON
Facts of the case
Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams in the 1800 presidential election.
Before Jefferson took office on March 4, 1801, Adams and Congress passed
the Judiciary Act of 1801, which created new courts, added judges, and gave
the president more control over appointment of judges. The Act was
essentially an attempt by Adams and his party to frustrate his successor, as
he used the act to appoint 16 new circuit judges and 42 new justices of the
peace. The appointees were approved by the Senate, but they would not be
valid until their commissions were delivered by the Secretary of State.
William Marbury had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of
Columbia, but his commission was not delivered. Marbury petitioned the
Supreme Court to compel the new Secretary of State, James Madison, to
deliver the documents. Marbury, joined by three other similarly situated
appointees, petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the delivery of the
commissions.
Question
Do the plaintiffs have a right to receive their commissions?
Can they sue for their commissions in court?
Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the delivery of their
commissions?
Conclusion
UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR MARBURY
MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN MARSHALL
Though Marbury was entitled to it, the Court was unable to grant it because
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicted with Article III Section 2 of
the U.S. Constitution and was therefore null and void.
The Court found that Madison’s refusal to deliver the commission was illegal,
but did not order Madison to hand over Marbury’s commission via writ of
Consti – Judiciary Cases 5 | P a g e
mandamus. Instead, the Court held that the provision of the Judiciary Act of
1789 enabling Marbury to bring his claim to the Supreme Court was itself
unconstitutional, since it purported to extend the Court’s original jurisdiction
beyond that which Article III, Section 2, established.
Marshall expanded that a writ of mandamus was the proper way to seek a
remedy, but concluded the Court could not issue it. Marshall reasoned that
the Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicted with the Constitution. Congress did not
have power to modify the Constitution through regular legislation because
Supremacy Clause places the Constitution before the laws.
In so holding, Marshall established the principle of judicial review, i.e., the
power to declare a law unconstitutional.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (PACU) VS
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
Facts:
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities assailed the
constitutionality of Act No. 2706, known as the “Act making the Inspection
and Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary
of Public Instruction.”
As contended by PACU, the Act is unconstitutional because of the following
reasons: 1) The act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as
teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; 2) it
will also deprive the parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their
children for civic efficiency; and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary
of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of legislative powers.
Additionally, the association contended that the Constitution guaranteed
every citizen the right to own and operate a school and any law requiring
previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise
the said right.
On the contrary, the Department of Education maintained that 1) the matters
does not contain justiciable controversy and thus does not need court
decision or intervention; 2) petitioners are inestoppels to challenge the
validity of the said act; and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid.
Section 1 of Act No. 2706 provides that “It shall be the duty of the Secretary
of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private
schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish
adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of
instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly-
authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and
regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of
instruction given in the same.”
Issue:
Whether or not Act No. 2706 is unconstitutional.
Held:
No, Act No. 2706 is constitutional.
The organic law provides that the state has the power to regulate private
schools for the development of morals, civic efficiency, and scientific aptitude
of students. The court found no justiciable controversy. The power of the
courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of
litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual
interference. As such, judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases
and controversies. Thus, the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic
question, such as that provided by the petitioner. On this phase of the
litigation, the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of
legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and
memoranda issued by the Department of Education.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 6 | P a g e
KILOSBAYAN INC. VS MORATO
Facts:
1. GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the contract
between Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the
privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The
contract violated the provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits
PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries through a collaboration,
association, or joint venture.
2. Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for
online lottery equipment and accessories on January 25, 1995. The
agreement are as follow:
4. Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at
which in no case be less than an annual rental computed at
P35,000 per terminal in commercial operation.
5. Rent is computed bi-weekly.
6. Term is 8 years.
7. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the
facilities.
8. Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment
at P25M.
3. Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid
because:
4. It is the same as the old contract of lease.
5. It is still violative of PCSO’s charter.
6. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not been
approved by the President and it is not most advantageous to the
government.
4. PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments
0. ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior
contract.
1. ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the exception
provided in EO No. 301.
2. Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the Board of
Directors of PCSO.
3. Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery
equipment.
4. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
5. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not
parties to the contract.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal
standing to sue.
2. Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in operating an
online lottery is valid.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.
1. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the
standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on
real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually
involved.
2. LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also
apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by the
parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in
any sense be regarded as “the law of this case”. The parties are the
same but the cases are not.
3. RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” cannot still apply. An
issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former
suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between
the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule
does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated
claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an
instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from
the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the
second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal
matters at issue.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 7 | P a g e
4. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not
preclude determination of the petitioner’s standing.
5. Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional
question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether
the petitioners are ‘real parties of interest’.
6. Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are
parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or are
prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting
parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to
them from the contract.
7. Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions
to the nature or validity of public contracts maybe made before COA
or before the Ombudsman.
8. Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is valid.
9. It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO now bears all
losses because the operation of the system is completely in its hands.
10. Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment
and the Court is not inclined to review.
11. Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by law as a maximum.
(4.3% of gross receipt is discussed in the dissenting opinion of
Feliciano, J.)
12. In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement.
Petitioners state that this would allow PGMC to control and operate
the on-line lottery system. The Court held that the claim is
speculative. In any case, in the construction of statutes, the
resumption is that in making contracts, the government has acted in
good faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason
for denying power.
13. It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO does not have the
power to enter into any contract which would involve it in any form
of “collaboration, association, or joint venture” for the holding of
sweepstakes activities. This only mentions that PCSO is prohibited
from investing in any activities that would compete in their own
activities.
14. It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement which does not
compete with their own activities. The Court held that is also based
on speculation. Evidence is needed to show that the transfer of
technology would involve the PCSO and its personnel in prohibited
association with the PGMC.
15. O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only to contracts for the
purchase of supplies, materials and equipment and not on the
contracts of lease. Public bidding for leases are only for privately-
owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government
owned buildings or spaces for private use.
Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. The motion for
reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with finality.
MOLDEX REALTY INC VS HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE
When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or
invalid, a party may raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion
that the regulation is being enforced. The requisite for judicial review that the
party assailing the regulation must show that the question of constitutionality
has been raised at the earliest opportunity should not be taken to mean that
the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately after the
execution of the state action complained of—a contrary rule would mean
that a law, otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by
the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the
same.
FACTS
Petitioner, as owner-developer of Metrogate Complex Phase I, has been
subsidizing the electric bill for its streetlights since 1988. In 2000, he decided
to stop and advised respondent association Metrogate Complex Village
Homeowners’ Association to assume the same. Respondent association’s
refusal led to discontinuance of the service, prompting it to apply for a
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction with the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) against petitioner. The
HLURB granted respondent association’s application for injunction based on
Consti – Judiciary Cases 8 | P a g e
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) Resolution
No. R-562, series of 1994. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was
rebuffed, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was granted to
respondent association thereafter. Petitioner then filed a Petition for
Prohibition and Certiorari with the Court of Appeals for the reversal of the
HLURB decision and to assail the constitutionality of the Resolution. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that the
constitutionality issue should have been raised directly to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner thus instituted an action for certiorari and prohibition with the
same prayers at the Supreme Court which is anchored on the
unconstitutionality of the HUDCC resolution for being a void exercise of
legislative power, grave abuse of discretion by the HLURB in issuing the
mandatory injunction, and not commanding the respondent association to
shoulder the electricity bill. HLURB commented that said petition was filed
beyond the 60-day reglementary period but petitioner maintains otherwise.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed
within the 60-day reglementary period.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the
ground that the constitutionality issue may be brought only to the
Supreme Court.
RULING
1. Yes. When an administrative regulation is attacked for being
unconstitutional or invalid, a party may raise its unconstitutionality
or invalidity on every occasion that the regulation is being enforced.
For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the party
assailing the regulation must show that the question of
constitutionality has been raised at the earliest opportunity. This
requisite should not be taken to mean that the question of
constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of
the state action complained of. That the question of constitutionality
has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow
it to be raised later. A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise
unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by the mere
failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the
same. Petitioner had already raised the question of constitutionality
in its petition filed with the Court of Appeals. The alleged injury
caused to petitioner as a result of the implementation of the HUDCC
Resolution is continuous in nature in that as long as the assailed
resolution is effective, petitioner is obliged to pay for the electricity
cost of the streetlights. For every occasion that petitioner is directed
to comply with the assailed resolution, a new cause of action to
question its validity accrues in favor of petitioner. Thus, the instant
petition is not time-barred.
2. Yes. It must be emphasized that the Supreme Court does not have
exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions assailing the
constitutionality of a law or an administrative regulation, the lower
courts also have jurisdiction at the first instance. The general rule is
that the Supreme Court shall exercise only appellate jurisdiction over
cases involving the constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation,
except in circumstances where the Court believes that resolving the
issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance is
of paramount importance and immediately affects the social,
economic and moral well being of the people. Ultimately, the Court
is called upon to resolve the question of who bears the obligation of
paying electricity cost, a question that the lower courts undoubtedly
have the competence to resolve.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 9 | P a g e
FABIAN VS DESIERTO
FACTS: Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president
of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which
participated in the bidding for government construction projects including
those under the First Manila Engineering District (FMED), and private
respondent Nestor V. Agustin, incumbent District Engineer, reportedly taking
advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous
relationship. After misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents, Fabian
eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against Agustin in a
letter-complaint. The Graft Investigator of the Ombudsman issued a
resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordering
his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. On
a motion for reconsideration, Agustin was exonerated of the administrative
charges.
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that —
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice
of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis
supplied)
ISSUE#1: Can the Court resolve the constitutionality of Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 not raised in the trial?
HELD#1: YES.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in
the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or
that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any
time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take
cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is
developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own
jurisdiction in any proceeding.
ISSUE#2: Is Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 unconstitutional?
HELD#2: YES.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition
which, as correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of
Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over
cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the Court.
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the
regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 10 | P a g e
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY INC VS CABILES
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is
a recruitment and placement agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year
employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was
deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She
alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as
quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from
Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that
“she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.”
She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she
was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane
ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC
reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation,
and attorney’s fees
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her
salary due to illegal dismissal.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of
respondent’s salary should be increased to the amount equivalent to the
unexpired term of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation
Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating
the equal protection clause and substantive due process.
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a
law. It “confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.”
The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was
reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No.
10022 in 2010.
Ruling on the constitutional issue
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or
office of the government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent
with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports
such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws
must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it
is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is
inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A
law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as
such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse
conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided
in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal
protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have
failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would
warrant us to revisit the precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 11 | P a g e
DE AGBAYANI VS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on
July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage. On July 13 1959 or 15 years
after maturity of the loan, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid.
Plaintiff countered with his suit against both alleging that the mortgage
sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed
from the date of maturity. PNB on the other hand claims that the defense of
prescription would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when
Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent
legislative act 2 extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid,
were to be deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank
took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. The lower court did not find
such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.
ISSUE: W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the
Moratorium Law before the same were declared invalid tolled the period of
prescription (Effect of the declaration of Unconstitutionality of a law)
HELD: YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: “The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to
be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.” 4
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive
order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal
consequences are attached. Precisely because of the judicial recognition that
moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the debtors
who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases
impressive in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period
that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force,
prescription did not run.
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus manifest. From
July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time consumed
is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled however,
from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18,
1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering
eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had
extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time
to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.
TAN VS BARRIOS
Facts: On the basis of Proclamation 1081 dated 21 September 1972, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General Order 8 dated 27 September
1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to try and
decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to
them." In General Order 21 dated 30 September 1972, the military tribunals,
"exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with jurisdiction among others,
over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly
related to the quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the safety and
security of the Republic. In General Order 12-b dated 7 November 1972,
"crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code"
were added to the jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions.
Subsequently, General Order 49, dated 11 October 1974, redefined the
jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals. The enumeration of offenses cognizable
by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as defined and penalized
in the Revised Penal Code. However, although civil courts should have
exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of GO 49,
Section 2 of the same general order provided that "the President may, in the
public interest, refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the civil courts" and vice versa. On 17 April 1975, William Tan
(@ Go Bon Ho), Joaquin Tan Leh (@ Go Bon Huat, @ Taowie) and Vicente Tan
(@ Go Bon Beng, @ Donge), with 12 others (Luis Tan [@ Tata, @ Go Bon Hoc],
Ang Tiat Chuan [@ Chuana], Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones,
Leopoldo Nicolas, Enrique Labita, Oscar Yaun, Eusebio Tan [@ Go Bon Ping],
Alfonso Tan [@ Go Bon Tiak], Go E Kuan [@ Kunga], Marciano Benemerito [@
Consti – Judiciary Cases 12 | P a g e
Marcing, @ Dodong], Manuel Beleta, and John Doe), were arrested and
charged in Criminal Case MC-1-67 before the Military Commission 1, for the
crimes of: (1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally-possessed
firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Section 1, par. 6 of General Order 49, for the killing on 25 August 1973 of
Florentino Lim of the wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City; and
(2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN-
1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General Orders 6 and 7 in relation
to Presidential Decree 9. Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan
de Oro City, President Marcos, pursuant to the recommendation of Defense
Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his earlier order to transfer the case to
the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the military court. All the
accused were detained without bail in the PC Stockade in Camp Crame. Upon
arraignment on 6 May 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty." Manuel
Beleta was discharged to be used as a state witness. He was released from
detention on 5 May 1975. Almost daily trials were held for more than 13
months. The testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses and 35 defense
witnesses filled up 21 volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages.
On 10 June 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was
promulgated by the Military Commission finding 5 of the accused namely:
Luis Tan, Ang Tiat
Constitutional Law II, 2005
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Chuan, Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones, and Leopoldo Nicolas guilty
of murder, where each of them was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of from 17 years, 4 months, and 21 days, to 20 years. A sixth
accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both murder and illegal
possession of firearm, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by
electrocution. 8 of the accused, namely: Oscar Yaun, Enrique Labita, Eusebio
Tan, Alfonso Tan, Go E Kuan, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh, and Vicente Tan
were acquitted of the charges, and released on 11 June 1976.
On 17 January 1981, Proclamation 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the
military tribunals and commissions. On 22 May 1987, the Supreme Court
promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission 34, et al. (150
SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered on 4 December 1984 by Military
Commission 34 against Olaguer, et al. and declaring that military commissions
and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over
civilians charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts, as
long as those courts are open and functioning as they did during the period
of martial law. In October 1986, 6 habeas corpus petitions were filed in the
Supreme Court by some 217 prisoners in the national penitentiary, who had
been tried for common crimes and convicted by the military commissions
during the 9-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077,79599-
79600, 79862 and 80565 consolidated and entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs.
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700). Conformably with the ruling
in Olaguer, the Supreme Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the
proceedings leading to the conviction of non-political detainees who should
have been brought before the courts of justice as their offenses were totally
unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule.
On 15 September 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez issued
Department Order 226 designating State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to
collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the
investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case MC-1-67 and, if the evidence
warrants, to prosecute the case in the court of competent jurisdiction." On
15 November 1988, State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios was designated
Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in lieu of the regular fiscal who
inhibited himself. Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal
Barrios filed on 9 December 1988, in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de
Oro City two (2) informations for (1) Illegal Possession of Firearm [Criminal
Case 88-824]; and (2) Murder [Criminal Case 88-825] against all the 15 original
defendants in Criminal Case MC1-67 including those who had already died.
Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, were
assigned by raffle to the sala of RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo. Before
issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge Demecillo issued an
order on 26 October 1988, requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit
certified copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous cases wherever
they are now," and of the Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing
the cases, within 5 days from receipt" of his said order. The State Prosecutor
has not complied with that order. On 7 November 1988, William Tan, Joaquin
Consti – Judiciary Cases 13 | P a g e
Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition
praying that the informations in Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825, and the
order of Judge dated 26 October 1988 be annulled, among others.
Issue: Whether the reprosecution of Tan, et. al. would violate their right to
protection against double jeopardy.
Held: The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military
tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-
1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos
in the exercise of his legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be
justly ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and
invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences
which occurred long before the Court's decision in Olaguer was promulgated
and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. The
doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against Tan, et. al.
and their co-accused before the Military Commission. The principle of
absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians
should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular
case of Tan, et. al., the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious
violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction
of the military commission that heard and decided the charges against them
during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by the Supreme Court
(Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the Olaguer
case arose and came before the Supreme Court. Because of these established
operative facts, the refiling of the information against Tan, et. al. would place
them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic. The
doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the
strong arm of the State: "The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality.
A single prosecution for any offense is all the law allows. It protects an
accused from harassment, enables him to treat what had transpired as a
closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to be resigned to
whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself
time-consuming and expense-producing for the state as well. It has been
referred to as 'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution
is inflicted only once, not whenever it pleases the state to do so."
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. VS FERTIPHIL CORPORATION
FACTS:
President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No.
1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery
component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers which
resulted in having Fertiphil paying P 10/bag sold to the Fertilizer and Perticide
Authority (FPA).
FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust Company who applies to
the payment of corporate debts of Planters Products Inc. (PPI)
After the Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10
levy. Upon return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded a refund but PPI
refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA
and PPI with the RTC on the ground that LOI No. 1465 is unjust, unreaonable
oppressive, invalid and unlawful resulting to denial of due process of law.
FPA answered that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the state in
ensuring the stability of the fertilizing industry in the country and that
Fertiphil did NOT sustain damages since the burden imposed fell on the
ultimate consumers.
RTC and CA favored Fertiphil holding that it is an exercise of the power of
taxation ad is as such because it is NOT for public purpose as PPI is a private
corporation.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Fertiphil has locus standi
2. W/N LOI No. 1465 is an invalid exercise of the power of taxation rather the
police power
Held:
1. Yes. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in
interest" or party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit. In public suits, there is the right of the ordinary citizen to petition
the courts to be freed from unlawful government intrusion and illegal official
Consti – Judiciary Cases 14 | P a g e
action subject to the direct injury test or where there must be personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result. Being a mere procedural technicality, it has also been held
that locus standi may be waived in the public interest such as cases of
transcendental importance or with far-reaching implications whether private
or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi.
2. As a seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy which made its
products more expensive and harm its business. It is also of paramount public
importance since it involves the constitutionality of a tax law and use of taxes
for public purpose.
3. Yes. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the
state but distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is the
power of the state to enact the legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty on property in order to promote general welfare. While, the power of
taxation is the power to levy taxes as to be used for public purpose. The main
purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while
taxation is revenue generation. The lawful subjects and lawful means tests
are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power.
The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and
constitutional limitations.
In this case, it is for purpose of revenue. But it is a robbery for the State to
tax the citizen and use the funds generation for a private purpose. Public
purpose does NOT only pertain to those purpose which are traditionally
viewed as essentially governmental function such as building roads and
delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to
promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the
relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform.
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES VS COMELEC
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the
League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P.
Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and
enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent
municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting
24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009
(RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450
of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement
for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million.
The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities
solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the
fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the
P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 15 | P a g e

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood
bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except
that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed
into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without
the President’s signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as
well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament
that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities
will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria
for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear,
plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was
never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th
Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and
are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present
case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took
effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Consti – Judiciary Cases 16 | P a g e

REPUBLIC VS EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CO. INC
Facts: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted Bayantel the
provisional authority to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service
(CMTS) on its own initiative applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1987 Rules of
Practice and Procedures.
Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised
Rules which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register
where the phrase “on its own initiative” were deleted and since the 1993
Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center.
Issue: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is
the law in force and effect in granting provisional authority.
Held: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies
that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that
gives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative Register is
merely a bulletin of codified rules. Publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes,
rules and regulations can take effect.
FORTICH VS CORONA
DOCTRINE: The orderly administration of justice requires that the
judgements/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point
of finality set by the law, rules and regulations; a resolution which
substantially modifies a decision after it has attained finality is utterly void.
When an administrative agency's decision becomes final and executory and
no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said
agency has lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its
decision.
FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision
converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-
industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries
staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of
publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming
1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers.
Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically
motivated”, “win-win” resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially
modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory.
ISSUE: WON the “win-win” resolution, issued after the original decision had
become final and executory, had any legal effect.
HELD:
No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision
of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a
motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to
re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the
Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion
for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion
became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be
taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for
reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious
cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the
said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first
motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the
Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office
of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March
29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross
disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 17 | P a g e
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions
of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law,
rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finish- to disputes once
and for all
FIRESTONE CERAMICS INC VS CA
Facts: The government filed a case to annul the certificate of title of D
covering forestland. X wanted to intervene believing that if D’s title would be
annulled and after declassification of the forestland to alienable land, then
his title over a portion of the property would become valid. Y also wanted to
intervene because the cancellation of D’s title would allegedly pave the way
for his free patent application.
Issue: Whether X and Y should be allowed to intervene.
Held: No. Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the
courts when the applicant shows that he is qualified to intervene as provided
under Sec. 1 of Rule 19. The legal interest of the intervenor must be of direct
and immediate character and not merely contingent or expectant so that he
will either gain or lose by the direct operation of the judgment. X and Y merely
have a collateral interest in the subject matter of the litigation, thus, allowing
intervention would not be justified.
PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS INC VS CA
Facts: On November 11, 1993, in a decision rendered by its Third Division,
the Court directed herein petitioner Philippine Duplicators, Inc. (Duplicators)
to pay 13th month pay to private respondent employees computed on the
basis of their fixed wages plus sales commissions. On December 10, 1993, in
the case of Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. Hon. Dionisio de la Serna, the
Court thru its Second Division, held that the so-called commissions "paid to
or received by medical representatives of Boie-Takeda Chemicals or by the
rank and file employees of Philippine Fuji Xerox Co.," were excluded from the
term "basic salary" because these were paid to the medical representatives
and rank-and-file employees as "productivity bonuses" and is thus excluded
to the computation of 13th month pay.
In view of the nature of the issues especially as regarding the appreciation of
the court on the term “commission”, petitioner Duplicators believe that the
decision in Boie-Tekada went "directly opposite and contrary to" the
conclusion reached in their case. Hence, the Court en banc, in order to settle
the condition of the relevant case law, accepted this present case as a banc
case.
Issue:
Whether or not there has been conflict in the decisions rendered by the two
Divisions of the Supreme Court relative to its appreciation of the term
“commission”.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court en banc held that NO, there was no conflict in the two
decisions.
The two cases present quite different factual situation, though the same word
“commission” was invoked, thus, legal characterization of which must
accordingly differ.
Its Third Division was correct in saying that the sales commissions were an
integral part of the basic salary structure of Philippine Duplicators' employees
salesmen. These commissions are not overtime payments, nor profit-sharing
payments nor any other fringe benefit. Thus, the salesmen's commissions
were properly included in the term "basic salary" for purposes of computing
their 13th month pay.
In Boie-Takeda the so-called commissions "paid to or received by medical
representatives” were excluded from the term "basic salary" because these
were paid to the medical representatives as "productivity bonuses." The
Second Division was correct in characterizing these payments as additional
monetary benefits not properly included in the term "basic salary" in
computing their 13th month pay.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 18 | P a g e
It is also important to note that the purported "commissions" paid by the
Boie-Takeda Company to its medical representatives could not have been
"sales commissions" in the same sense that Philippine Duplicators paid its
salesmen Sales commissions. Medical representatives are not salesmen; they
do not affect any sale of any article at all. The additional payments made to
Boie-Takeda's medical representatives were not in fact sales commissions but
rather partook of the nature of profit-sharing bonuses.
CABUAY JR. VS MALVAR
The heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, the heirs of Elino Adia, Ambrosio Aguilar, and
Eduardo V. Santos were engaged in a legal tug-of-war over the ownership of
a parcel of land located in Barrio De la Paz, Antipolo City.
Records show that as early as 1920, Fermin Lopez was in possession of the
land. He had it declared in his name for taxation purposes and in 1928, filed
a homestead application therefor. After his death in 1943, son, Hermogenes
Lopez, inquired from the Bureau of Lands about the status of the homestead
application. Upon learning that it was not acted upon, the latter filed said
application over the same land, which has been approved and issued with the
corresponding patent. Thereafter, Hermogenes transferred his rights thereto
in favor of Ambrosio Aguilar through a deed of sale executed on July 31, 1959
and on December 16, 1959, the land was sold to Eduardo Santos. Come 1980,
the heirs of the late Elino Adia began pursuing their adverse claim of
ownership over the same property questioning the authenticity of the
approved homestead patent of Lopez with the Bureau of Lands, now known
as Lands Management Bureau (LMB).
On August 11, 1993, The Supreme Court (Third Division) in G.R. No. 110900,
affirmed the CA in sustaining the LMB decision, dismissing petitioner
Hermogenes’ claim over the parcel of land and ordered the reconstitution of
the homestead application of the Adia heirs, or the filing of a new application
by the same. Although prior to this, there also existed a petition for certiorari
on September 13, 1990, docketed as G.R. No. 90380, wherein the Supreme
Court (First Division) recognized the right of ownership of Hermogenes Lopez
over the disputed property. In consonance with the decision of the First
Division, the Lopez heirs filed a motion for the issuance of writ of execution
concerning the demolition of the communication facilities and other
structures belonging to the Intelligence security Group (ISG) of the Philippine
army, situated on a part of the property purchased by the group from the
Adia heirs. Prompting Colonel Cabuay to question such action through a
petition seeking for clarification as to the validity and forceful effect of the
two final and executory but conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court
Divisions.
Issue:
Whether or not the resolution of the Third Division in G.R. no. 110900 is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that NO, the resolution of the Third Division in G.R.
no. 110900 is invalid.
The Supreme Court stressed that the Decision of this Court (First Division) in
G.R. No. 90380 is the law of the case binding upon the LMB and the Court of
Appeals and is beyond their authority to reverse. It also ruled that the Court
of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in affirming the LMB decision in B.L.
Claim 653 and ignoring the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 90380. The Third
Division of this Court was misled, so to speak, in resolving in G.R. 110900 that
no reversible error was committed by the Appellate Court. Section 4, sub-
paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: x x x no doctrine
or principle of law laid down by the (Supreme) Court en banc or its Divisions
may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.
A Decision rendered by a Division of the Supreme Court in violation of the
above constitutional provision would be in excess of jurisdiction and,
therefore, invalid.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 19 | P a g e
AGOY VS ARANETA
Facts:
The Court denied petitioner Jandy J. Agoys petition for review through a
minute resolution. Apparently, however, Agoy doubted the authenticity of
the copy of the above minute resolution that he received through counsel
since he promptly filed a motion to rescind the same and to have his case
resolved on its merits via a regular resolution or decision signed by the
Justices who took part in the deliberation.
The Court denied Agoys motion to rescind the subject minute resolution and
confirmed the authenticity of the copy of the June 15, 2011 resolution. It also
treated his motion to rescind as a motion for reconsideration and denied the
same with finality. Upon receipt of the Courts September 21, 2011 resolution,
Agoy filed a motion to rescind the same or have his case resolved by the Court
En Banc pursuant to Section 13 in relation to Sec. 4(3), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. Agoy reiterated his view that the Court cannot decide his
petition by a minute resolution. He thus prayed that it rescind its June 15 and
September 21, 2011 resolutions, determine whether it was proper for the
Court to resolve his petition through a minute resolution, and submit the case
to the Court en banc for proper disposition through a signed resolution or
decision.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the copies of the minute resolutions dated June 15, 2011
and September 21, 2011 that Agoy received are authentic; and
2. Whether or not it was proper for the Court to deny his petition through a
minute resolution.
Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court held that YES, the notices of the minute resolutions of
June 15 and September 21, 2011 sent to Agoy, bearing the signatures of
Assistant Clerk of Court Teresita Aquino Tuazon and Deputy Division Clerk of
Court Wilfredo V. Lapitan, both printed on pink paper and duly received by
counsel for petitioner as evidenced by the registry return cards, are authentic
and original copies of the resolutions.
Minute resolutions are issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions of the
Court. While they are the results of the deliberations by the Justices of the
Court, they are promulgated by the Clerk of Court or his assistants whose duty
is to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases by quoting verbatim
the resolutions adopted by the Court. Neither the Clerk of Court nor his
assistants take part in the deliberations of the case. They merely transmit the
Court’s action in the form prescribed by its Internal Rules.
The notices quote the Courts actual resolutions denying due course to the
subject actions and these already state the required legal basis for such
denial. To require the Justices to sign all its resolutions respecting its action
on new cases would be unreasonable and unnecessary.
2. This case reiterates the Court’s ruling that the adjudication of a case by
minute resolution is an exercise of judicial discretion and constitutes sound
and valid judicial practice. While the Constitution requires every court to
state in its decision clearly and distinctly the fact and the law on which it is
based, the Constitution requires the court, in denying due course to a petition
for review, merely to state the legal basis for such denial.
When a minute resolution shall issue is when the Court denies a petition filed
under Rule 45 of the [Rules of Court], citing as legal basis the absence of
reversible error committed in the challenged decision, resolution, or order of
the court below. The minute resolutions in this case complied with this
requirement.
The Court has repeatedly said that minute resolutions dismissing the actions
filed before it constitute actual adjudications on the merits. They are the
result of thorough deliberation among the members of the Court. When the
Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies
the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it
already means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of
the CA. The decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 20 | P a g e
RE: SAMANODIN L. AMPASO
Facts:
Samanodin L. Ampaso, former judge of the Shari'a Circuit Court in Tubod,
Lanao del Norte, was appointed as Jurisconsult in Islamic Law on March 26,
1991and took his oath of office on April 10, 1991. The Jurisconsult position
was created by virtue of PD 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, and one of the qualifications for the position
is that the appointee must be at least forty years of age.
After his appointment, Ampaso requested for the upgrading of his position
to Salary Grade 31 which is equivalent to an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, claiming that he is the highest Muslim Judicial Officer of the Philippines
under PD 1083.
But a cursory check into the 201 files of Ampaso by the Office of the Court
Administrator revealed that Ampaso was born on January 2, 1952 and he was
only 39 years, 3 months and 8 days when he took his oath as Jurisconsult,
thus, failing to meet the age requirement for the position.
In his comment, Ampaso claimed that his true birthdate is January 2, 1948
and not January 2, 1952 as appearing in his GSIS information sheet and
Personal Data Sheet and that the documents were not personally prepared
by him but by his brother who inadvertently misstated the year of his birth.
He supported his claim by submitting various documentary proof, including a
copy of his "Birth Certificate for Late Registration" and argued that the
misstatement was not done in bad faith and an honest mistake.
Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of Ampaso as Jurisconsult was valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that NO, the appointment was void ab initio.
It found Ampaso’s explanation to be unacceptable – a lame excuse and a
mere after-thought. The Court went on to say that it is very unlikely,
improbable and unbecoming that a person aspiring to such a high office
would request another to fill up and file such personal data farms. Granting
that Ampaso did make such request, still, he himself had to sign the forms
just the same prior to filing, and in the normal course of things. That he signed
it without reading and/or understanding its contents is not excusable, nor
credible. As an aspiring member of the Bench, it was incumbent upon Ampaso
to check and double-check important personal data being supplied through
such forms.
IN RE: TRANSFER OF HEARING CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 13308 AND 13337
FROM RTC BR.4, BATANGAS CITY TO THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
MUNTINLUPA
Facts:
The administrative matter concerns two criminal cases pending before
Branch 4, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City, to wit: People v.
Armamento and People v. Perez for violations of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 and for Murder, respectively. The accused are detained
and serving sentence in the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa. Their hearings
are conducted in Batangas City. In 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) received a letter from Judge Albert A. Kalalo of the RTC in Batangas
City, which he sought guidance on the course of action to be taken in the
subject cases thereof. The OCA recommended the courses of action, which
the letter of Judge Kalalo be noted; the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Branch
4, Batangas City be directed to forward the records of the cases to the
executive judge of Muntinlupa; the judge to whom the cases are assigned to
be directed to conduct the trials; the records of the cases to be returned to
RTC Branch 4, Batangas City for the preparation of decisions; and the cases
shall be returned to RTC Muntinlupa City for the promulgation of the
decisions.
Issue:
Whether or not OCA erred in giving recommendations in favor of Judge Kalalo
Consti – Judiciary Cases 21 | P a g e
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that YES, OCA erred in giving recommendations.
The Court ordered Judge Albert A. Kalalo to go to Muntinlupa City RTC to
conduct the trial of the subject cases. In this case, the trial judge has been
given the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to determine their
demeanor on the stand the probative value of their testimonies. The practice
of allowing one judge to conduct trial and another to render decision in the
same case based only on records should be avoided. The witnesses reveal
much when they testify that is not reflected in the transcript, which only
records what they say but not how they said it. The meaningful pause, the
ready reply, the angry denial, the elusive eyes or the forthright stare, the
sudden pallor when a lie is exposed or the flush of face that accentuates a
sincere assertion — these and many other tell-tale marks of honesty or
invention are not lost on the trial judge (Citing People v. Yadao). It is not
necessary that the judge who prepares and signs the decision be the one who
heard the case, stems from an entirely different factual milieu (Citing U.S. v.
Abreu). The case at bar does not involve circumstances where the judge who
hears the trial is no longer available by reason of death, retirement or
resignation to render the decision. It shall be therefore to the best interest of
justice that the judge who hears the trial shall also be the one who will decide
the case. Hence, Judge Albert A. Kalalo is ordered to go to Muntinlupa City
and conduct the rest of the trial of the subject cases within the premises of
the Bureau of Corrections.
In Re: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, PETIONER IN BIRAOGO
V. NOGRALES AND LIMKAICHONG
Facts:
During its session on July 15, 2008, the Court En Banc continued its
deliberations on the draft of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases
of Limkaichong v. Comelec, Villando v. Comelec, Biraogo v. Nograles and
Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, which was used by the Supreme Court
(SC) as a working basis for its deliberations. Since no one raised any further
objections to the draft, the En Banc approved it. It having been already
printed on Gilbert paper, albeit a number of Justices manifested that they
were concurring in the result, Justice Reyes immediately circulated the
ponencia during the same session.
After the session and during lunch, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno noted that
seven of the 13 Justices (excluding Justice Reyes) concurred in the result with
the ponencia of Justice Reyes. Justices Minita Chico-Nazario and Teresita
Leonardo-De Castro then informed the Chief Justice that they also wanted to
concur only in the result. Since nine Justices, not counting the Chief Justice,
would concur only in the result, the Justices unanimously decided to withhold
the promulgation of the Gilbert copy. It was noted that if a majority concurred
only in the result, the ponencia would have no doctrinal value. More
importantly, any decision ousting a sitting member of the House of
Representatives should spell out clearly the legal basis relied upon by the
majority for such extreme measure. Justice Antonio T. Carpio then
volunteered to write his Reflections on Justice Reyes ponencia for discussion
in the following weeks En Banc session.
On December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and
Limkaichong, held a press conference at the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant in Maria
Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila, and circulated to the media an undated letter
signed by him, together with what appeared to be a xerox copy of the
unpromulgated ponencia. In his letter, Biraogo insinuated that the Court, at
the instance of the Chief Justice and with the implied consent of the other
Justices, unlawfully and with improper motives withheld the promulgation of
the ponencia.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 22 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not Justice Reyes is liable for the leakage of the confidential
internal document, which is an unpromulgated ponencia.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that YES, Justice Reyes is liable as any release of a
copy to the public, or to the parties, of an unpromulgated ponencia infringes
on the confidential internal deliberations of the Court.
It is settled that the internal deliberations of the Court are confidential. A
frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise judicial power.
The fact that Justice Reyes was not formally charged is of no moment. It is
settled that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its
authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show
gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct.
REPUBLIC VS GINGOYAN
Facts
An agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport
terminal (NAIA 3). However, the Court nullified such agreement
notwithstanding that the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO
and were nearing completion. In the Court’s resolution later on, it granted
the rights of PIATCO to refund, compensation or reimbursement from the
Government for its expenses in the construction of the NAIA 3 facilities.
The NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the
avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate
operation. Thereafter, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation
with the trial court and sought the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing
it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The
Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of P3 Billion in
Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal's
assessed value for taxation purposes.
The case was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by
respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). The RTC issued
an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government,
authorizing it to "take or enter upon the possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However,
it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974 (RA 8974) had amended Rule 67
in many respects.
There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures
under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is
required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing
of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67,
the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized
government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit
be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation,
unlike RA 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial
compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax
Consti – Judiciary Cases 23 | P a g e
declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements
and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
The Government filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was set
for hearing. The RTC issued another Order which appointed three (3)
Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3
Complex. That same day, the Government filed a Motion for Inhibition of
Hon. Gingoyon.
Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was
filed. The petition prayed for the nullification of the RTC orders and for the
inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the expropriation
case.
Issue:
Whether Rule 67, not RA 8974, governs the present expropriation
proceedings.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that NO, the above – stated law do not govern the
present expropriation proceeding.
The appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is
well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did
through the enactment of R.A. No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new
standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation
cases relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well as the
manner of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of
possession. Of course, rules of procedure, as distinguished from substantive
matters, remain the exclusive preserve of the Supreme Court by virtue of
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution.
Moreover, RA 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more
favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in
instances when the national government expropriates property "for national
government infrastructure projects. Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by
the national government for purposes other than national infrastructure
projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in
Rule 67 continues to apply
Re: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF TAX EXEMPTION OF GSIS FROM
PAYMENT LEGAL FEES
Facts: Section 22, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides for the entities
exempt from the payment of legal fees; Local Government Units as well as
Government-owned and controlled corporations are therein expressly not
exempted. GSIS seeks exemption from aforementioned provision by virtue
of Section 39 of RA 8291 which states that “the GSIS, its assets, revenues
including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes,
assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds.” The GSIS argues that its
exemption from the payment of legal fees would not mean that RA 8291 is
superior to the Rules of Court. It would merely show deference by the Court
to the legislature as a co-equal branch. This deference will recognize the
compelling and overriding State interest in the preservation of the actuarial
solvency of the GSIS for the benefit of its members.
Issue:
Whether or not Congress may exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by
the Court on government-owned and controlled corporations and local
government units.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that NO, the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts is a traditional power of this
Court as an exercise of its rule-making power.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated
by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly
annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this
Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of
Consti – Judiciary Cases 24 | P a g e
pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That
power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the
Executive.
In addition, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement.
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Appellate docket
and other lawful fees are required to be paid within the same period for
taking an appeal. Payment of docket fees in full within the prescribed period
is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the
appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and
executory.
In Re: IN THE MATTER OF CLARIFICATION OF EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT
OF ALL COURT AND SHERIFF’S FEES OF COOPERATIVES DULY REGISTERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9520 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE PHILIPPINE COOPERATIVE CODE OF 2008
Facts:
Herein petitioner Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (PHCCI) requests
for the issuance of a court order to clarify and implement the exemption of
cooperatives from the payment of court and sheriffs fees pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) No. 6938, as amended by RA 9520, otherwise known as the
Philippine Cooperative Act of 2008.
PHCCI contends that as a cooperative, it enjoys the exemption provided for
under Section 6, Article 61 of RA 9520 which states that cooperatives shall be
exempt from the payment of all court and sheriffs fees payable to the
Philippine Government. It also claims that this is a reiteration of Section 62,
paragraph 6 of RA 6398, also known as An Act to Ordain a Cooperative Code
of the Philippines.
It avers that despite the exemptions granted by the aforesaid laws and
issuances, PHCCI had been continuously assessed and required to pay legal
and other fees whenever it files cases in court.
PHCCI reports that it filed with the Office of the Executive Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) a Motion to implement the exemption,
but the latter ruled that the matter is of national concern and should be
brought before the Supreme Court for it to come up with a straight policy and
uniform system of collection.
Records show that on September 21, 2011, Executive Judge Antonio
Estoconing issued an Order treating the motion filed by PHCCI as a mere
consulta considering that no main action was filed in his court. He submits
that he had second thoughts in considering the exemption in view of the
guidelines laid down in the Rules. He reported that many cases filed by PHCCI
are small claims cases under Section 8 of the Rule on Small Claims, requiring
it to pay docket fees and other related costs unless allowed to litigate the
case as an indigent.
Issue: Whether or not cooperatives are exempt from the payment of court
and sheriffs fees or those fees provided for under Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the
Rules of Court.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that NO, cooperatives are not exempt from the
payment of the legal fees provided under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
The term “all court fees” under Section 6, Article 61 of RA 9520 refers to the
totality of legal fees imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as an
incident of instituting an action in court. These include filing or docket fees,
appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees,
sheriffs fees, stenographers fees and commissioners fees. The Court in the
GSIS case, citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, stressed that the 1987
Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary; took
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
Consti – Judiciary Cases 25 | P a g e
pleading, practice, and procedure; and held that the power to promulgate
these Rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress, more so, with the
Executive.
It held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of
the government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure within the sole
province of the Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if
they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter, or modify any of
the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
The Court held that the exemption of cooperatives from payment of court
and sheriffs fees no longer stands; they can no longer invoke RA 6398, as
amended by RA 9520, as a basis for exemption from the payment of legal
fees.
ESTIPONA JR. VS. LOBRIGO
Facts:
The petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. was charged for violation of Section
11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). Estipona filed
a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,
praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty
for violation of Section 12, Article II of RA No. 9164 (Posession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus, and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a
penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the
minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.
Salvador A. Estipona then challenged the constitutionality of Section 23 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002,” which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision
of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of
the provision on plea-bargaining.
Estipona argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the
law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority
of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution;
and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches
of the government.
Respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona’s motion. Estipona
filed a motion for reconsideration and was denied. Hence, this petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 23 of Republic Act no. 9165 is unconstitutional as it
encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate Rules of
Procedure.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that YES, SEC 23 of RA No. 9165 is unconstitutional
for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now
the exclusive domain of the SC and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments. While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto
Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court.
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province
of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact
laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the Court. To reiterate, the Court's authority
to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one
of the safeguards of the Supreme Court’s institutional independence.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 26 | P a g e
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
The Board of Investments (BOI) granted the petitioner First Lepanto
Ceramics, Inc.’s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by
changing the scope of its registered product from “glazed floor tiles” to
“ceramic tiles”. Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano
Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom.
Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for
review with respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91. The CA
temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision until it lapsed
on its own terms. The petitioners later filed a motion to dismiss and lift the
TRO contending that Ca does not have jurisdiction over the case as stated in
Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. Furthermore, the
petitioners argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and Circular
1-91 cannot be a basis of Mariwasa’s appeal which is contrary to Art. 82 of EO
226 wherein decisions of the BOI shall be filed directly to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the EO 226 has been repealed or superseded by Circular No. 1-91
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that YES, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or
superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of
enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.
Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed
to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the
Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P.
129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court
of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and
quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing
rules of procedure.
LAPINID VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Facts:
Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) as
Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal. Juanito
Junsay, who was also a candidate for the position, protested to the PPA and
contended that he should be designated as the terminal supervisor, given
that his evaluation scores were higher that of Lapinid. Due to the inaction of
PPA over Junsay’s protest, the latter went to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) and challenged Lapinid’s appointment. The CSC allowed the protest and
ordered the PPA to appoint Junsay as terminal supervisor. Lapinid claimed
that he was not informed of the appeal and filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the CSC. The PPA also filed its own
motion and a second motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Petitioner Lapinid raised the issue to the Court.
Issues:
Whether or not the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on grounds that there is more qualified person for the position.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that NO, the CSC is not authorized to disapprove a
permanent appointment on grounds that there is more qualified person for
the position.
The Supreme Court, in Luego v. CSC, declared the appointment is a
discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. The CSC has no
authority to revoke the said appointed simply because it believed that the
respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an
encroachment on the discretion. The Supreme Court the ruling that has been
affirmed on cases such as these.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 27 | P a g e

The Supreme Court further declared that the CSC should recognized that its
acts are subject to reversal by the Court and is expected to fully comply with
the decision brought herein even if the Commission may not agree with it.
CHAVEZ VS JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
Facts:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to
the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one
from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings
held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph
G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously
sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux
of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their
theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the
absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed
under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers,
requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section
8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from
Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress.
Issue:
1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial
review have been met in this case?
2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?
3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the
JBC is unconstitutional?
Held:
1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only
when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the
constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his
standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief
Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to
have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of
Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for
being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other
members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s
duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the
land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be
affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very
process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial
post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for
rectification of legal blunders.
2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as
ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law,
a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 28 | P a g e
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be
discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph
calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of
the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are
enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On
the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex
officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall
be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”
The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of
what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is,
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been
the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature
would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis
non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the
word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used
in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in
either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a
practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate
in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote
may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress,
or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This
unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the
JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid
purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism
which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to
expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to
presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break
a voting deadlock.
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the
word “Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read
as including both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize
that it was so worded because at the time the said provision was being
drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then,
when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of
Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section
8 of the Constitution.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its
primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the
process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-
play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This,
however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 29 | P a g e
3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights;
it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not
absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only
applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy
or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law
creating it.3
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case
and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the
current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless
valid.
UMALI VS JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
FACTS: Rep. Reynaldo V. Umali, current Chair of the House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, impugns the present-day practice of six-month
rotational representation of Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for
it unfairly deprives both Houses of Congress of their full participation in the
said body. The aforementioned practice was adopted by the JBC in light of
the ruling in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.
As an overview, in Chavez, the constitutionality of the practice of having two
representatives from both houses of Congress with one vote each in the JBC,
thus, increasing its membership from seven to eight, was challenged. With
that, the Court examined the constitutional provision that states the
composition of the JBC, that is, Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as
ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law,
a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector. (Emphasis supplied.)
Following a painstaking analysis, the Court, in a Decision dated July 17, 2012,
declared the said practice of having two representatives from Congress with
one vote each in the JBC unconstitutional. The Court enunciated that the use
of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of the Congress" in the
aforequoted provision is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other
construction or interpretation. The same is indicative of the Framers' intent
that Congress may designate only one representative to the JBC.
In light of Chavez, both Houses of Congress agreed on a six-month rotational
representation in the JBC, wherein the House of Representatives will
represent Congress from January to June and the Senate from July to
December. This is now the current practice in the JBC.
ISSUE: Is this six-month rotational representation in the JBC constitutional?
Does it weaken Congress itself as a bicameral department?
Consti – Judiciary Cases 30 | P a g e
HELD: It is not unconstitutional. It does NOT weaken Congress. WHEREFORE,
the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Before delving into the above-stated issues, the Court noted that the Petition
was primarily filed because of the non-counting of the petitioner's votes in
the JBC En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016 held for the
purpose of determining, among others, who will be the possible successors
of the then retiring Associate Justices of the Supreme Court Perez and Brion,
whose retirements were set on December 14 and 29, 2016, respectively.
As a rule, courts do not entertain moot questions. Nevertheless, considering
that all the arguments herein once again boil down to the proper
interpretation of the 1987 Constitution on congressional representation in
the JBC, mootness cannot stop the Petition.
Having said that, this Court shall now resolve the issues in seriatim.
On petitioner's locus standi. The legal standing of each member of Congress
was also upheld in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez. It is clear
therefrom that each member of Congress has a legal standing to sue even
without an enabling resolution for that purpose so long as the questioned
acts invade the powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress.
On the application of Chavez as stare decisis in this case. Stare decisis et non
quieta movere. This principle of adherence to precedents has not lost its
luster and continues to guide the bench in keeping with the need to maintain
stability in the law. The doctrine is based on the principle that once a question
of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.
Here, the facts are exactly the same as in Chavez, where this Court has already
settled the issue of interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. Truly, such ruling may not be unanimous, but it is undoubtedly
a reflection of the wisdom of the majority of members of this Court on that
matter. Chavez cannot simply be regarded as an erroneous application of the
questioned constitutional provision for it merely applies the clear mandate of
the law, that is, Congress is entitled to only one representative in the JBC in
the same way that its co-equal branches are.
As the Court declared in Chavez, Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution is clear, categorical and unambiguous. Thus, it needs no further
construction or interpretation. Time and time again, it has been repeatedly
declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation, only application.
JARDELEZA VS SERENO
FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) announce an opening for application and
recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza),
incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of
candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.
However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself –
CJ Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because
Jardeleza’s integrity is in question.
During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which
characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he
would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His
request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist.
Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to
compel the JBC to include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ
Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having
garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of
JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or opposition to an application
is raised.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 31 | P a g e
RULING: Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does
not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC
proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard
and to explain one’s self is availing.
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the
observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s
duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in
the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due
process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an
applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the
chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the
situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and
capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an
objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person
challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that
an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been
included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position
of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the
JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.
True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind
from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of
due process.
VILLANUEVA VS JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
FACTS : The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan,
Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court.
On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge
in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch
13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur In a letter2 dated
December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination,
informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for
the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through
electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of
considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not
pass the prejudicature examination. The petitioner was informed by the JBC
Executive Officer, through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest
and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision
not to include his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's
long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level
courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current
position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only
for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner
to take recourse to this Court
ISSUE : WON the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent
the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution to
recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function
HELD : The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present
Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process
of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or
Consti – Judiciary Cases 32 | P a g e
quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and
criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and
incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a
determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and
enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of
the Court's power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that
the power of supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties.
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC
is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus,
when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the Court, through its
supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter
and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules
The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing
JBC's policy. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the
applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must
be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The
remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer
to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of
discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly
compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound
discretion by the JBC
The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory
relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract
or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an
executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this
remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the
written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties
thereunder."
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound
policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the
petitioner has the right to be included in the list of applicants although he
failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates
that no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included
in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of
appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially
enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court
does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even
if only questions of law are involved.18 The special civil action of declaratory
relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to
Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the
exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over
the present petition. But in any event, even if the Court will set aside
procedural infirmities.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 33 | P a g e
IN RE: CUNANAN
FACTS: As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional,
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that
in 1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar was stricken down was based under the following reasons:
Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar
Section 1 provided the following passing marks: from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was
very close to the end of World War II;
1946-1951………………70% The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;
1952 …………………….71% The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine
who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative
1953……………………..72% power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down
by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to
1954……………………..73% substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
1955……………………..74% As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster
enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%. take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court
resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify
75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and rules of admission to the practice of law.
the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average
in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being
embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the
bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing
partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.
Consti – Judiciary Cases 34 | P a g e
SALONGA VS PANO
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and
liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case
has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion
against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the
respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and
persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro
Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. Victor
Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner
Salonga as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a
“Notice of Preliminary Investigation” in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al.
(which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that “the preliminary
investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on
December 12, 1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt
of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his
counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was
lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not
received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called
supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint
signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga,
along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD
885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a
motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution
to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani
Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII,
Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a
resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised
Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The
resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are
the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of
Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to
justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his
further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to
admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a
decision from the Supreme Court
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on
the Court’s judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was
circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January
18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent
City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner.
Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied
its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as
one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent
Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and
signatures and to place it once again in the Court’s crowded agenda for
further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion
charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by
the action of the prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and
academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in
similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by
constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal
from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of
fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the
Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.”
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In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of
the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was
mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center’s new charter pursuant to
the President’s legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court
discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development
of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of
the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that
the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise
of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous
decisions ever printed in the Reports
DAVID VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President
announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th
anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to
hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the
rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf
S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper
columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of
party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to
arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and
BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On
March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari
with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President
Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the
proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress
and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of
speech and assembly.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald
Llamas and the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies
were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as
respondent in the petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the
constitutionality of the proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the
alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used?
Ruling:
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it
constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the
President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related
to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The
absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and
oppression on the part of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section
17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative
legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private
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business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only
partly unconstitutional.
2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the
dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members
during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners
were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and
violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices
and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are
declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of
a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the
doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide
for it in the Constitution or law.
4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v.
Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have
“a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the
petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from
“illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives
pursuant to PP 1017.
5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times
of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President
may temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest only if there is congressional authority or
approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the
terms and conditions under which the President may exercise the powers
that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law would be
observed.

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