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* the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per year, the interim period being deemed
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILARREYES, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES CIPRIANO
MIJARES and FLORENTINA MIJARES, respondents.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Civil Law; Marriage; Conjugal Property; The husband could not alienate or encumber
any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied of the wife otherwise the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
contract is voidable.—The husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real
Renato T. Nuguid for petitioners.
property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is
voidable. Indeed, in several cases the Court had ruled that such alienation or encumbrance Napoleon A. Espiritu for private respondents.
by the husband is void. The better view, however, is to consider the transaction as merely
voidable and not void. This is consistent with Article 173 of the Civil Code pursuant to YNARESSANTIAGO, J.:
which the wife could, during the marriage and within 10 years from the questioned
transaction, seek its annulment. Under the regime of the Civil Code, the alienation or encumbrance of a conjugal real
Same; Same; Same; The alienation or encumbrance must be annulled in its entirety property requires the consent of the wife. The absence of such consent renders the entire
and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned .—The trial transaction1 merely voidable and not void.2 The wife may, during the marriage and within
court correctly annulled the voidable sale of Lot No. 4349B2 in its entirety. In Bucoy v. ten years from the transaction questioned, bring an action for the annulment of the contract
entered into by her husband without her consent.3
Paulino, a case involving the annulment of sale with assumption of mortgages executed by
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the January 26, 2000 Decision 4 and
the husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the alienation or encumbrance
June 19, 2000, Resolution5 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 28464 which declared
must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal
respondents as purchasers in good faith and set aside the May 31, 1990 and June 29, 1990
property is concerned. Although the transaction in the said case was declared void and not
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, in Civil Case No. Q48018.
merely voidable.
The controversy stemmed from a dispute over Lot No. 4349B2,6 approximately 396
Same; Property; Sales; A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a square meters, previously covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 205445, located
reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.—With respect to the in Balintawak, Quezon City and registered in the name of Spouses Vicente Reyes and
third issue, the Court finds that respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith. A Ignacia AguilarReyes.7 Said lot and the apartments built thereon were part of the spouses’
purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other conjugal properties having been purchased using conjugal funds from their garments
person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same, business.8
at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been separated de facto since
persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he 1974.9 Sometime in 1984, Ignacia learned that on March 1, 1983, Vicente sold Lot No. 4349
receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. A purchaser cannot B2 to respondent spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares for P40,000.00. 10 As a
close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he consequence thereof, TCT No. 205445 was cancelled and TCT No. 306087 was issued on
acted in good faith. April 19, 1983 in the name of respondent spouses.11 She likewise found out that Vicente filed
Same; Same; Same; If a voidable contract is annulled the restoration of what has been a petition for administration and appointment of guardian with the Metropolitan Trial
given is proper.—If a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is Court of Quezon City, Branch XXI. Vicente misrepresented therein that his wife, Ignacia,
proper. The relationship between parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled died on March 22, 1982, and that he and their 5 minor children were her only heirs. 12 On
must always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing. Hence, for the September 29, 1983, the court appointed Vicente as the guardian of their minor
sake of justice and equity, and in consonance with the salutary principle of nonenrichment children.13 Subsequently, in its Order dated October 14, 1983, the court authorized Vicente
at another’s expense, the Court sustains the trial court’s order directing Vicente to refund to to sell the estate of Ignacia.14
respondent spouses the amount of P110,000.00 which they have paid as purchase price of On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to respondent spouses
Lot No. 4349B2. demanding the return of her 1/2 share in the lot. Failing to settle the matter amicably,
Same; Interests; Interest on obligations not constituting a loan or forbearance of Ignacia filed on June 4, 1996 a complaint 15 for annulment of sale against respondent
money is six percent (6%) annually; After the judgment becomes final and executory until the spouses. The complaint was thereafter amended to include Vicente Reyes as one of the
defendants.16
obligation is satisfied the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per year, the interim period
In their answer, respondent spouses claimed that they are purchasers in good faith and
being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of credit.—The trial court, however, erred in
that the sale was valid because it was duly approved by the court. 17 Vicente Reyes, on the
imposing 12% interest per annum on the amount due the respondents. In Eastern Shipping other hand, contended that what he sold to the spouses was only his share in Lot No. 4349
Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was held that interest on obligations not constituting a B2, excluding the share of his wife, and that he never represented that the latter was
loan or forbearance of money is six percent (6%) annually. If the purchase price could be already dead.18 He likewise testified that respondent spouses, through the counsel they
established with certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint, the six percent (6%) provided him, took advantage of his illiteracy by filing a petition for the issuance of letters
interest should be computed from the date the complaint was filed until finality of the of administration and appointment of guardian without his knowledge. 19
decision. After the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied,
On February 15, 1990, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring the sale of Lot No. Both Ignacia AguilarReyes and respondent spouses appealed the decision to the Court of
4349B2 void with respect to the share of Ignacia. It held that the purchase price of the lot Appeals.24 Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and she was substituted by her compulsory
was P110,000.00 and ordered Vicente to return 1/2 thereof or P55,000.00 to respondent heirs.25
spouses. The dispositive portion of the said decision, reads— Petitioners contended that they are entitled to reimbursement of the rentals collected
“WHEREFORE, premises above considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the on the apartment built on Lot No. 4349R2, while respondent spouses claimed that they are
subject Deed of Absolute Sale, dated March [1,] 1983 signed by and between defendants buyers in good faith. On January 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
Vicente Reyes and defendant Cipriano Mijares NULL AND VOID WITH RESPECT TO decision of the trial court. It ruled that notwithstanding the absence of Ignacia’s consent to
ONEHALF (1/2) OF THE SAID PROPERTY; the sale, the same must be held valid in favor of respondents because they were innocent
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to cancel TCT No. 306083 (sic) purchasers for value.26 The decretal potion of the appellate court’s decision states—
in the names of defendant spouses Cipriano Mijares and Florentina Mijares and to issue a “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from and the Orders dated
new TCT in the name of the plaintiff Ignacia AguilarReyes as owner in fee simple of one May 31, 1990 and June 29, 1990, are SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof a new one is rendered
half (1/2) of said property and the other half in the names of defendant spouses Cipriano —
Mijares and Florentin[a] Mijares, upon payment of the required fees therefore; 1. 1.Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 1, 1983 executed by Vicente
Said defendant spouses Mijares are also ordered to allow plaintiff the use and exercise Reyes in favor of spouses Cipriano and [Florentina] Mijares valid and lawful;
of rights, as well as obligations, pertinent to her onehalf (1/2) ownership of the subject 2. 2.Ordering Vicente Reyes to pay spouses Mijares the amount of P30,000.00 as
property; attorney’s fees and legal expenses; and
Defendant Vicente Reyes is hereby ordered to reimburse P55,000.00 with legal rate of 3. 3.Ordering Vicente Reyes to pay spouses Mijares P50,000.00 as moral damages.
interest from the execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale on March 1, 1983, to the
defendant spouses Cipriano Mijares and Florentina Mijares which corresponds to the one No pronouncement as to costs.
half (1/2) of the actual purchase price by the said Mijares but is annulled in this decision SO ORDERED.”27
(sic); Undaunted by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, 28 petitioners filed the instant
Defendant Vicente Reyes is hereby further ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of petition contending that the assailed sale of Lot No. 4392B2 should be annulled because
P50,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages, plus costs of this suit. respondent spouses were not purchasers in good faith.
SO ORDERED.”20 The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) What is the status of the sale of Lot No. 4349B2
Ignacia filed a motion for modification of the decision praying that the sale be declared void to respondent spouses? (2) Assuming that the sale is annullable, should it be annulled in its
in its entirety and that the respondents be ordered to reimburse to her the rentals they entirety or only with respect to the share of Ignacia? (3) Are respondent spouses purchasers
collected on the apartments built on Lot No. 4349B2 computed from March 1, 1983. in good faith?
On May 31, 1990, the trial court modified its decision by declaring the sale void in its Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code,29 the governing laws at the time the assailed sale
entirety and ordering Vicente Reyes to reimburse respondent spouses the purchase price of was contracted, provide:
P110,000. Thus— Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the subject under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or
Deed of Absolute Sale, dated March 1, 1983 signed by and between defendants Vicente encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. If she
Reyes and defendant Cipriano Mijares as null and void ab initio, in view of the absence of refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same . . .
the wife’s conformity to said transaction. Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
Consequent thereto, the Register of Deeds for Quezon City is hereby ordered to cancel questioner, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into
TCT No. 306083 (sic) in the name of Cipriano Mijares and Florentin[a] Mijares and issue a without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband
new TCT in the name of the plaintiff and defendant Ignacia AguilarReyes and Vicente which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.
Reyes as owners in fee simple, upon payment of required fees therefore. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the
Defendant Vicente Reyes is hereby ordered to pay the amount of one hundred ten marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
thousand pesos (P110,000.00) with legal rate of interest at 12% per annum from the Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the husband could not alienate or encumber any
execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale on March 1, 1983. conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the
Further, defendant Vicente Reyes is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 by way of contract is voidable. Indeed, in several cases30 the Court had ruled that such alienation or
moral and exemplary damages, plus costs of this suit. encumbrance by the husband is void. The better view, however, is to consider the
SO ORDERED.”21 transaction as merely voidable and not void. 31 This is consistent with Article 173 of the Civil
On motion22 of Ignacia, the court issued an Order dated June 29, 1990 amending the Code pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and within 10 years from the
dispositive portion of the May 31, 1990 decision by correcting the Transfer Certificate of questioned transaction, seek its annulment.32
Title of Lot No. 4349B2, in the name of Cipriano Mijares and Florentina Mijares, from In the case of Heirs of Christina Ayuste v. Court of Appeals;33 it was categorically held
TCT No. 306083 to TCT No. 306087; and directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to that—
issue a new title in the name of Ignacia AguilarReyes and Vicente Reyes. The Order There is no ambiguity in the wording of the law. A sale of real property of the conjugal
likewise specified that Vicente Reyes should pay Ignacia AguilarReyes the amount of partnership made by the husband without the consent of his wife is voidable. The action for
P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.23 annulment must be brought during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned
transaction by the wife. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no that. The conjugal property is even subject to the payment of debts contracted by either
room for interpretation—there is room only for application. 34 spouse before the marriage, as those for the payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon
Likewise, in Spouses Guiang v. Court of Appeals,35 the Court quoted with approval the them after the responsibilities in Article 161 have been covered (Article 163, par. 3), if it
ruling of the trial court that under the Civil Code, the encumbrance or alienation of a turns out that the spouse who is bound thereby, “should have no exclusive property or if it
conjugal real property by the husband absent the wife’s consent, is voidable and not void. should be insufficient.” These are considerations that go beyond the mere equitable share of
Thus— the wife in the property. These are reasons enough for the husband to be stopped from
. . . Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber disposing of the conjugal property without the consent of the wife. Even more fundamental
any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. The alienation or is the fact that the nullity is decreed by the Code not on the basis of prejudice but lack of
encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended consent of an indispensable party to the contract under Article 166. 37
wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus, the provision With respect to the third issue, the Court finds that respondent spouses are not purchasers
of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit: Art. 173. The wife may, during the in good faith. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice
marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the
right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on
property fraudulently alienated by the husband. his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.38
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years x x x during [the] marriage to annul
the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that In the instant case, there existed circumstances that should have placed respondent spouses
any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect on guard. The death certificate of Ignacia, shows that she died on March 22, 1982. The same
by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null death certificate, however, reveals that—(1) it was issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar
and void . . . of Lubao Pampanga on March 10, 1982; (2) the alleged death of Ignacia was reported to the
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that Lot No. 4349B2, is a conjugal property having
Office of the Civil Registrar on March 4, 1982; and (3) her burial or cremation would be
been purchased using the conjugal funds of the spouses during the subsistence of their
on March 8, 1982.39 These obvious flaws in the death certificate should have prompted
marriage. It is beyond cavil therefore that the sale of said lot to respondent spouses without
the knowledge and consent of Ignacia is voidable. Her action to annul the March 1, 1983 respondents to investigate further, especially so that respondent Florentina Mijares
sale which was filed on June 4, 1986, before her demise is perfectly within the 10 year admitted on cross examination that she asked for the death certificate of Ignacia because
prescriptive period under Article 173 of the Civil Code. Even if we reckon the period from she was suspicious that Ignacia was still alive.40 Moreover, respondent spouses had all the
November 25, 1978 which was the date when Vicente and the respondent spouses entered opportunity to verify the claim of Vicente that he is a widower because it was their lawyer,
into a contract concerning Lot No. 4349B2, Ignacia’s action would still be within the Atty. Rodriguito S. Saet, who represented Vicente in the special proceedings before the
prescribed period. Metropolitan Trial Court.
Anent the second issue, the trial court correctly annulled the voidable sale of Lot No.
4349B2 in its entirety. In Bucoy v. Paulino,36 a case involving the annulment of sale with Neither can respondent spouses rely on the alleged court approval of the sale. Note that
assumption of mortgages executed by the husband without the consent of the wife, it was the Order issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XXXI, appointing
held that the alienation or encumbrance must be annulled in its entirety and not only Vicente as guardian of his 5 minor children, as well as the Order authorizing him to sell the
insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned. Although the estate of Ignacia were issued only on September 29, 1983 and October 14, 1983,
transaction in the said case was declared void and not merely voidable the rationale for the respectively. On the other hand, the sale of the entire Lot No. 4349B2 to respondent
annulment of the whole transaction is the same thus— spouses appears to have been made not on March 1, 1983, but even as early as November
The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its 25, 1978. In the “Agreement” dated November 25, 1978, Vicente in consideration of the
entirety, executed by the husband without the wife’s consent, may be annulled by the wife. amount of P110,000.00, sold to Cipriano Mijares Lot No. 4349B2 on installment basis,
Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall “prejudice” with the first installment due on or before July 31, 1979. 41 This was followed by a
the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. It is not the legitimate “Memorandum of Understanding” executed on July 30, 1979, by Vicente and Cipriano—(1)
concern of this Court to recast the law. As Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court and acknowledging Cipriano’s receipt of Vicente’s down payment in the amount of P50,000.00;
Judge Ricardo C. Puno of the Court of First Instance correctly stated, “[t]he rule (in the first and (2) authorizing Florentina Mijares to collect rentals. 42 On July 14, 1981, Vicente and
Cipriano executed another “Memorandum of Agreement,” stating, among other, that out of
sentence of Article 173) revokes Baello vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 213 and Coque vs. Navas
the purchase price of P110,000.00 Vicente had remaining balance of P19,000.00. 43 Clearly
Sioca, 45 Phil. 430,” in which cases annulment was held to refer only to the extent of the therefore, the special proceedings before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
onehalf interest of the wife . . . Branch XXXI, could not have been the basis of respondent spouses’ claim of good faith
The necessity to strike down the contract of July 5, 1963 as a whole, not merely as to because the sale of Lot No. 4349B2 occurred prior thereto.
the share of the wife, is not without its basis in the commonsense rule. To be underscored Respondent spouses cannot deny knowledge that at the time of the sale in 1978, Vicente
here is that upon the provisions of Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal was married to Ignacia and that the latter did not give her conformity to the sale. This is so
partnership is liable for many obligations while the conjugal partnership exists. Not only because the 1978 “Agreement” described Vicente as “married” but the conformity of his wife
to the sale did not appear in the deed. Obviously, the execution of another deed of sale in month, no other evidence was presented to substantiate her claim. In awarding rentals
1983 over the same Lot No. 4349B2, after the alleged death of Ignacia on March 22, 1982, which are in the nature of actual damages, the Court cannot rely on mere assertions,
as well as the institution of the special proceedings were, intended to correct the absence of speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best
Ignacia’s consent to the sale. Even assuming that respondent spouses believed in good faith evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss. 50 None, having been presented in
that Ignacia really died on March 22, 1982, after they purchased the lot, the fact remains the case at bar, petitioner’s claim for rentals must be denied.
that the sale of Lot No. 4349B2 prior to Ignacia’s alleged demise was without her consent While as a general rule, a party who has not appealed is not entitled to affirmative
and therefore subject to annulment. The October 14, 1983 order authorizing the sale of the relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below, law and jurisprudence
estate of Ignacia, could not have validated the sale of Lot No. 4349B2 because said order authorize a tribunal to consider errors, although unassigned, if they involve (1) errors
was issued on the assumption that Ignacia was already dead and that the sale dated March affecting the lower court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) plain errors not specified,
1, 1983 was never categorically approved in the said order. and (3) clerical errors.51 In this case, though defendant Vicente Reyes did not appeal, the
The fact that the 5 minor children 44 of Vicente represented by the latter, signed the “plain error” committed by the court a quo as to the award of moral and exemplary damages
March 1, 1983 deed of sale of Lot No. 4349B2 will not estop them from assailing the must be corrected. These awards cannot be lumped together as was done by the trial
validity thereof. Not only were they too young at that time to understand the repercussions court.52 Moral and exemplary damages are different in nature, and require separate
of the sale, they likewise had no right to sell the property of their mother who, when they determination. Moral damages are awarded where the claimant experienced physical
signed the deed, was very much alive. suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
If a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper. The moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as a result of the act complained of. 53 The
relationship between parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always be award of exemplary damages, on the other hand, is warranted when moral, temperate,
characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing. Hence, for the sake of justice liquidated, or compensatory damages were likewise awarded by the court.54
and equity, and in consonance with the salutary principle of nonenrichment at another’s Hence, the trial court’s award of “P50,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages”
expense, the Court sustains the trial court’s order directing Vicente to refund to respondent should be modified. Vicente Reyes should be ordered to pay the amounts of P25,000.00 as
spouses the amount of P110,000.00 which they have paid as purchase price of Lot No. 4349 moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Since Vicente Reyes was among the
B2.45 The court a quo correctly found that the subject of the sale was the entire Lot No. heirs substituted to the late Ignacia AguilarReyes, payment of moral and exemplary
4349B2 and that the consideration thereof is not P40,000.00 as stated in the March 1, damages must be made by Vicente to his children, petitioners in this case.
1983 deed of sale, but P110,000.00 as evidenced by the—(1) “Agreement” dated November WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
25, 1978 as well as the July 30, 1979 “Memorandum of Understanding” and the July 14, January 26, 2000 Decision and June 19, 2002, Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R.
1981 “Memorandum of Agreement” which served as receipts of the installment payments No. 28464 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The May 31, 1990 Order of the Regional Trial
made by respondent Cipriano Mijares; and (2) the receipt duly signed by Vicente Reyes Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, in Civil Case No. Q48018, which annulled the March 1,
acknowledging receipt of the amount of P110,000.00 from respondent spouses as payment of 1983 Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 4349B2, and ordered the Register of Deeds of
the sale of the controverted lot.46 Quezon City to cancel TCT No. 306087 in the name of respondent spouses Cipriano Mijares
The trial court, however, erred in imposing 12% interest per annum on the amount due and Florentina Mijares covering the same property; as well as the June 29, 1990 Order
the respondents. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,47 it was held that correcting the typographical errors in the order dated March 1, 1983, are REINSTATED,
interest on obligations not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six percent (6%) with the following MODIFICATIONS—
annually. If the purchase price could be established with certainty at the time of the filing of 1. (1)The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is ordered to issue a new certificate of
the complaint, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the date the complaint title over Lot No. 4349B2, in the name of petitioners as coowners thereof;
was filed until finality of the decision. In Liu v. Loy, Jr.48 involving a suit for reconveyance 2. (2)Vicente Reyes is ordered to reimburse the respondent spouses the amount of
and annulment of title filed by the first buyer against the seller and the second buyer, the P110,000.00 as purchase price of Lot No. 4349B2, with interest at 6% per
Court, ruling in favor of the first buyer and annulling the second sale, ordered the seller to annum from June 4, 1986, until finality of this decision. After this decision
refund to the second buyer (who was not a purchaser in good faith) the purchase price of the becomes final, interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the principal and
lots. It was held therein that the 6% interest should be computed, from the date of the filing interest (or any part thereof) shall be imposed until full payment.
of the complaint by the first buyer. After the judgment becomes final and executory until 3. (3)Defendant Vicente Reyes is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Ignacia Aguilar
the obligation is satisfied, the amount due shall Reyes, the amounts of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
earn interest at 12% per year, the interim period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance exemplary damages.
of credit.49
Accordingly, the amount of P110,000.00 due the respondent spouses which could be
SO ORDERED.
determined with certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint shall earn 6% interest
per annum from June 4, 1986 until the finality of this decision. If the adjudged principal Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
and the interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be Petition partially granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final and Note.—A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made by the husband
executory until it is fully satisfied. without the consent of his wife is voidable. (Heirs of Christina Ayuste vs. Court of
Petitioner’s prayer for payment of rentals should be denied. Other than the allegation of Appeals, 313 SCRA 493 [1999])
Ignacia in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that the apartments could be rented at P1,000.00 a
there was no such order previously made by the court, there is nothing thereafter to be
recorded.
Same; When liability of judgment debtor is joint only.—When the judgment does not
order the defendants to make a solidary payment to the plaintiff, their liability is merely
joint. No one of them may be compelled to satisfy the judgment in full (Art 1137, New Civil
Code).
Husband and wife; Conjugal partnership; When property in the name of one spouse is
not presumed to be conjugal.—The presumption that property is conjugal refers to property
acquired during the marriage. When there is no showing as to when the property was
acquired by a spouse, the fact that the title is in the spouse's name is an indication that the
property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
Same; House constructed on separate lot of a, spouse does not automatically become
conjugal.—The construction of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of a
spouse does not automatically make it conjugal. It is true that, in the meantime, the
conjugal partnership may use both the land and building, but it does so not as owner but as
usufructuary. The ownership of the land remains the same until the value thereof is paid.
This payment can only be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership.
Appeals; Facts occurring after the appeal.—A petition filed in the appellate court,
during the pendency of an appeal, which petition alleges facts occurring after the perfection
of the appeal, should be passed upon by the trial court in connection with the
implementation of the judgment rendered on appeal.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of, Dagupan City. San Diego, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
N. Tanopo, Jr. and V. Millora for plaintiffappellant.
Manuel Ancheta and Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for def endantsappellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Dagupan City in its Civil Case No.
10485, dated June 28, 1961. This case was originally brought to the Court of Appeals, but
subsequently certified to Us on the ground that the issues raised are purely legal.
It appears that on November 3, 1948, the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant
Nieves de Lozano and her husband Pascual Lozano for the collection of a sum of money.
No. L21533. June 29, 1967. After trial, the court a quo on June 23, 1959 rendered its decision, the dispositive part of
HERMOGENES MARAMBA, plaintiffappellant, vs'. NIEVES DE LOZANO, ET AL.. which is as follows:
defendantsappellees. "WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders judgment, sentencing the defendants herein,
Judgments; Final and executory judgment cannot be corrected; Exception.— Nieves de Lozano and Pascual Lozano, to pay unto the herein plaintiff, Hermogenes
Maramba, the total sum of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos and Seven Centavos
A judgment, which has become final and executory, can no longer be amended or corrected
(P3,500.07), with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the instant complaint
by the court, except for clerical errors or mistakes, However erroneous it may be, it cannot
until fully paid.
be disobeyed; otherwise, litigations would be endless and no question could be considered
With costs against the said defendants."
finally settled.
Not satisfied with the judgment, the def endants interposed an appeal to the Court of
Same; When nunc pro tunc order is allowed.—An amendment of a judgment which Appeals but the appeal was dismissed on March 30, 1960 for failure of the defendants to file
involves not merely clerical errors but the very substance of the controversy, cannot be
their brief on time. After the record of the case was remanded to the court a quo, a writ of
accomplished by means of a nunc pro tunc order. The purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is to execution was issued, and on August 18, 1960 levy was made upon a parcel of land covered
make a present record of an order which the court rendered at a previous term when the by transfer certificate of title No, 8192 of Pangasinan in the name of Nieves de Lozano. The
thing ordered has previously been made but, by inadvertence, has not been entered. When
notice of sale at public auction was published in accordance with law and scheduled for thing ordered s previously been made, but by inadvertence has not been entered. In the
September 16, 1960. instant case there was no order previous made by the court and therefore there is nothing
On that date, however, defendant Nieves de Lozano made a partial satisfaction of the now to be recorded.
judgment in the amount of P2,000.00, and requested for an adjournment of the sale to Now ten, it is clear that the decision of June 23, 1959 does not specify the extent of the
October 26, 1960. On October 17, 1960, she filed an amended motion, dated October 14, liability of each defendant. The rule is that when the judgment does not order the
alleging that on November 11, 1952, during the pendency of the case, defendant Pascual defendants to pay jointly and severally their liability is merely joint, and none of them may
Lozano died and that the property levied upon was her paraphernal property, and praying be compelled to satisfy the judgment in full. This is in harmony with Articles 11 and 1138 of
that her liability be fixed at onehalf (1/2) of the amount awarded in the judgment and that the Civil Code.
pending the resolution of the issue an order be issued restraining the Sheriff from carrying Plaintappellant contends that in any event the entire judgment debt can be satisfied
out the auction sale scheduled on October 26, 1960. from the proceeds of the property sold at public auction in view of the presumption that is
On that date the sale proceeded anyway, and the property of Nieves de Lozano which conjugal in character although in the name of only e of the spouses. The contention is
has been levied upon was sold to the judgment creditor, as the highest bidder, for the incorrect. The pressumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code ref ers to proper acquired
amount of P4,175.12, the balance of the judgment debt. during the marriage. But in the instant casthere is no showing as to when the property in
On October 27, 1960, plaintiff filed an opposition to the defendant's amended motion question as acquired and hence the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is
dated October 14, 1960. And on June 28, 1961, the trial court issued the questioned order, determinative. Furthermore, appellant himself admits in his brief (p. 17) that the property
the dispositive part of which is as follows: in question is paraphernal.
"WHEREFORE, the court hereby grants the motion of counsel for defendant Nieves de Appellate next points out that even if the land levied upon we originally paraphernal, it
Lozano, dated October 5, 1960, which was amended on October 14, 1960, and holds that the became conjugal property by rtue of the construction of a house thereon at the expee of the
liability of the said defendant under the judgment of June 23, 1959, is only joint, or common fund, pursuant to Article 158 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. However, it has been
P1,750.04, which is onehalf (1/2) of the judgment debt of P3,500.07 awarded to the plaintiff held by this Court that the construction of a house at conjugal expense d the exclusive
and that the writ of execution be accordingly modified in the sense that the liability of property of one of the spouses does not automatically make it conjugal. It is true that in the
defendant Nieves de Lozano be only P1,750.04 with legal interest from the date of the filing meantime the conjugal partnership may use both the land and the building, but it does so
of the complaint on November 5, 1948 until fully paid, plus the amount of P21.28 which is not as owner but in the exercise of the right of usufruct. The ownership of the land remains
also onehalf (1/2) of the costs taxed by the Clerk of Court against the defendant spouses. the same until the value thereof is paid, and this payment can only be demanded in the
Let the auction sale of the abovementioned property of defendant Nieves de Lozano proceed liquidation of the partnership (Coingco vs. Flores, 82 Phil. 284; Paterno vs. Bibby Vda. de
to satisfy her liability of P1,750.04 with legal interest as above stated and the further sum Padilla, 74 Phil. 377; Testate Estate of Narciso Padilla, G.R. No. L8748, Dec. 26, 1961). The
of P21.28 representing the costs, unless she voluntarily pays the same to the judgment record does not show that there has already been a liquidation of the conjugal partnership
creditor (herein plaintiff)." between the late Pascual Lozano and Nieves de Lozano. Consequently, the property levied
Plaintiff interposed an appeal from the abovequoted order and assigned several errors, upon, being the separate property of defendant Nieves de Lozano, cannot be made to answer
which present three major issues, to wit: for the liability of the other defendant.
1. (a)whether or not the decision of the lower court dated June 23, 1959 could still be On May 18, 1967 counsel for defendantsappellees filed with Us a petition
questioned; alleging, inter alia; that prior to the expiration of the redemption period and pursuant to an
2. (b)whether or not the judgment was joint or solidary; and order of the lower court defendants filed a surety bond in the amount 01 P3,175.12 as the
3. (c)whether or not the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds of the redemption price, which bond was duly approved by the lower court; that sometime last
properties sold at public auction. September 1966, defendants filed a petition before the lower court praying that the sheriff
of Pangasinan be ordered to execute the corresponding deed of redemption in favor of
Plaintiffappellant submits that a "nunc pro tunc" order should have been issued by the trial defendant Nieves de Lozano represented by her judicial administrator or that, in the
court dismissing, as of November 11, 1952, the case against the late Pascual Lozano by .alternative, the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City be directed to cancel Entries Nos. 19234
reason of his death, and that the lower court should have corrected its decision of June 23, and 20042 at the back of TCT No. 8192; and that said petition was denied by the lower
1959, by striking out the letter "s" in the word "defendants" and deleting the words "and court. The same prayer made below is reiterated in the said petition of May 18, 1967.
Pascual Lozano." The foregoing petition of May 18, 1967 alleges facts which occurred after the perfection
We do not think that the action suggested would be legally justified. It would entail a of the present appeal and which should therefore be submitted to and passed upon by the
substantial amendment of the decision of June 23, 1959, which has long become final and in trial court in connection with the implementation of the order appealed from, which is
fact partially executed. A decision which has become final and executory can no longer be hereby affirmed, with costs.
amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes, 1 and however Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castr
erroneous it may be, cannot be disobeyed;2 otherwise litigations would be endless and no o, JJ., concur.
questions could be considered finally settled. 3 The amendment sought by appellee involves Order affirmed.
not merely clerical errors but the very substance of the controversy. And it cannot be
Notes.—The phrase nunc pro tunc signifies "now for then", or that a thing is done now that
accomplied by the issuance of a "nunc pro tunc" order such as at sought in this case. The
shall have the same legal effect as if done at the time it ought to have been done. A court
purpose of an order "nunc p tunc" is to make a present record of an order which the court
may order an act done nunc pro tunc when it, or one of its immediate ministerial officers,
made at a previous term. but which was not then recorded. It can only be made when the
has done some act which for some reason has not been entered of record or otherwise noted
at the time the order or judgment was made or should have been made to appear on the
papers or proceedings by the ministerial officer (Secou vs. Leroux, 1 N. M. 388, 389, cited
in Lichauco vs. Tan Pho, 51 Phil. 862, 880).
The object of a nunc pro tunc, is not the rendering a new judgment and the
ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the
record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to
make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to
G.R. No. 145222. April 24, 2009.*
render judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did
erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and ROMULO NICOL,
may have been. (Wolmerding vs. Corbin Banking Co., 28 So. 640, 641, 126 Ala. 268).
respondents.
A nunc pro tunc entry in practice is an entry made now of something which was
actually previously done, to have effect as of the former date. Its office is not to supply Appeals; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Where the error is not one of jurisdiction,
omitted action by the court, but to supply an omission in the record of action already had, but of law or fact which is a mistake of judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal.—A
but omitted through inadvertence or mistake. (Perkins vs. Haywood, 31 NE 670, 672). petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is adopted to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasijudicial agency, or when there is grave
In this jurisdiction there is no positive rule or statute governing nunc pro tunc orders
abuse of discretion on the part of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of
(Lichauco vs. Tan Pho, supra). jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake
In order that a court may enter a nunc pro tunc order, that is to say, an order in writing of judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal. In addition, an independent action for
containing what was previously ordered verbally, it is necessary that there should be a basis certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
for said nunc pro tunc order, that is, some circumstance in the record relative to the order remedy in the ordinary course of law.
which is sought to be supplied by the nunc pro tunc, whether said circumstance relates to Actions; ThirdParty Claims; Pleadings and Practice; Apart from the remedy of
the whole of the order or to a point thereof, in such a way that the part not found in the terceria available to a thirdparty claimant or to a stranger to the foreclosure suit against the
record may be a necessary part, an inevitable and ordinary consequence of the point sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy
appearing therein. (Syllabus, Lichauco vs. Tan Pho, supra). thereof upon the judgment creditor, a thirdparty claimant may also resort to an independent
Where judicial approval for a lease was required, but it was neither obtained in due
separate action, the object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the property
time nor subsequently, inasmuch as the approbatory nunc pro tunc order impliedly entered
seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the
in the judgment appealed from is invalid on account of having been entered without a
property.—Apart from the remedy of terceria available to a thirdparty claimant or to a
sufficient legal basis therefor, said lease is void (Lichauco vs. Tan Pho, supra).
stranger to the foreclosure suit against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on
However, the omission to state in the dispositive part of a judgment, rendered in a case
him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, a thirdparty
for the foreclosure of a mortgage, that the mortgagor should pay the amount of the
claimant may also resort to an independent separate action, the object of which is the
judgment to the court within a period not less than three months, as provided in section 256
recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages
of the Code of Procedure (now section 2, Rule 68, Revised Rules of Court), may be corrected
arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the property. If a separate action is the
even after the said judgment had become final and the expiration of the term during which.
recourse, the thirdparty claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an
it was rendered (Rodriguez vs. Caoibes, 62 Phil. 142). action, distinct and separate from the action in
Another case regarding nunc pro tunc order is Philippine Long Distance Telephone which the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a claim in
Company vs. Medina, L24340, July 18, 1967 ante. the court that issued the writ.
As to trial court's ministerial duty to execute final judgments, see Republic vs. De los Same; Same; Husband and Wife; Conjugal Properties; Parties; A thirdparty claim
Angeles, L26112, June 30, 1967, post. must be filedby a person other than the judgment debtor or his agent—only a stranger to the
case may file a thirdparty claim; In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the
suit, the character of the property must be taken into account.—A thirdparty claim must be
filed by a person other than the judgment debtor or his agent. In other words, only a
stranger to the case may file a thirdparty claim. This leads us to the question: Is the
husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on
account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a “stranger?” In
determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the property
must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 59 (1989), which
was later adopted in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 356 (2004) this Court
held that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case
prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals, 347 SCRA 60 attorney’s fees and litigation expenses and exemplary damages and the cost of suit of the
(2000), and Sy v. Discaya, 181 SCRA 378 (1990), the Court stated that a spouse is deemed a plaintiff aside from your lawful fees on this execution and do likewise return this writ into
stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is therefore justified in court within sixty (60) days from date, with your proceedings endorsed hereon.
bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution and
paraphernal property. lawful fees thereon, then you are commanded that of the lands and buildings of said
defendant you make the said sum of money in the manner required by the Rules of Court,
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlike in the system of absolute community where
and make return of your proceedings with this writ within sixty (60) days from date.” 3
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasidelict is chargeable to the
Finding Erlinda Nicol’s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the
absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution addressed to the
the debtorspouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership Register of Deeds of Cavite. The notice of levy was annotated on the Transfer Certificate of
of gains; By no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising Title No. T125322.
from the crime of slander committed by the spouse redounded to the benefit of the conjugal On 20 November 1992, a notice of sheriff’s sale was issued.
partnership.—There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993, an affidavit of third
party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting
of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the
petitioners to put up a sheriff’s indemnity bond. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
as the highest bidder.
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the
On 4 February 1993, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners.
system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a
Almost a year later on 2 February 1994, Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of
crime or quasidelict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or
Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtorspouse, the same advantage is not
preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as plaintiff
accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains
therein, alleged that the defendants, now petitioners, connived and directly levied upon and
has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtorspouse.
execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation
Respondent averred that there was no proper publication and posting of the notice of sale.
arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the
Furthermore, respondent claimed that his property which was valued at P500,000.00 was
conjugal partnership.
only sold at a “very low price” of P51,685.00, whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Nicol was only P40,000.00. The case was assigned to Branch 21 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
In response, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
Venus T. Buado for petitioners.
and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of execution. Citing De Leon v.
TINGA, J.:
Salvador,4 petitioners claimed that respondent should have filed the case with Branch
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of
19 where the judgment originated and which issued the order of execution, writ of
Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 47029 and its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof. execution, notice of levy and notice of sheriff’s sale.
The case stemmed from the following factual backdrop: In an Order5 dated 18 April 1994, the RTC dismissed respondent’s complaint and ruled
On 30 April 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) filed a complaint for that Branch 19 has jurisdiction over the case, thus:
damages against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda) with Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) “As correctly pointed out by the defendants, any flaw in the implementation of the writ
of Bacoor, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 8433. Said action originated from Erlinda of execution by the implementing sheriff must be brought before the court issuing the writ
Nicol’s civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by of execution. Besides, there are two (2) remedies open to the plaintiff, if he feels that the
petitioners. property being levied on belongs to him and not to the judgment debtor. The first remedy is
On 6 April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages. to file a thirdparty claim. If he fails to do this, a right is reserved to him to vindicate his
The dispositive portion reads: claim over the property by any proper action. But certainly, this is not the proper action
“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff[s] and against reserved to the plaintiff to vindicate his claim over the property in question to be ventilated
defendant ordering the latter to pay the former the amount of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) before this court. As earlier stated, this case should have been addressed to Branch 19, RTC
pesos as moral damages, five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as attorney’s fees and litigation Bacoor as it was that court which issued the writ of execution.” 6
expenses, another five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages and the cost of Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied on 26 July 1994.
suit.”2 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that Branch 21 has
Said decision was affirmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and this Court. It jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by appellant. The dispositive portion reads:
became final and executory on 5 March 1992. “WHEREFORE, the Orders appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
On 14 October 1992, the trial court issued a writ of execution, a portion of which This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 for further
provides: proceedings.
“Now, therefore, you are commanded that of the goods and chattels of the defendant SO ORDERED.”7
Erlinda Nicol, or from her estates or legal heirs, you cause the sum in the amount of forty Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied on 23 August 2000. Hence, the
thousand pesos (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, representing the moral damages, instant petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is adopted to correct errors of may also resort to an independent separate action, the object of which is the recovery of
jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasijudicial agency, or when there is grave ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising
abuse of discretion on the part of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of from wrongful seizure and detention of the property. If a separate action is the recourse, the
jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake thirdparty claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an action, distinct
of judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal. In addition, an independent action for and separate from the action in which the judgment is being enforced, even before or
certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate without need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ.10
remedy in the ordinary course of law. 8 A thirdparty claim must be filed by a person other than the judgment debtor or his
Nowhere in the petition was it shown that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may file a thirdparty claim.
questioned. The issue devolves on whether the husband of the judgment debtor may file an This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose
independent action to protect the conjugal property subject to execution. The alleged error conjugal property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment
therefore is an error of judgment which is a proper subject of an appeal. obligor, considered a “stranger?”
Nevertheless, even if we were to treat this petition as one for review, the case should In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the
still be dismissed on substantive grounds. property must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court of Appeals,11 which was later
Petitioners maintain that Branch 19 retained jurisdiction over its judgment to the adopted in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals,12 this Court held that the husband of the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts for its execution and all incidents thereof, in line judgment debtor cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case prosecuted and adjudged against
with De Leon v. Salvador. Petitioners insist that respondent, who is the husband of the his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. 13 On
judgment debtor, is not the “third party” contemplated in Section 17 (now Section 16), Rule the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals 14 and Sy v. Discaya,15 the Court stated that a
39 of the Rules of Court, hence a separate action need not be filed. Furthermore, petitioners spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is
assert that the obligation of the wife redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership
and cited authorities to the effect that the husband is liable for the tort committed by his over his exclusive or paraphernal property.
wife. Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the
Respondent on the other hand merely avers that the decision of the Court of Appeals is
judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not.
supported by substantial evidence and in accord with law and jurisprudence.9
Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is
Verily, the question of jurisdiction could be resolved through a proper interpretation of
chargeable to the conjugal partnership. We do not agree.
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the
“Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. Family Code16 explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband
If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse
making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound by reason of a crime or quasidelict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in
to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond
the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtorspouse, the same
approved by the court to indemnify the thirdparty claimant in a sum not less than the
advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal
value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be
partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor
determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking
spouse.
or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil
filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.
obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any
of the conjugal partnership.
thirdparty claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation
claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the
separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the conjugal partnership.17
same or a separate action against a thirdparty claimant who filed a frivolous or In Guadalupe v. Tronco,18 this Court held that the car which was claimed by the third
plainly spurious claim. party complainant to be conjugal property was being levied upon to enforce “a judgment for
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any support” filed by a third person, the thirdparty claim of the wife is proper since the
officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in case the obligation which is personal to the husband is chargeable not on the conjugal property but
sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be represented on his separate property.
by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction is thus
court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for vested on Branch 21. Petitioners failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed grave
the purpose.” (Emphasis Supplied) abuse of discretion in remanding the case to Branch 21 for further proceedings.
Apart from the remedy of terceria available to a thirdparty claimant or to a stranger to WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
the foreclosure suit against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, a thirdparty claimant SO ORDERED.
CarpioMorales,** Velasco, Jr., LeonardoDe Castro*** and Brion, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed, judgment affirmed.
Note.—Pretrial may proceed even in the absence of an answer to the thirdparty
complaint where circumstances show that no such answer was forthcoming. (Philippine
Pryce Assurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 164 [1994])
——o0o——