G.R. No.

199199 August 27, 2013 (1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on,
which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely
filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to
MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-
attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as
SORSOGON, PETITIONER
required by the rules.12
vs.
HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, REYNULFO A. JUAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINES Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU, DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE, GOVERNOR, PROVINCE OF
SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR., VICTORIA A. AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR, AND JUAN
Issues
M. AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL SUMMIT MINES DEV'T CORP., AND TR
ORE, RESPONDENTS.
The main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-
8338. The other issue is whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is no final court
DECISION
decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely
filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits
REYES, J.: and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency.

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Order2 dated
September 16, 2011 and Resolution3 dated October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Sorsogon, Branch 53. The assailed issuances dismissed Civil Case No. 2011-8338 for Continuing
Mandamus, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environment
Protection Order.
Antecedent Facts
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy
Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for
continuing mandamus, damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2011-8338.4 The petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they
protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines
Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the
Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need
to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible
to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction,
ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the
mining operators did not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his
predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have
authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the
interest of the people of Matnog;5 and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the
People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the
Local Government Code.6 Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ
commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog;
(2) the issuance of a temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency
group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron
ore, among others.7
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated
environmental court.8 In the Order9 dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution10 dated October 18,
2011. Aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC11 further ruled that:
Ruling of the Court
Jurisdiction and Venue
In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated September 16, 2011,
apparently relied on SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional
Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-2008,13 designating
the environmental courts "to try and decide violations of environmental laws x x x committed within their
respective territorial jurisdictions."14 Thus, it ruled that its territorial jurisdiction was limited within the
boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and
Juban and that it was "bereft of jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide [the] case, as such authority
rests before another co-equal court."15
Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular
No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the
action filed by the petitioners.
None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to
hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law.16 It may either be over the nature of the action, over the
subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings.17 By virtue
of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special
civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly, Section 21(1)
thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction –
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. (Emphasis ours)
A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which
gave the Court authority to define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority.
These administrative orders and circulars issued by the Court merely provide for the venue where an
action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as
the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress. 18 It also cannot be delegated to another office
or agency of the Government.19 Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly states that the territory thus
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining
the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions. It was also clarified in Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge Matas20 that –
Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National
Capital Judicial Region] and, in like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on
the covered regional trial courts or its branches, such that non-observance thereof would nullify their
judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of the administrative area within which a
branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.21
The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location
in which an action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court.
It is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict
their access to the courts.22 Consequently, the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently incorrect.
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of
improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules)
specifically states that a special civil action for continuing mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC]
exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x."23 In this
case, it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in the Municipality of Matnog
and as such, the petition should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin.24 But even then, it does not warrant
the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be waived.25 Moreover, the action filed by
the petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element of jurisdiction.26 In Gomez-
Castillo v. Commission on Elections,27 the Court even expressed that what the RTC should have done
under the circumstances was to transfer the case (an election protest) to the proper branch. Similarly, it
would serve the higher interest of justice28 if the Court orders the transfer of Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to
the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution, with the RTC applying the Rules in its disposition of
the case.
At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 constituting
the different "green courts" in the country and setting the administrative guidelines in the raffle and
disposition of environmental cases. While the designation and guidelines were made in 2008, the same
should operate in conjunction with the Rules.
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal, the RTC further ruled that the petition was dismissible on the following grounds: (1)
there is no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2)
the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to
attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate
agency.29 The respondents, and even the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of the public
respondents, all concur with the view of the RTC.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay.30 Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of
continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the
enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to
the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and
substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright.
Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss
it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with
the spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.31
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8, Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station
in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence,
specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment
be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied,
and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties
of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping.1âwphi1
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved
by an act or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of
substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations
specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima
facie basis for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment
of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically
enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.32
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law."33 The petition should mainly involve an environmental
and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a
final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus
under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final
judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the
judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing
mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such
judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the
government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective
performance of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a
final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully
implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. 34 A writ of continuing
mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the
court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs
mandated under the court’s decision."35
The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case with
the Panel of Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942.
Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes. 36 But the
petition filed below does not involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are the alleged negative
environmental impact of the small-scale mining operation being conducted by Antones Enterprises,
Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in the Municipality of Matnog; the authority
of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor of these entities; and the perceived
indifference of the DENR and local government officials over the issue. Resolution of these matters does
not entail the technical knowledge and expertise of the members of the Panel but requires an exercise of
judicial function. Thus, in Olympic Mines and Development Corp. v. Platinum Group Metals
Corporation,37 the Court stated –
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement between the parties
as to some provisions of the contract between them, which needs the interpretation and the application
of that particular knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It is not proper when
one of the parties repudiates the existence or validity of such contract or agreement on the ground of
fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of the contract cannot be subject of arbitration
proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of a contract are matters within the
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. These questions are legal in nature and require the application
and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function. 38 (Emphasis supplied
in the former and ours in the latter)
Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial
affidavits. As previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting
evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. There is nothing in
Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the
petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits
of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be attached to the petition/complaint. 39
Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case
should be dismissed. The RTC could have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the petition to
the respondents. It should be remembered that "courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have
the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful
of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to an
opportunity to be heard."40
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution dated
October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 53, dismissing Civil Case No.
2011-8338 are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon is DIRECTED to transfer the case to the Regional Trial Court of Irosin, Branch 55, for further
proceedings with dispatch. Petitioner Maricris D. Dolot is also ORDERED to furnish the respondents with
a copy of the petition and its annexes within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision and to submit its
Compliance with the RTC of Irosin.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211010
VICTORIA SEGOVIA, RUEL LAGO, CLARIESSE JAMI CHAN, REPRESENTING THE CARLESS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; GABRIEL ANASTACIO, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER GRACE
ANASTACIO, DENNIS ORLANDOSANGALANG, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER MAY ALILI
SANGALANG, MARIA PAULINA CASTANEDA, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHERATRICIAANN
CASTANEDA, REPRESENTING THE CHILDREN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CHILDREN OF THE
FUTURE; AND RENATO PINEDA, JR., ARON KERR MENGUITO, MAY ALILI SANGALANG, AND
GLYNDA BATHAN BATERINA, REPRESENTING CAROWNERS WHO WOULD RATHER NOT HA VE
CARS IF GOOD PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION WERE SAFE, CONVENIENT, ACCESSIBLE AND
RELIABLE, Petitioners
vs
THE CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, HIS EXCELLENCY
BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, AND ITS COMMISSIONERS MARY ANN LUCILLE SERING, HEHERSON
ALVAREZANDNADAREV SANO; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
(DOTC) REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE JOSEPH ABAYA; DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) AND THE ROAD BOARD, REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY, HONORABLE ROGELIO SINGSON; DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT (DILG), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE MANUEL ROXAS;
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY, HONORABLE RAMON PAJE; DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
(DBM), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE FLORENCIO ABAD; METROPOLITAN
MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA), REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, FRANCIS
TOLENTINO; DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (DA), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
HONORABLE PROCESO ALCALA; AND JOHN DOES, REPRESENTING AS YET UNNAMED LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE, JURIDICAL ENTITIES,
AND NATURAL PERSONS WHO FAIL OR REFUSE TO IMPLEMENT THE LAW OR COOPERATE IN
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW, Respondents
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus to compel the
implementation of the following environmental laws and executive issuances - Republic Act No. (RA)
97291 (Climate Change Act), and RA 87492 (Clean Air Act); Executive Order No. 7743 (BO 774); AO 254,
s. 20094 (AO 254); and Administrative Order No. 171, s. 20075 (AO 171).
Accordingly, the Petitioners seek to compel: (a) the public respondents to: (1) implement the Road
Sharing Principle in all roads; (2) divide all roads lengthwise, one-half (½) for all-weather sidewalk and
bicycling, the other half for Filipino-made transport vehicles; (3) submit a time-bound action plan to
implement the Road Sharing Principle throughout the country; (b) the Office of the President, Cabinet
officials and public employees of Cabinet members to reduce their fuel consumption by fifty percent (50%)
and to take public transportation fifty percent (50%) of the time; (c) Public respondent DPWH to
demarcate and delineate the road right-of-way in all roads and sidewalks; and (d) Public respondent DBM
to instantly release funds for Road Users' Tax.6
The Facts
To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, Former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change
(PTFCC) on February 20, 2007. This body was reorganized through BO 774, which designated the
President as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as members of the Task Force. EO 774 expressed
what is now referred to by the petitioners as the "Road Sharing Principle." Its Section 9(a) reads:
Section 9. Task Group on Fossil Fuels. - (a) To reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) shall lead a Task Group to reform the transportation
sector. The new paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who
have less in wheels must have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall favor nonmotorized
locomotion and collective transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered mini-train).
In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC (as lead agency for the Task Group on Fossil Fuels
or TGFF) to formulate a national Environmentally Sustainable Transport Strategy (EST) for the
Philippines. The Road Sharing Principle is similarly mentioned, thus:
SECTION 4. Functions of the TGFF- In addition to the functions provided in EO 774, the TGFF shall
initiate and pursue the formulation of the National EST Strategy for the Philippines.
Specifically, the TGFF shall perform the following functions:
(a) Reform the transport sector to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. The new paradigm in the
movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have
more in road." For this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective
transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the manpowered mini-train).
xxxx
Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate Change
Commission which absorbed the functions of the PTFCC and became the lead policy-making body of the
government which shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of
the government relating to climate change.7
Herein petitioners wrote respondents regarding their pleas for implementation of the Road Sharing
Principle, demanding the reform of the road and transportation system in the whole country within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the said letter - foremost, through the bifurcation of roads and the reduction of
official and government fuel consumption by fifty percent (50%).8 Claiming to have not received a
response, they filed this petition.
The Petition
Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children, who in turn
represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good public
transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable". They claim that they are entitled
to the issuance of the extraordinary writs due to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform
an act mandated by environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos. 9
These identified violations10 include: (a) The government's violation of "atmospheric trust" as provided
under Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution, and thoughtless extravagance in the midst of acute public
want under Article 25 of the Civil Code for failure to reduce personal and official consumption of fossil
fuels by at least fifty percent (50%); (b) DOTC and DPWH's failure to implement the Road Sharing
Principle under EO 774; (c) DA's failure to devote public open spaces along sidewalks, roads and parking
lots to sustainable urban farming as mandated by Section 12(b)11 f EO 774; (d) DILG's failure to
coordinate with local government units (LGUs) to guide them on the Road Sharing Principle under Section
9(g)12 of EO 774; (e) DENR's failure to reduce air pollutant emissions; and lastly, (f) DBM's failure to make
available Road Users' Tax for purposes stated in Section 9(e)13 of EO 774.
In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and executive
issuances resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of
the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology,14 and may even be tantamount to
deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, and air" by the government without due process of
law.15 They also decry the "unequal" protection of laws in the prevailing scheme, claiming that ninety-
eight percent (98%) of Filipinos are discriminated against by the law when the car-owning two percent
(2%) is given almost all of the road space and while large budgets are allocated for construction and
maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for sidewalks, bike lanes and non-motorized
transportation systems.16
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment seeking the outright
dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts.17 Moreover, respondents argue that petitioners are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.
Specifically, respondents assert that petitioners are not entitled to a writ of kalikasan because they failed
to show that the public respondents are guilty of an unlawful act or omission; state the environmental
law/s violated; show environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property
of inhabitants of two or more cities; and prove that non- implementation of Road Sharing Principle will
cause environmental damage. Respondents likewise assert that petitioners are similarly not entitled to a
Continuing Mandamus because: (a) there is no showing of a direct or personal injury or a clear legal right
to the thing demanded; (b) the writ will not compel a discretionary act or anything not in a public officer's
duty to do (i.e. the manner by which the Road Sharing Principle will be applied; and to compel DA to
exercise jurisdiction over roadside lands); and (c) DBM cannot be compelled to make an instant release
of funds as the same requires an appropriation made by law (Article VI, Section 29[1] of the Constitution)
and the use of the Road Users' Tax (more appropriately, the Motor Vehicle Users' Charge) requires prior
approval of the Road Board.18
In any event, respondents denied the specific violations alleged in the petition, stating that they have
taken and continue to take measures to improve the traffic situation in Philippine roads and to improve
the environment condition - through projects and programs such as: priority tagging of expenditures for
climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport System which is aimed to decongest
major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service
Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs. These projects are individually and jointly implemented by
the public respondents to improve the traffic condition and mitigate the effects of motorized vehicles on
the environment.19 Contrary to petitioners' claims, public respondents assert that they consider the impact
of the transport sector on the environment, as shown in the Philippine National Implementation Plan on
Environment Improvement in the Transport Sector which targets air pollution improvement actions,
greenhouse gases emission mitigation, and updating of noise pollution standards for the transport sector.
In response, petitioner filed their Reply, substantially reiterating the arguments they raised in the Petition.
ISSUES
From the foregoing submissions, the main issues for resolution are:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition;
2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts; and
3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue. For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:

RULING 1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;

The petition must be dismissed. 2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity; and
Procedural Issues
3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude
20 as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. 34
Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC), respondents argue
that the petitioners failed to show that they have the requisite standing to file the petition, being
representatives of a rather amorphous sector of society and without a concrete interest or It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that
injury.21 Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as citizens, taxpayers, and representatives; that the a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.35
rules on standing had been relaxed following the decision in Oposa v. Factoran;22 and that, in any event,
legal standing is a procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion.23
In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a balanced and
healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that
The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the requirements on standing, public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners'
allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
laws.24 This has been confirmed by this Court's rulings in Arigo v. Swift,25 and International Service for
the Acquisition of Agri-BioTech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
While there can be no disagreement with the general propositions put forth by the petitioners on the
(Philippines).26 However, it bears noting that there is a difference between a petition for the issuance of
correlation of air quality and public health, petitioners have not been able to show that respondents are
a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by
guilty of violation or neglect of environmental laws that causes or contributes to bad air quality. Notably,
the environmental damage subject of the writ; 27 and a petition for the issuance of a writ of
apart from bare allegations, petitioners were not able to show that respondents failed to execute any of
continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or
the laws petitioners cited. In fact, apart from adducing expert testimony on the adverse effects of air
omission. 28
pollution on public health, the petitioners did not go beyond mere allegation in establishing the unlawful
acts or omissions on the part of the public respondents that have a causal link or reasonable connection
Respondents also seek the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petitioners failed to adhere to to the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, reasoning that since a petition for the issuance of a writ magnitude contemplated under the Rules, as required of petitions of this nature. 36
of kalikasan must be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of
Appeals,29 then the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is applicable.30 Petitioners, on the other hand, cite the
Moreover, the National Air Quality Status Report for 2005-2007 (NAQSR) submitted by the petitioners
same provision and argue that direct recourse to this Court is available, and that the provision shows that
belies their claim that the DENR failed to reduce air pollutant emissions - in fact, the NAQSR shows that
the remedy to environmental damage should not be limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the lower
the National Ambient Total Suspended Particulates (TSP) value used to determine air quality has steadily
courts.31
declined from 2004 to 2007,37 and while the values still exceed the air quality guideline value, it has
remained on this same downward trend until as recently as 2011.38
The respondents' argument does not persuade. Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary
remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property
On the other hand, public respondents sufficiently showed that they did not unlawfully refuse to implement
of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord
or neglect the laws, executive and administrative orders as claimed by the petitioners. Projects and
a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective
programs that seek to improve air quality were undertaken by the respondents, jointly and in coordination
resolution of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology
with stakeholders, such as: priority tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation,
that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially exponential nature of
the Integrated Transport System which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-
large-scale ecological threats.32 At the very least, the magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated
Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service Programs, and Urban Re-Greening
under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct
Programs.
resort is allowed where it is dictated by public welfare.1âwphi1 Given that the RPEC allows direct resort
to this Court,33 it is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought
directly before it. In fact, the same NAQSR submitted by the petitioners show that the DENR was, and is, taking concrete
steps to improve national air quality, such as information campaigns, free emission testing to complement
the anti-smoke-belching program and other programs to reduce emissions from industrial smokestacks
Requisites for issuance of Writs of
and from open burning of waste.39 The efforts of local governments and administrative regions in
Kalikasan and Continuing
conjunction with other · executive agencies and stakeholders are also outlined.40
Mandamus

Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.

We find that the petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed for.
Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for continuing mandamus as Clearly, the determination of the means to be taken by the executive in implementing or actualizing any
follows: stated legislative or executive policy relating to the environment requires the use of discretion. Absent a
showing that the executive is guilty of "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
authority,"44 the general rule applies that discretion cannot be checked via this petition for
RULES
continuing mandamus. Hence, the continuing mandamus cannot issue.1âwphi1
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS

Road Users' Tax

SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus.-When any agency or instrumentality of the government
or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an Finally, petitioners seek to compel DBM to release the Road Users' Tax to fund the reform of the road
environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or and transportation system and the implementation of the Road Sharing Principle.
enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
It bears clarifying that the Road Users' Tax mentioned in Section 9(e) of EO 774, apparently reiterated in
certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental
Section 5 of AO 254 is the Special Vehicle Pollution Control Fund component of the Motor Vehicle Users'
law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act
. Charge ("MVUC') imposed on owners of motor vehicles in RA 8794, otherwise known as the Road
or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by
Users' Tax Law. By the express provisions of the aforementioned law, the amounts in the special trust
reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or
accounts of the MVUC are earmarked solely and used exclusively (1) for road maintenance and the
regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
improvement of the road drainage, (2) for the installation of adequate and efficient traffic lights and road
safety devices, and (3) for the air pollution control, and their utilization are subject to the management of
First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the the Road Board.45 Verily, the petitioners' demand for the immediate and unilateral release of the Road
respondents to be entitled to the writ.1âwphi1 While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in Users' Tax by the DBM to support the petitioners' operationalization of this Road Sharing Principle has
environmental cases, the general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for no basis in law. The executive issuances relied upon by the petitioner do not rise to the level of law that
continuing mandamus.41 can supplant the provisions of RA 8794 that require the approval of the Road Board for the use of the
monies in the trust fund. In other words, the provisions on the release of funds by the DBM as provided
in EO 774 and AO 254 are necessarily subject to the conditions set forth in RA 8794. Notably, RA 9729,
Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a principle. It cannot be considered
as amended by RA 10174, provides for the establishment for the People's Survival Fund 46 that may be
an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public respondents to determine the manner by
tapped for adaptation activities, which similarly require approval from the PSF Board. 47
which this principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the
performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, 42 and the
official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being That notwithstanding, the claim made by the petitioners that hardly any budget is allotted to mitigating
enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself. Thus, the recognized environmental pollution is belied by the priority given to programs aimed at addressing and mitigating
rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can climate change that the DBM and the CCC had been tagging and tracking as priority expenditures since
only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other.43 2013.48 With the coordination of the DILG, this priority tagging and tracking is cascaded down to the local
budget management of local government units.49
This Court cannot but note that this is precisely the thrust of the petition - to compel the respondents to
act one way to implement the Road Sharing Principle - to bifurcate all roads in the country to devote half Other causes of action
to sidewalk and bicycling, and the other to Filipino-made transport - when there is nothing in EO 774, AO
254 and allied issuances that require that specific course of action in order to implement the same. Their
As previously discussed, the petitioners' failure to show any violation on the part of the respondents
good intentions notwithstanding, the petitioners cannot supplant the executive department's discretion
renders it unnecessary to rule on other allegations of violation that the petitioners rely upon as causes of
with their own through this petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus.
action against the public respondents.

In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to perform any act
In fine, the allegations and supporting evidence in the petition fall short in showing an actual or threatened
that the law specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the executive issuances relied upon by
violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology arising from an unlawful
the petitioners that specifically enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle.
act or omission by, or any unlawful neglect on the part of, the respondents that would warrant the issuance
To the opposite, the respondents were able to show that they were and are actively implementing projects
of the writs prayed for.
and programs that seek to improve air quality.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

At its core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a ministerial act, but a
discretionary act - the manner of implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners'
preferred specific course of action (i.e. the bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk and G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
bicycling and Filipino-made transport vehicles) to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no textual
basis in law or executive issuances for it to be considered an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to
the necessary conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the implementation of an MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.; MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S.
environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of discretion of the executive as to how INIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR.,
the principle enunciated in an executive issuance relating to the environment is best implemented. Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, Bayan Muna Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN,
PH.D., Junk VF A Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, Kabataan
Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES, Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D., Agham, ELMER C.
LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA,
THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A. EDSEL F.
TUPAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, MARK A. RICE in his capacity as
Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO,
Secretary, pepartment of Foreign Affair.s, HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of
the President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of National Defense, HON. RAMON
JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resoz!rces, VICE ADMIRAL JOSE
LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, ADMIRAL
RODOLFO D. ISO RENA, Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN
EVANGELISTA, Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN. VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO, Commandant
of Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US Marine Corps
Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-Director, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and
regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
Factual Background
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines) language which
means "long reef exposed at low tide." Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls - the north atoll
and the south atoll - and the Jessie Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of
the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley are considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote
island municipality of Palawan.1
into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry into
the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined,
including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law likewise
created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-
making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012,
the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit
the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine
ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty."4 On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for
Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.1âwphi1
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No
cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the
incident in a press statement.5 Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a
meeting at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over the
grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario that the United States will
provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship." 6 By March 30, 2013, the
US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective
sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition
agairtst Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as
Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces,
Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III in
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert
F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin (Department of
National Defense), Secretary Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-
Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena
(Philippine Coast Guard Commandant), Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-
Palawan), and Major General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the "Philippine
respondents."

In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by
The Petition
President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150
kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the global
center of marine biodiversity. Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause
and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan,
Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan,
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
(UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems,
They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for
containing excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare
acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding
protected marine park is also an important habitat for internationally threatened and endangered marine
incident.
species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as an important and significant natural
habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example representing significant on-going
ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance. 2 Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067:
unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law
enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise known as the "Tubbataha
resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces
Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally
Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.
significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the petition, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court: 1.
Immediately issue upon the filing of this petition a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist all operations
over the Guardian grounding incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well as an additional
buffer zone;
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration, repair, salvage or
post salvage plan or plans, including cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the
Tubbataha Reef absent a just settlement approved by the Honorable Court;
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU consultations in accordance with
the Local Government Code and R.A. 10067;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a deposit to the TRNP
Trust Fund defined under Section 17 of RA 10067 as a bona .fide gesture towards full
reparations;

c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan' because of the j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas affected by the
absence of clear guidelines, duties, and liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and grounding of the Guardian in light of Respondents' experience in the Port Royale grounding in
require Respondents to assume responsibility for prior and future environmental damage in 2009, among other similar grounding incidents;
general, and environmental damage under the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the name of
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving, recreation, and transparency and accountability such environmental damage assessment, valuation, and
limited commercial activities by fisherfolk and indigenous communities near or around the valuation methods, in all stages of negotiation;
TRNP but away from the damaged site and an additional buffer zone;
l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and technical support
2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until further orders of the to the TPAMB;
Court;
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and the
3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without limitation: Department of Environment and Natural Resources to review the Visiting Forces Agreement
and the Mutual Defense Treaty to consider whether their provisions allow for the exercise of
erga omnes rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and for damages which follow from any
a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive portion of Nicolas
violation of those rights;
v. Romulo, "to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate
agreement on [environmental guidelines and environmental accountability] under Philippine
authorities as provided in Art. V[] of the VFA ... " n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for purposes of protecting
the damaged areas of TRNP;
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence administrative, civil, and
criminal proceedings against erring officers and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the
make such proceedings public; Visiting Forces Agreement unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for violating the
preemptory norm of nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section
2, Article II, of the Philippine Constitution;
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive criminal jurisdiction
over erring U.S. personnel under the circumstances of this case;
p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the settlement of all
meritorious claims for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no less q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other respects; and
severe than those applicable to other States, and damages for personal injury or death, if such
had been the case;
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such other reliefs as
are just and equitable under the premises.7 (Underscoring supplied.)
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the
collection and production of evidence, including seizure and delivery of objects connected with
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment 8 to the petition, petitioners also filed a motion
the offenses related to the grounding of the Guardian;
for early resolution and motion to proceed ex parte against the US respondents. 9

f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify each other of the
Respondents' Consolidated Comment
disposition of all cases, wherever heard, related to the grounding of the Guardian;
In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular inspection and Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question of whether this
production orders, respondents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this
writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were already case.
completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and substance; (3) the petition improperly raises issues
involving the VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America; and ( 4) the
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of
determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as regards the damage to the
the State,17 is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the executive branch.

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

The Court's Ruling

In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of state immunity from suit, as
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present petition.
follows:

Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 10 Specifically, it is "a
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of
party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have
a result" of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance." 11 However,
adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. x x x.
the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject
matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
paramount public interest.12 international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of
states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and
consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a
automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need
not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice
of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with Holmes that ''there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right
intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from depends." [Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the enforcement
impairing the environment.14 of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added
inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals
and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not
celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can
do so in representation of their own and future generations. Thus:
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable
to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find
their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
affirmative act to satisfy the same,. such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be
awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state may move to
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of
dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. 19 (Emphasis supplied.)
nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment which reads:
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present a:: well as future
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
and harmony for the full 1:njoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. 15 (Emphasis supplied.) or Subjects of any Foreign State.

The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet
unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The
provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on
the principle that humans are stewards of nature."16
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals, 20 we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states
from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of
customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from
suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of
state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving
rise to a suit arc those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a
diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of
the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in
effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the
State, in whose service he is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet imperium -that all states are
soverr~ign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that
if the judgment against an official would rec 1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy
the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the
suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an
immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is,
rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. 22
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,23 one of the consolidated cases therein involved a Filipino
employed at Clark Air Base who was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers
of the US Air Force, and was eventually dismissed from his employment when he was charged in court
for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for damages filed by the said employee against the military
officers, the latter moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the suit was against the US Government
which had not given its consent. The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint. We held that petitioners US
military officers were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for
discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts
imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes
sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure
gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.24
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,25 we discussed the limitations of the State immunity principle, thus:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary
to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by JustiGe Zaldivar in Director of the
Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only
legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State,
and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such
acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State
from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer
or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or
invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional
provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
xxxx
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will
not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government
is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the
public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle
of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.26 (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity
as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its
crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the
TRNP was committed while they we:re performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction
of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore
bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of
the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused
damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an
exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State
regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-
standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional uses of
the oceans" as codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations by former Presidents
Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines,
Ltd.27
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid customary norms
governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over
maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect
to the uses of the oceans."28 The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on
December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into
force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare
clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). 29 The freedom to use the world's
marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international law.30 The UNCLOS gives to the
coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal
waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also
gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is
located.31
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty,
subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space
over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. 32
In the case of warships,33 as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity
subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the
coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting
from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with
the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.
Article
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this
Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters with
resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply. But what
if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but despite this
the US, the world's leading maritime power, has not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting, the U.S.
delegation ultimately voted against and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed mining
technology transfer provisions contained in Part XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to induce U.S.
membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member states cooperated over the succeeding decade to revise the
objection.able provisions. The revisions satisfied the Clinton administration, which signed the revised Part
XI implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton transmitted UNCLOS and the
Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its advice and consent. Despite consistent
support from President Clinton, each of his successors, and an ideologically diverse array of
stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent required for the President to internationally bind
the United States to UNCLOS.
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during the 108th and 110th
Congresses, its progress continues to be hamstrung by significant pockets of political ambivalence over
U.S. participation in international institutions. Most recently, 111 th Congress SFRC Chairman Senator
John Kerry included "voting out" UNCLOS for full Senate consideration among his highest priorities. This
did not occur, and no Senate action has been taken on UNCLOS by the 112th Congress. 34
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on March 10, 1983
that the US will "recognize the rights of the other , states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the
convention [UNCLOS], so long as the rights and freedom of the United States and others under
international law are recognized by such coastal states", and President Clinton's reiteration of the US
policy "to act in a manner consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to traditional uses of the oceans
and to encourage other countries to do likewise." Since Article 31 relates to the "traditional uses of the
oceans," and "if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the rights of the other states in the waters off their
coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates that "there is more reason to expect it to recognize the rights of other
states in their internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this case."
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US' refusal to join the UN CLOS
was centered on its disagreement with UN CLOS' regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which
considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind," pointing out that such "has
nothing to do with its [the US'] acceptance of customary international rules on navigation."
31
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps publicly endorses the
ratification of the UNCLOS, as shown by the following statement posted on its official website:
The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it establishes stable maritime
zones, including a maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies innocent passage, transit passage,
and archipelagic sea lanes passage rights; works against "jurisdictiomtl creep" by preventing coastal
nations from expanding their own maritime zones; and reaffirms sovereign immunity of warships,
auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.
xxxx
32
Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests by enhancing the ability
of the US to assert its sovereign rights over the resources of one of the largest continental shelves in the
world. Further, it is the Law of the Sea Convention that first established the concept of a maritime
Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical miles, and recognized the rights of coastal states to
conserve and manage the natural resources in this Zone.35
We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the
US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial
sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that
our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country's efforts to preserve
our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its
warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising
leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to
cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197,
viz:
Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through
competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the
said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating
the.latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial '::;ea immediately if they
flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their
warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise, they invoke
federal statutes in the US under which agencies of the US have statutorily waived their immunity to any
action. Even under the common law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US respondents are liable
for negligence, trespass and nuisance.
We are not persuaded.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines to promote "common security interests" between the US and the Philippines in the region. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the
United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel
and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. 36 The invocation of US
federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VF A which governs
disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives
of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special
civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from
Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan
shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the
award of damages to individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the
sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished
when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents
to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stn icture and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding
incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the
removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the fact that the US and
Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation
for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely
coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate
methods of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. As can be
gleaned from the following provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the consideration of the
parties, and which dispute resolution methods are encouraged by the court, to wit:

RULE3
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of
the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We xxxx
also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed
absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall inquire from the
environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative
parties if they have settled the dispute; otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the parties or their
fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
counsel, if authorized by their clients, to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for purposes of
charging the same violation of an environmental law.37
mediation. If not available, the court shall refer the case to the clerk of court or legal researcher for
mediation.
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan, to wit:
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of
referral to mediation.
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court
shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the 30-day period.

The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance of the pre-trial.
Before the scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting preliminary conference for the following purposes:
the performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental
destruction or damage;
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;

(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency, private person or entity to
xxxx
protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;

SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the parties and their counsels under
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to
oath, and they shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;

The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to
judge may issue a consent decree approving the agreement between the parties in accordance with law,
make periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
morals, public order and public policy to protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.

xxxx
SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree to compromise or settle
in accordance with law at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of judgment. (Underscoring
supplied.)
The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided-missile cruiser, the USS Port
Royal, ran aground about half a mile off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for four
days. After spending $6.5 million restoring the coral reef, the US government was reported to have paid
the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in settlement over coral reef damage caused by the grounding. 38
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate compensation for the damage
caused by the USS Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has announced the formation
of a US interdisciplinary scientific team which will "initiate discussions with the Government of the
Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-
based marine scientists." The US team intends to "help assess damage and remediation options, in
coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate Philippine government entities, non-
governmental organizations, and scientific experts from Philippine universities." 39
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a major relief
that may be obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:
RULES
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which
shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of
attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a
program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the
violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court.1âwphi1
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and
rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our
relations with another State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that
"[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive
and legislative-"the political" --departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in
the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." 40
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of the
VFA and to nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora,41 the VFA was duly concurred
in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and
certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The VF A being a valid
and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and
provisions.42 The present petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality
of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is
hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paje vs Casino (749 SCRA 39)
FACTS:
In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a government agency organized and
established under Republic Act No. (RA) 7227, and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing their intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay
which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP).
 On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby TCC undertook to build
and operate a coal-fired power plant.
 On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), a
subsidiary of TCC, for the construction, installation, and operation of 2x150-MW Circulating
Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio Naglatore.
 On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU dated July 28, 2006
to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy).
 RP Energy then contracted GHD Pty., Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for the proposed coal-fired power plant and to assist RP Energy in applying
for the issuance of an ECC from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
 The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 131, Series of 2008,
expressing the city government’s objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source
and urging the proponent to consider safer alternative sources ofenergy for Subic Bay.
 On December 22, 2008, the DENR, through former Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., issued an
ECC for the proposed 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant.
 Sometime thereafter, RP Energy decided to include additional components in its proposed
coal-fired power plant. On July 8, 2010, the DENR-EMB issued an amended ECC (first
amendment) allowing the inclusion of additional components, among others.
 Several months later, RP Energy again requested the DENR-EMB to amend the ECC. Instead
of constructing a 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant, as originally planned, it now sought to
construct a 1x300-MW coal-fired power plant.
 On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the request and further amended the ECC (second
amendment).
 The Sangguniang Panglalawiganof Zambales issued Resolution No. 2011-149, opposing the
establishment of a coal-fired thermal power plant.
 The Liga ng mga Barangayof Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 12, Series of 2011,
expressing its strong objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source.
 Hon. Casino’s group filed for a writ of kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, DENR. The Casiño
Group alleged, among others, that the power plant project would cause environmental damage.
that it would adversely affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic,
Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo.
 While the case was pending in the CA, RP Energy applied for another amendment to its ECC
proposing the construction and operation of a 2x300-MW coal fired power plant
CA:
Denied the writ of kalikasan due to the failure of the Casiño Group to prove that its constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or threatened
- no reason also to nullify sec 8.3 of DAO 2003-30) which allows amendments of ECCs. Not ultra
vires, as the express power of the Secretary of DENR, director and regional directors of the
EMB to issue an ECC impliedly includes the incidental power to amend the same.
- The validity of the said section cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for a writ of kalikasan
 But invalidated the ECC for non-compliance with the IPRA law and LGC and failure to affix the
signature in the sworn statement of full responsibility
- Non-compliance with sec 59 of IPRA Law (enjoins all departments and other governmental
agencies from granting any lease without a prior certification that the area affected does not
overlap with any ancestral domain)
- The CA also invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy as it was issued without
the prior consultation and approval of all the sanggunians concerned as required under
Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC
- For failure of Luis Miguel Abolitz, director of RP Energy to affix his signature in the sworn
statement of full responsibility (integral part of the ECC)
- The first and second amendment for failure to comply with the restrictions in the ECC which
requires that any expansion of the project beyond the project description or any change in the
activity shall be subject to a new environmental impact assessment
Invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy
- Issued without prior consultation and approval of all the sanggunians concerned as under secs
26 and 27 of the LGC
- In violation of sec 59 chapter VIII of the IPRA Law which enjoins all departments and other
governmental agencies from granting any lease without a prior certification that the area
affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain
- no CNO was secured from the NCIP prior to the execution of the LDA and that the
CNO dated October 31, 2012 was secured during the pendency of the case and was
issued in connection with RP Energy’s application for a 2x300 MW Coal fired plant
ISSUE
1. Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan; and
2. Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan
3. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; The Rules on the Writ of
Kalikasan, which is Part III of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC), was
issued by the Court pursuant to its power to promulgate rules for the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, in particular, the individual’s right to a balanced and
healthful ecology.—The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan, which is Part III of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, was issued by the Court pursuant to its power to
promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, in particular, the
individual’s right to a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 1 of Rule 7 provides: Section
1. Nature of the writ.—The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity
authorized by law, people’s organization, nongovernmental organization, or any public interest
group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity,
involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property
of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Same; Same; Same; The writ of kalikasan is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus,
conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide judicial relief from threatened or actual
violation/s of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or degree of
damage that transcends political and territorial boundaries.—The writ is categorized as a special civil
action and was, thus, conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide judicial relief
from threatened or actual violation/s of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a
magnitude or degree of damage that transcends political and territorial boundaries. It is intended “to
provide a stronger defense for environmental rights through judicial efforts where institutional
arrangements of enforcement, implementation
and legislation have fallen short” and seeks “to address the potentially exponential nature of large-
scale ecological threats.” Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to avail of
this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened
violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. Expectedly, the Rules do not define
the exact nature or degree of environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms
of the territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity
of environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-case basis.
Same; Same; Same; The writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental
damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries.—As earlier noted, the writ
of kalikasan is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends
political and territorial boundaries. A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or
irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but
must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities
in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be
dismissed outright and the action refiled before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. This must be so if we are to preserve the noble and laudable
purposes of the writ against those who seek to abuse it.
Same; Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Due to the extreme urgency of the
matter at hand, the present case is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.—Be that as it may, we shall resolve both the issues proper in a writ of kalikasan case and
those which are not, commingled as it were here, because of the exceptional character of this case. We
take judicial notice of the looming power crisis that our nation faces. Thus, the resolution of all the issues
in this case is of utmost urgency and necessity in order to finally determine the fate of the project center
of this controversy. If we were to resolve only the issues proper in a writ of kalikasan case and dismiss
those not proper therefor, that will leave such unresolved issues open to another round of protracted
litigation. In any case, we find the records sufficient to resolve all the issues presented herein. We also
rule that, due to the extreme urgency of the matter at hand, the present case is an exception to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As we have often ruled, in exceptional cases, we can
suspend the rules of procedure in order to achieve substantial justice, and to address urgent and
paramount State interests vital to the life of our nation.
Same; Same; Same; The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow the parties to raise, on appeal,
questions of fact — and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court — because of
the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.—It is worth
noting that the Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact —
and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court — because of the extraordinary
nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan. Thus, we shall review both
questions of law and fact in resolving the issues presented in this case.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) sustains the appellate court’s findings that the
Casiño Group failed to establish the alleged grave environmental damage which will be caused by the
construction and operation of the power plant.—In upholding the evidence and arguments of RP Energy,
relative to the lack of proof as to the alleged significant environmental damage that will be caused by the
project, the appellate court relied mainly on the testimonies of experts, which we find to be in accord with
judicial precedents. Thus, we ruled in one case: Although courts are not ordinarily bound by testimonies
of experts, they may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the
facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province
of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the
witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his
possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative
 opportunities for study and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters
which serve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to
be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common
knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effects. (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058) The
problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion
of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.
Hence, we sustain the appellate court’s findings that the Casiño Group failed to establish the alleged
grave environmental damage which will be caused by the construction and operation of the power plant.
Same; Same; Same; The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases liberally provide the courts
with means and methods to obtain sufficient information in order to adequately protect or safeguard the
right to a healthful and balanced ecology.—The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases liberally
provide the courts with means and methods to obtain sufficient information in order to adequately protect
or safeguard the right to a healthful and balanced ecology. In Section 6(l) of Rule 3 (Pre-Trial), when
there is a failure to settle, the judge shall, among others, determine the necessity of engaging the services
of a qualified expert as a friend of the court (amicus curiae). While, in Section 12 of Rule 7 (Writ
of Kalikasan), a party may avail of discovery measures: (1) ocular inspection and (2) production or
inspection of documents or things. The liberality of the Rules in gathering and even compelling
information, specifically with regard to the Writ of Kalikasan, is explained in this wise: [T]he writ
of kalikasan was refashioned as a tool to bridge the gap between allegation and proof by providing a
remedy for would-be environmental litigants to compel the production of information within the custody
of the government. The writ would effectively serve as a remedy for the enforcement of the right to
information about the environment. The scope of the fact-finding power could be: (1) anything related to
the issuance, grant of a government permit issued or information controlled by the government or private
entity and (2) [i]nformation contained in documents such as environmental compliance certificate (ECC)
and other government records. In addition, the [w]rit may also be employed to compel the production of
information, subject to constitutional limitations. This function is analogous to a discovery measure, and
may be availed of upon application for the writ.
1. Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan because the
Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases)
allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court— because of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance
of a writ of kalikasan.
2. Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is principally
predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial
boundaries.
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an
ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or,
at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the
magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the
action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted relative
to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in
the issuance of the ECC.
The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casino group FAILED to substantiate its claims that the
construction and operation of the power plant will cause environmental damage of the magnitude
contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. On the other hand, RP Energy presented evidence to establish
that the subject project will not cause grave environmental damage through its environmental
management plan which will ensure that the project will operate within the limits of existing environmental
laws and standars.
OTHER ISSUES:
 CA erred in invalidating the ECC on the ground of lack of signature of Mr. Abolitz in the ECC’s
statement of accountability relative to the copy of the ECC submitted by RP Energy to the CA.
The circumstance of the case show that the DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised
of the issue of lack of signature in order for them to present controverting evidence and
arguments on this point, as the issue only arose during the course of the proceedings upon
clarificatory questions from the CA.
 CA erred when it ruled that the first and second amendments to the ECC were invalid for failure
to comply with a new EIA and for violating DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. DENR
reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring an ERMP and a PDR for the first and second
amendment respectively. Through these documents which the DENR reviewed, a new EIA was
conducted relative to the proposed project modifications. No showing of grave abuse of
discretion or patent illegality.
 CA erred when it invalidated ECC for failure to comply with sec 59 of the IPRA Law. The ECC
is not the license or permit contemplated under sec 59. There is no necessity to secure the
Certificate of Non Overlap (CNO) under sec 59 before and ECC may be issued and the
issuance of the subject ECC without first securing the aforesaid certification does not render it
invalid.
 CA erred when it ruled that compliance with sec 27 in relation to sec 26 of the LGC (approval
of the concerned sanggunian requirement) is necessary prior to issuance of the subject ECC)
issuance of the ECC does not, by itself, result in the implementation of the project. Hence,
there is no necessity to secure prior compliance with the approval of the concerned sanggunian
requirement and the issuance of the subject ECC without first complying with the aforesaid
requirement does not render it invalid.