Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 22

IBP vs.


G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall
have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null
and void and unconstitutional.


(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review

(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP


When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However,
there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to
call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and
provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy
burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out
the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the
ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of
the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the
PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of
the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the
Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)

G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012


A body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process was conceived and
called the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and its composition, term and functions are provided under
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which also indicates that the JBC shall be composed of
seven (7) members.

In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. In separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives
one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. Francisco I. Chavez,
(petitioner) questioned this practice in this petition.

The Supreme Court granted the petition.


(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been met in this case; and

(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two
(2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.


(1) Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such
that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ argument that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he
is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. To question the JBC composition for being
unconstitutional is not limited to official nominees for the post of Chief Justice.

The court recognizes the petitioner’s right to sue in this case and that he has the legal standing to bring
the present action because he has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. According to
petitioner, “since the JBC derives financial support for its functions, operation and proceedings from
taxes paid, petitioner possesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand that the JBC’s
proceedings are not tainted with illegality and that its composition and actions do not violate the

The legality of the very process of the nominations to the positions in the judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy which is considered by the court as a constitutional issue that must be passed upon and that
the allegations are substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from the court.

(2) Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its basic
sense, and not pertaining to either House of Representatives or Senate is referred to, but that, can only
have one representative. The practical purpose of the seven-member composition of the JBC is solution
to stalemate voting.

Bicameralism of “Congress” refers to its legislative function in the government. The Constitution is clear
in the distinction of the role of each house in the process of lawmaking. In the JBC, since there is no need
for a liaison between the Senate and House of Representatives when nominating judicial officers.
“Congress” must therefore refer to the entire Legislative department. It is clear that the Constitution
orders that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

Even though finding the current composition of the JBC as unconstitutional, all its prior official actions
are valid. Actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized under the
doctrine of operative facts. These official actions are not nullified.

Macalintal v. PET (G.R. No. 191618)

Atty. Romulo Macalintal filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the previous ruling of the SC that
found the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by the SC as constitutional. In his motion,
Macalintal contended that the creation of the PET by the SC did not fall within the ambit of the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. He also contended that the PET exercises
quasi-judicial power, and thus, its members violate Section 12, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution,


Whether or not the PET is constitutional.


Yes, the Court held that PET is constitutional. A look at the deliberations of the framers reveals that the
exclusive authority granted to the SC in judging cases relating to the elections of President and Vice-
President does not impinge on the supposed separation of power between the judiciary and the
executive departments, even if the said provision can be found in Art. VII.

The Court held that election issues are adversarial and judicial proceedings, and are essentially
justiciable questions.

Similarly, the Court held that in creating PET, it merely constitutionalized what was statutory. The last
paragraph of Section 4, Art. VII bestows upon the SC the power to hear questions relating to the election
of the President and Vice-President. Following the doctrine of necessary implication, the creation of PET
should be seen as the means necessary to carry said constitutional mandate into effect.

Motion for reconsideration denied.


G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133

Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving
pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A
of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted
members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic
readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices
was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong
information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in
1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.

It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus
there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it
tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce
any effect.


Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the
payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.


The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds
should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the
Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.

Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground
that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired Justices ignores
these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special
protections for the Judiciary be repealed.

The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared
valid and subsisting.

In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November
9, 1998

Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998
of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan
City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15,
Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any
appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1)
and 9 of Art. VIII

Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that
the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless
prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban.
They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of
vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any
compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban



A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC JULY 31, 2012


Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not
only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the
constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the
Judiciary’s own affairs.


Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA) found that an underpayment
amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme
Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed
this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in
computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division
erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En
Banc in A.M. No. 03- 12-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No.

Atty. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, recommended that the Court
advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the
first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and
its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in 1997. As a
matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices, the
COA upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG
guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling
of its budget and resources.


WON COA’s interference, in this case, violates the judiciary’s autonomy.


Yes. The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted
fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This
authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in
relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing
jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters. The concept of the independence of the three
branches of government extends from the notion that the powers of government must be divided
to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid
any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To achieve this
purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally
capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates; lack of independence
would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest
assertions of another or others.
Thus, judicial independence can be “broken down into two distinct concepts: decisional independence
and institutional independence.” Decisional independence “refers to a judge’s ability to render decisions
free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law.”On the
other hand, institutional independence “describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive
and legislative branches of government.”

While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is
unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary’s fiscal
autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to
perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that
purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national purse
(which at first blush appears to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative
autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence and is expressly provided for by the
Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII.

The Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the
Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its
personnel. As the Court En Banc’s Resolution reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the
basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciary’s properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and the
appellate courts. The Judiciary has full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the wisdom
and dispatch that (its) needs require.

By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the
sale to the retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency has
been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established practice within the
Judiciary that even the COA has previously recognized. The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of
the privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and employees
in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision. Under this administrative authority, the Court
has the power to administer the Judiciary’s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle and
manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as provided by law and by its own

In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the
manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference
on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the
fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional
duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s
own affairs.

Power of the Judiciary: De Castro vs. JBC (G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010)


This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The said decision
directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the
vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to
prepare the short list of nominees and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue that the
disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on
midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of
stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela

ISSUE (Section 4):

Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during
the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII?

RULING:The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice
Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Sec.
15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision on nepotism. Election ban on
appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld its March 17, 2010 decision
ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing
president does not apply to vacancies in the Supreme Court.

Emilio A. Gonzales vs. Office of the President

G.R. No. 196231

February 26, 2014

Brion, J.:

These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to
remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which
they belong – the Office of the Ombudsman.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232

Primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman


A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR
against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private complainant, Christian
M.Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the
Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication.
Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in the
Office of the Ombudsman.

Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made
by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses
charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the
administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings
despite due notice. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza
and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a
motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in whose office it remained pending for
final review and action when P/S Insp.Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in
desperate attempt to have him reinstated in the police service. In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the
tragic murder of eight Hong Kong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando?

Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and
Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and
executive sessions.

The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules
of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in
violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five
(5) days from submission.

The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to
hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence the petition.

G.R. No. 196232:

Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D.
Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder and
Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia’s urgent petition for bail holding
that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special
Prosecutor Barreras-Sulitand sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with
the accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with
jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing but a slap on the hand
notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of
Representatives ‘Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the
Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner
Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate
government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the
Ombudsman Act.

Hence the petition.


Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.


Yes. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not

Ratio Decidendi:

While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive
or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners
cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of
R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the
President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two
apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No.6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman
and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same
Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of
administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and
plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of
"check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to
protect one another from administrative liabilities.

By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress merely
filled an obvious gap in the law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution,
which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the
removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770,
Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the
Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.

The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutors Implied from his Power to Appoint. In giving
the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an
authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the
Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses
and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to
the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant
the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish the Independence of the Office of the

Ombudsman. he claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No.6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from
office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence
which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional
mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons
under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."

Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling short of constitutional standards, do not
constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman
without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, is considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would amount
to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is
part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people. “The factual
circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner’s request; that administrative liability
was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that the
decision was immediately implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months
cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of any personal
grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was
likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable motivation. The OP's
pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of
dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of
public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.

The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed administratively against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to
determine the existence of any of the grounds for her removal from office as provided for under the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act.

Disposition: The decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Datu Michael Abas Kida vs Senate of the Philippines GR No. 196271


On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections
and for Other Purposes” was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

The history of ARMM instituted first by the provisions of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated
the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras specfically Sections 15 to
22 wherein the congress promulgated the Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 which is the organic act that
established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials.Following aforementioned arcticle is the RA No. 9054 which amended the ARMM Charter and
reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA
No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third
time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3
years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for
the various regional offices to be elected.

In these consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition and madamus filed directly with the Supreme
Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.


1.Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

2.Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.


The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.

1.YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization
of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the
following elections.

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous
regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted
to Local Government.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the

Thus, the Supreme Court find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution
does not include the regional elections of the ARMM unmeritorious.
NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which refers to the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement.

Before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become law or statute they must pass through
three readings on separate days, with the EXCEPTION of when the President certifies to the necessity of
the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of
the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days.The phrase “except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc.” in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its
final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. Following the Tolentino ruling, the Supreme Court held
the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the
three separate readings requirement.

G.R. No. 131457, August 19, 1999

Hon. Carlos Fortich (Governor), Hon. Rey Baula (Mayor, Sumilao), NQSR Management and Development

vs Hon. Renato C. Corona, Deputy Exec. Sec., Hon. Ernesto Garilao, Sec. DAR

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago


Respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred to SC En Banc. A careful reading however,
reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, "decided" referring to cases
and "resolved" referring to matters, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. (referring each to
The issue presented by the respondents is whether the power of the LGU to reclassify lands is subject to
the approval of the CAR is no longer novel, this having decided in Camarines Sur vs CA case that the LGU
need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use.

Intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest inasmuch as they have already been issued
certificates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they are seasonal farm workers at the
plantation, they have been identified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the property.


Intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal farm workers, have no legal or actual and
substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land. Rather, their
right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land.
GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et.al G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008


Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the
Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend
the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation
which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and
wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of
general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that
the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.


Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through
the Senate’s website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at
the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the
rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation,"
precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply
with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person
who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional
equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of

G.R. No. 178830; July 14, 2008

Triple petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for the issuance of a TRO and/or
preliminary injunction were filed and consolidated in the SC. The prayers of the said petitions, among others,
sought the annulment of the award of the contract for the national broadband network to respondent ZTE
Corporation and to enjoin any activity in connection with the said deal.

On October 2, 2007, during a meeting, Pres. GMA, acting in her official capacity informed Pres. Hu Jintao of China
that the Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN project. Later, the Solicitor General
made a manifestation and motion stating that in an Indorsement by the Legal Division of the DOTC, it has been
informed that the Philippine Government has decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project. That said, there is
no more justiciable controversy for the Court to resolve. The public respondents then prayed that the present
petitions be dismissed.
The petitioners, in their respective replies, argued that the Indorsement is self-serving and not a sufficient basis
that the deal has been permanently scrapped. Assuming arguendo that the petition has become moot, the Court
may still take cognizance thereof to educate the bench and the bar. Further, because of the transcendental
importance of the issues raised, the Court should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness.

The petitioners ultimately contended the declarations made by officials belonging to the executive branch on the
Philippine Government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project are self-serving, hence, inadmissible.

WON the Court may take judicial notice of the acts of President GMA?

The SC dismissed the petition. It held that It has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official act of the

Under the Section 1 Rule 129, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the
official acts of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further
provided in the said rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without introduction of
evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN
Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as an official act of the executive
department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without need of evidence.

Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the executive
officials of informing this Court of the government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project is also
presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the contrary. The Court finds no factual or legal basis
to disregard this disputable presumption in the present instance.

Pormento vs. Estrada


Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 1998 elections. He sought
the presidency again in the May 2010 elections. Pormento opposed Estrada’s candidacy and filed a
petition for disqualification. COMELEC (Division) denied his petition as well as his subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration (En Banc). Pormento then filed the present petition for certiorari before the Court. In
the meantime, Estrada was able to participate as a candidate for President in the May 10, 2010 elections
where he garnered the second highest number of votes.


Is Estrada disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010 elections in view of the prohibition in the
Constitution which states that: "[t]he President shall not be eligible for any reelection?


Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the proper
interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be premised on a persons second (whether immediate or
not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of
legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches
on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be
decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the
essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or
controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.The Court is not empowered to
decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it
becomes non-justiciable.

An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and
hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the
parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by
subsequent events.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been
duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that
elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his
reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.