COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS:

Caballero v. COMELEC

Take away: COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction.

FACTS:Rogelio Batin Cabllero (Petitioner) run as a candidate for the mayoralty position in
Uyugan, Province of Batanes. Private respondent Nanud filed a petition to deny due course to to
the cancellation of Caballer's COC for false representation that he was eligible to run fo Mayor of
Uyugan despite being a Canadian citizen.

Caballero manifested that he was not properly served with a copy of the petiion and the peition
was served by registered mail not in his address lathough he received a cipy during the
conference.

Caballero did not file an answer but filed a memorandum controverting respondent's substantial
allegations in his petition. He argued that prior to the filing of his COc he has fulfilled the
requirements to become a Filipino pursuant to RA 9225.

The COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that Caballero made a material
representation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of his municipality within one
year.

After the May 2013 election, Caballero won over his opponent Nanud. Thereafter, proclaimed as
Mayor.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC failed to follow its rules of procedure in serving order to the
petitioner

RULING: COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. As a general rule,
statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order that the will of the
people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
Moreover, the COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as provided under
Section 4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure.

The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the
interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This
liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its
objectives - ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well
as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action
and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest
is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary
interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which
beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to
ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader.
The issue raised, whether petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year
before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC” pertains to his
qualification and eligibility to run for public office, therefore imbued with public interest, which
justified the COMELEC's suspension of its own rules.

Velasco v. Belmonte

TAKE AWAY: Jurisdiction of COMELEC

FACTS: Velasco filed an election contest on the qualification od Reyes, his opponent for the
position of the representative of Marinduque. He averred that Reyes made a material
misrepresentation in her COC. The first division granted the petition which resulted to the
cancellation of her COC. Reyes, filed a motion for reconsideration but while the motion was
pending, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Reyes as the winner of the May 2013 elections for
the posirion of Representative of Marinduque. The pending motion was later decided by the
COMELEC En Banc and it affirmed the ruling of the first division.

Velasco went to the HRET and filed a case but Speaker Belmonte, administed the oath of office
to Reyes.

ISSUE: Whether the HRET has the jurisdiction over Reyes

RULING: The Court affirmed the decision of the COMELEC in saying the the application for the
COC of Reyes should be cancelled and should become final and executory. Using the Court's
decision, the HRET dismissed the case on tha grounds that it has no jurisdiction over Reyes
becuase she was not a member of the House of Representatives in the first place because for her
to considred a member of the HOR, she is required to have a valid proclamation, vaild oath and
valid assumption of office. Reyes was proclaimed as winner, she took her oath and assumed
office but as found by the Supreme Court, there was a fundamental defect in one of her
requirements and that her proclamation was not valid.

She was already disqualified by the COMELEC when she was proclaimed by the provincial board
of the canvasssers as the winner. Her oath is invalid, and her assumption to office that's why she
could not be under the juridiction of the HOR therefor it is the COMELEC that has the jurisdiction
over her.

Engle v. COMELEC

TAKE AWAY: Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC is a technicality that can be defeated by the
will of the electorate.

FATCS: Petitioner and private respondent vied for the position of Vice-Mayor of Babatngon,
Province of Leyte in the May 2013 elections. Originally, it was the petitioner's late husband who
contested the position. She filed her candidacy as a substitute candidate for her deceased
spouse.

In response, private respondent a petition to deny due course or cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of the petitioner arguing that she misrepresented that she is qualified to substitute
her husband who was declared as an independent candidate of the COMELEC because the
political party they claim to be members of failed to submit candidates in Babatngon as
prescribed by Section 6(3) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518. Private respondent charged
petitioner with violation of Section 15, COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 which disallows the
substitution of an independent candidate.

Petitioner contended that there was no official declaration from the COMELEC that her deceased
husband was an independent candidate.

The petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's COC was still pending with the COMELEC
Second Division when the May 2013 Elections were held. James L. Engle's name remained on the
ballot and the petitioner was later declared as the duly elected-Vice-Mayor.

It was only in July 2013 did the COMELEC Second Division promulgate the assailed Resolution
which denied due course to and cancelled petitioner's COC resulting in the annulment of
petitioner's previous proclamation as duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte and the
declaration of private respondent as winner of the contested position on the ground of
misrepresentation becuase the persosn who signed the CoNA had no authority and the party
failed to submit authority of the person to the COMELEC law divisioon.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC acted with grave abused of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it disregarded and bypassed the will of the electorate by ignoring the
overwhelming and prominent number of votes obtained by Engled during the May 2013
elections.

RULING: The Court concludes that petitioner was the undisputed choice of the electorate as
Vice-Mayor as she was elected by the majority in a landslide vote on the apparent belief that
she may validly substitute her husband. That belief was not contradicted by any official or formal
ruling by the COMELEC prior to the elections.

According to the Court the late submission of Romualdez's authority to sign the CONA of James
L. Engle to the COMELEC was a mere technicality that cannot be used to defeat the will of the
electorate in a fair and honest election.

While the COMELEC has the power to prescribe its own rules of procedure, submission of this
authority to the COMLEC law department, it is a long standing principle that rules and
regulations for the conduct of elections are mandatory for the elections, but after the elections
are held, they are mainly directory if they would defeact the will of the electorate.
The Court said that technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made
to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not
be defeated by mere technical objections.

Rivera v. COMELEC

TAKE AWAY: Jurisdiction of COMELEC ends when one is already considered as member of the
Hourse of Representatives. Representatives under the political party system are allso included.

FATCS: CIBAC was registered as a multi-sectoral party with the COMELEC under Republic Act No.
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.

Villanueva, President of CIBAC National Council's Chairman and President submitted lists of
nomimees to represent CIBAC in the House of Representatives to the COMELEC shile Maria
Blanc, CIBAC Foundation claimed to be CIBAC's President submitted a certificate of nomination
for CIBAC'S nominees. The COMELEC conducted a summary hearing to settle the issue of whose
nominees should represent CIBAC in the 2013 elections. Villanueva's group filed a Motion for
Clarificatory Judgment dated April 30, 2013, claiming that Maria Blanca was neither CIBAC's
President nor a member of its National Council; and that it was CIBAC National Council resolved
to authorize its President or Secretary-General to sign and submit all necessary documents to
signify its participation in May 2013 election.

CIBAC Foundation filed a petition for quo warranto arguing in the main that the CIBAC National
Council lost its legal existence following the registration of CIBAC with the SEC as CIBAC
Foundation by reason of which it is now governed by a BOT. By recognizing the nominees of
CIBAC National Council, CIBAC Foundation insists that the COMELEC unlawfully deprived it of its
right and authority to represent CIBAC in Congress.

ISSUE: Whether CIBAC Foundation the rightful and legitimate representatives of CIBAC Party-List
in the 16th Congress.

RULING: The Court reiterates that it is the CIBAC National Council, the COMELEC-registered
governing body of CIBAC under its Constitution, which is empowered to formulate its policies,
plans, and programs, and to issue decisions and resolutions binding on party members and
officers.

The nominees of CIBAC National Council, Tugna and Gonzales, assumed their seats in Congress
on June 26, 2013 and July 22, 2013, respectively, G.R. No. 213069 should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. It should be noted that since they had been already proclaimed, the jurisdiction to
resolve all election contests lies with the HRET as it is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of its Members.

The Court has held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins. Since the nominees of CIBAC National Council have already assumed their
seats in Congress, the quo warranto petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Abayon v. HRET

TAKE AWAY: Distinguishes the power of the COMELEC to declare a failure of elections and the
power of the Electoral Tribunal to Annul elections on the ground of terrorism.

FATCS: Abayon and Daza were contenders for the position of Representative in the First
Legislative District of Northern Samar during the May 2013 Elections. Abayon emerged as the
winner with the difference of 52 votes only. Four days after, Abayon was proclaied as the duly
elected member of HOR. Daza filed an election protest challengnf the results of election alleging
that there was a massive fraud, vote buying, intimidation and employment of illegal and
fraudulent devices and schemes before, during and after the elections benefitting Abayon and
that the terrorism was committed by the latter with his supporters.

Abayon's counter-protest, alleging that the votes obtained by Daza were questionable in view of
the frauds and anomalies committed by the latter and his supporters during the elections.

The HRET ratiocinated that there was clear and convincing evidence to warrant the annulment of
the elections in the concerned precincts because the terrorism affected more than 50% of the
votes cast in the said precincts and it was impossible to distinguish the good votes from the bad.

Abayon asserts that the nullification of the election results in the concerned clustered precincts
was not within the jurisdiction of the HRET. He explains that the annulment of election results on
the ground of terrorism is akin to a declaration of failure of elections, which is under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc.

The HRET faulted Abayon in claiming that the case was similar to a declaration of failure of
elections which was under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC En Banc. It reasoned that mere
allegation of terrorism would not immediately convert the case to a nullification case because
terrorism was an act resulting in either failure of elections or electoral fraud, anomaly, or
irregularity, which can only be protested through an election protest. Moreover, the HRET
claimed that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion as its decision in favor of Daza was
supported by clear and convincing evidence. As such, it concluded that its decision should be
sustained.

ISSUE: Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in annulling the electiosn on the
ground of terrorism.

RULING: The Court agrees that the power of the HRET to annul elections differ from the power
granted to the COMELEC to declare failure of elections. The annulment of election results is but
a power concomitant to the HRET' s constitutional mandate to determine the validity of the
contestee's title. The Court reiterated that the HRET had jurisdiction to determine whether
there was terrorism in the contested precincts then it could annul the election results in teh said
precincts.

The COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial function when it decides election contests not
otherwise reserved to other electoral tribunals by the Constitution. The COMELEC, however, .
does not exercise its quasijudicial functions when it declares a failure of elections. Rather, the
COMELEC performs its administrative function when it exercises such power.

The functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive and
administrative in nature. It is elementary in administrative law that "courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies." The authority given to COMELEC to declare a failure of elections and to call for special
elections falls under its administrative function.

The difference between the annulment of elections by electoral tribunals and the declaration of
failure of elections by the COMELEC cannot be denied. First, the former is an incident of the
judicial function of electoral tribunals while the latter is in the exercise of the COMELEC's
administrative function. Second, electoral tribunals only annul the election results connected
with the election contest before it whereas the declaration of failure of elections by the
COMELEC relates to the entire election in the concerned precinct or political unit.

In annulling elections, the HRET does so only to determine who among the candidates garnered
a majority of the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on the other hand, declares a failure of
elections with the objective of holding or continuing the elections, which were not held or were
suspended, or if there was one, resulted in a failure to elect. When COMELEC declares a failure
of elections, special elections will have to be conducted

COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATION OF COMMISSIONERS (CSC AND COMELEC)

Cayetano v. Monsod

TAKE AWAY: Commission on Appointments has the authority to confirm the appointment of
the officials of Constitutional Commissions.

FATCS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission
on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

The Court said: "Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by
the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide."

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages:
(1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance.

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required
by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether Monsod is qualified to be appointed as a Chairman of Commission on Elections.

RULING: The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article
C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without re appointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and
the last Members for three years, without re appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required
by law. This no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse has been
shown since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown.