Raiyan

Ghandhi Somasundram LSE ID: 201600526 Class Group 1

Can liberty be defended from a utilitarian point of view?

In this essay, I will argue that liberty can be defended from a utilitarian point of view. (i) I will
begin by outlining Mill’s conception of utilitarianism and liberty principle. (ii) Then I will
examine Mill’s attempt to defend liberty on a utilitarian foundation. (iii) I will then consider the
argument that utilitarianism contradicts Mill’s categorical approach to liberty. I will proceed to
show such views as unsound given Mill’s consideration of individuality and progress and the
notion of liberty as necessary for preeminent goods.

(i) Mill defines utilitarianism as a theory which ‘holds that actions are right in proportion as they
tend to promote happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by
unhappiness pain and the privation of pleasure’.1 This can be condensed as the sum of pleasure
over pain, however, Mill’s utilitarianism also makes qualitative distinctions between higher and
lower pleasures. The latter describing sensual pleasures and the former intellectual pleasures
that an educated individual would not give up for any amount of sensual pleasure.

Mill’s principle of liberty is that the only reason ‘power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral is not a sufficient warrant’2. In summary, Mill expresses the view that
liberty is the freedom to do anything that does not harm others and hence infringe on their
enjoyment of the same right. Actions can be divided into purely-self-regarding actions and
other-regarding actions. Other-regarding actions involve at least one other person whilst purely
self-regarding actions involve solely the agent and possibly other people—but only with their
free consent. To delineate between harm and offense, Mill characterizes harm as damage to
one’s interests3 where the interests in question concern our safety and security. Mill’s example
of the corn-dealer conspiracy shows this difference, with the conspiracy being permissible if
circulated in the press, but violating the harm principle when ‘delivered orally to an excited
mob’.4

(ii) Mill contends that the liberties ‘which society ought to defend me in possession of … [are
justified by] general utility’5. By arguing this, one can interpret Mill as adopting an indirect
utilitarian approach where society adheres to a set of rules that indirectly result in the
optimization of utility. This approach differs from direct utilitarianism which impels one to
choose whatever action will produce the greatest total happiness. Mill’s approach is outlined in
his defense of the liberty of free expression where Mill shows how freedom of expression can
be given a long-term utilitarian justification. Mill identifies four reasons6:

1
Warnock, M. (1962). Mill: utilitarianism and other writings. Utilitarianism, 257.
2
Ibid, On Liberty, 135.
3
Ibid, On Liberty, 136.
4
Ibid, On Liberty, 184.
5
Ibid, Utilitarianism, 309.
6
Brink, D. (2007). Mill's moral and political philosophy
Raiyan Ghandhi Somasundram LSE ID: 201600526 Class Group 1

(a) The censored opinion might be true.

(b) Even if false, it may constitute part of the truth.
(c) Even if totally false, censoring would prevent true opinions from becoming dogma.
(d) An unopposed view as dogma would lose its meaning.

Both (a) and (b) are defenses that recognize that the freedom of expression will lead to a
greater ratio of true to false beliefs and hence greater total happiness. But the more robust
defenses (c) and (d) show the deliberative rationale7 for accepting free expression. Indeed,
consistent with his notion of higher pleasures, Mill argues that questioning our beliefs and a
process of practical deliberation is a fundamental part of our wellbeing. This process is arrested
without free expression as a society would not be able to challenge and hence become aware
of the foundations of its opinions. The failure to engage with opinions in society mean that they
will be discussed rarely and will lose their meaning and hence value. Indeed, even if one
supposes all censored beliefs are false, there is still value in free expression as a ‘conflict with
the opposite error is essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of truth’8. Thus, Mill
conveys that the freedoms of expression would maximize the happiness of humans as
progressive beings by allowing us to use our deliberative capacities, a conclusion supported by
his claim that ‘it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied’9. Mill, is therefore, able to defend liberty from a
utilitarian standpoint by arguing that our higher activities that utilize our deliberative abilities
represent the primary component of human happiness.

(iii) Despite providing a defense of liberties that does not rest on an abstract notion of natural
rights, a major objection to Mill’s approach is the claim that utilitarianism encourages precisely
the type of paternalistic intervention the liberty principle rules out. Mill’s categorical approach
to basic liberty seems to be at odds with utilitarianism’s defining duty being the promotion of
good consequences as there are a host of instances where happiness might be maximized at
the expense of liberty. For example, a government seems to have utilitarian grounds in
preventing an incautious young adult from smoking tobacco, a practice that is the leading cause
of preventable death and is highly addictive. Indeed, one could argue that a society where
smoking is prohibited would enjoy greater overall happiness owing to the better health and life
expectancies of its citizens as well as lower healthcare costs.

Nevertheless, the view that utilitarianism necessarily encourages paternalism neglects the
importance of individuality and progress. By enforcing a certain lifestyle upon its citizens, a
government risks stifling the ‘free development of individuality … one of the leading essentials
of well-being’10. Mill accepts that liberty does not consistently lead to the improvement of
happiness but argues that advancing liberty in a broader sense contributes to greater human
happiness. To illustrate this Mill points to the role of ‘different experiments in living’ and

7
Ibid, Brink.
8
Ibid, On Liberty.
9
Ibid, Utilitarianism, 315
10
Ibid, On Liberty, 185
Raiyan Ghandhi Somasundram LSE ID: 201600526 Class Group 1

‘varieties of character’ in serving as the ‘chief ingredient in social progress’11. Hence, Mill can
once again justify his defense of liberty by appealing to the notion of utility being grounded in
the interests of man as a progressive being. With exposure to the various ‘successful
experiments’ of living and learning from experience creating genuine human flourishing that
secures the greatest possible long-term happiness. An opponent could reply that Mill’s
assumption of a progressive man is mistaken12, and that Mill is overoptimistic about our
capacity to learn from experience. Indeed, following from our example, people continue to
start smoking despite its well-documented health risks, albeit at a lesser rate. This objection
undermines Mill’s utilitarian justification for liberty as there is no longer any point in people
demonstrating different lifestyles if they will not learn from them. Indeed, at a more pessimistic
level, it could even be argued that human beings are for the most part akin to the ‘barbarians
and children’ whom Mill argues are unfit recipients of liberty according to a utilitarian
perspective.

To resolve the criticism that maximizing happiness potentially requires a paternalistic and
illiberal society, a proponent of Mill’s argument can treat basic liberties as key to preeminent
goods that have a more fundamental role in human happiness13 most notably the opportunities
for responsible choice and self-determination. Mill already accepts the notion of higher order
pleasures and recognizes certain liberties (such as freedom of expression) as essential in
achieving these pleasures. It follows then, that from a utilitarian perspective one could justify
the promotion of basic liberties over the promotion of lower pleasures. In this way, the losses in
happiness caused by giving individuals the liberty to engage in misguided self-regarding actions
such as smoking for example, can be reconciled as necessary conditions for the achievement of
the preeminent goods that play a greater role in human happiness.

In conclusion, I have argued that liberty can be defended from a utilitarian perspective by
showing Mill’s indirect utilitarian justification of the freedom of expression (ii) and by arguing
that the apparent tension between utilitarianism and liberty (iii) can be reconciled by treating
liberties as necessary for preeminent goods and human progress.

Ibid.
11
12
Wolff, J. (2006). An introduction to political philosophy. Oxford University Press, USA.
13
Ibid, Brink
Raiyan Ghandhi Somasundram LSE ID: 201600526 Class Group 1

Bibliography

Warnock, M. (1962). Mill: utilitarianism and other writings.

Brink, D. (2007). Mill's moral and political philosophy.

Wolff, J. (2006). An introduction to political philosophy. Oxford University Press, USA.