Umali vs Estanislao 209 SCRA 446
account, among others, the movement in consumer price indices,
Facts:
Congress enacted Republic Act 7167 amending the NIRC (adjusting
the basic and additional exemptions allowable to individuals for
income tax purposes to the poverty threshold level). The said Act
was signed and approved by the President on 19 December 1991
and published on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of
general circulation. On 26 December 1991, the CIR promulgated
Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 stating that the regulations shall take
effect on compensation income from January 1, 1992. Petitioners
filed a petition for mandamus to compel the CIR to implement RA
7167 in regard to income earned or received in 1991, and
prohibition to enjoin the CIR from implementing the revenue
regulation.
Issue:
Assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992 (15
days after its publication in “Malaya”), whether or not the said law
nonetheless covers or applies to compensation income earned or
received during calendar year 1991.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should
cover or extend to compensation income earned or received during
calendar year 1991. Sec. 29, par. [L], Item No. 4 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the
President shall automatically adjust not more often than once every
three years, the personal and additional exemptions taking into
levels of minimum wages, and bare subsistence levels.
The exemptions were last adjusted in 1986. The president could
have adjusted it in 1989 but did not do so. The poverty threshold
level refers to the level at the time Rep. Act 7167 was enacted by
Congress. The Act is a social legislation intended to alleviate in part
the present economic plight of the lower income taxpayers.
Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions shall be
available after the law shall have become effective. These
exemptions are available upon the filing of personal income tax
returns, done not later than the 15th day of April after the end of a
calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167, which became effective,
on 30 January 1992, the increased exemptions are literally available
on or before 15 April 1992 [though not before 30 January 1992]. But
these increased exemptions can be available on 15 April 1992 only
in respect of compensation income earned or received during the
calendar year 1991. The personal exemptions as increased by Rep.
Act 7167 are not available in respect of compensation income
received during the 1990 calendar year; the tax due in respect of
said income had already accrued, and been presumably paid (The
law does not state retroactive application). The personal
exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as
available as to compensation
income received during 1992 because it would in effect postpone
the availability of the increased exemptions to 1 January-15 April
1993. The implementing regulations collide with Section 3 of Rep.
Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall take effect upon its
approval”. The revenue regulation should take effect on
compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1991.
Since this decision is promulgated after 15 April 1992, those
taxpayers who have already paid are entitled to refunds or credits.
BENGZON VS. DRILON
G.R. 103524
Gutierrez, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals who are currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as
amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing
section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the
pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the
AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for
the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted
men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA
1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers
gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992
GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990,
President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a
valid law absent its publication, thus there was no law. It follows
that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous
because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away
validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the
GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of
retired Justices is constitutional or valid.
HELD:
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to
dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds should be utilized, which is
clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional
mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the
funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law
to former Justices on the ground that there should be no grant of
distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired Justices
ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that
these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the
Judiciary be repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the
provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and subsisting.
Farinas v. Executive Secretary et al. 417 SCRA 503
FACTS:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition
The petition seeks to declare Section 14 of RA no. 9006 (The Fair
Elections Act) Unconstitutional as it expressly repeals Section 67 of
Batas Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code ) which provides:
Sec. 67 Candidates holding elective office-Any elective official,
whether national or local, running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Reason for the petition: The unconstitutionality rose upon the
violation of Section 26 of article 6 of the constitution requiring every
law to have only one subject, which should be expressed in its title.
RA No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices, while section 67 of the Omnibus election code
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office rather
than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity
Petitioners also asserted that Sec 14 violates equal protection
clause because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election
Code, leaving Section 66 intactwhich imposes similar limitation to
appointive individuals.
Sec. 66 Candidates holding appointive office or position- Any person
holding a public appointive office or position, including members of
the AFP, and officers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing his certificate of candidacy.
Respondents’ defense:
Section 14 of RA No. 9006 as it repeals Section 67 of
Omnibus Election Code is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate
Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title “An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices” is broad and could
encompass entire election exercise including the filing of candidacy
of elective officials.
The effectivity clause of RA No. 9006 does not run afoul of
the due process clause of the Constituion as it does not entail any
arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and property.
ISSUE/S:
The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is not
embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of RA
9006.
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 be rendered unconstitutional
because it as it expressly repealed Section 67 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 and violated the “one-subject-one title” rule?
Whether Section 14 of RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider?
*rider- additional provision added to a bill or other measure under
the consideration by a legislature having little connection with the
subject matter of the bill.
Whether RA 9006 (The Fair Elections Act) null and void in its entirety
which provides “this act shall take effect upon its approval “ is a
violation of due process.
How is the clause “this law shall take effect immediately upon its
approval” be interpreted?
RULING:
Petition was dismissed.
The title and the objectives of RA No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. Section 14 of RA 9006 is not a
proscribed rider.
There is no dissimilarity between Section 67 (OEC) and RA No. 9006
and does not violate the one-subject-one title rule.
- An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title
may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they
may be so long as they are not inconsistent with the general
subject.
Effectivity clause of RA No. 9006 is defective but not renders the
entire law invalid. (as laid down in Tanada v. Tuvera)
This law shall take effect immediately upon is interpreted, as the
law will take into effect after 15 days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of General
Circulation.
LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., ET AL. V. RAMOS
G.R. No. 127882
Ponente: Carpio-Morales
FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to
accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon
appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may
execute with the foreign proponent.
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved
R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization
and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the
modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the
procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and
withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial
or technical assistance agreements.
On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March
10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general
circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity
of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President
entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land
in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato.
On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos
issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995,
otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which
was adopted on December 20, 1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter
to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the
implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the
DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however,
has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction.
They pray that the Court issue an order:
(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any
application for Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act
No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative Order
No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as
unconstitutional and null and void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional,
illegal and null and void.
In January 2001, MMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and
exploration company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius
Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is
owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR
approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius’
name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. WMCP contends
that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the
Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of
Australian investments.
ISSUE: W/N the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for
allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit Philippine
mineral resources. – YES.
ISSUE: W/N the FTAA between WMCP and the Philippines is a
service contract. – YES.
RATIO:
First Issue:
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for
permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit Philippine
natural resources. Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
retained the Regalian doctrine which states that “All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.” The
same section also states that, “exploration and development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.”
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses,
concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation,
development or utilization of natural resources. Y such omission,
the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through license,
concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987
Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a
direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular
natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to
complete control by the concessionaire over the country’s natural
resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a
particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase
“management or other forms of assistance” in the 1973 Charter.
The present Constitution now allows only “technical and financial
assistance.” The management or operation of mining activities by
foreign contractors, the primary feature of service contracts was
precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to
avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter
into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the
nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos.
Accordingly such provision must be construed strictly against their
enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore RA 7942 is invalid insofar as
said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs
the phrase “financial and technical agreements” in accordance with
the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these
agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is
that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like
the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign
contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining
operation, RA 7942 has in effect conveyed beneficial ownership
over the nation’s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the
State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence,
permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40%
capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged
in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural
resources.
 When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must
connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or be struck down.
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are
unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional GREGORIO B. HONASAN II vs. THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING
or connected must fall with them. PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 159747
April 13, 2004
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign
owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial
assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and “Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the Department of
utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. Justice.”

Facts:
2nd Issue:
Senator Gringo Honasan was charged with the crime of coup d’etat
before DOJ. , Capt. Gerardo Gambala, for and in behalf of the
The FTAA between WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise
military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a device contract.
on nation television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain
of command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP, a fully foreign owned
Macapagal Arroyo and they are willing to risk their lives in order to
corporation, the “exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and
achieve the National Recovery Agenda of Sen. Honasan, which they
dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from
believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society.
the contract area.” Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that
Subpoena was issued for preliminary investigation.
WMCP shall provide “all financing, technology, management, and
Petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.”
jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the imputed acts
were committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the
Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the
FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over
corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge be
natural resources that properly belong to the State and are
filed in court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that
intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are
can legally take cognizance of the case considering that he belongs
abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that
to the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31.
the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to
He is directed to file a counter-affidavit, but instead Senator
Gregorio B. Honasan II filed the herein petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its
members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted
Order on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation.
Honasan’s contention:
Ombudsman and not DOJ has the jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation over all public officials, including him as he
is a senator. Since, Honasan is charged with coup d’etat in relation
to his office. As according the Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it
confers to the Ombudsman the power to investigate moto proprio,
or by complaint of any person, any act or omission that appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Petitioner rationalizes
that the 1987 Administrative Code and the Ombudsman Act of 1989
cannot prevail over the Constitution.
DOJ’s contention:
DOJ has the jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation
pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code. And Coup d’etat is not
directly related to his public office as a senator. Thus, the
jurisdiction of the DOJ is a statutory grant and is not derived from
provisions of the joint circular.
Ombudsman’s contention:
DOJ has the jurisdiction because coup d’etat falls under the
Sandiganbayan only if it’s committed in relation to office. Thus, Joint
Circulat need not be published because it is merely an internal
arrangement between DOJ and Ombudsman and it neither
regulates nor penalizes conduct of persons.
Issue: Whether or not DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation over the charge of coup d’etat against Senator Gringo
Honasan II.
Held: The Court finds the petition without merit.
The jurisdiction of DOJ is not derived from the Joint Circular, OMB-
DOJ Circular No. 95-001 but on the provisions of the 1987
Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the
DOJ. Sec. 1. As a principal law agency which shall be both its legal
counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice
system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of
offenders and administration of the correctional system; and
investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and
administer the probation and correction system. Thus, in Section
13(1), it does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law
to investigate and prosecute public officials. However, under
Ombudsman Act of 1987, was enacted empowering Ombudsman
with primary jurisdiction over cognizable cases by Sandiganbayan. It
may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the
government. Moreover, Ombudsman recognizes its concurrent
jurisdiction with other investigative body of the government.
Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct
the preliminary investigation because petitioner is a public officer
with salary Grade 31 so that the case against him falls exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Considering the
Court's finding that the DOJ has concurrent jurisdiction to
investigate charges against public officers, the fact that petitioner
holds a Salary Grade 31 position does not by itself remove from the
DOJ Panel the authority to investigate the charge of coup
d'etat against him.
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner,v. LA
TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.
CARPIO,J.:
FACTS:
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative,
organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang,
La Trinidad, Benguet. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local
water utility created under Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic,
industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La
Trinidad, Benguet.
TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an
application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate
and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD
opposed TMPCs application, arguing that its franchise is exclusive as
provided under PD 198. A CPC is however granted. LTWD filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by NWRB.
LTWD then appealed to the RTC where it court set aside the NWRB
decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition may be granted
HELD: Yes. RTC Decision Set Aside.
Political Law- No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens,nor shall
such franchise, certificate or authorizationbe exclusive in
characteror for a longer period than fifty years.
Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions are clear franchises for the operation of a public utility
cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions expressly and clearly state that,"nor shall such
franchise x x x be exclusive in character."There is no exception.
When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to
apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the way it is
worded. What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done
indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does not
need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly
can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create
directly franchises that are exclusive in character. What the
President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly they
cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the Court
cannot create indirectly.

In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(President Marcos) created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in
character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create
directly franchises that are exclusive in character.
In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the
Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the basic
law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court
is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not
conform to it.
Petition Granted. Section 47 of PD 198 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Sps. Gauvain Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97973,
January 27, 1992
FACTS: In this case, petitioners Gauvain and Bernadita Benzonan
want a review on the decision made by herein respondent Court of
Appeals – sustaining the right of private respondent Pe to
repurchase a parcel of land sold to petitioners. It started when
respondent Pe was granted parcel of lands acquired through free
patent, however, Pe then mortgaged the lot to DPB; developed it
into commercial complex. Failed to pay the mortgaged, DBP
foreclosed the lot; Pe leased it to DBP; the former failed to redeem
such property within one year period; DBP sold it to petitioners
Benzonan. Then Pe filed a complaint to repurchase. The RTC and CA
affirmed and granted the claim to repurchase. Petitioners filed a
complaint against CA, alledging, among other issues, that the latter
erred in its decision re. the five-year period in foreclosure sale by
not relying on the doctrine in Monge v. Angeles and instead relied
on the ruling in Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate Court which was
applied retroactively. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in its decision
regarding the foreclosure sale by not applying the doctrinal law
ruled in Monge v. Angeles and instead applied retroactively the
ruling in the case Belisario v. IAC?
HELD: Yes
At the time of the foreclosure sale issue, the prevailing
jurisprudence was still the Monge case, hence, it is the doctrine that
should be applied in the case at bar. However, the respondent court
applied the rulings in Belisario case in 1988 thereby rendering a
decision in favor of the private respondent. But the Supreme Court
sustained the claims of the petitioners. The Court said that though
they are bound by decisions pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code,
the Court also stressed that: “while our decisions form part of the
law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code
which states that “laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided””. Moreover, the Court emphasized that “when
a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted,
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively xxx.” Therefore,
respondents cannot rely on the Belisario ruling because it should be
applied prospectively and not the contrary. CA erred in its decision
regarding this case. Wherefore, such decision was reversed and set
aside.
A.M. No. 02-12-01-SC November 24, 2004
RE: RESOLUTION GRANTING AUTOMATIC PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABILITY BENEFITS TO HEIRS OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES WHO DIE
IN ACTUAL SERVICE.
GARCIA, J.:
FACTS:
Judge Emmanuel R. Real was the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial at Ligao, Albay, Branch II, when he died on 25 February 2002 of
cardiac arrest and multiple organ failure or the complications due to
multiple myeloma. At the time of his death, the Judge had rendered
a total government service of thirty-two (32) years, seven (7)
months and twenty-three (23) days, with ten (10) years and twenty-
eight (28) days thereof in the Judiciary.
On 11 March 2002, the Judge’s widow, Mrs. Elena N. Real and their
four (4) children filed a claim for permanent total disability
retirement benefits. The application was denied by this Court
through a Resolution dated 3 June 2002 in A.M. No. 10821-Ret.5 The
denial was based on the failure of the late judge to submit the
application for permanent total disability retirement benefits during
his incumbency for the purpose of medical evaluation. In the same
Resolution, however, the Court treated and approved the
application as a "claim for Retirement/Gratuity Benefits under Sec.
2 of R.A. 910, as amended, effective February 25, 2002 (death),
subject to the availability of funds and the usual clearance
requirements".
Mrs. Real then sought a reconsideration of the 03 June 2002
Resolution and claimed entitlement under this Court’s Resolution of
30 September 2003 in A.M. No. 02-12-01-SC. In a Resolution dated
22 March 2004, this Court approved the claim and accordingly
ordered the payment to Judge Real’s heirs of "the additional
gratuity benefits of 5-year lump sum to complete the 10-year lump
sum gratuity they are entitled under said resolution".
Conformably therewith, the FMBO then sent DBM a request for the
release of funds to cover the additional 5-year lump sum benefits
due the heirs of the late Judge.
Unfortunately, as in the earlier case of Judge Calvan, the DBM,
through Undersecretary Relampagos, virtually denied the request in
his letter dated 19 July 2004 to the Chief Justice,6 the pertinent
portions of which read:
"It is represented that Judge Real died while in actual
service. Based on Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-12-
01-SC dated 13 (sic) September 2003, the Supreme Court
granted an additional five-year lump sum (or a total of ten-
year lump sum) to the heirs of Justices and Judges who,
after having attained the prescribed length of service for
retirement, dies while in actual service.
However, Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, as
amended, clearly provides that if a Judge or Justice dies
while in actual service, his or her heirs shall only be entitled
to a five-year lump sum gratuity, regardless of whether or
not they attained the prescribed length of service for
 retirement. Only those who retire due to permanent
disability are entitled to receive a ten-year lump gratuity if
they attained the prescribed length of service for retirement
(Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended).
We therefore humbly opine that R.A. 910 treats ‘death
while in actual service’ and ‘retirement due to permanent
physical disability’ as distinct and separate circumstances. In
treating these two circumstances as one and the same, and
extending the benefits due to one to the other, A.M. No. 01-
12-01-SC may have expanded the clear intent of R.A. 910.
In view of the foregoing, and our mandate to ensure that
disbursements are made in accordance with law, we are
thus constrained to deny your request." (Emphasis
supplied).
ISSUE:
Was there basis for the DBM to disallow FMBO’s request for the
release of funds in order to cover the additional 5-year lump sum
benefits of the late two (2) judges who both unquestionably died
while in actual service. (NO)
RULING:
We rule and so hold that there is none.
Under our Constitution, each of the three (3) great branches of
government exercises specific powers. As far back as 1922, in
United States vs. Ang Tang Ho,7 this Court had made it abundantly
clear that –
"[i]t is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the
Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to
construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to
execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority
to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power
to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution
only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own
jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any
Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional".
Being the highest court of the land and in the entire judicial
hierarchy, this Court’s construction of a law is final. No other
government agency, much more the other two (2) branches, may
exercise the constitutionally mandated function of this Court to
interpret and construe the law.
The Court considered death "while in actual service" to be
encompassed by the phrase "permanent physical disability". For, as
aptly pointed out by then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee in his
concurring opinion in that case of Judge Galang, "there is no more
permanent or total physical disability than death".
Where the law has gaps which tend to get in the way of achieving its
purpose, thus resulting in an injustice, this Court is allowed to fill
the open spaces therein. So it is that in Floresca vs. Philex Mining
Corporation,9 we stated –
 "…even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New
Civil Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the court, in
the language of Justice Holmes, ‘do and must legislate’ to fill
in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator,
like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot
envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply. Nor
has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all
situations".
We take it as beyond any penumbra of doubt that this Court may
construe a law by issuing resolutions and/or guidelines in applying
it. And this is done not really to enlarge or restrict the law but to
delineate what it requires, including prudence and circumspection
in its enforcement,10 or to assist a government agency in its
implementation.11
Under Republic Act No. 910, a situation whereby a Justice or Judge
dies while in actual service but without having attained the twenty-
year length of service requirement is not expressly provided for.
There is thus a gap in that law, which gap prompted this Court to
issue the Resolution dated 30 September 2003 in A.M. No. 02-12-
01-SC.
Stated in People vs. Jabinal:12
"[d]ecisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws,
are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this
the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code,
‘judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system x x x.’ The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a
way, a part of the law as of the date the law was originally
passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus
construed intends to effectuate".
And as an interpretation of Republic Act No. 910, the Resolution
dated 30 September 2003 in A.M. No. 02-12-01-SC promulgated by
this Court pursuant to its mandates of fiscal autonomy under
Section 3 and of administrative supervision over all courts and
personnel thereof under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution,
became part of said statute. As such, the DBM is duty-bound to
honor and execute the same.
We take this occasion to remind DBM that it is an agency under the
executive branch of government. Hence, it is mandated to ensure
that all laws, not the least of which is this Court’s Resolution dated
30 September 2003 in A.M. 02-12-01-SC, are faithfully executed.
In his letter of 19 July 2004 to the Chief Justice,13 Undersecretary
Relampagos speaks of DBM’s "mandate to ensure that
disbursements are made in accordance with law". It must be
emphasized, however, that such a mandate does not include
reviewing an issuance of this Court and substituting the same with
DBM’s own interpretation of the law. Anything of that sort is
nothing less than a blatant usurpation of an exclusively judicial
function and a clear disregard of the boundary lines delineated by
the Constitution.
We note that this is not the first time DBM has demonstrated its It is truly unfortunate that the admonition of this Court has
uncomplimentary regard for issuances of this Court. In the apparently fallen on deaf ears.
Resolution of August 3, 2004 in A.M. No. 11238-Ret,14 this Court has
once cautioned DBM, thus: FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court RESOLVES to DIRECT the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to: (a) release the
"The DBM should be reminded of its responsibilities to amounts corresponding to the permanent total disability benefits to
respect the law and to act within the limits of its authority. the heirs of the late Judges Melvyn U. Calvan and Emmanuel R. Real
The Administrative Code of 1987 clothes it with the within ten (10) days from notice of the requests for SARO and NCA
responsibility of seeing to the ‘efficient and sound of the FMBO of this Court, and (b) implement the Resolution dated
utilization of government funds and revenues to effectively September 30, 2003 in A.M. No. 02-12-01-SC in all cases of death of
achieve our country’s development objectives.’ That Justices and Judges while in actual service.
responsibility does not include the review of issuances of
the judicial branch of government which it is only duty-
bound to respect, record, and implement. It should realize
that the DBM has no power of judicial review, as it should
be well aware that ‘[t]he power expressly vested in any
branch of the Government shall not be exercised by, nor
delegated to, any other branch of the Government, except
to the extent authorized by the Constitution.’

Indeed, the DBM has the ‘responsibility to ensure that

disbursements are made in accordance with law.’ However,
in the exercise of such responsibility, it should always be
aware of the parameters of its statutory functions. If it
perceives a misapplication of budgetary laws, it behooves
the DBM, as the guardian of the government’s budget, to
call the attention of the Court thereto before implementing
its own interpretation of an issuance of the Court;
otherwise, it would perilously tread on power and authority
constitutionally assigned to the Judiciary."