Republic of the Philippines

TARLAC STATE UNIVERSITY

School of Law
G. Romulo Boulevard, Tarlac City 2300

New Rules Promulgated by the Supreme Court in Relation to

Extralegal Killings and Enforced Disappearances

(Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data, by Justice Adolfo Azcuna)

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Course
Human Rights Law

Presented By:

Maharlika Aquino
Galilee Patdu
Melissa Prellejera
Ray John Dorig

Presented To:
Judge Regina Laxa
Writ of Amparo

A remedy available to any person who’s right to life, liberty, and security has been violated
or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof (Rule on Writ of Amparo, Sec.1).

In the Philippines, amparo is provided for in our 1987 Constitution under Article 8,
Section 5 stating that:

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. x x x.

“In 2007, because of the spate of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in our
country that attracted international attention, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno saw it fit to call a
national summit in order to consult all the stakeholders—left, right and center—whether the
Supreme Court should finally exercise its rule- making power, that is to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights in order to better enforce the
right to life, liberty, and security in the Philippines. The overwhelming consensus of that summit
was a resounding Yes, a signal to go ahead and exercise that power. For the first time, the
Supreme Court adopted and exercised this latent power under Article 8, Section 5(1) of the
Constitution to adopt rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
This is now the rule onWrit of Amparo, A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, adopted on September 25, 2007,
and became effective on October 24, 2007, United Nations Day.”

“The Rule on the Writ of Amparo is a very simple rule, very simple to understand and
implement. The Rule, now part of the Rules of the Court, contains only 27 sections. Basically, it
provides for a mechanism to a petition that is summary in nature but actually unique in character.
It is neither a civil, a criminal, or a special proceeding; it is sui generis. It does not end when
someone is held liable for a crime or just fined. It simply gives certain protective orders or reliefs
to the petitioner. So what is this writ of amparo? It is a special writ available to any person whose
right to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. It covers also cases
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. What is the factual situation?
There are extralegal killings or enforced disappearances or threats thereof. There is an aggrieved
person or a person has been killed or has been abducted or there were threats to do so. Should
the aggrieved person or the authorized parties file a petition for writ of amparo to protect this
person and/or to redress the wrong? Yes. Who may file the petition? The aggrieved person
himself or the authorized parties.The authorized parties are the immediate family, other relatives
or even concerned citizens or associations, respectively.”1

Extralegal killings

These pertain to killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings.

Enforced disappearance

Arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty committed by

agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which places such person
outside the protection of the law[R.A. 10353, Sec. 3(b)].

As clarified in Navia, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9851 ,the Amparo Rule is now a
procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security, but on
a concrete statutory definition as well of what an ‘enforced or involuntary disappearance’ is.
Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s reference to enforced disappearances should be construed to
mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of R.A.
No. 9851 [now Sec. 3(b), R.A. 10353]. Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts
should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9851[should now be read as R.A. No.
10353]. Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851 [now R.A. No. 10353], we can readily discern
that Ku’s circumstance does not come under the statutory definition of an enforced or
involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no refusal
on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give information
on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the BI had any intention to remove Ku from
the protection of the law for a prolonged time(Mison v. Gallegos, G.R. No. 210759, June 23, 2015).

Jurisprudence

Secretary Leila M De Lima, et al.

vs.
Magtanggol B. Gatdula

Facts:

1 P 225 – P 226, PHILJA JUDICIAL JOURNAL vol. 10, issue no. 30

Gatdula filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo in the RTC Manila which is directed
against petitioners De Lima, et al. ‘to cease and desist from framing up Gatdula for the fake
ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against him in relation to the
alleged ambush incident.”

However, instead of deciding whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and
ordered De Lima, et al. to file an answer, and was set for hearing. But despite of failure to answer,
residing Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the said case, and ordered the parties
to file their respective memoranda.

The RTC then granted the issuance of the writ, together with the interim reliefs prayed for
(temporary protection, production and inspection orders).

De Lima et al filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC. As a result, they
elevated the matter to SC through a petition for review on certiorari via rule 45.

Issue:

Is the decision rendered by the RTC correct?

Held:

NO. The confusion arose due from the procedural irregularities in the RTC.

The insistence of filing of an answer was INAPPROPRIATE. It is the return that serves as the
responsive pleading for the petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to
file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those
whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In the utter
disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and
requiring an Answer. Hence, the procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal
the petitioners used in elevating the matter to this Court.

However, simply dismissing the case would cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It
undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.
In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order to promote
a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

The rules can be suspended on the following grounds:

1. Matters of life, liberty or security

 2. The existence of special or compelling circumstances
3. The merits of the case
4. A cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules
5. A lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory
6. The other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby

In the interest of justice, the Court RESOLVES to NULLIFY all orders that are the subject of this
Resolution issued by Judge Pampilo, and DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within 48 hours
from his receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on
the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.

Writ of Habeas Data

The Writ of Habeas Data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting, or sorting of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.

The writ of habeas data is a similar writ to the writ of amparo but it is an independent
remedy to protect the right of privacy of a person. The idea of the writ of habeas data is that if
there is any person, public or private, who is gathering information or a database on any person,
like, for example, name, family members, girlfriends or other information in violation of that
person’s right to personal privacy or the right to self-information or self-determination of said
information, that person has the right to access that database. That person has the right to have
the information corrected if it is wrong, update it if it is out of date, or even suppress it if its
purported use is unlawful. Thus, the writ of habeas data is a procedure for enforcing the right to
privacy, the right to personality which is threatened to be violated through the gathering of a
database.

The writ of habeas data is also a remedy to protect the right to life, liberty, or security of
a person from violation or threatened violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee or of a private individual or entity. It complements the remedies of the writ of
amparo and writ of habeas corpus.
 In other words, any person who is in the process of gathering a database or collecting
data about any person is responsible to see to it that that data must be gathered for a lawful
purpose, that it must not contain erroneous or outdated facts and figures and that it must be
accessible to the person. If there is a violation of this writ of habeas data, the aggrieved person
can file the appropriate petition for writ of habeas data and the procedure is similar to the writ
of amparo although the periods are different.

Jurisprudence

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,

vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and
P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office,
Ilocos Norte, Respondents G.R. No. 193636; July 24, 2012 (SERENO, J.:EN BANC)

FACTS
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order
No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of
Private Armies in the Country." The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa
Commission was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the
country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them
permanently in the future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission
released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A Journey
Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the President"
(the Report).

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted
a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who
keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded
the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in
the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.

Thru local TV news (July 2010) and print media, Gamboa’s name had been tagged as one of those
politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also
appeared on print media. As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the
enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well
as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police
surveillance operations.

Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed,
Gamboa filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs:
(a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of
all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her
honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and
(e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports.

ISSUE: Whether the forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the
Commission is an intrusion to Gamboa’s right to privacy, thus, rendering the remedy of writ of
habeas data proper.

HELD: NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum
to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s
right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information
is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other.

GAMBOA’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY NOT VIOLATED

It is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate
the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to
the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded
to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals
suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those
individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa. This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently
establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to
the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy
in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body
specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups.
Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the
fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the
latter.

The fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior
communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same
cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent
and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa
herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on
individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field.
Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its
integrity and accuracy.

REMEDY OF WRIT OF HABEAS DATA NOT PROPER

Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In
any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her
reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data
unnecessary and improper.