Ramirez v. CA, G.R. No.

93833, September 28, 1995

FACTS:

This is a civil case filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez against private

respondent Ester S. Garcia in which the said case was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result, respondent
filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation
of Republic Act 4200. Petitioner argues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a
"private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently,
her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not
illegal under the said act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication,"

not a "private conversation". (NO)

HELD:

The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous. The
provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY
ALL PARTIES to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder.

Florentino, et al. V. PNB, G.R. No. L-8782, April 28, 1956

FACTS:

The petitioners and appellants filed a petition for mandamus against

Philippine National Bank to compel it to accept the backpay certificate of
petitoner Marcelino B. Florentino to pay an indebtness in the sum of P6,800
secured by real estate mortgage plus interest. The petitioners offered to pay
their loan with the respondent bank with their backpay certificate. Under
section 2 of the Republic Act No. 879, respondent-appellee contends that the
qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents, whereas the appellant’s
contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent.

ISSUE:

Whether the clause “who may be willing to accept the same for settlement”
refers to all antecedents “the Government, any of its branched or
instrumentalities, the corporations owned or controlled by the Government,
etc., or only the last antecedents “any citizen of the Philippines, or any
association organized under the laws of the Philippines.” (NO)

HELD:

Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is,
"any citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines." It should be noted that there is a comma
before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase from the
preceding ones. But even disregarding the grammatical construction, to make
the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen,
association, or corporation, which are not government entities or owned or
controlled by the government, would render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897
unconstitutional for it would amount to an impairment of the obligation of
contracts by compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note
payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than the
current or even the legal one.

Mapa v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 78585, July 5, 1989

FACTS:

Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation (Labrador)

payable in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and
continued to do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter
informed Mapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa
invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to
complete the development of the lots, except those requiring the services of a
public utility company or the government, within 3 years from the date of the
contract. Petitioner contends that P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the
“facilities, improvements, and infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of
development” if offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of PD 957 and its implementing rules form part
of the contracts to sell executed by petitioner and respondent corporation.
(NO)

RULING:

The complete and applicable rule is ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi
impediatur sentencia. Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it
be prevented by the context. In the present case, the employment of the word
"and" between "facilities, improvements, infrastructures" and "other forms of
development," far from supporting petitioner's theory, enervates it instead
since it is basic in legal hermeneutics that "and" is not meant to separate
words but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union. Thus, if ever
there is any valid ground to suspend the monthly installments due from
petitioner, it would only be based on non-performance of the obligations
provided in Clause 20 of the contract, particularly the alleged
non-construction of the cul-de-sac.

People v. Tamani, G.R. Nos. L-22160 & L-22161, January 21, 1974

FACTS:

Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court
on February 14, 1963. Upon receipt of a copy of this order, his counsel
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1,
1963,which was denied. The lower court sent a copy o f t h e o r d e r o f
d e n i a l t o t h e c o u n s e l b y registered mail on July 13, 1963 through
the counsel’s wife. Counsel filed his appeal only on September 10, 1963,
forty-eight days from July24th, which is the reglementary fifteen -day
period for appeal. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed
on the ground that the appeal was for ty -eig ht days late. They
invoked Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which st at es t hat an
appe al must be t aken within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or
notice of the judgment or order appealed from.

ISSUE:

Whether the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of

promulgation of the decision. (YES)

HELD:

Using the rule of reddendosingula singulis, the word “promulgation” should

be construed as referring to “judgment”, while“notice” should be construed
as referring to“order”. Tamani’s appeal is therefore 58 days late, not 47, as
appellees contend; he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the
notice on July 13. Nonetheless, the court decided to act upon the appeal at
hand “to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice.”

Escribano v. Avila, G.R. No. L-30375 September 12, 1978

FACTS:

Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun, the governor-elect of Cotabato, filed

directly with the Court of First Instance of that province a complaint for libel
against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong, Cotabato. In that complaint
Escribano was charged with having said in a speech, which was broadcasted
on a radio station, that "Mr. Pendatun is the worst animal that ever live in this
province.” Escribano questioned Judge Avila's authority to conduct the
preliminary investigation of the offense. Judge Avila in his orders of March 5,
20 and 27, 1969 ruled that he had the power to conduct the preliminary
investigation. On April 1, 1969 Escribano filed in this Court against Judge
Avila and Pendatun the instant special civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition, praying that the said orders of Judge Avila be set aside. On April
18 Escribano filed a supplemental petition to annul Judge Avila's order of
March 29, 1969. In that order he found that Pendatun's evidence had
"established a probable cause to believe that" libel by radio had been
committed and that Escribano "probably committed the same". The city fiscal
filed an information for libel against Escribano. Petitioner invokes the
provisions of article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which were inserted by
Republic Act No. 4363, which do not empower the Court of First Instance to
conduct a preliminary investigation of written defamations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with

authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel
committed by means of radio at Cotabato City or whether that power is
lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city. (YES)

HELD:

The lawmaking body, by means of that amendment of Art. 360, never

intended to take away the jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance to
conduct a preliminary investigation in libel cases. The amendment merely
sought to strip the ordinary municipal court of its power to hold a
preliminary investigation of written defamations. The fact that the Court of
First Instance is not mentioned in Article 360 as a tribunal that may conduct
the preliminary investigation of libel cases would seem to suggest that it
cannot conduct such preliminary investigation, following the maxim inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of
another or the enumeration of particular things excludes the Idea of
something else not mentioned.)

However, the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius cannot be applied in
this case because, as shown above, the fact that the Court of First Instance is
not mention in the amendment, as being empowered to conduct a
preliminary investigation in cases of written defamation, has nothing to do
with the purpose of the amendment. It should be stressed that in construing a
law, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and
mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and it should
give the law a reasonable or liberal construction which win best effect its
purpose rather than one which win defeat it. The silence of article 360 on the
power of a judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct an investigation of
criminal actions for written defamations does not preclude a judge of that
court from holding such investigation.