TRANSPORTATION LAW 7. Mauro Ganzon v.
Court of Appeals – When the good are unconditionally placed in the
Judge Gener M. Gito
1. Jesus Vda. De Nueca, et al. v. The Manila Railroad Company – the parties in a contract of
carriage of passengers are the common carrier and the passenger. A passenger is defined as one who
travels in a public conveyance by virtue of contract, express or implied, with the carrier subject to
payment of fare or an equivalent thereof.
 A person who wants to board a train in a railway station must purchase a ticket and
must present himself at the proper place and in the proper manner for transportation.
Such person must have a bona fide intention to use the facilities of the carrier, possess
sufficient fare to pay for his passage, and present himself to the carrier for
transportation in the place and manner provided. If he does not do so, he will not be
considered a passenger.
2. Baliwag Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals (1989– Since the suit was for a breach of
contract of carriage, the real party-in-interest was the injured passenger because the latter was the
contracting party. It is the person whose contractual right has been invaded who must bring every
action based on contract.
3. Sps. Fabre v. Court of Appeals – Breach of the agreement will entitle the other party to file an
action against the other. However, whether or not there is a written agreement, the carrier owes a
duty of extraordinay diligence directy to the passengers.
4. Everett Steamship Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al. – The consignee is bound by the
terms and conditions of the bill of lading where it was established that he accepted the same and is
trying to enforce the agreement.
5. MOF Company, Inc. v. Shin Yang Brokerage Corporation (2009) citing Sea-Land Service v.
Intermediate Appellate Court – While the bill of lading is oftentimes drawn up by the
shipper/consignor and the carrier without the intervention of the consignee, however, the latter can
be bound by the stipulations of the bill of lading.
a. A consigne although not a signatory to the contract of carriage between the shipper
and the carrier becomes a party to the contract by reason of either:
i. The relationship of agency between the consignee and the
shipper/consignor;
ii. The unequivocal acceptance of the bill of lading delivered to
the consignee, with full knowledge of its contents;
iii. Availment of the stipulation pour atrui (i.e. when the consignee,
a third person, demands before the carrier the fulfillment of the
stipulation made by the consignor/shipper in the consignee’s
favor, specifically the delivery of the goods/cargoes shipped.
6. British Airways v. Court of Appeals – The Supreme Court has adopted in one case the view that
there are two types of contracts of carriage of passengers of passenger. The first type is the contract to
carry, that is, an agreement to carry the passenger at some future date. This contract is consensual
and is therefore perfected by mere consent. The second is the contract of carriage or of common carriage
itself that should be considered a real contract for not until the facilities of the carrier are actually
used can the carrier be said to have already assumed the obligation of the carrier.
 That an action for damages may be sustained for breach of contract to carry. Even if no
tickets were issued, a verbal contract to carry is already a binding consensual contract.
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possession and control of the carrier, and upon theier receipt by the carrier for transportation, the
contract of carriage is perfected.
8. Compania Maritima v. Insurance Company of North America – Whenever the control and
possession of goods passes to the carrier and nothing remains to be done by the shipper, then it can
be said with certainty that the relation of shipper and carrier has been established. The liability of
the carrier as common carrier begins with the actual delivery of the goods for transportation, and
not merely with the formal execution of the receipt or bill of lading, the issuance of a bill of lading is
not necessary to complete delivery and acceptance.
 A written contract is not essential/ necessary for the perfection of the contract of
carriage. The Supreme Court explained that the bill of lading is not essential to the
contract, although it may become obligatory by reason of the regulations of railroad
companies, or as a condition imposed in the contract by the agreement of the parties
themselves. The Code does not demand, as a necessary requisite in the contract of
transportation, the delivery of the bill of lading to the shipper, but gives right to
both the carrier and the shipper to mutually demand of each other the delivery of
said bill.
 Compania Maritima v. Insurance Company of North America citing Del Viso:
There is a perfected contract to carry passengers even if no tickets have been issued to said
passengers so long as there was already a meeting of minds with respect to the subject
matter and the consideration.
9. Korean Airlines Co. Ltd. v. Court of Appeals – On the other hand, there is a perfected contract of
carriage between a passenger and an airline if it can be established that the passenger had checked in at the
departure counter, passed through customs and immigration, boarded the shuttle bus and
proceeded to the ramp of the aircraft and that his baggage had already been loaded in the aircraft to
be flown with the passenger to his destination.
10. Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals – The Supreme Court explained in
Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. V. CA (1991) that once a public utility bus or jeepney stops, it is in
effect making a continuing offer to bus riders. Under this continuing offer rule it is the duty of the
drivers to stop their conveyances for a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an
opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passensgers
resulting from the sudden starting up of the carrier. Liability of the carrier is already based on
contract. It follows that the passenger is deemed to be accepting the offer if he is already attempting
to board the conveyances and the contract of carriage is perfected from that point.
11. Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), et al. v. Marjorie Navidad, et al. – Mr. Navidad was
treated as a passenger because he entered the LRT station after having purchased a ‘token’ and he
fell while he was on the platform waiting for a train. Thus, Mr. Navidad was in the place designated
for boarding the train with the intention of riding the oncoming train.
12. De Guzman v. Court of Appeals – Definition of common carrier; It has been defines as “one that
holds himself out as a public employment and not as a casual occupation.
 The concept of ‘common carrier’ under Article 1732 the concept of common carrier
under Art. 1732 may be seen to neatly coincide with the notion of public service under
the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) that at least partially
supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code.
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  Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of the person or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an
ancillary activity (a sideline).
 Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such
service on an occassional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
 Article 1732 does not distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general
public and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of
the general population.
 A person or entity is a common carrier and has the obligations of the common carrier
under the Civil Code even if he did not secure a Certificate of Public Convenience.
13. First Philippine Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals – the Supreme Court reiterated that
the tests for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods are:
a. He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public
employment, and must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of
goods for persons generally as a business and not as a casual occupation;
b. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;
c. He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and
over his established roads; and
d. The transportation must be for hire.
 The Civil Code made no distinction as to the means of transporting, as long as it is by
land, water or air.
 The Civil Code does not provide that the transportation should be by motor vehicle.
 Pipeline operators are comon carriers that are subject to business taxes on common
carriers even if the oil or petroleum products are being transported not through motor
vehicles but through pipelines. The Court used the tests to determine the existence of
common carriers enumerated earlier.
14. National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals – the Supreme Court reiterated the ruling that
the test of a common carrier is the carriage of goods or passengers, provided it has space for all who
opt to avail themselves of its transportation for a fee.
15. The United States v. Tan Piaco, et al. citing Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz – Public use
means the same as use by the public. The essential feature of public use is that it is not confined to
the privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. It is this indefinite or unrestricted
quality that gives it its public character xxx Public use is not synonymous with public interest . The
true criterion by which to judge of the character of the use is whether the public may enjoy it by
right or only by permission.
16. Bascos v. Court of Appeals – the Supreme Court explained that the test to determine a common
carrier is whether the given undertaking is part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he
has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the
business transacted.
17. Westwind Shipping Corp. v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. – Otherwise stated, “as long
as a personor corporation holds itself to the public for the purpose of transporting goods as a
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business, it is already considered a common carrier regardless of whether it owns the vehicle to be
used or has to actually hire one.”
 Customs brokers have been regarded as a common carrier because the transportation of
goods is an integral part of their business.
 The operation of an arrastre operator starts on and its responsibility for the merchandise
and goods begins from the time they are placed upon the wharves or piers or delivered
along sides of ships.
 However, the liability of the carrier usually remains until delivery of the goods to the
consignee; thus, the custody of the carrier remains while the goods are being unloaded.
18. Sps. Cruz v. Sun Holidays, Inc. – The operator of a beach resort that accepts clients by virtue of
a tour package-contracts that included transportation to and from the Resort and the point of
departure in Batangas is considered as a common carrier. The Court observed that its ferry services
are so intertwined with its business as to be properly considered ancillary thereto. The constancy of
respondent’s ferry services in its resort operations is underscored by its having its own boats. And
the tour packages it offers, which include the ferry services, may be availed of by anyone who can
afford to pay the same. These services are thus available to the public.
19. Sps. Perena v. Sps. Nicolas – The Supreme Court summarized the rule in this case in this wise:
“As all the foregoing indicate, the true test for a common carrier is not the quantity or extent of the
business actually transacted, or the number and character of the conveyances used in the activity,
but whether the undertaking is a part of the activity engaged in by the carrier that he has held out to
the general public as his business or occupation. If the undertaking is a single transaction, not a part
of the general business or occupation engaged in, as advertised and held out to the general public,
the individual or the entity rendering such service is a private, not a common, carrier. The question
must be determined by the character of the business actually carried on by the carrier, not by any
secret intention or mental reservation it may entertain or assert when charged with the duties and
obligations that the law imposes. “
 Carriers that provide bus service to school children are common carriers. Necessarily,
the clientele of the so-called school buses are limited to students of particular schools
where their passengers study.
 Despite catering to a limited clientele, the petitioners “operated as common carrier
because they held themselves out as a ready transportation indiscriminately to the
students of a particular school living within or near where they operated the service
and for a fee.
 Note Page 28
20. Asia Lighterage and Shipping, Inc. v. Court of Appeals – A person or entity may be a common
carrier even if he has no fixed and publicly known route, maintains no terminals, and issues no
tickets.
 The Supreme Court still ruled that the petitioner is a common carrier pointing out that
the principal business of the petitioner is that of lighterage and drayage and it offers its
barges to the public for carrying or transporting by water for compensation. Petitioner
was considered a common carrier whether its business of carrying goods is done on an
irregular basis rather than scheduled manner and with a limited clientele. A common
carrier need not have a fixed and publicly known route nor does it have to maintain
terminals or issue tickets.
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21. Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals – A person or entity need not be engaged in the business of public
transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them.
22. Cebu Salvage Corporation v. Philippine Home Assurance Corp. – The carrier can also be a
common carrier even if the operator does not own the vehicle or vessel that he or she operates.
23. Luzon Stevedoring Co. Inc. v. The Public Service Commission – The Supreme Court
explained that it is not necessary , under this definition, that one holds himself out as serving and
willing to serve the public as a class or at large in order to be considered public service.
 The Supreme Court ruled that just as the legislature may not declare a company or
enterprise to be a public utility when it is not inherently such, a public utility may not
evade control and supervision of its operation by the government by selecting its
customers under the guise of private transactions.
24. Luzon Brokerage Company v. Public Service Commission – The Supreme Court declared that
Act 454 is clear in the definition of a public service that which is rendered for compensation,
although limited exclusively to the customers of the petitioners.
25. Virgines Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Co. – As a common carrier , she is bound to
exercise extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods and is presumed to be negligent when she
failed to deliver the same.
26. Phil. American General Insurance Company, et al. v. PKS Shipping Company – The
Supreme Court declared that PKS was a common carrier because it was engaged in the business of
carrying goods for others for a fee. “The regularity of its activities in the area indicates more than
just a casual activity on its part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier change merely
because individual contracts are executed or entered into with the patrons of the carrier.”
27. Saltis v. A.B.B. Daimler Benz (North America Inc.) (Court of Appeals of Georgia) citing
Millar Elevator Svc. Co. v. O’ Sheilds – It should be noted in this connection that in another
jurisdiction, a private entity that operates a shuttle train or “people mover,” which gives free
transportation inside the secured area of the airport between the passenger terminals and
concourses to the airline passengers, and the airline employees, is considered public transportation.
It was held that there is a duty of extraordinary care regarding the operation of a carrier of
passengers on such public conveyance.
28. Caltex (Phils.) v. Sulpicio Lines – A charter party may transfor a common carrier into a private
carrier. However, it must be a bareboat or demise charter where the charterer mans the vessel with
his own people and becomes, in effect, the owner for the voyage or service stipulated.
 In a voyage charter, the carrier is answerable to the loss of the goods received for
transportation.
29. Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. v. Pioneer Asia Insurance Corp. – The common carrier is not
transformed into a private carrier if the charter party is a contract of affreightment like a voyage
charter or a time charter.
30. Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. – A ‘charter party’ is defined as a contract by
which an entire ship or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another personfor a
specified time or use; a contract of affreightment by which the owner of a ship or other vessel lets
the whole or a part of her to a merchant or other person for the conveyance of goods, on a
particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight. (Cont. in Page 21)
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 The distinction between a ‘common or public carrier’ and a ‘private or special carrier’
lies in the character of the business, such that if the undertaking is a single transaction,
not a part of a general business or occupation, although involving the carriage of goods
for a fee, the person or corporation offering such service is a private carrier.
31. Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc. – Although the charter party in
this case was a contract of affreightment, the Court still ruled that it was a private carrier.
32. Philam Insurance Comapany, Inc. v. Heung-A Shipping Corporation, et al. – A a lot or space
charter agreement is in the nature of a contract of affreightment. Hence, the Court observed in one
case that the slot charter agreement did not divest the carrier of such characterization as a carrier
nor relieve it of any accountability for the shipment. The slot or space charter party not only
allowed the shipper to load its cargo for a certain specified space.
33. Cargolift Shipping, Inc. v. L. Actuario Marketing Corp. and Skyland Brokerage, Inc. – The
party that provides the service in a contract of towage is required to observe the due diligence of a
good father of the family. The negligence of the obligor in the performance of the obligation
renders him liable for damages for the resulting loss suffered by the obligee. Fault or negligence of
the obligor consists in his failure to exercise due care and prudence in the performance of the
obligation as the nature of the obligation so demands.
 While adverse weather has always been a real threat to maritime commerce, the least
that the operator of a tugboat should do is to ensure that the tugboat would be able to
secure the vessel being towed at all times during the engagement.
34. Standard Vacuum Oil Company v. Luzon Stevedoring Company, Inc. – Though it is engaged
in a limited contract of carriage in the sense that it chooses its customers and is not open to the
public, nevertheless, the continuity of its operationin this kind of business has earned for it the level
of a public utility.
35. Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Phoenix Assurance Company of New
York / Mcgee & Co., Inc. – Arrastre, a Spanish word that refers to the hauling of cargo,
comprehends the handling of cargo on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or
shipper and the ship’s tackle. The responsibility of the arrastreoperator lasts until the delivery of the
cargo to the consignee. Longshoremen usually perform the service.
 Stevedoring refers to the handling of the cargo in the holds of the vessel or between the
ship’s tackle and the holds of the vessel. The responsibility of the stevedore ends upon
the loading and stowing of the cargo in the vessel.
 The diligence required of a stevedore is the diligence of a good father of a family.
 The public policy considerations in legally imposing upon a common carrier or a
warehouseman a higher degree of diligence is not present in a stevedoring outfit which
mainly provides labor in loading and stowing of cargoes for its clients.
36. Delgado Brothers , Inc. v. Home Insurance, Inc.; Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Allied Guarantee,
Ins. – The functions of an arrastre operator usually include the following: (1) to receive, handle,
care for, and deliver all merchandise imported and exported, upon or passing over government-
owned wharves and piers in the port; (2) to record or check all merchandise which may be delivered
to said port or shipside, and in general and; (3) to furnish light, and water services and other
incidental services in order to undertake its narrastre service.
 Hence, the functions of an arrastre operator have nothing to do with the trade and
business of navigation, nor the use or operation of vessels.Even if the arrastre service
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 depends on, assists, or furthers maritime transportation, it may be deemed merely
incidental to its aforementioned functions as arrastre operator and does not, thereby,
make the service maritime in character.
37. Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc. v. Wallem Phils. Shipping, Inc. – The functions of an
arrastre operator involve the handling of cargo deposited on the wharf or between the
establishment of the consignee or shipper or the ship’s tackle. Being the custodian of the goods
discharged from a vessel, the arrastre operator’s duty is to take good care of the goods nd turn over
to the party entitled to their possession.
 The common carrier may be held solidarily liable with the arrastre operator depending
on the circumstances. They may not be held solidarily liable at all times. It should be
noted that both the arrastre operator and the carrier may be charged with and obligated
to deliver the goods in good condition to the consignee.
38. Asian Terminals v. Philam Insurance Co., Inc. – In some cases however, the arrastre operator
may even be tasked to unload the cargoes from the vessel.
 Solidary liability may be imposed against the carrier and the arrastre operator if both
their employees were concurrently negligent. Thus, solidary liability is imposed if there
was concurrent negligence in unloading the cargo reulting in damages thereto.
39. Summa Insurance Corporation v. CA and Port Service Inc.; citing Malayan Insurance Co.,
Inc. v. Manila Port Services – The Supreme Court imposed a higher degree of diligence on the
arrastre operator explaining that: “x x x The relationship therefore between the consignee and the
arrastre operator must be examined. This relationship is much akin to that existing between the
consignee or owner of shipped goods and the common carrier, or that between a depositor and a
warehouseman. In the performance of its obligations, an arrastre operator should observe the
same degree of diligence as that required of a common carrier and a warehouseman as
enunciated under Article 1733 of the Civil Code and Section 3(b) of the Warehouse Receipts Law,
respectively. Being the custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arrastre
operator’s duty is to take good care of the goods and to turn them over to the party entitled
to their possession.”
40. E. Razon, Inc. v. Court of Appeals – It is for the purpose of determining its liability so that it
may obtain compensation commensurable to the risk it assumes, not for the purpose of determining
the degree of care or diligence it must exercise as a depository or warehouseman.
41. Cebu Arrastre Service v. Collector of Internal Revenue – The function of stevedores involves
the loading and unloading of coastwisevessels calling the port.
42. Crisostomo v. The Court of Appeals – The contract between the travel agency and a passenger is
a contract of service and not a contract of carriage. The diligence required of a travel agency is not
extraordinary diligence but that of a good father of a family under Article 1733 of the New Civil
Code.
43. Cathay Pacific Airways v. Juanita Reyes, et al. – However, the travel agency and the carrier may
be made jointly and severally liable.
44. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. The Nisshin Fire and Marine Insurance Co., et al. –
However, Article 1753 of the Civil Code is also explicit that with respect to cases involving loss,
destruction or deterioration of goods, the law of the country of destination shall apply. Thus,
Philippine Laws shall apply if the goods are to be transported from Japan to the Philippines.
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45. National Development Company v. The Court of Appeals – It was explained that the laws of
the Philippines would apply in case of loss of goods due to collision. It is immaterial that the
collision occurred in foreign waters. However, it was explained that collision falls among matters
not specifically regulated by the Civil Code, so Article 826 to 839 of Book 3 of the Code of
Commerce shall apply exclusively.
46. Alitalia v. Intermediate Appellate Court – Thus, in iternational air transportation, the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the International Carriage by Air or
‘Warsaw Convention’ with its amendments should be applied.
47. Mapa v. Court of Appeals – The place of departure and the place of destination are within the
territory of a single contracting country if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject
to the sovereignty , mandate or authority of another power, even though the power is not a party to
the Convention.
48. Fisher v. Yangco Steamship Company, et al. – Common carriers exercise a sort of public office,
and have duties to perform in which the public is interested. Consequently, common carriers are
subject to regulation by the State.
49. Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas – The rule in this jurisdiction is that the person who is the
registered owner of a vehicle is liable for any damage caused by the negligent operation of the
vehicle although the same was already sold or conveyed to another person at the time of the
accident. This rule is a matter of public interest.
50. Gaudioso Erezo, et al. v. Aguedo Jepte – The registered owner is liable to the injured party
subject to his right of recourse against the transferee or the buyer.
 The administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any essential relation to the
contract of sale between the parties but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle
upon any public highway.
51. Duavit v. Court of Appeals – The registered owner is not liable if the vehicle was taken from his
garage without his knowledge and consent. To hold the registered owner liable would be absurd as
it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person
who stole such vehicle.
52. Duquillo v. Bayot – Indeed, unauthorized use and/or theft of the vehicle may be invoked in
proper cases.
53. BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals – The registered owner rule applies even if the
registered owner leased the vehicle to another who is the actual operator.
54. PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance, Inc. – In order to be free from
liability, the lessor-owner should register the lease contract with the Land Transportation Office.
The lease should be annotated in the certificate of registration in order that there will be notice to
third parties that it is the lessee and not the registered owner who is in possession and operating the
vehicle.
 A lease such as the one involved in the instant case is an encumbrance in contemplation
of law, which needs to be registered in order for it to bind third parties.
55. Perez v. Gutierrez – If the registered owner is made liable despite the transfer of the vehicle, the
transferee is liable to the registered owner for the damages caused to the passenger.
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56. Zamboanga Transportation Co., Inc. v. The Court of Appeals; citing Dizon v. Octavio, et al.
– The Supreme Court observed, however, that it is for the better protection of the public that both
the owner of record and the actual operator, as held by us in the past, should be adjudged jointly
and severally liable with the driver.

57. Abelardo Lim, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. – Although law does not outrightly penalize the
parties to such an agreement, the kabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to public
policy and therefore void and inexistent unde Article 1409 of the Civil Code.

58. Lita Enterprises v. Intermediate Appellate Court – Persons who are parties to the ‘kabit’ system
cannot invoke the same as against each other either to enforce their illegal agreement or to invoke
the same to escape liability. This is consistent with the time honored maxim ‘ex pacto illicito non
oritur action.’ Having entered into an illegal contract, neither can seek relief from the courts, and
each must bear the consequences of his acts.

59. Teja Marketing v. Intermediate Appellate Court – Although the motorcycle was allegedly
purchased from the petitioner, the same remained to be registered in the name of the petitioner and
was operated under the latter’s franchise pursuant to what is commonly known as ‘kabit system’
without prior approval of the appropriate government agenc. The Court ruled that it would not aid
either party to enforce an illegal contract.

60. Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals – re: existence of employer-employee
relationship; The Court ruled that the remittance of SSS contributions was the responsibility of the
employer, Pascual Tuazon, regardless of the existence or non-existenceof kabit system.

61. Zamboanga Transport Co., Inc. v. The Court of Appeals – Transfer of a certificate of public
convenience to operate a transportation service is not effective and binding insofar as the
responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in its relation to the public is concerned, without
the approval of the transfer by the Public Service Commission required by the Public Service Act,
and that in contemplation of law, the transferor of such certificate continues to be the operator of
the service as long as the transfer is not yet approved, and as such operator, he is the one
responsible jointly and severally with his driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons
in consequence of injuries or deaths resulting from the operation of such service.

62. Santos v. Sibug – The sheriff may proceed with the auction sale of the jeepney. The vehicle
remainsto be the property of the registered owner despite the alleged transfer to another. As regards
the public and third persons, the vehicle is considered the property of the registered operator.

63. Hernandez v. Dolor – In land transportation where the boundary system may be implemented by
the common carrier, the carrier cannot escape liability by claiming that the driver is a lessee. The
carrier cannot exempt himself on the the ground he is a lessor because to tolerate such position
would not only abet flagrant violations of the Public service Law but also to place the riding public
at the mercy of reckless and irresponsible drivers – reckless because the measure of their earnings
depends largely upon the number of trips they make and, hence, the speed at which they drive; and
irresponsible because most if not all of them are in no position to pay the damages they might
cause.

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