CONSTI CASES

Marcos vs Comelec
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938
to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine
Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President
Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there
as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they
lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative
of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by
adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed
on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in
running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor
of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the
following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts
which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile
of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence”
in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late
 CONSTI CASES

President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home
and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte,
the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995
are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.
Dumpit v. Boado GR NO. 163619
Facts:
Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La
Union during the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Engineer Carlos
Boado, Rogelio L. De Vera, Fernando Calonge, Benito Carrera, Salvador Carrera and
Domingo Carrera sought Dumpit-Michelena's disqualification and the denial or cancellation
of her certificate of candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation under Sections
74 and 78of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Boado, et al. alleged that Dumpit-Michelena, the
daughter of Congressman Tomas Dumpit, Sr. of the Second District of La Union, is not a
resident of Agoo, La Union. Boado, et al. claimed that Dumpit-Michelena is a resident and
was a registered voter of Naguilian, La Union and that Dumpit-Michelena only transferred
her registration as voter to San Julian West, Agoo, La Union on October 24, 2003. Dumpit-
Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in San Julian West when she
purchased from her father, Congressman Dumpit, a residential lot on April 19, 2003. She
even designated one Gardo Fontanilla as a caretaker of her residential house. Dumpit-
Michelena presented the affidavits and certifications of her neighbors in San Julian West to
prove that she actually resides in the area. COMELEC rules in favor of Boado et al. The
COMELEC En Banc denied in its ruling the motion for reconsideration filed by Dumpit-
Michelena. Hence, the present recourse by Dumpit-Michelena.
Issues:
1.Whether Dumpit-Michelena's motion for reconsideration was filed on time;
2.Whether Dumpit-Michelena was denied due process of law; and
3.Whether Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the residency requirement under the Local
Government Code of 1991.
 CONSTI CASES

Held:
1. SC ruled that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
Dumpit-Michelena's motion for reconsideration for late filing.
Aquino v. COMELEC 248 SCRA 400 (1995)
Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age,
able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative
District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of
the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10
months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground
that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which
under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one
year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his
certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a
resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of
8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the
latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission
resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.
Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to
warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence
(not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.
 CONSTI CASES

Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile”
not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court
cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is
it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was
domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at
times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and
actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of
domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain,
i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs
of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to
place through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for
him to qualify.
 CONSTI CASES

Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established
a domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior
to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was
a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years
prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his
COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of
origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement
of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in
Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short
length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in
Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in
transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one
year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the
candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of
Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving
congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with
the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the
elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR
Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
 CONSTI CASES

C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its
questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to
be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year
against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year
residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which
were only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in
the case of petitioner’s district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered
the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining
qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the
doctrine that a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is
a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new
political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing
their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these
areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one
year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself
establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.
Osmena v. Pendatun (1960)
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to
Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his
administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in
order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his
allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary
actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court.
Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred
that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to
discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the
 CONSTI CASES

courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him
from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is
dismissed.
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan GR No. 126055 April 2001
FACTS:
A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a
complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID
Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the
application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then
issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension
against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines
RULING:
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent
public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both
legal and jurisprudential support. xxx
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension
upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is
found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of
suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.”
Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs.
Sandiganbayan observed:
“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact,
if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.”
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the
clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court
has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public
officials and employees indicted before it.
Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’ Prerogative to
Discipline its Members
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner,
behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of
preventive suspension.
 CONSTI CASES

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure
that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the
case may be, upon an erring member.
xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and
that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive
suspension order.
De Venecia v. Sandiganbayan GR NO. 130240
Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of
Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a
“Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But
the Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through
counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and
claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House
Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan
rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and
ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr., in
his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his
capacity as Secretary-General of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño,
Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of
Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is a penalty or a
precautionary measure; and
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress from the
mandate of R.A. 3019.
Held: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (GR 118354, 8 August 1995), the
suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and
purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary measure
resorted to upon the filing of valid Information.
 CONSTI CASES

As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of separation of

powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order
of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.
Ratio: Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution
by influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence and from committing
further acts of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings
before the court. On the other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the
Constitution is a House-imposed sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for
disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its
honor and integrity.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The
maxim simply recognizes that each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit
coordinate, branches of the government – the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary –
has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively
prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
Quorum, Avelino v. Cuenco (1949)

On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on the senate
floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to
do so on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day however, Avelino delayed
the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano
Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He
however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall
Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Tañada et al were being blocked
by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among others, as being
out of order. Avelino’s camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder.
Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in
voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately
followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of
record — it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino,
made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining
members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the
Senate. Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to
Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was
unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the
 CONSTI CASES

following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo
warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.

HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This
is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this
case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who
are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as
the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?

There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of
the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving
the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that
met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution
been approved only by ten or less.

**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor
was in the USA.

Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided
by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such
session?

The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes
entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time
(including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the
Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each
House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a
majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a
majority of “all the members of the House” and a majority of “the House”, the latter
requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members
of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose
of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have
ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested,
there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just
the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
 CONSTI CASES

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)

Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and
that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or
wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected
president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and
the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the
majority which if mathematically construed is ½ + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13
NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no
quorum.

The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the
light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the
result of the majority’s pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has
become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a
quorum would result in Cuenco’s election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group,
taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing
compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the
Avelino’s persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason,
the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and that the majority’s ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with
the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate
President and the petition is dismissed.

Justice Feria: (Concurring)

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that “the majority of all the members
of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business” and the fact that said
provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read “a majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum to do business,” shows the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the
Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual
members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death,
incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make
attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which
each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to
constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and
not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words “of all the members” as
unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution
 CONSTI CASES

which required “concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly to

expel a member” was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to
require “the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House”. Therefore, as
Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate,
the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three
(23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

Jimenez v. Cabangbang (1966)

Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of
an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with
the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with
communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to
place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others,
under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used
as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of
general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of
damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang
petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower
house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule
and that the said letter is not even libelous.

ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress.

HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and
in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not
be questioned in any other place.”

The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to
utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same
is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not,
and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
 CONSTI CASES

Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of
the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was
published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is
obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing
his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not
absolutely privileged.

Kida v. Senate, GR NO. 196271

Facts:
RA 6734 provided for the organic act mandated by the constitution for the formation
of ARMM. Unfortunately said organic act did not provide for the exact date for the regional
elections in ARMM. Because of this, several Laws were enacted to provide for the date of
the election ; RA 9054- Second Monday of September 2001, RA 9140—November 26, 2001,
RA 9333—2nd Monday of August 2005. And on the same date every three years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but
sometime in June, Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for the synchronization of
the elections in ARMM with the national and local elections.
Several people, including herein plaintiff assailed the constitutionality of the said
enactment.

Issue/s:
1. WON ARMM is a distinct from an ordinary local government unit and therefore should
not be required to hold its election during the local elections mandated in the constitution.
2. WON RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the president the power
to appoint OIC for several elective positions until such positions be filled during the May
2013 elections.

Held:
1. No ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not exempt from the
synchronization of election. SC held that the inclusion of autonomous regions in the
enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading “Local Government”
indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of
the forms of local governments.
That the Constitution mentions only the “national government” and the “local
governments,” and does not make a distinction between the “local government” and the
“regional government,” is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the
 CONSTI CASES

framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of
government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than
other local government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since
autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in
autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.
2. Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that there is
no incompatibility between the President’s power of supervision over local governments
and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific
confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as “the power of a superior officer to see to it that
lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law.” This is distinguished from
the power of control or “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter.”
The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control over the
OICs is rooted in their belief that the President’s appointment power includes the power to
remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs
will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the
people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’ supposition. The provision
states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-
charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices
until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed
office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of
the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same
officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May
2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to
recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners’ fears in this regard are
more apparent than real.
Arnault v. Nazareno (1950)
THE FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as
Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to
resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a
non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in
the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited
 CONSTI CASES

anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who
benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was
one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the
investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom
he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million
proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of
the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He
thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning
the validity of his detention.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond
its period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with
process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not
infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown
that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in
contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and
cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the
petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties
responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name
 CONSTI CASES

of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to
that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is
not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation
or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary
for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to
any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the
matter under inquiry.
xxx xxx xxx
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject,
obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond
its period of legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt
to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence
of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to
enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or
obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by
duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or
conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which
that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is
coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a
continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in
cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
[P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction,
we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person
might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the
Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as
he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear
reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as
well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus
developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a
question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show
 CONSTI CASES

that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the
constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to
prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by
reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure
immunity to a third person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the
case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from
answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather
it is for the trial judge to decide that question.
Senate v. Ermita GR NO. 169777
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power
by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other
Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for,
inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus,
and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations,
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire
tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided
by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress,
valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in
 CONSTI CASES

this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must
be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions,
the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability GR NO. 180643
FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to
testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos
offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA
about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result,
the Senate cited him for contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive
privilege.
RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications
privilege. It pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect
presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should
remain confidential.” Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of
the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the
President’s unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the
area of military and foreign relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy
greater confidentiality than others.
Elements of presidential communications privilege:
 CONSTI CASES

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor
of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains
important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority. - there is no adequate showing of a compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Gudani v. Senga GR NO. 170165
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election
fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of
the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a
Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate
Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in
spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of
their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle
of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General
Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power
as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which
seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom
Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the
President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel
the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the
land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
 CONSTI CASES

SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional
hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive
privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds.
However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as
commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The
President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations
as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear
before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of
the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is
ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners
testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from
members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier
disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief
Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, GR NO. 192935
FACT:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by
President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President
tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers
and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to
investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot
determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.
It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally
 CONSTI CASES

reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does
not include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth
Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting
it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The
Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials
and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team
and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities
of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
Rufino v. Endriga GR NO. 139554, July 21, 2006
The Facts
Petitioners in GR No. 139565, led by Baltazar N. Endriga (the Endriga group), were
appointed members of the board of trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP)
by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1995, with the qualification that their appointments would
extend only until December 31, 1998. On December 22, 1998, then President Joseph Estrada
advised petitioners that they were being replaced by seven new appointees to the CCP
board, led by Armita B. Rufino (the Rufino group). Having been dislodged from the CCP,
Endriga filed quo warranto proceedings questioning the President’s authority to appoint
new members in the CCP board.
It was alleged that under Section 6(b)[1] of Presidential Decree No. 15, vacancies in the
board “shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next
regular meeting x x x.” The Endriga group claimed that it was only when the board was
entirely vacant that the President of the Philippines may fill the vacancies, in consultation
with the ranking officers of the CCP. The members of the group believed that since only one
seat was vacant, President Estrada could not appoint a new board. They averred that
presidential appointment was unjustified, since the CCP board still had 10 incumbent
trustees who had the statutory power to fill any vacancy in the board by election.
On May 14, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the quo warranto Petition. It declared
the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office and ousted respondents from the CCP
 CONSTI CASES

board. The CA held that Section 6(b) of Presidential Decree (PD) 15 had clearly vested in the
remaining members of the board the power to elect new trustees. It ruled that the
President could exercise the power to appoint only when the board was entirely vacant.
In its appeal before this Court, the Rufino group asserted that Section 6(b) of PD 15, which
authorized the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees, should be declared
unconstitutional. The provision was allegedly repugnant to Section 16 of Article VII of the
Constitution, which allowed the appointment only of “officers lower in rank” than the
appointing power.
The Issue
The lone issue was whether Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was unconstitutional in the light of
Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, the Court recognized the occurrence of a supervening event that could have
rendered the case moot – the resignation of the Rufino group and the appointment of new
CCP trustees by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The Court, however, deemed it best to
pass upon the merits of the case, in order to prevent a repeat of this regrettable controversy
and to protect the CCP from being periodically wracked by internecine politics. Moreover,
the Court brushed aside procedural barriers, in view of the paramount importance of the
constitutional issues involved.
By a vote of 10-3,[2] the Court held that Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was irreconcilable with
Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
The clear and categorical language of Section 6 (b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in the CCP
board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. It is only when the board
becomes entirely vacant that the vacancies shall be filled by the President of the Philippines,
acting in consultation with the same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, Section 6 (b)
empowers the remaining trustees of the board to fill the vacancies by electing their fellow
trustees. Simply put, this provision authorizes the appointing officer to appoint an officer
who will be equal in rank to the former.
In its Decision, the Court held that the power of appointment granted in Section 6 (b) of PD
15 transgressed Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.[3 It explained that the power to
appoint – vested by Section 16 in the President; or the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions or boards – was restricted only to officers lower in rank. This constitutional
provision clearly excluded a situation in which the appointing officers appointed an officer
who would be equal to them in rank.
This latter situation, however, was present in the CCP, whose trustees were appointing new
co-trustees who would be equal in rank to the former. Thus, Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15
was found to be unconstitutional, insofar as it violated the constitutional mandate that the
head of the board may be authorized to appoint lower-ranking officers only.
 CONSTI CASES

Further, Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution authorized Congress to vest specifically
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards – and in no other person –
the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. The word “heads” referred to the chairpersons
of the commissions or boards, not to their members, for several reasons.
First, the 1935, the 1973, and the 1987 Constitutions made a clear distinction whenever the
power to appoint lower-ranked officers was granted to the members of or the head of a
collegial body. When conferring the power of appointment to the members of that collegial
body, our past and present Constitutions used the phrases “in the courts,”[4] “courts,”[5]
“the Supreme Court,”[6] “members of the Cabinet,” 4and “the Constitutional
Commissions.”[7]
Thus, if the intention was to grant to members of a commission or board the power to
appoint lower-ranked officials, Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution should have used
the phrase “in the commissions or boards.” But in sharp contrast, this provision vested the
power “in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.”
Second, the deliberations[8] of the present Constitution revealed that the framers had
intended the phrase “in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards” to be
an enumeration of offices whose heads may be vested by law with the power to appoint
lower-ranked officers. Thus, in the enumeration, what applied to the first office applied also
to the succeeding offices mentioned.
Third, all commissions or boards had chief executives who were their heads. Since the
Constitution spoke of “heads” of office, and all commissions or boards had chief executives
or heads, that word could have referred only to the chief executives or heads of the
commissions or boards. Given that the word “heads” referred to the commission or board
chair persons, not members, the Court ruled that the head of the CCP was the chairperson
of the CCP board of trustees. This conclusion was further supported by the fact that Section
8 of PD 15[9] and Section 3 of the Revised Rules and Regulations[10] of the CCP recognized
that its board chairperson – as the head of the CCP – had the power to appoint, remove, and
discipline all officers, staff and personnel of the CCP.
Pursuant to Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, the chairperson of the CCP board,
as the head of the CCP, was the only officer who could be vested by law with the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP. Section 6 (b) of PD 15 could not validly grant this
power of appointment to the members of the CCP board, as they were not the head of the
CCP.
Moreover, Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was found to be unconstitutional, because it ran
afoul of the President’s power of control under Section 17 of Article VII of the
Constitution.[11] It was noted that the CCP was an agency that fell under the Executive
Branch.
Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency “not placed by law or order
creating them under any specific department” fell “under the Office of the President.”[12]
Since the CCP did not fall under the Legislative or the Judicial Branch of government and was
 CONSTI CASES

not an independent constitutional or quasi-judicial body or local government unit, then the
CCP necessarily fell under the Executive Branch and should be subject to the President’s
control.
However, Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15, by authorizing the trustees of the CCP board to fill its
vacancies, insulated the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the
President. This authority made the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the
control of the Chief Executive. Such public office or board could not legally exist under the
present Constitution.The legislature could not have validly enacted a law that would put a
government office in the Executive Branch outside the control of the President.
While the charter of the CCP vested it with autonomy of policy and operation, this charter
did not free it from the President’s control. As part of the Executive Branch, the CCP could
not be cut off from that control in the guise of insulating the latter from presidential
influence.
Sarmiento v. Mison (1987)
FACTS:
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
by then President (Corazon) Aquino. The said appointment made by the President is being
questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who are both taxpayers,
members of the bar, and both Constitutional law professors, stating that the said
appointment is not valid since the appointment was not submitted to the Commission On
Appointment (COA) for approval. Under the Constitution, the appointments made for the
"Heads of Bureau" requires the confirmation from COA.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President without the confirmation from
COA is valid.
HELD:
Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list of officers that
needed confirmation from the Commission On Appointment. It enumerated the four (4)
groups whom the President shall appoint:
Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public minister or consuls,
Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain, and Other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in him in this Constitution;
The above-mentioned circumstance is the only instance where the appointment made by
the President that requires approval from the COA and the following instances are those
which does not require approval from COA:
All other Officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law;
 CONSTI CASES

Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
Pimintel v. Aguirre, GR NO. 132988, July 19, 2000
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local
government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing
Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.
HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does
not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in
order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals.
AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his powers
of supervision over local governments. A directory order cannot be characterized as an
exercise of the power of control. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies
and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain
economic stability in the country. It does not contain any sanction in case of
noncompliance.
The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters,
provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the
national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the
House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior
and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the
allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue
taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated
by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the
withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.
Manalo v. Sistoza, GR No. 107369
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 was passed. This law created the Department of Interior and
Local Government. Said law, under Sections 26 and 31 thereof, also provided on the manner
as to how officers of the Philippine National Police are to be appointed. It was provided that
the PNP Chief as well as certain police officers including Directors and Chief
Superintendents, after being appointed by the President, must be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments before said officers can take their office.
In 1992, then president Corazon Aquino appointed Pedro Sistoza et al as Directors and Chief
Superintendents within the PNP. Said appointments were not confirmed by the Commission
 CONSTI CASES

on Appointments hence, Jesulito Manalo questioned the validity of the appointments made.
He insists that without the confirmation by the Commission, Sistoza et al are acting without
jurisdiction, their appointment being contrary to the provisions of R.A. 6975.
He then went to the Supreme Court asking the court to carry out the provisions of the said
law. Manalo also insists that the law is a valid law, as it enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality, and hence, it must be carried out by the courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. No. 6975 are valid.
HELD: No. Said provisions are unconstitutional. It is true that prior to this case, as with all
other laws, R.A. 6975 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. As such, laws enacted by
Congress must be respected by courts and as much as possible, courts must avoid delving
into the constitutionality of a law.
However, it is also the duty of the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, to see to it that
every law passed by Congress is not repugnant to the Constitution.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the
government to be appointed by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The first group are the only ones whose appointments are required by the Constitution to
be affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. All others need not be confirmed. Officers
of the PNP are not included therein. There is also no merit to the contention that PNP
officers are akin to officers of the armed forces.
Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. 6975 are void for amending the provisions set forth in the
Constitution.
Courts have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit alienated by the fundamental law. When it does the courts
will not hesitate to strike down such TANGINA AYOKO NAAAAAA unconstitutionality.
Risos-Vidal v. Lim

NATURE:
These are petitions including:
1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, which essentially prays for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 2013 and April 23,
 CONSTI CASES

2013 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En banc,
respectively.

(2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by Alfredo S. Lim praying to be declared the 2013 winning
candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s) disqualification to run for and hold public office

FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former
President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction
during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that He
is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.

On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy[7] for the
position of President but was opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification.
None of the cases prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only
managed to garner the second highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized
elections.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena,
and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post, that of the
Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada
before the COMELEC because of Estrada’s Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan
Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute
Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in
relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)

In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition
for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been
effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim
garnered the second highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of
Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be
 CONSTI CASES

voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President
Arroyo.

HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail
to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions were issued in a “whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law” or were so
“patent and gross” as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada
is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of
the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that
both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in
the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code,
it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction
and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to
Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to
him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in
absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a
plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has
been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense
involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or
national position.
 CONSTI CASES

Llamas v. Orbos (1991)

FACTS:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other
complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting
graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days
hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo
III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without
completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases.
They say that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to
criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to
anyone who has been “convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because the word
“conviction” refers only to criminal cases.

ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases.
HELD:
Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or
administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The
Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be
exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same
token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be
unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article
VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded
inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant
executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the court’s considered view that if the
President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in
criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency
in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not
in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence
required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision.
IBP v. Zamora GR NO. 141284
applying for and availing thereof.
 CONSTI CASES

IBP VS Zamora
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other
for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the
Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable
period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition
seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may
review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the
armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3
powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to
grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out
because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law,
both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the
Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner
to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition
fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that
there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.
 CONSTI CASES

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian
task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The
deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all
times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of
a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Sanlakas v. Exec. Sec. GR No. 159085
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and
unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of
the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government,
demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These
acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State
of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the
evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders
were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was
issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of
the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP,
and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon.
Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention
of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President
to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally,
they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep.
Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners
contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation
of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?
 CONSTI CASES

Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or
rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the
Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary
power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such
power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the
petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted
without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there
was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the
legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of
rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on
the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative
powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is
unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as
this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless
arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing,
petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only
petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to
challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise
of the powers of that institution.
 CONSTI CASES

David v. Arroyo GR No. 171390

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency,
thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,― and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain
law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence
as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience
to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of
the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest”
and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have
factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary
powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The
petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act
of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
 CONSTI CASES

Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare
a State of National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status
or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk
II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is
more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only
rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and
business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an
awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President
Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing
lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national
emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants
the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But
to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
 CONSTI CASES

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a
body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet
of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states
that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now,
whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress
may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing
PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the
emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such
exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no
power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be
taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of
the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by
Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the
PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of
terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion
of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
 CONSTI CASES

Marcos v. Manglapus (1989)

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order
the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former
Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the
right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair
the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits
prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the
President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from
the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to
travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right
to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from
although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the
right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of
is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On
the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such
rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public
health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country
cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to
the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat
to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization
caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past
few years after the Marcos regime.
 CONSTI CASES

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to
the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Beltran v. Macasia GR No. 82585
Facts:
Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that
"the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative
disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for
the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect
way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she
would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends
that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the
publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling
effect” on press freedom.
Issues:
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were
filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under
review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;

(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC
judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate
criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Held:
(1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated
by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare
Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-
affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed.
All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits if he is so minded.
(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
 CONSTI CASES

cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with
the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts
(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's
behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot
raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against
such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to
waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on
the “chilling effect” point. (Beltran vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988)
Estrada v. Desierto GR No. 146710-15

FACTS:

It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more
serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only
stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in
suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was
thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President
Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the
crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently
with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the
presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left
 CONSTI CASES

Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
“confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.

3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.

4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.

5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II

exercise of people power of freedom of

speech and freedom of assemblyto
exercise of the people power of petition the government for redress of
revolution which overthrew the whole grievances which only affected the
government. office of the President.

extra constitutional and the legitimacy

intra constitutional and the resignation
of the new government that resulted
of the sitting President that it caused
from it cannot be the subject of judicial
and the succession of the Vice President
review
as President are subject to judicial
review.

presented a political question; involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art
II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII.
The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They
also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
 CONSTI CASES

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both
were present when President Estrada left the Palace.

Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing

material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive
resignation.

SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by
his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:

 He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

 He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability
and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability
disappears);
 He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as
President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
 He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the
same service of the country;
 He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity.

Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before,

during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed
H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate
passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been
terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer
temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he
did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch
of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder
which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-
sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that
 CONSTI CASES

unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is
not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also,
since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally
enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said
that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has
influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that
the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of
the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should
be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
In Re: Cunanan, Mar. 18, 1954
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946
to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern
as R.A. 972 popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is
deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in
any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending
on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948-
70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed
by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates
who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to
congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after
he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate
bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became
law on June 21, 1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced
by their failure in the exams.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the
administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that
should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.
 CONSTI CASES

The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending,
disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial.
The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which
the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court.
Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules
set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this
power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in
the judiciary.
Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme
Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise
or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on
admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and
those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution
enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
HELD:
Under the authority of the court:
1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all
of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law
(1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who
failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination
of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are
considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)