LEGAL PROFESSION position of Regional Director necessarily required the

practice of law in addition to its qualifications being a

LINGAN VS. CALUBAQUIB
member of the bar in good standing and authorized to
June 30, 2014 A.C. No. 5377 practice law. Hence, when Atty. Baliga was suspended,
he lost the authority to hold the position of regional
FACTS: Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga was suspended director. The court finds that Atty. Baliga violated this
from the practice of law for one year for being found court’s order of suspension, therefore, suspending him
guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of further from the practice of law for six months.
Professional Responsibilty and of the Lawyer’s Oath
because they allowed their secretaries to notarize
documents in their stead, in violation of Sections 245
and 246 of the Notarial Law. Complainant Lingan IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE
alleged that Atty. Baliga, despite the suspension,
continued to practice law and discharge his functions as INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
a Regional Director. When the suspension order lapsed,
it was recommended that both attorneys file their 49 SCRA 22
respective motions to lift the order of suspension. The
FACTS:
court lifted Atty. Calubaquib’s but not Atty. Baliga’s. The
latter was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant
Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing
(OBC) for evaluation, report, and recommendation. The
for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and
OBC recommended that Atty. Baliga should not have
Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in
been allowed to perform his functions, duties, and
September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from
responsibilities to the CHR which required acts
the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
constituting practice of law.
adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Baliga’s motion to lift Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a
order of suspension should be granted. Commission on Bar Integration and in December
1972, the Commission earnestly recommended the
HELD: Practice of law is any activity, in or out of court,
integration of the bar. The Court accepted all
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
comments on the proposed integration.
knowledge, training and experience. Work in
government that requires the use of legal knowledge is
ISSUES:
considered practice of law. It was clarified that the
 1. Does the Court have the power to integrate
the Philippine bar?
2. Would the integration of the bar be
constitutional?
3. Should the Court ordain the integration of the
bar at this time?
RULING:
In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first
adopted the definition given by the Commission to
“integration” in this wise: “Integration of the
Philippine Bar means the official unification of the
entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This
requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as
conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and
the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys
of the Supreme Court.” The term “Bar” refers to
the collectivity of all persons whose names appear
in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or
unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is
decreed by an entity with power to do so; the
State. Bar integration therefore, signifies the
setting up by government authority of a national
organization of the legal profession based on the
recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an
instrumentality of justice and the rule of law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and
ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the
legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
On the first issue, the Court held that it may
integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law.” Indeed, the power to integrate
is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional
authority over the Bar.
The second issue hinges on the following
constitutional rights: freedom of association and of
speech, as well as the nature of the dues exacted
from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus
levies a tax. The Court held:
1. Integration is not violative of freedom of
association because it does not compel a
lawyer to become a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. All that it
does is “to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member.” The
lawyer too is not compelled to attend
meetings, participate of activities, etc. The
only compulsion is the payment of annual
 dues. Assuming, however, that it does
compel a lawyer to be a member of an
integrated bar, the court held that “such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the state”
2. Integration is also not violative of the
freedom of speech just because dues paid b
the lawyer may be used for projects or
programs, which the lawyer opposes. To rule
otherwise would make every government
exaction a “free speech issue.” Furthermore,
the lawyer is free to voice out his objections
to positions taken by the integrated bar.
3. The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the
nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of
regulation.
As to the third issue, the Court believes in the
timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an
overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored
integration.
A.C. No. 10912. January 9, 2016
PAULINA T. YU, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ
It appears from the records that respondent lawyer
agreed to represent Paulina T. Yu (complainant) in
several cases after having received various amounts as
acceptance fees. While the lawyer-client relationship
was subsisting, respondent lawyer borrowed pieces of
jewelry from complainant and pledged the same with
the Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. for the amount of
P29,945.50, as shown in the Promissory Note with Deed
of Pledge. Respondent lawyer appropriated the
proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In order to
facilitate the redemption of the said jewelry, respondent
lawyer issued to complainant, Citystate Savings Bank
Check. Upon presentment, however, complainant was
shocked to learn that the check was dishonored for the
reason, “Account Closed.” Complainant immediately
notified respondent lawyer of the dishonor of the check.
Complainant demanded for the refund of the
acceptance fees received by respondent lawyer prior to
the “abandonment” of the cases and the payment of the
value of the jewelry, but to no avail.
For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal
case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed
with the Office of the City Prosecutor against him.
A verified complaint was filed with the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), where complainant prayed
for the disbarment of respondent lawyer on account of
grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and
commission of acts in violation of the lawyer’s oath. The
IBP-CBD required respondent lawyer to submit his
answer to the complaint. Despite having been duly
served with a copy of the complaint and the order to file
his answer, as shown in a certification issued by the
Post Master of the Las Piñas Central Post Office,
respondent still failed to file an answer.
Issue: WON respondent violated CPR?
Held:
The complaint stemmed from the use by respondent
lawyer of his client’s property. He had, indeed, come
into possession of valuable pieces of jewelry which he
presented as security in a contract of pledge.
Complainant voluntarily and willingly delivered her
jewelry worth P135,000.00 to respondent lawyer who
meant to borrow it and pawn it thereafter. This act
alone shows respondent lawyer’s blatant disregard of
Rule 16.04. Complainant’s acquiescence to the
“pawning” of her jewelry becomes immaterial
considering that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are
proscribed from borrowing money or property from
clients, unless the latter’s interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Here, respondent lawyer’s act of borrowing does not
constitute an exception. Respondent lawyer used his
client’s jewelry in order to obtain, and then appropriate
for himself, the proceeds from the pledge. In so doing,
he had abused the trust and confidence reposed upon
him by his client. That he might have intended to
subsequently pay his client the value of the jewelry is
inconsequential. What deserves detestation was the
very act of his exercising influence and persuasion over
his client in order to gain undue benefits from the
latter’s property. The Court has repeatedly emphasized
that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is
one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as
any natural tendency goes, this “trust and confidence”
is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money
by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the
lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his
client. The rule presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation. Suffice it to
say, the borrowing of money or property from a client
outside the limits laid down in the CPR is an unethical
act that warrants sanction.
The Court does not harbor any doubt in favor of
respondent lawyer. Obviously, his unfulfilled promise to
facilitate the redemption of the jewelry and his act of
issuing a worthless check constitute grave violations of
the CPR and the lawyer’s oath. These shortcomings on
his part have seriously breached the highly fiduciary
relationship between lawyers and clients. Specifically,
his act of issuing worthless checks patently violated
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR which requires that “[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.” This indicates a lawyer’s unfitness
for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such
lack of personal honesty and good moral character as
to render him unworthy of public confidence, and
constitutes a ground for disciplinary action, and thus
seriously and irreparably tarnishes the image of the
profession. Such conduct, while already off-putting
when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more
abhorrent when exhibited by a member of the Bar. In
this case, respondent lawyer turned his back from the
promise that he once made upon admission to the Bar.
As “vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers
must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.”
Dela Fuente Torres v. Dalangin
A.C. No. 10758, 5 December 2017
Facts: Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining
an illicit and immoral affair with one Julita Pascual,
a clerk at the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) in
Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Upon review, however, the
alleged amorous relationship was not adequately
proved (The quantum of proof in administrative
cases is substantial evidence). Also, Atty. Dalangin
was said to be misquoting jurisprudence in a
pleading he filed in court. In addition, he took an
immediate recourse to the Court via a petition for
review that questioned the IBP Board of Governors’
resolve to affirm the Investigating Commissioner’s
recommendation on his administrative liability,
notwithstanding the fact that the Court had not yet
taken a final action on the complaints.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Dalangin should be
held administratively liable.
Held: Yes. While he vehemently denied any
romantic relationship with Pascual, he admitted
demonstrating closeness with the latter’s family,
including her children. It was such display of
affection that could have sparked in the minds of
observers the idea of a wrongful relationship and
belief that Julienne was a product of the illicit affair.
Atty. Dalangin should have been more prudent and
mindful of his actions and the perception that his
acts built upon the public, particularly because he
and Pascual were both married. The fault,
nonetheless, does not warrant Atty. Dalangin’s
suspension, much less disbarment. An admonition
should suffice under the circumstances. Also, while
the Court detests Atty. Dalangin’s failure to
properly indicate that the statement was not a
verbatim reproduction of the cited jurisprudence
and, accordingly, calls his attention on the matter,
it finds the admonition to be adequate. A
suspension for the lone incident would be too harsh
a penalty. Lastly, the filing of the petition for review
on the issue of Atty. Dalangin’s suspension from
the practice of law was as yet not among his
remedies, considering that the Court still had to
release its final action on the matter.
Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is ADMONISHED to be
more prudent and cautious in handling his personal
affairs and dealings with courts and the public, with
a STERN WARNING that any repetition of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.