CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

REMMAN
ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO. G.R. No.
199310; February 19, 2014.

FACTS: On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an

application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land,
Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.

On December 13, 2001, the RTC granted respondent's application for registration.
Thereafter, following the required publication and posting, a scheduled hearing was
set. However, on May 30, 2002, only the Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default
except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the
respondent's application for registration.

On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition to the respondent's application for
registration, asserting that the lots are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on
July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition,alleging that the respondent failed to prove
that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Respondent's witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels
of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077
from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989.
The subject properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime
(Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the said lots, through
her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said
parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the
same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.

The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent's application for registration
should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11)
of Republic Act No. 4850(R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay,
located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands
which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the
oppositor LLDA, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are
below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject properties on
September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject
properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.

On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the
actual topographic survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of
the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDA's claim, are
above 12.50 m.

The RTC granted the respondent's application for registration of title to the subject
properties. The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject
properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties are very much higher
than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna
Lake.

The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.

The petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA
likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present certifications issued by
the DENR, attesting that the subject properties form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, which was not disputed by the petitioner.
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in affirming the RTC Decision which granted the application
for registration filed by the respondent?

HELD: Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth
Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073.Under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands
of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject
property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the
respondent presented two certifications issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos.
3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to
prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.

In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441 (2008).The Court
clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency
that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by
the legal custodian of the records.

Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do

not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed
to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Cerquena testified for the respondents that the subject properties were originally
owned by Jaime who supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since 1943; that
sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in
turn, sold the same to the respondent in 1989.

The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession
and occupation of the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-
interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession
and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of
specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject
of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over
it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property. Valiao v.
Republic, G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011

"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute
possession under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and
notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of
public land, however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public
land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession
and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of
years." Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines, 432 Phil. 824

Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties
presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain
why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and
that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property
since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of
taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they
constitute proof of claim of ownership." Aide v. Bernal, G.R. No. 169336, March 18,
2010 GRANTED.
 [ G.R. No. 108998, August 24, 1994 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF

APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BIDIN, J.:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a
vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to
nullify the decision of the appellate court which affirmed the judgment of
the court a quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for
registration over the lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-
D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo
City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the
purchase, respondent spouses were then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title
of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo
City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino
citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through
naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have
presented their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision
confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the
said application and confirms the title and possession of herein applicants
over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B.
Lapiña and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now
Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San
Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9,
Canada.
"Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of
registration be issued. In the certificate of title to be issued, there shall be
annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-of-way."
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based
on the following ratiocination:
"In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino
citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its former owner.
For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by
aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of
the subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum
of money. Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm
their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been the
owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that registration
is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not
established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is
intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already
have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189,
March 31, 1987). With particular reference to the main issue at bar, the
High Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands within the
meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional prohibition dates back
to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the applicants-
appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for
they were not disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs.
Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442, November 11, 1987)." (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit
petitioner's approval, hence this present recourse, which was belatedly
filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been
filed out of time had it not been for the constitutional issue presented
therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration
thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered
lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of
whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine.
Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the
juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land
to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately
owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public
land, depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
"The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves
and their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the two
adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bona-fide
claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is
conclusively presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation
of their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be
registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to the issuance
of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree." (Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
"The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the
alienable and disposable zone established by the Bureau of Forest
Development (Exhibit 'P'). The investigation conducted by the Bureau of
Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty
had been occupied by the applicants 'whose house of strong materials
stands thereon'; that it had been declared for taxation purposes in the name
of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by means of a
public instrument entitled 'Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan' duly executed
by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits 'I' and 'J');
and that applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in
possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the
application for registration. But what is of great significance in the instant
case is the circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the
subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they
filed their application for registration in 1987, ownership over the land in
dispute had already passed to them." (Rollo, p., 27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and
argues:
"17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of respondent spouses only since 1979.However, tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence
of ownership. (citing cases)
"18. Then again, the appellate court found that 'applicants (respondents)
and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for
more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration.'
This is not, however, the same as saying that respondents have been in
possession 'since June 12, 1945.' (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA
No. 141; see also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents'
possession. They fall short of the required possession since June 12, 1945 or
prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30) years
possession prior to the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987), they
would still be short of the required possession if the starting point is 1979
when, according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation
purposes in their name." (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner,
any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a
parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive
possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what
the law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
"Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by wars or forcemajeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter." (Underscoring supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
"Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of
the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions
shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fideclaim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945."
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the
terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-
in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in
possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period
and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with
by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession.
In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not
only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny
this except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of
the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the
required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were
acquired by private respondents through their predecessors-in-interest,
who, in turn, have been in open and continued possession thereof since
1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-
interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to
confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA
875 [1982]) deserves scant consideration. There, it was held that before the
issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense
the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has
already been abandoned in the 1986 case of Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of
Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
"(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates
the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period
ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. x x x
"Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
"x x x. Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the
respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since
1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest,title over the land has
vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by
free patent. x x x
xxx
'As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in
the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title
as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent.'
"Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of
considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration
prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the
State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the
possessor(s] `x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title x x x.' No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than
a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claims is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already
vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public
to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Cariño, 'x x x (There are indications
that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.'" (Underscoring supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open,
continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public
land ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director of Lands
v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]).
This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as
to segregate the land from the mass of public land (National Power
Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land
is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above
stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed
in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]).
When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power
Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the
public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the
acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149
SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As
could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able
to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest.
Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid
taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits
"F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo
and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject
parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father
Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G").
Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence
together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that
the questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of the
government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953,
Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for
registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the
ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were
natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition
of the property. But this is where the similarity ends. The applicants
in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the
Public Land Act. The land registration court decided in favor of the
applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The
Director of Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
"As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents
do not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory
information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private
respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-
interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the 'titulo real'
or royal grant (b) the 'concession especial' or special grant; (c) the
'composicion con el estado' title or adjustment title; (d) the 'titulo de
compra' or title by purchase; and (e) the 'information posesoria' or
possessory information title, which could become a 'titulo gratuito' or a
gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The
primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
"If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in
possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be
upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890
[1946]):
'x x x All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant
and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part
of the public domain or that if had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest (Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212
U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant does not come under the
exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in
interest began in 1880.'
`x x x alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion
of said period, ipso jure.' (Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, supra)
"it is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a)
the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept
above stated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled in both
Cariño and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to
the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA
37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then
Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., x x x, that an applicant for
registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a
certification from the Government that the lands which he claims to have
possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and
disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
"In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove
that the property subject of the application is an alienable and disposable
land. On the contrary, the entire property x x x was pasture land (and
therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
"x x x (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their
imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation of possession
since time immemorial, x x x, is patently baseless. x x x When referring to
possession, specifically 'immemorial possession,' it means possession of
which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he
has learned form his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession was
never present in the case of private respondents. x x x
"x x x, there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the
private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land
for more than eighty (80) years, x x x.
xxx
"To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their
predecessor-in-interest) had possessed the property - allegedly covered by
Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will and
testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs - in such
manner as to remove the same from the public domain under the Cariño
and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31
May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said
property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked
to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their
application. x x x
xxx
"Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before
such filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no vested right,
consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before they lost
their Philippine citizenship." (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the applicants in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely
because they were American citizens at the time of their application
therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their
predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a
manner that the property has been segregated from public domain; such
that at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have
acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born
Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by
virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the
possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held
by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition,
private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the
contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiña's mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that
the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested
parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
"Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
"Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this
Article, a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines who has lost hisPhilippine citizenship may b
e a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law." (Und
erscoring supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to
Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
"Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a
transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang
Pambansa may provide."
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the
relevant provision of which provides:
"Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a
contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a
maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or
one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In
the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein
granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area
acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
"In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential
purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban
or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already
owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized."
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law
has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs
the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen
who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they
applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as
discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no
legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of
what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered
no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in
character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under
claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides
that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of
1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by
him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were
natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or
acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether
private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they
purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important
is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the
Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the
requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-
interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must
perforce be approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185,
must also be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to
Section 6, which provides:
"Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for
the registration of titles to lands, no private land shall be transferred under
this Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the
province or city where the property is located a sworn statement showing
the date and place of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of
his spouse and children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of
acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his intention to
reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine
citizenship and the country of which he is presently a citizen; and such
other information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act."
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do
not apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily
directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be
submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the
requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court
prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An
application for registration of title before a land registration court should
not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of
deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving
the application for registration has become final that a decree of
registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6,
BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the
applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the
office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor
of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration,
the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application
for registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,

Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., see concurring statement.
Padilla and Davide, Jr., JJ., joins J. Cruz in his dissenting opinion.
“JAMES R. BRACEWELL vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”CASE NO.: GR NO. 107427, 323
SCRA 193CHAPTER: JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
OR INCOMPLETE TITLE, p. 74 PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago
FACTS:
Sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles, married to james Bracewell Sr.,
acquired parcels of land totaling 9,657sqm. Located in Las Pinas,
M.M. from the Dalandan and Jimenez families, after which tax
declarations were issuedin her name. On Jan. 16, 1961, she sold the
said parcels of land to her son (petitioner) by virtue of a deed of
salewhich was duly annotated and registered. Tax declarations were
thereafter issued in the latter’s name. On Sept. 19,1963, petitioner filed
for an action for confirmation of imperfect title with the CFI. On Feb.
21, 1964, the Dir. of Lands,represented by the SolGen, opposed.
Registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account of an
actionfiled by Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles, which later
upheld the rights of Cailles over those of Leonardo.On Mar. 26, 1985,
entire records were forwarded to the RTC. SolGen resubmitted its
opposition. On May 3, 1989,RTC granted the application. On appeal,
CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Motion for
reconsiderationwas denied hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner has imperfect title over the subject parcels of land?
RULING:
Petition deniedRespondents allege that since the subject parcels of
land were only classified as alienable and disposableon March 27,
1972, petitioner did not have any title to confirm when he filed his
application in 1963.It is required that the applicant must prove that the
land is alienable public land.Petitioner failed to show that the parcels of
land subject of his application are alienable or disposable. On
thecontrary, it was conclusively shown by the government that the
same were only classified as alienable ordisposable on March 27,
1972.Petitioner cannot claim title by virtue of possession (since 1908)
since the subject were not yet alienable atthe time nor capable of
private appropriation.The adverse possession which may be the basis
of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refersonly to
alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.Rules on the
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land
classified as forest land isreleased in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural landsof the
public domain.
G.R. No. 165863

MENDOZA, J.:
These cases were already disposed of with finality by the Court on April 22,
1994, but were reconsidered, remanded to the Court of Appeals (CA) for
reevaluation and elevated to this Court again for another review.

It appears from the records that on April 22, 1994, G.R. No. 105027, a
case for annulment of title, entitled Lorenzana Food Corporation, Jimmy
Chua Chi Leong, Albert Chua, and Spouses Eduardo Solis and Gloria Victa
v. Court of Appeals and B.E. San Diego, Inc., was dismissed by the
Court.[1] On June 20, 1994, the Court stood by its April 22, 1994 Decision by
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by Lorenzana Food
Corporation (LFC) and Spouses Eduardo Solis and Gloria Victa (Spouses
Solis). On November 16, 1994, the Court issued a resolution ordering
the entry of judgment.

Insistent, LFC filed its Petition to Re-open Case while Jimmy Chua Chi
Leong (Jimmy) and Albert Chua (Albert) filed their Second Motion for
Reconsideration, both seeking to set aside the April 22, 1994 Decision and
the June 20, 1994 and November 16, 1994 Resolutions of the Court.

On March 18, 1996, the Court issued its Resolution[2] favorably granting
both pleadings stating that the "petitioners alleged new facts and submitted
pertinent documents putting in doubt the correctness of our factual
findings and legal conclusions,"[3] and ordering the remand of the case to
the CA for another round of evaluation.

B.E. San Diego, Inc. (San Diego) filed an Omnibus Motion 1) to Recall the
Resolution of March 18, 1996; and 2) to Refer the Case to the Court En
Banc; and 3) to Set Case for Oral Argument; but the Court denied it on
March 3, 1997.

On July 14, 2004, after considering all the evidence presented by the
parties, the CA rendered another decision,[4] the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, after a detailed consideration of the totality of evidence

presented by both parties, this Court hereby holds, as follows:

a. The complaints of plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 80-17 and BCV 81-18 are
hereby DISMISSED.

b) The Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of plaintiffs, that is, TCT
Nos. 88467, 88468, 104248 and 104249, as well as the title of Spouses
Solis, TCT No. 94389, are hereby CANCELLED on account of their spurious
nature.

c) The validity of the title of defendant B.E. San Diego is hereby UPHELD.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Again, not in conformity, the petitioners come to this Court with two
separate petitions, challenging the July 14, 2004 Decision[6] of the CA and
the October 29, 2004 Resolution,[7] denying their motion for
reconsideration. The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 165863was filed
by Albert, Jimmy and Spouses Solis. The other one, docketed as G.R. No.
165875, was filed by LFC.

The Facts

Records show that three (3) civil cases for Quieting of Title involving tracts
of land located in Bacoor, Cavite, were filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XIX, Bacoor, Cavite and docketed as

1. Civil Case BCV-80-17 entitled "Lorenzana Food Corporation vs. B.E.

San Diego, Inc., et al."
2. Civil Case BCV-81-18 entitled "Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert
Chua vs. B.E. San Diego, Inc."
 3. Civil Case BCV-83-79 entitled "B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Eduardo
Solis."

The factual and procedural antecedents of this long-drawn controversy

were succinctly summarized by the Court in its April 22, 1994 Decision in
G.R. No. 105027, entitled Lorenzana Food Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, as follows:

The objects of the controversy are several portions of a large tract of land
located in the municipality of Bacoor, Cavite. The large tract of land is
claimed to be originally owned by one Juan Cuenca y Francisco, who had it
surveyed way back in 1911. The land itself is traversed by railroad tracks
dividing the land into two (2) parcels. On February 21, 1922, Juan Cuenca
was issued Original Certificate of Title No. 1020 (Exhibit "H") covering the
two parcels, designated as Lots 1 and 2. Original Certificate of Title No.
1020 was later reconstituted as O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9, containing the
technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 2.

On April 14, 1928, a separate original certificate of title for Lot 1, referring
to the parcel north of the railroad tracks, was issued to Juan Cuenca as
O.C.T. No. (1898) RO-58 (Exhibit "Z"). Lot 1 itself was divided into thirteen
(13) parcels, eleven (11) of which were described therein as situated in the
barrios of Talaba, Zapote, and Malicsi, while two (2) parcels were situated
in the poblacion of Bacoor, Cavite.

Upon the demise of Juan Cuenca, an action for partition of his properties
was filed by Jose Cuenca, one of the surviving heirs. On February 21, 1969,
a project of partition was approved by the Land Registration Commission
(Exhibit "EEE"), and on April 10, 1969, the court ordered the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite to issue individual titles for twelve (12)
parcels of Lot 2 (Exhibit "GG). Three (3) parcels thereof: Lot 2-A, 2-K, and
2- L, were titled (T.C.T. Nos. 35963, 35973 and 35974, respectively) and
registered in the name of Juan Cuenca (Exhibits "K", "TTT-1" and "TTT-2")
on April 21, 1969. All three titles stated that the lands covered therein were
originally registered as O.C.T. No. RO-9 on February 21, 1922 (Exhibits "K",
"G" and "H").

Lot 2-A of Juan Cuenca was later subdivided into seven (7) lots in 1969. Of
these seven subdivided parcels, one parcel (Lot 2-A-3) was adjudicated to
his heir, Pura Cuenca, who was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No.
41505 on February 24, 1970 (Exhibit "L). The said T.C.T. No. 41505 stated
that the land covered therein was originally registered as Original
Certificate of Title No. 1898 on April 14, 1928, and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RO-58-I was cancelled by virtue thereof. One other parcel (Lot 2-
A-4) was adjudicated to another heir, Ladislaw Cuenca, who was issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41506 (Annex "M") on February 24, 1970.
Likewise, T.C.T. No. 41506 stated that the land covered therein was
originally registered as Original Certificate of Title No. 1898 on April 14,
1928, and that T.C.T. No. RO-58-I was cancelled by virtue thereof.

We interpose at this point the observation that although the transfer

certificates of title issued to Pura and Ladislaw Cuenca stated that the lands
covered therein were originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898, hence,
referring to Lot 1 located at the northern portion of Juan Cuenca's large
tract of land, the technical description appearing in said transfer certificates
of title were taken or lifted from O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9 covering Lot 2,
referring to the southern portion of the original tract of land.

In the meantime, Lots 2-K and 2-L (T.C.T. Nos. 35973 and 35974) in the
name of Juan Cuenca, were consolidated and, in turn, were subdivided into
eight (8) lots. Lot 4 was adjudicated to Pura Cuenca, who was issued T.C.T.
No. 41498 (Exhibit "TTT-5") on February 24, 1970. Lot 3 was adjudicated
to Ladislaw Cuenca, who was issued T.C.T. No. 41497 (Exhibit "TTT-4") on
the same date. Lot 6 was adjudicated to Jose Cuenca, who was issued T.C.T.
No. 41501 with the inscription therein that the land covered by said titles
were originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898 on April 14, 1928, and that
T.C.T. No. RO-58-I was cancelled thereby, referring to Lot 1 of the original
tract. However, the technical descriptions inscribed therein were lifted from
O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9 covering Lot 2 of the original tract of land.

Upon the deaths of Pura and Ladislaw Cuenca, the administrators of their
respective testate estates were given authority by the court to dispose of
some parcels of land. Lot 2-A-3 of Pura Cuenca covered by T.C.T. No.
41505, and Lot 2-A-4 of Ladislaw[a] Cuenca covered by T.C.T. No. 41506,
were eventually sold to herein appellee Lorenzana Food Corporation on
February 4, 1977 (Annexes, "OOO", "CCC" and "UU-1"). Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 41505 was cancelled by T.C.T. No. 88468 issued to, and
registered in favor of, Lorenzana Food Corporation (Annex "D"). Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 41506 was cancelled by T.C.T. No. 88467 (Exhibit
"2") on February 18, 1977. Both T.C.T. Nos. 88467 and 88468 also stated
that the lands covered therein were originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898,
but contained portions of the technical description appearing in O.C.T. No.
(1020) RO-9.

On the other hand, Lot 3 of the consolidated Lots 2-K and 2-L, as part of
the testate estate of Ladislaw Cuenca, was sold to herein appellee Jimmy
Chua Chi Leong. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 104248 (Exhibit "A") was
issued to and registered in his name on May 9, 1979, cancelling T.C.T. No.
41497. Lot 4, being part of the testate estate of Pura Cuenca, was sold to
Albert Chua, who was issued T.C.T. No. T-104249 on May 9, 1979 (Exhibit
"B"), cancelling T.C.T. No. 41498. Lot 6 was sold by Jose Cuenca to
Eduardo Solis, who was issued T.C.T. No. T-94389, cancelling T.C.T. No. T-
41501. Common to the titles of Jimmy Chua Ching Leong, Albert Chua and
Eduardo Solis is the inscription that the lands covered therein were
originally registered as O.C.T. No. 1898 on April 14, 1928.

Another common feature of all these succeeding titles is the description

that the property therein described is situated in the barrio of Talaba,
Bacoor, Cavite. Looking back, the records show that the original tract of
land owned by Juan Cuenca was bounded on the north by Calle Real de
Talaba, on the south and southeast by Sapa Niog, and on the west, by Calle
Niog. As mentioned earlier, the land was divided into two (2) by the
railroad tracks running from and going to east and west. The area located
north of the railroad tracks, bordering Calle Real de Talaba was later titled
as O.C.T. (1898) 50-58, said parcel straddling the barrios of Talaba, Zapote
and Milicsi, as well as the poblacion proper.

On the other hand, the portion located south of the railroad tracks was
designated as Lot 2. Traversing this land is what used to be a national road,
now called the Aguinaldo Highway, linking Tagaytay City to Metro Manila.
This parcel was later titled as O.C.T. No. (1020) RO-9. The sub-divided
parcels aforementioned, by their technical descriptions are located at the
south to southeast portions of Lot 2, bounded on the south, by Sapa Niog
and Calle Niog on the west. Nevertheless, the said parcels were described as
situated in the barrio of Talaba.

The controversy arose when herein appellees learned that the same parcels
were being claimed by herein appellant, B.E. San Diego, Incorporated. B.E.
San Diego's claim was based on two (2) titles registered in its name. The
first parcel was covered under T.C.T. No. T-17621 (Annex "C") issued on
March 2, 1966, which originated from O.C.T. No. 0-490 registered on
December 22, 1965. The said title described "a parcel of land Plan Psu-
211245, pursuant to L.R.C. Case No. N-467, (LRC) Record No. N-27923,
situated in the Barrio of Niog, Municipality of Bacoor." The second parcel
was titled under O.C.T. No. 0-644, registered on January 5, 1967, pursuant
to LRC Case No. N-557, (LRC) Record No. N-30647, describing "a parcel of
land (Lot 1, Plan Psu-223920), situated in Barrio of Niog" (Exhibit "9").

All parties resolutely seeking to enforce their respective claims over the
subject properties, three (3) civil suits for quieting of title were filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Branch XIX. The first case,
docketed as BCV-80-17 was filed by Lorenzana Food Corporation versus
B.E. San Diego, Incorporated, and other defendants. The second civil case,
BCV-81-18, was filed by Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert Chua, also
against B.E. San Diego, Inc., et al., as defendants. The last case, BCV-83-79
was filed by B.E. San Diego, Inc., against spouses Eduardo and Gloria Solis,
as defendants.

In Civil Case No. BCV-80-17, Lorenzana Food Corporation claimed

exclusive ownership over the two (2) parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 88467
and 88468, issued to it on February 18, 1977. Lorenzana Food Corporation
alleged that it took immediate possession of the said property and even
contracted to prepare the land for development. It is alleged that it was only
years later that Lorenzana Food Corporation learned that B.E. San Diego,
Inc. was claiming ownership over portions of the said parcels by virtue of
O.C.T. No. 0-644. It is Lorenzana Food Corporation's contention that the
O.C.T. No. 0-644, in B.E. San Diego's name is null and void because
Lorenzana Food Corporation's title emanated from an O.C.T. issued more
than thirty-nine (39) years prior to the issuance of B.E. San Diego's original
certificate of title.

In answer, B.E. San Diego countered that it and its predecessors-in-interest

have been in the open continuous and adverse possession in concept of
owner of the subject property for more than fifty (50) years prior to
Lorenzana Food Corporation's purchase of the two (2) parcels. It also
argued that Original Certificate of Title No. 0-644 was not null and void
since it was issued upon application and proper proceedings in (LRC) Case
No. N-557 and N-30647, before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite.
Pursuant to its issuance, the said property was declared by B.E. San Diego
for tax purposes (Exhibits "Q" and "5-F") since June 22, 1966.

B.E. San Diego claims it bought the subject property from Teodora
Dominguez on February 6, 1966 (Exhibit "5-D") and the absolute deed of
sale was submitted in (LRC) Case No. N-577. It was further argued that
Lorenzana Food Corporation was erroneously claiming the subject property
because Lorenzana's titled property is described to be located in Barrio
Talaba, while B.E. San Diego's property is situated in Barrio Niog. Denying
that Lorenzana Food Corporation's predecessor-in-interest had been in
possession of the subject property, B.E. San Diego claimed that in 1979, by
force, intimidation, threat, stealth, and strategy, Lorenzana Food
Corporation entered and occupied the subject property, despite barbed wire
fencing with warning signs, and security guards posted by B.E. San Diego.

In Civil Case No. BCV-81-18, plaintiffs Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Albert
Chua claim ownership over the parcels they respectively purchased from
the heirs of Juan Cuenca, as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Titles
Nos. T-104248 and T-104249, issued on January 20 and 30, 1979,
respectively. B.E. San Diego, for its part, claimed the property by virtue of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-17621 issued on March 2, 1966, which
cancelled Original Certificate of Title No. 0-490 originally issued to
Teodora Dominguez, who sold the same property to B.E. San Diego. Again,
B.E. San Diego argued that, as appearing in their respective titles, Jimmy
Chua Chi Leong's and Albert Chua's properties were located in Barrio
Talaba while that of B.E. San Diego was located in Barrio Niog.

The last case, BCV-83-79 was initiated by B.E. San Diego against the Solis
spouses who, according to the former, unlawfully entered a portion of its
property titled under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-17621. The Solis
spouses, meanwhile, claim the said portion by virtue of their Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-94389, issued pursuant to their purchase of said
portion from Jose Cuenca.[8]

The Ruling of the RTC

On July 15, 1986, after a long trial, the RTC handed down its Joint
Decision[9] in favor of LFC, Jimmy, Albert, and Spouses Solis, and declared
the titles of San Diego null and void. The pertinent portions of the RTC
decision reads:
Proceeding in the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court finds that the
three lots of San Diego which are presently covered by O.C.T. No. 0-644
and TCT No. T-17621, are within Lot 2, Psu-2075 and overlapped the lots
in question of Lorenzana, Chua and Solis. The fact that it appears in the
titles of San Diego that its lots are situated in Niog, and not in Talaba,
cannot prevail over the findings in the verification surveys conducted by the
Bureau of Lands. Aside from this, these two barrios are adjoining and that
the land described in plan Psu-2075 of Cuenca is bounded by Calle Real de
Talaba and Calle Niog and Sapa Niog.

Since the titles of Lorenzana, Chua and Solis emanated from the title of
Juan Cuenca y Francisco issued on February 21, 1922, these titles should
prevail over O.C.T. No. 0-644 issued on January 5, 1967 and O.C.T. No. 0-
490 allegedly issued on December 22, 1965, not to mention the fact that the
authenticity of O.C.T. No. 0-490 of Teodora Dominguez predecessor-in-
interest of San Diego, is questionable, for the original thereof appears to be
registered under the name of Antonio Sentero. The rule is well-settled that
a decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to a
future application for registration covering or affecting said lot (Legarda vs.
Saleeby, 31 Phil 590). Thus, where two certificates of title are issued to
different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in
date must prevail as between original parties and in case of successive
registration where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the
person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land against the
person who rely on the second certificate (De Villa vs. Trinidad, L-24918,
March 20, 1968, 22 SCRA 1167, Gatioon vs. Gaffud, L-21953, March 28,
1969, 27 SCRA 769).[10]

xxxx

Thereafter, San Diego filed an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 13540, based on the following assignments of error:

I. The trial court erred in finding that the three lots of the appellant are
within and overlapped the lots in question of the appellees.
 II. The trial court erred in declaring "null and void" and ordering the
cancellation of appellant's titles and ordering to pay appellees sums of
money, attorney's fees and costs.
III. The trial court erred in not ordering judgment for the appellant.[11]

First Ruling of the CA

On December 24, 1991, the CA rendered its Decision[12] in CA-G.R. CV No.

13540, reversing the RTC Decision. The CA ruled that the titles held by
LFC, Jimmy, Albert, and Spouses Solis were defective while those of San
Diego showed no defects. Hence, it ordered the nullification and
cancellation of the TCTs in the names of LFC (TCT Nos. T-88467[13] and T-
88468[14]), Jimmy and Albert (TCT Nos. T-104248[15] and T-104249[16]) and
Spouses Solis (TCT No. T-94389); and dismissed Civil Case No. BCV-80-17
and Civil Case No.BCV-81-18 ordering Spouses Solis to vacate the subject
premises. The relevant portions of the CA decision read:

First In this case, where there is a so-called "overlapping" or "overlaying" of

titles, the best evidence are the certificates of title themselves. While the
titles of all the contending parties, at first blush, seem to have been
regularly issued, a closer examination bares the peculiar common defects in
the titles of the appellees. These defects are:

a. The appellees' titles are annotated with the inscription that the land
described therein was originally registered under OCT No. 1898, but the
technical descriptions found therein were lifted from OCT No. (1020) RO-9.

b. The appellees' titles state that the properties are located in the barrio of
Talaba when the properties described therein are situated in the Barrio of
Niog.

On the other hand, the appellant's titles show no defect. x x x

xxxx xxxx xxxx

Thus, even though the appellees can trace their titles as having been
originally registered on February 21, 1922, the succeeding titles, issued on
February 24, 1970, were all defective. Why no effort was exerted to correct
the alleged "clerical errors" on the part of the appellees' predecessors-in-
interest, has not been explained. x x x

Second Not only were the appellants' titles not blemished by any defect and
were regularly issued, its valid title was coupled with open, adverse and
continuous possession of the subject property. x x x

Besides, the land possessed by the appellant is, as described in its titles, in
the barrio of Niog. On the other hand, the appellees' titles describe their
properties as located in the barrio of Talaba, but the land they claim is
located in Barrio Niog. The appellant is where it should be, as decreed in its
titles. The appellees are claiming properties that are not in the location
stated in their respective titles.

xxxx xxxx xxxx

Third the lower court largely relied on the testimony and recommendation
of the Bureau of Lands surveyor who was ordered to conduct a verification
survey. The surveyor's report declared that the appellant's property
overlapped those of the appellees. Upon questioning, however, the same
surveyor admitted that his verification survey was just based on the
technical descriptions appearing in the opposing parties' titles. x x x

The Bureau of Lands' verification and recommendation, therefore, does not

prove that only the appellees have the right to claim the property, to the
exclusion of others. The survey did not even pretend to resolve the issue of
whether or not the titles issued to the appellees were perfect or defective. x
x x[17]

Not in conformity, LFC, Jimmy, Albert and Spouses Solis moved for
reconsideration but their motions were denied by the CA.

First Petition to the Court

On June 5, 1992, LFC, Jimmy, Albert and Spouses Solis filed a petition for
review on certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 105027, raising
the following issues:
 I. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law
and grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the lower
court to uphold the validity of the land titles of private respondent in
spite of the fact that these were issued some forty-six (46) years later
than the titles of petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest.

II. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law

and grave abuse of discretion in giving more significance to the
annotation than the technical description in identifying the lots in
dispute.

III. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible erroneous

conclusion of facts, amounting to reversible error of law and grave
abuse of discretion in holding in its resolution denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration that petitioners failed to make proper
correction of their titles.

IV. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion

when it failed to pass judgment on the liabilities of the estates of Pura
Cuenca and Ladislao Cuenca, predecessors-in-interest (sellers) of the
petitioners.

On April 22, 1994, the Court dismissed the petition and subsequently
issued Resolutions, dated June 20, 1994 and November 16, 1994, denying
with finality the petitioners' motions for reconsideration.

On March 18, 1996, however, the Court issued a Resolution[18] granting 1)

LFC's Petition to Re-open Case; and 2) Jimmy and Albert's Second Motion
for Reconsideration and setting aside the Decision, dated April 22, 1994,
and the Resolutions dated June 20, 1994 and November 16, 1994. The
Court, thus, declared:

Petitioners now assail the correctness of the factual bases of our Decision,
i.e., that their titles facially contain irregularities while the titles of private
respondent are unblemished. They also deny that Barrios Talaba and Niog
are one and a half kilometers away from each other.

To prove their claim, petitioners have attached the following documents:

certified true copies of the titles of Juan Cuenca, petitioners and private
(1)
respondents;
a historical study of how San Diego acquired its titles (OCT No. 0-490
and OCT No. 0-644) and a certification dated August 29, 1994 from the
(2) Register of Deeds that the original of OCT No. 0-490 in the name of
Teodora Dominguez, San Diego's predecessor, did not exist in the
Registry file and did not form part of their records;
a statement that OCT No. 0-491 (not OCT No. 490) in the name of
Teodora Dominguez now exists in the records of the Register of Deeds
(3)
of Cavite with a true copy of said OCT No. 0-491 certified on February
24, 1995;
a certification and sketch from the Land Registration Authority that the
(4) lot described in the alleged OCT No. 0-490 of Teodora Dominguez sits
upon and encroaches on the National Highway (Aguinaldo Highway);
survey, sketch plans and certifications from the Land Registration
Authority indicating that the land in OCT No. 0-644 of San Diego
(5)
overlaps with the land covered by OCT No. 1020 (RO-9) of Juan
Cuenca;
flow charts tracing the subdivision and partition of Cuenca's land into
(6) the present parcels of land purchased by petitioners from the heirs of
Cuenca himself; the partitions were made with approval of the court;
a historical outline and graphic study of the transactions over Cuenca's
(7)
land which shows how petitioners came to purchase their lots;
a factual representation that OCT No. 1020 (RO-9), Cuenca's title, and
OCT No. 1898 (RO-58) inscribed in petitioners' titles cover different
(8)
parcels of land; and that OCT No. 1898 is not the same as OCT Nos. 0-
644 and 0-490 of San Diego;
a certification by the Municipal Planning and Development
(9) Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite that Barrio Niog and Barrio Talaba are
actually adjacent to each other;
order dated January 26, 1981 of the Court of First Instance, Branch 5,
Bacoor, Cavite, decreeing the correction of the Chuas' transfer
certificates of title. The court declared that the certification in the face
(10)
of the Chuas' titles was an error and, therefore, ordered its amendment
to reflect the true fact that the titles were derived from OCT No. 1020
(RO-9) of Cuenca "originally registered on the 21st day of February, in
 the year nineteen hundred and twenty two x x x" not OCT 1898 as
originally inscribed therein. Per annotation in the second page of the
Chuas' titles, the order of the Court was recorded and the correction
duly made on January 29, 1981 prior to the institution by the Chuas of
Civil Case No. BCV-81-18 against San Diego.
The general rule is that no party is allowed a second motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment. After the promulgation of our
Decision, however, petitioners alleged new facts and submitted pertinent
documents putting in doubt the correctness of our factual findings and legal
conclusions. We cannot be insensitive to these allegations for this Court is
committed to render justice on the basis of the truth.

Pursuant to this postulate, this Court has held time and again that rules of
procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
They are not the end in themselves. Under extreme circumstances, we have
suspended the rules and excepted a particular case from their operation to
respond to the higher interests of justice. In the cases at bar, the location of
the contested lots, the number of people affected and the impact of the
litigation on the peace of the community justify its reopening to give all the
parties full opportunity to prove their claims.[19]

On March 3, 1997, the Court issued another resolution denying San Diego's
Omnibus Motion 1) to Recall the Resolution of March 18, 1996; 2) to Refer
the Case to the Court En Banc; and 3) to Set Case for Oral Argument.

Back to the Court of Appeals

In accordance with this Court's Resolutions, dated March 18, 1996 and
March 3, 1997, the CA was tasked to receive evidence and resolve the
following issues:

I Whether or not there is overlapping of titles of the petitioners with those

of the private respondent; and

II Whether or not the apparent defective transfer certificates of title of the

petitioners, allegedly coming from Original Certificate of Title No. 1020,
can withstand the rigors of legal scrutiny.
Second Ruling of the CA

On July 14, 2004, after considering all the evidence presented by the
parties, the CA rendered another decision again in favor of San Diego, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, after a detailed consideration of the totality of evidence

presented by both parties, this Court hereby holds, as follows:

a. The complaints of plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 80-17 and BCV 81-18 are
hereby DISMISSED.

d) The Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of plaintiffs, that is, TCT
Nos. 88467, 88468, 104248 and 104249, as well as the title of Spouses
Solis, TCT No. 94389, are hereby CANCELLED on account of their
spurious nature.

e) The validity of the title of defendant B.E. San Diego is hereby UPHELD.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[20]

The CA composed of a new set of Justices,[21] again found that first, there
was no overlapping of titles between those of the petitioners' and those of
the respondent because the subject properties described in the separate
titles were located in separate and different barrios. The certificates of title
of the petitioners indicated that the properties covered therein were located
in Barrio Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite, while those of the respondent showed that
its properties were located in Barrio Niog. Barrio Talaba and Barrio Niog
were two separate and distinct localities whose boundaries were clearly
defined and delineated.

Moreover, copies of the application for registration and confirmation of

title filed by Juan Cuenca (Juan) before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of the Province of Cavite specifically indicated that the
properties applied for were located in Barrios Talaba, Zapote, Malicsi, and
Poblacion in Bacoor, Cavite. The notices of hearing for his application
likewise identified the subject lots as located in the aforementioned
barrios, without any mention of a property in Barrio Niog.

Second, the CA stated that, except for TCT Nos. 104248 and 104249, the
titles relied upon by the petitioners all indicated that they came from OCT
No. 1898.[22] It appeared, however, that the technical descriptions of the
properties therein referred to the parcels of land previously covered by OCT
No. (1020) RO-9. On the other hand, the survey plans presented by San
Diego consistently showed that its property was located in Barrio Niog and
these survey plans appeared to be regular and in order.

Third, the CA noted that TCT Nos. 104248 and 104249 of Jimmy and
Albert, respectively, contained alterations, in violation of Section 108 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, considering that the number 1898 in
the OCT was altered to reflect R0-9. Additionally, Jimmy and Albert failed
to notify San Diego, as a party-in-interest, when they filed a petition for
correction of entries in their respective titles before the then CFI of Cavite,
despite their knowledge of its claim over the subject property.

Fourth, the CA ruled that the documents presented by the petitioners were
not exactly "newly discovered evidence" because all of them could have
been previously obtained and presented at the hearing before the lower
court. The petitioners failed to exert their best efforts to obtain these
already available documents to buttress their claim.

Back to the Court

Obviously not satisfied with the July 14, 2004 CA Decision, the petitioners
again filed separate petitions before this Court. The first petition,
entitled Albert Chua, Jimmy Chua Chi Leong and Spouses Eduardo Solis
and Gloria Victa v. B.E. San Diego, Inc., was docketed as G.R. No. 165863.
The second, entitled Lorenzana Food Corporation v. B.E. San Diego,
Inc., was docketed as G.R. No. 165875.

On March 9, 2005, upon motion of the parties, the Court issued a

Resolution[23] directing the consolidation of G.R. No. 165875 with G.R. No.
165863.

On June 6, 2007, the Court issued the Resolution[24] denying due course to
the petitions.

On March 5, 2008, acting on the separate motions for reconsideration of

the petitioners and other supplemental pleadings, the Court resolved to
grant the motions, reinstate the petitions and require the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.[25]

In effect, this disposition is a review of the Court's April 22, 1994 Decision
in G.R. No. 105027.[26]

In their respective petitions, LFC, Jimmy, Albert, and Spouses Solis

anchored their prayer for the reversal of the CA decision on the following: