SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, Petitioner, v. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY* and HON. GREGORIO S.

SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Respondents.

DECISION

MARTINEZ, J.:

Which should prevail between the ration decidendi and the fallo of a decision is the primary issue in
this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Federico C. Suntay who opposes
respondent Isabels petition for appointment as administratrix of her grandmothers estate by virtue
of her right of representation.

The suit stemmed from the following:

On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were
born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco
Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay filed a criminal
case1 against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the
then Court of First Instance (CFI)2 a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her,
among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their children who were living
with their mother.3 The suit was docketed as civil case number Q-7180.

On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion which reads:

WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties. It
being admitted by the parties and shown by the records that the question of the case and custody of
the three children have been the subject of another case between the same parties in another
branch of this Court in Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be litigated in this case.

With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of counsel that the third party defendants
are willing to pay P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is willing to accept the offer instead
of her original demand for P130,000.00, the defendant is awarded the sum of P50,000.00 as her
counterclaim and to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00.

SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied)

As basis thereof, the CFI said:

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans Memorial Hospital.
Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out
of the hospital he continued to be under observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as
schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened
with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment;
that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding
of right and wrong.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years
after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for nay of the following causes after (sic) existing at the
time of the marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife.

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition of
the plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in
this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that
plaintiff really lives more in fancy that in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia
(sic).5 (emphasis supplied)

On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay. The latter is respondent Isabels paternal grandmother. The decedent died on June 4, 1990
without leaving a will.6cräläwvirtualibräry

Five years later or on October 26 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC)7 a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of
the Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay which case was docketed as
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. In her petition, she alleged among others, that she is one of
the legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be appointed as administratrix of
the estate.8cräläwvirtualibräry

On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the surviving spouse of the
decedent, that he has been managing the conjugal properties even while the decedent has been
alive and is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that petitioner
and her family have been alienated from the decedent and the Oppositor for more than thirty (30)
years and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration be issued instead to him.9cräläwvirtualibräry

On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to dismiss
the special proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent Isabel should not be appointed as
administratrix of the decedents estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under Article 992
of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation the
legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabels father
predeceased his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession by
representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal
that the marriage of the respondent Isabels parents is null and void, the latter is an illegitimate
child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother the decedent.10 On
October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed order denying petitioners Motion to
Dismiss.11 When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated
January 9, 1998,12 petitioner, as mentioned above filed this petition.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in denying his motion to dismiss
as well as his motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (a) a motion to dismiss is appropriate
in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the motion to dismiss
was timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the decision declaring the marriage of respondent
Isabels parents null and void must be upheld; and (d) said decision had long become final and had,
in fact, been executed.

On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that petitioners motion to dismiss was late having
been filed after the opposition was already filed in court, the counterpart of an answer in an
ordinary civil action and that petitioner in his opposition likewise failed to specifically deny
respondent Isabels allegation that she is a legitimate child of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, the
decedents son. She further contends that petitioner proceeds from a miscomprehension of the
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the
body of the decision and its dispositive portion because in an action for annulment of a marriage,
the court either sustains the validity of marriage or nullifies it. It does not, after hearing a marriage
voidable otherwise, the court will fail to decide and lastly, that the status of marriages under Article
85 of the Civil Code before they are annulled is voidable.

The petition must fail.

Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential
requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess or
jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding.13 There must be a
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.14cräläwvirtualibräry

A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the respondent court did not abuse its
discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which are quoted
hereunder. To with:

The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively assessed and the pertinent laws applied,
the Court finds that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate considering the peculiar
nature of this special proceeding as distinguished from an ordinary civil action. At the outset, this
proceeding was not adversarial in nature and the petitioner was not called upon to assert a cause of
action against a particular defendant. Furthermore, the State has a vital interest in the maintenance
of the proceedings, not only because of the taxes due it, but also because if no heirs qualify, the State
shall acquire the estate by escheat.

xxx xxx xxx

The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality of the petitioner to file ad maintain
this special proceedings, that in the case at bench, the body of the decision determines the nature of
the action which is for annulment, not declaration of nullity.
The oppositors contention that the fallo of the questioned decision (Annex A Motion) prevails over
the body thereof is not of a final decision is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given
effect without need of interpretation or construction.

Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of the decision may be referred to for
purposes of construing the judgement (78 SCRA 541 citing Morelos v. Go Chin Ling; and Heirs of
Juan Presto v. Galang). The reason is that the dispositive portion must find support from the
decisions ratio decidendi.

Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of Quezon City, marked as Annex A of
oppositors motion, the marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was
annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which are
considered voidable. Petitioner being conceived and born of a voidable marriage before the decree
of annulment, she is considered legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the
Phils.).15cräläwvirtualibräry

The trial court correctly ruled that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate. The 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal
and special proceedings.16 The Rules do not only apply to election cases, land registration,
cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for.

Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the Rules on Civil Procedure, a
motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides
that the motion to dismiss may be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint. Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or before the filing of petitioners
opposition.17 which is the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions.

Not only was petitioners motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed almost two years after
respondent Isabel was already through with the presentation of her witnesses and evidence and
petitioner had presented two witnesses. The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only improper but
also dilatory.

The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from established jurisprudence on
this matter, as petitioner asserts, had in fact faithfully observed the law and legal precedents in this
case. In fact, the alleged conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive portion
thereof which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable.
The legal basis for setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is clear under
paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment of the Family
Code.

Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI decision has
categorically declared that the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is null and void and that the
legal effect of such declaration is that the marriage from its inception is void and the children born
out of said marriage is illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and
8318 of the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the causes
for which a marriage may be annulled.19cräläwvirtualibräry

The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed
never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of
the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages
who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children under Article 8920 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the
void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.

On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it
is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the
law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction.21 (Emphasis
supplied)

Stated otherwise, the annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the
society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences which the
marital union produced during its continuance.22cräläwvirtualibräry

Indeed, the terms annul and null and void have different legal connotations and implications. Annul
means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish;
to do away with23 whereas null and void is something that does not exist from the beginning. A
marriage that is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is
terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares a status
condition which already exists from the very beginning.

There is likewise no merit in petitioners argument that it is the dispositive portion of the decision
which must control as to whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabels parents was void or
voidable. Such argument springs from a miscomprehension of the judgment of the Civil Case No. Q-
7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the decision and its
dispositive portion.

Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a given
issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to
settlement of rights of the parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding statement in the
body of the decision or order which may be somewhat confusing,24 the same is not without
qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final decision or
order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of
interpretation or construction which usually is the case where the order or decision in question is
that of a court not of record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on
which the judgment is based.25cräläwvirtualibräry

Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and the body of the
decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order to give effect to
the intention, purpose and judgment of the court. In Republic v. delos Angeles26 the Court said:
Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that [i]n case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail. This mandate of law, obviously cannot be any less binding upon the courts in relation to its
judgments.

x x x The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be construed as a whole so as to bring all
of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation and so as
to give effect to every word and part if possible, and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the
Court, consistent with the provisions of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864 [Emphasis supplied]

Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the CFI of Rizal quoted earlier shows
that the marriage is voidable:

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as
schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened
with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic) treatment;
that even if the subject has shown marked progress, he remains bereft of adequate understanding
of right and wrong.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years
after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

xxx xxx xxx

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition of
plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this
very complaint add emphasis to the finding of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that
plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia
(sic).27cräläwvirtualibräry

Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of respondent Isabels
parents based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal consequences as to the
rights of the children are therefore governed by the first clause of the second paragraph of Article
89. A contrary interpretation would be anathema to the rule just above-mentioned. Based on said
provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were
conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3,
1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking appointment as estate administratrix, the
legitimate grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of
representation in the estate of their grandmother Cirstina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father,
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased their grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice
to a determination by the courts of whether Letters of Administration may be granted to her.
Neither do the Court adjudged herein the successional rights of the personalities involved over the
decedents estate.

It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Ruiz Castro, emphasized to all magistrates of all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme
degree of care should be exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a decision,
because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decision becomes final. The adjudication of
the rights and obligations of thoe parties, and the dispositions made as well as the directions and
instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the decision, must all
be spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate
or interpretation.28cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008

VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO "JAKE" TAN and GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO
NIERRAS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12, ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN
RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO LIM, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal
of the Decision1 dated 29 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order2 dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Ormoc City in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June
2003 whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator to the estate of the late
Gerardo Tan.

The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:

Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31 October 2001, private
respondents, who are claiming to be the children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for
the issuance of letters of administration. The Petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4014-
0 and was raffled to Branch 12. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an
Opposition to the Petition.

Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need
for a special administrator to take possession and charge of Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can
be resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their
attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondents’ Motion for Appointment, arguing that none
of the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not residing
in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity,
experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already
acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his death.

On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner, issued

directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix, to wit:
 b.1.) requiring the de facto administratrix Ms. Vilma Tan to deposit in the fiduciary account
of the Court all money and or cash at hand or deposited in the bank(s) which rightfully
belong to the estate of the decedent within five (5) days from receipt hereof;

b.2.) requiring the same administratrix to deposit in the same account the proceeds of all
sugarcane harvest or any crop harvest, if any, done in the past or is presently harvesting or
about to undertake, which belong to the estate of the decedent;

b.3.) relative to the foregoing, the same de facto administratrix is also required to submit a
financial report to the Commission as regards the background of the cash at hand or
deposited in bank(s), if any, the expenses incurred in course of her administration and other
relevant facts including that of the proceeds of the sugarcane/crop harvest, which
submission will be done upon deposit of the foregoing with the court as above-required.3

More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC, acting on the private respondents’ Urgent Ex-
parte Motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive
of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.

Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order4 appointing
Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardo’s Estate, the fallo of which states:

Foregoing considered, the motion for the appointment of a special administrator is hereby
GRANTED. Mr. Romualdo D. Lim is hereby appointed as Special Administrator and shall
immediately take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, upon his
filing of a bond in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and upon approval of the same by this Court.5

Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming that
petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of
kin of the deceased.

On 17 July 2003, respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio), in his capacity as RTC Executive
Judge, issued an Order6 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.1avvphi1

Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing
the 17 July 2003 Order, again insisting on petitioner Vilma’s right to be appointed as special
administratix. Petitioners likewise prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin Romualdo from entering the estate and acting as
special administrator thereof.

On 29 July 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision denying petitioners’ Petition. On 6
December 2004, the Court of Appeals similarly denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration filed
by petitioners, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING
and DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed order in Special
Proceeding No. 4014-0.7
On 22 January 2005, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assigning the
following errors:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO BOTH GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONERS’ PLEA TO BE GIVEN PRIMACY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR
FATHER’S ESTATE.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ PLEA FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT.8

On 14 February 2005, this Court issued a Resolution9 denying the Petition on the ground of late
filing, failure to submit an affidavit of service of a copy of the Petition on the Court of Appeals and
proof of such service, failure to properly verify the Petition, and failure to pay the deposit for the
Salary Adjustment for the Judiciary (SAJ) fund and sheriff’s fee. Upon Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioners, however, this Court issued on 18 July 2005 a Resolution10 reinstating the
Petition.

Petitioners contend11 that they should be given priority in the administration of the estate since
they are allegedly the legitimate heirs of the late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who
are purportedly Gerardo’s illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the doctrine that generally, it is
the nearest of kin, whose interest is more preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of
administrator of the decedent’s estate.

Petitioners also claim that they are more competent than private respondents or their attorney-in-
fact to administer Gerardo’s estate. Petitioners Vilma and Gerardo "Jake" Tan (Jake) claim to have
lived for a long time and continue to reside on Gerardo’s estate, while respondents are not even in
the Philippines, having long established residence abroad.

Petitioners additionally claim that petitioner Vilma has been acting as the administratrix of the
estate since Gerardo’s death on 14 October 2000 and is thus "well steeped in the actual
management and operation of the estate (which essentially consists of agricultural
landholdings)."12

As regards the denial of petitioners’ plea for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
TRO, petitioners argue that such denial would leave Romualdo, private respondents’ attorney-in-
fact, free to enter Gerardo’s estate and proceed to act as administrator thereof to the prejudice of
petitioners.

The appeal is devoid of merit.

The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.

However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a
regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a
special administrator.13 The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of
kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as
the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not
appealable.14

Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law.15

We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavez’s appointment of Romualdo as special
administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special
administratrix of Gerardo’s estate, but decided against her appointment for the following reasons:

Atty. Clinton C. Nuevo, in his capacity as court appointed commissioner, directed oppositor Vilma
Tan in the latter’s capacity as de fact[o] administratrix, to deposit in the fiduciary account of the
court all money and cash at hand or deposited in the banks which rightfully belong to the estate
within five days from receipt of the directive. Oppositor Vilma Tan was likewise directed to deposit
in the same account the proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop from the estate of the
decedent. She was likewise directed to submit a financial report as regards the background of the
cash on hand, if any, the expenses incurred in the course of her administration. The directive was
issued by Atty. Nuevo on March 18, 2002 or more than a year ago. On May 23, 2003, this Court,
acting on the urgent ex parte motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma Tan another ten days
to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.
This Court is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo Tan for the benefit of all heirs be
that heir is (sic) the nearest kin or the farthest kin. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does not
satisfy the requirement of a special administrator who can effectively and impartially administer
the estate of Gerardo Tan for the best interest of all the heirs.16 (Emphases supplied.)

Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited for the job as
special administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo, who was actually appointed by the court as special
administrator of Gerardo’s estate, the latter’s appointment, at best, would constitute a mere error of
judgment and would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment is one which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an
appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was issued
by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.17 The Court of Appeals could not
have reversed a mere error of judgment in a Certiorari petition.

Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their claim that their co-
petitioner Vilma would have been the more competent and capable choice to serve as the special
administratrix of Gerardo’s estate. Contrary to petitioners’ bare assertions, both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that the documented failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the
reportorial requirements after the lapse of a considerable length of time certainly militates against
her appointment.

We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for the same cannot be said as
regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo, who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as
special administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the country and can, thus,
personally administer Gerardo’s estate.

If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference provided in Section 6, Rule
78 of the Rules of Court, so that petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may
take over administration of Gerardo’s estate, they should already pursue the appointment of a
regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special
administrator. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in
granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or administrative (in the
event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any
cause.18 The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the
estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of
creditors and heirs.19

In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special
administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the
directives of the court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma
were still appointed special administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought
about by her defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners submit
the defense that petitioner Vilma was unable to comply with the directives of the RTC to deposit
with the court the income of Gerardo’s estate and to provide an accounting thereof because of the
fact that Gerardo’s estate had no income. This defense is clearly specious and insufficient
justification for petitioner Vilma’s non-compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income,
petitioners should have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing to
disregard the court’s orders.
Finally, as we are now resolving the case in favor of private respondents, there is no longer any
need to discuss petitioners’ arguments regarding the denial by the appellate court of their prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 July
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335 affirming the Order dated 17 July 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its
Order dated 12 June 2003, whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator of the
estate of Gerardo Tan, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
G.R. No. L-3677 November 29, 1951

In the Matter of the Testate Estate of BASIL GORDON BUTLER; MERCEDES LEON, petitioner-
appellant, and ADA LOGGEY GHEZZI, administratrix-appellant, vs. MANUFACTURERS LIFE
INSURANCE CO., thru Philippine Branch, oppositor-appellee.

Juan S. Rustia for petitioner and appellant.

Peralta & Agrava for oppositor and appellee.

TUASON, J.:

This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance of Manila which denied a motion of the
administratrix in the matter of the testate estate of Basil Gordon Butler (Special Proceedings No.
6218). The motion prayed for the citation of the Manager of the Manila Branch of the Manufacturers
Life Insurance Co. of Toronto, Canada, to appear and under a complete accounting of certain funds
the said Branch allegedly has in its possession and claimed to belong to the estate. His Honor, Judge
Rafael Amparo of the court below, held that these funds "came into the possession of the
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., Inc., regularly and in due course and, therefore, sees no justifiable
ground to require said company to render an accounting thereon."chanrobles virtual law library

The essential facts are that Basil Gordon Butler, formerly a resident of the Philippines, died in
Brooklyn, New York City, in 1945, leaving a will which was duly probated in the Surrogate's Court
of New York County on August 3 of the same year, and of which James Ross, Sr., James Madison
Ross, Jr. and Ewald E. Selph were named executors. The estate having been settled, the proceedings
were closed on July 17, 1947.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The will contained this residuary clause:

After payment of these legacies and my just debts, including funeral expenses, I devise, give and
bequeath all of my remaining estate and personal effects of which I may die possessed to Mercedes
de Leon, of Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, to wit: the personal effects to be delivered to her for her use
and profit; the moneys, securities and other valuable property, not personal effects, to be held in
trust for her benefit by my executors, at their absolute discretion, to be administered for her
permanent benefit in whatever way they may consider most advantageous in the circumstances
existing. Since the said Mercedes de Leon is not of sound judgment, and discretion in the handling
of money, it is not my wish that she be given any sums of money other than for her current needs,
except as my executors in their judgment deem advantageous to her. In case the amount available
for this bequest be sufficient to purchase an adequate annuity, the executors in their discretion may
do so. And I attest and direct that I do not wish to intend that the action of my executors upon their
discretion in this matter be questioned by anyone whatsoever.

For the purpose of carrying out that testamentary provision, James Madison Ross was appointed
trustee by the New York County Surrogate's Court on February 4, 1948. Once appointed, and with
the beneficiary signing the application with him, Ross bought an annuity from the Manufacturer's
life Insurance Co. at its head office in Toronto, Canada, paying in advance $17,091.03 as the
combined premiums. The contract stipulates for a monthly payment of $57.60 to Mercedes Benz
during her lifetime, with the proviso that in the event of her death, the residue, if any, of the capital
sum shall be paid in one sum to James Madison Ross or his successor as trustee. And beginning May
27, 1948, Mercedes de Leon has been receiving the stipulated monthly allowance through the
Insurance Company's Manila Office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

With the object, so it would seem, of getting hold at once of the entire amount invested in the
annuity, Mercedes de Leon on September 4, 1948, presented Butler's will for probate in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, and secured the appointment of Ada Loggey Ghezzi as administratrix with
the will annexed early in 1949. (James Madison Ross and Ewald E. Selph had expressly declined
appointment as executors "on the ground that the probate proceedings of the above estate were
terminated by the Surrogate's Court of the County of New York, New York City, U. S. A., and that
there are no properties of the estate left to be administered.") After having qualified, the
administratrix filed the motion which Judge Amparo has denied; and as the party most if not solely
interested in that motion, Mercedes de Leon has joined Ghezzi in this
appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The administration of Butler's estate granted in New York was the principal or domiciliary
administration (Johannes vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 175), while the administration taken out in the
Philippines is ancillary. However, the distinction serves only to distinguish one administration from
the other, for the two proceedings are separate and independent. (34 C.J.S.
1232,1233).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The important thing to inquire into is the Manila court's authority with respect to the assets herein
involved. The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only to the assets
of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, so that an administrator
appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state or country.
(Keenan vs. Toury, 132 A.L.R. 1362; Nash vs. Benari, 3 A.L.R. 61; Michigan Trust Co. vs. Chaffee, 149
A.L.R. 1078).This principle is specifically embodied in section 4 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

Estate, how administered.-When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or
letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration,
shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just
debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will
may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of
estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.

It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside the jurisdiction of
the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract
executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the money. The party whose appearance the
appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the company which holds the funds in its possession,
the agency's intervention being limited to delivering to the annuitant the checks made out and
issued from the home office. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have been transferred
or removed to the Manila Branch.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila Branch, yet it no longer forms part of butler's
estate and is beyond the control of the court. It has passed completely into the hands of the
company in virtue of a contract duly authorized and validly executed. Whether considered as a trust
or as simple consideration for the company's assumed obligation, which it has been religiously
performing, of paying periodical allowances to the annuitant, the proceeds of the sale can not be
withdrawn without the consent of the company, except, upon the death of the annuitant, the
residuary legatee may claim the remainder, if there be any. Neither the domiciliary or ancillary
executor of Butler's will, nor the trustee, nor the annuitant has disposition of any of these funds
beyond the amounts and except upon the conditions agreed upon in the contract for
annuity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the third place, the power of the court to cite a person for the purpose stated in the
administratrix's motion is defined in section 7 of Rule 88, which provides.

Person entrusted with estate compelled to render account.-The court, on complaint of an executor or
administrator, with any part the estate of the deceased to appear before it, and may require such
person to render a full account, on oath, of the money, goods, chattels, bonds, accounts, or other
papers belonging to such estate as came to his possession in trust for such executor or
administrator, and for his proceedings thereon; and if the person so cited refuses to appear to
render such account, the court may punish him for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of
the court.

The appellant administratrix did not entrust to the appellee the money she wants the latter to
account for, nor did the said money come to the appellee's possession in trust for the
administratrix. In other words, the administratrix is a complete stranger to the subject of the
motion and to the appellee. There being no creditors, the only subject of the motion, we incline to
believe, is to enable Mercedes de Leon to get the legacy in a lump sum in complete disregard of the
wishes of the testator, who showed deep concern for her welfare, and of the annuity contract which
the annuitant herself applied for in conjunction with the
trustee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

All in all, from every standpoint, including that of the annuitant's financial well-being, the motion
and the appeal are utterly groundless and ill-advised.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

The appealed order therefore is affirmed with costs against the

appellants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18403 September 30, 1961

IN RE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF PASCUAL VILLANUEVA. MAURICIA G. DE

VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellant.

Ramon B. de los Reyes for defendant-appellant.

Marcos M. Calo for petitioners.

PAREDES, J.:

A case certified by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the issues involved are purely of law.

For the administration of the estate of her deceased husband, Pascual Villanueva, the widow
Mauricia G. Villanueva, on December 19, 1949, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Agusan, for
letters of Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 67). The petition was set for hearing and Notice thereof was
published on February 25, March 4, and 11, 1950, in the Manila Daily Bulletin. At the hearing, other
heirs while agreeing to the placing of estate under administration, opposed the appointment the
widow. The name of Atty. Teodulo R. Ricaforte, suggested and all the parties agreed. After the
taking the required oath, Atty. Ricaforte entered upon the performance of his duties. Under date of
November 9, 1950 the Clerk of the Agusan CFI, issued the following Notice to Creditors:

Letters of administration having been issued in the above entitled case in favor of Teodulo
R. Ricaforte for the settle of the intestate of Pascual Villanueva, deceased;

Notice is hereby given to all persons having claims for money against the decedent, the said
Pascual Villanueva, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not
due or contingent, for funeral expenses and expenses of last sickness of the deceased, and
Judgment for money against him, requiring them to file their claims with the clerk of court
within six but not beyond twelve months after date of the first publication of this notice,
serving copies of such claims upon administrator, the said Teodulo R. Ricaforte.

The above notice contained the usual order for publication thereof (once a week for three
consecutive weeks) which was effected, thru the Morning Times of City, a newspaper of general
circulation, on Nov. 16, 23 and 30, 1950, which expired on November 16, 1951.

On July 20, 1953, the defendant-appellant Philippine National Bank filed in the administration
proceedings, Creditor's Claim of the following tenor —
 The Philippine National Bank, Creditor of Pascual Villanueva, deceased, respectfully
presents its claim against the estate of the said deceased for Approval as follows:

Original amount thru Agusan Agency on Dec. 20, 1939 ........................................................ P600.00

To int. at 10%: on P600.00 fr. 12-20-39 to 6-5-53 ...................................................................... 747.45

Total due as of June 5, 1953 (Daily int. of P0.1644 after June 5, 1953) .......................... P1,347.45

That the said obligation has been due demandable since Dec. 20, 1940; that the same is true
and just claim and that it is still unpaid without any set-off.

On October 12, 1954, the Philippine National Bank filed a Motion for Admission of claim, stating —

1. That the Philippine National Bank filed its claim dated July 20, 1953;

2. That the last action taken on the claim was an ordered this Honorable Court issued on
March 20, 1954, transferring the hearing of the claim until the next calendar of the court,
without objection of the administrator;

3. That the administrator has not answered the claim nor denied the same.1awphîl.nèt

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that an order be issued admitting and approving the
claim and ordering the administrator to pay the Bank the amount of the claim.

The administrator, on November 5, 1954, opposed the alleging that he had no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations therein. As special defenses,
he interposed —

That the same indebtedness, if it existed, has already been paid;

That the caused action for the recovery of the aforesaid amount of P1,847.45 is barred by
the statute of limitations, for more than ten (10) Years have elapsed since the cause of
action accrued up to present time;

That the said claim is barred forever on the ground that notice to creditors having been
published in the MORNING TIMES of Cebu City, a newspaper of general circulation in on
November 16, 23 and 30, 1950, ... the Philippine National Bank failed to file its claim within
the time limited in the notice, ....

The appellant PNB, on November 14, 1958, more than four (4) Years after the opposition of the
claim presented by the administrator, filed a pleading captioned "Petition for an Extension of time
within which to File the Claim of Philippine National Bank", alleging, among others, that Sec. 2, Rule
87 of the Rules, allows the filing of claims even if the period stated in the notice to creditors elapsed,
upon cause shown and on such terms as equitable; that its failure to present the claiming with the
period stated in the notice, was its lack of knowledge of administration proceedings, for while said
maintains a branch office in Agusan, the employees did not come to know of the proceedings, the
notice has been published in the Morning Times, a newspaper very limited circulation.
On January 16, 1959, the CFI issued the following Order —

It appearing that the claim of the Philippine National Bank against the estate of the deceased
Pascual Villanueva already barred by the statute of limitations because the claim was due
and demandable since December 20, 1940, but filed on July 20, 1953, after the expiration of
ten years, considering that said filing was furthermore not present court within the period
fixed by Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, and no reason having been shown to justify the
tension of time for its filing, the Court resolves to deny it as it hereby denies the petition for
an extension of time for filing of the claim by the Philippine National Bank. The failure of the
Bank to present on time the claim was due its own fault and can hardly be considered
excusable negligence.

Appellant Bank moved to reconsider the above Order, arguing that the statute of limitations had
been suspended by the Moratorium Law, and that the courts can extend the period limited in the
notice, under special circumstances, and on grounds of equity (Velasquez v. Teod 46 Phil. 757). The
PNB listed five incidents, which considered special circumstances to warrant the of the extension to
present the claim, among which the lack of knowledge of the pendency of the administration
proceedings; the legitimacy of the loan secured the deceased; that when it filed the claim, it did
know that the period stated in the notice had already expired.

In disposing the motion for reconsideration, the lower court, on March 3,1959, said —

The Court believes that the filing of money claim on July 20, 1953 in the Office of the Clerk
of Court did not suspend running of the period of prescription because said claim was filed
out of time and therefore invalid for all legal purposes. A careful revision of the record
shows that the Philippine National Bank, contrary to the pretension of its counsel, had
knowledge of the present administration proceedings long before July 20, 1953, because the
second payment of the claim due to the deceased Pascual Villanueva from the Philippine
War Damage Commission in the amount of P6,441.30, was deposited in the Agusan Agency
of the Bank in June, 1951. And in the inventory filed by the new administrator Francisco S.
Conde, on February 27, 1957, the following item appears:

Money belonging to the said deceased which came into the hands of the
administrator on December 1, 1951, appearing in the Bank A-1114, Agusan Agency
deposited by the late administrator Teodulo R. Ricaforte. — P6,897.52.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merits.

The order of January 16, 1959 was the subject of the appeal to the Court of Appeals which, as stated
at the threshold of this opinion, certified the same to this Court.

The important issue presented is whether or not the in question is already barred. Admittedly, the
claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the Order of the lower court, within which to
present claims against the estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed on November 16, 1951 and
the claim was filed on July 20, 1953 or about 1 year and 8 months late. This notwithstanding,
appellant contends that it did not know of such administration proceedings, not even its employees
in the Branch Office in Butuan City, Agusan. It is to be noted that the petition for Letters of
Administration and the Notice to Creditors were duly published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in
the Morning Times, respectively, which was a full compliance with the requirements of the Rules.
Moreover, the supposed lack of knowledge of the proceedings on the part of appellant and its
employees had been belied by uncontested and eloquent evidence, consisting of a deposit of an
amount of money by the administrator Of the estate in said Bank (Agusan Agency). The deposit was
made on December 1, 1951, inspite of which the appellant Bank only filed its claim on July 20, 1953.
It is quite true that the Courts can extend the period within Which to present claims against the
estate, even after the period limited has elapsed; but such extension should be granted under
special circumstances. The lower did not find any justifiable reason to give the extension and for
one thing, there was no period to extend, the same had elapsed.

Having reached the above conclusions, We deem it necessary to determine the question as to
whether or not the Moratorium Law had suspended the prescriptive period for filing of the claim
under consideration.

WHEREFORE, the order subject of the appeal is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant
Philippine National Bank, in both instances.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Barrera, took no part.