GR No. 138364 People v.

Villanueva

Issue:
Whether the qualifying circumstance as indicated in the caption is sufficient to be appreciated

Ruling:
Nothing in Secs. 6 and 8 of Rule 110 mandates the material allegations should be stated in the
body and not in the preamble or caption of the Information. It is irrelevant and immaterial
whether the qualifying circumstance of relationship is mentioned in the opening paragraph of the
Information or in the second paragraph which alleges the acts constituting the crime charged
since either paragraph is an integral part of the Information.

The preamble or opening paragraph is as much an essential part of the Information as the
accusatory paragraph itself. The preamble in fact complements the accusatory paragraph which
draws its strength from the preamble. It lays down the predicate for the charge in general terms;
while the accusatory portion only provides the necessary details. The preamble and the
accusatory paragraph, together, form a complete whole that gives sense and meaning to the
indictment. Thus, any circumstance stated in the preamble (i.e., minority, relationship) should
also be considered as an allegation of such fact.

Significantly, the name of the accused is set forth, not in the body of the Information, but only in
the opening paragraph. If the preamble can validly contain such an essential element as the
name of the accused, there appears to be no logical reason why it cannot likewise contain the
equally essential allegations on the qualifying circumstances.

Moreover, the opening paragraph bears the operative word "accuses," which sets in motion the
constitutional process of notification, and formally makes the person being charged with the
commission of the offense an accused.

The minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender constitute special qualifying
circumstances, which must both be sufficiently alleged and proved. While the relationship
between appellant and Reseilleta was adequately established during the trial by the admission
of no less than appellant himself, the prosecution evidence is quite anemic to prove the minority
of the victim.

GR NO.143375 Bautista v. CA

Issue:
Whether the drawer of a check which is dishonored due to lack of sufficient funds can be
prosecuted under BP 22 even if the check is presented for payment after ninety (90) days from
its due date
Fact:
Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing of an Information against
petitioner for violation of BP 22, which was approved by the City Prosecutor.

Petitioner filed with the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) for Region IV a petition
for review of the 22 April 1999 resolution. The ORSP denied the petition. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the ORSP also denied on 31 August 1999. According to the
ORSP, only resolutions of prosecutors dismissing a criminal complaint were cognizable for
review by that office, citing Department Order No. 223.

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the resolution of the ORSP,
Region IV. The appellate court issued the assailed Resolution dated 26 October 1999 denying
due course outright and dismissing the petition.

This case went to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 43 applies to "appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court
of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions." Petitioner submits that a
prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-judicial function.

Ruling:
The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation
is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining ​(a) whether a crime has been committed​ and ​(b) whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof.

Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions
approving the filing of a criminal complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the power to resolve appeals with finality only where the penalty
prescribed for the offense does not exceed prision correccional, regardless of the imposable
fine, the only remedy of petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, is to present her
defense in the trial of the case.

Fact:
Petitioner asserts that she could not be prosecuted for violation of BP 22 on the simple ground
that the subject check was presented 166 days after the date stated thereon. Petitioner
interprets this provision to mean that the ninety (90)-day presentment period is an element of
the offenses punished in BP 22.

Ruling:
It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or
information, and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be stated must be determined by reference to the definitions
and the essentials of the specific crimes.

The ninety (90)-day period is not among these elements. Section 2 of BP 22 is clear that a
dishonored check presented within the ninety (90)-day period creates a prima facie presumption
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is an essential element of the offense. The
presumption in Sec. 2 is not a conclusive presumption that forecloses or precludes the
presentation of evidence to the contrary.

Thus, the only consequence of the failure to present the check for payment within ninety (90)
days from the date stated is that there arises no prima facie presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds. But the prosecution may still prove such knowledge through other
evidence. Whether such evidence is sufficient to sustain probable cause to file the information is
addressed to the sound discretion of the City Prosecutor and is a matter not controllable by
certiorari.

GR NO. 180122 Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the infrastructure works on 1 August 1990 while the
complainant Candido M. Fajutag, Jr.(Fajutag, Jr.) was designated Project Engineer of the
project. Fajutag, Jr. discovered certain deficiencies. As a result, he issued Work Instruction No.
1 requiring some supporting documents however, the contractor failed to comply with the work
instruction. The Inventory and Acceptance Committee determined the total accomplishment of
the contractor at 40.89%. NHA Board of Directors approved the mutual termination of the A.C.
Cruz Construction contract and awarded the remaining work to Triad Construction and
Development Corporation (Triad). Thereafter, Triad discovered that certain work items that had
been in under the inventory report as accomplished and acceptable were in fact non-existent.
Fajutag, Jr. brought these irregularities to the attention of the Commission on Audit (COA).

Consequently, petitioner, as manager of the Regional Projects Department and Chairman of the
Inventory and Acceptance Committee, and other NHA officials were charged in an Information.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information raising the following grounds: (1) the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense; (2) the information does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusations against them have been violated by the inadequacy of
the information; and (4) the prosecution failed to determine the individual participation of all the
accused in the information in disobedience with the Resolution dated 27 March 2005.
Issue:
Sufficiency of the information

Concept:
MOTION TO QUASH:
GR: Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the
remedy is not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.

XPN: If the court acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion

The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether or not the facts asseverated, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in law.

The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to
apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d’etre of the
rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. Another purpose is to enable
accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense
charged is sufficient.

Ruling:
The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the essential elements of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
(a) Information specifically alleges the petitioner as public officers
(b) The offense was committed in relation to the office and while in the performance of their
official function, connived with each other (conspiracy) and helped Arceo C. Cruz
(c) With deliberate intent and evident bad faith
(d) Gave unwarranted benefits to the petitioner which resulted to the damage and prejudice
of the government

As to the issue of conspiracy, the Court underscores the fact that under Philippine law,
conspiracy should be understood on two levels. When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act
of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information.
But when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the
crime as in the case at bar, there is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information
because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged.

It is not necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in
describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts
relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much
certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead
his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. A statement of
the evidence on the conspiracy is not necessary in the Information.

GR NO. 184800 Bonifacio v. RTC

Facts:

Pacific Plans, Inc owned by the Yuchengco Group purchased a pre-need educational plans.
Petitioners availed the benefits under the plan but failed to collect due to liquidity concerns.
Because of PPI’s refusal to honor their obligations, PEPCI, which has been formed by a large
disgruntled planholders of PPI, provided a forum which the planholders could seek redress for
their pecuniary loss under the address of ​www.pepcoalition.com​.

Respondent Gimenez alleged that ​upon accessing in Makati​ the websites mentioned, he read
a numerous articles which allegedly had been maliciously and recklessly published containing
derogatory statements and false accusation. This prompted him to file a criminal complaint
before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office for 13 counts of libel.

The prosecutor’s office found probable cause to indict the accused but the petitioners filed
before the RTC Makati a Motion to Quash the Information on the grounds that it failed to vest
jurisdiction on the Makati RTC.

The prosecution insisted that the information sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the Makati
RTC contending that the information need not allege verbatim that the libelous was “ printed and
first published” in the appropriate venue. In the Amended Information the phrase “a website
accessible in Makati City, an injurious and defamatory article, which was first published and
accessed by the private complainant in Makati City” was used.

ISSUE:
Whether Makati RTC has jurisdiction over the case

RULING:
In Agbayani, the venue of libel cases filed by a private individual is limited only to: (1) residence
of the complainant at the time of the commission; and (2) where the alleged defamatory article
was printed and first established.

The Amendment made by RA 4363 to Art 360 sought to prevent the offended party to harass
the accused from filing an out-of-town libel suits even in remote municipal court. Hence, if the
Court would rule in favor of the respondents, it will abandon the Agbayani Rule and would result
to harassment on the part of the accused because respondents can allege that he access the
website in any place he wanted.
Medez v. CTA GR NO. 179962

FACTS:
BIR file a complaint against Dr. Mendez for his failure to file his income tax return for taxable
years 2001 to 2003. BIR alleged that petitioner had been operating as a sole proprietor in QC,
Makati, Dagupan and San Fernando. An information was filed to the CTA.

After arraignment, the prosecution filed a motiion to amned information with leave of court. The
amended information change the date from 2001 to 2002and added the phrase “for income
earned.” Additionally, the amended information included therein the phrase “ doing business
under the name and style of Mendez Medical Group” and the change and/or addition of the
branches of petitioner’s operation.

Petitioner contended that such amendment is substantial which is prohibited because it cause a
surprise to him and affect the form of his defense. CTA ruled that such amendement is merely a
formal one as it “merely states with additional precision something already contained in the
original information.

ISSUE:
Whether the amendment made after arraignment is valid

RULING
YES. The change in the date from 2001 to 2002 is only consistent with the allegation that
petitioner failed to file his income tax return for the taxable year 2001 because the offense could
only be possibly committed upon his failure to file the return on or before April 2002.

The change/addition in the place of business is also valid. His opportunity to present his
evidence during preliminary investigation is not exhaustive. Evidence in preliminary
investigationis only requires to establish minimal evidentiary which will determine whether there
is a probable cause.

Likewise, the addition of Mendez Medical Group as it merely describes the nature of the
business organization established by the petitioner as a way to carry out the practice of his
profession.