Echegaray v.

Secretary of Justice

Leo Echegaray was a sick man who raped his own daughter Rodessa Echegaray. The Secretary
of Justice at the time of this case was Serafin Cuevas.

Facts: On 4 January 1999, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order staying the
execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice
Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the Supreme Court not only
violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to
onstitutional Law 317
vb) By Resolution in A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data, effective February 2, 2008. Section 1 thereof provides: “The writ of habeas
data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, honor and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. ”
vi) Congress cannot amend the Rules of Court. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
132601, January 19, 1999, the Supreme Court declared: “But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.”
vii) Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former
continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment;
the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. For after the judgment has become final
facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot
be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is the same — the temporary
suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that
Congress can at any time amend RA 7659 (Death Penalty Law) by reducing the penalty of death
to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence.
But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend
laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of
conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a
death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than
the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted
expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality
has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant
reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the
right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and
coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of

the child which includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse

and emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans

the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;

 (3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such

as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured

child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and

development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

(c) "Circumstances which gravely threaten or endanger the survival and

normal development of children" include, but are not limited to, the

following;

Background of the Case:

1998 Decision

FACTS:
On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten year old daughter and was
sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA 7659 “ The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of death
penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the court finding no reason to declare it
unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the requirements for its imposition.

Act 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode of execution was
changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to
implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of
Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its implementing rules are
unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104
were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of execution.

On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to mantain status quo .
Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for TRO until resolution of the petition.

The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in question is
unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable
provisions and statistics showing how other countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have become
abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and
violative of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ISSUE : Whether or not R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules are violative of the unconstitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment, violative of international treaty and obligations , discriminatory
and an undue delegation of legislative powers.

RULING:
I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER
SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.