Perkins v Perkins

Facts:

The parties of this case are husband and wife, duly married in the Philippines on January 3, 1914, and the dispute occurs over the
custody of the one child of that marriage, a daughter who was born on the 16th of October, 1914. Appellant amended her suit for
separate maintenance and other relief by asking that the daughter, Dora, be placed in her custody.

A separate hearing was had without delay as to the custody of the minor child, and the trial court awarded the custody to the father.

The minor child has expressed a preference to live with her mother. There is no question of habitual drunkenness or poverty. After
the marital difficulties had resulted in litigation, the husband discovered a bundle of old letters written to appellant by a young man,
named Chambers, during the summer of 1921. The trial court held that these letters show that appellant was guilty of infidelity to
her husband. This finding of the court is denied and fiercely attacked in the brief of the appellant. An act of infidelity so many years
ago would not be conclusive at this time as to the moral fitness of a mother to the custody of a minor daughter. The treasuring of
such erotic letters does, however, throw some light upon the mental and moral state of mind of appellant

In order to attain her own ends she went as far as to make statements absolutely contrary to the truth; and while testifying before this
court on the trial of this incident she could not but reveal how unscrupulous she is by stating one thing for another notwithstanding
the fact that she was then testifying under an oath to tell the truth and nothing but the truth. She said for example, under oath, in
order to succeed in her desire to obtain an allowance for support from the defendant, that the latter had abandoned her and had gone
to live at the Army and Navy Club, when in truth and in fact that never happened; that the defendant had abandoned her in the
months of May, June, July, and August, in Europe and in America, without having written to her even once, when the truth is that her
very letters written to the defendant during that time (Exhibits 52, 52-A et seq.) , which show that said defendant had been writing to
her almost daily, with the exception of the time when he was on his journey from Europe to America; that said defendant had
authorized her to engage in stock speculations in the New York market, when she knew that the contrary was true as she herself in her
diary attached to this record as Exhibit 24. The plaintiff attempted to take advantage of the innocence and youth of her daughter Dora
to attain her own ends by inducing the latter to think ill of her own father and to testify against him. These facts are shown by
documentary evidence for the defendant marked Exhibits 53, 54, and 56. It may well be said that she considered any means tending to
the attainment of her own ends as good and proper.

Issue: WON Idonah Perkins is eligible for receiving support from her husband

Held: No. the latter had abandoned her and had gone to live at the Army and Navy Club, when in truth and in fact that never
happened; that the defendant had abandoned her in the months of May, June, July, and August, in Europe and in America, without
having written to her even once, when the truth is that her very letters written to the defendant during that time (Exhibits 52, 52-A et
seq.) , which show that said defendant had been writing to her almost daily, with the exception of the time when he was on his
journey from Europe to America; that said defendant had authorized her to engage in stock speculations in the New York market,
when she knew that the contrary was true as she herself in her diary attached to this record as Exhibit 24. The plaintiff attempted to
take advantage of the innocence and youth of her daughter Dora to attain her own ends by inducing the latter to think ill of her own
father and to testify against him. These facts are shown by documentary evidence for the defendant marked Exhibits 53, 54, and 56. It
may well be said that she considered any means tending to the attainment of her own ends as good and proper.
It also appears in evidence that the appellant, over the objection of the father, removed Dora from school and took her daily to the
court where she could listen to the charges and counter charges that her parents were making against each other. The father desired
the custody primarily to remove her from such atmosphere and place her in a young ladies’ school in Switzerland, which school had
tentatively been selected by the parents while living in the state of domestic tranquillity. There is no question in the mind of this court
that the welfare of the child will be served by this action. The welfare of the minor is normally the controlling consideration in the
matter of its custody, and where the evidence, as it does in this case, shows that the exception set forth in section 771 in the Code of
Civil Procedure exists, the court will look for the future welfare of the minor. In our opinion this has been done by the trial judge.

This case was submitted to this court by stipulation of the attorneys on January 23, 1932. Two days thereafter appellant requested
leave to file an additional memorandum which was denied by the court. On March 14, 1932, appellant filed a motion for new trial on
the grounds of newly discovered evidence, and attached to said motion certain affidavits which show on their face that they were
made on the 26th day of May, 1931. They related to matters of no consequence, are not newly discovered evidence, and the motion
was not filed at a proper time. The motion for new trial is therefore not entitled to serious consideration. The order appealed from is
affirmed with costs against appellant. So ordered.

Pelayo v Lauron

Facts: Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or
about the 13th of October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and
that upon arrival he was requested by them to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a
child; that therefore, and after consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escaño, it was found necessary, on account of the difficult
birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth,
in which services he was occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient several
times; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without alleging
any good reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants, or any of
them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together with any other relief that might be deemed proper.

In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation therein contained and alleged as a special defense,
that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was
in the house of the defendants, her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances.

Issue: WON the father and mother-in-law of the patient, or the husband of the latter is bound to pay the medical expenses incurred?

Held: In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the
professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, is the husband of the patient
and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and
requested his assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent
danger, to which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was urgently needed, and the
obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is specially
established by the law, as has been seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is
entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action against the husband who is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to his
lawful wife in such an emergency.

From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to have brought an action against the defendants simply
because they were the parties who called the plaintiff and requested him to assist the patient during her difficult confinement, and
also, possibly, because they were her father and mother-in-law and the sickness occurred in their house. The defendants were not, nor
are they now, under any obligation by virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contract
entered into between them and the plaintiff from which such obligation might have arisen.

In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an action for support, the supreme court of Spain, while recognizing the validity and
efficiency of a contract to furnish support wherein a person bound himself to support another who was not his relative, established
the rule that the law does impose the obligation to pay for the support of a stranger, but as the liability arose out of a contract, the
stipulations of the agreement must be held. (Decision of May 11, 1897.)

Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the
husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on
the other hand, it does not appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which reason it is
obvious that the former cannot be compelled to pay fees which they are under no liability to pay because it does not appear that they
consented to bind themselves.

The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned to the judgment below are unfounded, because, if the
plaintiff has no right of action against the defendants, it is needless to declare whether or not the use of forceps is a surgical operation.

Therefore, in view of the consideration hereinbefore set forth, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed
with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Sanchez v Zulueta

Facts: Josefa Diego and Mario Sanchez are plaintiffs and Feliciano Sanchez is defendant, the plaintiffs ask that the defendant be
sentenced to pay them a monthly allowance for support.

It was alleged that defendant Feliciano Sanchez, since 1932, refused and still refuses to support the plaintiffs; that the latter have no
means of subsistence, while the defendant receives from the United States Army a monthly pension of P174.20; that the defendant
abandoned the plaintiffs without any justifiable cause and now refuses to allow them to live with him.

The defendant alleges, as special defense, that the plaintiff Josefa Diego abandoned the conjugal home on October 27, 1930, without
his knowledge or consent, because she committed adultery with Macario Sanchez, with whom she had, as a result of the illicit
relations, a child which is the other plaintiff Mario Sanchez.

The plaintiffs asked the court to compel the defendant to give them, by way of allowance pendente lite, the sum of P50 a month. In
opposition to his petition, the defendant alleged that Mario Sanchez is not his legitimate child but is the adulterous child of the
plaintiff with Macario Sanchez, and he asked for an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of this defense. The court, without
acceding to this petition of the defendant to adduce evidence, favorably acted upon the application of the plaintiffs and ordered the
defendant to pay a monthly allowance pendente lite of P50 to the plaintiffs, from July 1, 1936. In view of these facts, the defendant
filed a petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals against the judge of the Court of First Instance and the plaintiffs. The Court
of Appeals denied the petition, and from this resolution, the defendant comes to this court on certiorari.

Issue: WON the Plaintiff is entitled for support pendente lite?

Held: We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to present his evidence for the purpose of
determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the application. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against
an action for support (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such
adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such.
But as this defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not of
course necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it
may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of
the resolution to be entered.

Although mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application, nevertheless, the failure to accompany the opposition
therewith did not justify the court in ignoring said opposition, just because of this omission, inasmuch as an opportunity to present
evidence has been asked. It may be that the defendant could not get hold of affidavits in support of his opposition, but he may have on
hand other evidence of greater weight.

If the defendant has a valid defense which calls for proof, and he asks for an opportunity to present evidence, it is error to deny him
this opportunity.

The decision rendered by the Court Appeals is reversed, and it is ordered that the petitioner be given an opportunity to present
evidence in support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite, to the extent which the court determine, without
special pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.

De Asis v CA

FACTS: Private respondent, in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for
maintenance and support against petitioner before the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that petitioner is the father of subject minor, and
the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands. Petitioner denied his
paternity of the said minor alleged and that he cannot be required to provide support for him. The mother’s child sent in a
manifestation stating that because of petitioner’s judicial declarations, it was futile and a useless exercise to claim support from him.
Hence, she was withdrawing her complaint against petitioner subject to the condition that the latter should not pursue his
counterclaim. By virtue of the said manifestation, the parties mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint. The motion
was granted by the trial court, which then dismissed the case with prejudice.

Subsequently, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against petitioner, this time in the name of Glen Camil
Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian, herein private respondent. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the reason
that renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law. The trial court likewise denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. CA dismissed the same.

ISSUE: WON an action for support can be barred by res judicata?

RULING: No, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and cannot bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief
against the same defendant.

The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because the amount may be increased or decreased
depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the right to receive support cannot be
renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person; neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligator (Art.
301). Furthermore, the right to support cannot be waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of
compromise (Art. 2035).

In the case at bar, respondent minors mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she was withdrawing the case as
it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for support is
predicated on the existence of filiation between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that such
manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future complaint for
support.

The manifestation sent in by respondent’s mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its
complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim
support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent’s
mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the
nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.

It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon a compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of
persons and future support, cannot be the subject of compromise.

Rondina v People

Facts: On March 29, 1999, the City Prosecution Office of Ormoc City filed with the RTC an Information 3 charging Victor as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of July 1998, at around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at "DDD", [Ormoc City], and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused: VICTOR RONDINA, being then armed with a knife and by means of force, threat
and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of] the complainant herein, "AAA"4 - a
sixteen (16) year old lass, against her will. 5

On arraignment, Victor pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged.6 Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.

In 1998, "AAA" was a young girl of 16 who was in second year high school. The youngest and the only girl among a brood of four, she
lived with her parents and siblings in a rented house located in "DDD," Ormoc City.
On July 15, 1998, "AAA," upon arriving home from school at around 4:00 p.m., immediately proceeded to the toilet to defecate. The
said toilet, constructed of hollow blocks with G.I.-sheet roofing, had only a tie-wire as lock. It was located outside "AAA’s" house and
was being used as a communal toilet by the occupants of nearby houses.

Once inside, "AAA" immediately took off her panty and relieved herself, forgetting to lock the door.7 After washing her anus, "AAA"
was surprised when Victor, a neighbor, suddenly entered the toilet with only a towel covering himself from the waist down. Victor
immediately removed the towel from his waist as well as his brief. He then poked a knife on "AAA’s" neck, covered her mouth and
threatened her by saying "[d]on’t ever tell anybody otherwise I will kill your parents, your siblings including yourself."8 Because her
mouth was covered, "AAA" was not able to shout.9

Victor ordered "AAA" to stand against the wall with her hands on both sides10 and forcefully inserted his penis into "AAA’s"
vagina.11 "AAA" felt pain.12 After a while, she felt a liquid-like substance discharged from Victor’s penis.13 When Victor had already
satisfied his bestial desire, he again wrapped the towel around his waist 14 and before getting out of the toilet uttered "do not tell your
mother or else I will kill you."15

"AAA" did not immediately tell anyone of her misfortune and just kept on crying. However, it came to the point where she could no
longer keep silent so that a few months after the incident, "AAA" finally told her mother "BBB" that Victor raped her.16

When "BBB" had "AAA" examined by physicians, it was discovered that aside from having healed hymenal lacerations, "AAA" was
more or less six months pregnant. Victor was charged with the crime of rape. During the pendency of the proceedings and after about
nine months from the date of the alleged incident, "AAA" gave birth to a baby girl, "CCC," on May 1, 1999.

Issue: WON CCC is entitled for support against the Victor Rondina

Held: All told, we hold that neither did the RTC err in finding Victor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape nor did the CA
in affirming said conviction. As aptly declared by the appellate court, the prosecution has sufficiently established that Victor had carnal
knowledge of "AAA" against her will and consent. We subscribe to the same.

Support of the offspring "CCC"

The RTC ordered Victor to acknowledge "AAA’s" offspring "CCC" and give her support. "Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides
for three different kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring,
unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code,
the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the
specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering
that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority over his children, no
‘further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child’s status’. Hence, [Victor] should only be ordered to
indemnify and support the victim’s child."70 "The amount [and terms] of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice
and hearing in accordance with Article 20171 of the Family Code."72

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00185 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS
as follows:

1) Petitioner Victor Rondina is ordered to pay "AAA" ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

2) Interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from the date of the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

3) Petitioner Victor Rondina is further ordered to give support to "AAA’s" offspring, "CCC," in such amount and under such
terms to be determined by the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City in a proper proceeding with support arrears to be reckoned
from the finality of this Decision.

Gotardo v Buling
Facts: On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC of Maasin, Southern Leyte, for compulsory
recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the Charles Gotardo is the father of her child Gliffze. (answer) Petitioner denied
the paternity. Parties failed to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trial on the merits ensued.
Evidence for Divina (casual employee) showed that she met Charles (accounting supervisor) on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch. Charles courted Divina in the third week of December 1992 and they
became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993. Charles gave the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, (Valentines
Day and her birthday); she reciprocated his love and took care of him when he was ill. In September 1993, Charles started intimate
sexual relations with the respondent in the formers rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo (Divinas uncle). Rented
the room from March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994. The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more frequent in June
1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, she got pregnant. Charles was happy and made plans to marry Divina. BUT, Charles backed out of
the wedding plan. (Divina filed for damages for breach of promise to marry but was amicably settled). Divina gave birth to Gliffze on
March 9, 1995. (When Charles did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, Divina sent him a demand letter on July 24,
1995 for recognition and support of their son) Due to unanswered demand, Divina took her demands in Court. Charles denied being
Gliffzes father in Court.

RTC approved monthly child support. RTC (appeal) reversed former decision CA ordered Charles to recognize Gliffze and give monthly
child support

ISSUE: WON Gliffze is entitled to receive child support and to be recognized as Charles son.

HELD: YES

RATIO: One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.32 We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family
bible in which [his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.We explained that a prima facie case exists if a
woman declares supported by corroborative proof that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of
evidence shifts to the putative father. We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are:

(1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual
relations with other men at the time of conception.In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the
putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. On the other hand,
the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the
respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been three

(3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner failed to
substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of
evidentiary support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear and categorical assertions.

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final
judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities
of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.

Perla v Baring

FACTS: Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio Perla (Antonio) were allegedly neighbors. Eventually, they became
sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio allegedly assured her that he would support her. However, Antonio started to
evade her.
Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for support against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy
thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and
Baptismal Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information
in the said certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio to support Randy, which was affirmed by CA.

ISSUE: Is Randy entitled for support from Antonio?

HELD: Mirasol and Randy's Complaint for support is based on Randy's alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be
entitled for support, his filiation must be established with sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is
required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for x xx support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to
the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence.

In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The Certificate of Live Birth and
baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries
with respect to the child's paternity. Thus, x xx baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they
cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

***
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court. However, this rule admits of certain
exceptions such as when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures or when the judgment of the CA is
based on misapprehension of facts. As this case falls under these exceptions, the Court is constrained to re-examine the factual
findings of the lower courts. GRANTED.

Lerma v CA

FACTS: Teodoro E. Lerma and Concepcion Diaz were married on May 19, 1951. On August 22, 1969 the
petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez and on
September 26, 1972 the court of First Instance of Rizal decided the adultery case of the respondent and
found her and her co-accused, Teodoro Ramirez, guilty of the charge, sentencing them to a term of
imprisonment. During the pendency of the adultery case against the respondent, wife On November 18,
1969 the respondent filed with the lower court, a complaint against the petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of properties,
custody of their children and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their youngest son, Gregory, who
was then and until now is in her custody. The respondent's complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and
attempt against her life. The application for support pendente lite was granted in an order dated December 24, 1969, which was
amended in an order dated February 15, 1970. The petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent's application for support pendente
lite, setting up as defense the adultery charge he had filed against the respondent. On March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed with
respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the aforementioned orders
on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion. The next day the respondent court gave due course to the petition
and issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said orders. The respondent court, in its decision of
October 8, 1970, set aside the assailed orders and granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the lower court in
support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite.The respondent moved to reconsider the decision on the
ground that the petitioner had not asked that he be allowed to present evidence in the lower court. The respondent court, in its
resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside the decision of October 8 and rendered another, dismissing the petition. This is now the
subject of the instant proceeding for review.

ISSUE: W/N the lower court acted with grave abused of discretion in granting the respondent’s application for support pendente lite
without giving the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense against the said application.

HELD:
Court of Appeals January 20, 1971 resolution and the orders of respondent Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court herein complained of, dated December 24, 1969 and February 15, 1970, all are set aside
and their enforcement enjoined, without prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the pending
action for legal separation between the parties. The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership
property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article
104 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live
separately from each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes
a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting
separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a
forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the causes for
disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to support in such a
situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite.

DOCTRINE/PROVISIONS/PRINCIPLES INVOLVED

SOURCE OF SUPPORT

FC 197 – 198, in relation to FC 49, 70, 94, 121, 122

DOCTRINE/PROVISIONS/PRINCIPLES INVOLVED

ORDER OF SUPPORT

FC 199
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the
order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
 (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.

FC 200
Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between
them in proportion to the resources of each.

However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support
provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them.

When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should the
latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the
concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred.

FC 204
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or
by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be
availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

G.R. No. 125041, 30 June 2006

Mangonan v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

On 17 March 1994, Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of
Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16
February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi
City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was
solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner
gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her
twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were
about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had
moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long
Island University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however,
financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Francisco is obliged to support Rica and Rina.

2. Whether Francisco can avail of the option under Article 204 anent his obligation.

RULING:

1. Yes. Francisco is obliged to support his granddaughters Rica and Rina in default of the father.

Pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code, whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon
the following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters.

There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and
respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children’s college education. In view however of their incapacities, the
obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina.

2. No. Francisco cannot avail of the option under Article 204 anent his obligation.

Article 204 of the Family Code provides that the person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The
latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second option. With the filing of this case, and
the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly
difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial
relationship with them. Given the moral obstacle, the Court could not see Rica and Rina moving back to the Philippines in the company
of those who have disowned them.

Lim v. Lim, G.R. No. 163209, October 30, 2009.

FACTS: In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in
Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edwards. Edwards family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000,
shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.

In 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation
with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of his grandmother in what the trial court described a very compromising
situation. Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.

In 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to jointly provide P40,000 monthly support to
respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability. The
defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their liability. The trial court, while denying reconsideration, clarified that petitioners
and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with Edward because of the latters inability x x x to give sufficient support x x x. Petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among others, their liability to support respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edwards
income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal support should be in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines).

In 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court ordering petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim (petitioners) to provide legal
support to respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim (respondents).

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

HELD: YES.

By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil.
Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are
liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability
is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the childrens minority.
Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners
submit that the obligation to support the latters offspring ends with them.

Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her children, then all
school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient
to meet respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their
obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in
Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme
material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are
more than able to fill the void.

However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to
relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano
III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising
from their marital bond. Unfortunately, Cheryl’s share from the amount of monthly support the trial court awarded cannot be
determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court for this limited purpose.

DOCTRINE/PROVISIONS/PRINCIPLES INVOLVED

MANNER AND TIME OF PAYMENT

FC 200 - 204
Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between
them in proportion to the resources of each.

However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support
provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them.

When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should the
latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the
concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred.
(295a)

Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion to the resources or means
of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. (296a)

Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.
(297a) chan robles virtual law library

Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs
it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extra-judicial demand.

Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Payment shall be made within the first five days of each corresponding month or when the recipient dies, his heirs shall not be
obliged to return what he has received in advance. (298a)

Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or
by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be
availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

G.R. No. 72746 May 7, 1987

BERNARDA S. CANONIZADO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ BENITEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XLVII, MANILA and ATTY. CESAR R. CANONIZADO,
respondents.

FACTS:

 Petitioner filed against her estranged husband, the private respondent on March 13, 1956 in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila. The trial court granted the claim for their minor child Christina in the amount of P100.00 monthly but denied similar
support for the petitioner on the ground that she was gainfully employed.
 On September 9, 1964, a decision on the merits was promulgated by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court awarding
arrearages in support pendente lite to both the petitioner and her daughter plus current monthly support for the latter at the rate of
P150.00 beginning October 1964. This decision was affirmed on appeal, with the modification that a P100.00 monthly support was also to
be given to petitioner beginning October 1964. This became final and executory on January 21, 1969.
 A writ of execution was accordingly issued on July 22, 1976, for the collection of the amounts of P16,150.00 and P17,200.00,
respectively, representing the private respondent's liabilities for the support of daughter Christina up to the time she finished her studies
in April 1969 and the total arrearages in support due the petitioner as of December 1972. However, these amounts were not collected,
and remain unliquidated to date because of a series of compromise agreements reached by the parties for deferment and moratorium.
 The petitioner filed on April 4, 1977, a motion for an alias writ of execution based on the original writ of July 22, 1976. The
respondent judge, however, denied the motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration, holding that the decision could no longer
be enforced by mere motion in view of the lapse of more than five years.
ISSUE:
WN the respondent judge erred in denying the motion, holding that the decision could no longer be enforce because it already lapsed.
HELD:
 The writ of execution we have ordered is not affected by that motion. The motion affects only support from 1973 and does not
at all involve the support adjudged against him before that date, specifically, from 1956 to 1972. Such support has already become due
and has acquired the character of vested rights accruing to the petitioner and the daughter Christina.
 The respondent judge is hereby directed to order the immediate enforcement of the alias writ of execution of August 14, 1984,
and the collection from the private respondent of arrearages in support due to the petitioner from March 1956 to December 1972 in the
sum of P17,200.00 and to the daughter Christina from March 1956 to April 1969 in the sum of P16,150.00. For contempt of this Court, the
private respondent is also punished as above indicated.

DOCTRINE/PROVISIONS/PRINCIPLES INVOLVED

AMOUNT OF SUPPORT

FC 200 – 208 (Please refer to above for Sec. 200 – 204)

Art. 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well as any money or property obtained as such support shall not be levied
upon on attachment or execution. (302a)

Art. 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right
to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without intention of being reimbursed. (2164a)

Art. 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter,
any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.
This Article shall particularly apply when the father or mother of a child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to support or
fails to give support to the child when urgently needed. (2166a)

Art. 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal support shall be
subject to levy on attachment or execution.

Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to changes of
circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.
 G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006

EDWARD V. LACSON, Petitioner,

vs.

MAOWEE DABAN LACSON and MAONAA DABAN LACSON, represented by their mother and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN LACSON,
Respondents.

FACTS
Edward V. Lacson and Lea Daban Lacson are the parents of Maowee Daban Lacson andMaonaa Daban Lacson. For unknown reason,
Edward left their conjugal home thereby leaving Leah tofend for their children. For a period of 18 years, Leah and her children transferred
from one dwelling place to another not their own. Records reveal that in a note dated December 10, 1975, Edward promise to give support
to his daughters however, aside from occasional giving of some amount, Edward failed to fulfill his promise. In 1995, Leah instituted an
action for support in behalf of her daughter before the RTC of Iloilo City demanding the amount of the support her daughters should have
received. The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff sisters and ordered Edward to pay them the amount equivalent to 216-monthworth of
support in arrears. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The motion for reconsideration filed by Edward was likewise
dismissed. Hence this appeal. Before the SC, Edward contended that the demand required by law was never complied with by Leah thus
the award of support in arrears is not proper.

ISSUE
Whether or not the mother of the petitioner failed to make a demand for support as required by law.

RULING
No. The requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in 1975. It maybe that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in
the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter.
Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to
the urgency of the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea. Edward’s insistence on requiring a formal
demand from his wife is truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and commitment to comply with such obligation through a
note in his own handwriting. Said note stating that he will "sustain his two daughters Maowee and Maonaa" also stated "as requested by
their mother" thus practically confirming the fact of such demand having been made by mother. The trial court thus correctly ruled that
Edward’s obligation to pay support in arrears should commence from 1976

G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013

SUSAN LIM-LUA V. DANILO LUA

FACTS:
Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a declaration of nullity of marriage with a prayer for support pendente lite for herself
and her two children amounting to P500,000.00 per month. Citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several
companies and businesses here and abroad.

After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said
support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus also granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00.

The husband filed for Motion for Reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she does
not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance
and well- being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing.

The husband also assert that the P250,000 monthly support and the 1,750,000.00 retroactive support is unconscionable and beyond the
intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent

MR denied thus he appealed to the CA wherein it reduced the monthly support to P115,000.00 which ruling was no longer questioned by
both parties.
The controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the final CA decision indicated that he deducted
from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00) the sum of P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars for the children, their
cost of maintenance and advances are given to the petitioner and his children.

CA ruled in favor of the husband that the expenses incurred by the husband be considered advances which may be properly deducted
from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two children.

Thus ordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim
Lua and their two children.

ISSUE:
Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total support in arrears owing to the petitioner
and her children.

RULING.
The SC partly granted CA’s decision. First, is to resume payment of his monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time
payment of this amount was deferred by him. Second, that only the amount of Php 648,102.29 may be allowed as deductions from the
accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her children and not PhP3,428,813.80 (rendered by the CA).

DOCTRINE/PROVISIONS/PRINCIPLES INVOLVED

PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY OF CHILDREN

CONCEPT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Art. II, Sec. 12, 1987 PH Constitution

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government.

FC 209
Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental
authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the
development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.

FC 211
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children
are under parental authority.

FC 176
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.

FC 225
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child
without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial
order to the contrary.

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required
to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property
or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child
resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.

The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the
obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.

The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the
guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.

NCC 356 – 363

Art. 356. Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development.

Art. 357. Every child shall:

(1) Obey and honor his parents or guardian;
(2) Respect his grandparents, old relatives, and persons holding substitute parental authority;
(3) Exert his utmost for his education and training;
(4) Cooperate with the family in all matters that make for the good of the same.

Art. 358. Every parent and every person holding substitute parental authority shall see to it that the rights of the child are respected
and his duties complied with, and shall particularly, by precept and example, imbue the child with highmindedness, love of country,
veneration for the national heroes, fidelity to democracy as a way of life, and attachment to the ideal of permanent world peace.

Art. 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child. For this purpose, the government will establish,
whenever possible:
(1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional religious instruction shall be taught as part of the
curriculum at the option of the parent or guardian;
(2) Puericulture and similar centers;
(3) Councils for the Protection of Children; and
(4) Juvenile courts.

Art. 360. The Council for the Protection of Children shall look after the welfare of children in the municipality. It shall, among other
functions:
(1) Foster the education of every child in the municipality;
(2) Encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents;
(3) Protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children, and orphans;
(4) Take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency;
(5) Adopt measures for the health of children;
(6) Promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds;
(7) Coordinate the activities of organizations devoted to the welfare of children, and secure their cooperation.

Art. 361. Juvenile courts will be established, as far as practicable, in every chartered city or large municipality.

Art. 362. Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court, the father, mother, or guardian may in a proper case be judicially
admonished.

Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No
mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.
 G.R. No. L-26953 March 28, 1969

ZENAIDA MEDINA, assisted by her husband, FELICIANO CASERO, petitioner-appellant, vs. DRA. VENANCIA L. MAKABALI,
respondent-appellee.
FACTS:

On February 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero in the Makabali Clinic in San Fernando,
Pampanga, owned and operated by respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali, single, who assisted at the delivery. The boy was Zenaida’s
third, had with a married man, Feliciano Casero.

The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as her own son; had him treated at
her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in Manila, until he recovered his health; and sent him to school. From birth until
August 1966, the real mother never visited her child, and never paid for his expenses.

The trial disclosed that petitioner Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano Casero with her two other children apparently with the tolerance,
if not the acquiescence, of Caseros lawful wife who resides elsewhere, albeit the offspring of both women are in good terms with each
other; that Casero makes about P400.00 a month as a mechanic, and Zenaida herself earns from 4 to 5 pesos a day.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the petition for rights and duties of parents and children should go to the petitioner (parent)

HELD:
Upon extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to allow the minor a free choice with whom to live when he reaches the age of 14, the
Court held that it was for the child’s best interest to be left with his foster mother and denied the writ prayed for. The real mother
appealed, as already stated.

We see no reason to disturb the order appealed from. While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts
must not lose sight of the basic principle that “in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s
welfare shall be paramount” (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be
ordered separated from the mother (Do.) This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria potestas
has been transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a
chattel of his parents, into a radically different institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect
is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Peña, now “there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties;
no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.” 1

As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties
to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356).
As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to provide the child
with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most. It may
well be doubted what advantage the child could derive from being coerced to abandon respondent’s care and love to be compelled to
stay with his mother and witness her irregular menage a trois with Casero and the latter’s legitimate wife.

It is hinted that respondent’s motivation in refusing to surrender the boy is to coerce petitioner to pay for the rearing of the child. This
is not acceptable, for Dra. Makabali knew (at least at the trial) that any expectation on her part is illusory, given Zenaida’s meager
resources, yet expressed willingness to care and educate him.

No abuse of discretion being shown, but on the contrary, the appealed order being justified in fact and law, we hold that said order
should be, and hereby is, affirmed. Costs against appellant.

G.R. No. L-52242, 17 November 1980

Miguel R. Unson III, petitioner, v. Hon. Pedro C. Navarro And Edita N. Araneta, respondents.

Facts:
On 19 April 1971, Miguel and Edita were married. By 1 December 1971, Edita bore their daughter named Maria Teresa Unson. Since
June 1972, the petitioner and private respondent were living separately. On 13 July 1974, the respondent judge presided the judicial
agreement of the couple for the separation of properties and live separately. The agreement do not contain any provision regarding the
custody of the child since they have their own separate arrangement.

In the early part of 1978, the petitioner found out the following information regarding his wife: (1) she was in a relation with her brother-
in-law and godfather of their child (a former seminarian at that), Maria Teresa; (2) that the brother-in-law was being treated for manic
depressive disorder; (3) the illicit affair produced 2 children; and (4) that Edita and her brother-in-law embraced a Protestant faith.

On 28 December 1979, the respondent judge ordered the petitioner to produce the child, Maria Teresa Unson, his daughter barely eight
years of age, with private respondent Edita N. Araneta and return her to the custody of the later, further obliging petitioner to "continue
his support of said daughter by providing for her education and medical needs," allegedly issued without a "hearing" and the reception
of testimony in violation of Section 6 of Rule 99.

Issue:
Can the child stay with her mother given the immoral relationship the mother entered into?

Held:
No. The Court ruled it is in the best interest that the child Maria Teresa no longer stay with her mother given the immoral situation the
mother entered into. The Court granted that the child stay with the petitioner.

Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are
under parental authority.

Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The
remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. (n)

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court
shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit. (n)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON YU

SHIRLY VINGSON @ SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP VS. JOVY CABCABAN

UDK NO. 14817, January 13, 2014

FACTS:

Shirly Vingson (Petitioner) alleged that her daughter, Shang Ko Vingson Yu (Shang Ko) ran away from home. Petitioner received an
information from the police station in Bacolod City that Shang Ko was in the custody of Jovy Cabcaban (Respondent), who was a police
officer in the said station. Since the Respondent would not release Shang Ko to her, the former sought help from the NBI, who in turn,
told her that the latter is in a private organization, Calvary Kids.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Petitioner filed a petition for Habeas Corpus against the Respondent and the unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the Court of
Appeals (CA), instead of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, because of several threats against her life in the said city.

The CA denied her petition for failure to clearly allege who has custody of Shang Ko. The former also denied the latter’s motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is available in the case.

HELD:

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available also in cases involving the rightful custody over a
minor.

REASONING:

The State has the right to intervene where parents treat their children abusively.

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule
is that parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than
care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that
they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counseled.

Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of Bacolod City, it would be best that such issues be
resolved by a Family Court in that city. Meantime, considering the presumption that the police authorities acted regularly in placing
Shang Ko in the custody of Calvary Kids, the Court believes that she should remain there pending hearing and adjudication of this
custody case. Besides, she herself has expressed preference to stay in that place.

Infant JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner,

vs.

Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO, Respondents

FACTS:

Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child
without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in
fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and
Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City.

On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and
Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a
Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as “Legally Available for Adoption.” On
February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was “matched” with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was then commenced.

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the
suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together.

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary Cabrera
informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or
three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made
Baby Julian a ward of the State.

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC seeking to obtain custody of
Baby Julian from DSWD.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor
child.
HELD:

The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there was no enforced disappearance in
this case.

As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements constituting
“enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:

1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;

3. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s
whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of
the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD
officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in the
context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption,
supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not
searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights
over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly
applied.

SHERYL M. MENDEZ VS. SHARI’ DISTRICT COURT

GR. NO. 201614

FACTS:

Sheryl M. Mendez and Dr. John O. Maliga were married under Muslim rites, but they already have a daughter before their
marriage. Shortly after their marriage, their relationship became sour, and two years after, Maliga filed with the Sharia Circuit Court a
petition for judicial confirmation of talaq from Mendez, with a grant of probational custody of their minor child. According to Maliga,
Mendez was a Roman Catholic and only embrace the Islamic faith on the date of their marriage and that her sincerity to Islam is
dubitable. He also alleged that Mendez reverted to Christianity when she went to Manila and brought their daughter with her without
his knowledge and consent and she enrolled their daughter in a Catholic School. Mendez denied the allegations and that she followed
the religion of her Muslim grandfather, she also averred that she became pregnant before she married and had been raising their
daughter on her own and that Maliga had been totally remiss in his material and moral obligations to support their child, and argued
that she was the one who raised the child from birth and that the custody of children below seven years old should belong to the
mother. She further contends that she never received the summons in connection with the urgent motion and never received a copy
of the order granting temporary custody to Maliga, which she had only picked up from the court herself. The ShCC partially
reconsidered its initial order awarding temporary custody to Maliga by granting the right of visitation to Mendez and subsequently
confirmed the talaq between the parties and awarded to Maliga the care and custody of Princess Fatima. Upon appeal by Mendez of
the ShCC Decision with respect to custody, the ShDC sustained the assailed decision.

Issue(s):

1. Whether or not the ShCC erred in acting on Maliga’s urgent motion for issuance of temporary custody;
 2. Whether or not the ShCC and the ShDC had jurisdiction on the issue of custody; and

3. Whether or not custody was properly granted.

HELD:

1. According to the Court, it is clear that the ShCC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions between parties who have been
married in accordance with the Muslim law, involving disputes relating to divorce under P.D. No. 1083. There is, therefore, no doubt
that the ShCC had jurisdiction to confirm the talaq between Mendez and Maliga. Article 143 of the same P.D., however, clearly
provides that the ShDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving custody under P.D. No. 1083. But, notwithstanding
with the foregoing, as opined by Secretary Sadain, the ShCC does seem to have ancillary jurisdiction over custody issues as they relate
to a divorce decree. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the issue of custody is a necessary consequence of a divorce proceeding.
This Court, therefore, believes that to rule the ShCC is without jurisdiction to resolve issues on custody after it had decided on the issue
of divorce, simply because it appears to contravening to P.D. No. 1083, would be antithetical to the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.
Hence, in view of the foregoing doctrine, the ShCC, in cases involving divorce, possesses the power to resolve the issue of custody, it
being a related issue to the main cause of action.

2. The Court, nonetheless, agrees with Mendez that the urgent motion lacked the requisite notice of hearing. It is immediately evident
from the face of the motion that it did not contain the notice of hearing required by the Rules of Court which has suppletory
application to the present case. Under the law, it provides that every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every
written motion is required to be heard and the notice of hearing shall be served in such manner as to insure its receipt by the other
party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. A
seasonable service of a copy of the motion on the adverse party with a notice of hearing indicating the time and place of hearing is a
mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with as this is the minimum requirement of procedural due process. Therefore, a
motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper and presents no question which merits the attention and
consideration of the court. It is not even a motion for it does not comply with the rules, and, hence, even the clerk has no right to
receive it.

3. The orders of the ShCC and the ShDC awarding custody of Princess Fatima to Maliga were without evidentiary basis because no
hearing was actually conducted prior to the issuance of the order granting the urgent motion. Moreover, there was no explanation
given as to why the motion was resolved without notice to, or the participation of Mendez. Although the ShCC stated that, in deciding
on the custody case, it scrutinized the evidence on hand, it was remiss in its duty to state the precise factual and legal basis on which
its ruling awarding custody to Maliga was based. Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that decisions must clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the law on which they are based. The decisions of courts must be able to address the issues raised by
the parties through the presentation of a comprehensive analysis or account of factual and legal findings of the court. It is evident that
the ShCC failed to comply with these requirements. It merely stated that it was in Princess Fatima's "best interest in all aspects of life,
economically, socially and religiously" that custody be awarded to her father, and no express finding that Mendez was unfit in any way,
or a hint of an explanation as to why Maliga was in a better position to take custody of Princess Fatima. The ShDC, on the other hand,
in affirming the findings of the ShCC, stated that Mendez was disentitled to custody because she had turned apostate, and held that
she would remain disqualified until she return to the Islamic faith in accordance with the Muslim Law. It appears, however, that
disqualification due to apostasy under the Muslim Code pertains to disinheritance under Article 93 of the Muslim Code, and not to the
custody of children. Nevertheless, the award of custody is violative of the constitutional right of Mendez to due process.

The Decisions, with respect to each issue presented, the Court declared null and void the Decisions rendered by ShCC on Probational
Custody and Permanent Custody of Princess Fatima and likewise the Order of ShDC affirming the ShCC Decision insofar as the ruling on
Custody is concerned. On the other hand, the Order of the ShCC confirming the Pronouncement of Talaq by Dr. John O. Maliga against
Sheryl M. Mendez is maintained.

CELIS VS. CAFUIR

Facts:
1. On July 10, 1946, petitioner, Ileana A. Celis, single, gave birth at the North General Hospital to a boy subsequently named Joel (John)
Cafuir.

2. The father seems to be unknown, although from what may be gathered from the decisions appealed from, he was an American
soldier who formed part of the American Liberation Forces.

3. Due to the anger and extreme displeasure of the father of Ileana because of the alleged disgrace that she brought on herself and the
family for having maintained illicit relations with a man to whom she had not been married and because of her father's objection to
having her son in the paternal home where Ileana was then living, nine days after the delivery, Joel was given to the custody of the
respondent Soledad Cafuir

4. Respondent took him direct from the hospital to her house, ministered to his needs and comfort, and even employed a nurse to
take care of him.

5. Ileana herself spent several days in Soledad's house while recuperating; later, she returned to her own home leaving her child to the
care of the respondent Soledad.

6. Thereafter, Ileana visited her child every Saturday, taking him condensed milk, food, and a little money.

7. On September 17, 1948, Ileana married her co-petitioner Agustin C. Rivera. The couple thereafter decided to get back Joel Cafuir.

8. Because of the refusal of respondent Soledad to give him up, petitioners sued out the corresponding writ of habeas corpus.

9. The theory of the respondents-appellants is that Ileana had definitely renounced her custody of and patria potestasover her child
and that now she may not get him back.

10. In support of this claim, two letters (documents) were presented in evidence signed by Ileana.

11. July 10, 1946 (the same day that John Cafuir was born at the hospital) document:

I hereby entrusted to Mrs. Soledad Cafuir of 131 Limasana, Quiapo, Manila, my son named John Cafuir, for the reason that I don't have
the means to bring the child up.

Anybody who may claim my son for adoption in the future without the consent of the undersigned is hereby ignored.

12. November 2, 1946 document:

I, Nenita Celis, of 1196 Singalong, Malate, Manila, is hereby designate Mrs. Soledad Cafuir, residing at 131 Limasana, R. Hidalgo,
Quiapo, Manila to be the real guardian of my son, named Johnny Cafuir.

No one has the right to claim for adoption except Mrs. Soledad Cafuir.

13. The trial court found and ruled that under these two exhibits signed by petitioner Ileana Celis, there is no basis for finding that she
had renounced the custody of her child in favor of respondent Soledad.

Issue: WON Ileana renounced her parental authority or patria potestas over her child to Soledad. (NO.)

Ruling:

The dispositive part of the decision appealed from should therefore direct not the Sheriff but respondent Soledad to deliver the boy to
petitioners. With this modification, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

Reasoning:

- The respondents, particularly Soledad, are strangers to the child. She is not related to him in any degree by consanguinity or affinity.

Document 1:

- The document wherein the boy's mother is supposed to have definitely renounced custody over the child cannot be reasonably
interpreted as having contemplated such renunciation. In the first document she merely entrusted her son to Soledad because she did
not have the means to bring him up. The word "entrusted" cannot convey the idea of definite and permanent renunciation of the
mother's custody of her child.

- Furthermore, the very last paragraph of Exhibit 1 to the effect that "no one has the right to claim for adoption except Mrs. Soledad
Cafuir," envisages a future act; it means that no one else may adopt the boy except respondent Soledad. It does not mean, however,
that she has already adopted him. She may or may not adopt him. It is something yet to be done in the future. This the respondent has
not done.

Document 2:

- The second document merely designated respondent Soledad as the "real guardian" of the child. The designation of one as the
guardian of another cannot and does not mean that said guardian will always assume and discharge the duties of the office or position.

Guardianship:

- Guardianship is always or almost invariably understood to be temporary. While one is a minor or is incompetent, a guardian is
appointed; but when minority has passed or incapacity has ceased, guardianship also terminates. The same reasoning may be applied
in the present case.

- While petitioner Ileana was still unable to care for and support her child and because she could not bring said child to live with her in
the home of her father, she entrusted its custody and care to respondent. Now, that she has been emancipated from the parental
authority of her father and now that she has already been married and is now in a position to care for and support her own child, this
with the consent and desire of her husband, who joins her in the petition, there can no longer be any reason for depriving her of the
custody of her boy. In her legitimate efforts, and to have her realize her natural desire in this respect, the law and this court should
give her every help.

Soledad:

- To separate the boy from her now will mean a loss and mental suffering. But to assuage such suffering she has her own children, four
of them.

Natural and Artificial Mother:

- We should not take away from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to
poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and
her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come true.

- We should not forget that the relationship between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be
a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for him, said parents might yet count and appraise all that they have done and
spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into
their hearts and their home.

- Not so with a real natural mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her associations with her
child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood count. On this point we quote with approval a paragraph in the decision
of the trial court

Financial Means:

- The decision of the trial court does not assess the financial means of the mother to support and educate the boy. But bearing in mind
the fact that she is now married to a man who with her is ready and willing to assume the responsibility of support and education, we
may presume that the couple is able to discharge and cope with said responsibility. It is possible that the means of the respondent in
this respect are more adequate, and that Joel would be better off staying and remaining with her.

- But financial means is not everything. Whether a child should stay permanently with a kindly stranger or with his own mother, is not
to be determined alone by considerations of affluence or poverty.

MIGUEL R. UNSON III, PETITIONER, V. HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO AND EDITA N. ARANETA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. L-52242, 17 November 1980

Facts:

On 19 April 1971, Miguel and Edita were married. By 1 December 1971, Edita bore their daughter named Maria Teresa Unson. Since
June 1972, the petitioner and private respondent were living separately. On 13 July 1974, the respondent judge presided the judicial
agreement of the couple for the separation of properties and live separately. The agreement do not contain any provision regarding
the custody of the child since they have their own separate arrangement.

In the early part of 1978, the petitioner found out the following information regarding his wife: (1) she was in a relation with her
brother-in-law and godfather of their child (a former seminarian at that), Maria Teresa; (2) that the brother-in-law was being treated
for manic depressive disorder; (3) the illicit affair produced 2 children; and (4) that Edita and her brother-in-law embraced a Protestant
faith.

On 28 December 1979, the respondent judge ordered the petitioner to produce the child, Maria Teresa Unson, his daughter barely
eight years of age, with private respondent Edita N. Araneta and return her to the custody of the later, further obliging petitioner to
"continue his support of said daughter by providing for her education and medical needs," allegedly issued without a "hearing" and the
reception of testimony in violation of Section 6 of Rule 99.

Issue:

Can the child stay with her mother given the immoral relationship the mother entered into?

Held:

No. The Court ruled it is in the best interest that the child Maria Teresa no longer stay with her mother given the immoral situation the
mother entered into. The Court granted that the child stay with the petitioner.

ESPIRITU VS CA

GR 115640, March 15, 1995

FACTS:

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of husband while in US. Teresita works as a
nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a child in
1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently,
they had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of
Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines
and left them with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the children.

ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.

HELD:

In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be the paramount concern and that even a child
under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is
the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2
children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the
records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her
mother’s infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his
best to give the children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the
mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality
conflicts at least with the daughter.

Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.
SANTOS SR VS CA (G.R. 113054)

FACTS: Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their
union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until
sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and
Ofelia Bedia. On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel
Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely
spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental. The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control
of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After an ex-parte
hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his
grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order. Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate
court to award custody of his minor son to his parents-inlaw, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code,
substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's
unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents.

ISSUE: Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.

RULING: The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a
friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of
parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's parental authority
and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly
because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous
inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts
to keep his only

DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Daisie T. David, secretary of private respondent had a relationship Ramon R. Villar, a married businessman in Angeles City
with four children. Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls,
namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.

The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles
City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife.

After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.

In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed,
but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next
school year.

On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.

RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner and gave Christopher J.’s custody to her.

CA reversed RTC ruling and stated that it is for the best interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under the custody
of respondent-appellant until the issue on custody and support shall have been determined in a proper case.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: WoN petitioner should have custody of Christoper J.

Held:
Yes.

Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto."

It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in
cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however,
that it cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case ofSalvaña v. Gaela, 1 it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is
the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third
person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.

In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R.
Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is
under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody
of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not
for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." 3

Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering
that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor and a secretary at the
Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can
personally attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day. That she
receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion,
love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made
it what it is.

Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough,
however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to her means.

In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was
decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's
custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213
of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it
has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he
should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).

Child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the
bond between parent and son. The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So
many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of
their children. Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a
ground to wrest custody from him.
Tonog vs. CA

Facts: Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with Edgar V. Daguimol. The two cohabited for a time
and lived with Edgar's parents and sister. A year after, Dinah left for the USA where she found a work as a registered nurse. Gardin was
left in the care of her father and paternal grandparents.

Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin. The court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as the legal guardian.

Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. The trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to
Edgar's petition. Meanwhile, the court issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin. Dinah moved for the
immediate execution of the resolution.

Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA let Gardin remain in the custody of Edgar until otherwise
adjudged.

Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is entitled to the custody of Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as the mother
of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin cannot be
separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven.

Issue: Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship proceeding?

Held: In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child.

In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the
proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who
should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the
appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not
be wrenched from her familiar surroundings and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment.

Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings
before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in
the best position to assess the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that
inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and
opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person.

For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father, the private
respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court. (Dinah B. Tonog vs. Court of Appeals and Edgar V. Daguimol, G.R. No.
122906, February 7, 2002)

BRIONES VS MIGUEL

FACTS: On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and
Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin
Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda
be given to him as his biological father and [as] he has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.

ISSUE: Whether or not as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of the
mother who is away.

HELD: There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority over the minor, is
entitled to have custody of him.

She has the right to keep him in her company.

She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it "except in the cases authorized by law.” Not to be
ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise.

JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V.

Facts: Crisanto filed a petition for the nullity of his marriage with Joycelyn with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their 4
year old son Rafaelo, whom Joycelyn took away with her from the conjugal home and his school

Joycelyn failed to appear despite notice therefore Crisanto presented evidence ex parte

Joycelyn took their child. Despite efforts exerted by him, he has failed to see his child. Joycelyn and the child are presently staying with
the former’s stepfather in Occidental Mindoro

Renato Santos, commissioned by Crisanto to do a surveillance on Joycelyn, testified that Joycelyn was having lesbian relations with a
Noreen Cuidadano in Cebu City

Findings of Renato Santos were corroborated by Cherry Batistel, the house helper of the spouses. She testified that Joycelyn was
always out of the house and saw one time slap Rafaelo.

RTC awarded the custody to Crisanto

1. Mother’s authority is subordinated to that of the father

2. Joycelyn had no reason to take the child with her

Joycelyn filed a motion to lift the award of custody pendente lite of the child to Crisanto. RTC awarded the custody to Joycelyn:

1. Rafaello is barely 4 years old and and pursuant to Art. 213 of the Family Code, he shall not be separated from his mother unless the
Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

2. The grounds stated by Crisanto are not compelling reasons to deprive the mother of her child’s custody

3. Visitation rights were granted to Crisanto

Crisanto filed a petition for certiorari, charging the RTC with grave abuse of discretion for issuing the Order granting Joycelyn the
custody of their child.

CA ruled that grave abuse of discretion had been committed by the RTC:

1. The only incident to resolve was Joycelyn’s Motion to Dismiss, not the issuance of the earlier Order

2. The previous Order, granting the custody to Crisanto must prevail because the trial court did not resolve the correct incident in the
later Order.

3. Ordered the trial court judge to “consider, hear, and resolve the motion to lift the award of custody pendente lite” without any
motion of Joycelyn

Joycelyn brings this case to the SC:

1. CA erred in granting the custody to Crisanto in violation of

Art. 213 of the FC

2. Is it Article 213 or 211 which applies in this case?

8. Crisanto brings up this issue (among others):

1. CA gravely abused its discretion by ordering the trial court to hear the motion to lift the award of custody pendente lite.

Issue: W/N CA erred in granting the custody to Crisanto in violation of Art. 213 of the Family Code
Held: Article 213 applies in this case as the parents are separated legally or otherwise.

Given the mandatory character of Article 213 of the Family Code, and the statutory recognition of tender-age presumption, Joycelyn
should be granted the custody of her child pendente lite.

As a general rule, mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the age of 7. The so called tender-age presumption
under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness.

The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances:

(1) Neglect

(2) Abandonment

(3) Unemployment

(4) Immorality

(5) Habitual Drunkeness

(6) Drug Addiction

(7) Maltreatment of the child

(8) Insanity or

(9) affliction with a communicable disease

Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed
been held that under certain circumstances, the mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason.

But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a
prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of
custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have
distracted the offending spouse from exercing the proper parental care. (Espiritu vs. CA; Unson III vs. Navarro)

It is not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported
relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper
moral development. Such a fact has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged
sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.

Grande v. Antonio

FACTS: Respondent [the father] filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer
for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a
notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a
judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio citing the
“best interest of the child”. Respondent’s petition was granted by RTC and modified by the CA. In CA’s decision, it reversed the
granting of the custody of the two children to the respondent but affirmed the surname change to of the same to Antonio. Aggrieved,
wife filed petition for certiorari in SC.

ISSUES: Whether or not the father can exercise parental authority and consequently, custody, over his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their filiation.

Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their
filiation.

RULING: On the first issue, no, petitioner cannot exercise custody over the children.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since
parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be
unfit.

Respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely affected the welfare of the children or
rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors; she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their children.

On the second issue, the answer is still a no.

An acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father.

Even if IRR of RA 9255 provides that a surname change “shall” be necessary upon recognition of paternity, it is of no moment. The
clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of “may” in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary
govern and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known. Case is remanded to lower court to
determine the choice of said children.

Cherith Bucal v. Manny Bucal, GR. No. 206957 (2015)

FACTS: Cherith A. Bucal (Cherith) and Manny were married on July 29, 2005 and have a daughter named Francheska A. Bucal
(Francheska). Sometimes in 2010 Cherish filed against Manny a Petition for the Issuance of a Protection Order base on VAWC Law.
Cherith specifically prayed that the RTC prohibit Manny from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with her, directly or indirectly and order Manny to absolutely desist and refrain from imposing any restraint on her
personal liberty and from taking from her custody or charge of Francheska, and direct Manny and/or any of his family members to stay
away from her and any of her designated family or household members under the limitations set by the court. Defendant Manny, in
his pleading never prayed for visitation rights. While Manny was present during the hearing for the issuance of the TPO and PPO, he
neither manifested nor filed any pleading which would indicate that he was seeking for such relief. After due proceedings, the RTC
issued a TPO granting the above-mentioned reliefs. However, Manny was given visitation rights every Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00.
Cherith filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Amend Order, seeking the reversal of the grant of visitation rights. Manny filed an Omnibus Motion
praying among others that Cherith be cited for contempt for failure to abide by the visitation rights granted to him. Cherith opposed
Manny’s Omnibus Motion, alleging that after she filed her petition, Manny personally appeared before the court but did not file any
pleading, nor oppose the prayer in her RTC Petition.

ISSUE: Whether the court may grant a relief which was not prayed for in the pleading?

RULING: NO. It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by a
party to a case. The rationale for the rule was explained in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, viz: “Due process considerations
justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which
affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement
that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.”

The records do not show that Manny prayed for visitation rights. While he was present during the hearing for the issuance of the TPO
and PPO, he neither manifested nor filed any pleading which would indicate that he was seeking for such relief.

For all these reasons, the Court concludes that the grant of visitation rights by the RTC in favor of Manny, as contained in the PPO, and
reiterated in its assailed Orders, being both unexplained and not prayed for, is an act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction which deserves correction through the prerogative writ of certiorari.

Masbate v. Relucio

Facts: Queenie was born on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been living together with Renalyn's parents without the
benefit of marriage. Three (3) years later, or in April 2015, the relationship ended. Renalyn went to Manila, supposedly leaving
Queenie behind in the care and custody of her father, Ricky James.

Ricky James alleged that on November 7, 2015, Spouses Renata and Marlyn Masbate (Renalyn's parents) took Queenie from the school
where he had enrolled her. When asked to give Queenie back, Renalyn's parents refused and instead showed a copy of a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) executed by Renalyn granting full parental rights, authority, and custody over Queenie to them. Consequently, Ricky
James filed a petition for habeas corpus and child custody docketed as SP No. FC-15-239 before the RTC (petition a quo).
A hearing was conducted on December 3, 2015, where Renalyn brought Queenie and expressed the desire for her daughter to remain
in her custody.

The RTC ruled that the custody of three (3) year-old Queenie rightfully belongs to Renalyn, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code, which states that "no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother." The RTC likewise found
that, while Renalyn went to Manila to study dentistry and left Queenie in the custody of her parents, her intention was to bring Queenie
to Manila at a later time. Thus, in the fallo of said Order, the RTC declared that it will "NOT GIVEFURTHER DUE COURSE" to the petition
a quo. Dissatisfied, Ricky James moved for reconsideration. The motion was denied in an Order dated January 7, 2016,wherein the RTC
emphasized that Queenie was born out of wedlock, for which reason she shall be under the parental authority of her mother, Renalyn,
pursuant to Article 176 of the Family Code. In addition, the RTC faulted.

Aggrieved, Ricky James filed an appeal before the CA, imputing error upon the RTC: (a) in not conducting a full blown trial and not
receiving evidence; (b) in granting sole custody to Renalyn without giving paramount consideration to the best interests of the child; and
(c) in not granting him shared custody and/or visitation rights. Ricky James insisted that the tender-age presumption in Article 213 of the
Family Code is rebuttable by evidence of the mother's neglect, abandonment, and unemployment, among other factors, and claimed
that Renalyn abandoned Queenie when she went to live in Manila and failed to seek employment to support her daughter.
For their part, Renalyn and her parents (petitioners) moved for the outright dismissal of the appeal on the ground that no appeal can be
had against an order denying a motion for reconsideration. In addition, petitioners argued that being the illegitimate father of Queenie,
Ricky James has absolutely no right of custody over her, and that Renalyn's act of entrusting the care of Queenie to her parents was not
a renunciation of parental authority but only a temporary separation necessitated by her need to adjust to her studies, which she
undertook to improve her and Queenie’s life.

CA granted Ricky James visitation rights of two (2) days a week, with provision for additional visitation days that may be permitted by
Renalyn.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, while Ricky James filed a motion for clarification asking that he be allowed to pick up
Queenie from petitioners' residence on a Friday afternoon and to return the child on a Sunday afternoon. In their Comment, petitioners
argued that the arrangement proposed by Ricky James is not within the scope of his visitation rights, but that he may, through Renalyn's
written consent, take Queenie home on certain family occasions.

In its Omnibus Resolution dated October 3, 2017, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, insisting on its
application of the case of Bagtas v. Santos, which held that a trial is still necessary to determine the issue of custody despite the
production of the child. On the other hand, the CA ruled in favor of Ricky James' motion for clarification, granting the latter what it calls
a " limited and temporary custody" that will allow him to take Queenie out once a month, or on the first Saturday of each month, for a
period not exceeding twenty-four (24) hours, but which shall not reduce his visitation days fixed at two (2) days per week. In so holding,
the appellate court cited "humane and practical considerations" and argued that it is in Queenie's best interest to have an exclusive time
with Ricky James.

Undaunted, petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, maintaining that the RTC correctly dismissed the petition a
quo after the hearing on December 3, 2015 on the grounds that: (a) the purported custodial right that Ricky James seeks to enforce in
filing his petition has no legal basis; (b) the petition a quo does not comply with the requisites for habeas corpus petitions involving
custody of minors; and (c) there are no more factual issues to be resolved as it had already been admitted by Renalyn during the hearing
that she goes to Manila to study but that she comes home every week for Queenie and whenever there is a problem.

Ricky James filed a Comment/Opposition as well as an Urgent Omnibus Motion to dismiss the petition and for immediate execution
pending appeal of the Omnibus Resolution dated October 3, 2017, claiming that the instant petition was filed out of time and that it was
erroneous for petitioners to state that the last day of filing fell on November 4, 2017, a Saturday, which compelled them to file their
petition on November 6, 2017, a Monday. By his calculation, the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period, which commenced to run upon
petitioners' receipt on October 19, 2017 of the Omnibus Resolution dated October 3, 2017, ended on November 3, 2017, a Friday, and
not on November 4, 2017.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly remanded the case a quo for determination of who should exercise custody over Queenie.

Ruling: No.

The Omnibus Resolution dated October 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 144406 are hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION deleting the grant of limited and temporary custody for lack of legal and factual basis. The grant of visitation rights
of two (2) days per week shall be maintained. Respondent Ricky James Relucio may take his daughter, Queenie Angel M. Relucio, out
but only with the written consent of petitioner Renalyn A. Masbate in accordance with this Decision.

The CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision contemplates a situation in which the parents of
the minor are married to each other but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are living
separately de facto. In the present case, it has been established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence, that
portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to live with is deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of
petitioner to support the child.

Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code states that illegitimate children shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. Accordingly, mothers (such as Renalyn) are entitled to the sole parental authority of their illegitimate children
(such as Queenie), notwithstanding the father's recognition of the child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are consequently
entitled to keep their illegitimate children in their company, and the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any imperative cause
showing the mother's unfitness to exercise such authority and care.

In addition, Article 213 of the same Code provides for the so-called tender-age presumption, stating that "no child under seven (7) years
of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."

According to jurisprudence, the following instances may constitute "compelling reasons" to wrest away custody from a mother over
her child although under seven (7) years of age: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.

As the records show, the CA resolved to remand the case to the RTC, ratiocinating that there is a need to establish whether or not
Renalyn has been neglecting Queenie, for which reason, a trial is indispensable for reception of evidence relative to the preservation or
overturning of the tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code. In opposition, petitioners contend that the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code would not even apply in this case (so as to determine Renalyn's unfitness as a mother)
because the said provision only applies to a situation where the parents are married to each other.

For easy reference, Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, which were cited in Pablo-
Gualberto, are quoted hereunder in full:

Article 213 of the Family Code

Article 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.

Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court

Section 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. – When husband and wife are
 divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the question to the care, custody, and
control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or
as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall
award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child
to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent so chosen
be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or
poverty. If, upon such hearing, it appears that both parents are improper persons to have the care,
custody, and control of the child, the court may either designate the paternal or maternal grandparent
of the child, or his oldest brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet person to take charge of such
child, or commit it to any suitable asylum, children's home, or benevolent society. The court may in
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code order either or both parents to support or help support
said child, irrespective of who may be its custodian, and may make any order that is just and reasonable
permitting the parent who is deprived of its care and custody to visit the child or have temporary custody
thereof. Either parent may appeal from an order made in accordance with the provisions of this section.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are
compelling reasons therefore.

The Court cannot also subscribe to petitioners' contention that even if there are compelling reasons to separate Queenie from her
mother, Renalyn, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, Ricky James would still not acquire custody over
their daughter because there is no provision of law granting custody rights to an illegitimate father. In the event that Renalyn is found
unfit or unsuitable to care for her daughter, Article 214 of the Family Code mandates that substitute parental authority shall be exercised
by the surviving grandparent. However, the same Code further provides in Article 216 that in default of parents or judicially appointed
guardian, there are persons who shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated

Eslao v. Court of Appeals and Cordero

FACTS: When Reynaldo Eslao died,Maria Paz’s husband, she entrusted care and custody of her youngest child Angelica to her grieving
mother-in-law stating that she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. She then returned
to her mother’s house with her another daughter, Leslie. Years later, Maria Paz got married to a Japanese-American and lives with him
in the US. She then returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the US. She then informed Teresita
about her desire to take custody of Angelica her new husband’s willingness to adopt her children. Teresita refused, and accused Maria
of having abandoned Angelica when she was 10 days old. Teresita added that she would be deserving to take care of Angelica; that she
had managed to raise 12 children of her own herself; that she has the financial means to carry out her plans for Angelica; that she
maintains a store which earns a net income of about P500 a day, she gets P900 a month as pension for the death of her husband, she
rents out rooms in her house which she owns, for which she earns a total of P6,000 a month, and that from her gross income of
roughly P21,000, she spends about P10,000 for the maintenance of her house.

Maria instituted an action against Teresita over the return of the custody of Angelica to her. After the trial on the merits, the trial court
granted the petition. CA affirmed in the full decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Teresita Sagala-Eslao should be given the custody of the child.

RULING: No, Sagala-Eslao cannot be given the custody of the child. Article 210 of the Family Code states that “Parental authority and
responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law.”

In Santos, Sr. v Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 407we stated, viz:

[Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the childrens physical
preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards
parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the
welfare of the minor.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law
[Article 210]. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in
cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution.[Art.222-224] when a parent entrusts the
custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it
does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their
custody and company [Article 209 and 211].

Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the
latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.

Vancil vs Belmes

FACTS: The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie
and Vincent, the children of her deceased son Reeder. Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minor children, instituted a motion for
removal of Guardianship and Appointment of Vancil, asserting that she is the natural mother in custody of and exercising parental
authority over the subject minors. Trial court rejected Belmes'petition. The CA reversed the RTC order. Since Valerie had reached the
age of majority at the time the case reached the SC, the Court resolves to determine who between the mother and grandmother of
minor Vincent should be his guardian.

ISSUE: Whether Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor Vincent.

RULING: Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be his guardian. Art. 211 of the FC states: "The
father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the
father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of
Belmes. Considering that Belmes is still alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Vancil has to prove
Belmes' unsuitability. Assuming that Belmes is unfit as a guardian of Vincent, still Vancil cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She
admitted in her petition that an expatriate like her will find difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian. As the Court held in
Guerrero vs Teran, the courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of the courts as they will
find it difficult to protect the wards.