Chapter 9

Semantic Organization
How do we store our verbal knowledge; knowledge in the form of language

A Conceptual Hierarchy

*Animals

-mammals (Dogs-poodles, siamese-snooky/waffles) Cats-siamese, calicoes- Mr.

chucks)

- Reptiles (Snakes-rattlers- BoaBoa) (Lizards-Dinos, Gias)

- Birds (Penguins) (swallows) (finches)

Set Theoretical Models

*Semantic concepts presented by sets of elements.

*Concepts represent the intersection and grouping of elements

* Both examplars and attributes represent concepts (to describe a "set" of animas
one might say monkeys, elephants, etc. ~ these are examplars

Verification Propositions

* Done by verifying the overlap or lack of overlap of attributes

- "A penguin is a bird" is an examplar proposition

- "All penguins are birds" is a Universal Affirmative (UA) ~ saying the one group is
completely within the other.

- "Some birds are penguins " is a Particular Affirmative (PA) ~ saying that some, but
not all fall into the category

----------> UA more difficult to prove true b/c one would have to check ALL to
whereas in PA, one could only check one and would prove right as long as it is
"some"
 Semantic Feature-Comparison Models

*Meanings of two words are represented by features

-Defining Features: necessary

-Characteristic Features: Associated but not necessary ( CAN be in character but

doesn't have to be in order to make it what it is)

*Argues for two-Stage models to Validate Sentences (A bird is a boat)

- 1st stage notes if there is overlap in features

-if so, second stage tests that defining feature shared

*Rosch noted/noticed that typical category members shared more characteristic

attributes of the category

*Problems arise: many concepts have no defining necessary and sufficient

characteristics

*What necessary and sufficient characteristics do exist may not be useful for day to
day classification.

Semantic Network models

- In Collins and Quillian model, meaning of each word is represented by

connectionist other words.

- Attributes are listed only once and located in only one place in storage,
connections define things

- Time to verify propositions predicted by number of links that must be traversed.

(Will take longer to say a canary has feathers rather than a canary can sing ~ or a
canary has skin takeslonger than a canary sings ..... Maybe some links are stronger
than others; we know better than canaries sing, they're more assocated with that
rather than the fact that they have skin ~ loosely tied vs. strongly linked.)

Spreading Activation Models

-Collins & loftus: Nodes are concepts, links are associations, with length of link
representing strength of association.

-Activation spreads between concepts.

- Number & strength of links determines amount of activation that spreads and odds
the next node will be activated.

(As you build network, you strengthin' activation)

(Spreading activation model for "red" ~ Fire engine, roses, fire)

Support for Spreading Activation

*Posner compared repetition and semantic priming

*PET scans showed:

-visual word forms are processed in the ventral occipital lobe

-Semantic tasks involve the left-lateralized brain sections

-ventral occipital lobe is activated even when passively scanning

-left lateralized sections activated only when semantically processing

Propositional Networks: HAM

*Anderson & Bower's Human Associative Memory (HAM)

* Ideas linked by subject, predicate, relation, object, location, time, fact-idea, and
context notes

(how do we hold propositions involved in concepts (building blocks) in our heads)

Wanted to develop a computer that could store away information and interpret it for
new questions ~ Must have a semantic network that knows what each term means;
attempt to make a way for computer to break things down and store them so they
could be accessed later)

-Aderson eventually abandoned HAM concluding that it was not a good system,
didn't do what he needed it to do ~ replaced it with ACT

Propositional Networks: ACT

*Anderson's Adaptive Control of Thought

*Memory consists of:

-Working Memory- memory that is currently active

-Declarative memory, knowing what

-productive memory- procedural memory, knowing how

*Three knowledge representation codes:

1-The Temporal String- sequencing of events

2-Spatial representation- almost like mental pictures

3-Propositional representation- info relationships, but not spatial or temporal info

"Bill hit Fred" would be stared as Bill, and the act of hitting, but their spatial
relationship and the temporal ordering of who did which when would be in the other
codes.

(In ACT, Anderson is trying to show how we put these propositions on top of the
info)

-An ACT representation for "The tall lawyer believed the men were from Mars": must
be broken down into separate nodes wit relationships and categories subjects, and
locations

(HAM labeled each kind of link vs. ACT which puts the relationships down where
they belong, in the meaning rather than in the links)

eXPERTISE & pROPOSITIONAL nETWORKS

*Experts have domain-specific, organized knowledge

*Experts organize and classify knowledge by principles rather than surface features
(semantic networks in experts are more organized) (As databases enlarge, it
becomes harder to search which is why we need subnodes, humans create these
automatically) (No shortcuts to expertise)

*Typical experts have 10,000 to 50,000 organized, memorized patterns in memory

*experts need 10 or more years of full time practice to create this network of
knowledge.

Cognitive Neuroscience

*Squire suggests memory is stored as changes in the same neural systems that
make perception possible

* So the "engram", or basic memory trace, is stored with the visual part in the
occipital lobe, the auditory part in the temporal lobe, the spatial part in the parietal
lobe , and the procedural part in the frontal lobe
-Taxonomy of Memory Systems

Explicit/Declarative (Semantic events ~episodic events) -----LTM-----

Procedural/Implicit (Skills: Motor, perceptual, cognitive{Adaptation level} ~
Priming: perceptual, semantic {shifts in judgment and preference} ~ Dispositions:
simple classical conditioning {Opperant conditioning} ~ Nonassociative:
habituation, sensitization