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K J Somaiya College of Engineering, Vidyavihar

HEARTILY WELCOMES

DEPARTMENT OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING

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Vehicle Safety
IDC for semester VI

Dr. Manoj Janardan Pawar


Associate Professor,
Mechanical Engineering Department,
K J Somaiya College of Engineering, Mumbai
Outcome Based Education Framework

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Vision of the Department
To become a program of world repute in the field of
Mechanical Engineering, known for an ambience
conducive to value based multifarious development of
students, enabling them face technological challenges
for service of the mankind.

Mission of the Department


1. To impart skills and expertise in design,
manufacturing and thermal areas of mechanical
engineering that is the backbone of industry, so that
the students thrive as successful engineers.
2. To provide an opportunity to create, interpret, apply
and disseminate knowledge to improve the quality of
life.
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Program Educational Objectives

PEO1: Demonstrate expertise in mechanical engineering for solving


real life problems with due respect for the principles of sustainable
development.
PEO2: Pursue higher education, research or entrepreneurship and be
ethical in all his endeavours.
PEO3: Engage in lifelong learning and exhibit team work, leadership
and communication skills to evolve as successful professional.

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Program Outcomes and
Program Specific Outcomes
After successful completion of the program a Mechanical Engineering Graduate
will be able to:
1. Apply knowledge of mathematics, science and mechanical engineering to solve
engineering problems (Engineering knowledge).
2. Identify and define an engineering problem, gather relevant information and find
viable solution through analysis and synthesis (Problem analysis).
3. Devise engineering solutions for real life problems by developing systems or
processes with due consideration for economy, environment and society
(Design/development of solutions).
4. Survey research literature, design and conduct experiments and analyze and
interpret data to draw reliable conclusions (Conduct investigations of complex
problems).
5. Select and use modern engineering tools for qualitative and quantitative
decision making (Modern tool usage).
6. Appreciate cultural and social values and asses the health, safety and legal
issues in engineering practice (The engineer and society).
7. Recognize the need for an engineering solution to be in conformity with the
principles of sustainable development (Environment and sustainability).

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Program Outcomes and
Program Specific Outcomes
8. Know the professional and ethical responsibility and national and international
norms regarding engineering practice (Ethics).
9. Function in multidisciplinary teams as a member or leader (Individual and
team work).
10. Communicate effectively within engineering community and society at large by
means of deliberation, report writing, documentation and presentation
(Communication)
11. Understand the basic principles of management and apply them at work as an
individual or team member on a project (Project management and finance).
12. Recognize the need for and engage in life – long learning and keep abreast with
contemporary issue (Life-long learning).

Program Specific Outcomes (PSOs)


1. Develop and deploy integrated mechanical systems.
2. Undertake higher studies in areas of design, manufacturing and energy
conversion.

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CO Statement
Class: T.Y. Course: Vehicle Safety (UMEI608)
Continuous Assessment End Sem Total
Test 1 Test 2 IA Exam

15 15 10 60 100

CO Course Outcome Statement Blooms level


At the end of this course the students will be able to,
CO1 Explain basic principles and concepts in vehicle Understanding
safety
CO2 Interpret different vehicle tests for occupant and Understanding
pedestrian safety
CO3 Compare passive safety and active safety for Understanding
Automobile
CO4 Illustrate the recent trends in passive and active Understanding
safety system
CO5 Explain various Automotive safety regulations Understanding

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Course Content
Class: T.Y. Course: Vehicle Safety (UMEI608)
Module Content Hrs
1 Introduction: Introduction to vehicle safety, Basic concepts of 08
vehicle safety, Risk evaluation and communication, Human error
control, Universal design, The distracted driver, Special design
problems (Design for children, handicap, etc)
2 Safety and Vehicle Testing: Accident Data, Accident Avoidance, 08
Biomechanics and Occupant Simulation, Crash Testing, Vehicle
Body Testing, Dynamic Vehicle Simulation Tests, Role of Seat in
Crash, Occupant Protection, Pedestrian Protection
3 Passive Safety System: Occupants restraint systems- Seat belt, 09
airbags, Sensors for restraint system, Child restraint, Design of
bumper, crumble zone, recent trends in passive safety system
4 Active Safety System: Human factors, Comfort and Ergonomics, 09
Adaptive Cruise Control, Antilock Brakes, Brake by wire, traction
control system, recent trends in active safety system
5 Automotive Safety Regulations: Automotive Industry 05
Standards, Transport Engineering Standards, Indian road
congress Standards Automotive Safety Regulations

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INTRODUCTION
Objectives
 The purpose of this course is to provide useful
information that could save lives, prevent personal
injury, reduce property damage, and generally
improve the individual’s quality of life.
 In some respects, information in this course could
serve as a complementary ‘safety design manual’ or
supplemental ‘safety training handbook’ for a wide
variety of industrial and commercial enterprises.

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INTRODUCTION
Good intentions are not enough
 Design safety is not achieved by chance or hope.
 Assurance of acceptable levels of product safety
cannot be left to chance and the good intentions of
individuals or companies.
 Specific techniques and assurance procedures are
corporate health essentials.

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INTRODUCTION
Adequacy of knowledge
A design engineer may have had very little
preparation or on-the-job training in terms of specific
design safety principles, techniques, or knowledge.
 There may be little or nothing available in terms of
sources of information.

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INTRODUCTION
Someone else’s responsibility
 Safety may be assumed to be adequate and relegated
to a secondary service function.
 If there are safety problems, they will be addressed by
others.
 In some companies, safety is considered almost as a
non-design or after-design function.
 Safety is considered to be a broadly shared
responsibility, superficially implemented by all, with
no real accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
The hear-no-evil problem
 During the design process, those who convey ‘good
news’ are very welcome.
 Unfortunately, the discovery of a possible safety
problem is ‘bad news’.
 Since design managers do not welcome bad news and
this may be perceived as a desire to hear no evil, the
design engineer may not want to frustrate the
managers by conveying bad news about safety
problems.
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INTRODUCTION
Generic implications
 Vehicle safety may seem to be exclusively a design engineering
function.
 Vehicle safety problems may originate from damage during
fabrication, assembly-line errors and flaws during manufacture.
 Safety problems may be caused by damage during vehicle
transport to the dealer.
 Aftermarket accessories and customizing of vehicles may affect
vehicle safety.
Safety assurance is not good luck; it must be earned by
attention to detail.

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Precursor to all other safety activities
 The public health analogy
 Prioritization of efforts
 First- Design alternative, improvement or remedy
 Next lower- Safeguard, add on safety devices
 Lesser- Warnings
 Least- Operating instructions, personal training
 The significant Triology: Hazards-Risk-Danger
 A hazard is that which could possibly cause harm.
 The hazard is then evaluated in terms of risk. Risk is the
amount or severity of harm that could be caused by each
hazard.
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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Precursor to all other safety activities
 The significant Triology: Hazards-Risk-Danger
 The risk is then categorized as to whether or not it exceeds
some established criterion as to the acceptability of the risk.
This decision-making relates to the danger posed by the risk
that is presented by the hazard.
 The objective of this approach is first to locate, then to take
action to prevent or eliminate the hazard.
 Cause and Effect

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Fail-Safe
 As a general rule, no component or device should fail in a
manner that presents or creates a hazard.
 If a component, assembly, or system should experience a
failure or malfunction, this should not occur in a situation
where the failure itself could create a high risk.
 Ex: Self propelled scissor lift
 Ex: Run-flat tire
 Fail-safe is a safety concept that is basic to vehicle design.

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Alternative Design
 It is a basic general rule that for every design there is an alternative
design.
 Doubts, questionable comments, hard to decide issues, poor test
results, and customer uncertainties all imply that alternative
designs should be considered for new or near future models of the
product.
 There are always questions as to overdesign versus under-design,
what is needed or can be ignored, or does it cost money or save
money?
 In essence, higher levels of safety may require alternative designs
to overcome potential problems, but the alternative designs require
early analysis and appropriate verification.
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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Redundancy and Derating
 When there is a critical safety function that involves a somewhat
suspect pathway to successful operation, it may be advisable to
consider redundancy.
 This is to design so that there is more than one means to
accomplish a given function or task.
 For system failure each means must fail.
 In essence, redundancy may be advisable to prevent system failure
that could have catastrophic results.
 Ex:
 Spare tire is a standby redundant element
 Multiple engine aircraft

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Redundancy and Derating
 To reduce failure rates, derating is often used.
 This means operating the part below its rated value. In effect, this
lowers the stress levels and prolongs the life of the part.
 This is exactly opposite to lean manufacturing.
 Techniques such as redundancy and derating can serve to protect
against catastrophic malfunctions and failures by providing an
alternative means of continued function and prolonging service life.
 They may provide a soft cushion or additional time to stop after the
first failure occurs.

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Fault Tolerance
 It is often desirable to have a system that will continue to operate
despite failures of components, circuits or software
 The system must tolerate the failure and function normally without
any repair and maintenance.
 It could be important to include an operator advisory (for a time-
delayed functional failure) or warnings (for immediate functional
problems).

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Fault Tolerance, Fail-Safe and Redundancy
 A fault-tolerant tire may continue to be used without repair or
replacement, it tolerates faults without loss of normal function.
 A run-flat tire may be fail-safe, but it still needs repair or
replacement to return to full normal functioning.
 A redundant tire is an extra or backup tire that can preserve
normal vehicle functioning, but it needs repair or replacement.

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Safety Factors
 Design for uncertainty
 During design, an extra allowance should be made to accommodate
unexpected factors, loads, or conditions, as well as the expected.
 Expected conditions include normal wear and tear over the stated
service life of the product or until disposal, the effects of corrosion
or adverse environmental conditions.
 Disappearing safety factor
 The safety factor considered by manufacturer is suffered and
lowered to less than it’s half value as it ages and suffers the
condition that weaken the component.
 As a general rule, aging and corrosion will gradually decrease the
remaining safety factor on many products.

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Safety Factors
 Identifying Component Safety Factor
 There may be any number of safety factors for the components of
an assembly.
 However, there are circumstances where a general safety factor
may be warranted for the preservation of the output function of an
overall device.
 The process by which the critical safety functions are identified, is
important.
 To lower the costs, supplier or vendor may make changes in design,
material, manufacturing methods, packaging, or shipping.
 Intrusion into the margin of safety may occur shortly before or
anytime during a production run, so some procedure should be
instituted to preserve the safety factor.
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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Objective Appraisal
 There should be a quest for objective rather than subjective
information concerning possible safety problems.
 One objective method is to force a systematic engineering analysis
of each part, component, subassembly, assembly, and the total
system.
 In essence, uncertainties are reduced by specialized analysis, in a
system context, using as much quantitative data as possible.
 A team approach is usually beneficial to assure that there is a lack
of individual bias, the use of interdisciplinary knowledge, and some
compatibility with other related analyses.

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Objective Appraisal
 Objective probability analysis

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Unloading the Operator
 The results of overloading the driver can be confusion, mistakes,
and collisions.
 An overload can result from just too much information to be
processed at a given time, multitasking at an inappropriate time,
excessive skill levels required, and too many choices for effective
decision-making.
 Since humans are essentially single-channel information
processors, this limitation should be uppermost in the design
engineer’s approach, not the maximum load that could be carried
by a good driver or operator.

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Unloading the Operator
 Early equipment sometimes involved a variety of levers, pedals,
knobs, and switches together with ongoing judgments.
 Each year has shown a remarkable simplification of controls and
displays, reduction in vision and auditory demands.
 The automobile driver now requires less skill in basic vehicle
operation, but there is a trend for adding a variety of electronic
communications and entertainment devices which increase the
driver load.

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Interlocks (Event sequencing)
 It may be desirable positively to prevent the improper, untimely, or
unplanned actuation of a particular function.
 This might be achieved by requiring some sequence of events to
occur before the function or event can occur.
 The final event is locked-out (interlocked) until the precursor
(sequence of) events take place.
 The interlocks or event sequencing are safety devices that control
undesirable or potentially unsafe behavior.
 Ex: vehicle cannot be started unless the transmission is in the park
position, rather than start in a forward or rearward gear position.

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Design by and for test
 No subassembly pre-installation test, and no incoming quality
inspection, so great reliance was on the first-tier vendor’s
assurance could lead to post assembly failure of the system.
 There is one caution: the design of test equipment should not be an
afterthought, since it could harm the vehicle components. Even the
test equipment should be thoroughly checked.

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Design for manufacturing and assemble
 Safety problems can arise during manufacturing operations unless
there is a conscious attempt to design for ease of manufacture and
simplified assembly.
 The continuous emphasis on cost savings could erode the safety
objectives if not properly controlled and audited.
 Design responsibilities for manufacturing and assembly start early
and continue during the manufacture of the product in order to
assure appropriate compliance with the design specifications and
design objectives.

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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Design for maintenance, repair, recycling, and disposal
 In the past, the after-sale considerations by the manufacturer were
minimal.
 The aftermarket accessories and modifications also were believed to
be someone else’s obligation and responsibility.
 One solution was to develop a maintenance demonstration facility,
using people representative of those who would perform
maintenance, service, and repair operations.
 The make-ready, installation, and preparation for reuse (preowned,
used, or secondhand equipment) operations should be evaluated.
 Another neglected area is recycling and final disposal. It is
considered environmentally friendly to utilize materials that can be
recycled and/or dispose safely.
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BASIC CONCEPTS OF VEHICLE SAFETY
Underlying principles
 Recall and liability avoidance
 Every company should have a formal recall program plan.
 It should state who has what responsibility, how a recall could be
initiated, and the means by which it should be implemented.
 If it is to recall for an unsafe condition, it should be done quickly
and reach all of the owners or users of all products being recalled.
 Any confusion and delay might result in injuries, damage,
mandatory penalties, or adverse public relations.
 Liability mitigation is the attempt to show good faith or absence of
fault for an unsafe condition or defective product.

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RISK EVALUATION
The basic triology: Hazards-Risk-Danger

Acceptable Not Danger

Not-Acceptable Danger

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RISK EVALUATION
The basic triology: Hazards-Risk-Danger
 Hazards
 The hazard is a condition or situation that has the potential to
cause harm.
 Hazards may include human errors, failure modes, features,
conditions, characteristics, attributes, or structures that
conceivably could cause personal injury, property damage,
environmental insult, or loss of the desired performance of
products, components, assemblies, processes, or systems.
 A person may be exposed to a hazard with or without harm.

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RISK EVALUATION
The basic triology: Hazards-Risk-Danger
 Risk
 The risk is the character and magnitude of the harm that could
occur.
 Risks may be the likelihood, magnitude, frequency and severity,
extent, or amount of harm that could occur.
 It may be a qualitative, quantitative, or mixed data assessment.
 The process of determining the risk is called a risk assessment or
risk evaluation.

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RISK EVALUATION
The basic triology: Hazards-Risk-Danger
 Danger
 Danger is determined by comparing the hazard’s risk to some
criterion, standard, or reference point.
 An acceptable risk is not a danger. An unacceptable risk
constitutes a danger that may be considered a defect, fault, unsafe
condition etc.

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RISK EVALUATION
The basic triology: Hazards-Risk-Danger
 Illustration 1: Rotating element
 A projected rotating element of system has potential to cause harm
(i.e. Hazards exists).
 If it is adequately covered or shielded it does not have high risk.
 So it probably would not be considered a danger.
 Illustration 2: Tire failure
 The hazard is a belt-leaving-belt tire failure mode (belt separation).
 The risk is loss of vehicle control ending in rollover or collision (a
threat of injury and property damage).
 The danger decision was that it was a safety-related defect.

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RISK EVALUATION
The basic triology: Hazards-Risk-Danger

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RISK EVALUATION
Process of risk evaluation
 Step 1: Identify hazards, i.e. anything that may cause harm.
 This is one common classification of hazards:
 Physical: e.g. lifting, awkward postures, slips and trips, noise,
dust, machinery, computer equipment, etc.
 Mental: e.g. excess workload, long hours, working with high-
need clients, bullying, etc. These are also called 'psychosocial'
hazards, affecting mental health and occurring within working
relationships.
 Chemical: e.g. asbestos, cleaning fluids, aerosols, etc.
 Biological: including tuberculosis, hepatitis and other
infectious diseases faced by healthcare workers, home care
staff and other healthcare professionals.

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RISK EVALUATION
Process of risk evaluation
 Step 2: Decide who may be harmed, and how.
 Step 3: Assess the risk and take action.
 This means evaluator must consider how likely each hazard could
cause harm.
 This will determine whether or not to reduce the level of risk.
 Even after all precautions have been taken, some risk usually
remains. Employers must decide for each remaining hazard
whether the risk remains high, medium or low.

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RISK EVALUATION
Process of risk evaluation
 Step 4: Make a record of the findings.
 Evaluator is required to record in writing the main findings of the
risk assessment.
 This record should include details of any hazards noted in the risk
assessment, and action taken to reduce or eliminate risk.
 This record provides proof that the assessment was carried out,
and is used as the basis for a later review of working practices.

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RISK EVALUATION
Process of risk evaluation
 Step 4: Review the risk assessment.
 A risk assessment must be kept under review in order to:
 ensure that agreed safe working practices continue to be
applied (e.g. that management's safety instructions are
respected by supervisors and line managers); and
 take account of any new working practices, new machinery or
more demanding work targets.

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RISK EVALUATION
Hazards minimization
1. Substitution (i.e. try a risk-free or less risky option).
2. Prevention (e.g. erect a machine guard, or add a non-slip surface to a
pathway).
3. Reorganize work to reduce exposure to a risk.
4. Issue personal protective equipment (PPE) to all stake holders at risk,
and make sure they are trained in when and how to use this equipment
5. Provide training in safe working systems.

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RISK COMMUNICATION
 The communication of risk is everywhere in the automotive industry;
sometimes it is excellent, occasionally it is poor, and often it is
overlooked as an integral part of vehicle design.
 Risk communication is implicit in vehicle turn signals and brake
lights, rear reflectors and side lights, horns and backup alarms, battery
and fuel warnings, tread wear indicators and oil-pressure lights, airbag
and collision avoidance warnings, low tire pressure and navigator
warnings, recall and retrofit notices, and the warnings contained in
service and owner’s manuals and safety bulletins.
 The roadway environment in which a vehicle may operate has many
warnings such as construction zone and pedestrian crossing signs,
yield and wrong-way signs, reflective pavement markers and plastic
bumps or rumble strips, railroad–highway grade crossing cross-buck
signs and barrier gates, and traffic safety cones and guide posts.
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RISK COMMUNICATION
 Risk communication is the process of presenting information
concerning hazards and their risks.
 It is generally limited to possible unacceptable risks. It is directed to all
those who might take informed avoidance behavior, either preventive or
corrective.
 Risk communication may seem like a simple task, but this is where the
hidden danger is there.

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RISK COMMUNICATION
Urgency of risk communication
 As the risk becomes more specific and certain, it assumes a greater
sense of urgency. Warnings should reflect that urgency.
 Ex: Cigarette
 ‘Underage sale prohibited’ or ‘Contains carbon monoxide’ (The
urgency level that was communicated was low).
 ‘Smoking is injurious to health and lead to lung cancer’
 Risk communication by illustration, pictures, graphs etc. (The
urgency level that was communicated was high).
 It also illustrates the fact that the greater the urgency and certainty
of injury or damage, the more graphically urgent and attention-
getting should be the warning or risk communication.

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RISK COMMUNICATION
Magnitude of risk
 The risk of a particular hazard may be classified quantitatively, such as
the number of specified injuries expected over the service life of an
item, for equipment produced in a stated quantity, and used in a
defined market or environment.
 The risk may be defined qualitatively as high, medium, low, or
negligible.
 Estimating the magnitude of the risk is important in terms of
engineering management, but also in terms of what is represented or
conveyed to the purchaser, user, or consumer.

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RISK COMMUNICATION
Ex: Example of warning in door area

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RISK COMMUNICATION
Ex: Example of warning on bed extender bar

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RISK COMMUNICATION
Ex: Example of bilingual warning

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RISK COMMUNICATION
Ex: Example of inconspicuous warning

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RISK COMMUNICATION
Ex: Example of simple warning

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RISK COMMUNICATION
Ex: Example of warning with too much information

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RISK COMMUNICATION
Ex: Example of warning with pictorials and words

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RISK COMMUNICATION
Ex: Example of well placed pictorial warning

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HUMAN ERROR CONTROL
 Human fault and error serve to blame the driver and tend to close any
further inquiry as to causation either of the behavior or of a possible
accident.
 Thus, the approach to human error control must be commensurate
with the complexity of human behavior, whether it is in design,
manufacture, use, or repair of automotive vehicles.
 There have been some estimates that human error is involved in 50% to
90% of all accidents. This may be due to the simplicity in just blaming
the person involved in an accident, the limited forced choices available
in some accident checklists.

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HUMAN ERROR CONTROL
Basic approaches to human error analysis
1. Passive Approach
2. Behavioral Approach
3. Situational Approach
4. Product design approach
5. Multi-Factorial Approach

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HUMAN ERROR CONTROL
Passive Approach
 Human error as inevitable in an imperfect world populated by imperfect
people.
 There is a belief that errors will happen and there is little that can be
done about it.
 From a business standpoint, a passive approach to possible problems
is a high risk situation.
 The symptoms of a passive attitude are rationalizations or excuses that
include words such as ‘reasonably expected errors’, ‘reasonably safe
under the conditions’, ‘harmless errors’, ‘inherent errors’, and ‘normal
accidents’.

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HUMAN ERROR CONTROL
Behavioral Approach
 Another approach to human error is to focus on undesirable behavior
and unsafe acts, then attempt to develop safer people, achieve zero
defects, and strive for error-free human performance.
 This may be accompanied by special training to improve job skills and
hazard recognition.
 Improved behavior can reduce human error to some degree. But the
residual human error may remain too high.
 The cause analysis might be very simple because the behavioral fault
would generally fall on the proximate individual whose behavior could
be described in a blameworthy fashion.

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HUMAN ERROR CONTROL
Situational Approach
 There could be an attempt to blame the situation in which the accident
occurred.
 The fault might be perceived as in the work environment, the unique
overall circumstances of the accident site etc.
Product Design Approach
 The design engineering focus has gradually broadened to include more
user-friendly designs, driver-assist devices, and consideration of
human factors criteria.
 This approach is still dependent on available specialized knowledge,
relevant data, appropriate design criteria, productive test methods, and
access to aftermarket problems.

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HUMAN ERROR CONTROL
Illustrative errors
1. Judgmental error
2. Anthropometrically induced error
3. Oversteering error
4. Braking error
5. Mismatch error
6. Language induced error
7. Load placement error
8. Drinking and gambling error
9. Misuse and abuse

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HUMAN ERROR CONTROL
Preventive measures
1. Proactive plan
2. Positive perspective
3. Open causation
4. Empirical data
5. Responsible person
6. Localization
7. Validation

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HUMAN ERROR CONTROL
Preventive measures
1. attempt to control the error, not the person
2. people vary; accommodate them
3. consider the context and dynamics, not the static and sterile
4. observe and analyze intrinsic human characteristics, then find a means
to compensate for them
5. passive compliance alone may inhibit leadership in the search for
fundamental and real solutions
6. a situation or condition may be deemed unsafe or unacceptable
depending on customer expectations, the ease of correctability, or the
unacceptability to others of the errors.

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UNIVERSAL DESIGN
 It is only natural for an engineer to design a product that he feels personally
comfortable with, can operate easily, has a good dimensional fit, and believes
will be accepted by the average user.
 But all the users may not be of the same height, weight, age, intelligence, or
have the same familiarity with such products.
 They vary considerably in terms of human attributes and variables.
 The product should be user-friendly as well as designer-friendly.
 This required designs that could accommodate or be adjustable to fit different
users (universal design for people).
 they should be capable of operating over the range of environmental conditions
that can be anticipated (universal design for environmental).
 Design also applies to the purposes for which the vehicle is intended as well as
the unintended (universal design for anticipated use).
 The basic vehicle design should be compatible with modified or altered use
(universal design for predictable modification).
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DISTRACTED DRIVER
 A serious heath problem is developing from automobile collisions caused by
distracted drivers.
 This is the result of the
 use of portable cellular telephones,
 personal organizers used while driving (inattention to road traffic
conditions),
 development of more sophisticated entertainment systems and instrument
panel controls (less vigilance),
 advent of navigation and television displays in vehicles (eyes off the road),
 promises of sophisticated wireless e-mail, fax, and Internet services in the
vehicle (addition of complex activities).

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DISTRACTED DRIVER
Reduction of risk due to distraction
 First, there could be printed and audible warnings not to use a device
unless the vehicle is stopped.
 The second technique is to have an integrated system, with all devices
either cut-off from or out-of-sight of the driver when the vehicle is in
motion except for warnings, heads up navigation prompts, or
customary radio signals.
 The third technique is marketing and dealer restraint.

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Thank You
Life is Learning Process, Welcome Your Suggestions!

29 January 2019 69

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