O X F O R D R E A D I N G S IN P H I L O S O P H Y

APPLIED ETHICS
 A ls o p u b lis h e d in this series

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M a rtin H o llis
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H eg el, e d ite d b y M ic h a e l In w o o d
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P h ilo s o p h ic a l L o g ic , e d ite d b y P . F . S tra w so n
L o c k e on H u m a n U nderstanding, e d ite d b y I. C . T ip to n
T h eo ries o f R ig h ts, e d ite d b y J e re m y W a ld ro n
K a n t on P u re R e a s o n , e d ite d b y R a lp h C . S. W a lk e r
Free W ill, e d ite d b y G a r y W a tso n
T h e P h ilo so p h y o f A c t io n , e d ite d b y A la n R . W h ite
L e ib n iz : M eta p h y sics an d P h ilo so p h y o f S cien c e, e d ite d by
R . S. W o o d h o u s e

O th er vo lu m es are in p reparation
 APPLIED
ETHICS

E D IT E D B Y

P E T E R S IN G E R

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1986
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 CONTENTS
Introduction 1

i. D eath 9
by Thomas Nagel

ii . O f Suicide 19
by David Hum e

iii . A ctive and Passive Euthanasia 29

by James Rachels

iv. A D efence o f A bo rtio n 37

by Judith Jarvis Thomson

v. A bo rtio n and Infanticide 57

by M ichael Tooley

vi. The Survival L ottery 87

by John Harris

v ii. Speech in Favour o f Capital Punishment (1868) 97

by John Stuart M ill

vm. Judgem ent D ay 105

by L ouis Pascal

ix. ‘It M akes N o D ifference W hether or Not I D o It’ 125

by Jonathan Glover

x. O verpopulation and the Q uality o f Life 145

by Derek Parfit
xi. W hat is W rong with Slavery? 165
by R. M. Hare

xii. Separate Spheres 185

by Janet Radcliffe Richards

xiii. A ll A nim als are Equal 215

by Peter Singer
Vi CONTENTS

xiv. G am es T heory and the N uclear A rm s R ace 229

by Nicholas Measor

N otes on Contributors 257

Bibliography 259

Index o f Nam es 263

 INTRODUCTION

T o an observer o f m oral philosophy in the twentieth century, the

m ost striking developm ent o f the past tw enty years w ould not be
any advance in our theoretical understanding o f the subject, nor
w ould it be the acceptance o f any particular ideas about right and
wrong. It w ould, rather, be the revival o f an entire departm ent of
the subject: applied ethics.
I use the term ‘revival’ because applied ethics is not new to
philosophy. The essays in this volum e by D avid H um e and John
Stuart M ill fit well alongside m odern writings; in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries these philosophers w ere doing applied ethics
in much the way that it is done today. Indeed, it w ould have been
possible to go further back, and include samples o f applied ethics
from the m edieval scholastics, or from any of a dozen classical
writers. From Plato onwards m oral philosophers have confronted
practical questions, including suicide, the exposure o f infants, the
treatm ent o f w om en, and the proper behaviour o f public officials.
(The continuity is evident in H um e’s discussion o f suicide, which
draws on S eneca’s letter on the same topic; while Thom as N a g el’s
discussion o f death takes up a problem raised by Lucretius.)
Christian philosophers like Augustine and A qu in as exam ined with
great care such m atters as when a war was just, whether it could ever
be right to tell a lie, and if a Christian wom an did wrong to com mit
suicide in order to save herself from rape. H obbes, with the English
Civil W ar freshly in mind, had an urgent practical purpose in writing
about the moral basis o f obedience to the sovereign. Practical
concerns continued with H um e and then with the British
utilitarians. B entham ’s reform ing zeal ranged over an incredible
variety o f topics, and M ill, in addition to the little-known speech on
capital punishment included in this volum e, wrote celebrated essays
on liberty and on the subjection o f wom en.
D espite this long tradition, for most o f the present century moral
philosophers kept alo o f from practical ethics— a fact that becom es
all the m ore rem arkable if we consider the traum atic events through
2 INTRODU CTION
which most o f them lived. There w ere one or two notable excep­
tions. C . E . M. Joad w rote on political and social issues, and spoke
at the fam ous 1933 O xford U nion debate, when the students voted
against fighting for K ing and Country. Bertrand Russell seem ed the
epitom e o f a philosopher engaged with the concerns o f his times,
but his stature am ong his philosophical colleagues was based on his
w ork in logic and m etaphysics, not on his writings on disarmament
or sexual m orality. In any case, these few exceptions could not
produce a body o f writings which could be regarded as a branch of
an academ ic discipline.
Instead o f taking up practical issues, moral philosophers limited
them selves to the study o f the nature o f m orality, or (in the heyday
o f linguistic philosophy) to the study o f the m eaning o f moral
judgem ents. This cam e to be known as ‘m eta-ethics’— a term which
signified that they w ere not actually taking part in ethics, but were
engaged in a higher-level study about ethics. Norm ative ethics, the
study of general theories about what is good and bad, right and wrong,
was considered an important part of ethics until the 1930s. Then it too
was relegated to a secondary concern, except for occasional discus­
sions o f utilitarianism and the different forms it might take.
O rdinary people— and no doubt students beginning their study of
the subject— som etimes still harboured the illusion that moral
philosophy could be o f som e use in deciding what we ought to do.
Leading philosophers like A . J. A y e r soon put them right: ‘It is silly,
as well as presum ptuous, for any one type o f philosopher to pose as
the cham pion o f virtue. A n d it is also one reason why many people
find m oral philosophy an unsatisfactory subject. For they mis­
takenly look to the m oral philosopher for guid an ce.’ 1 C . D . Broad
w ent to the trouble o f offering reasons for the received wisdom: ‘It
is no part o f the professional business o f moral philosophers to tell
people what they ought or ought not to do . . . M oral philosophers,
as such, have no special inform ation not available to the general
public about what is right and what is wrong; nor have they any call
to undertake those hortatory functions which are so adequately
perform ed by clergym en, politicians, leader-writers .. ,’ 2

1 A . J . A y e r , ‘T h e A n a ly sis o f M oral Ju d gm en ts’ in P h ilo so p h ica l Essays

(L o n d o n , 1959), p. 246.
2 C . D . B ro a d , E thics and the History o f P hilo so p hy (L o n d o n , 1952), p. 244.
 IN TRO D U CTIO N 3
It m ay in part have been doubts about the adequacy o f those to
whom B road refers which induced moral philosophers to take up
practical questions; som eone had to be able to do better than the
clergy, politicians, and leader-writers! M ore im portantly, those
w ho nodded assent to views like A y e r ’s and B ro a d ’s had not
stopped to ask whether moral philosophers could, without m erely
preaching, m ake an effective contribution to ethical dilemmas.
D o es expertise in m oral philosophy equip one to clarify the muddy
waters o f popular moral debates? D oes a know ledge o f norm ative
ethical theories m ake it possible to apply such theories to real
ethical problem s? Can such an application lead to m ore defensible
positions on these questions? The possibility o f an affirmative
answer to such questions began to be widely recognized only during
the 1960s, when first the A m erican civil rights m ovem ent, and then
the V ietnam w ar and the rise o f student activism began to draw
philosophers into discussions o f m oral issues: equality, justice, war,
and civil disobedience. Philosophers who entered these debates as
concerned citizens gradually realized that they w ere discussing
ethical questions which w ere part o f the philosophical tradition in
which they had been educated. The skills they had acquired in
studying and teaching philosophy w ere suddenly highly relevant.
G radually the academ ic world began to respond. A rticles on civil
d isobedience, on racial discrim ination, and on war and pacificism ,
began to appear in publications like The Journal o f Philosophy. B y
1971 sufficient articles in applied ethics had been published for
James R achels to produce an anthology, M oral P roblem s . 3 A t that
time R achels could still w rite, in his introduction, that most students
beginning m oral philosophy found it disappointingly rem ote from
practical problem s, and that ‘If practical problem s are m entioned at
all, it is only by way o f illustrating som e m ore theoretical point. ’ But
within five years this was no longer true; and M oral Problem s was
itself one o f the most w idely used texts in introductory ethics
courses. T h e founding o f Philosophy and Public Affairs, a new
journal devoted to the application o f philosophy to public issues,
provided both a forum and ,a new standard o f rigour for those
bringing philosophy to bear on practical problem s. (The prom i­
nence o f this journal is indicated by the fact that three o f the articles
3 N e w Y o r k . 1971.
4 INTRODUCTION
in this anthology are drawn from its pages, whereas no other
publication is represented more than once.)
T h e broader com m unity has willingly accepted the relevance and
value o f contributions by philosophers to practical issues— perhaps
they too have not been entirely satisfied with the perform ance o f the
clergy, politicians, and leader-writers. This acceptance is particu­
larly noticeable in bioethics, where new developm ents in medicine
and the biological sciences throw up ethical questions which have
few precedents. Thus it was no surprise when the British G o ve rn ­
ment appointed a philosopher, M ary W arnock, to chair its Com m it­
tee o f Inquiry into Hum an Fertilisation and E m bryology.4 In
several countries philosophers sit on ethics com m ittees in universi­
ties, passing judgem ent on research involving human or animal
experim entation, and in some hospitals they are m em bers o f
com m ittees which advise on such matters as the withdrawal of
treatm ent from com atose patients. In the Australian state o f V ic ­
toria, there is now even a legislative requirem ent that medical
experim ents involving human em bryos must be approved by a
com m ittee which includes, am ong other m em bers, ‘a person hold­
ing a qualification in the study o f philosophy’ .
A p p lied ethics has becom e part o f the teaching o f most philos­
ophy departm ents in English-speaking universities, taking its place
alongside m eta-ethics and norm ative ethics. The clim ate o f political
radicalism and student activism from which applied ethics gained so
much initial impetus has gone; but applied ethics continues to
thrive. This should cause no surprise; it is testim ony to the perennial
im portance o f the issues discussed, and to the need for them to be
discussed with the greatest possible clarity and rigour. A gain st the
long history o f philosophical involvem ent in practical ethical issues,
it is the neglect o f applied ethics in the earlier years o f this century
which should be regarded as surprising.

The success o f applied ethics in establishing itself as part o f the

philosophical curriculum has spawned dozens o f anthologies, usu­
ally arranged so as to cover the m ajor topics which seem ed relevant
and im portant when the anthology was put together. O ften the
4 S e e the Report o f the Com m ittee o f Inquiry into H um an Fertilisation and
E m bryology (L o n d o n , 1984).
 INTRODUCTION 5
articles chosen are selected to provide opposing points o f view . For
educational purposes, a loosely argued but provocative article m ay
be m ore effective than one about which students can find nothing to
disagree. This collection is intended to serve a different purpose. I
have not sought to give expression to alternative view points on each
issue. N or did I set out with the intention o f covering every m ajor
topic, although I did want to show the range o f im portant topics on
which w ork in applied ethics has been done. M y prim ary aim in
selecting from the immense body o f literature which now exists in
this field was sim ply to take the best.
A n y choice m ade on this basis will necessarily be highly personal.
M oreover the task o f choosing the best is made m ore com plicated
by the fact that there is no single quality on the basis o f which works
o f philosophy can be ranked. N evertheless I judge each o f the
articles which follow to excel in at least one— and often all— o f the
follow ing qualities: rigour o f argument; originality o f ideas; illum i­
nation o f a significant philosophical question; clarity o f presen­
tation; and relevance to an im portant practical problem . T h e last o f
these may be considered to be a prerequisite for entry in a collection
such as this, rather than a characteristic excellence; but in com bina­
tion with one or m ore o f the other qualities it can m ake a m arked
difference to the overall value o f an article. T h e greater the
im portance o f a topic in all our lives, the m ore thoroughly it will
have been discussed outside philosophy; there is then special merit
in adding som ething new which shifts the discussion to a higher
level.
I shall not go through each o f the articles which follow , and
explain in just which o f these qualities I considered them to excel.
B ut for those seeking exam ples o f the kind o f rigorous argument
that is so im portant to the subject, I w ould recom m end D avid
H um e’s classic essay on suicide, James R ach els’s dissection o f the
alleged significance o f the distinction between active and passive
euthanasia, Jonathan G lo v e r’s -consideration o f the tempting
thought that ‘ It m akes no difference w hether or not I do it’ , D erek
P arfit’s ‘ O verpopulation and the Q uality o f L ife ’ , and Janet Rad-
cliffe Richards’s ‘Separate Spheres’ .
V aried form s o f originality are displayed by different articles.
T h e essays on abortion, by Judith Jarvis Thom son and by M ichael
6 IN TRO D U CTIO N
T o o le y , succeed in dealing in new ways with a topic which might
have been thought to be exhausted. The same might be said o f Louis
Pascal's striking essay, on a different but equally w ell-rehearsed
subject. O n the other hand the essays by Thom as N agel, John
H arris, Jonathan G lo ver, and D erek Parfit are original in that they
find philosophical issues in questions which had previously scarcely
been noticed.
Several o f the papers shed light on deeper ethical issues— N agel,
H arris, G lo ver, and Parfit could again serve as exam ples. The
proper m ode o f argument in ethics is particularly central to R . M.
H are’s ‘W hat is W rong with Slavery?’ Clarity is a special virtue of
m any o f the essays, including those by John Stuart M ill. Harris,
T o o ley , G lo ver, Parfit, H are, Richards, and (I hope) my own.
A s for relevance to im portant practical problem s, that is, as I
have said, satisfied by all those articles which have been included.
B ut we should not take it for granted. A n yo n e reading Thom son or
T o o ley on abortion must gain a clearer insight into where the public
debate over abortion— which has for so long been fixated on the
question o f w hether the foetus is ‘a human being’— has missed the
central issues. T o provide such an insight is no small achievem ent.
Sim ilarly, while feminist writers have produced m any volum es of
essays on the position o f w om en, how many of them have dissected
the arguments o f their opponents with the care and precision shown
in R ichards’s w ork? Nicholas M easor’s application o f gam es theory
to the nuclear arms race is another illustration of the diverse ways in
which philosophers can use their skills to challenge conventional
wisdom and contribute to public debates on issues o f ultimate
practical im portance.

A lth o u gh applied ethics has now established itself in academ ia, it

still has its critics. Behind much o f the criticism lies the belief that
ethics is the realm o f feeling and em otion: if there can be no
o bjective truth in ethics, it may seem , there can be no scope for
reason and argum ent. T he premiss is, o f course, controversial; but
even if we accept it, the conclusion does not follow . In general, the
articles in this anthology take no stance on the question o f the status
o f ethical judgem ents. The authors argue from widely accepted
prem isses; or they seek to persuade by exposing inconsistencies and
 INTRODU CTION 7
arbitrary distinctions in opposing positions. A bandoning the idea of
objective truth in ethics should not mean abandoning the standards
o f consistency and relevance we uphold in other aspects o f our lives.
But I shall not go into such theoretical questions now; the articles
which follow are the best defence o f the claim that reason and
argument have a role to play in the solution o f practical ethical
issues.
*

For encouraging me to take on this project, I thank Lloyd H um ber-

stone; for advice on the contents. D erek Parfit, H elga Kuhse and
A u b rey Tow nsend; and for secretarial assistance, Lois O sborn. The
final responsibility for the contents (and the omissions) is, o f course,
mine.
P. S.

A p ril ig 86
i
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\
I

I
 I

DEATH
TH OM AS N AG EL

I f death is the u n e q u iv o c a l and p e rm a nent en d o f o u r ex iste n ce, the

q uestion arises w h e t h e r it is a b ad thing to die.
T h ere is conspicuous disagreem ent about the m atter: some
people think death is dreadful; others have no objection to death
per se, though they hope their own will be neither prem ature nor
painful. Those in the form er category tend to think those in the
latter are blind to the obvious, while the latter suppose the form er to
be prey to som e sort o f confusion. O n the one hand it can be said
that life is all we have and the loss o f it is the greatest loss we can
sustain. O n the other hand it may be objected that death deprives
this supposed loss o f its subject, and that if we realize that death is
not an unim aginable condition o f the persisting person, but a mere
blank, we will see that it can have no value w hatever, positive or
negative.
Since I want to leave aside the question whether we are, or might
b e, im m ortal in som e form , I shall simply use the word ‘d eath ’ and
its cognates in this discussion to m ean permanent death, unsup­
plem ented by any form o f conscious survival. I want to ask whether
death is in itself an evil; and how great an evil, and o f what kind, it
might be. T h e question should be o f interest even to those who
believe in som e form o f im m ortality, for o n e’s attitude toward
im m ortality must depend in part on o n e’s attitude toward death.
If death is an evil at all, it cannot be because o f its positive
features, but only because o f what it deprives us of. I shall try to deal
with the difficulties surrounding the natural view that death is an
evil because it brings to an end all the goods that life contains. W e
need not give an account o f these goods here, except to observe that
som e o f them , like perception, desire, activity, and thought, are so
T h o m as N a g e l, ‘ D e a th ’ from M ortal Q uestions (1979 ), pp. 1-10 . R ep rin ted by
perm ission o f C a m b rid ge U n iv ersity Press and the author.
10 THOMAS NAGEL
general as to be constitutive o f human life. T h ey are widely
regarded as form idable benefits in them selves, despite the fact that
they are conditions o f m isery as well as o f happiness, and that a
sufficient quantity o f m ore particular evils can perhaps outweigh
them . That is what is m eant, I think, by the allegation that it is good
sim ply to be alive, even if one is undergoing terrible experiences.
The situation is roughly this: There are elem ents which, if added to
o n e’s experience, m ake life better; there are other elem ents which,
if added to o n e’s experience, m ake life worse. But what remains
when these are set aside is not m erely neutral: it is em phatically
positive. T herefore life is w orth living even when the bad elem ents
o f experience are plentiful, and the good ones too m eagre to
outweigh the bad ones on their own. The additional positive weight
is supplied by experience itself, rather than by any o f its contents.
I shall not discuss the value that one person’s life or death may
have for others, or its objective value, but only the value it has for
the person who is its subject. That seems to me the primary case,
and the case which presents the greatest difficulties. Let me add
only two observations. First, the value o f life and its contents does
not attach to m ere organic survival: almost everyone would be
indifferent (other things equal) betw een im mediate death and
im m ediate com a follow ed by death twenty years later without
reaw akening. A n d second, like most goods, this can be m ultiplied
by time: m ore is better than less. The added quantities need not be
tem porally continuous (though continuity has its social advanta­
ges). People are attracted to the possibility o f long-term suspended
anim ation or freezing, follow ed by the resumption o f conscious life,
because they can regard it from within simply as a continuation of
their present life. If these techniques are ever perfected, what from
outside appeared as a dorm ant interval o f three hundred years
could be experienced by the subject as nothing m ore than a sharp
discontinuity in the character o f his experiences. I do not deny, of
course, that this has its own disadvantages. Family and friends m ay
have died in the m eantim e; the language may have changed; the
com forts o f social, geographical, and cultural fam iliarity would be
lacking. N evertheless these inconveniences would not obliterate
the basic advantage o f continued, though discontinuous, existence.
If we turn from what is good about life to what is bad about death,
 DEATH II
the case is com pletely different. Essentially, though there m ay be
problem s about their specification, what we find desirable in life are
certain states, conditions, or types o f activity. It is being alive, doing
certain things, having certain experiences, that we consider good.
But if death is an evil, it is the loss o f life, rather than the state o f
being dead, or non-existent, or unconscious, that is o b jectio n a b le.1
This asym m etry is im portant. If it is good to be alive, that advantage
can be attributed to a person at each point o f his life. It is a good of
which Bach had m ore than Schubert, simply because he lived
longer. D eath , how ever, is not an evil o f which Shakespeare has so
far received a larger portion than Proust. If death is a disadvantage,
it is not easy to say when a man suffers it.
T h ere are two other indications that we do not o bject to death
m erely because it involves long periods o f non-existence. First, as
has been m entioned, most o f us w ould not regard the temporary
suspension o f life, even for substantial intervals, as in itself a
m isfortune. If it ever happens that people can be frozen without
reduction o f the conscious life-span, it will be inappropriate to pity
those who are tem porarily out o f circulation. Second, none o f us
existed b efore w e w ere born (or co n ceived ), but few regard that as a
m isfortune. I shall have m ore to say about this later.
T h e point that death is not regarded as an unfortunate state
enables us to refute a curious but very com m on suggestion about the
origin o f the fear o f death. It is often said that those who o bject to
death have m ade the m istake o f trying to imagine what it is like to be
dead. It is alleged that the failure to realize that this task is logically
im possible (for the banal reason that there is nothing to imagine)
leads to the conviction that death is a m ysterious and therefore
terrifying prospective state. B ut this diagnosis is evidently false, for
it is just as im possible to im agine being totally unconscious as to
im agine being dead (though it is easy enough to im agine oneself,
from the outside, in either o f those conditions). Y e t people who are
averse to death are not usually averse to unconsciousness (so long as
it does not entail a substantial cut in the total duration o f waking
life).
If we are to m ake sense o f the view that to die is bad, it must be on
1 It is som etim es su ggested that w h at w e really m ind is the process o f dying. B u t I
sh ou ld not re a lly o b je c t to d yin g if it w ere not fo llo w e d b y death.
12 THOMAS NAGEL
the ground that life is a good and death is the corresponding
deprivation or loss, bad not because o f any positive features but
because o f the desirability o f what it rem oves. W e must now turn to
the serious difficulties which this hypothesis raises, difficulties about
loss and privation in general, and about death in particular.
E ssentially, there are three types o f problem . First, doubt m ay be
raised w hether anything can be bad for a man without being
positively unpleasant to him: specifically, it may be doubted that
there are any evils which consist m erely in the deprivation or
absence o f possible goods, and which do not depend on som eone’s
minding that deprivation. Second, there are special difficulties, in
the case o f death, about how the supposed m isfortune is to be
assigned to a subject at all. T here is doubt both as to who its subject
is, and as to when he undergoes it. So long as a person exists, he has
not yet died, and once he has died, he no longer exists; so there
seem s to be no time when death, if it is a m isfortune, can be ascribed
to its unfortunate subject. The third type o f difficulty concerns the
asym m etry, m entioned above, betw een our attitudes to posthu­
mous and pre-natal non-existence. H ow can the form er be bad if the
latter is not?
It should be recognized that if these are valid objections to
counting death as an evil, they will apply to many other supposed
evils as well. T h e first type o f objection is expressed in general form
by the com m on rem ark that what you don’t know can’t hurt you. It
means that even if a man is betrayed by his friends, ridiculed behind
his back, and despised by people who treat him politely to his face,
none o f it can be counted as a m isfortune for him so long as he does
not suffer as a result. It means that a man is not injured if his wishes
are ignored by the executor o f his will, or if, after his death, the
b elief becom es current that all the literary works on which his fam e
rests w ere really written by his brother, who died in M exico at the
age o f 28. It seem s to me worth asking what assumptions about good
and evil lead to these drastic restrictions.
A ll the questions have som ething to do with time. T here certainly
are goods and evils o f a simple kind (including some pleasures and
pains) which a person possesses at a given time simply in virtue of
his condition at that time. But this is not true o f all the things we
regard as good or bad for a man. O ften we need to know his history
 DEATH 13
to tell w hether som ething is a m isfortune or not; this applies to ills
like deterioration, deprivation, and dam age. Som etim es his
experiential state is relatively unim portant— as in the case o f a man
who wastes his life in the cheerful pursuit o f a m ethod o f com m uni­
cating with asparagus plants. Som eone who holds that all goods and
evils must be tem porally assignable states o f the person m ay, of
course, try to bring difficult cases into line by pointing to the
pleasure or pain that m ore com plicated goods and evils cause. Loss,
betrayal, deception, and ridicule are on this view bad because
people suffer when they learn o f them. But it should be asked how
our ideas o f human value w ould have to be constituted to accom ­
m odate these cases directly instead. O ne advantage o f such an
account might be that it w ould enable us to explain why the
discovery o f these m isfortunes causes suffering— in a way that
m akes it reasonable. For the natural view is that the discovery of
betrayal m akes us unhappy because it is bad to be betrayed— not
that betrayal is bad because its discovery m akes us unhappy.
It therefore seems to me worth exploring the position that most
good and ill fortune has as its subject a person identified by his
history and his possibilities, rather than m erely by his categorical
state o f the m om ent— and that while this subject can be exactly
located in a sequence o f places and tim es, the same is not necessarily
true o f the goods and ills that befall him .2
T hese ideas can be illustrated by an exam ple o f deprivation
whose severity approaches that o f death. Suppose an intelligent
person receives a brain injury that reduces him to the mental
condition o f a contented infant, and that such desires as remain to
him can be satisfied by a custodian, so that he is free from care. Such
a developm ent would be widely regarded as a severe m isfortune,
not only for his friends and relations, or for society, but also, and
prim arily, for the person himself. This does not mean that a
contented infant is unfortunate. The intelligent adult who has been
reduced to this condition is the subject o f the m isfortune. H e is the
one we pity, though o f course he does not mind his condition— there
is som e doubt, in fact, w hether he can be said to exist any longer.
T h e view that such a man has suffered a m isfortune is open to the
2 It is c erta in ly not true in gen eral o f the things that can be said o f him . F o r
exa m p le , A b ra h a m L incoln w as taller than L o u is X I V . B u t w h en ?
14 THOMAS NAGEL
sam e objections which have been raised in regard to death. H e does
not mind his condition. It is in fact the same condition he was in at
the age o f three m onths, except that he is bigger. If we did not pity
him then, why pity him now; in any case, who is there to pity? The
intelligent adult has disappeared, and for a creature like the one
before us, happiness consists in a full stom ach and a dry diaper.
If these objections are invalid, it must be because they rest on a
m istaken assum ption about the tem poral relation betw een the
subject o f a m isfortune and the circumstances which constitute it. If,
instead o f concentrating exclusively on the over-sized baby before
us, we consider the person he was, and the person he could be now,
then his reduction to this state and the cancellation o f his natural
adult developm ent constitute a perfectly intelligible catastrophe.
This case should convince us that it is arbitrary to restrict the
goods and evils that can befall a man to non-relational properties
ascribable to him at particular times. A s it stands, that restriction
excludes not only such cases o f gross degeneration, but also a good
deal o f what is im portant about success and failure, and other
features o f a life that have the character o f processes. I believe we
can go further, how ever. There are goods and evils which are
irreducibly relational; they are features o f the relations betw een a
person, with spatial and tem poral boundaries o f the usual sort, and
circum stances which m ay not coincide with him either in space or in
time. A m an’s life includes much that does not take place within the
boundaries o f his body and his mind, and what happens to him can
include much that does not take place within the boundaries o f his
life. These boundaries are com m only crossed by the m isfortunes o f
being deceived, or despised, or betrayed. (If this is correct, there is
a simple account o f what is wrong with breaking a deathbed
prom ise. It is an injury to the dead man. For certain purposes it is
possible to regard time as just another type o f distance.) The case of
mental degeneration shows us an evil that depends on a contrast
betw een the reality and the possible alternatives. A man is the
subject of good and evil as much because he has hopes which may or
m ay not be fulfilled, or possibilities which may or may not be
realized, as because o f his capacity to suffer and enjoy. If death is an
evil, it must be accounted for in these term s, and the impossibility of
locating it within life should not trouble us.
 DEATH 15
W hen a man dies we are left with his corpse, and while a corpse
can suffer the kind o f mishap that may occur to an article of
furniture, it is not a suitable o bject for pity. The m an, how ever, is.
H e has lost his life, and if he had not died, he would have continued
to live it, and to possess w hatever good there is in living. If we apply
to death the account suggested for the case o f dem entia, we shall say
that although the spatial and tem poral locations o f the individual
w ho suffered the loss are clear enough, the m isfortune itself cannot
be so easily located. O ne must be content just to state that his life is
o ver and there will never be any more o f it. That fact, rather than his
past or present condition, constitutes his m isfortune, if it is one.
N evertheless if there is a loss, som eone must suffer it, and he must
have existence and specific spatial and tem poral location even if the
loss itself does not. The fact that B eethoven had no children may
have been a cause o f regret to him, or a sad thing for the world, but it
cannot be described as a m isfortune for the children that he never
had. A ll o f us, I believe, are fortunate to have been born. But unless
good and ill can be assigned to an em bryo, or even to an unconnec­
ted pair o f gam etes, it cannot be said that not to be born is a
m isfortune. (That is a factor to be considered in deciding whether
abortion and contraception are akin to m urder.)
This approach also provides a solution to the problem of
tem poral asym m etry, pointed out by Lucretius. H e observed that
no one finds it disturbing to contem plate the eternity preceding his
own birth, and he took this to show that it must be irrational to fear
death, since death is simply the m irror image o f the prior abyss.
Th at is not true, how ever, and the difference betw een the two
explains why it is reasonable to regard them differently. It is true
that both the tim e before a m an’s birth and the time after his death
are times when he does not exist. But the time after his death is time
o f which his death deprives him. It is time in which, had he not died
then, he would be alive. T herefore any death entails the loss o f some
life that its victim would have led had he not died at that or any
earlier point. W e know perfectly well what it would be for him to
have had it instead o f losing it, and there is no difficulty in
identifying the loser.
But we cannot say that the time prior to a m an’s birth is time in
which he w ould have lived had he been born not then but earlier.
i6 THOMAS NAGEL
For aside from the brief margin perm itted by prem ature labour, he
could not have been born earlier: anyone born substantially earlier
than he was w ould have been som eone else. T h erefore the time
prior to his birth is not time in which his subsequent birth prevents
him from living. His birth, when it occurs, does not entail the loss to
him o f any life w hatever.
T he direction o f time is crucial in assigning possibilities to people
or other individuals. Distinct possible lives of a single person can
diverge from a com m on beginning, but they cannot converge to a
com m on conclusion from diverse beginnings. (The latter would
represent not a set o f different possible lives o f one individual, but a
set o f distinct possible individuals, whose lives have identical
conclusions.) G iven an identifiable individual, countless possibili­
ties for his continued existence are im aginable, and we can clearly
conceive o f what it w ould be for him to go on existing indefinitely.
H ow ever inevitable it is that this will not com e about, its possibility
is still that o f the continuation o f a good for him , if life is the good we
take it to b e .3
W e are left, therefore, with the question whether the non­
realization o f this possibility is in every case a m isfortune, or

3 I co n fess to b ein g tro u b led b y the above argu m en t, on the groun d that it is too
so p h isticated to exp lain the sim ple d ifferen ce b etw een ou r attitudes to pre-n atal and
posth u m ou s n o n -existen ce. F o r this reason I suspect that som eth in g essential is
o m itted from the acco u n t o f the badness o f death by an analysis w hich treats it as a
d ep riv atio n o f possibilities. M y suspicion is su ppo rted b y the fo llo w in g su ggestion o f
R o b e rt N o zick . W e co u ld im agin e discoverin g that p eople d ev e lo p e d from
in d ivid u al spores that had e xisted in d efin itely far in advan ce o f th eir birth. In this
fa n ta sy , birth n e ve r occurs n atu rally m ore than a h undred years b e fo re the p e rm a ­
n ent end o f the sp o re ’s existen ce. B u t then w e d iscover a w a y to trigg er the
p rem atu re hatch in g o f these sp o res, and p eo p le are born w h o h ave thousands o f
y ears o f active life b e fo re them . G iv e n such a situ ation , it w ou ld be possible to
im agin e o n e s e lf havin g com e into existen ce thousan d s o f years p reviou sly. If w e put
aside the qu estion w h eth er this w ou ld really be the sam e p erson , e ve n given the
id en tity o f the sp o re , then the co n seq u en ce appears to be that a p erson 's birth at a
given tim e c o u ld d ep rive him o f m any earlier years o f possible life. N ow w h ile it
w o u ld be cause for re gret that on e had been d ep rived o f all those possible years o f life
b y b ein g born to o la te, the feelin g w o u ld d iffer from that w hich m an y p eo p le h ave
a bou t d eath . I co n clu d e that som eth in g abou t the fu tu re prospect o f perm an en t
nothingness is not cap tu red b y the analysis in term s o f d en ied possibilities. If so, then
L u cre tiu s’ argum en t still aw aits an answ er. I suspect that it req u ires a gen eral
treatm en t o f the d ifferen ce b etw een past and fu tu re in our attitudes tow ard ou r ow n
lives. O u r attitu d es tow ard past and fu tu re pain are very d iffe re n t, for exam p le.
D e re k P arfit’s un pu blish ed w ritin gs on this to p ic h ave re v ea le d its d ifficu lty to m e.
 DEATH 17
w hether it depends on what can naturally be hoped for. This seems
to me the most serious difficulty with the view that death is always
an evil. E ven if we can dispose o f the objections against admitting
m isfortune that is not experienced, or cannot be assigned to a
definite time in the person’s life, we still have to set som e limits on
how possible a possibility must be for its non-realization to be a
m isfortune (or good fortune, should the possibility be a bad one).
T h e death o f K eats at 24 is generally regarded as tragic; that of
T o lstoy at 82 is not. A lth ou gh they will both be dead for ever,
K e a ts’s death deprived him o f many years o f life which w ere
allow ed to T olstoy; so in a clear sense K ea ts’s loss was greater
(though not in the sense standardly em ployed in mathem atical
com parison betw een infinite quantities). H ow ever, this does not
prove that T o lsto y ’s loss was insignificant. Perhaps w e record an
objection only to evils which are gratuitously added to the inevit­
able; the fact that it is worse to die at 24 than at 82 does not imply
that it is not a terrible thing to die at 82, or even at 806. The question
is w hether we can regard as a m isfortune any lim itation, like
m ortality, that is normal to the species. Blindness or near-blindness
is not a m isfortune for a m ole, nor would it be for a man, if that were
the natural condition o f the human race.
T h e trouble is that life fam iliarizes us with the goods o f which
death deprives us. W e are already able to appreciate them , as a
m ole is not able to appreciate vision. If w e put aside doubts about
their status as goods and grant that their quantity is in part a
function o f their duration, the question remains w hether death, no
m atter when it occurs, can be said to deprive its victim o f what is in
the relevant sense a possible continuation o f life.
T h e situation is an am biguous one. O bserved from without,
human beings obviously have a natural life-span and cannot live
much longer than a hundred years. A m an’s sense o f his own
experience, on the other hand, does not em body this idea o f a
natural limit. His existence defines for him an essentially open-
ended possible future, containing the usual m ixture o f goods and
evils that he has found so tolerable in the past. H aving been
gratuitously introduced to the world by a collection o f natural,
historical, and social accidents, he finds him self the subject o f a life,
with an indeterm inate and not essentially limited future. V iew ed in
i8 THOMAS NAGEL
this w ay, death, no m atter how inevitable, is an abrupt cancellation
o f indefinitely extensive possible goods. Norm ality seems to have
nothing to do with it, for the fact that we will all inevitably die in a
few score years cannot by itself imply that it would not be good to
live longer. Suppose that we were all inevitably going to die in
agony— physical agony lasting six months. W ould inevitability
m ake that prospect any less unpleasant? A nd why should it be
different for a deprivation? If the normal life-span w ere a thousand
years, death at 80 w ould be a tragedy. A s things are, it m ay just be a
m ore widespread tragedy. If there is no limit to the amount o f life
that it w ould be good to have, then it may be that a bad end is in
store for us all.
 II
OF SUICIDE
D A V ID HUM E

O n e considerable advantage that arises from Philosophy, consists

in the sovereign antidote which it affords to superstition and false
religion. A ll other rem edies against the pestilent distem per are
vain, or at least uncertain. Plain good sense and the practice o f the
w orld, which alone serve most purposes o f life, are here found
ineffectual: H istory as well as daily experience furnish instances o f
m en endow ed with the strongest capacity for business and affairs,
w ho have all their lives crouched under slavery to the grossest
superstition. E ven gaiety and sweetness o f tem per, which infuse a
balm into every other w ound, afford no rem edy to so virulent a
poison; as we m ay particularly observe o f the fair Sex, w ho, th o’
com m only possest o f these rich presents o f nature, feel many of
their joys blasted by this im portunate intruder. B ut when sound
Philosophy has once gained possession o f the mind, superstition is
effectually excluded; and one may fairly affirm, that her triumph
o ver this enem y is m ore com plete than over most o f the vices and
im perfections incident to human nature. L ove or anger, am bition,
or avarice, have their root in the tem per and affections, which the
soundest reason is scarce ever able fully to correct; but superstition
being founded on false opinion, must im m ediately vanish when true
philosophy has inspired juster sentiments o f superior powers. The
contest is here m ore equal betw een the distem per and the m edicine,
and nothing can hinder the latter from proving effectual, but its
being false and sophisticated.
It will here be superfluous to m agnify the merits o f philosophy, by
displaying the pernicious tendency o f that vice o f which it cures the
human mind. T he superstitious man, says T u l l y , 1 is m iserable in

P u b lish ed posth u m o u sly in 1784 and reprin ted from The P h ilo so p h ica l W orks o f
D a v id H u m e , ed. T . H . G r e e n and T . H . G o sse (L o n d o n , 1874-5).
1 D e D iv in . lib. ii. 72, 150.
20 DAVID HU M E
every scene, in every incident o f life; even sleep itself, which
banishes all other cares o f unhappy m ortals, affords to him matter
o f new terror; while he exam ines his dream s, and finds in those
visions o f the night prognostications o f future calam ities. I may add,
that th o ’ death alone can put a full period to his m isery, he dares not
fly to this refuge, but still prolongs a m iserable existence from a vain
fear lest he offend his m aker, by using the pow er, with which that
beneficent being has endow ed him. The presents o f G o d and nature
are ravished from us by his cruel enem y; and notwithstanding that
one step w ould rem ove us from the regions o f pain and sorrow , her
m enaces still chain us down to a hated being, which she herself
chiefly contributes to render m iserable.
’Tis observed by such as have been reduced by the calam ities of
life to the necessity o f em ploying this fatal rem edy, that if the
unseasonable care o f their friends deprive them o f that species of
D eath , which they proposed to them selves, they seldom venture
upon any other, or can summon up so much resolution a second
tim e, as to execute their purpose. So great is our horror o f death,
that when it presents itself, under any form , besides that to which a
man has endeavoured to reconcile his im agination, it acquires new
terrors and overcom es his feeble courage: B ut when the m enaces o f
superstition are joined to this natural tim idity, no w onder it quite
deprives men o f all pow er over their lives, since even many
pleasures and enjoym ents, to which we are carried by a strong
propensity, are torn from us by this inhuman tyrant. L et us here
endeavour to restore men to their native liberty by exam ining all the
com m on arguments against Suicide, and shewing that that action
m ay be free from every im putation o f guilt or blam e, according to
the sentim ents o f all the antient philosophers.
If Suicide be crim inal, it must be a transgression o f our duty either
to G o d , our neighbour, or ourselves.— T o prove that suicide is no
transgression o f our duty to G o d , the follow ing considerations may
perhaps suffice. In order to govern the material world, the alm ighty
C reato r has established general and im mutable laws by which all
bodies, from the greatest planet to the smallest particle o f m atter,
are m aintained in their proper sphere and function. T o govern the
animal w orld, he has endow ed all living creatures with bodily and
m ental powers; with senses, passions, appetites, m em ory and
 OF S U I C I D E 21

judgem ent, by which they are im pelled or regulated in that course

o f life to which they are destined. These two distinct principles of
the m aterial and animal w orld, continually encroach upon each
other, and m utually retard or forward each oth er’s operations. The
pow ers o f men and o f all other animals are restrained and directed
by the nature and qualities o f the surrounding bodies; and the
m odifications and actions o f these bodies are incessantly altered by
the operation o f all animals. M an is stopt by rivers in his passage
o ver the surface o f the earth; and rivers, when properly directed,
lend their force to the motion o f m achines, which serve to the use o f
man. But th o ’ the provinces o f the m aterial and animal powers are
not kept entirely separate, there results from thence no discord or
disorder in the creation; on the contrary, from the m ixture, union
and contrast o f all the various powers o f inanimate bodies and living
creatures, arises that surprising harm ony and proportion which
affords the surest argument o f suprem e wisdom. T he providence o f
the D eity appears not im m ediately in any operation, but governs
everything by those general and im mutable laws, which have been
established from the beginning o f time. A ll events, in one sense,
m ay be pronounced the action o f the A lm ighty; they all proceed
from those powers with which he has endowed his creatures. A
house which falls by its own weight is not brought to ruin by his
providence m ore than one destroyed by the hands o f men; nor are
the human faculties less his workm anship, than the laws o f motion
and gravitation. W hen the passions play, when the judgem ent
dictates, when the limbs obey; this is all the operation o f G o d , and
upon these anim ate principles, as well as upon the inanim ate, has he
established the governm ent o f the universe. E very event is alike
im portant in the eyes o f that infinite being, who takes in at one
glance the most distant regions o f space and rem otest periods o f
time. There is no event, how ever im portant to us, which he has
exem pted from the general laws that govern the universe, or which
he has peculiarly reserved for his own im mediate action and
operation. T he revolution o f states and em pires depends upon the
sm allest caprice or passion o f single men; and the lives o f men are
shortened or extended by the smallest accident o f air or diet,
sunshine or tem pest. N ature still continues her progress and opera­
tion; and if general laws be ever broke by particular volitions o f the
22 DAVID HUM E
D eity , ’tis after a m anner which entirely escapes human observa­
tion. A s , on the one hand, the elem ents and other inanimate parts
o f the creation carry on their action without regard to the particular
interest and situation o f men; so men are entrusted to their own
judgem ent and discretion, in the various shocks o f m atter, and may
em ploy every faculty with which they are endow ed, in order to
provide for their ease, happiness, or preservation. W hat is the
m eaning then o f that principle, that a man who, tired o f life, and
hunted by pain and m isery, bravely overcom es all the natural
terrors o f death and m akes his escape from this cruel scene; that
such a m an, I say, has incurred the indignation o f his C reator by
encroaching on the office o f divine providence, and disturbing the
order o f the universe? shall we assert that the A lm igh ty has reserved
to him self in any peculiar m anner the disposal of the lives o f men,
and has not subm itted that event, in com m on with others, to the
general laws by which the universe is governed? This is plainly false;
the lives o f men depend upon the same laws as the lives o f all other
animals; and these are subjected to the general laws o f matter and
m otion. The fall o f a tow er, or the infusion o f a poison, will destroy
a man equally with the meanest creature; an inundation sweeps
away every thing without distinction that com es within the reach o f
its fury. Since therefore the lives o f men are for ever dependent on
the general laws o f m atter and m otion, is a m an’s disposing o f his
life crim inal, because in every case it is criminal to encroach upon
these laws, or disturb their operation? But this seems absurd; all
animals are entrusted to their own prudence and skill for their
conduct in the world, and have full authority, as far as their power
extends, to alter all the operations o f nature. W ithout the exercise
o f this authority they could not subsist a m om ent; every action,
every m otion o f a man, innovates on the order o f som e parts of
m atter, and diverts from their ordinary course the general laws of
m otion. Putting together, therefore, these conclusions, we find that
human life depends upon the general laws o f matter and m otion,
and that it is no encroachm ent on the office o f providence to disturb
or alter these general laws: Has not every one, o f consequence, the
free disposal o f his own life? A n d m ay he not lawfully em ploy that
pow er with which nature has endowed him? In order to destroy the
evidence o f this conclusion, we must shew a reason, why this
 OF SU IC ID E 23
particular case is excepted; is it because human life is o f so great
im portance, that ’tis a presum ption for human prudence to dispose
o f it? But the life o f a man is o f no greater im portance to the
universe than that o f an oyster. A n d w ere it o f ever so great
im portance, the order o f nature has actually submitted it to human
prudence, and reduced us to a necessity in every incident of
determ ining concerning it. W ere the disposal o f human life so much
reserved as the peculiar province o f the A lm ighty that it w ere an
encroachm ent on his right, for men to dispose o f their own lives; it
w ould be equally criminal to act for the preservation o f life as for its
destruction. If I turn aside a stone which is falling upon my head, I
disturb the course o f nature, and I invade the peculiar province of
the A lm igh ty by lengthening out my life beyond the period which by
the general laws o f m atter and motion he had assigned it.
A hair, a fly, an insect is able to destroy this m ighty being whose
life is o f such im portance. Is it an absurdity to suppose that human
prudence m ay law fully dispose o f what depends on such insignifi­
cant causes? It w ould be no crime in me to divert the N ile or Danube
from its course, w ere I able to effect such purposes. W here then is
the crime o f turning a few ounces o f blood from their natural
channel?— D o you im agine that I repine at providence or curse my
creation, because I go out o f life, and put a period to a being, which,
w ere it to continue, would render me m iserable? Far be such
sentim ents from m e; I am only convinced o f a matter o f fact, which
you you rself acknow ledge possible, that human life may be
unhappy, and that my existence, if further prolonged, would
becom e ineligible: but I thank providence, both for the good which
I have already en joyed, and for the pow er with which I am endowed
o f escaping the ill that threatens m e.2 T o you it belongs to repine at
p rovidence, who foolishly im agine that you have no such pow er,
and who must still prolong a hated life, th o’ loaded with pain and
sickness, with shame and poverty.— D o you not teach, that when
any ill befalls m e, tho’ by the m alice o f my enem ies, I ought to be
resigned to providence, and that the actions o f men are the opera­
tions o f the A lm igh ty as much as the actions o f inanimate beings?
W hen I fall upon my own sword, therefore, I receive my death
equally from the hands o f the D eity as if it had proceeded from a
2 A g a m u s D e o gratias, qu o d n em o in vita ten eri potest. S e n ., E p ist. 12.
24 DAVID HUM E
lion, a precipice, or a fever. The submission which you require to
providence, in every calam ity that befalls m e, excludes not human
skill and industry, if possibly by their means I can avoid or escape
the calam ity: A n d why m ay I not em ploy one rem edy as well as
another?— If my life be not my own, it w ere criminal for me to put it
in danger, as well as to dispose o f it; nor could one man deserve the
appellation o f hero whom glory or friendship transports into the
greatest dangers, and another merit the reproach o f wretch or
miscreant who puts a period to his life from the same or like
m otives.— T h ere is no being, which possesses any pow er or faculty,
that it receives not from its C reator, nor is there any one, which by
ever so irregular an action can encroach upon the plan o f his
providence, or disorder the universe. Its operations are his works
equally with that chain o f events, which it invades, and which ever
principle prevails, we m ay for that very reason conclude it to be
most favoured by him. B e it anim ate, or inanim ate, rational, or
irrational; ’tis all a case: Its pow er is still derived from the suprem e
creator, and is alike com prehended in the order o f his providence.
W hen the horror o f pain prevails over the love o f life; when a
voluntary action anticipates the effects o f blind causes; ’tis only in
consequence o f those powers and principles, which he has im plan­
ted in his creatures. D ivine providence is still inviolate and placed
far beyond the reach o f human injuries.3 ’Tis im pious, says the old
R om an superstition, to divert rivers from their course, or invade the
prerogatives o f nature. ’Tis im pious, says the French superstition,
to inoculate for the sm all-pox, or usurp the business o f providence,
by voluntarily producing distempers and m aladies. ’Tis im pious,
says the m odern European superstition, to put a period to our own
life, and thereby rebel against our creator; and why not im pious, say
I, to build houses, cultivate the ground, or sail upon the ocean? In
all these actions we em ploy our powers o f mind and body, to
produce som e innovation in the course o f nature; and in none of
them do we any m ore. T h ey are all o f them therefore equally
innocent, or equally crim inal.— But you are placed by providence,
like a centinel in a particular station, and when you desert it without
being recalled, you are equally guilty o f rebellion against your
almighty sovereign, and have incurred his displeasure.— I ask, why
3 T ac it. A n n lib. i. 79.
 OF S U I C I D E 25
do you conclude that providence has placed me in this station? For
my part I find that I ow e my birth to a long chain o f causes, o f which
m any depended upon voluntary actions o f men. But Providence
guided all these Causes, and nothing happens in the universe without
its consent and Co-operation. If so, then neither does my death,
h ow ever voluntary, happen without its consent; and w henever pain
or sorrow so far overcom e my patience, as to m ake me tired o f life, I
m ay conclude that I am recalled from my station in the clearest and
m ost express terms. ’Tis Providence surely that has placed me at
this present m om ent in this cham ber: but m ay I not leave it when I
think proper, without being liable to the im putation o f having
deserted m y post or station? W hen I shall be dead, the principles o f
which I am com posed will still perform their part in the universe,
and will be equally useful in the grand fabric, as when they
com posed this individual creature. T he difference to the whole will
be no greater than betwixt my being in a cham ber and in the open
air. T h e one change is o f m ore im portance to me than the other; but
not m ore so to the universe.
’Tis a kind o f blasphem y to im agine that any created being can
disturb the order o f the world or invade the business o f providence!
It supposes, that that Being possesses powers and faculties, which it
received not from its creator, and which are not subordinate to his
governm ent and authority. A man m ay disturb society no doubt,
and thereby incur the displeasure o f the Alm ighty: But the govern­
m ent o f the world is placed far beyond his reach and violence. A n d
how does it appear that the A lm igh ty is displeased with those
actions that disturb society? B y the principles which he has im plan­
ted in human nature, and which inspire us with a sentiment o f
rem orse if we ourselves have been guilty o f such actions, and with
that o f blam e and disapprobation, if we ever observe them in
orders.— L et us now exam ine, according to the m ethod proposed,
w hether Suicide be o f this kind o f actions, and be a breach o f our
duty to our neighbour and to society.
A m an, who retires from life, does no harm to society: H e only
ceases to do good; which, if it is an injury, is o f the low est kind.— A ll
our obligations to do good to society seem to im ply som ething
reciprocal. I receive the benefits o f society and therefore ought to
prom ote its interests, but when I withdraw m yself altogether from
26 DAVID HUM E
society, can I be bound any longer? B u t, allowing that our obliga­
tions to do good w ere perpetual, they have certainly some bounds; I
am not obliged to do a small good to society at the expense o f a great
harm to m yself; why then should I prolong a m iserable existence,
because o f som e frivolous advantage which the public m ay perhaps
receive from me? If upon account o f age and infirmities I may
law fully resign any office, and em ploy my time altogether in fencing
against these calam ities, and alleviating as much as possible the
miseries o f my future life: W hy m ay I not cut short these miseries at
once by an action which is no m ore prejudicial to society?— But
suppose that it is no longer in my pow er to prom ote the interest o f
society; suppose that I am a burthen to it; suppose that my life
hinders som e person from being much m ore useful to society. In
such cases my resignation o f life must not only be innocent but
laudable. A n d most people who lie under any tem ptation to
abandon existence, are in som e such situation; those, who have
health, or pow er, or authority, have com m only better reason to be
in hum our with the world.
A man is engaged in a conspiracy for the public interest; is seized
upon suspicion; is threatened with the rack; and knows from his
own weakness that the secret will be extorted from him: C ou ld such
a one consult the public interest better than by putting a quick
period to a m iserable life? This was the case o f the fam ous and brave
Strozi o f Florence.— A g ain , suppose a m alefactor is justly con­
dem ned to a sham eful death; can any reason be im agined, why he
m ay not anticipate his punishment, and save him self all the anguish
o f thinking on its dreadful approaches? He invades the business of
providence no m ore than the m agistrate did, who ordered his
execution; and his voluntary death is equally advantageous to
society by ridding it o f a pernicious m em ber.
That suicide m ay often be consistent with interest and with our
duty to ourselves, no one can question, who allows that age,
sickness, or m isfortune m ay render life a burthen, and m ake it
w orse even than annihilation. I believe that no man ever threw away
life, while it was worth keeping. For such is our natural horror o f
death, that small m otives will never be able to reconcile us to it; and
though perhaps the situation o f a m an’s health or fortune did not
seem to require this rem edy, we may at least be assured, that any
 OF S U I C I D E 27

one w ho, without apparent reason, has had recourse to it, was curst
with such an incurable depravity or gloom iness o f tem per as must
poison all enjoym ent, and render him equally m iserable as if he had
been loaded with the most grievous m isfortunes.— If suicide be
supposed a crim e, ’tis only cowardice can impel us to it. If it be no
crim e, both prudence and courage should engage us to rid ourselves
at once o f existence, when it becom es a burthen. ’Tis the only way
that w e can then be useful to society, by setting an exam ple, which,
if im itated, w ould preserve to every one his chance for happiness in
life and w ould effectually free him from all danger or m isery.4

4 It w ou ld be easy to p ro ve that Suicide is as law fu l under the C h ristian

d ispen sation as it w as to the H eath en s. T h e re is not a single text o f Scrip tu re w hich
p roh ib its it. T h a t g rea t and in fallib le rule o f faith and p ractice w h ich m ust con trou l all
p h ilo so p h y and hum an reason in g, has left us in this particu lar to o u r n atural lib erty.
R esig n a tio n to P ro vid e n ce is in d eed recom m en d ed in Scrip tu re; b u t that im plies o n ly
subm ission to ills that are u n av o id a b le , not to such as m ay be rem ed ied b y p rud en ce
o r c o u ra g e . T h ou shalt not k ill, is evid en tly m eant to exclu d e on ly the killin g o f others
o v e r w h ose life w e h ave no a u th o rity. T h a t this p rece p t, like m ost o f the Scripture
p rece p ts, must be m odified by reason and com m on sen se, is plain from the p ractice o f
m agistrates, w h o punish crim inals cap itally , n otw ithstan din g the letter o f the law.
B u t w e re this com m and m en t e v e r so exp ress against su icid e, it w ou ld n ow h ave no
au th o rity , fo r all the law o f M oses is a bolish ed , exc ep t so far as it is estab lished b y the
law o f N atu re. A n d w e h ave a lread y en d e a vo u re d to p ro v e , that suicide is not
p ro h ib ited by that law . In all cases C h ristian s and H eath en s are p recisely upon the
sam e fo o tin g; Cato and B ru tu s, A rria and Portia acted h ero ically; th ose w h o now
im itate their exa m p le o u gh t to rece iv e the sam e praises from p o sterity. T h e p o w e r o f
com m ittin g su icide is regard ed b y P lin y as an a d van tage w hich m en possess even
a b o v e the d eity h im self. ‘ D e u s non sibi potest m ortem con sciscere si v elit, q uod
h om ini ded it optim um in tantis vitae poenis.” — L ib . ii. cap. 5.
 Ill
ACTIVE AND PASSIVE EUTH ANASIA
JAM E S R A C H E LS

T h e distinction betw een active and passive euthanasia is thought to

be crucial for m edical ethics. The idea is that it is perm issible, at
least in some cases, to withhold treatm ent and allow a patient to die,
but it is never perm issible to take any direct action designed to kill
the patient. This doctrine seem s to be accepted by most doctors,
and it is endorsed in a statem ent adopted by the H ouse o f D elegates
o f the A m erican M edical A ssociation on 4 D ecem ber 1973:

T h e in te n tio n a l te rm in a tio n o f th e life o f o n e hu m an b e in g b y a n o th e r—

m e rc y k illin g — is c o n tra ry to th at fo r w h ich th e m e d ic a l p ro fe s sio n stan d s
a n d is c o n tra ry to th e p o lic y o f th e A m e r ic a n M e d ic a l A s s o c ia tio n .
T h e ce ssa tio n o f th e e m p lo y m e n t o f e x tra o rd in a ry m e a n s to p ro lo n g th e
life o f th e b o d y w h e n th e r e is irr e fu ta b le e v id e n c e th at b io lo g ic a l d e a th is
im m in e n t is th e d e c isio n o f th e p a tie n t and/or his im m e d ia te fa m ily . T h e
a d v ic e a n d ju d g e m e n t o f th e p h y sicia n sh o u ld b e fr e e ly a v a ila b le to th e
p a tie n t and/or his im m e d ia te fa m ily .

H ow ever, a strong case can be made against this doctrine. In what

follow s I will set out som e o f the relevant arguments, and urge
doctors to reconsider their view s on this matter.
T o begin with a fam iliar type o f situation, a patient who is dying of
incurable cancer o f the throat is in terrible pain, which can no longer
be satisfactorily alleviated. He is certain to die within a few days,
even if present treatm ent is continued, but he does not want to go on
living for those days since the pain is unbearable. So he asks the
doctor for an end to it, and his fam ily joins in the request.
Suppose the doctor agrees to withhold treatm ent, as the conven­
tional doctrine says he may. The justification for his doing so is that
the patient is in terrible agony, and since he is going to die anyw ay, it
Jam es R a c h e ls. ‘A c tiv e and Passive E u th a n asia ’ , The New E n gland Journal o f
M ed icin e, V o l. 292, pp. 7 8 -8 0 ,19 7 5 . C o p y righ t 1975 M assachusetts M ed ica l S ociety.
R e p rin te d b y perm ission .
30 JAMES RACHELS
would be wrong to prolong his suffering needlessly. But now notice
this. If one simply withholds treatm ent, it may take the patient
longer to die, and so he m ay suffer m ore than he would if m ore
direct action w ere taken and a lethal injection given. This fact
provides strong reason for thinking that, once the initial decision
not to prolong his agony has been m ade, active euthanasia is
actually preferable to passive euthanasia, rather than the reverse.
T o say otherwise is to endorse the option that leads to m ore
suffering rather than less, and is contrary to the humanitarian
impulse that prom pts the decision not to prolong his life in the first
place.
Part o f my point is that the process o f being ‘allow ed to d ie’ can be
relatively slow and painful, whereas being given a lethal injection is
relatively quick and painless. L et me give a different sort of
exam ple. In the U nited States about one in 600 babies is born with
D ow n 's syndrom e. M ost o f these babies are otherwise healthy—
that is, with only the usual pediatric care, they will proceed to an
otherwise normal infancy. Som e, how ever, are born with con­
genital defects such as intestinal obstructions that require op era­
tions if they are to live. Som etim es, the parents and the doctor will
decide not to operate, and let the infant die. A n th o n y Shaw
describes what happens then:

W h e n su rg e r y is d e n ie d [the d o cto r] m u st try to k e e p th e in fa n t fro m

s u ffe rin g w h ile n atu ra l fo rc e s sap th e b a b y ’s life a w a y . A s a s u rg e o n w h o s e
n a tu ra l in clin a tio n is to u se th e sc a lp el to fight o f f d e a th , stan d in g b y and
w a tc h in g a s a lv a g e a b le b a b y d ie is th e m o st e m o tio n a lly e x h a u stin g e x p e r i­
e n c e I k n o w . It is e a s y at a c o n fe r e n c e , in a th e o re tic a l d iscu ssio n to d e c id e
th at su ch in fa n ts sh o u ld be a llo w e d to d ie . It is a lto g e th e r d iffe re n t to stan d
b y in th e n u rse ry a n d w a tc h as d e h y d ra tio n and in fe c tio n w ith e r a tin y b e in g
o v e r h o u rs a n d d a y s. T h is is a te rrib le o r d e a l fo r m e and th e h o sp ita l sta ff—
m u ch m o re so th an fo r th e p a re n ts w h o n e v e r set fo o t in th e n u r s e ry .1
I can understand why som e people are opposed to all euthanasia,
and insist that such infants must be allow ed to live. I think I can also
understand why other people favour destroying these babies
quickly and painlessly. But why should anyone favour letting
‘dehydration and infection wither a tiny being over hours and
1 S h aw , A n th o n y , ‘D o c to r , D o W e H av e a C h o ic e ? ’ The New Y o rk Tim es
M a g a zin e, 30 Jan. 1972, p. 54.
 ACTIVE AN D PASSIVE EU TH A N A SIA 31
d ays’ ? The doctrine that says a baby m ay be allowed to dehydrate
and w ither, but m ay not be given an injection that would end its life
without suffering, seem s so patently cruel as to require no further
refutation. T h e strong language is not intended to offend, but only
to put the point in the clearest possible way.
M y second argument is that the conventional doctrine leads to
decisions concerning life and death m ade on irrelevant grounds.
Consider again the case o f the infants with D o w n ’s syndrom e who
need operations for congenital defects unrelated to the syndrom e to
live. Som etim es, there is no operation, and the baby dies, but when
there is no such defect, the baby lives on. N ow , an operation such as
that to rem ove an intestinal obstruction is not prohibitively difficult.
T h e reason why such operations are not perform ed in these cases is,
clearly, that the child has D o w n ’s syndrom e and the parents and the
doctor judge that because o f that fact it is better for the child to die.
But notice that this situation is absurd, no matter what view one
takes o f the lives and potentials o f such babies. If the life o f such an
infant is w orth preserving what does it m atter if it needs a simple
operation? O r, if one thinks it better that such a baby should not live
on, what difference does it m ake that it happens to have an
unobstructed intestinal tract? In either case, the m atter o f life and
death is being decided on irrelevant grounds. It is the D o w n ’s
syndrom e, and not the intestines, that is the issue. T h e matter
should be d ecided, if at all, on that basis, and not be allow ed to
depend on the essentially irrelevant question o f whether the
intestinal tract is blocked.
W hat m akes this situation possible, o f course, is the idea that
w hen there is an intestinal blockage, one can ‘let the baby d ie’ , but
w hen there is no such defect there is nothing that can be done, for
one must not ‘kill’ it. T h e fact that this idea leads to such results as
deciding life or death on irrelevant grounds is another good reason
w hy the doctrine w ould be rejected.
O n e reason why so many people think that there is an important
moral difference betw een active and passive euthanasia is that they
think killing som eone is m orally worse than letting som eone die.
B ut is it? Is killing, in itself, worse than letting die? T o investigate
this issue, two cases may be considered that are exactly alike except
that one involves killing w hereas the other involves letting som eone
32 JAMES RACHELS
die. Then , it can be asked whether this difference m akes any
difference to the m oral assessments. It is important that the cases be
exactly alike, except for this one difference, since otherwise one
cannot be confident that it is this difference and not som e other that
accounts for any variation in the assessments o f the two cases. So,
let us consider this pair o f cases:
In the first, Smith stands to gain a large inheritance if anything
should happen to his six-year-old cousin. O ne evening while the
child is taking his bath, Smith sneaks into the bathroom and drowns
the child, and then arranges things so that it will look like an
accident.
In the second, Jones also stands to gain if anything should happen
to his six-year-old cousin. L ike Smith, Jones sneaks in planning to
drown the child in his bath. H ow ever, just as he enters the
bathroom Jones sees the child slip and hit his head, and fall face
down in the water. Jones is delighted; he stands by, ready to push
the child’s head back under if it is necessary, but it is not necessary.
W ith only a little thrashing about, the child drowns all by himself,
‘accidentally’ , as Jones watches and does nothing.
N ow Smith killed the child, whereas Jones ‘m erely’ let the child
die. That is the only difference betw een them. D id either man
behave better, from a moral point o f view ? If the difference
betw een killing and letting die were in itself a m orally important
m atter, one should say that Jones’s behaviour was less reprehen­
sible than Sm ith’s. But does one really want to say that? I think not.
In the first place, both men acted from the same m otive, personal
gain, and both had exactly the same end in view when they acted. It
m ay be inferred from Sm ith’s conduct that he is a bad man,
although that judgem ent m ay be withdrawn or modified if certain
further facts are learned about him— for exam ple, that he is m en­
tally deranged. But would not the very same thing be inferred about
Jones from his conduct? A n d w ould not the same further considera­
tions also be relevant to any m odification o f this judgem ent?
M oreover, suppose Jones pleaded, in his own defen ce, ‘A fte r all, I
didn’t do anything except just stand there and watch the child
drown. I didn’t kill him; I only let him d ie .’ A g ain , if letting die w ere
in itself less bad than killing, this defence should have at least some
w eight. But it does not. Such a ‘defen ce’ can only be regarded as a
 A C T IV E A N D P A S S I V E E U T H A N A S I A 33
grotesque perversion o f moral reasoning. M orally speaking, it is no
defence at all.
N ow , it m ay be pointed out, quite properly, that the cases of
euthanasia with which doctors are concerned are not like this at all.
T h ey do not involve personal gain or the destruction o f normal
healthy children. D octors are concerned only with cases in which
the patient’s life is o f no further use to him, or in which the patient’s
life has becom e or will soon becom e a terrible burden. H ow ever,
the point is the sam e in these cases: the bare difference betw een
killing and letting die does not, in itself, m ake a moral difference. If
a doctor lets a patient die, for humane reasons, he is in the same
m oral position as if he had given the patient a lethal injection for
hum ane reasons. If his decision was wrong— if, for exam ple, the
patien t’s illness was in fact curable— the decision w ould be equally
regrettable no m atter which m ethod was used to carry it out. A n d if
the d octor’s decision was the right one, the m ethod used is not in
itself im portant.
T h e A M A policy statem ent isolates the crucial issue very well;
the crucial issue is ‘the intentional term ination o f the life o f one
human being by another’ . But after identifying this issue, and
forbidding ‘m ercy killing’ , the statem ent goes on to deny that the
cessation o f treatm ent is the intentional term ination o f a life. This is
w here the m istake com es in, for what is the cessation o f treatm ent,
in these circum stances, if it is not ‘the intentional term ination o f the
life o f one human being by another’? O f course it is exactly that, and
if it w ere not, there w ould be no point to it.
M any people will find this judgem ent hard to accept. O ne reason,
I think, is that it is very easy to conflate the question o f whether
killing is, in itself, worse than letting die, with the very different
question o f w hether most actual cases o f killing are m ore reprehen­
sible than most actual cases o f letting die. M ost actual cases of
killing are clearly terrible (think, for exam ple, o f all the murders
reported in the newspapers), and one hears o f such cases every day.
O n the other hand, one hardly ever hears o f a case o f letting die,
except for the actions o f doctors who are m otivated by humani­
tarian reasons. So one learns to think o f killing in a much worse light
than o f letting die. B u t this does not mean that there is som ething
about killing that m akes it in itself worse than letting d ie , for it is not
34 JAMES RACHELS
the bare difference betw een killing and letting die that m akes the
difference in these cases. R ather, the other factors— the m urderer’s
m otive o f personal gain, for exam ple, contrasted with the doctor’s
humanitarian m otivation— account for different reactions to the
different cases.
I have argued that killing is not in itself any worse than letting die;
if my contention is right, it follow s that active euthanasia is not any
worse than passive euthanasia. W hat arguments can be given on the
other side? T h e most com m on, I believe, is the following:

T h e im p o rta n t d iffe r e n c e b e tw e e n a c tiv e and p a ssive e u th a n a sia is th a t,

in p a ssive e u th a n a sia , th e d o c to r d o e s n o t d o a n y th in g to b rin g a b o u t th e
p a tie n t’s d e a th . T h e d o c to r d o e s n o th in g , and th e p a tie n t d ies o f
w h a te v e r ills a lre a d y a fflict him . In a ctiv e e u th a n a sia , h o w e v e r , th e
d o c to r d o e s s o m e th in g to b rin g a b o u t th e p a tie n t’s d e a th : h e k ills him .
T h e d o c to r w h o g iv e s th e p a tie n t w ith c a n c e r a le th a l in je c tio n has
h im se lf c a u se d his p a tie n t’ s d e a th ; w h e r e a s if h e m e re ly c e a se s tr e a t­
m e n t, th e c a n c e r is th e cau se o f the d e a th .

A num ber o f points need to be m ade here. The first is that it is not
exactly correct to say that in passive euthanasia the doctor does
nothing, for he does do one thing that is very important: he lets the
patient die. ‘Letting som eone d ie’ is certainly different, in some
respects, from other types o f action— m ainly in that it is a kind of
action that one m ay perform by way o f not perform ing certain other
actions. F or exam ple, one may let a patient die by way o f not giving
m edication, just as one m ay insult som eone by w ay o f not shaking
his hand. But for any purpose o f moral assessment, it is a type of
action none the less. The decision to let a patient die is subject to
m oral appraisal in the same way that a decision to kill him would be
subject to moral appraisal: it may be assessed as wise or unwise,
com passionate or sadistic, right or wrong. If a doctor deliberately
let a patient die who was suffering from a routinely curable illness,
the doctor w ould certainly be to blame for what he had done, just as
he w ould be to blame if he had needlessly killed the patient.
Ch arges against him would then be appropriate. If so, it w ould be
no defence at all for him to insist that he didn’t ‘do anything’ . He
w ould have done som ething very serious indeed, for he let his
patient die.
Fixing the cause o f death m ay be very important from a legal
 A C T IV E A N D P A S S I V E E U T H A N A S I A 35
point o f view , for it may determ ine whether criminal charges are
brought against the doctor. But I do not think that this notion can be
used to show a moral difference betw een active and passive
euthanasia. T he reason why it is considered bad to be the cause of
som eone’s death is that death is regarded as a great evil— and so it
is. H ow ever, if it has been decided that euthanasia— even passive
euthanasia— is desirable in a given case, it has also been decided
that in this instance death is no greater an evil than the patient’s
continued existence. A n d if this is true, the usual reason for not
wanting to be the cause o f som eone’s death simply does not apply.
Finally, doctors m ay think that all o f this is only o f academ ic
interest— the sort o f thing that philosophers may w orry about but
that has no practical bearing on their own work. A fte r all, doctors
must be concerned about the legal consequences o f what they do,
and active euthanasia is clearly forbidden by the law. But even so,
doctors should also be concerned with the fact that the law is forcing
upon them a m oral doctrine that may be indefensible, and has a
considerable effect on their practices. O f course, most doctors are
not now in the position o f being coerced in this m atter, for they do
not regard them selves as m erely going along with what the law
requires. R ather, in statem ents such as the A M A policy statem ent
that I have quoted, they are endorsing this doctrine as a central
point o f m edical ethics. In that statem ent, active euthanasia is
condem ned not m erely as illegal but as ‘contrary to that for which
the m edical profession stands’ , whereas passive euthanasia is
approved. H ow ever, the preceding considerations suggest that
there is really no moral difference betw een the two, considered in
them selves (there m ay be im portant moral differences in some
cases in their consequences, but, as I pointed out, these differences
m ay m ake active euthanasia, and not passive euthanasia, the
m orally preferable option). So, whereas doctors may have to
discriminate betw een active and passive euthanasia to satisfy the
law, they should not do any m ore than that. In particular, they
should not give the distinction any added authority and weight by
writing it into official statem ents of m edical ethics.
 IV

A DEFENCE OF ABO RTIO N 1

J U D IT H J A R V IS T H O M S O N

M ost opposition to abortion relies on the premiss that the foetus is

a human being, a person, from the m om ent of conception. The
premiss is argued for, but, as I think, not well. T a k e, for exam ple,
the most com m on argument. W e are asked to notice that the
developm ent o f a human being from conception through birth into
childhood is continuous; then it is said that to draw a line, to choose
a point in this developm ent and say ‘before this point the thing is not
a person, after this point it is a person’ is to m ake an arbitrary
choice, a choice for which in the nature o f things no good reason can
be given. It is concluded that the foetus is, or anyway that we had
better say it is, a person from the m om ent o f conception. But this
conclusion does not follow . Similar things might be said about the
d evelopm ent o f an acorn into an oak tree, and it does not follow that
acorns are oak trees, or that w e had better say they are. A rgum ents
o f this form are som etim es called ‘slippery slope argum ents’— the
phrase is perhaps self-explanatory— and it is dism aying that
opponents o f abortion rely on them so heavily and uncritically.
I am inclined to agree, how ever, that the prospects for ‘drawing a
line’ in the developm ent o f the foetus look dim. I am inclined to
think also that we shall probably have to agree that the foetus has
already becom e a human person well before birth. Indeed, it com es
as a surprise when one first learns how early in its life it begins to
acquire human characteristics. B y the tenth w eek, for exam ple, it
already has a face, arms and legs, fingers and toes; it has internal
organs, and brain activity is d etectable.2 O n the other hand, I think
Judith Jarvis T h o m so n , ‘A D e fe n se o f A b o r tio n ’ , Philosophy & P u b lic A ffairs i ,
N o . I (F all 19 7 1). C o p y rig h t © 1971 b y P rinceton U n iversity Press. R e p rin te d b y
perm ission.
1 I am v ery m uch in d eb ted to Jam es T h o m so n fo r d iscussion , criticism , and m an y
h elp fu l su ggestion s.
2 D a n ie l C a lla h a n , A b o rtio n : Law , C h o ice and M orality (N ew Y o r k , 1970),
38 J U D I T H J A R V IS T H O M S O N
that the premiss is false, that the foetus is not a person from the
m om ent o f co nception. A newly fertilized ovu m , a newly im planted
clump o f cells, is no m ore a person than an acorn is an oak tree. B ut I
shall not discuss any o f this. For it seems to me to be o f great interest
to ask what happens if, for the sake o f argum ent, we allow the
premiss. H ow , precisely, are we supposed to get from there to the
conclusion that abortion is m orally im perm issible? O pponents of
abortion com m only spend most o f their time establishing that the
foetus is a person, and hardly any time explaining the step from
there to the im perm issibility o f abortion. Perhaps they think the
step too simple and obvious to require much com m ent. O r perhaps
instead they are simply being econom ical in argument. M any of
those who defend abortion rely on the premiss that the foetus is not
a person, but only a bit o f tissue that will becom e a person at birth;
and why pay out m ore arguments than you have to? W hatever the
explanation, I suggest that the step they take is neither easy nor
obvious, that it calls for closer exam ination than it is com m only
given, and that when we do give it this closer exam ination we shall
feel inclined to reject it.
I propose, then, that we grant that the foetus is a person from the
m om ent o f conception. H ow does the argument go from here?
Som ething like this, I take it. E very person has a right to life. So the
foetus has a right to life. N o doubt the m other has a right to decide
what shall happen in and to her body; everyone would grant that.
But surely a person’s right to life is stronger and m ore stringent than
the m other’s right to decide what happens in and to her body, and so
outw eighs it. So the foetus m ay not be killed; an abortion m ay not
be perform ed.
It sounds plausible. But now let me ask you to im agine this. Y o u
w ake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an
unconscious violinist. A fam ous unconscious violinist. He has been
found to have a fatal kidney ailm ent, and the Society o f Music
L overs has canvassed all the available medical records and found
that you alone have the right blood type to help. T h ey have
p. 373. T h is b o o k giv es a fascin atin g su rvey o f the a vailab le in form ation on abortion.
T h e Jew ish tradition is su rveyed in D a vid M . F eld m a n , Birth C o n tro l in Jewish Law
(N e w Y o r k , 1968), Part 5 , the C a th o lic tradition in John T . N o o n an , Jr., ‘ A n A lm o st
A b s o lu te V a lu e in H isto ry ’ , in The M orality o f A b o r tio n , ed. John T . N o o n an , Jr.
(C a m b rid g e , M ass., 1970).
 A D E F E N C E OF A B O R T I O N 39
therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory
system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to
extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of
the hospital now tells you, ‘L o o k , w e’re sorry the Society o f M usic
Lovers did this to you— we w ould never have perm itted it if we had
know n. But still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into
you. T o unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it’s only
for nine m onths. B y then he will have recovered from his ailm ent,
and can safely be unplugged from y o u .’ Is it m orally incum bent on
you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be very nice of
you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it?
W hat if it w ere not nine m onths, but nine years? O r longer still?
W hat if the director o f the hospital says, ‘Tough luck, I agree, but
y o u ’ve now got to stay in bed, with the violinist plugged into you,
for the rest o f your life. Because rem em ber this. A ll persons have a
right to life, and violinists are persons. G ranted you have a right to
decide what happens in and to your body, but a person’s right to life
outw eighs your right to decide what happens in and to your body.
So you cannot ever be unplugged from him .’ I im agine you would
regard this as outrageous, which suggests that som ething really is
w rong with that plausible-sounding argument I m entioned a
m om ent ago.
In this case, o f course, you w ere kidnapped; you didn’t volunteer
for the operation that plugged the violinist into your kidneys. Can
those who oppose abortion on the ground I m entioned m ake an
exception for a pregnancy due to rape? Certainly. T h ey can say that
persons have a right to life only if they didn’t com e into existence
because o f rape; or they can say that all persons have a right to life,
but that som e have less o f a right to life than others, in particular,
that those who cam e into existence because o f rape have less. But
these statem ents have a rather unpleasant sound. Surely the ques­
tion o f w hether you have a right to life at all, or how much o f it you
have, shouldn’t turn on the question o f whether or not you are the
product o f a rape. A n d in fact the people who oppose abortion on
the ground I m entioned do not m ake this distinction, and hence do
not m ake an exception in case o f rape.
N or do they m ake an exception for a case in which the m other has
to spend the nine months o f her pregnancy in bed. Th ey would
40 J U D I T H J A R V IS T H O M S O N
agree that w ould be a great pity, and hard on the m other; but all the
sam e, all persons have a right to life, the foetus is a person, and so
on. I suspect, in fact, that they would not m ake an exception for a
case in which, m iraculously enough, the pregnancy went on for nine
years, or even the rest o f the m other’s life.
Som e w o n ’t even m ake an exception for a case in which continu­
ation o f the pregnancy is likely to shorten the m other’s life; they
regard abortion as imperm issible even to save the m other’s life.
Such cases are nowadays very rare, and many opponents o f abor­
tion do not accept this extrem e view . A ll the sam e, it is a good place
to begin: a num ber o f points o f interest com e out in respect to it.
i. L et us call the view that abortion is imperm issible even to save
the m other’s life ‘the extrem e view ’ . I want to suggest first that it
does not issue from the argument I m entioned earlier without the
addition o f som e fairly pow erful premisses. Suppose a wom an has
becom e pregnant, and now learns that she has a cardiac condition
such that she will die if she carries the baby to term. W hat may be
done for her? The foetus, being a person, has a right to life, but as
the m other is a person too , so has she a right to life. Presum ably they
have an equal right to life. H ow is it supposed to com e out that an
abortion may not be perform ed? If m other and child have an equal
right to life, shouldn’t we perhaps flip a coin? O r should we add to
the m other’s right to life her right to decide what happens in and to
her body, which everybod y seems to be ready to grant— the sum o f
her rights now outweighing the foetus’s right to life?
T h e most fam iliar argument here is the following. W e are told
that perform ing the abortion would be directly killing3 the child,
w hereas doing nothing w ould not be killing the m other, but only
letting her die. M oreover, in killing the child, one w ould be killing
an innocent person, for the child has com m itted no crim e, and is not
aim ing at his m other’s death. A n d then there are a variety o f ways in
which this might be continued, ( i ) But as directly killing an innocent
person is always and absolutely im perm issible, an abortion m ay not
be perform ed. O r, (2) as directly killing an innocent person is

3 T h e term ‘ d ire ct’ in the argum en ts I refer to is a techn ical on e. R o u g h ly , w h at is

m ean t b y 'd irect k illin g’ is eith e r killin g as an en d in itse lf, o r killin g as a m eans to
som e en d , for e x a m p le , the en d o f savin g so m eo n e e lse ’s life. S e e note 6, b e lo w , for
an exa m p le o f its use.
 A D E F E N C E OF A B O R T I O N 41
m urder, and m urder is always and absolutely im perm issible, an
abortion m ay not be perform ed.4 O r, (3) as o n e’s duty to refrain
from directly killing an innocent person is m ore stringent than o n e’s
duty to keep a person from dying, an abortion m ay not be p er­
form ed. O r, (4) if o n e’s only options are directly killing an innocent
person or letting a person die, one must prefer letting the person
die, and thus an abortion m ay not be perform ed.5
Som e people seem to have thought that these are not further
prem isses which must be added if the conclusion is to be reached,
but that they follow from the very fact that an innocent person has a
right to life.6 B ut this seem s to me to be a m istake, and perhaps the
simplest way to show this is to bring out that while we must certainly
grant that innocent persons have a right to life, the theses in (1) to
(4) are all false. T ake (2), for exam ple. If directly killing an innocent
person is m urder, and thus is im perm issible, then the m other’s
directly killing the innocent person inside her is m urder, and thus is
im perm issible. But it cannot seriously be thought to be m urder if
the m other perform s an abortion on herself to save her life. It
cannot seriously be said that she must refrain, that she must sit
passively by and wait for her death. L et us look again at the case o f
you and the violinist. T h ere you are, in bed with the violinist, and
the director o f the hospital says to you, ‘It’s all most distressing, and

4 C f. E n cyclical Letter o f P o p e Pius X I on Christian M arriage, St. Paul E d ition s

(B o sto n , n .d .), p. 32: ‘ h o w ev e r m uch w e m ay pity the m other w h ose h ealth and even
life is gra v ely im p eriled in the p erform an ce o f the d uty allotted to h er b y n atu re,
n everth eless w h at cou ld e v e r be a sufficient reason fo r excusing in any w ay the direct
m urder o f the in n o cen t? T h is is p recisely w hat w e are d ealin g with h e r e .’ N oon an
( The M orality o f A b o r tio n , p. 43) reads this as fo llo w s: ‘W hat cause can e v e r avail to
excu se in any w a y the direct killin g o f the in n ocent? F o r it is a qu estion o f th a t.’
5 T h e thesis in (4) is in an in terestin g w ay w e a k e r than those in ( 1 ), (2), and (3):
th ey rule ou t abo rtio n even in cases in w hich both m other and child w ill die if the
abortion is not p e rfo rm e d . B y con trast, on e w h o held the view exp ressed in (4) cou ld
con sisten tly say that on e n e ed n ’ t p refer lettin g tw o persons d ie to killin g one.
6 C f. the fo llo w in g passage from Pius X II, A d d ress to the Italian Ca tholic Society o f
M idw ives: ‘T h e b ab y in the m atern al b reast has the right to life im m ed iately from
G o d .— H e n c e th ere is n o m an, no hum an a u th o rity, n o scien ce, no m ed ical, e u gen ic,
so cia l, e co n o m ic or m oral “ in d icatio n ” w hich can establish o r grant a valid ju rid ical
groun d fo r a d irect d elib erate disposition o f an in n ocent hum an life, that is a
disposition w h ich lo o k s to its destru ction e ith er as an end or as a m eans to a noth er
end perh ap s in itse lf not illicit.— T h e b a b y , still not b orn , is a m an in the sam e d eg ree
and for the sam e reason as the m o th e r’ (q u o ted in N o o n an , The M orality o f
A b o r tio n , p. 45).
42 J U D I T H JA R V IS T H O M S O N
I deeply sym pathize, but you see this is putting an additional strain
on your kidneys, and y o u ’ll be dead within the m onth. But you have
to stay where you are all the same. Because unplugging you would
be directly killing an innocent violinist, and that’s m urder, and
that’s im perm issible.’ If anything in the world is true, it is that you
do not com mit m urder, you do not do what is im perm issible, if you
reach around to your back and unplug yourself from that violinist to
save your life.
T h e main focus o f attention in writings on abortion has been on
what a third party may or m ay not do in answer to a request from a
wom an for an abortion. This is in a way understandable. Things
being as they are, there isn’t much a wom an can safely do to abort
herself. So the question asked is what a third party may do, and
what the m other m ay do, if it is m entioned at all, is deduced, almost
as an afterthought, from what it is concluded that third parties may
do. But it seem s to me that to treat the m atter in this way is to refuse
to grant to the m other that very status o f person which is so firmly
insisted on for the foetus. F or we cannot simply read o ff what a
person m ay do from what a third party may do. Suppose you find
yourself trapped in a tiny house with a growing child. I mean a very
tiny house, and a rapidly growing child— you are already up against
the wall o f the house and in a few minutes y o u ’ll be crushed to
death. T h e child on the other hand w o n ’t be crushed to death; if
nothing is done to stop him from growing h e’ll be hurt, but in the
end h e’ll simply burst open the house and w alk out a free man. Now
I could well understand it if a bystander were to say, ‘T h e re’s
nothing we can do for you. W e cannot choose between your life and
his, we cannot be the ones to decide who is to live, we cannot
in terven e.’ But it cannot be concluded that you too can do nothing,
that you cannot attack it to save your life. H ow ever innocent the
child m ay be, you do not have to wait passively while it crushes you
to death. Perhaps a pregnant wom an is vaguely felt to have the
status o f house, to which w e don't allow the right o f self-defence.
But if the wom an houses the child, it should be rem em bered that
she is a person who houses it.
I should perhaps stop to say explicitly that I am not claim ing that
people have a right to do anything w hatever to save their lives. I
think, rather, that there are drastic limits to the right o f self­
 A D E F E N C E OF A B O R T I O N 43
defence. If som eone threatens you with death unless you torture
som eone else to death, I think you have not the right, even to save
your life, to do so. But the case under consideration here is very
different. In our case there are only two people involved, one whose
life is threatened, and one who threatens it. Both are innocent: the
one who is threatened is not threatened because o f any fault, the
one who threatens does not threaten because o f any fault. For this
reason we m ay feel that w e bystanders cannot intervene. But the
person threatened can.
In sum, a wom an surely can defend her life against the threat to it
posed by the unborn child, even if doing so involves its death. A n d
this shows not m erely that the theses in ( i) to (4) are false; it shows
also that the extrem e view o f abortion is false, and so we need not
canvass any other possible ways o f arriving at it from the argument I
m entioned at the outset.
2. The extrem e view could o f course be w eakened to say that
while abortion is perm issible to save the m other’s life, it m ay not be
perform ed by a third party, but only by the m other herself. But this
cannot be right either. F or w hat we have to keep in mind is that the
m other and the unborn child are not like two tenants in a small
house which has, by an unfortunate m istake, been rented to both:
the m other owns the house. The fact that she does adds to the
offensiveness o f deducing that the m other can do nothing from the
supposition that third parties can do nothing. But it does m ore than
this: it casts a bright light on the supposition that third parties can do
nothing. C ertain ly it lets us see that a third party who says ‘I cannot
choose betw een yo u ’ is fooling him self if he thinks this is
im partiality. If Jones has found and fastened on a certain coat,
which he needs to keep him from freezing, but which Smith also
needs to keep him from freezing, then it is not impartiality that says
‘I cannot choose betw een y o u ’ when Smith owns the coat. W om en
have said again and again ‘This body is my body!’ and they have
reason to feel angry, reason to feel that it has been like shouting into
the wind. Sm ith, after all, is hardly likely to bless us if we say to him,
‘O f course it’s your coat, anybody w ould grant that it is. But no one
m ay choose betw een you and Jones who is to have it.’
W e should really ask what it is that says ‘no one m ay choose’ in
the face o f the fact that the body that houses the child is the m other’s
44 J U D I T H J A R V IS T H O M S O N
body. It m ay be simply a failure to appreciate this fact. But it m ay be
som ething m ore interesting, nam ely the sense that one has a right to
refuse to lay hands on p eople, even where it would be just and fair to
do so, even where justice seems to require that som ebody do so.
Thus justice might call for som ebody to get Sm ith’s coat back from
Jones, and yet you have a right to refuse to be the one to lay hands
on Jones, a right to refuse to do physical violence to him. This, I
think, must be granted. But then what should be said is not ‘no one
m ay ch oose’ , but only 7 cannot choose’ , and indeed not even this,
but 7 will not a ct', leaving it open that som ebody else can or should,
and in particular that anyone in a position o f authority, with the job
o f securing p eo p le’s rights, both can and should. So this is no
difficulty. I have not been arguing that any given third party must
accede to the m other’s request that he perform an abortion to save
her life, but only that he may.
I suppose that in som e view s o f human life the m other’s body is
only on loan to her, the loan not being one which gives her any prior
claim to it. O ne who held this view might well think it im partiality to
say ‘ I cannot ch oose’ . But I shall simply ignore this possibility. M y
own view is that if a human being has any just, prior claim to
anything at all, he has a just, prior claim to his own body. A nd
perhaps this needn’t be argued for here anyw ay, since, as I m en­
tioned, the arguments against abortion we are looking at do grant
that the wom an has a right to decide what happens in and to her
body.
B ut although they do grant it, I have tried to show that they do not
take seriously what is done in granting it. I suggest the same thing
will reappear even m ore clearly when we turn away from cases in
which the m other’s life is at stake, and attend, as I propose we now
do, to the vastly m ore com m on cases in which a wom an wants an
abortion for som e less weighty reason than preserving her own life.
3. W here the m other’s life is not at stake, the argument I
m entioned at the outset seems to have a much stronger pull.
‘ E veryon e has a right to life, so the unborn person has a right to
life .’ A n d isn’t the child’s right to life weightier than anything other
than the m other's own right to life, which she might put forward as
ground for an abortion?
This argument treats the right to life as if it were unproblem atic.
 A D E F E N C E OF A B O R T I O N 45
It is not, and this seems to me to be precisely the source o f the
m istake.
F or we should now, at long last, ask what it com es to, to have a
right to life. In som e views having a right to life includes having a
right to be given at least the bare minimum one needs for continued
life. B ut suppose that what in fact is the bare minimum a man needs
for continued life is som ething he has no right at all to be given? If I
am sick unto death, and the only thing that will save my life is the
touch o f H enry F on d a’s cool hand on my fevered brow , then all the
sam e, I have no right to be given the touch o f H enry F on da’s cool
hand on my fevered brow. It w ould be frightfully nice o f him to fly in
from the W est C oast to provide it. It w ould be less nice, though no
doubt well m eant, if my friends flew out to the W est C oast and
carried H enry Fonda back with them. But I have no right at all
against anybody that he should do this for me. O r again, to return to
the story I told earlier, the fact that for continued life that violinist
needs the continued use o f your kidneys does not establish that he
has a right to be given the continued use of your kidneys. He
certainly has no right against you that you should give him con­
tinued use o f your kidneys. For nobody has any right to use your
kidneys unless you give him such a right; and nobody has the right
against you that you shall give him this right— if you do allow him to
go on using your kidneys, this is a kindness on your part, and not
som ething he can claim from you as his due. N or has he any right
against anybody else that they should give him continued use o f your
kidneys. C ertainly he had no right against the Society o f M usic
L overs that they should plug him into you in the first place. A n d if
you now start to unplug yourself, having learned that you will
otherwise have to spend nine years in bed with him, there is nobody
in the world who must try to prevent you, in order to see to it that he
is given som ething he has a right to be given.
Som e people are rather stricter about the right to life. In their
view , it does not include the right to be given anything, but amounts
to, and only to, the right not to be killed by anybody. B ut here a
related difficulty arises. If everybody is to refrain from killing that
violinist, then everybody must refrain from doing a great m any
different sorts o f things. E verybody must refrain from slitting his
throat, everybod y must refrain from shooting him— and everybody
46 J U D I T H JA R V IS T H O M S O N
must refrain from unplugging you from him. But does he have a
right against everybody that they shall refrain from unplugging you
from him? T o refrain from doing this is to allow him to continue to
use your kidneys. It could be argued that he has a right against us
that we should allow him to continue to use your kidneys. That is,
while he had no right against us that we should give him the use of
your kidneys, it might be argued that he anyway has a right against
us that we shall not now intervene and deprive him o f the use o f your
kidneys. I shall com e back to third-party interventions later. But
certainly the violinist has no right against you that you shall allow
him to continue to use your kidneys. A s I said, if you do allow him to
use them , it is a kindness on your part, and not som ething you owe
him.
T h e difficulty I point to here is not peculiar to the right to life. It
reappears in connection with all the other natural rights; and it is
som ething which an adequate account o f rights must deal with. For
present purposes it is enough just to draw attention to it. But I
w ould stress that I am not arguing that people do not have a right to
life— quite to the contrary, it seems to me that the primary control
w e must place on the acceptability o f an account o f rights is that it
should turn out in that account to be a truth that all persons have a
right to life. I am arguing only that having a right to life does not
guarantee having either a right to be given the use o f or a right to be
allow ed continued use o f another person’s body— even if one needs
it for life itself. So the right to life will not serve the opponents of
abortion in the very simple and clear way in which they seem to have
thought it would.
4. T here is another way to bring out the difficulty. In the most
ordinary sort o f case, to deprive som eone o f what he has a right to is
to treat him unjustly. Suppose a boy and his small brother are
jointly given a box o f chocolates for Christm as. If the older boy
takes the box and refuses to give his brother any o f the chocolates,
he is unjust to him, for the brother has been given a right to half of
them . But suppose that, having learned that otherwise it means nine
years in bed with that violinist, you unplug yourself from him. Y o u
surely are not being unjust to him, for you gave him no right to use
your kidneys, and no one else can have given him any such right.
B ut w e have to notice that in unplugging yourself, you are killing
 A D E F E N C E OF A B O R T I O N 47
him; and violinists, like everybod y else, have a right to life, and thus
in the view we w ere considering just now, the right not to be killed.
So here you do what he supposedly has a right you shall not do, but
you do not act unjustly to him in doing it.
T h e em endation which m ay be m ade at this point is this: the right
to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but rather in the right
not to be killed unjustly. This runs a risk o f circularity, but never
mind: it w ould enable us to square the fact that the violinist has a
right to life with the fact that you do not act unjustly toward him in
unplugging yourself, thereby killing him. For if you do not kill him
unjustly, you do not violate his right to life, and so it is no w onder
you do him no injustice.
But if this em endation is accepted, the gap in the argument
against abortion stares us plainly in the face: it is by no means
enough to show that the foetus is a person, and to remind us that all
persons have a right to life— we need to be shown also that killing
the foetus violates its right to life, i.e. that abortion is unjust killing.
A n d is it?
I suppose we m ay take it as a datum that in a case o f pregnancy
due to rape the m other has not given the unborn person a right to
the use o f her body for food and shelter. Indeed, in what pregnancy
could it be supposed that the m other has given the unborn person
such a right? It is not as if there w ere unborn persons drifting about
the world, to whom a wom an who wants a child says ‘ I invite you in’ .
But it might be argued that there are other ways one can have
acquired a right to the use o f another person’s body than by having
been invited to use it by that person. Suppose a wom an voluntarily
indulges in intercourse, knowing o f the chance it will issue in
pregnancy, and then she does becom e pregnant; is she not in part
responsible for the presence, in fact the very existence, o f the
unborn person inside her? N o doubt she did not invite it in. But
doesn’t her partial responsibility for its being there itself give it a
right to the use o f her b o d y ?7 If so, then her aborting it would be
m ore like the b o y ’s taking away the chocolates, and less like your
unplugging yourself from the violinist— doing so w ould be depriv-

1 T h e n eed fo r a discussion o f this argum ent w as b rought hom e to me by m em bers

o f the S o cie ty fo r E th ical and L eg al P h iloso p h y, to w hom this paper w as orig in ally
presen ted .
48 J U D I T H J A R V IS T H O M S O N
ing it o f what what it does have a right to, and thus w ould be doing it
an injustice.
A n d then, too, it might be asked w hether or not she can kill it
even to save her own life: If she voluntarily called it into existence,
how can she now kill it, even in self-defence?
T h e first thing to be said about this is that it is som ething new.
O pponents o f abortion have been so concerned to m ake out the
independence o f the foetus, in order to establish that it has a right to
life, just as its m other does, that they have tended to overlook the
possible support they might gain from m aking out that the foetus is
dependent on the m other, in order to establish that she has a special
kind o f responsibility for it, a responsibility that gives it rights
against her which are not possessed by any independent person—
such as an ailing violinist who is a stranger to her.
O n the other hand, this argument would give the unborn person a
right to its m other’s body only if her pregnancy resulted from a
voluntary act, undertaken in full know ledge o f the chance a
pregnancy might result from it. It would leave out entirely the
unborn person whose existence is due to rape. Pending the avail­
ability o f som e further argum ent, then we would be left with the
conclusion that unborn persons whose existence is due to rape have
no right to the use o f their m others’ bodies, and thus that aborting
them is not depriving them o f anything they have a right to and
hence is not unjust killing.
A n d we should also notice that it is not at all plain that this
argum ent really does go even as far as it purports to. For there are
cases and cases, and the details m ake a difference. If the room is
stuffy, and I therefore open a window to air it, and a burglar climbs
in, it would be absurd to say, ‘A h , now he can stay, she’s given him a
right to the use o f her house— for she is partially responsible for his
presence there, having voluntarily done what enabled him to get in,
in full know ledge that there are such things as burglars, and that
burglars b u rgle.’ It would be still m ore absurd to say this if I had had
bars installed outside my windows, precisely to prevent burglars
from getting in, and a burglar got in only because o f a defect in the
bars. It remains equally absurd if we im agine it is not a burglar who
climbs in, but an innocent person who blunders or falls in. A g ain ,
suppose it w ere like this: people-seeds drift about in the air like
 A D E F E N C E OF A B O R T I O N 49
pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take
root in your carpets or upholstery. Y o u d on ’t want children, so you
fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can
buy. A s can happen, how ever, and on very, very rare occasions
does happen, one o f the screens is defective; and a seed drifts in and
takes root. D o es the person-plant who now develops have a right to
the use o f your house? Surely not— despite the fact that you
voluntarily opened your windows, you knowingly kept carpets and
upholstered furniture, and you knew that screens w ere som etimes
d efective. Som eone m ay argue that you are responsible for its
rooting, that it does have a right to your house, because after all you
could have lived out your life with bare floors and furniture, or with
sealed windows and doors. But this w o n ’t do— for by the same
token anyone can avoid a pregnancy due to rape by having a
hysterectom y, or anyway by never leaving home without a (reli­
able!) army.
It seems to me that the argument we are looking at can establish
at most that there are som e cases in which the unborn person has a
right to the use o f its m other’s body, and therefore som e cases in
which abortion is unjust killing. T here is room for much discussion
and argument as to precisely which, if any. But I think we should
side-step this issue and leave it open, for at any rate the argument
certainly does not establish that all abortion is unjust killing.
5. T here is room for yet another argument here, how ever. W e
surely must all grant that there may be cases in which it would be
m orally indecent to detach a person from your body at the cost o f his
life. Suppose you learn that what the violinist needs is not nine years
o f your life, but only one hour: all you need do to save his life is to
spend one hour in that bed with him. Suppose also that letting him
use your kidneys for that one hour would not affect your health in
the slightest. A d m ittedly you were kidnapped. A d m ittedly you did
not give anyone perm ission to plug him into you. N evertheless it
seem s to me plain you ought to allow him to use your kidneys for
that hour— it would be indecent to refuse.
A g ain , suppose pregnancy lasted only an hour, and constituted
no threat to life or health. A n d suppose that a wom an becom es
pregnant as a result o f rape. A d m ittedly she did not voluntarily do
anything to bring about the existence o f a child. A dm ittedly she did
50 J U D I T H J A R V IS T H O M S O N
nothing at all which would give the unborn person a right to the use
o f her body. A ll the same it might well be said, as in the newly
em ended violinist story, that she ought to allow it to remain for that
hour— that it would be indecent in her to refuse.
N ow som e people are inclined to use the term ‘right’ in such a way
that it follow s from the fact that you ought to allow a person to use
your body for the hour he needs, that he has a right to use your body
for the hour he needs, even though he has not been given that right
by any person or act. T h ey m ay say that it follows also that if you
refuse, you act unjustly tow ard him. This use o f the term is perhaps
so com m on that it cannot be called wrong; nevertheless it seems to
me to be an unfortunate loosening o f what we w ould do better to
keep a tight rein on. Suppose that box o f chocolates I m entioned
earlier had not given given to both boys jointly, but was given only
to the older boy. T here he sits, stolidly eating his way through the
box, his small brother watching enviously. H ere we are likely to say
‘Y o u ought not to be so mean. Y o u ought to give your brother some
o f those chocolates. ’ M y own view is that it just does not follow from
the truth o f this that the brother has any right to any o f the
chocolates. If the boy refuses to give his brother any, he is greedy,
stingy, callous— but not unjust. I suppose that the people I have in
mind will say it does follow that the brother has a right to som e of
the chocolates, and thus that the boy does act unjustly if he refuses
to give his brother any. But the effect o f saying this is to obscure
what we should keep distinct, nam ely the difference betw een the
b o y ’s refusal in this case and the b o y’s refusal in the earlier case, in
which the box was given to both boys jointly, and in which the small
brother thus had what was from any point o f view clear title to half.
A further objection to so using the term ‘right’ that from the fact
that A ought to do a thing for B , it follow s that B has a right against
A that A do it for him, is that it is going to m ake the question o f
w hether or not a man has a right to a thing turn on how easy it is to
provide him with it; and this seems not m erely unfortunate, but
m orally unacceptable. T ake the case o f H enry Fonda again. I said
earlier that I had no right to the touch o f his cool hand on my fevered
brow , even though I needed it to save my life. I said it w ould be
frightfully nice o f him to fly in from the W est Coast to provide me
with it, but that I had no right against him that he should do so. But
 A D E F E N C E OF A B O R T I O N 51
suppose he isn’t on the W est Coast. Suppose he has only to walk
across the room , place a hand briefly on my brow— and lo, m y life is
saved. Then surely he ought to do it, it w ould be indecent to refuse.
Is it to be said ‘A h , w ell, it follow s that in this case she has a right to
the touch o f his hand on her brow , and so it would be an injustice in
him to refu se?’ So that I have a right to it when it is easy for him to
provide it, though no right when it’s hard? It’s rather a shocking
idea that anyon e’s rights should fade away and disappear as it gets
harder and harder to accord them to him.
So my own view is that even though you ought to let the violinist
use your kidneys for the one hour he needs, w e should not conclude
that he has a right to do so— w e should say that if you refuse, you
are, like the boy who owns all the chocolates and will give none
aw ay, self-centred and callous, indecent in fact, but not unjust. A n d
sim ilarly, that even supposing a case in which a wom an pregnant
due to ja p e ought to allow the unborn person to use her body for the
hour he needs, we should not conclude that he has a right to do so;
w e should conclude that she is self-centred, callous, indecent, but
not unjust, if she refuses. T h e com plaints are no less grave; they are
just different. H ow ever, there is no need to insist on this point. If
anyone does wish to deduce ‘he has a right’ from ‘you ought’ , then
all the same he must surely grant that there are cases in which it is
not m orally required o f you that you allow that violinist to use your
kidneys, and in which he does not have a right to use them , and so
also for m other and unborn child. E xcept in such cases as the
unborn person has a right to dem and it— and we w ere leaving open
the possibility that there m ay be such cases— nobody is m orally
required to m ake large sacrifices, o f health, o f all other interests and
concerns, o f all other duties and com m itm ents, for nine years, or
even for nine m onths, in order to keep another person alive.
6. W e have in fact to distinguish betw een two kinds o f
Sam aritan: the G o o d Sam aritan and what we might call the M ini­
m ally D ecent Sam aritan. T he story o f the G o o d Sam aritan, you will
rem em ber, goes like this:

A c e r ta in m an w e n t d o w n fro m J e ru sa le m to J e rich o , a n d fe ll a m o n g
th ie v e s , w h ich strip p e d him o f his ra im e n t, and w o u n d e d him , and
d e p a r te d , le a v in g him h a lf d e a d .
52 J U D I T H J A R V IS T H O M S O N
A n d b y c h a n c e th e re c a m e d o w n a c e rta in p rie st th at w a y ; and w h e n he
sa w h im , h e p a ssed b y o n th e o th e r side.
A n d lik e w is e a L e v ite , w h e n he w a s at th e p la c e , c a m e a n d lo o k e d on
h im , and p a ssed b y on th e o th e r side.
B u t a c e r ta in S a m a rita n , as h e jo u r n e y e d , c a m e w h e r e h e w a s; and w h en
h e sa w him h e h a d c o m p a ssio n on him .
A n d w e n t to h im , a n d b o u n d up his w o u n d s , p o u rin g in o il and w in e , and
se t him on his o w n b e a s t, a n d b ro u g h t him to an in n , and to o k c a re o f him .
A n d on th e m o rro w , w h e n h e d e p a rte d , h e to o k o u t tw o p e n c e , a n d g a v e
th e m to th e h o st, and said u n to him , ‘T a k e c a re o f him ; and w h a ts o e v e r
th o u sp e n d e st m o re , w h e n I c o m e a g a in , I w ill re p a y t h e e .’

( L u k e 10: 3 0 -5 )

T h e G o o d Sam aritan went out o f his w ay, at some cost to him self, to
help one in need o f it. W e are not told what the options w ere, that is,
w hether or not the priest and the L evite could have helped by doing
less than the G o o d Sam aritan did, but assuming they could have,
then the fact they did nothing at all shows they w ere not even
M inim ally D ecent Sam aritans, not because they w ere not
Sam aritans, but because they w ere not even m inimally decent.
T h ese things are a m atter o f degree, o f course, but there is a
difference, and it com es out perhaps most clearly in the story of
K itty G en o vese, w ho, as you will rem em ber, was m urdered while
thirty-eight people watched or listened, and did nothing at all to
help her. A G o o d Sam aritan w ould have rushed out to give direct
assistance against the m urderer. O r perhaps we had better allow
that it w ould have been a Splendid Samaritan who did this, on the
ground that it w ould have involved a risk o f death for himself. But
the thirty-eight not only did not do this, they did not even trouble to
pick up a phone to call the police. M inim ally D ecent Samaritanism
w ould call for doing at least that, and their not having done it was
monstrous.
A fte r telling the story o f the G o o d Sam aritan, Jesus said ‘G o , and
do thou lik ew ise. ’ Perhaps he meant that we are m orally required to
act as the G o o d Sam aritan did. Perhaps he was urging people to do
m ore than is m orally required o f them. A t all events it seem s plain
that it was not m orally required o f any o f the thirty-eight that he
rush out to give direct assistance at the risk o f his own life, and that it
is not m orally required o f anyone that he give long stretches o f his
 A D E F E N C E OF A B O R T I O N 53
life— nine years or nine months— to sustaining the life o f a person
who has no special right (we w ere leaving open the possibility o f
this) to dem and it.
Indeed, with one rather striking class o f exceptions, no one in any
country in the world is legally required to do anywhere near as much
as this for anyone else. The class o f exceptions is obvious. M y main
concern here is not the state o f the law in respect to abortion, but it
is w orth drawing attention to the fact that in no state in this country
is any man com pelled by law to be even a M inim ally D ecent
Sam aritan to any person; there is no law under which charges could
be brought against the thirty-eight who stood by while K itty
G en o vese died. B y contrast, in most states in this country wom en
are com pelled by law to be not m erely M inim ally D ecent
Sam aritans, but G o o d Sam aritans to unborn persons inside them.
This d oesn’t by itself settle anything one way or the other, because it
m ay well be argued that there should be laws in this country— as
there are in many E uropean countries— com pelling at least M ini­
m ally D ecent Sam aritanism .8 But it does show that there is a gross
injustice in the existing state o f the law. A n d it shows also that the
groups currently working against liberalization o f abortion laws, in
fact w orking tow ard having it declared unconstitutional for a state
to perm it abortion, had better start w orking for the adoption of
G o o d Sam aritan laws generally, or earn the charge that they are
acting in bad faith.
I should think, m yself, that M inim ally D ecent Sam aritan laws
w ould be one thing, G o o d Sam aritan laws quite another, and in fact
highly im proper. B ut we are not here concerned with the law. W hat
w e should ask is not w hether anybody should be com pelled by law
to be a G o o d Sam aritan, but whether we must accede to a situation
in which som ebody is being com pelled— by nature, perhaps— to be
a G o o d Sam aritan. W e have, in other words, to look now at third-
party interventions. I have been arguing that no person is m orally
required to m ake large sacrifices to sustain the life o f another who
has no right to dem and them , and this even where the sacrifices do
not include life itself; we are not m orally required to be G o o d

8 F o r a discussion o f the d ifficu lties in vo lve d , and a su rvey o f the E u ro p e a n

e x p e rie n ce w ith such law s, see The G o o d Samaritan and the L a w , ed. Jam es M .
R a tc liffe (N e w Y o r k , 1966).
54 J U D I T H JA R V IS T H O M S O N
Sam aritans or anyway V ery G ood Sam aritans to one another. But
what if a man cannot extricate him self from such a situation? W hat
if he appeals to us to extricate him? It seems to me plain that there
are cases in which we can, cases in which a G o o d Sam aritan would
extricate him. T here you are, you w ere kidnapped, and nine years
in bed with that violinist lie ahead o f you. Y o u have your own life to
lead. Y o u are sorry, but you simply cannot see giving up so much o f
your life to the sustaining o f his. Y o u cannot extricate yourself, and
ask us to do so. I should have thought that— in light o f his having no
right to the use o f your body— it was obvious that we do not have to
accede to your being forced to give up so much. W e can do what you
ask. T here is no injustice to the violinist in our doing so.
7. Follow ing the lead o f the opponents o f abortion, I have
throughout been speaking o f the foetus m erely as a person, and
what I have been asking is whether or not the argument we began
w ith, which proceeds only from the foetu s’s being a person, really
does establish its conclusion. I have argued that it does not.
But o f course there are arguments and argum ents, and it may be
said that I have simply fastened on the wrong one. It m ay be said
that what is im portant is not m erely the fact that the foetus is a
person, but that it is a person for whom the wom an has a special
kind o f responsibility issuing from the fact that she is its m other.
A n d it might be argued that all my analogies are therefore
irrelevant— for you do not have that special kind o f responsibility
for that violinist, H enry Fonda does not have that special kind of
responsibility for me. A n d our attention might be drawn to the fact
that men and wom en both are com pelled by law to provide support
for their children.
I have in effect dealt (briefly) with this argument in section 4
above; but a (still briefer) recapitulation now m ay be in order.
Surely we do not have any such ‘special responsibility’ for a person
unless we have assumed it, explicitly or im plicitly. If a set o f parents
do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an abortion, and
then at the time o f birth o f the child do not put it out for adoption,
but rather take it home with them , then they have assumed
responsibility for it, they have given it rights, and they cannot now
withdraw support from it at the cost o f its life because they now find
it difficult to go on providing for it. But if they have taken all
 A D E F E N C E OF A B O R T I O N 55
reasonable precautions against having a child, they do not simply by
virtue o f their biological relationship to the child who com es into
existence have a special responsibility for it. They m ay wish to
assume responsibility for it, or they m ay not wish to. A n d I am
suggesting that if assuming responsibility for it would require large
sacrifices, then they may refuse. A G o o d Samaritan w ould not
refuse— or anyw ay, a Splendid Sam aritan, if the sacrifices that had
to be m ade w ere enorm ous. But then so w ould a G o o d Samaritan
assume responsibility for that violinist; so w ould H enry Fonda, if he
is a G o o d Sam aritan, fly in from the W est C oast and assume
responsibility for me.
8. M y argum ent will be found unsatisfactory on two counts by
m any o f those who want to regard abortion as m orally permissible.
First, while I do argue that abortion is not im perm issible, I do not
argue that it is always perm issible. T here m ay well be cases in which
carrying the child to term requires only M inim ally D ecent
Sam aritanism o f the m other, and this is a standard we must not fall
below . I am inclined to think it a merit o f m y account precisely that
it does not give a general yes or a general no. It allows for and
supports our sense that, for exam ple, a sick and desperately
frightened fourteen-year-old schoolgirl, pregnant due to rape, may
o f course choose abortion, and that any law which rules this out is an
insane law. A n d it also allows for and supports our sense that in
other cases resort to abortion is even positively indecent. It would
be indecent in the wom an to request an abortion, and indecent in a
doctor to perform it, if she is in her seventh m onth, and wants the
abortion just to avoid the nuisance o f postponing a trip abroad. The
very fact that the arguments I have been drawing attention to treat
all cases o f abortion, or even all cases o f abortion in which the
m other’s life is not at stake, as m orally on a par ought to have m ade
them suspect at the outset.
Secondly, while I am arguing for the perm issibility o f abortion in
som e cases, I am not arguing for the right to secure the death o f the
unborn child. It is easy to confuse these two things in that up to a
certain point in the life o f the foetus it is not able to survive outside
the m other’s body; hence rem oving it from her body guarantees its
death. B ut they are im portantly different. I have argued that you
are not m orally required to spend nine m onths in bed, sustaining the
56 J U D I T H J A R V IS T H O M S O N
life o f that violinist; but to say this is by no means to say that if, when
you unplug yourself, there is a m iracle and he survives, you then
have a right to turn round and slit his throat. Y o u m ay detach
yourself even if this costs him his life; you have no right to be
guaranteed his death, by som e other m eans, if unplugging yourself
does not kill him. T h ere are som e people who will feel dissatisfied
by this feature o f my argum ent. A wom an may be utterly devastated
by the thought o f a child, a bit o f herself, put out for adoption and
never seen or heard o f again. She may therefore want not m erely
that the child be detached from her, but m ore, that it die. Some
opponents o f abortion are inclined to regard this as beneath
contem pt— thereby showing insensitivity to what is surely a pow er­
ful source o f despair. A ll the sam e, I agree that the desire for the
child’s death is not one which anybody m ay gratify, should it turn
out to be possible to detach the child alive.
A t this place, how ever, it should be rem em bered that we have
only been pretending throughout that the foetus is a human being
from the m om ent o f conception. A very early abortion is surely not
the killing o f a person, and so is not dealt with by anything I have
said here.
 V

AB O R T IO N A N D IN FA NT IC ID E 1
M IC H A E L T O O L E Y

T h is essay deals with the question o f the m orality o f abortion and

infanticide. T h e fundam ental ethical objection traditionally
advanced against these practices rests on the contention that human
foetuses and infants have a right to life. It is this claim which will be
the focus o f attention here. The basic issue to be discussed, then, is
what properties a thing must possess in order to have a serious right
to life. M y approach will be to set out and defend a basic moral
principle specifying a condition an organism must satisfy if it is to
have a serious right to life. It will be seen that this condition is not
satisfied by human foetuses and infants, and thus that they do not
have a right to life. So unless there are other substantial objections
to abortion and infanticide, one is forced to conclude that these
practices are m orally acceptable ones. In contrast, it m ay turn out
that our treatm ent o f adult m em bers o f other species— cats, dogs,
polar bears— is m orally indefensible. For it is quite possible that
such animals do possess properties that endow them with a right to
life.

I. A B O R T IO N A N D IN F A N T IC ID E

O n e reason the question o f the m orality o f infanticide is worth

exam ining is that it seems very difficult to form ulate a com pletely
satisfactory liberal position on abortion without com ing to grips
with the infanticide issue. The problem the liberal encounters is
essentially that o f specifying a cut-off point which is not arbitrary: at
what stage in the developm ent o f a human being does it cease to be
M ich a e l T o o le y , ‘ A b o rtio n and In fan ticid e', P hilo so p hy & P u b lic A ffairs 2, N o . 1
(F a ll, 1972). C o p y rig h t © 1972 b y P rinceton U n iversity Press. R e p rin te d w ith
p erm ission .
' I am gra tefu l to a nu m b er o f p e o p le , p articu larly the E d itors o f P hilo so p hy and
P u b lic A ffa irs, R o d e lia H a p k e , and W alter K a u fm a n n , for th eir h elpfu l com m en ts.
It sh ou ld n o t, o f c o u rse , be in ferred that th ey share the view s exp ressed in this paper.
58 MICHAEL TOOLEY
m orally perm issible to destroy it? It is im portant to be clear about
the difficulty here. The conservative’s objection is not that since
there is a continuous line o f developm ent from a zygote to a
newborn baby, one must conclude that if it is seriously wrong to
destroy a newborn baby it is also seriously wrong to destroy a zygote
or any interm ediate stage in the developm ent o f a human being. His
point is rather that if one says it is wrong to destroy a newborn baby
but not a zygote or som e interm ediate stage in the developm ent o f a
human being, one should be prepared to point to a morally relevant
d ifference betw een a newborn baby and the earlier stage in the
developm ent o f a human being.
Precisely the same difficulty can, o f course, be raised for a person
who holds that infanticide is m orally permissible. The conservative
will ask what m orally relevant differences there are between an
adult human being and a newborn baby. W hat m akes it m orally
perm issible to destroy a baby, but wrong to kill an adult? So the
challenge remains. But I will argue that in this case there is an
extrem ely plausible answer.
Reflecting on the m orality o f infanticide forces one to face up to
this challenge. In the case of abortion a number of events— quickening
or viability, for instance— might be taken as cut-off points, and it is
easy to overlook the fact that none of these events involves any
morally significant change in the developing human. In contrast, if one
is going to defend infanticide, one has to get very clear about what
m akes som ething a person, what gives som ething a right to life.
O ne o f the interesting ways in which the abortion issue differs
from most other m oral issues is that the plausible positions on
abortions appear to be extrem e positions. For if a human foetus is a
person, one is inclined to say that, in general, one w ould be justified
in killing it only to save the life of the m other.2 Such is the extrem e
conservative position.3 On the other hand, if the foetus is not a

2 Judith Jarvis T h o m a s, pp. 3 7-5 6 , a b o v e , argues w ith great force and in gen u ity
that this con clu sio n is m istaken. I w ill com m en t on h er argum ent later in this paper.
3 W h ile this is the position con servatives tend to h old , it is not cle a r that it is the
position th ey ou gh t to h old. F o r if the foetu s is a person it is far from clea r th at it is
perm issible to d estroy it to save the m oth er. T w o m oral principles lend support to the
v iew that it is the foetu s w hich sh ou ld live. F irst, o th er things bein g e q u a l, should not
on e giv e som eth in g to a person w h o has had less rather than to a person w h o has had
m o re ? T h e m oth er has had a ch an ce to live, w h ile the foetu s has n ot. T h e ch oice is
 ABORTION AN D IN FA N TIC ID E 59
person, how can it be seriously wrong to destroy it? W hy w ould one
need to point to special circumstances to justify such action? The
upshot is that there is no room for a m oderate position on the issue
o f abortion such as one finds, for exam ple, in the M odel Penal C ode
recom m endations.4
A sid e from the light it m ay shed on the abortion question, the
issue o f infanticide is both interesting and important in its own right.
T h e theoretical interest has been m entioned: it forces one to face up
to the question o f what m akes som ething a person. T h e practical
im portance need not be laboured. M ost people would prefer to
raise children who do not suffer from gross deform ities or from
severe physical, em otional, or intellectual handicaps. If it could be
shown that there is no m oral objection to infanticide the happiness
o f society could be significantly and justifiably increased.
Infanticide is also o f interest because o f the strong em otions it
arouses. T he typical reaction to infanticide is like the reaction to
incest or cannibalism , or the reaction o f previous generations to
m asturbation or oral sex. The response, rather than appealing to
carefully form ulated m oral principles, is primarily visceral. W hen
philosophers them selves respond in this w ay, offering no argu­
ments, and dismissing infanticide out o f hand, it is reasonable to
suspect that one is dealing with a taboo rather than with a rational
prohibition.5 1 shall attem pt to show that this is in fact the case.

thus b e tw e e n the givin g the m o th er m ore o f an op p ortu n ity to live w h ile givin g the
fo e tu s none at all and givin g the foetu s an o p p o rtu n ity to e n jo y life w h ile not giving
the m oth er a fu rth er o p p o rtu n ity to do so. S u rely fairness req u ires the latter.
S e co n d ly , sin ce the fo etu s has a g re a te r life e x p e cta n cy than the m oth er, on e is in
e ffe ct d istribu ting m ore go od s b y ch o osin g the life o f the foetu s o v e r the life o f the
m oth er.
T h e position I am here reco m m en d in g to the con servative should not be con fu sed
w ith the official C a th o lic position. T h e C a th o lic C h u rch holds that it is seriou sly
w ro n g to kill a fo etu s d irectly even if failu re to do so w ill result in the death o f both the
m o th er and the foetu s. Th is perverse valu e ju d g em e n t is not part o f the co n se rv a ­
tiv e ’s position.
4 S ection 230.3 o f the A m e rica n L a w Institu te's M o d el Pena l C o d e (P h ilad elp h ia,
1962). T h e re is som e in terestin g, th ough at tim e con fu sed , discussion o f the p rop osed
c o d e in M o d el P en a l C o d e— Tentative D raft N o. 9 (P h ilad elp h ia, 1959), pp. 146-62.
5 A clea r exa m p le o f such an unw illingness to en tertain serio u sly the possibility
th at m oral ju d g em e n ts w id ely a ccep ted in o n e 's ow n society m ay n everth eless be
in correct is p ro vid ed b y R o g e r W e rth e im e r’s superficial dism issal o f in fanticide on
p a ges 69-70 o f his article ‘ U n d erstan d in g the A b o rtio n A rg u m e n t’ , P hilo so p hy and
P u b lic A ffairs 1. no. 1 (F all, 19 71): 6 7-95.
6o MICHAEL TOOLEY

II. t e r m in o l o g y : ‘pe r so n ’ v e r su s ‘h u m a n b e in g ’

H ow is the term ‘person’ to be interpreted? I shall treat the concept

o f a person as a purely moral concept, free o f all descriptive content.
Specifically, in my usage the sentence ‘X is a person’ will be
synonym ous with the sentence ‘X has a (serious) m oral right to life . ’
This usage diverges slightly from what is perhaps the more
com m on w ay o f interpreting the term ‘person’ when it is em ployed
as a purely m oral term , w here to say that X is a person is to say that
X has rights. If everything that had rights had a right to life, these
interpretations would be extensionally equivalent. But I am
inclined to think that it does not follow from acceptable m oral
principles that w hatever has any rights at all has a right to life. M y
reason is this. G iven the choice betw een being killed and being
tortured for an hour, most adult humans would surely choose the
latter. So it seem s plausible to say it is worse to kill an adult human
being than it is to torture him for an hour. In contrast, it seem s to me
that while it is not seriously wrong to kill a newborn kitten, it is
seriously wrong to torture one for an hour. This suggests that
newborn kittens m ay have a right not to be tortured without having
a serious right to life. For it seems to be true that an individual has a
right to som ething w henever it is the case that, if he wants that
thing, it w ould be w rong for others to deprive him o f it. Then if it is
w rong to inflict a certain sensation upon a kitten if it doesn’t want to
experience that sensation, it will folllow that the kitten has a right
not to have sensation inflicted upon it.61 shall return to this exam ple
later. M y point here is m erely that it provides som e reason for
holding that it does not follow from acceptable moral principles
that if som ething has any rights at all, it has a serious right to
life.
T h ere has been a tendency in recent discussions o f abortion to use
expressions such as ‘person’ and ‘human being’ interchangeably.
B . A . B rod y, for exam ple, refers to the difficulty o f determ ining
‘w hether destroying the foetus constitutes the taking o f a human
6 C o m p a re the discussion o f the co n cep t o f a right o ffe re d b y R ich ard B . B ran d t in
his E th ica l Theory (E n g le w o o d C liffs, N .J ., 1959), pp. 43 4 -4 1. A s B ran d t p oints ou t,
som e ph ilo so ph ers h ave m ain tain ed that on ly things that can claim rights can h ave
rights. I agree w ith B ra n d t’s v iew that ‘in ab ility to claim d oes not d estro y the rig h t’
(p. 440).
 ABORTION A N D IN FA N TIC ID E 6l
life ’ , and suggests it is very plausible that ‘the taking o f a human life
is an action that has bad consequences for him whose life is being
tak en ’ .7 W hen B rod y refers to som ething as a human life he
apparently construes this as entailing that the thing is a person. For
if every living organism belonging to the species H om o sapiens
counted as a hum an life, there would be no difficulty in determ ining
w hether a foetus inside a human m other was a human life.
T h e same tendency is found in Judith Jarvis Thom son’s article,
which opens with the statement: ‘M ost opposition to abortion relies
on the premiss that the foetus is a human being, a person, from the
m om ent o f con ception .’ 8 T h e same is true o f R oger W ertheim er,
who explicitly says: ‘First o ff I should note that the expressions “ a
human life” , “ a human being” , “ a person” are virtually inter­
changeable in this co n text.’ 9
T h e tendency to use expressions like ‘person’ and ‘human being’
interchangeably is an unfortunate one. For one thing, it tends to
lend covert support to anti-abortionist positions. G iven such usage,
one who holds a liberal view o f abortion is put in the position o f
m aintaining that foetuses, at least up to a certain point, are not
human beings. E ven philosophers are led astray by this usage. Thus
W ertheim er says that ‘except for m onstrosities, every m em ber of
our species is indubitably a person, a human being, at the very latest
at birth’ .10 Is it really indubitable that newborn babies are persons?
Surely this is a wild contention. W ertheim er is falling prey to the
confusion naturally engendered by the practice o f using ‘person’
and ‘human being’ interchangeably. A n o th er exam ple o f this is
provided by Thom son: ‘I am inclined to think also that we shall
probably have to agree that the foetus has already becom e a human
person well before birth. Indeed, it com es as a surprise when one
first learns how early in its life it begins to acquire human
characteristics. B y the tenth w eek, for exam ple, it already has a
face, arms and legs, fingers and toes; it has internal organs, and
brain activity is d etectab le.’ 11 But what do such physiological
7 B . A . B ro d y , ‘ A b o rtio n and the L a w ’ , Journal o f P h ilo so p h y , L X V I I I , no. 12
(1 7 June 19 71): 357 - 6 9 - S ee pp. 357-8 .
8 T h o m so n , ‘ A D e fe n c e o f A b o r tio n ’ , p. 47.
9 W e rth e im e r, ‘ U n d erstan d in g the A b o rtio n A rg u m e n t’ , p. 69.
10 Ibid.
11 T h o m so n , ‘A D e fe n c e o f A b o r tio n ’ , pp. 47-8 .
62 M ICHAEL TOOLEY
characteristics have to do with the question o f whether the organism
is a person? Thom son, partly, I think, because o f the unfortunate
use o f term inology, does not even raise this question. A s a result she
virtually takes it for granted that there are some cases in which
abortion is ‘positively indecent’ .12
T h ere is a second reason why using ‘person’ and ‘human being’
interchangeably is unhappy philosophically. If one says that the
dispute betw een pro- and anti-abortionists centres on w hether the
foetus is a hum an, it is natural to conclude that it is essentially a
disagreem ent about certain facts, a disagreem ent about what
properties a foetus possesses. Thus W ertheim er says that ‘if one
insists on using the raggy fact-value distinction, then one ought to
say that the dispute is o ver a m atter o f fact in the sense in which it is a
fact that the N egro slaves w ere human beings ’.111 shall argue that
the two cases are not parallel, and that in the case o f abortion what is
prim arily at stake is what m oral principles one should accept. If one
says that the central issue betw een conservatives and liberals in the
abortion question is w hether the foetus is a person, it is clear that
the dispute m ay be either about what properties a thing must have in
order to be a person, in order to have a right to life— a m oral
question— or about w hether a foetus at a given stage o f d evelop­
ment as a m atter o f fact possesses the properties in question. The
tem ptation to suppose that the disagreem ent must be a factual one
is rem oved.
It should now be clear why the com mon practice o f using
expressions such as ‘person’ and ‘human being’ interchangeably in
discussions o f abortion is unfortunate. It would perhaps be best to
avoid the term ‘hum an’ altogether, em ploying instead some
expression that is m ore naturally interpreted as referring to a
certain type o f biological organism characterized in physiological
term s, such as ‘m em ber o f the species H om o sapiens'. M y own
approach will be to use the term ‘hum an’ only in contexts where it is
not philosophically dangerous.

12 I b id .. p. 65.
W e rth e im e r, U n d erstan d in g the A b o rtio n A rg u m e n t', p. 78.
 ABORTION AND INFA NTICID E 63
III. TH E B A S IC IS S U E ! W H E N IS A M E M B E R O F T H E
S P E C IE S H O M O S A P I E N S A P E R S O N ?

Settling the issue o f the m orality o f abortion and infanticide will

involve answering the follow ing questions: W hat properties must
som ething have to be a person, i.e. to have a serious right to life? A t
what point in the developm ent o f a m em ber o f the species H om o
sapiens does the organism possess the properties that m ake it a
person? T he first question raises a m oral issue. T o answer it is to
decide what basic14 moral principles involving the ascription o f a
right to life one ought to accept. The second question raises a purely
factual issue, since the properties in question are properties o f a
purely descriptive sort.
Som e writers seem quite pessimistic about the possibility of
resolving the question o f the m orality o f abortion. Indeed, some
have gone so far as to suggest that the question o f whether the foetus
is a person is in principle unanswerable: ‘we seem to be stuck with
the indeterm inateness o f the foetus’s hum anity’ .15 A n understand­
ing o f som e o f the sources o f this pessimism will, I think, help us to
tackle the problem . L et us begin by considering the similarity a
num ber o f people have noted betw een the issue o f abortion and the
issue o f N egro slavery. T he question here is why it should be m ore
difficult to decide w hether abortion and infanticide are acceptable
than it was to decide whether slavery was acceptable. T h e answer
seem s to be that in the case o f slavery there are moral principles o f a
quite uncontroversial sort that settle the issue. Thus most people
w ould agree to som e such principle as the following: No organism
that has experiences, that is capable o f thought and o f using
language, and that has harm ed no one, should be m ade a slave. In
the case o f abortion, on the other hand, conditions that are
generally agreed to be sufficient grounds for ascribing a right to life
to som ething do not suffice to settle the issue. It is easy to specify
other, purportedly sufficient conditions that will settle the issue, but
no one has been successful in putting forward considerations that

14 A m oral principle a ccep ted by a person is basic fo r him if and o n ly if his

accep tan ce o f it is not d ep en d en t upon any o f his (n on-m oral) factual b eliefs. T h a t is,
n o ch an ge in his factu al b e lie fs w ou ld cause him to aban don the principle in q u estio n .
15 W e rth e im e r, 'U n d e rstan d in g the A b o rtio n A rg u m e n t', p. 88.
64 MICHAEL TOOLEY
will convince others to accept those additional m oral principles.
i do not share the general pessimism about the possibility of
resolving the issue o f abortion and infanticide because I believe it is
possible to point to a very plausible moral principle dealing with the
question o f necessary conditions for som ething’s having a right to
life, where the conditions in question will provide an answer to the
question o f the perm issibility o f abortion and infanticide.
T h ere is a second cause o f pessimism that should be noted before
proceeding. It is tied up with the fact that the developm ent o f an
organism is one of gradual and continuous change. G iven this
continuity, how is one to draw a line at one point and declare it
perm issible to destroy a m em ber o f H om o sapiens up to, but not
beyond, that point? W o n ’t there be an arbitrariness about any point
that is chosen? I will return to this w orry shortly. It does not present
a serious difficulty once the basic moral principles relevant to the
ascription o f a right to life to an individual are established.
L et us turn now to the first and most fundam ental question: W hat
properties must som ething have in order to be a person, i.e. to have
a serious right to life? The claim I wish to defend is this: A n
organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the
concept o f a self as a continuing subject o f experiences and other
m ental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing entity.
M y basic argument in support o f this claim , which I will call the
self-consciousness requirem ent, will be clearest, I think, if I first
o ffe r a simplified version o f the argum ent, and then consider a
m odification that seems desirable. The simplified version o f my
argum ent is this. T o ascribe a right to an individual is to assert
som ething about the prim a-facie obligations o f other individuals
to act, or to refrain from acting, in certain ways. H ow ever, the
obligations in question are conditional ones, being dependent upon
the existence o f certain desires o f the individual to whom the right is
ascribed. Thus if an individual asks one to destroy som ething to
which he has a right, one does not violate his right to that thing if one
proceeds to destroy it. This suggests the following analysis: ‘A has a
right to X ’ is roughly synonym ous with ‘If A desires X , then others
are under a prim a-facie obligation to refrain from actions that
w ould deprive him o f it.’ 16
16 A g a in , co m p are the analysis d efen d ed by B ran dt in E thical T h eo ry , pp. 43 4 -4 1.
 ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE 65
A lth ou gh this analysis is initially plausible, there are reasons for
thinking it not entirely correct. I will consider these later. Even
here, how ever, som e expansion is necessary, since there are fea ­
tures o f the concept o f a right that are important in the present
context, and that ought to be dealt with m ore explicitly. In particu­
lar, it seem s to be a conceptual truth that things that lack conscious­
ness, such as ordinary m achines, cannot have rights. D o es this
conceptual truth follow from the above analysis o f the concept o f a
right? T he answer depends on how the term ‘desire’ is interpreted.
If one adopts a com pletely behaviouristic interpretation o f ‘desire’ ,
so that a m achine that searches for an electrical outlet in order to get
its batteries recharged is described as having a desire to be
recharged, then it will not follow from this analysis that objects that
lack consciousness cannot have rights. O n the other hand, if ‘desire’
is interpreted in such a w ay that desires are states necessarily
standing in som e sort o f relationship to states o f consciousness, it
will follow from the analysis that a m achine that is not capable o f
being conscious, and consequently o f having desires, cannot have
any rights. I think those who defend analyses of the concept o f a
right along the lines o f this one do have in mind an interpretation of
the term ‘desire’ that involves reference to som ething m ore than
behavioural dispositions. H ow ever, rather than relying on this, it
seem s preferable to m ake such an interpretation explicit. T h e
follow ing analysis is a natural way o f doing that: ‘A has a right to X ’
is roughly synonym ous with ‘A is the sort o f thing that is a subject o f
experiences and other m ental states, A is capable o f desiring X , and
if A does desire X , then others are under a prim a-facie obligation to
refrain from actions that w ould deprive him o f it.’
T h e next step in the argument is basically a m atter o f applying this
analysis to the concept o f a right to life. U nfortunately the
expression ‘right to life’ is not entirely a happy one, since it suggests
that the right in question concerns the continued existence o f a
biological organism . That this is incorrect can be brought out by
considering possible ways o f violating an individual’s right to life.
Suppose, for exam ple, that by som e technology o f the future the
brain o f an adult human w ere to be com pletely reprogram m ed, so
that the organism wound up with m em ories (or rather, apparent
m em ories), beliefs, attitudes, and personality traits com pletely
66 MICHAEL TOOLEY
different from those associated with it before it was subjected to
reprogram m ing. In such a case one would surely say that an
individual had been destroyed, that an adult hum an’s right to life
had been violated, even though no biological organism had been
killed. This exam ple shows that the expression ‘right to life’ is
m isleading, since what one is really concerned about is not just the
continued existence o f a biological organism , but the right of
a subject o f experiences and other mental states to continue to
exist.
G iven this m ore precise description o f the right with which we are
here concerned, we are now in a position to apply the analysis o f the
concept o f a right stated above. W hen we do so we find that the
statem ent ‘A has a right to continue to exist as a subject of
experiences and other mental states’ is roughly synonym ous with
the statem ent ‘A is a subject o f experiences and other m ental states,
A is capable o f desiring to continue to exist as a subject o f
experiences and other mental states, and if A does desire to
continue to exist as such an entity, then others are under a prima-
facie obligation not to prevent him from doing so .’
T h e final stage in the argument is simply a matter o f asking what
must be the case if som ething is to be capable o f having a desire to
continue existing as a subject o f experiences and other mental
states. T he basic point here is that the desires a thing can have are
lim ited by the concepts it possesses. For the fundam ental way of
describing a given desire is as a desire that a certain proposition be
tru e .17 T h en , since one cannot desire that a certain proposition be
true unless one understands it, and since one cannot understand it
without possessing the concepts involved in it, it follow s that the
desires one can have are limited by the concepts one possesses.
A p p lyin g this to the previous case results in the conclusion that an

17 In e v e ry d a y life one o ften speaks o f desirin g things, such as an apple o r a

n ew sp ap er. Such talk is ellip tical, the con text to ge th er w ith o n e ’s ord in ary b eliefs
servin g to m ak e it clea r that on e w ants to eat the apple and read the n ew spap er. T o
say th at w h at on e d esires is that a certain proposition be true should not be con strued
as in vo lvin g any p articu lar on to lo gica l com m itm en t. T h e point is m erely that it is
sen ten ces such as 'John w ants it to be the case that he is eatin g an apple in the next
few m in u tes’ th at provid e a co m p le te ly exp licit d escription o f a p e rso n ’s desires.
If on e fails to use such sen ten ces, one can be b ad ly m isled abou t w h at con cep ts are
p resu p p osed by a particu lar desire.
 ABORTION A ND INFANTICIDE 67
entity cannot be the sort o f thing that can desire that a subject o f
experiences and other m ental states exist unless it possesses the
concept o f such a subject. M oreover, an entity cannot desire that it
itself continue existing as a subject of experiences and other mental
states unless it believes that it is now such a subject. This com pletes
the justification o f the claim that it is a necessary condition of
som ething’s having a serious right to life that it possess the concept
o f a self as a continuing subject o f experiences, and that it believe
that it is itself such an entity.
L et us now consider a m odification in the above argument that
seem s desirable. This m odification concerns the crucial conceptual
claim advanced about the relationship betw een ascription o f rights
and ascription o f the corresponding desires. Certain situations
suggest that there m ay be exceptions to the claim that if a person
d oesn’t desire som ething, one cannot violate his right to it. There
are types o f situations that call this claim into question: (i) situations
in which an individual’s desires reflect a state o f em otional disturb­
ance; (ii) situations in which a previously conscious individual is
tem porarily unconscious; (iii) situations in which an individual’s
desires have been distorted by conditioning or by indoctrination.
A s an exam ple o f the first, consider a case in which an adult
human falls into a state o f depression which his psychiatrist recog­
nizes as tem porary. W hile in the state he tells people he wishes he
w ere dead. His psychiatrist, accepting the view that there can be no
violation o f an individual’s right to life unless the individual has a
desire to live, decides to let his patient have his way and kills him.
O r consider a related case in which one person gives another a drug
that produces a state o f tem porary depression; the recipient expres­
ses a wish that he w ere dead. T he person who adm inistered the drug
then kills him. D o esn ’t one want to say in both these cases that the
agent did som ething seriously wrong in killing the other person?
A n d isn’t the reason the action was seriously w rong in each case the
fact that it violated the individual’s right to life? If so, the right to life
cannot be linked with a desire to live in the way claim ed above.
T h e second set o f situations are ones in which an individual is
unconscious for som e reason— that is, he is sleeping, or drugged, or
in a tem porary com a. D o es an individual in such a state have any
desires? People do som etim es say that an unconscious individual
68 M ICHAEL TOOLEY
wants som ething, but it might be argued that if such talk is not to be
simply false it must be interpreted as actually referring to the desires
the individual would have if he were now conscious. Consequently,
if the analysis o f the concept o f a right proposed above w ere correct,
it w ould follow that one does not violate an individual’s right if one
takes his car, or kills him, while he is asleep.
Finally, consider situations in which an individual’s desires have
been distorted, either by inculcation o f irrational beliefs or by direct
conditioning. Thus an individual m ay perm it som eone to kill him
because he has been convinced that if he allows him self to be
sacrificed to the gods he will be gloriously rewarded in a life to
com e. O r an individual m ay be enslaved after first having been
conditioned to desire a life o f slavery. D o esn ’t one want to say that
in the form er case an individual’s right to life has been violated, and
in the latter his right to freedom ?
Situations such as these strongly suggest that even if an individual
doesn’t want som ething, it is still possible to violate his right to it.
Som e m odification o f the earlier account o f the concept o f a right
thus seem s in order. The analysis given covers, I believe, the
paradigm atic cases o f violation o f an individual’s rights, but there
are other, secondary cases where one also wants to say that
som eone’s right has been violated which are not included.
Precisely how the revised analysis should be form ulated is
unclear. H ere it will be sufficient m erely to say that, in view o f the
abo ve, an individual’s right to X can be violated not only when he
desires X , but also when he would now desire X w ere it not for one
o f the following: (i) he is in an em otionally unbalanced state; (ii) he
is tem porarily unconscious; (iii) he has been conditioned to desire
the absence o f X .
T he critical point now is that, even given this extension o f the
conditions under which an individual’s right to som ething can be
violated, it is still true that o n e’s right to som ething can be violated
only when one has the conceptual capability o f desiring the thing in
question. For exam ple, an individual who would now desire not to
be a slave if he w eren ’t em otionally unbalanced, or if he w eren’t
tem porarily unconscious, or if he hadn’t previously been
conditioned to want to be a slave, must possess the concepts
involved in the desire not to be a slave. Since it is really only the
 ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE 69
conceptual capability presupposed by the desire to continue
existing as a subject o f experiences and other mental states, and not
the desire itself, that enters into the above argum ent, the m odifica­
tion required in the account o f the conditions under which an
individual’s rights can be violated does not undercut my defence of
the self-consciousness requ irem ent.18
T o sum up, my argument has been that having a right to life
presupposes that one is capable o f desiring to continue existing as a
subject o f experiences and other mental states. This in turn presup­
poses both that one has the concept o f such a continuing entity and
that one believes that one is oneself such an entity. So an entity that
lacks such a consciousness o f itself as a continuing subject o f m ental
states does not have a right to life.
It w ould be natural to ask at this point whether satisfaction o f this
requirem ent is not only necessary but also sufficient to ensure that a
thing has a right to life. I am inclined to an affirmative answer.
H ow ever, the issue is not urgent in the present context, since as long
as the requirem ent is in fact a necessary one we have the basis o f an
adequate defence o f abortion and infanticide. If an organism must
satisfy som e other condition before it has a serious right to life, the
result will m erely be that the interval during which infanticide is
m orally perm issible m ay be som ewhat longer. A lthou gh the point
at which an organism first achieves self-consciousness and hence the
capacity o f desiring to continue existing as a subject o f experiences
and other m ental states m ay be a theoretically incorrect cut-off
point, it is at least a m orally safe one: any error it involves is on the
side o f caution.

18 T h e re a re, h o w e v e r, situation s o th er than th ose discussed h ere w hich m ight

seem to cou n t against the claim th at a person can n ot h ave a right unless he is
co n ce p tu a lly ca p ab le o f havin g the co rresp o n d in g d esire. C a n ’ t a y o u n g ch ild , fo r
e x a m p le , h ave a right to an estate , e ve n th ough he m ay not be co n ce p tu ally cap ab le
o f w an tin g the e state ? It is clea r th at Such situation s h av e to be c a re fu lly con sid ered if
o n e is to arrive at a satisfacto ry accoun t o f the co n cep t o f a right. M y in clin ation is to
say that the co rrec t d escription is not that the child now has a right to the estate , but
th at he w ill com e to h ave such a right w h en he is m atu re, and that in the m ean tim e no
on e else has a right to the e state. M y reason fo r sayin g th at the child d oes not now
h ave a right to the estate is that he cann ot n o w do things w ith th e e sta te , such as
sellin g it or givin g it a w a y , that he w ill be able to do later on.
70 M ICHAEL TOOLEY
IV . SO M E C R IT IC A L C O M M E N T S ON A L T E R N A T IV E

PRO POSALS

I now want to com pare the line o f dem arcation I am proposing with
the cut-off points traditionally advanced in discussions o f abortion.
M y fundam ental claim will be that none o f these cut-off points can
be defended by appeal to plausible, basic moral principles. The
main suggestions as to the point past which it is seriously wrong to
destroy som ething that will develop into an adult m em ber o f the
species H om o sapiens are these: (a) conception; (b) the attainm ent
o f human form ; (c) the achievem ent o f the ability to m ove about
spontaneously; (d) viability; (e) b irth .19 The corresponding moral
principles suggested by these cut-off points are as follows: ( i) It is
seriously wrong to kill an organism , from a zygote on, that belongs
to the species H om o sapiens. (2) It is seriously wrong to kill an
organism that belongs to H om o sapiens and that has achieved
human form . (3) It is seriously wrong to kill an organism that is a
m em ber o f H om o sapiens and that is capable o f spontaneous
m ovem ent. (4) It is seriously wrong to kill an organism that belongs
to H om o sapiens and that is capable o f existing outside the wom b.
(5) It is seriously wrong to kill an organism that is a m em ber of
H om o sapiens that is no longer in the wom b.
M y first com m ent is that it would not do simply to omit the
reference to m em bership in the species H om o sapiens from the
above principles, with the exception o f principle (2). For then
the principles w ould be applicable to animals in general, and one
would be forced to conclude that it was seriously wrong to abort a
cat foetus, or that it was seriously wrong to abort a m otile cat foetus,
and so on.
T h e second and crucial com ment is that none o f the five principles
given above can plausibly be view ed as a basic moral principle. T o
accept any o f them as such would be akin to accepting as a basic
m oral principle the proposition that it is m orally perm issible to
enslave black m em bers o f the species H om o sapiens but not white

l‘) A n o th e r freq u en t su ggestion as to the cu t-o ff poin t not listed h ere is

q u ick en in g. I om it it b ecau se it seem s clear that if abortio n a fter q u icken in g is w ro n g,
its w ron gn ess m ust be tied up w ith the m otility o f the fo etu s, not w ith the m o th e r’s
a w aren ess o f the fo e tu s’s ability to m ove about.
 ABORTION AN D IN FA N T IC ID E 71
m em bers. W hy should it be seriously wrong to kill an unborn
m em ber o f the species H om o sapiens but not seriously wrong to kill
an unborn kitten? D ifference in species is not per se a m orally
relevant difference. If one holds that it is seriously wrong to kill an
unborn m em ber o f the species H om o sapiens but not an unborn
kitten, one should be prepared to point to some property that is
m orally significant and that is possessed by unborn m em bers o f
H om o sapiens but not by unborn kittens. Sim ilarly, such a property
must be identified if one believes it seriously wrong to kill unborn
m em bers o f H om o sapiens that have achieved viability but not
seriously w rong to kill unborn kittens that have achieved that state.
W hat property might account for such a difference? That is to
say, what basic m oral principles might a person who accepts one of
these five principles appeal to in support o f his secondary moral
judgem ent? W hy should events such as the achievem ent o f human
form , or the achievem ent o f the ability to m ove about, or the
achievem ent o f viability, or birth serve to endow som ething with a
right to life? W hat the liberal must do is to show that these events
involve changes, or are associated with changes, that are m orally
relevant.
L et us now consider reasons why the events involved in cut-off
points (b) to (e) are not m orally relevant, beginning with the last
two: viability and birth. T he fact that an organism is not physiologi­
cally dependent upon another organism , or is capable o f such
physiological independence, is surely irrelevant to whether the
organism has a right to life. In defence o f this contention, consider a
speculative case where a foetus is able to learn a language while in
the wom b. O n e would surely not say that the foetus had no right to
life until it em erged from the wom b, or until it was capable o f
existing outside the wom b. A less speculative exam ple is the case of
Siam ese twins who have learned to speak. O ne doesn’t want to say
that since one o f the twins w ould die w ere the two to be separated, it
therefore has no right to life. Consequently it seems difficult to
disagree with the conservative’s claim that an organism which lacks
a right to life before birth or before becom ing viable cannot acquire
this right im m ediately upon birth or upon becom ing viable.
This does not, how ever, com pletely rule out viability as a line of
dem arcation. For instead o f defending viability as a cut-off point on
72 M ICHAEL TOOLEY
the ground that only then does a foetus acquire a right to life, it is
possible to argue rather that when one organism is physiologically
dependent upon another, the form er’s right to life m ay conflict with
the latter’s right to use its body as it will, and m oreover, that the
latter’s right to do what it wants with its body m ay often take
precedence over the other organism ’s right to life. Thom son has
defended this view : ‘I am arguing only that having a right to life does
not guarantee having either a right to the use o f or a right to be
allow ed continued use o f another person’s body— even if one needs
it for life itself. So the right to life will not serve the opponents o f
abortion in the very simple and clear w ay in which they seem to have
thought it w o u ld .’201 believe that Thom son is right in contending
that philosophers have been altogether too casual in assuming that
if one grants the foetus a serious right to life, one must accept a
conservative position on abortion.211 also think the only defence o f
viability as a cut-off point which has any hope o f success at all is one
based on the considerations she advances. I doubt very much,
how ever, that this defence o f abortion is ultim ately tenable. I think
that one can grant even stronger assumptions than those m ade by
Thom son and still argue persuasively for a sem i-conservative view.
W hat I have in mind is this. Let it be granted, for the sake of
argum ent, that a w om an’s right to free her body o f parasites which
will inhibit her freedom o f action and possibly impair her health is
stronger than the parasite’s right to life, and is so even if the parasite
has as much right to life as an adult human. O ne can still argue that
abortion ought not to be perm itted. For if A ’s right is stronger than
B ’s, and it is im possible to satisfy both, it does not follow that A ’s
should be satisfied rather than B ’s. It may be possible to
com pensate A if his right isn’t satisfied, but im possible to
com pensate B if his right isn’t satisfied. In such a case the best thing
to do m ay be to satisfy B ’s claim and to com pensate A . A bortion
m ay be a case in point. If the foetus has a right to life and the right is
not satisfied, there is certainly no way the foetus can be
com pensated. O n the other hand, if the wom an’s right to rid her
body o f harm ful and annoying parasites is not satisfied, she can be

20 See p. 46, above.

21 A g o o d e xa m p le o f a failu re to p ro b e this issue is p rovid ed b y B r o d y ’s ‘ A b o rtio n
and the L a w ’ .
 ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE 73
com pensated. Thus it w ould seem that the just thing to do w ould be
to prohibit abortion, but to com pensate wom en for the burden o f
carrying a parasite to term. Then , how ever, we are back at a
(m odified) conservative position.22 O ur conclusion must be that it
appears unlikely there is any satisfactory defence either o f viability
or o f birth as cut-off points.
L et us now consider the third suggested line of dem arcation, the
achievem ent o f the pow er to m ove about spontaneously. It might be
argued that acquiring this pow er is a m orally relevant event on the
ground that there is a connection betw een the concept o f an agent
and the concept o f a person, and being m otile is an indication that a
thing is an agen t.23
It is difficult to respond to this suggestion unless it is m ade m ore
specific. G iven that o n e’s interest here is in defending a certain cut­
o ff point, it is natural to interpret the proposal as suggesting that
m otility is a necessary condition o f an organism ’s having a right to
life. But this w o n ’t do, because one certainly wants to ascribe a right
to life to adult humans who are com pletely paralysed. M aybe the
suggestion is rather that motility is a sufficient condition of
som ething’s having a right to life. H ow ever, it is clear that motility
alone is not sufficient, since this would im ply that all anim als, and
also certain m achines, have a right to life. Perhaps, then, the most
reasonable interpretation o f the claim is that motility together with
som e other property is a sufficient condition o f som ething’s having a
right to life, where the other property will have to be a property
possessed by unborn m em bers o f the species H om o sapiens but not
by unborn m em bers o f other fam iliar species.
T h e central question, then, is what this other property is. U ntil
one is told, it is very difficult to evaluate either the moral claim that
m otility together with that property is a sufficient basis for ascribing
to an organism a right to life or the factual claim that a m otile human
foetus possesses that property while a m otile foetus belonging to
som e other species does not. A conservative w ould presum ably
reject m otility as a cut-off point by arguing that w hether an
22 A d m itte d ly the m odification is a substantial o n e , since given a so cie ty that
refu sed to co m p en sate w om en , a w o m an w h o had an abortion w o u ld not be doing
an yth in g w rong.
23 C o m p a re W e rth e im e r’s rem ark s, ‘ U n d erstan d in g the A b o rtio n A rg u m e n t’ ,
P- 79-
74 MICHAEL TOOLEY
organism has a right to life depends only upon its potentialities,
which are o f course not changed by its becom ing m otile. If, on the
other hand, one favours a liberal view o f abortion, I think that one
can attack this third suggested cut-off point, in its unspecified form ,
only by determ ining what properties are necessary, or what prop er­
ties sufficient, for an individual to have a right to life. Thus I would
base my rejection o f m otility as a cut-off point on my claim ,
defended above, that a necessary condition o f an organism ’s
possessing a right to life is that it conceive o f itself as a continuing
subject o f experiences and other mental states.
T h e second suggested cut-off point— the developm ent o f a
recognizably human form — can be dismissed fairly quickly. I have
already rem arked that m em bership in a particular species is not
itself a m orally relevant property. For it is obvious that if we
encountered other ‘rational anim als’ , such as M artians, the fact that
their physiological m ake-up was very different from our own would
not be grounds for denying them a right to life.24 Sim ilarly, it is clear
that the developm ent o f human form is not in itself a m orally
relevant event. N or do there seem to be any grounds for holding
that there is som e other change, associated with this event, that is
m orally relevant. The appeal o f this second cut-off point is, I think,
purely em otional.
T h e overall conclusion seems to be that it is very difficult to
defend the cut-off points traditionally advanced by those who
advocate either a m oderate or a liberal position on abortion. The
reason is that there do not seem to be any basic moral principles one
can appeal to in support o f the cut-off points in question. W e must
now consider w hether the conservative is any better off.

V. R E F U T A T IO N O F T H E C O N S E R V A T IV E P O S IT IO N

M any have felt that the conservative’s position is m ore defensible

than the liberal’s because the conservative can point to the gradual
and continuous developm ent o f an organism as it changes from a
24 T h is req u ires qualification . If th eir cen tral n ervous system s w ere radically
d ifferen t from o u rs, it m ight be th ought that o n e w ou ld not be ju stified in ascribing to
them m ental states o f an e xp erien tial sort. A n d th en , since it seem s to be a
co n ce p tu al truth that on ly things havin g e xp erien tial states can h ave rights, one
w o u ld be fo rced to con clu d e that o n e w as not ju stified in ascribing any rights to them .
 ABORTION A N D IN FA N TICIDE 75
zygote to an adult human being. He is then in a position to argue
that it is m orally arbitrary for the liberal to draw a line at som e point
in this continuous process and to say that abortion is perm issible
b efore, but not after, that particular point. The liberal’s reply would
presum ably be that the emphasis upon the continuity o f the process
is m isleading. W hat the conservative is really doing is simply
challenging the liberal to specify the properties a thing must have in
order to be a person, and to show that the developing organism does
acquire the properties at the point selected by the liberal. The
liberal may then reply that the difficulty he has m eeting this
challenge should not be taken as grounds for rejecting his position.
For the conservative cannot meet this challenge either; the
conservative is equally unable to say what properties som ething
must have if it is to have a right to life.
A lth o u gh this rejoinder does not dispose of the conservative’s
argum ent, it is not without bite. For defenders o f the view that
abortion is always wrong have failed to face up to the question of the
basic moral principles on which their position rests. T h ey have been
content to assert the wrongness of killing any organism , from a
zygote on, if that organism is a m em ber o f the species H om o
sapiens. But they have overlooked the point that this cannot be an
acceptable basic moral principle, since difference in species is not in
itself a m orally relevant difference. The conservative can reply,
h ow ever, that it is possible to defend his position— but not the
liberal’s— without getting clear about the properties a thing must
possess if it is to have a right to life. The conservative’s defence will
rest upon the follow ing two claims: first, that there is a property,
even if one is unable to specify what it is, that (i) is possessed by
adult humans, and (ii) endows any organism possessing it with a
serious right to life. Second, that if there are properties which satisfy
(i) and (ii) above, at least one o f those properties will be such that
any organism potentially possessing that property has a serious right
to life even now, simply by virtue o f that potentiality, where an
organism possesses a property potentially if it will com e to have that
property in the normal course o f its d evelo p m en t., T h e second
claim— which I shall refer to as the potentiality principle— is critical
to the conservative’s defence. Because o f it he is able to defend his
position without deciding what properties a thing must possess in
76 MICHAEL TOOLEY
order to have a right to life. It is enough to know that adult m em bers
o f H om o sapiens do have such a right. For then one can conclude
that any organism which belongs to the species H om o sapiens, from
a zygote on, must also have a right to life by virtue o f the potentiality
principle.
T h e liberal, by contrast, cannot mount a com parable argument.
H e cannot defend his position without offering at least a partial
answer to the question o f what properties a thing must possess in
order to have a right to life.
T h e im portance o f the potentiality principle, how ever, goes
beyond the fact that it provides support for the conservative’s
position. If the principle is unacceptable, then so is his position. For
if the conservative cannot defend the view that an organism ’s
having certain potentialities is sufficient grounds for ascribing to it a
right to life, his claim that a foetus which is a m em ber o f H om o
sapiens has a right to life can be attacked as follow s. T h e reason an
adult m em ber o f H om o sapiens has a right to life, but an infant ape
does not, is that there are certain psychological properties which the
form er possesses and the latter lacks. N ow , even if one is unsure
exactly what these psychological properties are, it is clear that an
organism in the early stages o f developm ent from a zygote into an
adult m em ber o f H om o sapiens does not possess these properties.
O n e need m erely com pare a human foetus with an ape foetus. W hat
m ental states does the form er en joy that the latter does not? Surely
it is reasonable to hold that there are no significant differences in
their respective m ental lives— assuming that one wishes to ascribe
any mental states at all to such organisms. (D oes a zygote have a
m ental life? D oes it have experiences? O r beliefs? O r desires?)
T h ere are, o f course, physiological differences, but these are not in
them selves m orally significant, //one held that potentialities were
relevant to the ascription o f a right to life, one could argue that the
physiological differences, though not m orally significant in them ­
selves, are m orally significant by virtue o f their causal conse­
quences: they will lead to later psychological differences that are
m orally relevant, and for this reason the physiological differences
are them selves m orally significant. But if the potentiality principle
is not available, this line o f argument cannot be used, and there will
then be no differences betw een a human foetus and an ape foetus
 ABORTION AND IN FA N TICIDE 77
that the conservative can use as grounds for ascribing a serious right
to life to the form er but not to the latter.
It is therefore tem pting to conclude that the conservative view of
abortion is acceptable if and only if the potentiality principle is
acceptable. But to say that the conservative position can be
defended if the potentiality principle is acceptable is to assume that
the argum ent is over once it is granted that the foetus has a right to
life, and, as was noted above, Thom son has shown that there are
serious grounds for questioning this assumption. In any case, the
im portant point here is that the conservative position on abortion is
acceptable only if the potentiality principle is sound.
O ne w ay to attack the potentiality principle is simply to argue in
support o f the self-consciousness requirem ent— the claim that only
an organism that conceives o f itself as a continuing subject o f
experiences has a right to life. For this requirem ent, when taken
together with the claim that there is at least one property, possessed
by adult humans, such that any organism possessing it has a serious
right to life, entails the denial o f the potentiality principle. O r at
least this is so if we add the uncontroversial em pirical claim that an
organism that will in the normal course o f events develop into an
adult human does not from the very beginning o f its existence
possess a concept o f a continuing subject o f experiences together
with a belief that it is itself such an entity.
I think it best, how ever, to scrutinize the potentiality principle
itself, and not to base o n e’s case against it simply on the self-
consciousness requirem ent. Perhaps the first point to note is that
the potentiality principle should not be confused with principles
such as the following: the value o f an object is related to the value o f
the things into which it can develop. This ‘valuation principle’ is
rather vague. T here are ways o f making it m ore precise, but we
need not consider these here. Suppose now that one w ere to speak
not o f a right to life, but o f the value o f life. It would then be easy to
m ake the m istake o f thinking that the valuation principle was
relevant to the potentiality principle— indeed, that it entailed it.
B ut an individual’s right to life is not based on the value o f his life.
T o say that the world w ould be better o ff if it contained few er
people is not to say that it w ould be right to achieve such a better
world by killing som e o f the present inhabitants. I f having a right to
78 M ICHAEL TOOLEY
life w ere a m atter o f a thing’s value, then a thing’s potentialities,
being connected with its expected value, would clearly be relevant
to the question o f what rights it had. C onversely, once one realizes
that a thing’s rights are not a m atter o f its value, I think it becom es
clear that an organism ’s potentialities are irrelevant to the question
o f w hether it has a right to life.
But let us now turn to the task o f finding a direct refutation o f the
potentiality principle. The basic issue is this. Is there any property J
which satisfies the follow ing conditions: ( i) T here is a property K
such that any individual possessing property K has a right to life,
and there is a scientific law L to the effect that any organism
possessing property J will in the normal course o f events com e to
possess property K at som e later tim e. (2) G iven the relationship
betw een property J and property K just described, anything
possessing property J has a right to life. (3) If property J w ere not
related to property K in the way indicated, it w ould not be the case
that anything possessing property J thereby had a right to life. In
short, the question is whether there is a property J that bestows a
right to life on an organism only because J stands in a certain causal
relationship to a second property K , which is such that anything
possessing that property ipso facto has a right to life.
M y argument turns upon the follow ing critical principle: L et C be
a causal process that norm ally leads to outcom e E. L et A be an
action that initiates process C , and B be an action involving a
minimal expenditure o f energy that stops process C before outcom e
E occurs. A ssum e further that actions A and B do not have any
other consequences, and that E is the only m orally significant
outcom e o f process C . Then there is no moral difference between
intentionally perform ing action B and intentionally refraining from
perform ing action A , assuming identical m otivation in both cases.
This principle, which I shall refer to as the moral sym m etry principle
with respect to action and inaction, would be rejected by some
philosophers. They w ould argue that there is an im portant distinct­
ion to be drawn betw een ‘what we owe people in the form o f aid and
what we ow e them in the w ay o f non-interference’ ,25 and that the
latter, ‘negative duties’ , are duties that it is m ore serious to neglect
25 P h ilip pa F o o t, 'T h e P roblem o f A b o rtio n and the D o ctrin e o f the D o u b le
E ffe c t’ , The O x fo r d Review 5 (1967): 5 -1 5 . S ee the discussion on pp. 11 ff.
 ABORTION AND INFAN TICID E 79
than the form er, ‘positive’ ones. This view arises from an intuitive
response to exam ples such as the follow ing. E ven if it is wrong not to
send food to starving people in other parts o f the w orld, it is m ore
w rong still to kill som eone. A n d isn’t the conclusion, then, that
o n e’s obligation to refrain from killing som eone is a m ore serious
obligation than o n e’s obligation to save lives?
I want to argue that this is not the correct conclusion. I think it is
tem pting to draw this conclusion if one fails to consider the m otivat­
ion that is likely to be associated with the respective actions. If
som eone perform s an action he knows will kill som eone else, this
will usually be grounds for concluding that he wanted to kill the
person in question. In contrast, failing to help som eone m ay
indicate only apathy, laziness, selfishness, or an amoral outlook: the
fact that a person knowingly allows another to die will not norm ally
be grounds for concluding that he desired that person’s death.
Som eone who know ingly kills another is m ore likely to be seriously
defective from a moral point o f view than som eone who fails to save
another’s life.
If we are not to be led to false conclusions by our intuitions about
certain cases, we must explicitly assume identical m otivations in the
two situations. C om pare, for exam ple, the following: ( i) Jones sees
that Smith will be killed by a bom b unless he warns him. Jones’s
reaction is: ‘H ow lucky, it will save me the trouble o f killing Smith
m yself.’ So Jones allows Smith to be killed by the bom b, even
though he could easily have warned him. (2) Jones wants Smith
dead, and therefore shoots him. Is one to say there is a significant
difference betw een the wrongness of Jones’s behaviour in these two
cases? Surely not. This shows the m istake o f drawing a distinction
betw een positive duties and negative duties and holding that the
latter im pose stricter obligations than the form er. The difference in
our intuitions about situations that involve giving aid to others and
corresponding situations that involve not interfering with others is
to be explained by reference to probable differences in the m otivat­
ions operating in the two situations, and not by reference to a
distinction betw een positive and negative duties. For once it is
specified that the m otivation is the same in the two situations, we
realize that inaction is as wrong in the one case as action is in the
other.
8o MICHAEL TOOLEY
T h ere is another point that m ay be relevant. A ction involves
effort, while inaction usually does not. It usually does not require
any effort on my part to refrain from killing som eone, but saving
som eone’s life will require an expenditure o f energy. O ne must then
ask how large a sacrifice a person is m orally required to m ake to
save the life o f another. If the sacrifice o f time and energy is quite
large it m ay be that one is not m orally obliged to save the life of
another in that situation. Superficial reflection upon such cases
m ight easily lead us to introduce the distinction betw een positive
and negative duties, but again it is clear that this w ould be a m istake.
T h e point is not that one has a greater duty to refrain from killing
others than to perform positive actions that will save them . It is
rather that positive actions require effort, and this means that in
deciding what to do a person has to take into account his own right
to do what he wants with his life, and not only the other person’s
right to life. T o avoid this confusion, we should confine ourselves to
com parisons betw een situations in which the positive action
involves minimal effort.
T h e m oral sym m etry principle, as form ulated above, explicitly
takes these two factors into account. It applies only to pairs o f
situations in which the m otivations are identical and the positive
action involves minimal effort. W ithout these restrictions, the
principle w ould be open to serious objection; with them , it seems
p erfectly acceptable. For the central objection to it rests on
the claim that we must distinguish positive from negative duties
and recognize that negative duties im pose stronger obligations
than positive ones. I have tried to show how this claim derives
from an unsound account o f our m oral intuitions about certain
situations.
M y argument against the potentiality principle can now be stated.
Suppose at som e future time a chem ical w ere to be discovered
which w hen injected into the brain o f a kitten would cause the kitten
to develop into a cat possessing a brain o f the sort possessed by
humans, and consequently into a cat having all the psychological
capabilities characteristic o f adult humans. Such cats would be able
to think, to use language, and so on. N ow it w ould surely be m orally
indefensible in such a situation to ascribe a serious right to life to
m em bers o f the species H om o sapiens without also ascribing it to
 ABORTION AND IN FA N TIC ID E 8l
cats that have undergone such a process o f developm ent: there
would be no m orally significant differences.
Secondly, it w ould not be seriously wrong to refrain from
injecting a newborn kitten with the special chem ical, and to kill it
instead. The fact that one could initiate a causal process that would
transform a kitten into an entity that would eventually possess
properties such that anything possessing them ipso facto has a
serious right to life does not mean that the kitten has a serious right
to life even before it has been subjected to the process o f injection
and transform ation. T he possibility o f transform ing kittens into
persons will not m ake it any m ore wrong to kill newborn kittens
than it is now.
T hirdly, in view o f the sym m etry principle, if it is not seriously
wrong to refrain from initiating such a causal process, neither is it
seriously wrong to interfere with such a process. Suppose a kitten is
accidentally injected with the chem ical. A s long as it has not yet
developed those properties that in them selves endow something
w ith a right to life, there cannot be anything wrong with interfering
w ith the causal process and preventing the developm ent of the
properties in question. Such interference might be accom plished
either by injecting the kitten with som e ‘neutralizing’ chem ical or
sim ply by killing it.
But if it is not seriously wrong to destroy an injected kitten which
will naturally develop the properties that bestow a right to life,
neither can it be seriously wrong to destroy a m em ber o f H om o
sapiens which lacks such properties, but will naturally com e to have
them . The potentialities are the same in both cases. The only
difference is that in the case o f a human foetus the potentialities
have been present from the beginning o f the organism ’s develop­
m ent, while in the case o f the kitten they have been present only
from the tim e it was injected with the special chem ical. This
difference in the time at which the potentialities w ere acquired is a
m orally irrelevant difference.
It should be em phasized that I am not here assuming that a
hum an foetus does not possess properties which in them selves, and
irrespective o f their causal relationships to other properties, pro­
vide grounds for ascribing a right to life to w hatever possesses them .
T h e point is m erely that if it is seriously w rong to kill som ething, the
82 MICHAEL TOOLEY
reason cannot be that the thing will later acquire properties that in
them selves provide som ething with a right to life.
Finally, it is reasonable to believe that there are properties
possessed by adult m em bers o f H om o sapiens which establish their
right to life, and also that any normal human foetus will com e to
possess those properties shared by adult humans. But it has just
been shown that if it is wrong to kill a human foetus, it cannot be
because o f its potentialities. O ne is therefore forced to conclude
that the conservative’s potentiality principle is false.
In short, anyone who wants to defend the potentiality principle
must either argue against the moral sym m etry principle or hold that
in a world in which kittens could be transform ed into ‘rational
anim als’ it w ould be seriously wrong to kill newborn kittens. It is
hard to believe there is much to be said for the latter m oral claim.
C onsequently one expects the conservative’s rejoinder to be
directed against the sym m etry principle. W hile I have not
attem pted to provide a thorough defense o f that principle, I have
tried to show that what seem s to be the most im portant objection to
it— the one that appeals to a distinction between positive and
negative duties— is based on a superficial analysis o f our moral
intuitions. I believe that a m ore thorough exam ination o f the
sym m etry principle w ould show it to be sound. If so, we should
reject the potentiality principle, and the conservative position on
abortion as well.

V I. SU M M A R Y A N D C O N C L U S IO N S

Let us return now to my basic claim , the self-consciousness require­

ment: A n organism possesses a serious right to life only if it
possesses the concept o f a self as a continuing subject o f experiences
and other m ental states, and believes that it is itself such a
continuing entity. M y defence o f this claim has been twofold. I have
offered a direct argument in support o f it, and I have tried to show
that traditional conservative and liberal views on abortion and
infanticide, which involve a rejection o f it, are unsound. I now want
to m ention one final reason why my claim should be accepted.
C onsider the exam ple m entioned in section II— that o f killing, as
opposed to torturing, newborn kittens. I suggested there that while
 ABORTION AND IN FA NTICID E 83
in the case o f adult humans most people w ould consider it worse to
kill an individual than to torture him for an hour, we do not usually
view the killing o f a newborn kitten as m orally outrageous, although
we would regard som eone who tortured a newborn kitten for an
hour as heinously evil. I pointed out that a possible conclusion that
might be drawn from this is that newborn kittens have a right not to
be tortured, but do not have a serious right to life. If this is the
correct conclusion, how is one to explain it? O ne merit o f the self-
consciousness requirem ent is that it provides an explanation o f this
situation. The reason a newborn kitten does not have a right to life is
explained by the fact that it does not possess the concept o f a self.
But how is one to explain the kitten’s having a right not to be
tortured? The answer is that a desire not to suffer pain can be
ascribed to som ething without assuming that it has any concept o f a
continuing self. For while som ething that lacks the concept of a self
cannot desire that a self not suffer, it can desire that a given
sensation not exist. The state desired— the absence o f a particular
sensation, or o f sensations o f a certain sort— can be described in a
purely phenom enalistic language, and hence without the concept of
a continuing self. So long as the newborn kitten possesses the
relevant phenom enal concepts, it can truly be said to desire that a
certain sensation not exist. So we can ascribe to it a right not to be
tortured even though, since it lacks the concept of a continuing self,
w e cannot ascribe to it a right to life.
This com pletes my discussion o f the basic moral principles
involved in the issue o f abortion and infanticide. But I want to
com m ent upon an im portant factual question, nam ely, at what
point an organism com es to possess the concept o f a self as a
continuing subject o f experiences and other mental states, together
with the b elief that it is itself such a continuing entity. This is
obviously a m atter for detailed psychological investigation, but
everyday observation m akes it perfectly clear, I believe, that a
newborn baby does not possess the concept o f a continuing self, any
m ore than a newborn kitten possesses such a concept. If so,
infanticide during a time interval shortly after birth must be m orally
acceptable.
B ut w here is the line to be drawn? W hat is the cut-off point? If
one m aintained, as som e philosophers have, that an individual
84 MICHAEL TOOLEY
possesses concepts only if he can express these concepts in
language, it w ould be a m atter o f everyday observation whether or
not a given organism possessed the concept o f a continuing self.
Infanticide w ould then be perm issible up to the tim e an organism
learned how to use certain expressions. H ow ever, I think the claim
that acquisition o f concepts is dependent on acquisition o f language
is m istaken. F or exam ple, one wants to ascribe m ental states o f a
conceptual sort— such as beliefs and desires— to organisms that are
incapable o f learning a language. T h e issue o f prelinguistic under­
standing is clearly outside the scope o f this discussion. M y point is
sim ply that i f an organism can acquire concepts without thereby
acquiring a way o f expressing those concepts linguistically, the
question o f whether a given organism possesses the concept o f a self
as a continuing subject o f experiences and other m ental states,
together with the b elief that it is itself such a continuing entity, may
be a question that requires fairly subtle experim ental techniques to
answer.
If this view o f the m atter is roughly correct, there are two worries
one is left with at the level o f practical m oral decisions, one o f which
m ay turn out to be deeply disturbing. The lesser w orry is where the
line is to be drawn in the case o f infanticide. It is not troubling
because there is no serious need to know the exact point at which a
human infant acquires a right to life. For in the vast m ajority of
cases in which infanticide is desirable, its desirability will be appa­
rent within a short tim e after birth. Since it is virtually certain that
an infant at such a stage o f its developm ent does not possess the
concept o f a continuing self, and thus does not possess a serious
right to life, there is excellent reason to believe that infanticide is
m orally perm issible in most cases where it is otherwise desirable.
T h e practical m oral problem can thus be satisfactorily handled by
choosing som e period o f tim e, such as a w eek after birth, as the
interval during which infanticide will be perm itted. This interval
could then be m odified once psychologists have established the
point at which a human organism com es to believe that it is a
continuing subject o f experiences and other m ental states.
T h e troubling w orry is whether adult animals belonging to species
other than H om o sapiens m ay not also possess a serious right to life.
F or once one says that an organism can possess the concept o f a
 ABORTION AND IN FA N TIC ID E 85
continuing self, together with the belief that it is itself such an entity,
w ithout having any way o f expressing that concept and that belief
linguistically, one has to face up to the question o f whether animals
m ay not possess properties that bestow a serious right to life upon
th em . T he suggestion itself is a fam iliar o n e , and one that most o f us
are accustom ed to dismiss very casually. The line o f thought
advanced here suggests that this attitude may turn out to be
tragically m istaken. O nce one reflects upon the question o f the basic
m oral principles involved in the ascription o f a right to life to
organism s, one m ay find him self driven to conclude that our
everyd ay treatm ent o f animals is m orally indefensible, and that we
are in fact m urdering innocent persons.
 VI

THE SURVIVAL LOTTERY

JO H N H A R R IS

L e t u s suppose that organ transplant procedures have been

perfected; in such circumstances if two dying patients could be
saved by organ transplants then, if surgeons have the requisite
organs in stock and no other needy patients, but nevertheless allow
their patients to die, we w ould be inclined to say, and be justified in
saying, that the patients died because the doctors refused to save
them . But if there are no spare organs in stock and none otherwise
available, the doctors have no choice, they cannot save their
patients and so must let them die. In this case we w ould be
disinclined to say that the doctors are in any sense the cause o f their
patients’ deaths. But let us further suppose that the two dying
patients, Y and Z , are not happy about being left to die. T h ey might
argue that it is not strictly true that there are no organs which could
be used to save them . Y needs a new heart and Z new lungs. T h ey
point out that if just one healthy person w ere to be killed his organs
could be rem oved and both o f them be saved. W e and the doctors
w ould probably be alike in thinking that such a step, while techni­
cally possible, would be out o f the question. W e would not say that
the doctors w ere killing their patients if they refused to prey upon
the healthy to save the sick. A n d because this sort o f surgical Robin
H oodery is out o f the question we can tell Y and Z that they cannot
be saved, and that when they die they will have died o f natural
causes and not o f the neglect o f their doctors. Y and Z do not agree,
how ever, they insist that if the doctors fail to kill a healthy man and
use his organs to save them , then the doctors will be responsible for
their deaths.
M any philosophers have for various reasons believed that we
must not kill even if by doing so we could save life . T h ey b elieve that
John H arris, 'T h e S u rvival L o tte ry ', Philosophy 50, (19 75 ), pp. 8 1-7 . R ep rin ted by
perm ission o f C a m b rid g e U n iversity Press and the author.
88 JO H N HARRIS
there is a m oral difference betw een killing and letting die. O n this
view , to kill A so that Y and Z might live is ruled out because we
have a strict obligation not to kill but a duty o f som e lesser kind to
save life. A . H. C lo u g h ’s dictum ‘Th ou shalt not kill but need’st not
strive officiously to keep alive’ expresses bluntly this point o f view .
T h e dying Y and Z m ay be excused for not being much im pressed by
C lo u g h ’s dictum . T h ey agree that it is wrong to kill the innocent and
are prepared to agree to an absolute prohibition against so doing.
T h ey do not agree, how ever, that A is m ore innocent than they are.
Y and Z might go on to point out that the currently acknow ledged
right o f the innocent not to be killed, even where their deaths might
give life to others, is just a decision to prefer the lives o f the
fortunate to those o f the unfortunate. A is innocent in the sense that
he has done nothing to deserve death, but Y and Z are also innocent
in this sense. W hy should they be the ones to die simply because
they are so unlucky as to have diseased organs? W hy, they might
argue, should their living or dying be left to chance when in so many
o ther areas o f human life we believe that w e have an obligation to
ensure the survival o f the maximum num ber of lives possible?
Y and Z argue that if a doctor refuses to treat a patient, with the
result that the patient dies, he has killed that patient as sure as
shooting, and that, in exactly the same w ay, if the doctors refuse Y
and Z the transplants that they need, then their refusal will kill Y
and Z , again as sure as shooting. T he doctors, and indeed the
society which supports their inaction, cannot defend them selves by
arguing that they are neither expected, nor required by law or
convention, to kill so that lives m ay be saved (indeed, quite the
reverse) since this is just an appeal to custom or authority. A man
who does his own m oral thinking must decide w hether, in these
circum stances, he ought to save two lives at the cost o f one, or one
life at the cost o f two. T h e fact that so called ‘third parties’ have
never before been brought into such calculations, have never before
been thought o f as being involved, is not an argument against their
now becom ing so. T here are, o f course, good arguments against
allowing doctors simply to haul passers-by o ff the streets w henever
they have a couple o f patients in need o f new organs. A n d the
harm ful side-effects o f such a practice in terms o f terror and distress
to the victim s, the witnesses and society generally, would give us
 THE SURVIVAL LOTTERY 89
further reasons for dismissing the idea. Y and Z realize this and
have a proposal, which they will shortly produce, which would
largely m eet objections to placing such pow er in the hands of
doctors and elim inate at least som e o f the harmful side-effects.
In the unlikely event o f their feeling obliged to reply to the
reproaches o f Y and Z , the doctors might offer the follow ing
argument: they might maintain that a man is only responsible for
the death o f som eone whose life he might have saved, if, in all the
circum stances o f the case, he ought to have saved the man by the
m eans available. This is why a doctor might be a m urderer if he
sim ply refused or neglected to treat a patient who w ould die without
treatm ent, but not if he could only save the patient by doing
som ething he ought in no circum stances to do— kill the innocent. Y
and Z readily agree that a man ought not to do what he ought not to
d o, but they point out that if the doctors, and for that m atter society
at large, ought on balance to kill one man if two can thereby be
saved, then failure to do so will involve responsibility for the
consequent deaths. T h e fact that Y ’s and Z ’s proposal involves
killing the innocent cannot be a reason for refusing to consider their
proposal, for this would just be a refusal to face the question at issue
and so avoid having to m ake a decision as to what ought to be done
in circum stances like these. It is Y ’s and Z ’s claim that failure to
adopt their plan will also involve killing the innocent, rather m ore of
the innocent than the proposed alternative.
T o back up this last point, to rem ove the arbitrariness o f
perm itting doctors to select their donors from am ong the chance
passers-by outside hospitals, and the trem endous pow er this w ould
place in d octors’ hands, to m itigate worries about side-effects and
lastly to appease those who w onder why poor old A should be
singled out for sacrifice, Y and Z put forward the follow ing scheme:
they propose that everyone be given a sort of lottery number.
W henever doctors have two or m ore dying patients who could be
saved by transplants, and no suitable organs have com e to hand
through ‘natural’ deaths, they can ask a central com puter to supply
a suitable donor. The com puter will then pick the num ber o f a
suitable donor at random and he will be killed so that the lives o f two
or m ore others m ay be saved. N o doubt if the schem e w ere ever to
be im plem ented a suitable euphem ism for ‘killed ’ w ould be
90 JO H N HARRIS
em ployed. Perhaps we w ould begin to talk about citizens being
called upon to ‘give life’ to others. W ith the refinement o f trans­
plant procedures such a schem e could offer the chance o f saving
large num bers o f lives that are now lost. Indeed, even taking into
account the loss o f the lives o f donors, the numbers o f untimely
deaths each year might be dram atically reduced, so much so that
everyo n e’s chance o f living to a ripe old age might be increased. If
this w ere to be the consequence o f the adoption o f such a schem e,
and it might well be, it could not be dismissed lightly. It might of
course be objected that it is likely that m ore old people will need
transplants to prolong their lives than will the young, and so the
schem e w ould inevitably lead to a society dom inated by the old. But
if such a society is thought objectionable, there is no reason to
suppose that a program could not be designed for the com puter that
w ould ensure the m aintenance o f w hatever is considered to be an
optim um age distribution throughout the population.
Suppose that inter-planetary travel revealed a world o f people
like ourselves, but who organized their society according to this
schem e. N o one was considered to have an absolute right to life or
freedom from interference, but everything was always done to
ensure that as m any people.as possible w ould en joy long and happy
lives. In such a world a man who attem pted to escape when his
num ber was up or who resisted on the grounds that no one had a
right to take his life, might well be regarded as a m urderer. W e
might or might not prefer to live in such a world, but the m orality of
its inhabitants would surely be one that w e could respect. It would
not be obviously m ore barbaric or cruel or immoral than our own.
Y and Z are willing to concede one exception to the universal
application o f their schem e. They realize that it would be unfair to
allow people who have brought their m isfortune on them selves to
benefit from the lottery. T here would clearly be som ething unjust
about killing the abstem ious B so that W (whose heavy sm oking has
given him lung cancer) and X (whose drinking has destroyed his
liver) should be preserved to over-indulge again.
W hat objections could be m ade to the lottery schem e? A first
straw to clutch at w ould be the desire for security. U nder such a
schem e we w ould never know when we would hear them knocking
at the door. E very post might bring a sentence o f death, every sound
 THE SURVIVAL LOTTERY 91
in the night might be the sound o f boots on the stairs. B u t, as we
have seen, the chances o f actually being called upon to m ake the
ultim ate sacrifice might be slimmer than is the present risk o f being
killed on the roads, and most o f us do not lie trem bling a-bed,
appalled at the prospect o f being dispatched on the m orrow. The
truth is that lives might well be m ore secure under such a scheme.
If we respect individuality and see every human being as unique
in his own w ay, we might want to reject a society in which it
appeared that individuals w ere seen m erely as interchangeable
units in a structure, the value o f which lies in its having as many
healthy units as possible. But o f course Y and Z would want to know
w hy A ’s individuality was m ore worthy o f respect than theirs.
A n o th er plausible objection is the natural reluctance to play G o d
with m en’s lives, the feeling that it is wrong to m ake any attem pt to
re-allot the life opportunities that fate has determ ined, that the
deaths o f Y and Z w ould be ‘natural’ , whereas the death o f anyone
killed to save them would have been perpetrated by men. But if we
are able to change things, then to elect not to do so is also to
determ ine what will happen in the world.
N either does the alleged m oral difference betw een killing and
letting die afford a respectable way o f rejecting the claims of Y and
Z . F or if w e really want to counter proponents o f the lottery, if we
really want to answer Y and Z and not just put them o ff, we cannot
do so by saying that the lottery involves killing and o bject to it for
that reason, because to do so would, as w e have seen, just beg the
question as to w hether the failure to save as m any people as possible
m ight not also amount to killing.
T o opt for the society which Y and Z propose w ould be then to
adopt a society in which saintliness w ould be m andatory. E ach o f us
w ould have to recognize a binding obligation to give up his own life
for others when called upon to do so. In such a society anyone who
reneged upon this duty w ould be a m urderer. The most promising
o bjection to such a society, and indeed to any principle which
required us to kill A in order to save Y and Z , is, I suspect, that we
are com m itted to the right o f self-defence. If I can kill A to save Y
and Z then he can kill me to save P and Q , and it is only if I am
prepared to agree to this that I will opt for the lottery or be prepared
to agree to a m an’s being killed if doing so would save the lives of
92 JO H N HARRIS
m ore than one other man. O f course, there is som ething paradoxi­
cal about basing objections to the lottery schem e on the right o f self-
defence since, ex hypothesi, each person would have a better chance
o f living to a ripe old age if the lottery schem e w ere to be
im plem ented. N one the less, the feeling that no man should be
required to lay down his life for others m akes many people shy away
from such a schem e, even though it might be rational to accept it on
prudential grounds, and perhaps even m andatory on utilitarian
grounds. A g a in , Y and Z would reply that the right o f self-defence
must extend to them as much as to anyone else, and while it is true
that they can only live if another man is killed, they would claim that
it is also true that if they are left to die, then som eone who lives on
does so over their dead bodies.
It might be argued that the institution o f the survival lottery has
not gone far to mitigate the harmful side-effects in terms o f terror
and distress to victim s, witnesses, and society generally, that would
be occasioned by doctors simply snatching passers-by o ff the streets
and disorganizing them for the benefit o f the unfortunate. D onors
would after all still have to be procured, and this process, how ever it
was carried out, w ould still be likely to prove distressing to all
concerned. T he lottery schem e would elim inate the arbitrariness o f
leaving the life and death decisions to the doctors, and rem ove the
possibility o f such terrible pow er falling into the hands o f any
individuals, but the terror and distress would remain. The effect of
having to apprehend presum ably unwilling victims w ould give us
pause. Perhaps only a long period o f education or propaganda could
rem ove our abhorrence. W hat this abhorrence reveals about the
rights and wrongs o f the situation is, how ever, m ore difficult to
assess. W e might be inclined to say that only monsters could ignore
the prom ptings o f conscience so far as to operate the lottery
schem e. But the prom ptings o f conscience are not necessarily the
most reliable guide. In the present case Y and Z w ould argue that
such prom ptings are m ere squeam ishness, an over-nice self-
indulgence that costs lives. D eath , Y and Z would remind us, is a
distressing experience w henever and to w hom ever it occurs, so the
less it occurs the better. Few er victim s and witnesses will be
distressed as part o f the side-effects o f the lottery schem e than
w ould suffer as part o f the side-effects o f not instituting it.
 THE SURVIVAL LOTTERY 93
L a stly , a m ore lim ited obj ection might be m ad e, not to the idea o f
killing to save lives, but to the involvem ent o f ‘third parties’ . W hy,
so the objection goes, should we not give X ’s heart to Y or Y ’s lungs
to X , the sam e num ber o f lives being thereby preserved and no one
e lse’s life set at risk? Y ’s and Z ’s reply to this objection differs from
their previous line o f argum ent. T o amend their plan so that the
involvem ent o f so called ‘third parties’ is ruled out w ould, Y and Z
claim , violate their right to equal concern and respect with the rest
o f society. T h ey argue that such a proposal w ould am ount to
treating the unfortunate who need new organs as a class within
society w hose lives are considered to be o f less value than those of
its m ore fortunate m em bers. W hat possible justification could there
be for singling out one group o f people whom we would be justified
in using as donors but not another? T h e idea in the mind o f those
w ho w ould propose such a step must be som ething like the
following: since Y and Z cannot survive, since they are going to die
in any event, there is no harm in putting their names into the lottery,
for the chances o f their dying cannot thereby be increased and will
in fact alm ost certainly be reduced. But this is just to ignore
everything that Y and Z have been saying. For if their lottery
schem e is adopted they are not going to die anyway— their chances
o f dying are no greater and no less than those o f any other
participant in the lottery whose num ber m ay com e up. This ground
for confining selection o f donors to the unfortunate therefore
disappears. A n y other ground must discriminate against Y and Z as
m em bers o f a class w hose lives are less worthy of respect than those
o f the rest o f society.
It might m ore plausibly be argued that the dying who cannot
them selves be saved by transplants, or by any other means at all,
should be the priority selection group for the com puter program .
B ut how far o ff must death be for a man to be classified as ‘dying’ ?
Th ose so classified might argue that their last few days or w eeks of
life are as valuable to them (if not m ore valuable) than the possibly
longer span rem aining to others. The problem o f narrowing down
the class o f possible donors without discriminating unfairly against
som e sub-class o f society is, I suspect, insoluble.
Such is the case for the survival lottery. U tilitarians ought to be in
favour o f it, and absolutists cannot o bject to it on the ground that it
94 JO H N HARRIS
involves killing the innocent, for it is Y ’s and Z ’s case that any
alternative must also involve killing the innocent. If the absolutist
wishes to m aintain his objection he must point to some m orally
relevant difference betw een positive and negative killing. This
challenge opens the door to a large topic with a whole library o f
literature, but Y and Z are dying and do not have time to explore it
exhaustively. In their own case the most likely candidate for som e
feature which might m ake this m oral difference is the m alevolent
intent o f Y and Z them selves. A n absolutist might well argue that
while no one intends the deaths o f Y and Z , no one necessarily
wishes them dead, or aims at their dem ise for any reason, they do
m ean to kill A (or have him killed). But Y and Z can reply that the
death o f A is no part o f their plan, they m erely wish to use a couple
o f his organs, and if he cannot live without them .. . tant pis\ N one
would be m ore delighted than Y and Z if artificial organs w ould do
as w ell, and so render the lottery schem e otiose.
O n e form o f absolutist argument perhaps remains. This involves
taking an O rw ellian stand on some principle o f com m on decency.
T h e argument w ould then be that even to enter into the sort o f
‘m acabre’ calculations that Y and Z propose displays a blunted
sensibility, a corrupted and vitiated mind. Forms o f this argument
have recently been advanced by N oam C hom sky {American Power
and the New Mandarins) and Stuart Ham pshire (Morality and
Pessim ism ). T h e indefatigable Y and Z would o f course deny that
their calculations are in any sense ‘m acabre’ , and w ould present
them as the most humane course available in the circumstances.
M oreover they would claim that the O rw ellian stand on decency is
the product o f a closed m ind, and not susceptible to rational
argum ent. A n y reasoned defence o f such a principle must appeal to
notions like respect for human life, as H am pshire’s argument in fact
does, and these Y and Z could m ake conform able to their own
position.
Can Y and Z be answered? Perhaps only by relying on moral
intuition, on the insistence that w e do feel there is som ething wrong
with the survival lottery and our confidence that this feeling is
prom pted by som e m orally relevant difference betw een our
bringing about the death o f A and our bringing about the deaths o f
Y and Z . W hether we could retain this confidence in our intuitions if
 THE SURVIVAL LOTTERY 95
we w ere to be confronted by a society in which the survival lottery
o p erated , was accepted by all, and was seen to save many lives that
w ould otherwise have been lost, it would be interesting to know.
T h ere w ould o f course be great practical difficulties in the way of
im plem enting the lottery. In so many cases it w ould be agonizingly
difficult to decide w hether or not a person had brought his m isfor­
tune on himself. T here are num erous ways in which a person m ay
contribute to his predicam ent, and the task o f deciding how far, or
how decisively, a person is him self responsible for his fate w ould be
form idable. A n d in those cases where we can be confident that a
person is innocent o f responsibility for his predicam ent, can we
acquire this confidence in time to save him? The lottery scheme
w ould be a pow erful w eapon in the hands o f som eone willing and
able to misuse it. C ould we ever feel certain that the lottery was safe
from unscrupulous com puter program m ers? Perhaps we should be
thankful that such practical difficulties m ake the survival lottery an
unlikely consequence o f the perfection o f transplants. O r perhaps
w e should be appalled.
It m ay be that we would want to tell Y and Z that the difficulties
and dangers o f their schem e would be too great a price to pay for its
benefits. It is as well to be clear, how ever, that there is also a high,
perhaps an even higher, price to be paid for the rejection o f the
schem e. That price is the lives o f Y and Z and m any like them , and
w e delude ourselves if we suppose that the reason why w e reject
their plan is that we accept the sixth com m andm ent.1

B alliol College O xford

1 T h a n k s are due to R o n a ld D w o r k in , Jonathan G lo v e r, M . J. In w o o d , and A n n e

S e lle r fo r h elp fu l com m en ts.
 VII

SPEECH IN FAVOUR OF CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT (1868)
JO H N STU ART MILL

. . . I t w ould be a great satisfaction to me if I w ere able to support

this M otion. It is always a m atter o f regret to me to find m yself, on a
public question, opposed to those w ho are called— som etim es in the
w ay o f honour, and som etim es in what is intended for ridicule— the
philanthropists. O f all persons who take part in public affairs, they
are those for w hom , on the w hole, I feel the greatest am ount of
respect; for their characteristic is, that they devote their tim e, their
labour, and much o f their m oney to objects purely public, with a less
adm ixture o f either personal or class selfishness, than any other
class o f politicians w hatever. O n almost all the great questions,
scarcely any politicians are so steadily and almost uniform ly to be
found on the side o f right; and they seldom err, but by an
exaggerated application o f some just and highly im portant
principle. O n the very subject that is now occupying us we all know
what signal service they have rendered. It is through their efforts
that our criminal laws— which within my m em ory hanged people for
stealing in a dwelling house to the value o f 40s.— laws by virtue o f
which rows o f human beings might be seen suspended in front o f
N ew gate by those who ascended or descended Ludgate Hill— have
so greatly relaxed their most revolting and most im politic ferocity,
that aggravated m urder is now practically the only crime which is
punished with death by any o f our lawful tribunals; and we are even
now d eliberating w hether the extrem e penalty should be retained in
that solitary case. This vast gain, not only to hum anity, but to the
ends o f penal justice, we ow e to the philanthropists; and if they are
m istaken, as I cannot but think they are, in the present instance, it is
R e p rin te d from H ansard's Parliamentary D ebates, 3rd S eries, 21 A p r . 1868 ( L o n ­
d o n , 1868).
98 JO H N STUART MILL
only in not perceiving the right time and place for stopping in a
career hitherto so em inently beneficial. Sir, there is a point at
which, I conceive, that career ought to stop. W hen there has been
brought hom e to any one, by conclusive evidence, the greatest
crime known to the law; and when the attendant circumstances
suggest no palliation o f the guilt, no hope that the culprit m ay even
yet not be unworthy to live among m ankind, nothing to m ake it
probable that the crime was an exception to his general character
rather than a consequence o f it, then I confess it appears to me that
to deprive the criminal o f the life o f which he has proved him self to
be unworthy— solem nly to blot him out from the fellow ship of
mankind and from the catalogue o f the living— is the most
appropriate, as it is certainly the most im pressive, m ode in which
society can attach to so great a crime the penal consequences which
for the security o f life it is indispensable to annex to it. I defend this
penalty, when confined to atrocious cases, on the very ground on
which it is com m only attacked— on that o f humanity to the crim inal;
as beyond com parison the least cruel m ode in which it is possible
adequately to deter from the crime. If, in our horror o f inflicting
d eath, we endeavour to devise some punishment for the living
criminal which shall act on the human mind with a deterrent force at
all com parable to that o f death, we are driven to inflictions less
severe indeed in appearance, and therefore less efficacious, but far
m ore cruel in reality. F ew , I think, would venture to propose, as a
punishment for aggravated m urder, less than im prisonment with
hard labour for life; that is the fate to which a m urderer w ould be
consigned by the m ercy which shrinks from putting him to death.
But has it been sufficiently considered what sort o f a m ercy this is,
and what kind o f life it leaves to him? If, indeed, the punishment is
not really inflicted— if it becom es the sham which a few years ago
such punishments w ere rapidly becom ing— then, indeed, its
adoption w ould be almost tantam ount to giving up the attem pt to
repress m urder altogether. But if it really is what it professes to be,
and if it is realized in all its rigour by the popular im agination, as it
very probably w ould not be, but as it must be if it is to be efficacious,
it will be so shocking that when the m em ory o f the crime is no longer
fresh, there will be alm ost insuperable difficulty in executing it.
W hat com parison can there really be, in point o f severity, betw een
 S P E E C H IN F A V O U R OF C A P I T A L P U N I S H M E N T 99
consigning a man to the short pang o f a rapid death, and immuring
him in a living tom b, there to linger out what m ay be a long life in the
hardest and most m onotonous toil, without any o f its alleviations or
rewards— debarred from all pleasant sights and sounds, and cut o ff
from all earthly hope, except a slight mitigation of bodily restraint,
or a small im provem ent o f diet? Y e t even such a lot as this, because
there is no one m om ent at which the suffering is o f terrifying
intensity, and, above all, because it does not contain the elem ent, so
im posing to the im agination, o f the unknown, is universally reputed
a m ilder punishment than death— stands in all codes as a mitigation
o f the capital penalty, and is thankfully accepted as such. For it is
characteristic o f all punishments which depend on duration for their
efficacy— all, therefore, which are not corporal or pecuniary— that
they are m ore rigorous than they seem; while it is, on the contrary,
one o f the strongest recom m endations a punishment can have, that
it should seem m ore rigorous than it is; for its practical pow er
depends far less on what it is than on what it seems. T here is not, I
should think, any human infliction which m akes an impression on
the im agination so entirely out o f proportion to its real severity as
the punishment o f death. T he punishment must be mild indeed
which does not add more to the sum o f human m isery than is
necessarily or directly added by the execution o f a criminal. A s my
hon. Friend the M em ber for Northam pton (M r G ilpin) has him self
rem arked, the most that human laws can do to anyone in the matter
o f death is to hasten it; the man would have died at any rate; not so
very much later, and on the average, I fear, with a considerably
greater am ount o f bodily suffering. Society is asked, then, to
denude itself o f an instrument o f punishment which, in the grave
cases to which alone it is suitable, effects its purposes at a less cost o f
human suffering than any other; which, while it inspires m ore
terror, is less cruel in actual fact than any punishment that we should
think o f substituting for it. M y hon. Friend says that it does not
inspire terror, and that experience proves it to be a failure. B ut the
influence o f a punishment is not to be estim ated by its effect on
hardened criminals. Those whose habitual w ay o f life keeps them ,
so to speak, at all times within sight o f the gallow s, do grow to care
less about it; as, to com pare good things with bad, an old soldier is
not much affected by the chance o f dying in battle. I can afford to
100 JO H N STUART MILL
admit all that is often said about the indifference o f professional
crim inals to the gallows. Though o f that indifference one-third is
probably bravado and another third confidence that they shall have
the luck to escape, it is quite probable that the rem aining third is
re a l. But the efficacy o f a punishment which acts principally through
the im agination, is chiefly to be m easured by the impression it
m akes on those who are still innocent; by the horror with which it
surrounds the first prom ptings o f guilt; the restraining influence it
exercises over the beginning o f the thought which, if indulged,
w ould becom e a tem ptation; the check which it exerts over the
graded declension tow ards the state— never suddenly attained— in
which crime no longer revolts, and punishment no longer terrifies.
A s for what is called the failure o f death punishment, who is able to
judge o f that? W e partly know who those are whom it has not
deterred; but who is there who knows whom it has deterred, or how
m any human beings it has saved who would have lived to be
m urderers if that awful association had not been thrown round the
idea o f m urder from their earliest infancy? L et us not forget that the
most im posing fact loses its pow er over the imagination if it is made
too cheap. W hen a punishment fit only for the most atrocious crimes
is lavished on small offences until human feeling recoils from it,
then, indeed, it ceases to intim idate, because it ceases to be believed
in. The failure o f capital punishment in cases o f theft is easily
accounted for; the thief did not believe that it would be inflicted. He
had learnt by experience that jurors would perjure them selves
rather than find him guilty; that Judges would seize any excuse for
not sentencing him to death, or for recom m ending him to m ercy;
and that if neither jurors nor Judges w ere m erciful, there w ere still
hopes from an authority above both. W hen things had com e to this
pass it was high time to give up the vain attempt. W hen it is
im possible to inflict a punishment, or when its infliction becom es a
public scandal, the idle threat cannot too soon disappear from the
statute book. A n d in the case o f the host o f offences which were
form erly capital, I heartily rejoice that it did becom e im practicable
to execute the law. If the same state o f public feeling com es to exist
in the case o f m urder; if the time com es when jurors refuse to find a
m urderer guilty; when Judges will not sentence him to death, or will
recom m end him to m ercy; or when, if juries and Judges do not
 S P E E C H IN F A V O U R OF C A P I T A L P U N I S H M E N T IOI
flinch from their duty, H om e Secretaries, under pressure o f deputa­
tions and m em orials, shrink from theirs, and the threat becom es, as
it becam e in the other cases, a m ere brutum fu lm en \then, indeed, it
m ay becom e necessary to do in this case what has been done in
those— to abrogate the penalty. That time may com e— my hon.
Friend thinks that it has nearly com e. I hardly know w hether he
lam ented it or boasted o f it; but he and his Friends are entitled to the
boast; for if it com es it will be their doing, and they will have gained
what I cannot but call a fatal victory, for they will have achieved it by
bringing about, if they will forgive me for saying so, an enervation,
an effem inancy, in the general mind o f the country. For what else
than effem inancy is it to be so much m ore shocked by taking a m an’s
life than by depriving him o f all that m akes life desirable or
valuable? Is death, then, the greatest o f all earthly ills? Usque
adeone mori miserum est? Is it, indeed, so dreadful a thing to die?
Has it not been from o f old one chief part o f a manly education to
m ake us despise death— teaching us to account it, if an evil at all, by
no means high in the list o f evils; at all events, as an inevitable one,
and to hold, as it w ere, our lives in our hands, ready to be given or
risked at any m om ent, for a sufficiently worthy object? I am sure
that my hon. Friends know all this as w ell, and have as much o f all
these feelings as any o f the rest o f us; possibly m ore. But I cannot
think that this is likely to be the effect o f their teaching on the
general mind. I cannot think that the cultivating o f a peculiar
sensitiveness o f conscience on this one point, over and above what
results from the general cultivation o f the moral sentiments, is
perm anently consistent with assigning in our own minds to the fact
o f death no m ore than the degree o f relative im portance which
belongs to it am ong the other incidents o f our humanity. T h e m en o f
old cared too little about death, and gave their own lives or took
those o f others with equal recklessness. O ur danger is o f the
opposite kind, lest we should be so much shocked by death, in
general and in the abstract, as to care too much about it in individual
cases, both those o f other people and our own, which call for its
being risked. A n d I am not putting things at the worst, for it is
proved by the experience o f other countries that horror o f the
executioner by no means necessarily implies horror o f the assassin.
T h e stronghold, as w e all know , o f hired assassination in the 18th
102 JO H N STUART MILL
century was Italy; yet it is said that in some o f the Italian populations
the infliction o f death by sentence o f law was in the highest degree
offensive and revolting to popular feeling. Much has been said o f
the sanctity o f human life, and the absurdity o f supposing that we
can teach respect for life by ourselves destroying it. But I am
surprised at the em ploym ent o f this argum ent, for it is one which
might be brought against any punishment w hatever. It is not human
life only, not human life as such, that ought to be sacred to us, but
human feelings. T h e human capacity o f suffering is what we should
cause to be respected, not the m ere capacity o f existing. A n d we
m ay im agine som ebody asking how we can teach people not to
inflict suffering by ourselves inflicting it? But to this I should
answer— all o f us w ould answer— that to deter by suffering from
inflicting suffering is not only possible, but the very purpose o f penal
justice. D oes fining a criminal show want o f respect for prop erty, or
im prisoning him, for personal freedom ? Just as unreasonable is it to
think that to take the life o f a man who has taken that o f another is to
show want o f regard for human life. W e show, on the contrary, most
em phatically our regard for it, by the adoption o f a rule that he who
violates that right in another forfeits it for him self, and that while no
other crime that he can com m it deprives him o f his right to live, this
shall. T here is one argum ent against capital punishm ent, even in
extrem e cases, which I cannot deny to have weight— on which my
hon. Friend justly laid great stress, and which never can be entirely
got rid of. It is this— that if by an error o f justice an innocent person
is put to death, the m istake can never be corrected; all com pensat­
ion , all reparation for the w rong is im possible. This w ould be indeed
a serious objection if these m iserable mistakes— am ong the most
tragical occurrences in the whole round o f human affairs— could not
be m ade extrem ely rare. The argument is invincible where the
m ode o f criminal procedure is dangerous to the innocent, or where
the Courts o f Justice are not trusted. A n d this probably is the reason
w hy the objection to an irreparable punishment began (as I believe
it did) earlier, and is m ore intense and m ore widely diffused, in
som e parts o f the Continent o f Europe than it is here. T h ere are on
the Continent great and enlightened countries, in which the crim i­
nal procedure is not so favourable to innocence, does not afford the
sam e security against erroneous conviction, as it does am ong us;
 S P E E C H IN F A V O U R OF C A P I T A L P U N I S H M E N T 10 3
countries where the Courts o f Justice seem to think they fail in their
duty unless they find som ebody guilty; and in their really laudable
desire to hunt guilt from its hiding places, expose them selves to a
serious danger o f condem ning the innocent. If our own procedure
and Courts o f Justice afforded ground for similar apprehension, I
should be the first to join in withdrawing the pow er o f inflicting
irreparable punishment from such tribunals. But we all know that
the defects o f our procedure are the very opposite. O ur rules o f
evidence are even too favourable to the prisoner; and juries and
Judges carry out the m axim , ‘ It is better that ten guilty should
escape than that one innocent person should suffer’ , not only to the
letter, but beyond the letter. Judges are most anxious to point out,
and juries to allow for, the barest possibility o f the prisoner’s
innocence. N o human judgem ent is infallible; such sad cases as my
hon. Friend cited will som etim es occur; but in so grave a case as that
o f m urder, the accused, in our system , has always the benefit o f the
m erest shadow o f a doubt. A n d this suggests another consideration
very germ ane to the question. The very fact that death punishment
is m ore shocking than any other to the im agination, necessarily
renders the Courts o f Justice more scrupulous in requiring the
fullest evidence o f guilt. Even that which is the greatest objection to
capital punishm ent, the im possibility o f correcting an error once
com m itted, must m ake, and does m ake, juries and Judges m ore
careful in form ing their opinion, and m ore jealous in their scrutiny
o f the evidence. If the substitution o f penal servitude for death in
cases o f m urder should cause any declaration in this conscientious
scrupulosity, there w ould be a great evil to set against the real, but I
hope rare, advantage o f being able to m ake reparation to a
condem ned person who was afterwards discovered to be innocent.
In order that the possibility o f correction m ay be kept open
w herever the chance o f this sad contingency is m ore than infinitesi­
m al, it is quite right that the Judge should recom m end to the Crow n
a com m utation o f the sentence, not solely when the proof o f guilt is
open to the smallest suspicion, but w henever there remains
anything unexplained and m ysterious in the case, raising a desire for
m ore light, or m aking it likely that further inform ation may at som e
future time be obtained. I would also suggest that w henever the
sentence is com m uted the grounds o f the com m utation should, in
104 JO H N STUART MILL
som e authentic form , be m ade known to the public. Thus much I
willingly concede to my hon. Friend; but on the question o f total
abolition I am inclined to hope that the feeling o f the country is not
with him, and that the lim itation o f death punishment to the cases
referred to in the Bill o f last year will be generally considered
sufficient. T h e m ania which existed a short time ago for paring down
all our punishments seem s to have reached its limits, and not before
it was tim e. W e w ere in danger o f being left without any effectual
punishm ent, except for small offences. W hat was form erly our chief
secondary punishment— transportation— before it was abolished,
had becom e alm ost a reward. Penal servitude, the substitute for it,
was becom ing, to the classes who w ere principally subject to it,
alm ost nom inal, so com fortable did we m ake our prisons, and so
easy had it becom e to get quickly out o f them. Flogging— a most
objectionable punishment in ordinary cases, but a particularly
appropriate ones for crimes o f brutality, especially crimes against
wom en— w e w ould not hear o f, except, to be sure, in the case o f
garrotters, for whose peculiar benefit we re-established it in a hurry,
im m ediately after a M em ber o f Parliam ent had been garrotted.
W ith this exception, offences, even o f an atrocious kind, against the
person, as my hon. and learned Friend the M em ber for O xford (M r
N eate) well rem arked, not only w ere, but still are, visited with
penalties so ludicrously inadequate, as to be almost an encourage­
ment to the crim e. I think, Sir, that in the case o f most offences,
except those against property, there is m ore need o f strengthening
our punishments than o f w eakening them ; and that severer
sentences, with an apportionm ent o f them to the different kinds o f
offen ces which shall approve itself better than at present to the
m oral sentiments o f the com m unity, are the kind o f reform o f which
our penal system now stands in need. I shall therefore vote against
the A m endm ent.
 VIII

JU D G E M E N T D A Y
L O U IS PA SCA L

J U D G E M E N T D A Y OR TH E H A N D W R IT IN G O N T H E W A L L *

(Transcript o f a speech on overpopulation)

G ood evening. This is the first time I’ve spoken before a college
audience, and therefore I would like to take advantage of your
presence to ask you a few questions before I begin on my prepared
speech. Principally I’m interested in asking these questions for my
own enlightenm ent, but I hope m any o f you will find your answers
interesting also. B asically I want to know how m orally com m itted
the students at a typical ‘g oo d ’ school are, and while I know an
audience o f several hundred from one school is neither large
enough nor diverse enough to give an especially accurate picture,
still the results should provide a rough indication o f where the real
truth lies. T h a t’s sort o f an interesting juxtaposition o f words.
‘Truth lies’ I mean.
A n y w a y , as I said, I’m interested in knowing how m orally
com m itted you are. The reasons for my curiosity are surely evident:
in tod ay’s world o f racial prejudice, V ietnam , and above all, the
m iseries o f overpopulation, it will take an uncom m only dedicated
and selfless generation to grapple with these issues successfully. I
must say at the outset, I am pessimistic. A t any rate, primarily what
I want to find out tonight is how im portant it is to you for you to act
L o u is P ascal, ‘Jud gem en t D a y or T h e H an d w ritin g on the W a ll’ first a p p eared as
part o f a lo n g e r article in Inquiry 1980, V o l. 23, pp. 2 42 -5 1; ‘ O n G o o d n e ss, B adn ess
and In d iffe re n c e ’ and P ostscript are © 1986 L o u is Pascal. R ep rin ted b y perm ission
o f the author.
* T h is section is the transcript and the n ext section a discussion o f a speech on
o v erp o p u la tio n by W a lte r B ra d fo rd E llis, a too -little-k n o w n p io n e e r in the field o f
o v erp o p u la tio n . It w as d elive re d b e fo re an au d ien ce o f abou t 300 at C o lu m b ia
U n iv e rsity on 20 O c t. 1970. I w as am on g the au d ien ce and m ade a record in g. (It is
reprin ted h ere with his perm ission .) Som e o f the num bers h ave ch an ged in the
in terven in g years, but his ideas h ave not aged.
io 6 LOUIS PASCAL
according to your own definition o f right and wrong. In other words
I’m not interested in knowing what sort o f behaviour you think is
right or wrong but m erely how com m itted you are to living up to
w hatever standards o f right and wrong you possess.
I was trying to think a few minutes ago what questions I could ask
you to find out this inform ation, and it is very difficult to com e up
with anything satisfactory simply because individual standards of
right and w rong vary so m arkedly. I had to pick a situation which
seem s perhaps a little silly because it is so im probable, but that is
because I wanted as pure a case as possible— one which is in no way
connected with any existing world situation— so that your
prejudices and preconceived notions about a particular situation
will play no part in your answers.
I needed to find a situation in which every one o f you would agree
as to the proper course o f action and then ask: but which o f you
w ould do it even if it hurt you personally? Probably no situation
exists which w ould elicit your total agreem ent, but the one which I
have picked I think will com e as close as possible. M y hypothetical
circum stances are concerned with a person who murders innocent
people, and I suspect that nearly every one of you will agree that
that is wrong. So please now imagine yourself to be in an ancient
country which is ruled over by an evil king who has absolute pow er
o f life or death over all his subjects— including yourself. N ow this
king is very bored, and so for his amusem ent he picks 10 o f his
subjects, m en, w om en, and children, at random as well as an
eleventh man who is separate from the rest. N ow the king gives the
eleventh man a choice: he will either hang the 10 people picked at
random and let the eleventh go free, or he will hang the eleventh
man and let the other 10 go free. A n d the eleventh man must decide
which it is to be.
N ow if death is bad, then on an average 10 deaths must be 10
times as bad as one. So hopefully nearly all o f you will agree that the
eleventh man should give up his life in order that the other 10 might
live. But that is not the question I am asking you. I’m asking
w hether you would in fact m ake that sacrifice if you w ere the
eleventh man— if you really did have to decide whether you or they
w ould die. A n d you knew the king meant business because he did
this every year and som etim es killed the 10 people and other times
 J U D G E M E N T DAY 107
the eleventh depending w holly upon what the eleventh had
decided.
N ow I am about to ask you for a show o f hands, but o f course I
realize that few o f you know yourselves so well that you can be
certain o f the correctness o f your answer— especially if your answer
is yes. So I sim ply will ask you to hold up your hand and answer yes if
you are any m ore than 50 per cent certain that you w ould m ake that
sacrifice. U nderstand?
A ll right, all yes answers, please raise your hands. L et me see,
that must be about a third o f you. T h a t’s m ore than I w ould have
guessed.
N ow let me ask only those who are reasonably certain— say 95 per
cent certain— that they w ould m ake the sacrifice to please raise their
hands.
Y e s. T h a t’s m ore like what I expected. T h a t’s at most a tenth o f
you. I have a feeling that most o f that tenth o f you are kidding
yourselves, but perhaps human beings aren’t as selfish as I have
always thought.
N ow just two m ore quick questions. Sam e situation except that
the king says he will let his 10 hostages go free if you will go to prison
for 20 years, otherwise he kills them . T h a t’s an easier question to be
sure o f your answer about than the previous one, so this time answer
yes only if you are quite certain— 95 per cent or better. A ll right,
everybody hold up his hand if he is at least 95 per cent sure he would
go to prison for 20 years in order to save 10 people’s lives.
W ell that looks like about three-quarters o f you. A gain I think
you have overly high opinions o f yourselves, or m aybe som e o f you
are too em barrassed to tell the truth, but I sincerely hope you are
correct in your self-assessments.
Just one question m ore now. The king says he will let his people
go if you will agree to give him all the m oney you have and all the
m oney you will m ake in the future, except o f course enough for you
to feed and house yourself and take care o f all the absolute
necessities. In other words he’s asking you to be poor, but not so
p oor that it impairs your health in any w ay. A gain I’m asking for at
least 95 per cent certainty. A ll in that category please hold up your
hands.
W ell that’s nearly every one o f you! I ’m very pleased; I hope you
io8 LOUIS PASCAL
m ean it. Perhaps in fact you do this time. A fte r all, since you have
the pow er to decide w hether 10 people die or w hether you give up
your m oney, if you m ade the other decision, you w ould be killing 10
people in order to keep m oney for yourself, and surely that is
m urder.
I see som e head-shaking— it looks as though a few o f you
disagree. T he king has said, kill these 10 people or I’ll take your
m oney. If you kill them , that is murder.
L o o k at it another way. If you are poor and kill 10 people in order
to steal their m oney, that is surely m urder. But m orally speaking,
that situation is exactly the same as this one. In both situations if the
p eople die, you will be rich; if they live, you will be poor, and it is
within your pow er to decide which it is to be. In either situation if
you decide that they should die in order that you can be rich, you
have put your happiness, or not actually even that, you have put
m aterial riches for yourself above 10 peo p le’s lives. That is the
moral error you have made and it is exactly the same for both cases.
O n e is as bad as the other and if one is murder so is the other.
A n y w ay , those are all the questions I wanted to ask you. I didn’t
m ean to spend as much time on them as I did, but at least from my
point o f view it was well worth the time. Thanks for your
indulgence, and also for your soul-searching— I guess those w eren ’t
easy questions to answer if you answered them honestly. Just be
happy it was a m ake-believe situation and none o f you is likely ever
to really be forced to m ake any o f those rather unpleasant decisions.
A n d now I’ll get on to what is supposed to be my topic:
overpopulation.
In 1650 the population o f the world was 500 million (500m.).
W ithin the next 50 years an absolute minimum o f 500m. people will
starve to death. D r Paul Ehrlich, a Stanford U niversity biologist
and leader in the population m ovem ent, says betw een 10m. and
20m. people starve to death every year right now. If you take the
sm aller figure and m ake the ridiculous assumption that it will not get
any larger in the near future, then you get the figure o f 500m. deaths
in the next 50 years. But it will get larger because in 35 years there
will be twice as many people trying to find food in a world which
today is so overpopulated that half o f all human beings are hungry.
Perhaps that figure o f 500m. is too large for you to grasp in
 J U D G E M E N T DAY 109

abstract terms. L et me translate it into som ething m ore concrete: if

those 500m. people w ere all to join hands, then figuring at about
1,000 people per m ile, they w ould form a line long enough to stretch
to the m oon and back— with enough left over to reach across the
U nited States 6 times. O r if you prefer keeping things more down to
earth, they w ould reach 20 times around the world.
T h e U S A r m y ’s M -16 m achine-gun fires 700 rounds per m inute,
or about 12 rounds per second. If you drove a car past this line o f
people at a little over 40 m iles per hour, you w ould pass 700 people
every m inute. If you used poisoned bullets or som e such deadly
concoction, you might be able to kill 1 person with every shot as you
drove past. If you kept your finger on the trigger for 10 hours a day,
7 days a w eek, killing 1 person with each shot, it would take you 3
years and 4 months to kill them all.
It is a rather gruesom e picture, and yet all these people— and
probably many m ore— are absolutely doom ed to die in the next 25
to 50 years. A n d it w o n ’t be the quick, easy death o f a bullet, but the
slow , pitiful, wasting death o f starvation.
T h ere is one bright spot in all this, how ever— the legions o f the
doom ed will not really reach quite 20 times around the world.
Perhaps th ey’ll reach only 12 or 15 times around, for most o f them
are children and their arms are short.
Just one m ore statistic along these lines and then I’ll m ove on.
T h ere are 3! billion (31b.) or 3 ,500m. people in the world to d a y.1 A s
I have said, som ew here betw een 10 and 20m. starve to death each
year. Thus in a group o f 350 average human beings, som ewhere
betw een 1 and 2 will starve to death each year.
O pposed to these ravaged peoples o f the world are the gluttons o f
A m erica. Y o u yourselves are good exam ples. A s future graduates
o f a good college, it is surely within the grasp of most o f you to be
m aking a salary, after taxes, o f $10,000 or m ore within a few years.
H ow much m oney is that? W ell, you could easily take care o f all the
true necessities o f life for $2,000, thus leaving you $8,000 for the
luxuries. In A m erica, anyone can stay healthy spending a dollar a
day for food. It is not even hard to do. If one really skim ps, he can
stay alive and well for 50 cents— for I have done it. If it can be done
1 T h e p o p u latio n o f the w orld sto od at abo u t 3.6b. in 1970 w h en this speech w as
w ritten . It surpassed 4.6 b . in 1982.
no LOUIS PASCAL
in A m erica for 50 cents a day, it can surely be done for that in the
countries where people are starving. In fact, U N IC E F can supply
m ilk to the hungry children o f the world at a rate o f 5 cups per penny
donated. Thus your $8,000 o f luxury m oney could be providing 44
people with 50 cents worth o f food a day— people who otherwise
m ight starve. R em em ber that out o f 44 average people, 1 will starve
to death every 4 to 8 years (since 44 is g o f 350 and 1 to 2 out o f 350
starve each year). T h a t’s as things now stand. Since in the next 40
years, things will get considerably worse, and since presum ably if
your $8,000 w ere donated to U N IC E F , they w ould take care to pick
out poorer than average people, I think it not unreasonable to state
that $8,000 per year over a period o f 40 years is enough to keep
healthy 10 people who w ould otherwise starve to death— plus a
good m any m ore who would otherwise be malnourished.
So you see, I lied to you a little while ago when I said none o f you
w ould ever have to m ake any of those three unpleasant decisions.
Y o u will never have to m ake the first or the second— the two
hardest choices— but you are this m om ent confronted with the
third: for the 10 who w ould otherwise starve are the 10 hostages,
you are the eleventh m an, and hunger is the king. Thus if you decide
to go on with the life you w ere probably planning to lead, you will be
letting 10 people die rather than give up your colour television and
your cocktail parties. A n d that is m ore than gluttony, it is m urder.

But don’t think o f yourselves as m urderers, for when I asked a

little while ago, nearly all o f you said you w ould m ake the proper
choice. H ow ever, before you go out and donate all your m oney to
U N IC E F , stop and think for a few m inutes. So long as the world
remains overpopulated, people will starve. Instead o f giving your
m oney to an organization which is trying to stamp out hunger,
contribute to one which is trying to stamp out overpopulation— the
cause o f hunger. For what good does it do to keep 44 people alive
enough and well enough to have 80 or 100 children who must then
go hungry because you only have sufficient m oney to feed their
parents? Instead o f solving the hunger problem , you m ay in fact be
m aking it even worse.
O f course, there are fairly simple ways to get around this
detrim ental effect o f feeding the hungry. For exam ple, you could
 J U D G E M E N T DA Y III
feed only sterile people. That is not hard to do, since nearly every
wom an over age 50 is sterile. But I repeat: so long as the world
rem ains overp o p u lated , people will starve. It is better in the long run
to direct our effort toward elim inating this basic cause o f hunger.
T h a t’s really all I have to say. I’ll close by stating my rather
pessim istic outlook. I have a terribly low opinion o f human beings
and think it extrem ely unlikely that m ore than a couple o f you will
m ake that decision you said yo u ’d m ake. A s I think I have shown,
the world o f today is a place o f stark horror, and the world o f
tom orrow bleaker still. W hile you go your m erry w ay, closing your
eyes and holding your nose as you step over the wasted bodies, I am
struck— and som etim es almost com forted— by the know ledge that
in not too m any years you yourselves will be in that same sad state.
F or the U nited States— indeed the whole earth— is fast running out
o f the resources it depends on for its existence. W ell before the last
o f the w orld ’s supplies o f oil and natural gas are exhausted early in
the next century, shortages o f these and other substances will have
brought about the collapse o f our whole econom y and, indeed, of
our whole technology. A n d without the wonders o f m odern
technology, A m erica will be left a grossly overpopulated, utterly
im poverished, helpless, dying land. Thus I foresee a whole world
full o f w retched, starving people with no hope o f escape, for the
only countries which could have aided them will soon be no better
o ff than the rest. A n d thus unless we are saved from this future by
the blessing o f a nuclear war or a truly lethal pestilence, I see
stretching o ff into eternity a world o f indescribable suffering and
hopelessness. It is a vision o f truly unspeakable horror m itigated
only by the fact that try as I might I could not possibly concoct a
creature m ore deserving o f such a fate. G o o d evening.

ON G O O D N E SS, B A D N E S S , A N D IN D IF F E R E N C E

I m entioned in a note at the beginning o f Ellis’s speech on o ver­

population that it w ould be follow ed by a chapter in which I
elaborated on som e o f his ideas. B efore beginning with that task, I
have a confession to m ake. A s som e o f you m ay have already
suspected, I w rote that speech m yself. It has never been given
before an audience. For the audience’s responses I m erely guessed
112 LOUIS PASCAL
at what I thought a real audience might have answered. T h ere is no
W alter Bradford Ellis. I used this subterfuge because it seem ed by
far the best way to m ake the reader an active participant in
answering personally the questions I was putting to the audience.
This personal involvem ent was essential if I was to stand any chance
o f breaking through the m any barriers which serve to shield us from
such dangerous thoughts.
T h ere w ere several im portant ideas com pressed into the few
paragraphs o f that speech, and I w ould like now to discuss them at
greater length to m ake certain they have been understood. The
most im portant o f these ideas, and perhaps the most important idea
in this essay, is the notion that one is responsible for the choices one
m akes, and that choices which do not involve action are as real as
those which do. For it is simply a fact that any o f you who are
m aking a good salary have it within your pow er to relieve an
enorm ous am ount o f misery m erely by deciding to spend your
m oney for that purpose rather than on yourselves. The misery is
th e re ; the m oney is th ere; and you have the pow er to decide how the
m oney will be spent— to relieve their misery or to store up luxuries
and status sym bols for yourself.
In the speech I showed that the choice facing the average
A m erican was the same as the easiest o f the three choices offered to
our audience. N ow I w ould like to liken it to a som ewhat different
situation.

The Paymaster
A lth ou gh I have no facts or figures, still I find it reasonable to
suppose that the average citizen o f the typical underdeveloped
country works as hard as the average A m erican. Q uite possibly he
w orks harder. A t any rate it seems a little unlikely that the average
A m erican (or perhaps I had better say the average reader o f this
book) actually believes he is m ore im portant or worthy or w hatever
than the average A sian , A frica n , or Latin A m erican , and still m ore
unlikely that he could be correct in so believing. Surely the typical
A m erican , at least if he w ould stop to think about it, w ould admit
that he was no better a person and no harder a w orker than the
average A sia n , and that their extrem e difference in station sprung
w holly and sim ply from the accident o f the o n e’s being born in
 J U D G E M E N T DA Y 113
A m erica and the oth er’s in A sia. So why should one get all the
m oney while the other starves?
Im agine a factory-ow ner who hires 45 people to w ork for him. A ll
the em ployees w ork equally hard, but when time com es to pay
th em , the ow ner entrusts all their salaries to 1 o f them and (for some
strange reason) leaves it totally up to this 1 w orker how much each
o f the others shall be paid. W hat would you think o f that w orker if
he kept all or so nearly all the m oney for him self that the other 44
w ere always in dire poverty and 10 o f them eventually died of
starvation? Is he not guilty (m orally if not legally) o f stealing the
others’ m oney; and if he knew some w ould die because o f his theft,
is he not also guilty o f m urder? A n d is not this the situation of the
average A m erican— by an odd quirk o f fate entrusted with the
salaries o f 45 human beings and em pow ered to dispense the money
at his whim ? A n d keeping all o f it for him self,2 leaving them to
starve? Killing them in order to steal their m oney? If he does not
want to be guilty o f these charges, then let him give them back their
m oney, or else explain how by keeping it nearly all for him self, he
has distributed it fairly— why he deserves to bask while they grovel.
Thus we have, I think, a rather com plete refutation o f those
strange people who think that life is nice. In the first place, life is
clearly not nice for that substantial proportion o f m ankind (soon to
be a m ajority)3 who must live from day to day from hand to mouth
for ever on the verge or over the verge o f starvation. A sk some o f
the thousands who starve each day how much they en joy the
beautiful birds and flowers and trees. A sk them their opinion of
G o d ’s love and His tender m ercy. O r if perchance you don’t believe
in G o d , then ask them their opinion o f the love and tender m ercy of
their fellow human beings, the rich gods across the sea who couldn’t
care less about their sufferings— at any rate not enough to go out of

2 A c tu a lly not q u ite all th e m on ey w as given to him origin ally— he k eep s all he is
p h ysically able to k ee p . W hich o f cou rse raises the q uestion: if a b so lu tely all o f it had
b e en given to h im . h ow m uch w ou ld he then return to the oth ers? E x a ctly as m uch as
w as a ctu a lly not given to him to begin w ith?
3 N ote that it n e ed n ’ t be a n yw h ere n ear a m ajo rity to support m y case: the
gre a te st so rrow s in life are m any tim es as intense and. excep t w h en fo llo w e d by
d ea th , m any tim es as lasting as the greatest jo y s. A n d w hile the su p rem ely m iserable
p e o p le are so p le n tifu l, I h ave n ever m et a su p rem ely happ y p erson. T h e happiest
p e o p le o f all e n jo y o n ly very m o derate d egrees o f happiness.
H 4 LOUIS PASCAL
their w ay to help them . A s k them those questions. Th ey count
too.
W hat does a beautiful bird mean beside a starving child?
A n d as though this w ere not sufficient, recall the m aterial a
couple o f paragraphs above. If you are part o f that small portion o f
hum anity who are to a significant degree happy, and if your
happiness is to any extent at all dependent upon material goods or
leisure tim e, then your happiness is bought at the expense o f the
m isery, degradation, and the very lives o f your fellow human
beings. H ow many people had to die and how m any people had to
suffer in order for you to en joy that wealth and that leisure? H ow
m any people could you have saved had you not preferred your
com fort to their lives?
T here is so very little happiness; and even what there is, is not a
beautiful thing— it is the happiness o f successful m urderers and
rapists. This is not a pretty world.
I think we have arrived now at a point where we are able to
form ulate a general statem ent o f m oral principle, sort o f analogous
to the G olden Rule: B y the various actions a person m ay take at any
given m om ent, he has the pow er to bring about various conse­
quences. T he action which he should take is the one which in the
long run in his opinion will result in the least total ‘bad ’ and the most
total ‘g o o d ’ . (B y ‘bad ’ we mean certainly unhappiness, perhaps
death. B y ‘g o o d ’ we mean happiness, at least for the present.) A n y
other act is m orally w rong, and the degree o f wrongness depends on
the degree to which the rule is violated .4 T here must be noted one
possible exception to the rule: it may well be that a person has the
right to cause as much unhappiness to him self as he wishes.

4 In o rd er to k ee p the statem ent o f the principle rela tively sim ple, I have
som ew h at b lu rred the d istinction b etw een w ron gn ess in an act and w ron gn ess in the
person p erfo rm in g the act. T h u s, if w e had w an ted to speak o f go o d and bad acts, w e
sh ou ld h ave om itted all referen ce to the p ro ta go n ist’s opin ion and in serted in ou r
paren thesis defining g o o d and bad: ‘o r w h atever the true definitions o f go o d and bad
a re ’ . H ad w e w an ted to speak o n ly o f go o d and bad p eo p le, w e should h ave inserted:
‘o r w h a te v e r the p rotago n ist sin cerely b e lieves to be the true definitions o f go o d and
b a d '. T h is latter case is grea tly co m p lica ted , h o w e v e r, by a n otab le ten den cy for
p e o p le ’s ‘sin ce re ’ b eliefs to suit th eir ow n best interests and even to ch an ge, w h en
circu m stan ces ch a n g e , so that both interests and con scien ce m ay still be served.
D e sp ite these d ifficu lties and m y blurrin g, the distinction is an im portant on e and
m ust be k ep t alw ays in m ind.
 J U D G E M E N T DAY 115
W ritten in this w ay, w e can see clearly why the sins o f omission
are as serious as those o f commission: there is really no such thing as
omission. T here are always choices to be m ade; it is im possible not
to choose. If the passage in the speech com paring a person who lets
10 p eople die rather than give the king his m oney with a person who
kills 10 people to steal their m oney wasn’t clear before, it should be
now.
O ffh and, I can think o f only three ways in which the rule is
com m only violated. People som etim es violate the rule to favour
them selves, som etim es they violate it to favour their friends,
fam ilies, countries, churches, and other people or institutions they
are loyal to, and som etim es they violate it to hurt those they dislike.
A ll these practices are totally indefensible, and in fact all the
objections I can think o f which might be raised are extrem ely
sim ple-m inded.5
A long tim e ago I used to think that if I could get through life
without doing any harm, I at least would not be a bad person. If the
world ended up being no worse o ff for my having been born, I would
be satisfied. W e can now see, how ever, that that is an extrem ely
erroneous, albeit very seductive, way o f thinking. The ‘statem ent o f
m oral principle’ m akes it clear that this w ay o f thinking is incorrect,
but I will give a quick exam ple none the less to m ake sure this
m isconception is thoroughly debunked.
Im agine you are w alking along a river bank when you com e upon
a man drowning just a few feet o ff shore. T here is a rope lying on the
bank, but you do not throw it to him because you want to watch him
drown. In my b o ok , you are as much a m urderer as if he had by
valiantly struggling made it to the bank, and you had pushed him
back in. A n d yet you have done no harm if you look at it from a

5 F o r in stance on e m ight sa y, ‘ B u t it’s insane not to v iolate the rule to fa vo u r y ou r

frien d s. If p e o p le d id n 't, no on e w ou ld h ave any frien ds; no on e w o u ld care very
m uch abou t a n y o n e e lse ; and e v e ry o n e w o u ld be m iserab le!’ B u t this o b je ctio n to the
p rin cip le is the v ery principle itself. T h e y 're o b je ctin g b ecau se treatin g e ve ry o n e
a like d oes not p ro vid e fo r the greatest happiness! B u t the principle d o esn 't say to
treat e v e ry o n e a lik e. If e ve ry o n e w o u ld be h app ier if a certain d eg re e o f favouritism
w e re show n to his frien d s, then let th ere be fa vou ritism . It m ay a ctu a lly b e true th at a
slight am ou n t o f favo u ritism is a go o d thing. I w ill not argue against it. Still I think it is
o b vio u s that the p ro p e r am ount is m uch less than the am ount p e o p le ge n e rally show .
H o w e v e r, eve n if o n e o u gh t to sh ow o n e ’s frien ds som e slight d eg ree o f favou ritism ,
it is difficult to see h o w any am ou n t o f favou ritism at all can be ju stified fo r on eself.
ii6 LOUIS PASCAL
view point o f what w ould have happened if you had never passed by.
C learly this is an im proper view point. Instead you should see that
you have com e upon a situation in which you have two choices,
neither o f which is difficult to execute, but one o f which will result in
a person’s death and the other will not. Som eone who m akes the
choice which will kill the person, simply because he wants him to
die, is a m urderer.
N ow let us consider a flank attack which might be m ade upon our
principle. A friend o f mine who had devoted a considerable amount
o f time tow ard fighting overpopulation once told me he was quitting
his volunteer w ork because he wanted m ore time to him self, and
besides he had done his share. That is the question I wish now to
explore: had he done his share? From the point o f view o f our
principle, he clearly was not justified in stopping his w ork, since by
continuing he w ould alleviate much m ore suffering in others than he
w ould cause in himself. A n d yet he was indeed justified according to
the way he applied his principle o f ‘doing your share’ . Since one
principle says he should continue and the other says that’s not so,
we know that (at least) one o f the principles must be wrong— or else
was incorrectly used. Since w e’re assuming our principle to be
correct, and since the problem is clearly not that our principle was
m isapplied, we must look for a m istake in my friend’s principle or in
the way he m ade use o f it. T here is, in fact, an obvious m istake in the
w ay he applied his principle; consequently we will be content with
pointing that out and leave open the question o f whether the
principle itself is in error.
Presum ably my friend thought he’d done his part because if
everyone would do as much as he, the problem w ould be solved.
H ow does one determ ine what on e’s share o f a particular jo b is?
D o es one take the sum total o f what has to be done and divide it by
the total num ber o f people in the world? O f course not. Som e
people are only two years old; you can’t count them. Som e people
are severely m entally retarded. Som e people have no arms or legs.
A great many other people must be eliminated because, for one
reason or another, they are not able to help. But there is another
group which must be elim inated as well: those who are not willing to
help. A n d when this last category is discounted, there are left few
people indeed to share in solving a truly immense problem . The
 J U D G E M E N T DAY 117
shares, in fact, com e out to be so large that it is not hum anly possible
for a person to do his full share even if he spends his every waking
m om ent in the effort. (This is tantam ount to saying the problem will
not be satisfactorily solved.) O ne cannot ever sit back and relax
because he has done his share.
Th ere is still one idea in my speech which needs to be better
developed: that feeding and supplying m edical care to sick, hungry
p eople actually causes m ore pain than it alleviates. Because o f the
com plexities o f the real world, I will have to m ake several
sim plifying assum ptions, but hopefully the burden will have been
placed on those w ho disagree to show why these simplifications
cause the results to be invalid.
Im agine an isolated island in the m iddle o f the ocean which has
enough arable land and resources to keep alive 1,000 people. The
inhabitants o f this land, believing birth control to be im moral and a
bother, have filled up their island to capacity, and for several
hundred years the population has rem ained at alm ost precisely
1,000 m iserable, nearly starving people. U nder better conditions
their growth rate w ould be 2 per cent (approxim ately the 1970 world
growth rate), but because o f the limited carrying capacity o f the
land, an average o f 20 people starve to death yearly, thus keeping
their growth rate at zero and their population constant.
Thus in the 70 years from 1900 to 1970, 1,400 people died o f
starvation. Im agine then in 1970 the U nited States o f A m erica
discovered the island, and in a great outpouring o f national
conscience over the plight o f the w retched masses, sent stores of
food sufficient to keep alive all the starving. Thus their population
began to grow , doubling every 35 years, until in another 70 years
there w ere 4,000 people on the island. B ut in the m eantim e the
population o f the U S had doubled once to over 400m. people; much
o f A m erica ’s best agricultural land was paved over with highways or
covered with urban sprawl or m ade infertile with air pollution or
had had the best topsoil washed away; oil, natural gas, and many
other im portant resources w ere either exhausted or in critically
short supply; and now A m erica herself was facing an imminent
crisis.6 So in the year 2040 the A m erican president summarily
6 T h e w orld gro w th rate w as abou t 2 per cen t in 1971 w hen this ch ap ter w as
o rig in ally w ritten . Since then it has d eclin ed sligh tly, and the 1986 figure is a bou t 1.7
ii8 LOUIS PASCAL
suspended all food shipments to our hapless island, and in conse­
quence 3,000 people prom ptly and on cue starved to death. Thus in
the 70 years before aid arrived, there w ere 1,400 deaths from
starvation com pared to 3,000 in the 70 years after the aid began.
I w ould like to take now a short quote from The Population
B om b, by D r Paul R . Ehrlich. Com pared with 1965
in 1966 e a c h p e rs o n o n E a rth h a d 2 % less to e a t, th e re d u c tio n , o f c o u rse
n o t b e in g u n ifo r m ly d is trib u te d . O n ly ten c o u n trie s g r e w m o re fo o d th an
th e y c o n su m e d : th e U n ite d S ta te s , C a n a d a , A u s tr a lia , A r g e n tin a , F ra n c e ,
N e w Z e a la n d . B u rm a , T h a ila n d , R u m a n ia , a n d S o u th A fr ic a . T h e U n ite d
S ta te s p ro d u c e d m o re th an h a lf o f the su rp lu s, w ith C a n a d a and A u s tr a lia
c o n trib u tin g m o st o f th e b a la n c e .7

I think it should be clear from these data that most o f the world is
p er ce n t, w hich represen ts a d ou blin g tim e o f 41 years. T h e 1986 U S d ou blin g tim e is
still abo u t 70 years, th ough the figure is on ly approxim ate becau se o f large
u n certain ties abou t the e xte n t o f im m igration.
7 E h rlich , D r Paul R ., The P opulation B o m b (N e w Y o r k , 19 7 1, p. 19 (revised
e d n .)). U n fo rtu n a te ly , E h rlich d oes not give the sou rce for his data. A m ore recent
p a p er b y D a v id P im en tel et al. ( ‘ L an d D e grad atio n : E ffe c ts on F o o d and E n e rg y
R e so u rc e s', S cien ce, v o l. 194, p. 154, 1976) rep o rts, ‘ A ll nations e xcep t the U .S .,
C a n a d a , A u stra lia , N ew Z e a la n d , A rg e n tin a , and T h a ilan d are con sisten t net food
im p o rte rs.’ H e d oes give a sou rce ( Y ea rb o ok o f International Trade Statistics ( U N ,
1974, v o l. 1)). B u t it is not cle a r to me how on e w ou ld use that sou rce to draw his
co n clu sio n , b ecau se w eigh ts o f fo o d s are o ften not giv e n , o n ly the m on etary v alu e . It
ap p ears o n e w o u ld first h ave to estim ate the w eigh t from the v a lu e , as m on etary
valu e b ears v ery little relation to fo o d v a lu e , and th en on e w ou ld h ave to translate the
w e igh t in to d ifferen t fo o d v alu es fo r d ifferen t foo d s: a cou n try w h ich im ports 1,000
tons o f w h eat and exp o rts 1,500 tons o f lettu ce is a net fo o d im porter.
A nu m b er o f cou n tries, such as E n gla n d and M o ro c co , m ust im port substantial
p rop ortion s o f th eir total fo o d su pply. F o r in stan ce, ‘T h e N eth erlan d s . . . im ports
a b o u t 5 0 % o f its w h ea t, 100% o f its rice, 7 5 % o f its o th er ce re als, all o f its steel,
an tim on y, b au x ite , ch rom ium , co p p er, gold , le a d , m agn esite, m an gan ese, m ercury,
m o ly b d en u m , n ick el, silver, tin, tu ngsten, v an ad iu m , zin c, p h osph ate rock (fe rti­
liz e r), potash (fe rtilize r), a sbesto s, and d iam on ds. It produ ces the e n ergy eq u iva len t
o f som e 20 m illion m etric tons o f co al and con su m es the eq u iv a len t o f o v e r 47 m illion
m etric to n s.' (P aul R . E h rlich and R ich ard L . H arrim an , H ow to B e a Survivor: A
Plan to Save Spaceship Earth (N e w Y o r k , 19 7 1, p. 3 7).) O n the o th er hand, m any
o th er cou n tries are on ly sm all-scale im porters and, at least fo r the p resen t, cou ld
p ro b a b ly prod u ce all th eir fo o d and o th er essen tials if really fo rced to do so. B u t
th ere are no o th er co u n tries w h o are lik ely e v e r to b eco m e large-scale exp o rters o f
fo o d . T h u s these statistics are m islead in g, and not even c o rrect, if in terp reted to
m ean th at all cou n tries b esid es th ese few w o u ld face starvation if th eir fo o d im ports
w e re cut o ff. B u t if th ey are v iew e d from a p ersp ective o f w h ere the rapid ly grow in g
fo o d deficit o f the rest o f the w orld is go in g to com e fro m , th ere is very little room for
error: it w ill com e from these co u n tries or not at all.
 J U D G E M E N T DA Y 119
already grossly overpopulated and that A m erica and the few other
food surplus countries are likely not to be able to supply food even
to all the rich countries (England, Japan, Russia, T he N etherlands,
e tc .) with m oney to buy it for much longer, to say nothing o f giving it
aw ay to the poor countries with their exploding populations.
So the point I am m aking is this. It should be clear to everybody
w ith even a rudim entary understanding o f the population crisis that
even if A m erica m anages to provide well for herself indefinitely into
the future (m ost unlikely), she cannot possibly continue for very
long to provide food to very many other countries. Soon aid must
cease or be drastically reduced to any country w e are helping now or
undertake to help in the future. The point o f the exam ple was to
show that when that aid finally stops, the resulting disaster will be
far m ore hellish than anything that w ould have happened had aid
never been sent at all. Thus aid in the form of food or m edical
technology (with the all-im portant exception o f birth control
devices) should never be sent to needy countries; and any countries
which are now receiving aid should be cut o ff— and the sooner the
better.
T h ere is one clear-cut error which has been introduced by the
sim plifications I m ade. O bviously a country which is on the verge of
achieving population stabilization and food self-sufficiency should
be fed until it has got over the hum p. Thus a policy o f blanket refusal
o f aid could be im proved upon, though what the criteria for aid
should b e, I have no idea. N one the less I w ill state without proof my
opinion that a policy o f blanket refusal o f aid w ould in the long run
cause less suffering than either a policy o f blanket granting o f as
m uch aid as is possible or the present policy (w hatever that is). Thus
w e have reality’s consum m ate and heart-breaking.final irony: even
those few , those very few people of the rich countries who are not
dead to the plight o f their fellow human beings, are by and large
engaged in food or m edical relief projects which in the long run will
p robably cause much m ore m isery than they cure.
B efore ending this chapter, I w ould like to develop one last
statistic whose derivation was too unwieldy to include in the speech.
O n e m ay be curious as to what fraction o f human beings will starve
to death. N o one can accurately predict the m agnitude o f the
com ing cataclysm or what percentage o f humanity will perish in it,
120 LOUIS PASCAL
but we m ay set a minimum by exploring the question o f what
fraction will die if things remain as they are. That is, we will assume
a constant rate o f population increase and assume that the fraction
o f people dying from starvation remains in the future what it is
today.
If our population w ere stable, things w ould be quite sim ple. Then
the fraction o f people who would eventually die o f starvation, or in
other words, a newborn bab y’s chances o f eventually starving (call
it ‘F ’), w ould simply be the deaths due to starvation in any given
year divided by the total deaths in that year. But with a constantly
increasing population that relation no longer holds true.
L et us call the total num ber o f deaths by starvation which
occurred in 1986, ‘D s’ , and the total num ber o f deaths from all
causes, ‘D ’ . Thus

though this w ould be true if the population w ere stable. C all the
total num ber o f births in 1986, ‘B ’ . A s we said, the fraction o f all
people born in 1986 who will eventually starve is F. T h erefore the
actual num ber o f people born in 1986 who will eventually starve is
F B . But this num ber o f deaths is greater than the num ber who
actually did starve to death in 1986 (D s) because starvation deaths
must increase from year to year at the same rate as the population,
since F is constant. Thus we m ay write F B > D s (where “> ’ means
‘is greater than’) or

Thus the fraction o f people born in 1986 who will eventually die of
starvation is greater than the starvation deaths o f 1986 divided by
the total births for 1986. Putting in actual numbers and using the
sm aller o f D r E hrlich’s estim ates, we get F > 10,000,000/
133,000,000 or F > 1/13.3. Putting in D r E hrlich’s larger num ber,
w e get F > 1/6.7. Thus if you are a human being born in 1986, your
chances o f eventually starving are considerably greater than 1 in 14
and possibly greater than 1 in 7— and those figures are obtained by
projecting today’ s level o f misery into the future, ignoring the
 J U D G E M E N T DA Y 121
absolute certainty that the level o f misery will soon drastically
increase. In fact if you look back through this section and the
preceding one, you will find that virtually all the statistics I m ade use
o f reflected conditions as they are tod ay.8

P O S T S C R IP T

M uch has happened on the population front since 1970-1 when this
essay was first written. A brief com parison o f the world situation
then and now (1986) is in order. The rate o f growth apparently
peaked at about 2.0 per cent per year (35-year doubling tim e) in the
early 1970s. It fell slightly during the mid-1970s, reaching
approxim ately 1.7 per cent in 1978. It has rem ained virtually
unchanged since 1978— eight o f the last nine growth rate estim ates
given by the Population R eference B ureau have been 1.7 per cent,
the exception com ing in 1983 with 1.8 per cent. The corresponding
doubling tim es have oscillated betw een 40 and 41 years (39 in 1983).
These w ere 9 lost years we w ere w holly unable to afford, com prising
quite possibly m ore than 25 per cent o f the time rem aining before
nature takes its revenge and quite certainly m ore than 25 per cent o f
the tim e in which to find a solution. Com pared to 1970, we are
significantly worse o ff today in the three ways which m atter most.
First and second: our population is larger by 1 .3 b ., and the num ber
added per year is considerably greater now. Population increase has
carried us backw ard much further than the tiny reduction in per cent
growth rate has taken us forward. A 1970 world population o f
3,632m. grow ing by 2.0 per cent was adding 73m. people per year;
8 T h e 'S p e e c h ' w as o rig in ally pu blish ed in Inquiry (vo l. 23, 1980, pp. 2 4 2 -5 1),
a lo n g w ith a few p ages o f rela ted m aterial. T h e re I estim ated a 10 per cent ch an ce o f
sta rva tio n , assum ing 10m. d eath s p er year. T h e re is a great d eal o f u n certain ty o v er
th e actu al n u m b ers, but I now su spect E h rlich 's larger figure o f 20m. is to o high. A
fa irly co n serv ativ e estim ate o f 10m. is accep ted as ‘ a p retty g o o d figure to u se ’ by
N ick E b e rstad t (perso n al co m m u n ication , 24 June 1985; see also p. 40 o f his ‘H u n ger
and Id e o lo g y ’ , Com m entary, v o l. 72, July 198 1), an anti-M althusian w riter w h o has
g o n e to a lot o f e ffo rt to sh ow th at certain h un ger figures h ave b een exa gge ra te d .
(U n fo rtu n a te ly he has som etim es gon e to o far in this regard , his w ell-kn o w n statistic
th at o n ly 2 p er cen t o f the hum an ra ce are ‘critica lly h un gry' at a giv en tim e b ein g a
fa ct w ith o u t any clea r m ean in g, p e rfec tly con sisten t w ith any fraction o f hum ans
starvin g to d ea th , in cluding 100 p e r cen t.) In ‘T h e D e clin e in H u n g e r-R e late d
D e a th s ’ (H unger P roject Pa pers, no. 1, M ay 1984) R o y L . Prosterm an gives a rough
p ro ced u re th at p rod u ces a figure o f I3 m .-i8 m .
122 LOUIS PASCAL
1986’ s 4,942m. at a little over 1.7 per cent is growing by 85m. Both
overpopulation and population growth are substantially greater
today.
U nder the current circum stances the third area o f deterioration
m ay be the most im portant o f all. W e have consumed another 16
years’ worth o f our dwindling resources. U p to the end o f 1970 the
world had used approxim ately 244b. barrels o f the estim ated
2,000b. barrels o f crude oil which will ever be recovered. (This
includes an estim ate for oil as yet undiscovered. A t least eight
recent studies have com e close to this figure, most being slightly
below .) Thus at the end o f 1970 there w ere about 478 barrels o f oil
for every person then alive. In the follow ing 12 years we consum ed
alm ost exactly as much oil as we had used from the beginning o f the
industrial era to the end o f 1970, so that by the end o f 1982 there
w ere only an estim ated 327 barrels o f oil remaining per person, a
drop o f alm ost one-third in 12 years. A m ericans, at their 1980 rate
o f consum ption o f 26.4 barrels a year apiece, even if the rate does
not rise and their population ceases to grow , will consum e their 327
barrels in 12.4 years and thereafter will be consuming other
countries’ shares. Even if other countries consume all their 327
barrels, at their 1980 rate o f 3.95 barrels per person per year, it will
still be gone in 83 years even if their per capita usage remains at its
current low level and their populations grow no larger. B ut at
current rates o f growth these countries’ populations will more than
quintuple in 83 years. N ot only is virtually all o f m odern industry
vitally dependent on oil, but A m erican agriculture in 1970 used nine
times m ore energy in producing food than the food contained. A n d
the increased yields o f the ‘ G reen R evo lu tio n ’ are paid for through
greatly increased energy requirem ents. W e are consuming our oil in
quite a literal sense.
O ne-quarter o f the w orld ’s people are dependent on w ood for
their ch ief source o f fuel, yet they are cutting down their forests so
rapidly that by the year 2020 (only 34 years away) ‘virtually all the
physically accessible forest in the Less D evelop ed Countries is
expected to have been cut’ . ( The G lobal 2000 Report to the
President, U S G o vt. Printing O ffice, 1980, vol. 1, p. 26.) A n d many
other m ineral and biological resources will be exhausted or nearing
exhaustion by this time.
 J U D G E M E N T DA Y 123
T h e world is rushing toward a precipice at dizzying speed. If we
are not already beyond the point o f no return, it is staring us in the
face and we show no sign o f turning back. It was 13 years ago
(unpublished) and again 5 years later (Inquiry, vol. 21, p. 452,
W inter 1978) when I predicted that not only would we lose the
battle against overpopulation, but that w e w ould not even m ake any
serious attem pt to save ourselves. The contest would not even be
close. It now looks as if that is going to be even m ore true than I
realized. Com placency has been growing even faster than
overpopulation.
D espite all this pessimism, I do not mean to leave the impression
nothing can be done. I do not think a catastrophe can be averted,
but actions we take or fail to take now will greatly affect the ultim ate
m agnitude o f the catastrophe. U ncertain, but potentially o f almost
unim aginable im portance, is the impact we can have on the nature
o f the post-crash world. T h e events which are about to unfold will
profoundly affect our world for a very long tim e, and the numbers of
people involved over that span m ay potentially be m any times the
current world population. It is not outside the realm o f possibility
that much o f the future o f sentient life on our planet will be
determ ined by the events o f the next twenty or so years.
M uch less uncertain, w e can probably still today vary the
m agnitude o f the im m ediate catastrophe by a factor o f tw o, and
possibly m ore. T w o catastrophes are twice as bad as one, and the
hundreds o f millions— if not billions— o f people whose lives hang in
the balance will be as saved if we save them or as lost if we don’t as
they w ould be if theirs w ere the only lives involved. Indeed, with so
few people interested and so much still to be determ ined, it is likely
that never before and never again in human history will the actions
o f the average individual who does take it upon him self to get
involved, m ean so much.
 IX

‘IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE

WHETHER OR NOT I DO IT’
JO N ATH A N GLOVER

T h ere are som e arguments used to justify people doing things,

otherwise adm itted to be w rong, which are puzzling. Th ey are
claim s that, while a certain act will be bad in its outcom e, so that it
w ould be better if it w ere not perform ed at all, it m akes only an
insignificant difference, or even no difference at all, if I am the
person to do it. O ne such argument is that used by a scientist who
takes a job developing means o f chem ical and biological warfare,
and who admits that it would be better if his country did not sponsor
such research, but who says (correctly) ‘ If I don’t do it, som eone
else w ill.’ This type o f argument also appears as an attem pted
justification o f Britain selling arms to South A frica. If w e accept this
as a justification, it is hard to see what acts, how ever otherwise
w icked, could not be defended in the same way. The job o f hired
assassin, or controller o f the gas supply at Belsen, or chief torturer
for the South A frican Police, will surely be filled by som eone, so it
seem s to m ake no difference to the total outcom e whether I accept
or refuse such a job. W hen we think o f these cases, most o f us are
probably reluctant to allow weight to this defence. Y e t it is hard for
those o f us who think that moral choices betw een courses o f action
ought to be determ ined, either largely or entirely, by their different
outcom es, to explain what is wrong with such a defence.
‘If I d on ’t do it, som eone else w ill’ is only one m em ber o f a fam ily
o f arguments relating to the insignificance o f a single person’s act or
omission. It is necessary to distinguish between som e o f these
related defences in order to exam ine them separately.

Jon athan G lo v e r, ‘ It m akes no d iffe re n ce w h eth er or not I do it’ , Proceedings o f the

Aristotelian Society, S u pp. V o l. X L I X , pp. 171-90 . © T h e A risto telia n S o cie ty,
1975. R e p rin te d b y co u rtesy o f the E d ito r.
126 JO N A TH A N GLOVER

A. M Y D O I N G IT M A K E S A N I N S I G N I F I C A N T D I F F E R E N C E

H ere, the argum ent is that, given the size o f a problem , the best I
can do in the w ay o f acting or refraining will m ake only an
insignificant difference, and so it does not m atter what I do. This
argument is found in discussions o f the population problem or o f
world poverty. The suggestion is that the problem o f over-populat­
ion is so vast that my refraining from having another child will not
m ake a significant im pact. It can similarly be argued that problem s
o f poverty and hunger are so vast that my sending m oney to relief
agencies is a drop in the ocean, and pointless.

B. M Y D O IN G IT M A K E S N O D I F F E R E N C E

A t least two sorts o f claim are made here:

(i) ‘ If I d on ’t do it, som eone else w ill.’ (Chem ical warfare

research; arms to South A frica .)
(ii) ‘ O ne person m akes no d ifferen ce.’ This can be used in
support o f not bothering to vote in any election, except in the
extrem ely rare case where there is a significant chance o f one
vote tipping the scale.

I shall look first at the argument from the insignificant difference,

and then at the argum ent from no difference.

i . The argument from the insignificant difference: context illusions

In m any o f the cases where it is used, the argument from the
insignificant difference can be dismissed at once. If I can rescue a
single person from death or m isery, the fact that there are many
others I cannot rescue is irrelevant to the moral worth o f doing this.
H uge problem s som etim es produce an irrational paralysis o f the
im agination. It is so terrible to think o f the poverty and starvation
that will still exist in the world w hatever I do, that it is tem pting to
despair and do nothing. But the difference that is small com pared to
the size o f the whole problem may be one that in other contexts we
 ‘IT M A K E S N O D I F F E R E N C E W H E T H E R OR N O T I D O I T ’ 127
w ould think w orth taking very seriously: when we are not thinking
in terms o f m illions o f people, we think it important to save a single
life.
B ut there are other cases where the argument from the insignifi­
cant difference is used, and where the harm a single person does
seem s small in a way that is independent o f the size illusions
generated by a context o f catastrophe. T hese other cases are best
introduced by distinguishing betw een different kinds o f threshold.

2. Two kinds o f threshold

A n A bsolute Threshold is found where there is a sharp boundary
betw een two different outcom es. T he clearest case is that o f voting.
If there are two candidates, and a thousand votes are cast for one of
them , the other will lose if he gets only 999 votes and will win if he
gets 1,001 votes. W inning or losing is an all-or-none matter: victory
by one vote is still a com plete victory. If, for sim plicity, we im agine a
voter who is fully inform ed about how everyone else will vote, we
see that, except for side effects, there is no point in his voting,
except w here doing so will lead to either a draw or to the victory of
his candidate by one vote. For, in all other cases, his vote will leave
the outcom e unchanged.
In contrast to an absolute threshold is a Discrimination
Threshold. This is where a single person’s act will push a situation
slightly further in a certain direction, but where his contribution,
although real, m ay be too small to be detected when its effects are
spread through the com m unity. H ere it is not, as with voting, that
there is an absolute threshold in reality. In these cases the reality is a
gentle slope, and the threshold is defined by the distance apart on
the slope two points have to be in order to be seen as separate by us.
If there is an electricity shortage, and I keep the heater on when we
are asked to econom ize, the result may be that everyone in the
com m unity has a pow er cut lasting one-hundredth o f a second
longer than it w ould have done. This is negligible, but the whole
thing is a m atter o f d egree, and things get worse as m ore people do
the same as I do.
In cases with an absolute threshold and where my act (say, o f
voting) does not result in the threshold being crossed, I have
contributed nothing to the outcom e. Som eone who takes the view
128 JONATHAN GLOVER
that m oral grounds for choosing one course o f action rather than
another must depend on som e difference in total outcom e will think
that, apart from side effects, it does not m atter whether or not I
vote. T h ere will be a case for my voting to the extent that the
outcom e o f the election is uncertain, but if 1 know that my vote will
not be decisive the argument for voting will have to appeal to
considerations other than the desirability o f my party or candidate
winning.

3. The principle o f divisibility

It m ay be thought that there is no difference in this respect betw een
absolute thresholds and discrimination thresholds. Som e people are
tem pted to assimilate the case o f the electricity shortage to the
voting case. In the electricity case, the harm I do when spread over
the com m unity is below the discrimination threshold. Consequent-
ialists who treat the two kinds o f threshold in the same way conclude
that, apart from side effects, it does not m atter w hether I use the
electricity or not. The suggestion is that the harm done counts as
zero.
But against this I want to argue that the harm done in such cases
should be assessed as a fraction o f a discriminable unit, rather than
as zero. L et us call this the Principle o f Divisibility. It says that, in
cases where harm is a m atter of degree, sub-threshold actions are
w rong to the extent that they cause harm , and w here a hundred acts
like mine are necessary to cause a detectable difference I have
caused one-hundredth o f that detectable harm.
A n yo n e who doubts this principle should consider the conse­
quences o f assigning zero harm to sub-threshold acts.
Suppose a village contains 100 unarm ed tribesm en. A s they eat
their lunch 100 hungry armed bandits descend on the village and
each bandit at gunpoint takes one tribesm an’s lunch and eats it. The
bandits then go o ff, each one having done a discriminable am ount o f
harm to a single tribesm an. N ext w eek, the bandits are tem pted to
do the same thing again, but are troubled by new-found doubts
about the m orality o f such a raid. Their doubts are put to rest by one
o f their num ber who does not believe in the principle o f divisibility.
T h ey then raid the village, tie up the tribesm en, and look at their
lunch. A s expected, each bowl o f food contains 100 baked beans.
 ‘ IT M A K E S NO D I F F E R E N C E W H E T H E R OR N O T I DO I T ’ 129
T h e pleasure derived from one baked bean is below the discrimi­
nation threshold. Instead o f each bandit eating a single plateful as
last w e ek, each takes one bean from each plate. T h ey leave after
eating all the beans, pleased to have done no harm, as each has done
no m ore than sub-threshold harm to each person. Those who reject
the principle o f divisibility have to agree.
If we accept that the principle o f divisibility applies when a
discrimination threshold is reached, a mildly scholastic further
question arises. W hat should we say about a case where a sub­
threshold increm ent is not ‘topped up’ by other sub-threshold
increm ents to produce a discriminable unit? (Suppose I am the only
person in the country to use electricity when econom y is asked for.)
Should w e, appealing to the divisibility principle, assign som e
disutility to this? T he case for answering ‘yes’ is that it seems
incoherent to weight each such act at zero before the threshold is
reached, but, if the threshold is reached, then to say that together
the acts add up to a detectable disutility.
B ut there is also a case for saying ‘n o’ . Ignoring side effects, it
seem s absurd for a consequentialist who is certain the threshold will
not be reached to refrain from using electricity although he knows
that this will in no w ay avoid any detectable discom fort or
inconvenience to anyone. M y inclination to say ‘no’ m akes me want
to explain aw ay the supposed paradox in saying ‘yes’ . W hy should
we not say that acts which do not contribute to the discrimination
threshold being reached have zero disutility, but that they do have
disutility where they do so contribute? This should only seem
paradoxical to som eone who thinks that the utility o f an act must be
independent o f the behaviour o f others.

4. Evaluation o f the argument from the insignificant difference

T h e argum ent that my doing som ething m akes only an insignificant
difference is in many cases not an acceptable defence. It is not
acceptable where the supposed insignificance is a size illusion
created by a special context. N or is it acceptable where its
plausibility depends on a tacit denial o f the principle of divisi­
bility.
It is only acceptable in cases where sub-threshold increm ents do
not com bine to produce discriminable harm, or where it is part o f a
130 JONATHAN GLOVER
larger argum ent, which includes countervailing reasons out­
w eighing the harm that is done.
I turn now to the argument from no difference.

5. The generalization test

Som etim es it is said that the only reason why the scientist’s claim ,
that if he does not w ork on chem ical warfare som eone else will,
seem s plausible as a defence is a m istaken concentration on the
consequences o f the act o f a single person. It is suggested that we
should not ask ‘what difference will it m ake if I do this?’ , but ‘what
difference w ould it m ake if everyone did this?’
B ut D avid Lyons has cast doubt on this by his argument that the
second question, when adequately form ulated, always gives the
sam e answer as the first question. W hen the generalization test is
applied, everything hangs on how the act is described. W e would
p robably give different answers to the crude question ‘what if
everyone broke his prom ises?’ and to the slightly m ore subtle
question ‘what if everyone broke his prom ises when this was
necessary to save som eone’s life?’ Lyons argues that utilitarians
applying the generalization test have to include in the description of
the act all those features that affect the utility o f the outcom e. So, in
the case o f the scientist and chem ical w arfare, we have to ask, not
the odd question, ‘what w ould happen if all scientists w orked on
chem ical w arfare?’ , but som e such com plicated question as ‘what
w ould happen if all those biologists who had these special skills, and
who w ere offered jobs in chem ical w arfare, accepted the jobs in
those cases w here, if they refused, som eone else equally able would
a ccept?’ This question is itself no doubt over-sim plified, but it
seem s that the more com plete in the relevant respects the description
becom es, the closer the generalization test com es to giving the same
answer that one gets to the question ‘what will happen if / d o this?’
Som etim es the Lyons argument is resisted, as it is by G ertrude
E zorsky, and by J .H . Sobel, by proposing restrictions on those
features o f other p eo p le’s behaviour that can be included in the
description o f the act when applying the generalization test. Sobel
uses Prisoner’s D ilem m a type cases to show that such restrictions
can result in the generalization test som etim es giving different
 ‘IT M A K E S N O D I F F E R E N C E W H E T H E R OR N O T I DO I T ’ I 3 I
answers from those obtained by the simple question about the
consequences o f a single person’s act.
But the difficulty for those versions o f the generalization test that
do differ in outcom e from the simple consequence question is that
using them threatens to produce results that differ by being worse.
This is because the features o f other peo p le’s behaviour that we are
debarred from considering often do in fact alter the desirability o f
the outcom e. If I am not allow ed to take into account how many
other people are voting, the generalization test is likely to tell me to
vote at som e inconvenience to m yself, even where my vote will not
influence the outcom e. If a nation in a balance o f terror situation is
not allow ed to take into account the predictable response o f other
nations, the generalization test m ay tell it to disarm in a situation
w here the outcom e will be that, as the only disarmed nation, it is
obliterated. Such acts m ay be noble, but in opting for them we have
abandoned consequentialism .
T h e generalization test could only help us if there w ere a version
o f it that w ould give answers that som etim es differed from those
given to the sim ple test, and which in such cases would not generate
a worse total outcom e. U ntil such a version has been found it w ould
be nice to hear no m ore o f the generalization test.

6. Side effects
A m ore prom ising w ay o f arguing against the scientist taking the
chem ical w arfare job is to exam ine all the side effects o f taking it,
together with the alternatives. For the claim that ‘if I d on ’t do it,
som eone else w ill’ is not sufficient to show that the total conse­
quences o f my taking the job will be no worse than the total
consequences o f m y not taking it.
O ne factor is the possibility o f my doing some socially useful
research instead. T he probability is that the other people wanting
the job are not guided much in their choice o f w ork by considera­
tions o f social usefulness. If one o f the others gets it, there is only an
average chance that the w ork he would otherwise have done would
have been beneficial. But if I refuse the job , it is in my pow er to look
for the most useful project I stand a good chance o f com pleting.
T h ere is also the question o f the influence I have on others. If I
take the jo b , this m akes a small contribution to m aking such w ork
132 JO NATHAN GLOVER
respectable am ong those o f my fellow scientists who know me and
give any weight to my view s. It may be said that the same contribut­
ion to an am oral clim ate o f scientific research will be m ade by
w h oever takes the job. But this objection ignores the positive
influence a refusal on principle can have. If I get the jo b , the other
applicants will probably just grum ble about the shortage o f scien­
tific jobs and m ake no contribution to discrediting chem ical warfare
as a field o f research. If I refuse the job on moral grounds, this may
itself m ake a good, if sm all, impact on the moral clim ate o f science.
It also leaves me free to cam paign against others taking such jobs. It
is true that if I accept the job (perhaps for som e very subtle
utilitarian reason) I can still campaign against others taking similar
jobs. But my cam paign would be w eakened by the impression of
hypocrisy this would create on unsubtle people.
There is also the effect on m yself o f doing, for good but subtle
reasons, som ething that in crude terms I disapprove of. Suppose I
take the jo b , while thinking it would be better if such research w ere
not done, partly because I need the m oney more than the other
applicants, and partly because I know that (by inefficient work not
quite bad enough to get me sacked) I can ensure that the w ork is less
productive. I m ay find I have underestim ated the effects o f this bad
faith, and when deception gets a perm anent foothold in that part o f
m y life, I m ay find it hard to prevent contam ination o f other
relationships. Consequentialists can justify some acts o f lying. But
an enorm ously greater case has to be m ade out for any policy
requiring constant deception, just because of the psychological
difficulty o f keeping one part o f one’s mind sufficiently cordoned o ff
from the other parts.
A n d , even if I can keep my mind com partm entalized in this
m anner, I m ay be corrupted in a more oblique way. O ur em otional
responses are not always governed by our beliefs. A n atheist who
was strongly conditioned to church-going in childhood may still feel
guilty when he lies in bed on Sundays. Sim ilarly, the utilitarian
scientist working on chem ical warfare may from time to time be
filled with self-loathing and disgust, which may not be dispelled
even when he rehearses to him self the com plex reasons which he
thinks justify his having the job. This may not in itself matter very
much. But it can be im portant not to be subjected to too much
 ‘IT M A K E S N O D I F F E R E N C E W H E T H E R OR N O T I DO I T ’ 13 3
tension o f this kind, not only because it is unpleasant, but also
because som e constancy o f self-esteem m ay be necessary for going
on trying to be moral at all. If among the burdens o f being m oral
there is a heavy weight o f self-disgust, the whole policy is likely to
break under the load.
B ut these appeals to side effects although powerful in the chem i­
cal warfare case, are not always sufficient to nullify the force o f the
claim ‘if I don’t do it, som eone else w ill’ . This is because it is always
possible to construct a case where the arguments on the other side
are even m ore pow erful. Suppose I am very uninfluential in the
scientific com m unity and so my exam ple either way carries very
little weight. (The effects o f a Bertrand Russell not follow ing a
m ultitude to do evil m ay be im mense, but most other people
com m and less attention.) A lso suppose that I have a huge fam ily;
that w e are very poor; and that there is very little chance of my
finding any other job at all, let alone doing any useful research. It is
plausible that, in the chem ical warfare problem , appeals to side
effects will in the normal case provide very good reasons against
taking the jo b , even where it is certain that if I do not take it
som eone else will. B u t, as with all such argum ents, it cannot be
guaranteed that this result will be generated in all instances o f the
dilem m a.

7. A special class o f side effects: spirals

T h ere are som e very im portant classes o f side effects which are
often underrated. These are side effects where the numbers o f
actions o f a certain type will have an influence on people. If this
influence is repeated, we have a spiral.
T o illustrate the idea o f a spiral, w e can again consider the voting
problem . A t first sight, there seems virtually no consequentialist
case for voting in a general election in Britain. The chance o f my
vote being decisive betw een governm ents can be ruled out: the
likelihood o f a governm ent com ing to pow er with a m ajority o f one
M P , where that one M P gets in by a single vote, is laughably small.
A n d even if I care about the size of the governing party’s m ajority, it
is still highly unlikely that a single person will be decisive in my own
constituency. W hen this is recognized, it is com m on for people to
produce a quite different argument for voting. M y vote will help
134 JO NATHAN GLOVER
keep up the m orale o f my party, or else it will help to support the
system o f dem ocratic elections.
People will in future be less inclined to vote for my party if it
seem s to stand very little chance o f winning, so the total votes now
cast for it m atter. A n d people will start to feel disillusioned with the
dem ocratic system if the percentage using their votes becom es
alarm ingly small. The danger is o f a downward spiral, like a flight
from a currency, where having few participants leads to loss of
confidence, which in turn leads to few er participants. Small political
parties are sim ilarly concerned to generate an upward spiral, where
larger num bers o f votes lead potential supporters to think they
stand a chance o f winning, and so their votes increase further.
A s so often when the argument from no difference is countered
by appeals to side effects, we are back here with problem s involving
discrimination thresholds. E ven where the existence o f spiral is
recognized, som eone m ay claim that his vote m akes an insignificant
difference. Potential supporters would have to be very sensitive to
feel differently about voting for a party which last time scored
8,341,692 votes from how they would feel about one which had
scored 8,343,691. W e can accept that one vote is below the discrimi­
nation threshold, but resist the view that it therefore does not
m atter at all. Such a view w ould lead to the baked beans paradox, so
we should instead invoke the principle o f divisibility. A n d a spiral
magnifies the utilities and disutilities to be divided, som etim es
enorm ously, as when the disutilities o f a price increase are turned
into the disutilities o f the collapse o f a currency.
T h e difficulty with spirals is our uncertainty about their onset and
their rate o f acceleration or slowing down. A specific num ber of
votes is needed to win an election. It is not certain that there is a
specific num ber m arking the point where a small party starts to
benefit from an upward spiral, or the point where it starts to be hurt
by a downward spiral. W e are often unable to identify even the
broad region o f onset, and equally unable to predict the shape o f the
upward or dow nward curve.
Because utilities and disutilities are magnified by spirals, a
rational consequentialist w ould give weight to this w herever it
seem ed plausible that they would occur. It is this feature of
consequentialism that is fatal to D . H. H odgson’s ingenious argu­
 ‘IT M A K E S N O D I F F E R E N C E W H E T H E R OR N O T I DO I T ’ I 3 5
m ent in support o f the view that act utilitarianism is self-defeating.
His claim that som e overriding important utilities depend on
expectations that act utilitarians are incapable o f generating. For
exam ple, com m unication depends on people expecting to be told
the truth. A c t utilitarians will only tell the truth where it is useful to
do so, i.e. where people expect it. But the expectation can only be
generated by the practice, which in turns depends on the exp ecta­
tion. H odgson claims that act utilitarians are on a downward spiral
that they cannot stop. B u t, as Peter Singer has pointed out, the very
danger o f the downward spiral gives them a good reason for telling
the truth, and the fact that they have this good reason should
generate the right expectations in those they talk to.
W hen the im portance o f spirals is understood, it is less hard to see
how act utilitarians (and others concerned with the contribution
that their particular act m akes to total outcom e) can m anage to
generate the m any benefits that flow from co-operative social
practices. B u t, as with side effects in general, there is no guarantee
that these effects will always generate a sufficient case for giving
support to a co-operative practice. E ven where the question o f a
spiral arises, there may be countervailing side effects that override
such a factor.

8. The appeal to justice

Suppose I do not vote because I have som ething else I want to do
instead. I know my party will get in anyw ay, and there are no spirals
or other side effects which outweigh the case for my not voting.
Som e people object here on grounds o f justice. M y argument for
not voting depends on my belief that the other m em bers o f my party
will m ostly turn out to vote. It has been said by Colin Strang and by
Lyons that there is som ething unfair in m y allowing others to do the
w ork and not m aking a contribution myself.
Lyons thinks that the claims o f fairness are such that I have a
prim a-facie obligation to co-operate in social practices from which I
benefit even where the threshold w ould be reached without my
doing so. But this derives part o f its plausibility in the case o f voting
from L yo n s’s assimilation o f the voting case to a car-pushing case.
In the context o f discussing surplus votes for a winning candidate,
Lyons asks, ‘ If it takes six men to push a car up a hill and, not
136 JO NATHAN GLOVER
knowing this, eight lend a hand to do the job , what are w e to say?’
B ut to assim ilate these cases is to ignore the distinction between
absolute thresholds and discrimination thresholds. H aving m ade
this distinction, w e are free to accept the argument from injustice in
the car-pushing case without accepting it in the voting case. If I do
not push the car, the others will have to push a bit harder. M any o f
us are against the kind o f injustice that involves giving benefits to
som e at the cost o f additional hardship to others. But no one has to
vote harder because I do not vote. It seems a dog-in-the-manger
version o f justice that objects to one person benefiting because
others are left unchanged.

9. Ritual
A p p eals to side effects (including spirals) will often not be powerful
enough to generate an adequate consequentialist argument for
voting, and the direct appeal to the question o f who will win the
election will carry weight only on very rare occasions. This is
som ething a consequentialist m ay just accept, but many others find
this rather shocking. Perhaps this is because, for many people in our
society, voting is a kind o f sacred ritual. There are em otional
satisfactions in ritual professions o f belief, and people who experi­
ence these satisfactions are disturbed by other people taking them
lightly. This is a very m inor factor to take into account, and it
cuts both ways. It is a pity to cause minor disturbance to believers,
but it is often beneficial to encourage people to question their
rituals.

10. A bsolute prohibitions

In considering the argument from no difference, it has so far been
claim ed that neither the generalization test nor the appeal to justice
•will defeat the argum ent. But it has also been suggested that, in very
m any cases, the act which apparently has no upshot will turn out to
have side effects too im portant to dismiss.
M any people will o bject to the contingency o f such a line of
defence against the argument from no difference. T o them it will
seem wrong that the question o f working on chem ical w arfare, or o f
selling arms to South A frica , should be decided by calculating
consequences, how ever likely the result is to fit in with their prior
 ‘IT M A K E S N O D I F F E R E N C E W H E T H E R OR N O T I DO I T ’ 1 3 7
disapproval. T h ey m ay be tem pted to invoke absolute prohibitions,
independent o f the total outcom e of those actions.
T h e difficulty with absolute prohibitions is that the exclusion o f
appeals to outcom e seems to rule out attem pts to justify them ,
except either by direct appeal to intuitive responses or by appeal to
som e authority. A pp eals to authority are not worth discussing here,
so let us look at the alternative: the intuitive acceptability of
absolute prohibitions.
T h e acts that can be defended by the argument from no difference
are so varied that, at first sight, the list o f absolute prohibitions
needed to defeat the argument seems enorm ous. It ranges from
‘N ever w ork on chem ical warfare projects’ through ‘N ever sell
arms to countries with evil governm ents’ to ‘N ever fail to vote in a
general election where you care about the outcom e’ . A long list o f
absolute prohibitions o f this kind should appal us. This is not m erely
because o f the aesthetic preference most o f us have for econom y of
principles, the preference for ethical systems in the style o f the
Bauhaus rather than B aroque. It is partly because we cannot see
how to select our long list o f absolute prohibited acts or omissions.
A n d it is partly because we are rightly alarmed about what disasters
w e m ay be letting ourselves in for, where all escape routes are
blocked by our having so many absolute prohibitions.
A n alternative is to produce a coherent system o f m anageable
size, where there is a small num ber o f prohibitions stated in very
general term s, together with priority rules where prohibitions
conflict. Prohibitions w ould no longer refer to chem ical warfare,
but to som e such act as indiscriminate killing. In recent philosophy
such a system is som etim es gestured at, especially in discussions of
w ar or abortion, where the prohibition on killing the innocent is
m entioned. But we have not been presented by those sym pathetic
to this kind o f outlook with even the outlines o f a properly w orked
out system. For this reason, we are still justified in any scepticism we
feel. In the absence o f a whole system to scrutinize, w e still do not
know what disasters such systems might m ake inescapable. A n d we
still do not know what principle o f selection is supposed to operate
when we m ake up our list o f forbidden acts.
138 JONATHAN GLOVER

1 1 . The Solzhenitsyn principle

Bernard W illiam s has recently argued that it is desirable to find
som e m iddle w ay betw een a m orality o f absolute prohibitions and a
m orality where total outcom e is decisive. Such a m orality would
have to leave m ore room , he argues, than a consequentialist
m orality can, for considerations o f personal integrity. In such a
m orality, outcom e is not all that matters. It is also im portant what
role m y decision or action plays in bringing it about.
Considerations o f this sort seem central to people’s resistance to
consequentialist m orality. In Solzhenitsyn’s N obel lecture, he says
(echoing one o f his own characters in The First Circle) ‘A n d the
simple step o f a simple courageous man is not to take part in the lie,
not to support deceit. L et the lie com e into the world, even
dom inate the w orld, but not through m e.’
T h e Solzhenitsyn principle does not com mit people who hold it to
the view that som e acts are wrong for reasons entirely independent
o f outcom e. It is open to us to incorporate this principle in a kind o f
tem pered consequentialism . I may think that a certain outcom e is
bad, and then invoke the Solzhenitsyn principle to say that I must
not be the person who brings it about. But this is obviously a
departure from the strictest consequentialism , which is concerned
with total outcom es, rather than with what would ordinarily be
described as the consequences o f my act.
H ow can we choose betw een the strictest consequentialism and
the Solzhenitsyn principle? If they always generated the same
answer, there w ould be no need to choose. But clearly they do not.
In the chem ical warfare problem , if there are cases where side
effects give overall support to taking the jo b , this leads to a clash
with the Solzhenitsyn principle. In those cases, to obey the principle
is to do so at the cost o f the total outcom e being worse. The strict
consequentialist will say that the principle tells us to keep our hands
clean, at a cost which will probably be paid by other people. It is
excessively self-regarding, placing considerations either o f my own
feelings or purity o f character far too high on the scale o f factors to
be considered.
W illiam s has considered an argument o f this kind, which he calls
the ‘squeam ishness appeal’ in the context o f an exam ple o f his own.
 ‘IT M A K E S N O D I F F E R E N C E W H E T H E R OR N O T I DO I T ’ I 3 9
A m an, arriving in a small South A m erican town, finds that soldiers
are about to shoot twenty captive Indians as a reprisal for recent
anti-governm ent protests there. The m an, as a foreign visitor, is
offered the privilege o f shooting one Indian. If he does this, the
others will be let off. There is no escape from the dilem m a of
accepting or refusing the offer.
W illiam s plausibly says that the utilitarian would think that he
obviously ought to accept the offer. W illiam s does not him self say
that the offer should be refused, but that it is not obvious that it
should be accepted. H e then refers to the criticism that a refusal
might be ‘self-indulgent squeam ishness’ . B ut he suggests a reply to
this squeam ishness appeal. H e says that this appeal can only carry
w eight with som eone already seeing the situation in terms o f strict
consequentialism . H e says that, for anyone not seeing things from
that point o f view , ‘he will not see his resistance to the invitation,
and the unpleasant feelings he associates with accepting it, just as
disagreeable experiences o f his; they figure rather as em otional
expressions o f a thought that to accept would be w rong’ . W illiam s
goes on to say, ‘B ecause our moral relation to the world is partly
given by such feelings, and by a sense o f what we can or cannot “ live
w ith ” , to com e to regard those feelings from a purely utilitarian
point o f view , that is to say, as happenings outside o n e’s moral self,
is to lose a sense o f o n e’s m oral identity; to lose, in the most literal
w ay, o n e’s in tegrity.’
This reply does have som e force, but also severe limitations. In
the first place, it does not show that the utilitarian who regards
certain o f his own feelings in this way has lost his integrity. He can
agree that his m orality is partly based on such feelings, but say that
when he reflects on his feelings he finds that they cannot all be
com bined into anything coherent. It then seems legitim ate to
disregard som e o f them as anomalies. W hen I hear o f som e m edical
experim ents on an anim al, I m ay feel a revulsion against all
vivisection, but this m ay conflict with my feelings when I reflect on
the im plications o f this for m edical research. I do not lose my
integrity by deciding that my first response was exaggerated.
T h e second lim itation o f the W illiam s reply is that it seems to
presuppose that we can readily distinguish feelings that have moral
im port from other feelings. B ut this is not clear. The atheist already
140 JONATHAN GLOVER
m entioned is surely right to attach no m oral significance to his guilt
feelings when he does not go to church. B ut his guilt feelings m ay
not be phenom enologically distinct from those o f a man whose
w hole m orality centres round his religion.
T h e final doubt about the Solzhenitsyn principle is that it appears
to presuppose a conventional but questionable doctrine about the
m oral difference betw een acts and omissions. A ccordin g to this
doctrine, I have m ade a worse m oral choice if som ething bad
foreseeably com es about as the result o f my deliberate act than I
have if som ething equally bad foreseeably com es about as the result
o f my deliberate omission. If we elim inate a com plication by
rem oving the difference o f num bers, the Solzhenitsyn principle
seem s to suggest that it w ould be worse for me to shoot an Indian
than for me deliberately to refuse an invitation with the foreseen
and inevitable consequence that a soldier would shoot the same
Indian. T o look closely at arguments norm ally offered for this
conventional view might increase our scepticism about the principle
so closely related to it.
(The criticism o f a possessive attitude to o n e’s own virtue seems
to be the point o f the story o f the old wom an and the onion in The
Brothers Karamazov. A fte r a w icked life, an old wom an was in the
lake o f fire. But G o d heard about her only good deed: she had once
given an onion from her garden to a beggar. He told her guardian
angel to hold out the onion for her to catch hold o f it, and to try to
pull her up from the lake to paradise. She was being pulled out when
other sinners in the lake caught hold o f her to be pulled out. The
wom an kicked them , saying ‘It’s me who is being pulled out, not
you. It’s my onion, not you rs.’ W hen she said this, the onion broke
and she fell back into the lake.)

12. Judging actions and judging people

O ur inclination to m ake the choice I am arguing against (to prefer
the Solzhenitsyn principle to strict consequentialism ) is perhaps
partly caused by a tendency to confuse judging actions with judging
people. W e ought in our thinking to keep separate the standpoints
o f the agent deciding betw een different courses o f action and o f the
m oral critic or jud ge, who com m ents on the moral quality o f
p eo p le’s character.
 ‘IT M A K E S N O D I F F E R E N C E W H E T H E R OR N O T I DO I T ’ I 4 I
T h e m oralities o f other people m ay lead them to perform acts that
arouse our adm iration, whether they are obeying absolute prohibit­
ions or the Solzhenitsyn principle. Solzhenitsyn’s own conduct
w hile in Russia is a case in point. A m ore calculating, strict
consequentialist m orality might not have generated such a fine
display o f independence and bravery. (M ight not: for the paradox
here is that Solzhenitsyn’s own exam ple has done good in Russia
that we cannot calculate, and has probably, in consequentialist
term s, been well worth the risks taken. A n d even in our society,
w here the penalties are so much less, acts o f moral independence
help to create a clim ate where social pressures are less, and where
the views o f the powerful and the orthodox are treated with
appropriate lack o f reverence.)
B ecause we often adm ire the m oral character o f people follow ing
the Solzhenitsyn principle, w e easily slide over into thinking their
action right. B ut there is no equivalence here. U nless we are
narrow-m inded bigots, we will often adm ire the m oral qualities o f
p eople follow ing many different sets o f beliefs: it does not follow
that we are justified in follow ing all or any o f them when we have to
act ourselves. The corollary o f this is the platitude that we can
som etim es disagree with a m oral view while respecting those who
act on it. Som etim es the reluctance to reject the Solzhenitsyn
principle rests on neglect o f this platitude.
Is there an oddity in saying that w e can admire the character of
those who accept the Solzhenitsyn principle just after quoting the
story o f the old wom an and the onion?
W e should distinguish here between adm irable character traits on
the one hand and a policy which gives exaggerated weight to
preserving them on the other. Som eone acting on the Solzhenitsyn
principle can display such traits as honesty, loyalty, or a revulsion
against killing or hurting people. T hese are all traits whose
existence is in overall effect im m ensely beneficial. A consequentia­
list has every reason to encourage them. (This is the point
som etim es exaggerated by crude consequentialists when they
w rongly suggest that we admire these traits because o f their
contribution to social w elfare.) W e can adm ire these traits while
thinking that they som etim es lead to the wrong decision, as happens
if, in the W illiam s case, the man refuses to shoot an Indian. If, in
14 2 JO N A TH A N GLOVER
explaining this, he says ‘I just could not bring m yself to do it’ , we see
an adm irable character trait that has too strong a grip on him. But if
he says ‘B efore com ing to South A m erica I read an interesting
article by Bernard W illiam s, and so I understood that I must
preserve my integrity, even at the cost o f nineteen lives’ , the onion
criticism then applies.

13. Esoteric morality

It may be said that the consequentialist approach to these questions
defended here is in some way incoherent, since if it w ere propagated
w idely, it w ould have disastrous consequences in its own terms.
(Jonathan H arrison, in his discussion o f these questions, said ‘No
principle is fit to be a moral principle unless it is fit that it should be
universally adopted and universally applied.’) T he consequentialist
approach leaves such decisions as whether or not to vote, or
w hether or not to w ork on chem ical w arfare, to be decided by
sophisticated reasoning about the outcom e, rather than by simple
and clear rules. T h e suggestion is that most people do not think in a
very sophisticated w ay, and are likely to be biased by self-interest,
so that if these views w ere propagated, disasters w ould follow .
Elections might collapse. If not, they might be decided by people
who w ere either not consequentialists or else not intelligent.
O n e reply is that propagating the consequentialist approach
w ould include telling people about spirals. W here sophisticated
utilitarian abstention started to becom e com m on, sophisticated
utilitarians w ould detect this. They w ould revise their estim ates of
the chances o f their party winning by a narrow m argin, and they
w ould also consider the danger o f helping to start a downward
spiral. T h e tendency not to vote would be to som e extent
self-correcting.
A n o th er reply is that people are not as dim as the criticism
suggests. Y o u do not really have to be a very sophisticated person to
grasp say the essential point o f the principle o f divisibility. A recent
anti-litter poster showed bits o f paper falling, thick and fast, each
accom panied by a speak-bubble saying ‘M y one bit o f paper w on’t
m ake any d ifferen ce.’ People who w ere not philosophers probably
got the m essage.
B u t, apart from these points, there is a m ore central reply. A
 ‘IT M A K E S N O D I F F E R E N C E W H E T H E R OR N O T I DO I T ’ I 4 3
m orality is not incoherent sim ply because, in its own term s, it would
be better not propagated. I can consistently adhere to a m orality
w hich, am ong other things, enjoins me to practise it secretly. It is
true that, if much o f the m orality is esoteric in this w ay, the bad
effects on me o f deceiving others will start to operate. But if the
cases where deception will be justified are as few as I think they are,
I can allow for them in my consequentialist calculations.
Sidgw ick put the m atter in an engaging sentence: ‘Thus the
U tilitarian conclusion, carefully stated, w ould seem to be this; that
the opinion that secrecy m ay render an action right which w ould not
otherw ise be so should itself be kept com paratively secret; and
sim ilarly it seem s expedient that the doctrine that esoteric m orality
is expedient should itself be kept esoteric.’ Sidgwick appropriately
buried this sentence in page 490 o f The M ethods o f Ethics.

14. Conclusions
T o sum m arize the position argued for:

(A ) T H E A R G U M E N T F R O M T H E I N S I G N I F IC A N T D I F F E R E N C E :

(i) fails where it depends on size illusions

(ii) fails where it depends on ignoring the principle of
divisibility.
(B ) T H E A R G U M E N T FROM N O D IF F E R E N C E :
(i) is not defeated by the generalization test
(ii) is not defeated by the appeal to justice
(iii) often is defeated by consideration o f alternatives and
side effects, especially spirals.
And
(iv) where the side effects are inadequate to defeat the
argum ent from no difference, this should then be
accepted in preference to looking for absolute prohibi­
tions or adopting the Solzhenitsyn principle.
(v) In cases w here the argument from no difference is
accepted, this should som etim es not be publicized.

(I follow Sidgw ick’s exam ple, and bury this last conclusion at the
end o f a paper in the Supplem entary V olum e o f the A ristotelian
Society.)
144 JONATHAN GLOVER
Note: In writing this paper I have been helped a lot by suggestions
and criticisms by V ivette G lo ver, H enry W est, Jim Griffin, and
D e rek Parfit.

REFERENCES

G e r tr u d e E z o r s k y : ‘ A D e fe n s e o f R u le U tilita ria n ism A g a in s t D a v id L y o n s

w h o in sists on T ie in g it to A c t U tilita r ia n ism , P lu s a B ra n d N e w W a y o f
C h e c k in g O u t G e n e r a l U tilita ria n P r o p e r tie s ’ , J o u r n a l o f P h ilo s o p h y ,
1968.
J o n a th a n H a rriso n : ‘ U tilita r ia n ism , U n iv e rs a lis a tio n , and O u r D u t y to be
J u st’ , P A S , 19 5 2 -3 .
D . H . H o d g s o n : C o n se q u e n ce s o f U tilitarianism ( O x fo r d , 1967).
D a v id L y o n s: F orm s an d L im its o f U tilitarianism ( O x fo r d , 19 6 5 ), e sp . p . 89
a n d C h a p . 5 P a rt A .
H e n r y S id g w ic k : T h e M eth o d s o f E th ics (S e v e n th e d n ., L o n d o n , 1907).
P e te r S in g er: ‘ Is A c t-U tilita r ia n is m S e lf- D e fe a t in g ? ’ P h ilo so p h ic a l
R e v ie w , 1972.
J o rd a n H o w a r d S o b e l: ‘U tilita ria n ism s: S im p le and G e n e r a l’ , In q u iry ,
1970.
A le x a n d e r S o lzh e n its y n : ‘ O n e W o rd o f T ru th . . . ’ ( L o n d o n , 1972).
B e r n a rd W illia m s: ‘ A C ritiq u e o f U tilita r ia n is m ’ , in J . J . C . S m art and
B e r n a r d W illia m s: U tilitarianism F o r an d A g a in st ( C a m b r id g e , 1973).
 X
OVERPOPULATION AND THE QUALITY
OF LIFE
D E R E K P A R F IT

H o w m any people should there be? Can there be overpopulation:

too m any people living? I shall present a puzzling argum ent about
these questions, show how this argument can be strengthened, then
sketch a possible reply.*

I Q U A L IT Y A N D Q U A N T IT Y

Consider the outcom es that might be produced, in some part o f the

w orld, by two rates o f population growth. Suppose that, if there is
faster grow th, there w ould later be m ore people, who w ould all be
worse off. T hese outcom es are shown in Fig. i . T he width o f the

F ig. i

D e re k Parfit, ‘ O ve rp o p u la tio n and the Q u a lity o f L ife ’ . © 1986 D e re k Parfit.

Printed by perm ission o f the auth or.

* T h e first h alf o f this (h ith erto u n p u b lish ed ) essay sum m arizes a lon ger discussion in
m y R easons and Persons (O x fo r d , 1984). Ih a v e been greatly h elped b y J. M cM ah an ,
J. R . R ich a rd s, L . T e m k in , K . K a la fsk i, and R . Jones. F or further readin g on this
su b je ct, see O bligations to Future Generations, ed. R . I. S ik o ra and B. B a rry
(P h ilad elp h ia , 1978) and M cM a h a n 's lon g review o f this a n th ology in E thics 92,
N o . 1, 1981.
146 D E R E K P A R F IT
blocks shows the num ber o f people living; the height shows how
w ell o ff these people are. Com pared with outcom e A , outcom e B
w ould have twice as m any people, who would all be worse off. T o
avoid irrelevant com plications, I assume that in each outcom e there
w ould be no inequality: no one w ould be worse o ff than anyone
else. I also assume that everyo n e’s life would be well worth living.
T h ere are various ways in which, because there would be twice as
m any people in outcom e B , these people might be all w orse o ff than
the people in A . T here might be worse housing, overcrow ded
schools, m ore pollution, less unspoilt countryside, few er opportuni­
ties, and a sm aller share per person o f various other kinds of
resources. I shall say, for short, that in B there is a lower quality o f
life.
E xcept for the absence o f inequality, these two outcom es could
be the real alternatives for some country, or m ankind, given two
rates o f population growth over m any years. W ould one o f these
outcom es be worse than the other? I do not mean ‘m orally w orse’ in
the sense that applies only to agents and to acts. But one o f two
outcom es can be worse in another sense that has moral relevance. It
w ould be w orse, in this sense, if more people suffer, or die young.
W ould it be worse, in this sense, if the outcom e was B rather than
A ? Part o f the answer is clear. W e w ould all agree that B would be,
in one w ay, worse than A : it would be bad that everyone would be
worse off.
O n one view , this is all that m atters, and it m akes B worse than A .
This view is expressed in

The Average Principle: If other things are equal, it is better if

p eo p le’s lives go, on average, better.

T h e Hedonistic version o f this principle substitutes, for ‘go better’ ,

‘contain m ore happiness’ .1

1 O f the m an y eco n om ists w h o appeal to the A v e r a g e Prin ciple, som e m ake it true
b y defin ition . S e e , for e xa m p le , P. A . S am u elso n , E co n o m ics (N e w Y o r k , 1970),
p. 5 51. C erta in w riters state this principle so that it co v ers on ly the lives that a re, at
a n y tim e, b ein g lived. T h is m akes the principle im ply th at it w ou ld h ave been b etter if
all but the b e st-o ff p e o p le had ju st d ropp ed d ead. M y version s o f the A v e ra g e
P rin cip le do not im ply this absurd con clu sion . If a n yo n e with a life w orth livin g dies
e a rlie r, this causes p e o p le 's lives to g o , on a ve ra g e , w o rse, and to con tain a sm aller
a ve ra g e sum o f happiness.
 O V E R P O P U L A T I O N A N D T H E Q U A L I T Y OF L I F E 147
O n the other main view about this question, it is good if any extra
life is lived, that is worth living. O n this view B might be better than
A . B w ould be in one way w orse, because everyone would be worse
off. But in another way B w ould be better, because there w ould be
m ore people living, all o f whose lives would be worth living. A n d
the fact that people w ould be worse o ff might be less important
than— or outweighed by— the fact that there would be m ore people
living.
W hich o f these view s should w e accept? C ould a loss in the quality
o f p eo p le’s lives be outw eighed by a sufficient increase in the
quantity o f worthw hile life lived? If this is so, what are the relative
values o f quality and quantity? These are the central questions
about overpopulation.2
T h e A ve ra g e Principle implies that only quality m atters. A t the
other extrem e is

The Hedonistic Total Principle: If other things are equal, it is

better if there is a greater total sum o f happiness.

This principle implies that only quantity m atters. Its N on-H edo-
nistic version substitutes, for ‘happiness’ , ‘w hatever m akes life
w orth living’ .
O n the H edonistic T o tal Principle, B would be better than A
because each life in B w ould be more than h a lf as happy as each life
in A . Though the people in B would each be less happy than the
p eople in A , they together would have m ore happiness— just as two
bottles m ore than half-full hold more than a bottleful. O n the non-
H edonistic version o f this principle, B w ould be better than A
because, com pared with lives in A , lives in B w ould be more than
h a lf as much w orth living.
These claims m ay seem im plausibly precise. But lives in B w ould
be m ore than half as much w orth living if, though a m ove from the
level in A to that in B would be a decline in the quality o f life, it
w ould take much m ore than another sim ilarly large decline before

2 T h e se rem ark s assum e that the q u ality o f life is h igh er if p e o p le ’s lives go b etter,
and th at each life g o e s b etter i f it con tain s a g re a te r q u an tity e ith er o f happiness o r o f
w h a te v e r else m ak es life w orth living. ‘ Q u a lity ’ thus m eans ‘q u an tity, p e r life liv e d ’ .
In S ection 5 b e lo w I d ro p this assu m ption , th ereb y sim plifying the con trast b etw een
q u a lity and q u an tity. (If this n o te is p u zzlin g, ign o re it.)
148 D E R E K P A R F IT
p eo p le’s lives ceased to be worth living. T here are many actual cases
in which such a claim would be tru e.3

2 TH E R E P U G N A N T C O N C L U S IO N

Consider Fig. 2. O n the Total Principle, just as B would be better

than A , C w ould be better than B , D better than C , and so on.
Best o f all w ould be Z . This is an enorm ous population all of
whom have lives that are not much above the level where they
w ould cease to be worth living. A life could be like this either
because its ecstasies m ake its agonies seem just w orth enduring, or
because it is painless but drab. L et us im agine lives in Z to be o f this
second kind. T h ere is nothing bad in each o f these lives; but there is
little happiness, and little else that is good. The people in Z never
suffer; but all they have is m uzak and potatoes. Though there is
little happiness in each life in Z , because there are so many o f these
lives Z is the outcom e in which there w ould be the greatest total sum
o f happiness. Sim ilarly, Z is the outcom e in which there w ould be
the greatest quantity o f w hatever m akes life worth living. (The
greatest mass o f milk might be in a vast heap o f bottles each
containing only one drop.)
It is worth com paring Z with N o zick’s im agined Utility Monster.

F ig . 2

3 In w h at fo llo w s I assum e, fo r co n ve n ie n ce , that th ere can be precise d ifferen ces

b e tw e e n the q u ality o f life o f d ifferen t groups. I b e lie ve that th ere cou ld not re a lly be
such precise d ifferen ces. A ll that m y argum en ts req u ire is that som e p eo p le can be
w orse o ff than o th ers, in m orally significant w a y s, and b y m ore or less.
 O V E R P O P U L A T I O N A N D T H E Q U A L I T Y OF L I F E 149
This is som eone who w ould gain more happiness than we would lose
w henever he is given any o f our resources. Som e Utilitarians
believe that the H edonistic T otal Principle should be our only moral
principle. N ozick claims that, on this U tilitarian theory, it w ould be
best if all our resources w ere taken away and given to his U tility
M onster, since this would produce the greatest total sum o f happi­
ness. A s he writes, ‘unacceptably, the theory seems to require that
w e all be sacrificed in the m onster’s m aw ’ .4
H ow could it be true that, if all m ankind’s resources w ere given to
N o zick ’s M onster, this would produce the greatest total sum o f
happiness? For this to be true, this M on ster’s life must, com pared
with other p eo p le’s lives, be m illions o f times as much w orth living.
W e cannot im agine, even in the dimmest w ay, what such a life
w ould be like. N o zick’s appeal to his M onster is therefore not a
good objection to the T o tal Principle. W e cannot test a m oral
principle by applying it to a case which we cannot even imagine.
R eturn now to the population in outcom e Z . This is another
U tility M onster. The difference is that the greater sum o f happiness
w ould com e from a vast increase, not in the quality o f one person’s
life, but in the num ber o f lives lived. A n d this U tility M onster can be
im agined. W e can im agine what it w ould be for som eone’s life to be
barely worth living— containing only m uzak and potatoes. A n d we
can im agine what it w ould be for there to be many people with such
lives. In order to im agine Z , we m erely have to im agine that there
w ould be very many.
W e could not in practice face a choice between A and Z . G iven
the limits to the w orld ’s resources, we could not in fact produce the
greatest possible sum o f happiness, or the greatest amount of
w hatever m akes life worth living, by producing an enorm ous
population w hose lives w ere barely worth living.5 But this w ould be
4 R . N o z ic k , A n archy, State, and Utopia (O x fo r d , 1974), p. 41.
5 A c c o r d in g to som e v ersion s o f the w id ely assum ed La w o f D im in ishin g M arginal
Utility, w e cou ld do this. T h e point can be m ade m ost easily in H ed o n istic term s. It is
assu m ed th at, b ecau se resou rces p rodu ce m ore happiness if th ey are given to p e o p le
w h o are w orse o ff, th ey w ou ld p rod u ce m ost happiness if th ey are all given to p eo p le
w h o se lives are b arely w orth livin g. T h e re is h ere an ob vio u s oversigh t. M an y
resou rces are n e ed e d to m ak e e ach p e rso n ’s life even reach a lev el w h ere it begin s to
b e w orth living. Such reso u rces d o not h elp to p rod u ce the greatest possible q uan tity
o f h app in ess, since th ey are m erely b e in g used to raise p eo p le to the le v el w h ere their
h app in ess begins to o u tw eigh th eir suffering.
150 D E R E K P A R F IT
m erely technically im possible. In order to suppose it possible, we
m erely need to add som e assumptions about the nature and
availability o f resources. W e can therefore test our moral principles
by applying them to A and Z . 6
T h e T o tal Principle im plies that Z w ould be better than A . M ore
generally, the principle implies
The Repugnant Conclusion: Com pared with the existence o f very
m any people— say, ten billion— all o f whom have a very high
quality o f life, there must be som e much larger num ber o f people
whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even
though these people w ould have lives that are barely worth
living.7

A s its name suggests, most o f us find this conclusion hard to accept.

M ost o f us believe that Z w ould be much worse than A . T o keep this
belief, we must reject the Total Principle. W e must also reject the
broader view that any loss in the quality o f life could be outw eighed
by a sufficient increase in the total quantity o f w hatever m akes life
w orth living. U nless we reject this view , we cannot avoid the
Repugnant Conclusion.
W hen the stakes are low er, as in the com parison betw een A and
B , most o f us believe that B w ould be worse. W e believe that,
com pared with the existence o f ten billion people whose lives are
very well worth living, it w ould be worse if instead there w ere twice
6 It m ay h elp to give this illustration . S u ppose th at, as a Negative Utilitarian, I
b e lie v e th at all that m atters m o rally is the re lie f o r p reven tion o f su ffering. It is
poin ted ou t to m e th at, on m y v iew , it w ou ld be best if all life on E arth w as pain lessly
d estro y e d , sin ce o n ly this w o u ld en sure that there w ou ld be no m ore su fferin g. A n d
su ppo se I a greed that this w o u ld be a very bad o u tco m e. C o u ld I say: ‘ It is true that
this v ery bad o u tco m e w o u ld , a ccord in g to m y m oral v iew , be the best o u tcom e. B u t
this is no o b je ctio n to m y v ie w , since w e are not in fact able to bring abou t this
o u tco m e ’ ? T h is w o u ld be no d efe n ce . O n m y v iew , I ou gh t to regret ou r in ab ility to
b rin g a bo u t this o u tco m e . W h e th e r m y v iew is plau sib le cann ot dep end on w hat is
te ch n ica lly p o ssib le. Since this v iew im plies that the destru ction o f all life on E arth
w o u ld be the b est o u tc o m e , if I firm ly b e lieve that this ou tcom e w o u ld be v ery b ad , I
sh ou ld re je ct this view .
7 T h e phrase ‘ if o th er things are eq u a l' allow s fo r the possibility th at the existen ce
o f the larger p op u lation m ight, in som e o th er w a y , be w o rse. It m ight, fo r in stan ce,
in vo lve in ju stice. W h a t the R ep u gn a n t C o n clu sion claim s is th at, th ough the low er
q u ality o f life w o u ld m ak e Z in o n e w ay w orse than A , this bad featu re cou ld be less
im portant than, or b e o u tw eigh ed b y , Z ’s go o d fea tu re: the existen ce o f en ou gh extra
p e o p le w h ose lives are— even if o n ly barely— w o rth living.
 O V E R P O P U L A T I O N A N D T H E Q U A L I T Y OF L I F E 151
as m any people who w ere all worse off. T o keep this belief, we must
again reject the T o tal Principle.
Suppose that w e do reject this principle. U nfortunately, this is
not enough. A s I shall now argue, it is hard to defend the belief that
B w ould be worse than A , and it is also hard to avoid the R epugnant
Conclusion.

3 TH E M ER E A D D IT IO N PARADOX

Consider the alternatives shown in Fig. 3. T here is here a new

outcom e, A + . This differs from A only by the addition o f an extra
group o f people, whose lives are well worth living, though they are
w orse o ff than the original group.
T h e inequality in A + is natural, not the result o f any kind o f social
injustice. T ake my waves to show the A tlan tic O cean, and assume
that we are considering possible outcom es in som e past century,
before the A tlan tic had been crossed. In A + there was one group of
p eople living in E u rope, A sia , and A frica , and another group, who
w ere worse o ff, living in the A m ericas. A is a different possible
outcom e at this tim e, in which the A m ericas w ere uninhabited.
Perhaps the B ering Straits had opened before the land was crossed.
Is A + worse than A ? N ote that I am not asking whether it is
better. If we do not believe that the existence o f extra people is in
itself good, we shall deny that the extra group in A + m akes A +
better than A . B ut is A + worse than A ? W ould it have been better if

Fig- 3
152 D E R E K P A R F IT
the extra group had never existed? This is hard to believe. It may
seem a bad feature that there is natural inequality in AH— that the
extra group are, through no fault o f theirs, worse o ff than the
original group. But the inequality in A + does not seem to justify
the view that the extra group should never have existed. W hy are
they such a blot on the U niverse?
Y o u m ay think that you have no view about whether it would
have been better if the extra group had never existed. It may help to
consider another outcom e: A + H ell. In this outcom e the extra
group are innocent people who all have lives which are much worse
than nothing. T h ey w ould all kill them selves if they could, but their
torturers prevent this. W e would all agree that A + H ell is worse
than A . It w ould have been better if this extra group, as they all
passionately wish, had never existed. Since we believe that
A + H ell is worse than A , we must be able to com pare A + and A .
U nlike the extra group in H ell, the extra people in A + have lives
that are well worth living; and their existence is not bad for anyone.
M ost o f us could not honestly claim to believe that it would have
been better if these people had never existed. M ost o f us would
therefore believe that A + is not worse than A .
N ow suppose that, as a result of changes in the environm ent, A +
turned into D ivided B . In both these outcom es the same num ber o f
people would exist, so we are not m aking one o f the unfam iliar
com parisons which involve different numbers o f people in
existence. Since the num bers are the same in A + and D ivided B ,
our ordinary m oral principles apply.
O n the principles which most o f us accept, D ivided B would be
better than A + . On the Principle o f U tility it is better if there is a
greater net sum o f benefits— a greater sum o f benefits minus losses.
D ivided B w ould be better than A + in utilitarian term s, since the
benefits to the people who gain w ould be greater than the losses to
the people who lose. O n the Principle o f Equality it is better if there
is less inequality betw een different people. D ivided B w ould be
better than A + in egalitarian terms, since the benefits w ould all go
to the people who are worse off.
It might be o bjected that the Principle o f Equality does not apply
to people who cannot even com m unicate. But suppose that I know
about two such people, one o f whom is, through m ere bad luck,
 O V E R P O P U L A T I O N A N D T H E Q U A L I T Y OF L I F E 15 3
worse off. C all these people P oor and Rich. I could either benefit
R ich , or give a greater benefit to Poor. M ost o f us w ould believe that
it w ould be better if I do the second. A n d we w ould believe that this
w ould m ake the outcom e better, not only because I would give Poor
a greater benefit, but also because he is worse o ff than Rich. M ost o f
us w ould believe this even though P oor and Rich cannot (except
through me) com m unicate.
H ow could we deny that a change from A + to D ivided B would
be a change for the better? W e w ould have to claim that the loss to
the best-off people in A + m atters more than the greater gain to the
equally num erous w orst-off people. This seem s to com mit us to the
Elitist view that what m atters most is the condition o f the best-off
people. This is the opposite o f R aw ls’s fam ous view that what
m atters most is the condition o f the w orst-off p eo p le.8 M ost o f us
w ould reject this Elitist V iew . M ost o f us w ould therefore agree that
D ivided B w ould be better than A + .
Suppose finally that the A tlan tic is crossed, turning D ivided B
into B . These two outcom es are clearly equally g o o d . Since D ivided
B w ould be better than A + , B must be better than A + .
L et us now com bine the conclusions we have reached. M ost o f us
believe both that A + is not worse than A , and that B is better than
A + . T hese beliefs together imply that B is not worse than A . B
cannot be worse than A if it is better than som ething— AH— which is
not worse than A . In the same w ay, you cannot be taller than me if
you are shorter than som eone who is not taller than me. B u t, as I
earlier claim ed, most o f us also believe that B is worse than A . W e
therefore have three beliefs which are inconsistent, and imply a
contradiction. T hese beliefs imply that B both is and is not worse
than A . I call this the Mere Addition Paradox.
This is not just a conflict betw een different m oral principles.
Suppose that we accept both the Principle o f E quality and the
Principle o f U tility. T here can be cases where these principles
conflict— where greater equality would reduce the sum o f benefits.
B ut such a case does not reveal any inconsistency in our moral view.
W e would m erely have to ask w hether, given the details o f the case,
the gain in equality would be m ore im portant than the loss o f

8 J. R a w ls, A Theory o f Justice (C a m b rid g e , M ass., 1971).

154 D E R E K P A R F IT
benefits. W e w ould here be trying to decide what, after considering
all the details, we believe would be the better outcom e.
In the M ere A ddition Paradox, things are different. M ost o f us
here believe, all things considered, that B is worse than A , though B
is better than A + , which is not worse than A . If we continue to hold
these three beliefs, we must conclude that B both is and is not worse
than A . B ut we cannot possibly accept this conclusion, any m ore
than we could accept that you both are and are not taller than me.
Since we cannot possibly accept what these three beliefs im ply, at
least one b elief must go.
W hich should go? Suppose that w e keep our belief that B is better
than A + , because we cannot persuade ourselves that what matters
most is the condition o f the best-off people. Suppose that we also
keep our b elief that A + is not worse than A , because we cannot
persuade ourselves that it w ould have been better if the extra group
had never existed. W e must then reject our belief that B is worse
than A . W e must conclude that, if these w ere two possible futures
for som e society or the w orld, it w ould not be worse if what com es
about is B: twice the population, who are all worse off.
T h e M ere A d dition Paradox does not force us to this conclusion.
W e can avoid the conclusion if we reject one o f our other two
beliefs. Som e people reject the b elief that A + is not worse than A ,
because they think that the inequality in A + is enough to m ake A +
w orse. These people can keep their belief that B is worse than A .
N o te, how ever, that w e cannot simply claim that A + must be worse
than A , since it is worse than som ething— B — which is worse than
A . W e w ould here be rejecting one o f our three inconsistent beliefs
simply on the ground that it is not consistent with the other two.
This could be said against each belief. T o avoid the paradox we
must believe, without considering the rest o f the argum ent, that
A 4- is worse than A . W e must believe that it was bad in itself that
the extra people ever lived, even though these people had lives
that w ere well worth living, and their existence was bad for no one.
T o the extent that we find this hard to believe, we still face a
paradox.
It m ay be objected: ‘Y o u r argument involves a kind o f trick.
W hen you com pare A and A + , you claim that the extra group’s
existence was bad for no one. But by the time we have m oved to B
 O V E R P O P U L A T I O N A N D T H E Q U A L I T Y OF L I F E I55
the original group have becom e worse off. T he addition o f the extra
group was bad for the original grou p.’
T h e argument can be restated. Suppose that A + was the actual
state o f the w orld in som e past century. A is a different state o f the
w orld which was m erely possible. W e can ask, ‘W ould A have been
better? W ould it have been better if the w orse-off group had never
existed ?’ A s I have said, most o f us could not answer Y es. Suppose
next that A + did not in fact later change into either D ivided B or B .
W e can ask, 7/ this change had occurred, would it have been a
change for the better?’ It is hard to answer No. O n this version of
the argum ent, the last objection has been met. The better-off group
in A + was not an originally existing group, to which the w orse-off
group was added. A n d the existence o f the w orse-off group was not
bad for the better-off group.
It is worth giving another version o f the argument. T o ensure that
there was no social injustice, we assumed that the tw o groups in A +
did not know o f each other’s existence. W e could assume instead
that both these groups live in the same society, and that the people
in one group are worse o ff, not because o f social injustice, but
because they all have som e handicap which cannot be cured.
Suppose, for exam ple, that they are deaf. If this is so, w ould it have
been better if these people had never existed? W ould this have been
better even though these p eo p le’s lives are worth living, their
existence is not bad for anyone, and if they had never existed no one
else would have existed in their place? It is hard to believe that these
d eaf people should never have existed. O n this version o f the
argum ent, it again seem s that A + is not worse than A .
Suppose next that these d eaf people could be cured, at some
lesser cost to the other group. This w ould be like the change from
A + to B. It is again hard to deny that this change would m ake the
outcom e better. In this version o f the argument, with the groups in
one society, we seem again driven to conclude that, since B would
be better than A + , which is not worse than A , B cannot be worse
than A .
T h ere are som e other possible objections to this argument. But
rather than discussing these I shall turn to another argum ent. This is
harder to answer, and it also leads to the R epugnant Conclusion.
156 DEREK PARFIT
4 TH E SECO N D PAR AD O X

Consider the first three outcom es shown in Fig. 4. Though this

argument involves m any outcom es, we need to m ake only two
com parisons.
O n e is betw een A + and the much more populated A lp h a.
Suppose that A lp h a will be the actual outcom e at som e time far in
the future, after humans have colonized thousands o f planets in this
G alaxy. A + is a different possible outcom e at this tim e, in which
humans have colonized only one other planet, near a distant star.
A s b efore, in neither A lp h a nor A + w ould the inequality betw een
different people be the result o f social injustice. B ecause o f the
difficulties o f trans-G alactic travel, those who are better o ff could
not raise the quality o f life o f those who are worse off.
T h e com parison betw een A + and A lp h a replaces the com pari­
son, in the old argum ent, betw een A and A + . O n one view , the
natural inequality in A + m akes it w orse than A . If I held this view , I
w ould now say:

The inequality in A lp h a is in one way w orse than the inequality in

A + , since the gap betw een the better-off and w orse-off people is
slightly greater. But in another way the inequality is less bad. This
is a m atter o f the relative numbers o f, or the ratio betw een, those
who are better-off and those who are worse-off. H alf o f the
people in A + are better o ff than the other half. This is a worse
inequality than a situation in which almost everyone is equally
well o ff, and those who are better o ff are only a fraction o f one per
cent. A n d this is the difference between A + and A lp h a. Because
there are so m any groups at level 45 (most o f them not shown in
the diagram ), the better-off people in A lp h a are only a fraction o f
one per cent.
T o put these claim s together: T he inequality in A lp h a is in one
w ay slightly worse than the inequality in A + , but in another way
much better. T here is a slightly greater gap between the better-off
and w orse-off groups, but a much better ratio betw een these
groups. A ll things considered, the natural inequality in A lp h a is
not worse than the natural inequality in A + . 9
9 I f y o u b e lie ve th at the in eq u a lity is w orse in A lp h a than it is in A + , read (w hen
y ou reach it) fo o tn o te 11.
 105 104 103
-------190

n45 45 45 ----- 145

and and „ and

A lp h a so on B eta so on G am m a so on O m ega

95 94 93
---.8 0

40 ,4 0 40 ----- 140

and and
A lp h a 2 so on B eta 2 G am m a 2 so on O m ega 2

O m ega 2— ► O m ega 3-
O m ega 100
158 D E R E K P A R F IT
It m ay be objected that A lp h a is worse than A + because the
w orst-off groups in A lp h a are worse o ff than the w orst-off group in
A + . M any people accept R aw ls’s view that what matters most is the
condition o f the w orst-off group. But there are two quite different
w ays in which any w orst-off group might have been better off. This
group might have existed, and been better off. This is the ordinary
case, which Raw ls discusses. Things would have been quite d iffe­
rent if the w orst-off group had never existed. This would have
provided another sense in which the ‘w o rst-o ff’ group w ould have
been better o ff, since som e other group would then have been those
who are worst off. W ould this have m ade the outcom e better? If we
answer Y e s , we must agree that it would have been even better if the
second w orst-off group had also never existed, and the third worst-
o ff group, and the fourth w orst-off group, and so on. It would have
been best if everyone except the best-off group had never existed.
Sim ilarly, it might be best if in future only the best-off nation— such
as the N orw egians— have children. Even if this w ould be worse for
them , it might cause it to be true that, after the rest o f us have died,
the ‘w o rst-o ff’ people in the world are as well o ff as possible. This
w ay o f raising the level o f ‘the w orst-off group’ has no m oral merit.
T h e non-existence o f all but the best-off group would not, in the
m orally relevant sense, m ake the w orst-off group better off.
T h e inequality in A lp h a is not worse than the inequality in A + ;
nor is A lp h a worse than A + because the w orst-off groups are worse
off. N or is there any other w ay in which A lp h a is worse than A + . 10
A n d , in one w ay, A lp h a is better than A + . A lp h a does not differ
from A + m erely by involving the existence o f the very many groups
at level 45. A ll o f the people in A + are in one o f two groups, and
both these groups are, in A lp h a, better off. (These are the groups at
level 105.) I conclude that, since A lp h a is in this way better than

10 A lp h a is w orse than A + a ccord in g to the A v e r a g e Principle. B u t this is on e o f

the cases w h ich sh ow that w e should reject this principle. T h e A v e r a g e Principle
co u ld also im p ly that it w o u ld be best if in futu re all e xc ep t the N o rw egia n s h ave no
ch ild ren . F o r fu rth er o b je ctio n s to this prin ciple, see m y R easons and Persons,
S ectio n 143, and J. A . M cM a h a n , ‘ P roblem s o f P op u lation T h e o r y ’ , E thics, V o l. 92
no. 1, O c t. 1981. It m ay also be cla im ed . 'A lp h a is w orse than A + b ecau se, if w e had
to ch o o se in w hich ou tco m e w e w ou ld p refer to exist— w itho ut k n o w in g w h o w e
w o u ld be— it w ou ld be ration al to ch o ose A + . ’ F o r o b je ctio n s to this claim , see m y
Reasons and P erson s, S ection 133.
 O V E R P O P U L A T I O N A N D T H E Q U A L I T Y OF L I F E 159
A + , and is in no way w orse, A lp h a is better than A + . W e are
assuming that the actual outcom e at som e future time is A lph a. If
the outcom e had been A + , this would have been worse.
C ou ld we honestly deny this conclusion? Could we honestly claim
that A - f w ould not have been worse than A lph a? This is the claim
that it w ould not have been worse if the w orst-off people in A lp h a
had never existed, even though their lives are worth living, and if
they had never existed, so that the outcom e had been A + , the
inequality w ould have been no better, and everyone who did exist
would have been worse off. That this w ould not have been worse is
hard to b e lie v e .11
C onsider next w hether B eta would be better than A lph a. In a
change from A lp h a to B eta, the best-off group in A lp h a would lose
a little, but an equally large w orse-off group would gain very much
m ore. If this is all we know about this change, it would need extrem e
Elitism to deny that it would be a change for the better.
T h e rest o f the argument merely involves repetition. Gam m a
w ould be better than B eta in the same w ay in which B eta w ould be
better than A lp h a. D elta w ould be better than Gam m a in the same
w ay, Epsilon better than D elta, and so on down to O m ega. W e then
run through the argument again, on the second line o f the diagram ,
from O m ega to O m ega 2. (O m ega is thinner on this second line only
because, to m ake room , all widths are reduced.) Similar steps take
us to O m ega 3, O m ega 4, and all the way to O m ega 100. E very step
w ould be a change for the better, so O m ega 100 must be the best o f
all these outcom es.
Since this argum ent implies that O m ega 100 would be better than
A + , it leads us to the Repugnant Conclusion. A-l- might be a world
with ten billion people, o f whom even the w orse-off half have an
extremely high quality o f life. A ccordin g to this argument it would
be better if instead there w ere vastly m any more people, all o f whose
lives w ere barely worth living.
W hat is wrong with this argum ent? T o avoid its conclusion, we
must either deny that A + w ould have been worse than A lp h a, or
11 Su p p ose yo u b e lie ve th at the in equ ality in A lp h a is w orse than the in eq u a lity in
A + . Is this en o u gh to ju stify the claim that it w ou ld not h ave been w orse if the actual
o u tco m e had b een A + rather than A lp h a ? W hich w o u ld h ave m attered m ore: (1)
th at the in eq u a lity w ou ld h ave b een less bad, or (2) that e ve ry o n e w h o did exist
w o u ld h ave b een w o rse o ff? It is hard to d en y that (2) w ou ld h ave m attered m ore.
i6o D E R E K PA R F IT
deny that B eta would be better than A lp h a. Unless we deny one o f
these claim s, we cannot plausibly deny the similar claims which
carry us down to O m ega 100. But how can we deny that A + would
have been worse than A lph a? If the outcom e had been A + ,
everyone who existed w ould have been worse off. A n d how can we
deny that B eta w ould be better than A lph a? In a change to Beta
som e people would lose a little, but as m any people who are much
worse o ff would gain much more.
W hile we consider these outcom es in these simple terms, it is hard
to answer this argum ent. There is little room for manoeuvre. T o find
an answer we must consider other features of these o utcom es.12

5 T H E Q U A L IT Y O F S IN G L E L IV E S

Consider first the analogue, within one life, o f the Repugnant

C o n clu sio n .13 Suppose that I can choose between two futures. I
could live for another 100 years, all o f an extrem ely high quality.
C all this the Century o f Ecstasy. I could instead live for ever, with a
life that would always be barely worth living. Though there would
be nothing bad in this life, the only good things would be m uzak and
p otatoes. Call this the Drab Eternity.
I believe that, o f these tw o, the Century o f Ecstasy would give me
a better future. A n d this is the future that I would prefer. M any
people would have the same belief, and preference.
O n one view about what m akes our lives go best, we would be
m aking a m istake. O n this view , though the Century o f Ecstasy

12 It m ay be o b je c te d th at m y argum ent is like w h at are called Sorites Argum ents,

w h ich are k n o w n to lead to false con clu sion s. Su ppose w e assum e that rem ovin g any
sin gle grain o f sand cann ot turn a h eap o f sand into som eth in g that is not a h eap. It
can then be argu ed that, even if w e rem ove e v e ry single grain , w e m ust still h ave a
h eap . O r su ppo se w e assum e that the loss o f any single hair cann ot cause som eon e
w h o is not bald to be bald. T h e re is a sim ilar argu m en t for the con clu sion th at, even if
so m e o n e loses all his hair, this can n o t m ake him bald. If m y argum en t w as like this, it
co u ld be referred to those w h o w o rk on w hat is w ro n g w ith S orites A rg u m e n ts. B u t
m y argu m en t is not like this. A S orites A rg u m e n t appeals to a series o f steps, each o f
w h ich is assum ed to m ake n o difference. M y argu m en t w ou ld be like this if it claim ed
th at A lp h a is not worse than A + , B e ta is not w orse than A lp h a , G a m m a is not w orse
than B e ta , and so on . B u t the argu m en t claim s th at A lp h a is better than A + , B e ta is
b e tte r than A lp h a , G a m m a is b e tte r than B e ta , and so on. T h e o b jectio n s to Sorites
A rg u m e n ts are th erefo re irrelevant.
13 T h is section is partly based on an u n published paper b y J. M cM ah an .
 O V E R P O P U L A T I O N A N D T H E Q U A L I T Y OF L I F E l6l
w ould have great value for m e , this value w ould be fin ite, or have an
upper limit. In contrast, since each day in the D rab Eternity w ould
have the same small value for m e, there would be no limit to the
total value for me o f this second life. This value must, in the end, be
greater than the lim ited value o f the Century o f Ecstasy.
I reject this view . I claim that, though each day o f the D rab
E ternity w ould be worth living, the Century o f Ecstasy would give
me a better life. This is like M ill’s claim about the ‘difference in
qu ality’ betw een human and pig-like pleasu res.14 It is often said that
M ill’s ‘higher pleasures’ are m erely greater pleasures: pleasures
with m ore value. A s Sidgw ick w rote, ‘all qualitative com parison of
pleasures must really resolve itself in quantitative [com parison]’ .15
This w ould be so if the value o f all pleasures lay on the same scale.
B ut this is what I have just denied. The Century o f Ecstasy w ould be
better for me in an essentially qualitative w ay. Though each day o f
the D rab Eternity w ould have some value for me, no am ount o f this
value could be as good for me as the Cen tury of Ecstasy.

6 P E R F E C T IO N IS M

Return to the argum ent about overpopulation. Should we m ake a

sim ilar claim , not about the value for one person o f different
possible futures, but about the relative goodness o f different ou t­
com es? Cardinal N ewm an m ade such a claim about pain and sin. H e
believed that both o f these w ere bad, but that no amount o f pain
could be as bad as the least amount o f sin. H e therefore w rote that,
‘if all m ankind suffered extrem est agony, this w ould be less bad
than if one venial sin was com m itted’ .16 Can we m ake such a claim
about what is good in my outcom es A and Z ?
C onsider what I shall call the best things in life. These are the best
kinds o f creative activity and aesthetic experience, the best relation­
ships betw een different people, and the other things which do most
to m ake life worth living. Return next to A and B . Suppose that all
o f the best things in life are, in B , better. T he people in B are all

14 J .S . M ill, Utilitarianism (L o n d o n , 1863), C h a p te r II.

15 H . S id gw ick , The M ethod s o f E thics (L o n d o n , 1907), p. 94.
16 J .H . N e w m an , Certain D ifficulties Felt by A n glica ns in C a tholic Teaching
(L o n d o n . 1885), V o l. I, p. 204.
 D E R E K PA R F IT
worse o ff than the people in A only because they each have many
few er o f these things. In B , for exam ple, people can hear good
music only a few times in their lives; in A they can often hear music
that is nearly as good. If this was the difference betw een A and B , I
w ould cease to believe that B would be worse.
A sim ilar claim applies to the Repugnant Conclusion. W hy is it so
hard to believe that my im agined world Z — or O m ega 100— would
be better than a world o f ten billion people, all o f whom have an
extrem ely high quality o f life? This is hard to believe because in Z
tw o things are true: p eo p le’s lives are barely worth living, and most
o f the good things in life are lost.
Suppose that only the first o f these was true. Suppose that, in Z ,
all o f the best things in life rem ain. P eop le’s lives are barely worth
living because these best things are so thinly spread. The people in Z
do each, once in their lives, have or engage in one o f the best
experiences or activities. But all the rest is m uzak and potatoes. If
this is what Z involves, it is still hard to believe that Z w ould be
better than a world o f ten billion people, each o f w hose lives is very
well worth living. B u t, if Z retains all o f the best things in life, this
b elief is less repugnant.
N ow restore the assum ption that in Z , and O m ega 100, most o f
the good things in life are lost. There is only m uzak and potatoes. B y
appealing to the value o f the best things in life, we can try to answer
the argument.
T h e argum ent involves two kinds o f step. O ne is the claim that
A lp h a is better than A + , A lp h a 2 is better than O m ega, and similar
later claims. A + contains two groups o f people, all o f whom are
better o ff in A lp h a. W e can add the assumption that these people
are better o ff because, in A lp h a , the best things in life are even
better. A p p ealin g to the value o f these best things cannot help us to
reject the claim that A lp h a is better than A + . A n d , as I argued,
there seem s to be no other way to reject this claim. If the actual
outcom e had been A + , the inequality w ould have been no better,
and everyone who existed w ould have been worse off. H ow can we
deny that this w ould have been worse? T here seems to be little hope
o f answering these steps in the argument.
The other steps are all redistributive. In each step the best-off
people would lose a little, but an equally large w orse-off group
 O V E R P O P U L A T I O N A N D T H E Q U A L I T Y OF L I F E 163
w ould gain much m ore. Can w e claim that at least one o f these steps
w ould not be a change for the better? This cannot be plausibly
claim ed if what we appeal to is the Elitist V iew . W e cannot plausibly
claim that it is the best-off people whose condition matters most.
W hat we might appeal to is not Elitism , but Perfectionism. In the
m ove from A lp h a to O m ega 100, the best things in life must have
disappeared. Suppose for instance that, in the m ove from A lp h a to
B eta , M ozart’s music would be lost, in the m ove to G am m a,
H aydn’s. In the m ove to D elta, V en ice w ould be destroyed, in the
m ove to Epsilon. V e r o n a .17 W e might claim that, even if some
change brings a great net benefit to those who are affected, it is a
change for the worse if it involves the loss o f one o f the best things in
life.
W hen should we m ake this claim ? It w ould not be plausible when
w e are considering outcom es that are close to O m ega 100. Suppose
that, in one such outcom e, the best thing left is a bad perform ance o f
R a v e l’s B o lero ; in the next outcom e, it is an even worse perform ­
ance o f R a v e l’s B olero. W e cannot claim that great benefits to those
who are w orst-off w ould not m ake the outcom e better if they
involved the loss o f a bad perform ance o f R a v e l’s B o lero . If such a
claim is to have any plausibility, it must be m ade at the start. W e
must reject the change in which the music o f M ozart is lost.
H as such a claim any plausibility? I believe that it has. It expresses
one o f our two main reasons for wanting to avoid the Repugnant
Conclusion. W hen we are most concerned about overpopulation,
our concern is only partly about the value that each life will have for
the person w hose life it is. W e are also concerned about the
disappearance from the world o f the kinds o f experience and
activity which do most to m ake life worth living.
Perfectionism faces many objections. O n e is raised by the moral
im portance o f relieving or preventing great suffering. W e should
reject the N ietzschean view that the prevention o f great suffering
can be ranked w holly below the preservation o f creation o f the best
things in life. W hat should Perfectionists claim about great

17 If, in the m o ve from A lp h a to B e ta , the b e st-o ff p eo p le lose M o za rt, it m ay

seem th at th eir q u ality o f life c a n n o t, as m y argu m en t assum es, fall b y o n ly a little.
B u t I h av e exp lain ed h ow this m ight be so. T h e loss o f a fe w p erfo rm an ces o f M ozart
co u ld fo r these p e o p le be n early ou tw eigh ed b y m an y extra perform an ces o f H ayd n .
164 DEREK PARFIT
suffering? But this problem is irrelevant here, since we can assume
that in the various outcom es we are considering there would be no
such suffering.
A n o th er problem is raised by the fact that the good things in life
do not com e in quite different categories. It is because pain and sin
are in such different categories that Newm an believed sin to be
infinitely worse. If we m erely com pare M ozart and m uzak, these
two m ay also seem to be in quite different categories. But there is a
fairly sm ooth continuum between these two. Though Haydn is not
as good as M ozart, he is very good. A n d there is other music which
is not far below H aydn’s, other music not far below this, and so on.
Sim ilar claims apply to the other best experiences, activities, and
personal relationships, and to the other things which give most to
the value o f life . M ost o f these things are on fairly sm ooth continua,
ranging from the best to the least good. Since this is so, it m ay be
hard to defend the view that what is best has m ore value— or does
m ore to m ake the outcom e better— than any amount o f what is
nearly as good. This view conflicts with the preferences that most of
us w ould have about our own futures. B ut, unless we can defend this
view , any loss o f quality could be outw eighed by a sufficient gain in
the quantity o f lesser goods.
T hese are only two o f the objections facing this view . It seems to
m e, at tim es, crazy. But at least, unlike the Elitist V iew , it is not
m orally monstrous. A n d without Perfectionism how can we avoid
the R epugnant C on clu sion ?18
18 I w o u ld be gra tefu l fo r a n y com m en ts on this essay, w hich cou ld be sent to me at
A ll S ou ls C o lle g e , O x fo rd .
 XI
WHAT IS WRONG WITH SLAVERY?
R. M. H AR E

N e a r l y everybod y would agree that slavery is wrong; and I can say

this perhaps with greater feeling than most, having in a m anner of
speaking been a slave. H ow ever, there are dangers in taking for
granted that som ething is wrong; for we m ay then assume that it is
obvious that it is wrong and indeed obvious why it is wrong; and this
leads to a prevalence o f very bad arguments with quite silly
conclusions, all based on the so-called absolute value o f human
freedom . If we could see m ore clearly what is valuable about
freed om , and why it is valuable, then we might be protected against
the rhetoric o f those w ho, the moment anything happens that is
disadvantageous or distasteful to them , start com plaining loudly
about som e supposed infringem ent o f their liberty, without telling
us why it is w rong that they should be prevented from doing what
they would like to do. It m ay well be wrong in many such cases; but
until we have som e way o f judging when it is and when it is not, we
shall be at the m ercy o f every kind o f dem agogy.
This is but one exam ple o f the widespread abuse o f the appeal to
human rights. W e may even be tem pted to think that our politics
w ould be m ore healthy if rights had never been heard of; but that
w ould be going too far. It is the unthinking appeal to ill-defined
rights, unsupported by argum ent, that does the harm. T here is no
doubt that arguments justifying some o f these appeals are possible;
but since the forms o f such arguments are seldom understood even
by philosophers, it is not surprising that many quite unjustified
claims o f this sort go unquestioned, and thus in the end bring any
sort o f appeal to human rights into disrepute. It is a tragedy that this
happens, because there really are rights that ought to be defended

R . M . H are , ‘W h a t is W ro n g w ith S la v e ry ’ , P h ilo so p h y & P u b lic A ffairs 8, N o . 2

(W in te r 1979). C o p y rig h t © 1979 b y R . M . H are. R ep rin ted by perm ission o f the
a u th or and Princeton U n iv ersity Press.
 R. M. H A R E
with all the devotion we can com mand. Things are being done the
world over which can properly be condem ned as infringem ents of
human rights; but so long as rights are used so loosely as an all­
purpose political w eapon, often in support o f very questionable
causes, our protests against such infringem ents will be deprived o f
m ost o f their force.
A n o th er hazard o f the appeal to rights is that it is seldom that such
an appeal by one side cannot be countered with an appeal to some
conflicting right by the opposite side. The controversies which led
finally to the abolition o f slavery provide an excellent exam ple o f
this, with one side appealing to rights o f liberty and the other to
rights o f property. But we do not have to go so far back in history to
find exam ples o f this sort o f thing. W e have only to think o f the
disputes about distributive justice between the defenders of
equality and o f individual liberty; or o f similar arguments about
education. I have written about both these disputes elsew here, in
the attem pt to substitute for intuitions som e m ore solid basis for
argum ent.1 I have the same general m otive in raising the topic o f
slavery, and also a m ore particular m otive. Being a utilitarian, I
need to be able to answer the follow ing attack frequently advanced
by opponents o f utilitarianism. It is often said that utilitarianism
must be an objectionable creed because it could in certain
circum stances condone or even com m end slavery, given that
circum stances can be envisaged in which utility would be m axim ized
by preserving a slave-owning society and not abolishing slavery.
T h e objectors thus seek to smear utilitarians with the taint o f all the
atrocious things that were done by slave-traders and slave-owners.
T h e o bjection, as I hope to show, does not stand up; but in order to
see through this rhetoric we shall have to achieve a quite deep
understanding o f some rather difficult issues in moral philosophy;
and this, too, adds to the im portance and interest o f the topic.

First, we have to ask what this thing, slavery, is, about whose
wrongness we are arguing. A s soon as we ask this question we see at

1 ‘Justice and E q u a lity ', in J. A rth u r and W . H . S h aw , ed s.. Justice and E co n o m ic

D istribution (E n g le w o o d C liffs, 1978); ‘ O p p o rtu n ity fo r W hat?: Som e R em ark s on
C u rre n t D isp u tes abou t E q u a lity in E d u c a tio n ’ , O x fo r d Review o f Education 3
( 1977)-
 W H A T IS W R O N G W I T H S L A V E R Y ? 167
o nce, if we have any know ledge o f history, that it is, in com m on use,
an extrem ely ill-defined concept. Even if we leave out o f account
such adm ittedly extended uses as ‘w age-slave’ in the writings o f
M arxists, it is clear that the word ‘slave’ and its near-equivalents
such as servus and doulos have meant slightly different things in
different cultures; for slavery is, prim arily, a legal status, defined by
the disabilities or the liabilities which are imposed by the law on
those called slaves; and obviously these m ay vary from one jurisdic­
tion to another. Fam iliar logical difficulties arise about how we are
to decide, o f a word in a foreign language, that it means the same as
the English word ‘slave’ . D o the relevant laws in the country where
the language is spoken have to be identical with those which held in
English-speaking countries before slavery was abolished? O b vi­
ously not; because it w ould be im possible for them to be identical
with the laws o f all such countries at all periods, since these did not
rem ain the same. Probably we have a rough idea o f the kind o f laws
which have to hold in a country before we can say that that country
has an institution properly called ‘slavery’ ; but it is pretty rough.
It would be possible to pursue at som e length, with the aid o f
legal, historical, and anthropological books on slavery in different
cultures and jurisdictions, the different shades o f meaning o f the
w ord ‘slave’ . But since my purpose is philosophical, I shall limit
m yself to asking what is essential to the notion o f slavery in com mon
use. T he essential features are, I think, to be divided under two
heads: slavery is, first, a status in society, and secondly, a relation to
a m aster. The slave is so called first o f all because he occupies a
certain place in society, lacking certain rights and privileges secured
by the law to others, and subject to certain liabilities from which
others are free. A n d secondly, he is the slave o f another person or
body (which might be the state itself). The first head is not enough
to distinguish slavery from other legal disabilities; for exam ple the
low est castes in som e societies are as lacking in legal rights as slaves
in som e others, or more so, but are not called slaves because they
are not the slaves o f anybody.
T h e status o f a slave was defined quite early by the G reeks in
terms o f four freedom s which the slave lacks. These are: a legally
recognized position in the com m unity, conferring a right o f access
to the courts; protection from illegal seizure and detention and
168 R. M. H A R E
other personal violence; the privilege o f going where he wants to go;
and that o f working as he pleases. The first three o f these features
are present in a manumission docum ent from M acedonia dated
about 235 b c ; the last is added in the series o f manumission
docum ents from D elphi which begins about thirty years later.2The
state could to som e extent regulate by law the treatm ent o f slaves
without m aking us want to stop calling them slaves, so that the last
three features are a bit w obbly at the edges. But we are seeking only
a rough characterization o f slavery, and shall have to put up with
this indefiniteness o f the concept.
T h e relation o f the slave to a master is also to som e extent
indefinite. It might seem that we could tie it up tight by saying that a
slave has to be the property o f an owner; but a m om ent’s reflection
will show what unsafe ground this is. So-called property-owners do
not need to be rem inded that legal restrictions upon the use and
enjoym ent o f property can becom e so onerous as to m ake it almost
a jo k e to call it property at all. I am referring not only to such recent
inventions as zoning and other planning laws (though actually they
are not so recent, having been anticipated even in ancient tim es),
and to rent acts, building regulations, clean air acts and the like, but
also to the ancient restrictions placed by the com mon law on uses of
o n e’s property which might be offensive to on e’s neighbours. In
relation to slavery, it is also instructive to think o f the cruelty-to-
animals legislation which now rightly forbids one to do what one
likes to o n e’s own dog or cow which one has legally purchased.
Legislation o f this kind was passed in the days before abolition, and
was even to som e extent enforced, though not always effectively.
T h e laws forbidding the slave trade w ere, o f course, the outstanding
exam ple o f such legislation preventing people from doing what they
wanted with their own property.
H ow ever, as before, we are seeking only a general and rough
characterization o f slavery, and shall therefore have to put up with
the open texture o f the concept o f property. This, like slavery itself,
is defined by the particular rights and obligations which are con­
ferred or im posed by a particular legal system , and these m ay vary
from one such system to another. It will be enough to have a general
2 S ee W . L . W esterm a n n , The Slave Systems o f G reek and R om an A ntiquity
(P h ilad e lp h ia , 1955), p. 35.
 W H A T IS W R O N G W I T H S L A V E R Y ? 169
idea o f what w ould stop us calling a person the slave o f another—
how far the law would have to go in assigning rights to slaves before
we stopped using that word o f them. I have gone into these
difficulties in such detail as space has allow ed only because I am now
going on to describe, for the purposes o f our moral discussion,
certain conditions o f life about which I shall invite the read er’s
judgem ent, and I do not want anybody to say that what I am
describing is not really slavery. The case I shall sketch is adm ittedly
to som e extent fantastic; and this, as we shall later see, is very
im portant w hen we com e to assess the philosophical arguments that
have been based on similar cases. But although it is extrem ely
unlikely that what I describe should actually occur, I wish to
maintain that if it occurred, we should still call it slavery, so that if
im aginary cases are allow ed to be brought into the argum ents, this
case will have to be adm itted.
It m ay be helpful if, before leaving the question o f what slavery is,
I list a few conditions o f life which have to be distinguished from
slavery proper. The first o f these is serfdom (a term which, like
‘slavery’ itself, has a wide range o f m eaning). A serf is normally
tied, not directly to a m aster, but to a certain area o f land; the rights
to his services pass with the land if it changes hands. This very
distinction, how ever, separates the English villein in gross, who
approxim ates to a slave although enjoying certain legal rights, from
the villein regardant, whose serfdom arises through his feudal
tenure o f land. Those who unsuccessfully tried to persuade Lord
M ansfield in Som m ersett’s case that slavery could exist in England
attem pted to show that the defendant was a villein in gross.3
Secondly, one is not a slave m erely because one belongs to a caste
which has an inferior legal status, even if it has pretty well no rights;
as I have said, the slave has to be the slave o/som e owner. Thirdly,
slavery has to be distinguished from indenture, which is a form of
contract. A ppren tices in form er tim es, and football players even
now, are bound by contract, entered into by them selves or, in the
case o f children, by their parents, to serve em ployers for a fixed
term under fixed conditions, which w ere in som e cases extrem ely
harsh (so that the actual sufferings o f indentured people could be as
3 Sum m ing up for d efen ce and ju d g em en t o f L o rd M an sfield in S o m m ersett’s
ca se , K in g ’s B e n c h , 12 G e o rg e III, 1 7 7 1 -2 , H ow ells' State Trials 20, pp. 1 ff.
170 R. M. H A R E
bad as those o f slaves).4 The difference lies in the voluntariness o f
the contract and in its fixed term. W e must note, how ever, that in
som e societies (A th en s before Solon for exam ple) one could choose
to becom e a slave by selling on e’s person to escape debt;5 and it
might be possible to sell o n e’s children as w ell, as the G reeks
som etim es did, so that even the heritability o f the slave status does
not serve to m ake definite the rather fuzzy boundary betw een
slavery and indenture.
W e ought perhaps to notice two other conditions which
approxim ate to slavery but are not called slavery. T h e first is
com pulsory military or naval service and, indeed, other forced
labour. T he im pressed sailors of N elson’s navy no doubt endured
conditions as bad as those o f many slaves; D r Johnson rem arked
that nobody would choose to be a sailor if he had the alternative o f
being put in prison.6 But they were not called slaves, because their
status as free men was only in abeyance and returned to them on
discharge. B y contrast, the galley slaves o f the M editerranean
powers in earlier times really w ere slaves. Secondly, although the
term ‘penal servitude’ was once in use, imprisonment for crime is
not usually called slavery. This is another fuzzy boundary, because
in ancient times it was possible for a person to lose his rights as a
citizen and becom e a slave by sentence o f a court for som e crim e;7
though when som ething very like this happened recently in South
A frica , it was not called slavery, officially.8 A g ain , prisoners o f war
and other captives and bondsm en are not always called slaves,
how ever grim their conditions, although in ancient times capture in
war was a w ay o f becom ing a slave, if one was not fortunate enough
to be ransom ed.91 have m yself, as a prisoner o f war, w orked on the
Burm a railway in conditions not at the time distinguishable from
slavery; but because my status was tem porary I can claim to have
been a slave only ‘in a m anner o f speaking’ .

4 S e e O . P atterson . The So cio lo g y o f Slavery (L on d o n : M a cG ib b o n and K e e ,

196 7), p. 74; A . S am pson , D rum (L o n d o n , 1956), ch ap. 3.
5 S e e W esterm a n n , Slave System s, p. 4.
6 B o sw e ll, L ife o f Jo h n so n , ed. G . B . H ill and L . F. P o w ell (O x fo r d , 1934), vol. 1,
p. 348, 16 M arch 1759.
7 S e e W esterm a n n , Slave System s, p. 81. In p re-rev o lu tio n ary F ran ce on e cou ld
b e sen ten ced to the galleys. 8 S e e S am pson , D ru m , p. 241.
9 S ee W esterm a n n , Slave System s, pp. 2, 5 - 7 , 29.
 W H A T IS W R O N G W I T H S L A V E R Y ? I7I
I shall put m y philosophical argum ent, to which w e have now com e,
in terms o f an im aginary exam ple, to which I shall give as much
verisim ilitude as I can. It will be seen, how ever, that quite unreal
assum ptions have to be m ade in order to get the exam ple going—
and this is very im portant for the argument between the utilitarians
and their opponents. It must also be noted that to play its role in the
argum ent the exam ple will have to m eet certain requirem ents. It is
intended as a fleshed-out substitute for the rather jeju n e exam ple
often to be found in anti-utilitarian writers. T o serve its purpose it
will have to be a case in which to abolish slavery really and clearly
would diminish utility. This m eans, first, that the slavery to be
abolished must really be slavery, and, secondly, that it must have a
total utility clearly, but not enorm ously, greater than the total utility
o f the kind o f regim e which would be, in that situation, a practical
alternative to slavery.
If it w ere not clearly greater, utilitarians could argue that, since all
judgem ents o f this sort are only probable, caution would require
them to stick to a well-tried principle favouring liberty, the principle
itself being justified on utilitarian grounds (see b elo w ); and thus the
exam ple w ould cease to divide them from their opponents, and
w ould becom e inapposite.
If, on the other hand, the utility o f slavery w ere enormously
greater, anti-utilitarians might com plain that their own view was
being made too strong; for many anti-utilitarians are pluralists and
hold that am ong the principles o f m orality a principle requiring
beneficence is to be included. T h erefo re, if the advantages of
retaining slavery are m ade sufficiently great, a non-utilitarian with a
principle o f beneficence in his repertory could agree that it ought to
be retained— that is, that in this case the principle o f beneficence has
greater weight than that favouring liberty. Thus there would again
be no d ifference, in this case, betw een the verdicts o f the utilitarians
and their opponents, and the exam ple would be inapposite.
T h ere is also another dimension in which the exam ple has to be
carefully placed. A n anti-utilitarian might claim that the exam ple I
shall give m akes the difference betw een the conditions o f the slaves
and those o f the free in the supposed society too sm all, and the
num ber o f slaves too great. If, he might claim , I had made the
num ber o f slaves small and the difference betw een the miseries of
172 R. M. H A R E
the slaves and the pleasures o f the slave-owners much greater, then
the society might have the same total utility as mine (that is, greater
than that o f the free society with which I com pare it), but it would be
less plausible for me to maintain that if such a com parison had to be
made in real life, we ought to follow the utilitarians and prefer the
slave so ciety .10
1 cannot yet answer this objection without anticipating my argu­
m ent; I shall m erely indicate briefly how I would answer it. The
answer is that the objection rests on an appeal to our ordinary
intuitions; but that these are designed to deal with ordinary cases.
T h ey give no reliable guide to what we ought to say in highly
unusual cases. B ut, further, the case desiderated is never likely to
occur. H ow could it com e about that the existence o f a small
num ber o f slaves was necessary in order to preserve the happiness
o f the rest? I find it im possible to think o f any technological factors
(say, in agriculture or in transport by land or sea) which w ould m ake
the preservation o f slavery for a small class necessary to satisfy the
interests o f the m ajority. It is quite true that in the past there have
been large slave populations supporting the higher standard of
living o f sm all m inorites. But in that case it is hard to argue that
slavery has m ore utility than its abolition, if the difference in
happiness betw een slaves and slave-owners is great. Y e t if, in order
to produce a case in which the retention o f slavery really would be
optim al, we reduce the num ber o f slaves relative to slave-owners, it
becom es hard to say how the existence o f this relatively small
num ber o f slaves is necessary for the happiness of the large num ber
o f free men. W hat on earth are the slaves doing that could not be
m ore efficiently done by paid labour? A n d is not the abolition
(perhaps not too abrupt) o f slavery likely to prom ote those very
technical changes which are necessary to enable the society to do
without it?
T h e crux o f the m atter, as we shall see, is that in order to use an

10 I am gra tefu l to the edito rs o f P hilo so p hy and P u b lic A ffairs fo r pressing this
o b je ctio n . I d eal w ith it o n ly so far as it con cern s slavery such as m ight occu r in the
w o rld as w e k n o w it. B ra v e N ew W o rld situation s in w hich p e o p le are con d ition ed
from birth to be o b e d ie n t slaves and given d isag reeab le o r d an gerou s tasks requ ire
sep arate treatm en t w h ich is b eyo n d the scop e o f this p a p er, th ough anti-utilitarian
argu m en ts based on them m eet the sam e d efe n ce , n am ely the req u irem en t to assess
re a listica lly w h at the con seq u en ces o f such practices w o u ld actu ally be.
 W H A T IS W R O N G W I T H S L A V E R Y ? 173
appeal to our ordinary intuitions as an argum ent, the opponents of
utilitarianism have to produce cases which are not too far rem oved
from the sort o f cases with which our intuitions are designed to deal,
nam ely the ordinary run o f cases. If the cases they use fall outside
this class, then the fact that our com m on intuitions give a different
verdict from utilitarianism has no bearing on the argum ent; our
intuitions could well be wrong about such cases, and be none the
worse for that, because they will never have to deal with them in
practice.
W e m ay also notice, while we are sifting possible exam ples, that
cases o f individual slave-owners who are kind to their slaves will not
do. The issue is one o f w hether slavery as an institution protected by
law should be preserved; and if it is preserved, though there may be
individuals who do not take advantage o f it to m altreat their slaves,
there will no doubt be m any others who do.

L et us im agine, then, that the battle o f W aterloo, that ‘dam ned nice
thing, the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life’ ,11 as W elling­
ton called it, went differently from the way it actually did go, in two
respects. T he first was that the British and Prussians lost the battle;
the last attack o f the French G uard proved too much for them , the
G u a rd ’s m orale having been restored by N apoleon who in person
led their advance instead o f handing it over to N ey. B ut secondly,
having exposed him self to fire as W ellington habitually did, but
lacking W ellin gton’s am azing good fortune, N apoleon was struck
by a cannon ball and killed instantly. This so disorganized the
French, who had no other com m anders o f such ability, that
W ellington was able to rally his forces and conduct one o f those
holding operations at which he was so adept, basing him self on the
Channel ports and their intricate surrounding w aterways; the result
was a cross betw een the Lines o f T orres V edras and the trench
w arfare o f the First W orld W ar. A fte r a year or two o f this, with
N apoleon out o f the way and the war party discredited in England,
liberal (that is, neither revolutionary nor reactionary) regimes cam e
into pow er in both countries, and the Congress o f Vienna

11 F o r re fe re n ce s, see E . L o n g fo rd , W ellington: The Years o f the Sw ord (L o n d o n ,

1969), p. 489.
174 R - M - HARE
reconvened in a very different spirit, with the French represented
on equal terms.
W e have to consider these events only as they affected two
adjacent islands in the Caribbean which I am going to call Juba and
C am aica. I need not relate what happened in the rest o f the w orld,
because the com bined E uropean powers could at that time
com m and absolute suprem acy at sea, and the Caribbean could
therefore be effectively isolated from world politics by the agree­
ment which they reached to take that area out o f the im perial war
gam e. A ll naval and other forces w ere withdrawn from it except for
a couple o f bases on small islands for the suppression o f the slave
trade, which, in keeping with their liberal principles, the parties
agreed to prohibit (those that had not already done so). The islands
w ere declared independent and their white inhabitants, very natu­
rally, all departed in a hurry, leaving the governm ent in the hands of
local black leaders, som e o f whom w ere o f the calibre o f Toussaint
l’O uverture and others o f whom were very much the reverse.
O n Juba, a form er Spanish colony, at the end o f the colonial
period there had been form ed, under pressure o f military need, a
militia com posed o f slaves under white officers, with conditions o f
service much preferable to those o f the plantation slaves, and
form ing a kind o f elite. T he senior sergeant-m ajor o f this force
found him self, after the white officers fled, in a position o f unassail­
able pow er, and, being a man o f great political intelligence and
ability, shaped the new regim e in a way that m ade Juba the envy of
its neighbours.
W hat he did was to retain the institution o f slavery but to rem edy
its evils. T he plantations w ere split up into smaller units, still under
overseers, responsible to the state instead o f to the form er owners.
T h e slaves w ere given rights to im proved conditions o f w ork; the
w age they had already received as a concession in colonial times was
secured to them and increased; all cruel punishments were
prohibited. H ow ever, it is still right to call them slaves, because the
state retained the pow er to direct their labour and their place of
residence and to enforce these directions by sanctions no more
severe than are custom ary in countries without slavery, such as fines
and im prisonm ent. T h e Juban governm ent, influenced by early
com munist ideas (though M arx had not yet com e on the scene) kept
 W H A T IS W R O N G W I T H S L A V E R Y ? 175
the plantations in its own hands; but private persons w ere also
allow ed to own a limited num ber of slaves under conditions at least
as protective to the slaves as on the state-owned plantations.
T h e island becam e very prosperous, and the slaves in it en joyed a
life far preferable in every way to that o f the free inhabitants o f the
neighbouring island o f Cam aica. In Cam aica there had been no such
focus o f pow er in the early days. The slaves threw o ff their bonds
and each seized what land he could get hold of. Though law and
order w ere restored after a fashion, and dem ocracy o f a sort
p revailed, the econom y was chaotic, and this, coupled with a
population explosion, led to widespread starvation and misery.
Cam aica lacked what Juba had: a governm ent with the will and the
instrument, in the shape o f the institution o f slavery, to control the
econom y and the population, and so m ake its slave-citizens, as I
said, the envy o f their neighbours. The flood o f people in fishing
boats seeking to em igrate from free Cam aica and insinuate them ­
selves as slaves into the plantations o f Juba becam e so great that the
Juban governm ent had to em ploy large numbers o f coastguards
(slaves, o f course) to stop it.

T h at, perhaps, will do for our im aginary exam ple. N ow for the
philosophical argum ent. It is com m only alleged that utilitarianism
could condone or com m end slavery. In the situation described,
utility w ould have been lessened and not increased if the Juban
governm ent had abolished slavery and if as a result the econom y of
Juba had deteriorated to the level o f that o f Cam aica. So, it might be
argued, a utilitarian w ould have had to oppose the abolition. But
everyone agrees, it might be held, that slavery is wrong; so the
utilitarians are convicted o f m aintaining a thesis which has conse­
quences repugnant to universally accepted moral convictions.
W hat could they reply to this attack? There are, basically, two
lines they could take. These lines are not incom patible but com p­
lem entary; indeed, the defence o f utilitarianism could be put in the
form o f a dilem m a. Either the defender o f utilitarianism is allowed
to question the im agined facts o f the exam ple, or he is not. First let
us suppose that he is not. H e might then try, as a first m ove, saying
that in the situation as portrayed it would indeed be wrong to abolish
slavery. If the argum ent descends to details, the anti-utilitarians
176 R. M. H A R E
m ay be perm itted to insert any num ber o f extra details (barring the
actual abolition o f slavery itself) in order to m ake sure that its
retention really does m axim ize utility. But then the utilitarian sticks
to his guns and m aintains that in that case it would be wrong to
abolish slavery, and that, further, most ordinary people, if they
could be got to consider the case on its merits and not allow their
judgem ent to be confused by association with m ore detestable
form s o f slavery, would agree with this verdict. The principle of
liberty which forbids slavery is a prim a-facie principle admitting
o f exceptions, and this im aginary case is one o f the exceptions. If
the utilitarians could sustain this line o f defence, they w ould win
the case; but perhaps not everyone w ould agree that it is sus­
tainable.
So let us allow the utilitarian another slightly m ore sophisticated
m ove, still staying, how ever, perched on the first horn o f the
dilem m a. H e might admit that not everyone would agree on the
merits o f this case, but explain this by pointing to the fantastic and
unusual nature o f the case, which, he might claim , would be
unlikely to occur in real life . I f he is not allowed to question the facts
o f the case, he has to admit that abolition would be wrong; but
ordinary people, he might say, cannot see this because the
principles o f political and social m orality which we have all o f us
now absorbed (as contrasted with our eighteenth-century ances­
tors), and with which we are deeply inbued, prevent us from
considering the case on its merits. The principles are fram ed to cope
with the cases o f slavery which actually occur (all o f which are to a
greater or lesser degree harm ful). Though they are the best
principles for us to have when confronting the actual world, they
give the wrong answer when presented with this fantastic case. But
all the sam e, the world being as it is, we should be m orally worse
p eople if we did not have these principles; for then we might be
tem pted, w hether through ignorance or by self-interest, to condone
slavery in cases in which, though actually harm ful, it could be
colourably represented as being beneficial. Suppose, it might be
argued, that an exam ple o f this sort had been used in anti-aboli-
tionist writings in, say, 1830 or thereabouts. M ight it not have
persuaded many people that slavery could be an adm irable thing,
and thus have secured their votes against abolition; and w ould this
 W H A T IS W R O N G W I T H S L A V E R Y ? 177
not have been very harm ful? For the miseries caused by the actual
institution o f slavery in the Caribbean and elsew here w ere so great
that it was desirable from a utilitarian point o f view that people
should hold and act on moral convictions which condem ned slavery
as such and without qualification, because this w ould lead them to
vote for its abolition.
If utilitarians take this slightly more sophisticated line, they are
left saying at one and the same time that it would have been wrong
to abolish slavery in the im agined circum stances, and that it is a
good thing that nearly everyone, if asked about it, would say that it
was right. Is this paradoxical? N ot, I think, to anybody who
understands the realities o f the human situation. W hat resolves the
paradox is that the exam ple is im aginary and that therefore people
are not going to have to pronounce, as a practical issue, on what the
laws o f Juba are to be. In deciding what principles it is good that
people have, it is not necessary or even desirable to take into
account such im aginary cases. It does not really m atter, from a
practical point o f view , what judgem ents people reach about
im aginary cases, provided that this does not have an adverse effect
upon their judgem ents about real cases. From a practical point o f
view , the principles which it is best for them to have are those which
will lead them to m ake the highest proportion o f right decisions in
actual cases where their decisions m ake a difference to what
happens— w eighted, o f course, for the im portance o f the cases, that
is, the am ount o f difference the decisions m ake to the resulting good
or harm.
It is therefore perfectly acceptable that we should at one and the
sam e time feel a strong moral conviction that even the Juban slave
system , how ever beneficial, is w rong, and confess, when we reflect
on the features o f this im agined system, that we cannot see anything
specifically wrong about it, but rather a great deal to com m end. This
is bound to be the experience o f anybody who has acquired the sort
o f moral convictions that one ought to acquire, and at the same time
is able to reflect rationally on the features o f some unusual imagined
situation. I have m yself constantly had this experience when
confronted with the sort o f anti-utilitarian exam ples which are the
stock-in-trade o f philosophers like Bernard W illiam s. O ne is led to
think, on reflection, that i/such cases w ere to occur, one ought to do
x7 8 R. M. H A R E
what is for the best in the circumstances (as even W illiam s him self
appears to contem plate in one o f his cases);12 but one is bound also
to find this conclusion repugnant to o n e’s deepest convictions; if
it is not, o n e’s convictions are not the best convictions one could
have.
A gain st this, it might be objected that if o n e’s deep m oral
convictions yield the wrong answer even in im aginary or unusual
cases, they are not the best one could have. C ould we not succeed, it
might be asked, in inculcating into ourselves convictions o f a m ore
accom m odating sort? C ould we not, that is to say, absorb principles
which had written into them either exceptions to deal with awkward
cases like that in my exam ple, or even provision for writing in
exceptions ad hoc when the awkward cases arose? U p to a point this
is a sensible suggestion; but beyond that point (a point which will
vary with the tem peram ent o f the person whose principles they are
to be) it becom es psychologically unsound. T here are som e simple
souls, no doubt, who really cannot keep them selves in the straight
and narrow way unless they cling fanatically and in the face o f what
most o f us would call reason to extrem ely simple and narrow
principles. A n d there are others who m anage to have very
com plicated principles with m any exceptions written into them
(only ‘w ritten’ is the wrong w ord, because the principles o f such
p eople defy form ulation). M ost o f us com e som ewhere in between.
It is also possible to have fairly simple principles but to attach to
them a rubric which allows us to depart from them , either when one
conflicts with another in a particular case, or where the case is such
an unusual one that we find ourselves doubting whether the
principles w ere designed to deal with it. In these cases we m ay apply
utilitarian reasoning directly; but it is most unwise to do this in more
normal cases, for those are precisely the cases (the great m ajority)
which our principles are designed to deal with, since they w ere
chosen to give the best results in the general run o f cases. In normal
cases, therefore, w e are m ore likely to achieve the right decision
(even from the utilitarian point o f view ) by sticking to these
principles than by engaging in utilitarian reasoning about the
particular case, with all its tem ptations to special pleading.
12 S ee W illiam s, ‘ A C ritiq u e o f U tilitarian ism ’ , in J. J. C . Sm art and B . W illiam s,
Utilitarianism: F o r and A g ainst (C a m b rid g e , 1973), p. 99.
 W H A T IS W R O N G W I T H S L A V E R Y ? 179
I have dealt with these issues at length elsew h ere.13 H ere all I
need to say is that there is a psychological limit to the com plexity
and to the flexibility o f the m oral principles that w e can wisely seek
to build d eeply, as m oral convictions, into our character; and the
person who tries to go beyond this limit will end up as (what he will
be called) an unprincipled person, and will not in fact do the best he
could with his life, even by the test o f utility. This m ay explain why I
w ould always vote for the abolition o f slavery, even though I can
admit that cases could be imagined in which slavery w ould do more
good than harm , and even though I am a utilitarian.

So m uch, then, for the first horn o f the dilem m a. B efore we com e to
the second horn, on which the utilitarian is allowed to o bject to his
o pponents’ argument on the ground that their exam ple would not in
the actual world be realized, I wish to m ake a m ethodological
rem ark which may help us to find our bearings in this rather
com plex dispute. Utilitarianism , like any other theory o f moral
reasoning that gets anywhere near adequacy, consists o f two parts,
one form al and one substantial. T he form al part is no m ore than a
rephrasing o f the requirem ent that moral prescriptions be
universalizable; this has the consequence that equal interests o f all
are to be given equal weight in our reasoning: everybody to count
for one and nobody for m ore than one. O ne should not expect such
a form al requirem ent to generate, by itself, any substantial con­
clusions even about the actual world, let alone about all logically
possible worlds. But there is also a substantial elem ent in the
theory. This is contributed by factual beliefs about what interests
people in the real world actually have (which depends on what they
actually want to like or dislike, and on what they would want or like
or dislike under given conditions); and also about the actual effects
on these interests o f different actions in the real world. G iven the
truth o f these beliefs, we can reason m orally and shall com e to
certain moral conclusions. But the conclusions are not generated by
the form al part o f the theory alone.
Utilitarianism therefore, unlike som e other theories, is exposed
to the facts. T h e utilitarian cannot reason a priori that whatever the
13 S e e m y ‘ E th ical T h e o ry and U tilita ria n ism ', in H . D . L ew is, e d ., Contem porary
B ritish P h ilo so p h y 4 (L o n d o n , 1976), and the re fe re n ce s given there.
i 8o R. M. H A R E
facts about the w orld and human nature, slavery is wrong. H e has to
show that it is wrong by showing, through a study o f history and
other factual observation, that slavery does have the effects
(nam ely the production o f misery) which m ake it wrong. This,
though it m ay at first sight appear a weakness in the doctrine, is in
fact its strength. A doctrine, like som e kinds o f intuitionism ,
according to which we can think up exam ples as fantastic as we
please and the doctrine will still com e up with the same old answers,
is really showing that it has lost contact with the actual world with
which the intuitions it relies on w ere designed to cope. Intuitionists
think they can face the world armed with nothing but their inbred
intuitions; utilitarians know that they have to look at what actually
goes on in the world and see if the intuitions are really the best ones
to have in that sort o f world.

I com e now to the second horn o f the dilem m a, on which the

utilitarian is allow ed to say, ‘Y o u r exam ple w o n ’t do: it would never
happen that w a y .’ H e m ay admit that W aterloo and the Congress of
V ien na could have turned out differently— after all it was a damned
nice thing, and high com m anders w ere in those days often killed on
the battlefield (it was really a m iracle that W ellington was not), and
there w ere liberal m ovem ents in both countries. B ut when we com e
to the C aribb ean, things begin to look shakier. Is it really likely that
there w ould have been such a contrast betw een the econom ies of
Juba and Cam aica? I do not believe that the influence o f particular
national leaders is ever so pow erful, or that such perfectly wise
leaders are ever forthcom ing. A n d I do not believe that in the
C aribbean or anyw here else a system o f nationalized slavery could
be made to run so sm oothly. I should, rather, expect the system to
deteriorate very rapidly. I base these expectations on general
beliefs about human nature, and in particular upon the belief that
people in the pow er o f other people will be exploited, w hatever the
good intentions o f those who founded the system.
A ltern atively, if there really had been leaders o f such amazing
statesm anship, could they not have done better by abolishing
slavery and substituting a free but disciplined society? In the
exam ple, they gave the slaves some legal rights; what was to prevent
them giving others, such as the right to change residences and jobs,
 W H A T IS W R O N G W I T H S L A V E R Y ? l8l
subject o f course to to an overall system o f land-use and econom ic
planning such as exists in many free countries? D id the retention o f
slavery in particular contribute very much to the prosperity o f Juba
that could not have been achieved by other means? A n d likew ise,
need the governm ent o f Cam aica have been so incom petent? Could
it not, without reintroducing slavery, have kept the econom y on the
rails by such controls as are com patible with a free society? In short,
did not the optim um solution lie som ew here between the systems
adopted in Juba and C am aica, but on the free side o f the boundary
betw een slavery and liberty?
These factual speculations, how ever, are rather m ore superficial
than I can be content with. T he facts that it is really important to
draw attention to are rather deep facts about human nature which
must always, or nearly alw ays, m ake slavery an intolerable con­
d itio n .14 I have m entioned already a fact about slave ownership:
that ordinary, even good, human beings will nearly always exploit
those over w hom they have absolute pow er. W e have only to read
the actual history o f slavery in all centuries and cultures to see that.
T h ere is also the effect on the characters o f the exploiters them ­
selves. I had this brought hom e to me recently when, staying in
Jam aica, I happened to pick up a history b o o k 15 written there at the
very beginning o f the nineteenth century, before abolition, whose
w riter had added at the end an appendix giving his view s on the
abolition controversy, which was then at its height. A lth ough
obviously a kindly man with liberal leanings, he argues against
abolition; and one o f his arguments struck me very forcibly. H e
argues that although slavery can be a cruel fate, things are much
better in Jamaica now: there is actually a law that a slave on a
plantation m ay not be given m ore than thirty-six lashes by the
forem an without running him up in front o f the overseer. The
contrast betw een the niceness o f the man and what he says here
does perhaps m ore than any philosophical argument to m ake the
point that our m oral principles have to be designed for human
nature as it is.

14 F o r the e ffe cts o f slavery on slaves and slave-o w n ers, see O . P atterson ,
S o cio lo g y o f Slavery; and S. M . E lk in s, Slavery (C h ic a g o , 1959).
15 R . C . D a lla s, T he H istory o f the M aroons (L o n d o n , 1803; reprin ted b y F ra n k
C a ss, 1968). I h ave not b een able to ob tain th e b o o k again to v erify this re feren ce.
182 R. M. H A R E
T h e most fundam ental point is one about the human nature o f the
slave which m akes ownership by another m ore intolerable for him
than for, say, a horse (not that we should condone cruelty to
horses). M en are different from other animals in that they can look
a long w ay ahead, and therefore can becom e an object o f deterrent
punishment. O ther anim als, we may suppose, can only be the
o bject o f Skinnerian reinforcem ent and Pavlovian conditioning.
T h ese m ethods carry with them , no doubt, their own possibilities of
cruelty; but they fall short o f the peculiar cruelty o f human slavery.
O ne can utter to a man threats o f punishment in the quite distant
future which he can understand. A piece o f human property,
th erefore, unlike a piece o f inanimate property or even a brute
anim al in a m an’s possession, can be subjected to a sort o f terror
from which other kinds o f property are immune; and, human
owners being what they are, many will inevitably take advantage of
this fact. That is the reason for the atrocious punishments that have
usually been inflicted on slaves; there would have been no point in
inflicting them on animals. A slave is the only being that is both able
to be held responsible in this w ay, and has no escape from , or even
redress against, the pow er that this ability to threaten confers upon
his oppressor. If he w ere a free citizen, he would have rights which
w ould restrain the exercise o f the threat; if he w ere a horse or a
piece o f furniture, the threat would be valueless to his owner
because it w ould not be understood. B y being subjected to the
threat o f legal and other punishm ent, but at the same time deprived
o f legal defences against its abuse (since he has no say in what the
laws are to b e , nor much ability to avail him self o f such laws as there
are) the slave becom es, or is likely to becom e if his master is an
ordinary hum an, the most m iserable o f all creatures.
N o doubt there are other facts I could have adduced. But I will
end by reiterating the general point I have been trying to illustrate.
T h e wrongness o f slavery, like the wrongness o f anything else, has
to be shown in the world as it actually is. W e can do this by first
reaching an understanding o f the m eaning of this and the other
m oral words, which brings with it certain rules o f moral reasoning,
as I have tried to show in other p laces.16 O ne o f the most important
16 S ee fo o tn o te 13 a b o v e , and m y Freedom and R eason (O x fo rd , 1963), esp ecially
ch ap. 6.
 W H A T IS W R O N G W I T H S L A V E R Y ? 183
o f these rules is a formal requirem ent reflected in the G olden Rule:
the requirem ent that what w e say we ought to do to others we have
to be able to say ought to be done to ourselves were we in precisely
their situation with their interests. A n d this leads to a way o f m oral
reasoning (utilitarianism) which treats the equal interests o f all as
having equal weight. Then w e have to apply this reasoning to the
w orld as it actually is, which will mean ascertaining what will
actually be the result o f adopting certain principles and policies, and
how this will actually im pinge upon the interests o f ourselves and
others. O nly so can we achieve a m orality suited for use in real life;
and nobody who goes through this reasoning in real life will adopt
principles which perm it slavery, because o f the miseries which in
real life it causes. U tilitarianism can thus show what is wrong with
slavery; and so far as I can see it is the kind o f moral reasoning best
able to show this, as opposed to m erely protesting that slavery is
wrong.

T h is is a revised version o f a lectu re given in 1978 in the U n d e rw o o d M em orial

S e rie s, W esleyan U n iv e rsity , M id d le to w n , C o n n ecticu t.
 XII
SEPARATE SPHERES
JA N E T R A D C L IF F E R IC H A R D S

T h e conviction which unites traditionalist opponents o f fem inism is

that men and wom en should occupy separate spheres. There are
different versions o f this doctrine; opinions differ about what the
nature o f the sphere should be, about how much neutral space there
should be belonging to neither sphere, and about the extent to
which trespassing in the other sex’s sphere should be tolerated.
Still, through all the variations o f detail the underlying theme
rem ains constant. A ll traditionalists hold that men and wom en
should at least to som e extent have different functions in society,
and that each sex should avoid the character and activity which is
the proper preserve o f the other.
A lm ost as constant is the argum ent given in defence o f such a
separation. T he sexes should act and be treated in different w ays, it
is said, for the sim ple and obvious reason that they are different. In
the words o f one eloquent defender o f the separate spheres, ‘Each
has what the other has not; each com pletes the other. T h ey are in
nothing alike, and the happiness and perfection o f both depends on
each asking and receiving what the other only can g iv e .’ 1 Present-
day opponents o f feminism m ay have fallen o ff som ewhat in
extrem ity o f view as w ell as in style o f expression, but their position

Jan et R a d c liffe R ich a rd s, 'S e p a rate S p h eres’ . C o p y rig h t © J a n e t R a d cliffe R ich ards
1986. Printed b y perm ission o f D a v id H igh am A sso c ia te s for the author.
A n earlier v ersio n o f this ch ap ter w as d elivered in the Q u an ce R e v isite d L e ctu re
S eries as part o f the U n iv e rsity o f S ask a tch e w a n ’s 75th ann iversary celeb ratio n s in
S a sk a to o n . C a n a d a , on 9 O ct. 1984. Parts o f this h itherto un pu blish ed essay are
tak e n from the a u th o r’s The S ceptical Fem inist (L o n d o n , 1980), bu t the argu m en t has
b e en co n sid e rab ly rearran g ed and e xte n d ed . T h e presen t version has b een sp ecially
w ritten fo r this a n th ology.
1 R u sk in , O f Q u e e n ’s G ardens, p. 143, q u o ted K a te M illett, Sexu a l Politics,
p. 132.
l86 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
remains in essence the same. It is still widely regarded as obvious
that the sexes are different, and that therefore as a m atter o f course
any w ell-judging society must have different expectations o f them
and treat them in different ways.
Sentim ents such as these are frequently expressed in such a way
as to m ake the whole idea sound very nice and considerate: a
sensitive division o f labour for the good o f all, with each individual
being encouraged to contribute w hatever is most suitable for them 2
to give. But in spite o f the sugary gloss o f ‘equal but different’ so
often given to the account o f the separate spheres, to the feminist it
seem s that the arrangem ent is nothing like one o f equality. Scratch
the egalitarian veneer even slightly, and all the differences o f role
betw een the sexes seem to depend on w om en’s being less strong,
less rational, less creative, and less just about everything else worth
while than m en, which supposed deficiencies have traditionally
been the excuse for excluding wom en from everything men have
been inclined to keep for them selves. Through all the euphem ism
there still com es the view o f A ristotle, who attem pted no such
tactful suggestion o f equality in difference when he said that a
fem ale was fem ale in virtue o f a certain lack o f qualities, and
Thom as A qu in as, who thought a fem ale was a defective male.
It is not surprising, then, that when feminists protest about the
lowliness o f w om en’s sphere, they nearly always start by attacking
the low ly ideas about wom en which provide the traditional justifica­
tion for keeping them confined to their place. If they are against the
whole principle o f separate spheres, they will deny that there are
any significant differences betw een the sexes: differences which are
adm itted to have any existence at all outside the self-serving male
im agination are attributed to m en’s own m anipulation o f wom en.
If, on the other hand, they o bject m ore to the relative status o f the
spheres than to their existence as such, and want w om en’s sphere to
be equal or even superior to m en’s, they will agree that the sexes are
different but m aintain that tradition is wrong about the nature o f the
2 T h is is a fem in ist ‘ th em ’ , not an in ad verten tly ungram m atical o n e. I share the
v iew that the best solu tion to th e problem o f finding a sex-n eu tral pron ou n w ithout
d o in g to o m uch vio le n ce to the lan gu age is to adop t and e xten d the a lread y c olloq u ial
use o f ‘ th e y ’ and ‘ th em ’ as sin gu lar and sex-n eu tral. T h e sim ilar exten sion o f the
plural ‘y o u ’ to a singular u sag e, a lon g tim e a g o , serves as b oth a p reced en t and a
m od el.
 SEPARATE SPHERES
d ifferences.3 In both cases objections to traditional view s about the
spheres are supported by objections to traditional beliefs about
the sexes.
H ow ever, although far too m any myths about the natures of
w om en and men have been around for far too long, and although it
is certainly right that they should be challenged, there are problem s
about doing so in this particular context. W hether by accident or
design, the irritating pronouncem ents about fem ale inferiority have
so engrossed fem inist attention that the structure o f traditionalist
argument in defence o f the separate spheres has too often slipped
past unnoticed, and as a result the opposition has been allow ed to
get away with som e extraordinary sleights o f hand. For the time
being, therefore, it m ay be interesting to forget all debates about
the natures o f the sexes— conceding for the sake o f argument even
the most outrageous claims any detractor o f wom en m ay care to
m ake— and concentrate instead on the rem arkable piece of
reasoning by which the positions o f wom en and men have for so
long been justified.

T h e argum ent which derives the appropriateness o f separate

spheres from differences in the natures o f men and wom en is not
com plete as it stands: it must be understood to have a missing
premiss. T o get from ‘men and wom en are different’ to ‘men and
w om en should occupy separate spheres’ you obviously need some
kind o f statem ent to the effect that people should act and be treated
in ways suitable to their natures. Still, since one o f the main
com plaints traditionalists m ake about feminists is that they are

3 Som e fem inists w h o are co n cern ed w ith the natu re o f the spheres rather than
th eir existen ce claim that w o m e n ’ s ch aracteristics h ave trad ition ally been under­
valued rather than m isdescribed . T h e y typically th in k , for in stan ce, th at nurturing
skills should h ave far m ore status than is the case at presen t. T h is m eans in e ffe ct that
th ey m ust be seen as b ein g m ore co n cern ed w ith disputes a bou t the first prem iss o f
th e argu m en t to be discussed b e lo w than the second: th ey o b je c t to tradition al ideas
ab o u t the a p p ro p riate treatment o f p eo p le w ith variou s kinds o f q u ality. H o w e v e r,
here to o the d isagreem en t is a bo u t on e o f the prem isses o f the argu m en t, rather than
its stru ctu re, and since (as w ill appear) the co n cern o f this p a p er is w ith the stru ctu re,
th ere has been no n eed to go into a separate discussion o f this m atter.
 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
trying to distort wom en out o f their natural fem ininity, they would
presum ably have no objection to adding such a premiss. W hen that
is done the argument goes roughly like this:

People should act and be treated in ways suitable to their natures

W om en and men are different

Therefore: wom en and men should act and be treated in different

ways (i.e. they should occupy separate spheres).

This, o f course, is only a skeleton argum ent, whose parts diffe­

rent people will want to flesh out differently. T here are, in the first
place, questions about what should count as suitable behaviour and
treatm ent for different kinds o f people. W hat is suitable treatm ent
for the w eak, for instance? Should they be given special protection,
or rem edial treatm ent to lessen their w eakness, or should they
perhaps be exposed at birth on grounds o f being useless to the state?
Should the clever be given special facilities to develop their skills, or
should they be subjected to special constraints in case they becom e
threatening? Is suitable treatm ent a m atter o f m aking everyone as
happy as possible, or is it m ore to do with extracting from people
every ounce o f w hatever they are capable o f contributing to the
defence o f their country, or the Faith, or the R evolution? T here is
enorm ous scope for disagreem ent about such matters. There is also
scope for considerable disagreem ent about the second premiss:
people m ay hold very different opinions about the extent and
nature o f differences betw een the sexes. A n d , o f course, differences
o f opinion about these two kinds o f question will usually result in
different conclusions about what the sexes’ spheres should be like.
If, for instance, you thought that the strong should help the weak
and that men w ere strong and wom en w eak, the argument would
lead you to the conclusion that part o f what was involved in the
separation o f the spheres was m en’s helping wom en. If, on the other
hand, you thought that the w eak were a drain on society and should
m ake them selves as useful as they could without expecting much in
return, you might conclude that wom en should be m en’s servants.
It is because the premisses can be filled out in different ways, to
yield different conclusions about what the separate spheres should
 SEPARATE SPHERES 189
be like, that traditionalists o f different colours can nevertheless
produce the same general form o f argument. H ow ever, since it is
this general argument which is to be discussed here, we can ignore
controversies about what counts as suitable treatm ent as well as
about how different men and wom en actually are. W h ere, then,
should the investigation start?
O n e thing which certainly needs to be done is to check the
argum ent for am biguities which might result in equivocation: the
use o f w ords in such a way that they have one m eaning when first
introduced, but shift to a subtly different one, essential for reaching
the conclusion, during the course o f the argument. W e can begin,
th erefore, by m aking sure that the elem ents o f this argument are
unam biguous in all relevant ways.
Consider first the conclusion, that men and wom en should occupy
separate spheres. This statem ent is a very bare one when the
natures o f the separate spheres are not specified, and there may
seem to be no scope for problem s about its interpretation.
H ow ever, it does in fact contain an im portant ambiguity. A r e we to
take the separate spheres conclusion as m eaning that the sexes
should be allowed to drift into their spheres as their natures
dictate— rather as children m ay be allow ed to take a wide range of
subjects in school until they find out which ones they like and are
best at— or as m eaning that they should be actively pushed towards
their spheres?
Th ere is obviously no correct answer to this question; some
people m ay want to defend one form o f the conclusion and some the
other. W hat is im portant is to recognize them as distinct, and to be
ready to pounce at any sign o f slithering about betw een them.
D efend ers o f separate spheres, whose main com plaint about fem in­
ists is that they are trying to force wom en into activities alien to their
nature, often give the im pression that all they mean by w om en’s
sphere is the situation wom en would drift towards by nature in a
society o f equal opportunity where they were left to their own
devices and uncorrupted by feminism. But anyone who does want
to reach this version o f the conclusion o f the argument must
recognize that they are not defending anything like the traditional
form o f the separate spheres doctrine. Tradition has never
perm itted such drifting. It has never simply allowed a free-for-all
 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
betw een the sexes, subjecting them to the same restrictions and
giving them access to the same opportunities, so that men and
wom en found them selves doing different things simply because
they w ere differently inclined by nature. M en and wom en have
always been subjected to pressure o f various kinds to m ake them
behave in different ways. O ften it has been made im possible for the
sexes to trespass on what has been regarded as the o th er’s territory
(as when wom en have been prevented from entering the pro­
fessions or owning property); even more often, one sex has been
discouraged from doing what is thought appropriate to the other by
penalties o f various sorts, ranging from severe legal punishments to
varying degrees o f social disapproval. The nature and extent o f such
sexually specific pressures has varied considerably from one society
to another, but they have always existed.
A n y o n e who wants to defend any traditional form o f separate
spheres arrangem ent, therefore, must defend a situation in which
there are pressures o f various kinds— laws, institutions, conven­
tions, and so on— to keep the sexes in their places. A n d , in fact,
though they m ay not always recognize it, most apologists for
separate spheres do advocate such pressures. T h ey are likely to be
in favour o f such things as teaching boys and girls different subjects
and training them for different kinds o f w ork; they m ay be critical o f
wom en who ‘take jobs from m en’ in times o f unem ploym ent or who
are unwilling to sacrifice their own careers to their husbands’ ;
they may be scornful o f men who give up w ork to look after children
or are bullied by their wives into sharing the housework and
shopping. A n y o n e who has such attitudes is in favour o f strongly
differentiated opportunities and pressures, and since most tra­
ditionalist opponents o f feminism are o f this kind we shall con­
centrate m ainly on the argument with the stronger version o f the
conclusion, stating that the sexes should be under pressure to keep
to their spheres.
This means that the argument to be assessed now looks like this:

People should act and be treated in ways suitable to their

natures
W om en and men are different
 SEPARATE SPHERES 191
T h erefore: w om en and men should be pushed into separate
spheres.

That is one im portant clarification, but there is also another to be

m ade. T he second premiss o f the argument also provides scope for
equivocation. E ven though in this very general argument w e are not
concerned with particular ideas about what differences there might
be betw een the sexes, nevertheless whatever kinds o f difference
there are held to be, there are two quite different ways in which this
premiss might be taken. Is it supposed to be claim ing that there are
universal differences betw een the sexes, or m erely that they are
d ifferent on average? 4O nce again there is no correct answer; people
m aking claim s about sex differences might mean either.
A ctu ally, once the distinction is m ade clear, not m any people are
likely to try to m aintain that many— or even any— of the kinds o f
sexual difference usually invoked to justify the separate spheres are
universal. Even the most dyed-in-grain o f male suprem acists, and
even with w om en’s educational disadvantages to assist his
prejudices, w ould be hard put to it to m ake out that all wom en were
different from all men in any (not purely sexual) respect; even
physical strength, the most com m only invoked differentiating
characteristic, does not place all men on one side o f som e divide and
all wom en on the other. It is not plausible even that all wom en lack
any significant ability usually possessed by m en.5 Claim s about

4 E a ch o f th ese ca te go rie s is in tended to c o v e r a range o f variation s. I am

in ten d in g the a ve ra g e in terpretation to stand in also fo r claim s a bou t m ean s, m edians
and th e lik e , and the u n iversal in terpretation to in clu d e not o n ly cases in w hich all
m en d iffer from all w o m e n , bu t a lso on es w here som eth in g is attribu ted to all o r none
o f the m em b ers o f only on e sex. A n d in eith er case w hat is claim ed fo r each sex m ight
re fe r to a ran ge o f ab ility , o r a specific le v el. T h e se m atters are not d istinguished in
this p a p e r b ecau se the argu m en ts w hich fo llo w w o rk in essen tially the sam e w ay
w h a te v e r the d eta iled in terp retatio n o f eith er the a vera ge or the u n iversal form o f the
secon d prem iss.
5 T h e m ost plau sib le claim s a lo n g these lines are that th ere are som e levels o f
a ch iev em en t w h ich can be (o r h ave b een ) reach ed b y som e m en but no w om en .
H o w e v e r, v irtu ally none o f these are o f a kind a ch ieved by m ost m en b ut no w om en ,
and th ey are no use as the basis o f an argu m en t fo r the tradition al sep arate sph eres.
E v e n if all the g rea t m usical gen iuses h ave b een m en (and even if this is as a result o f
n atu re, not o p p o rtu n ity ) that d o es not show that w om en sh ou ld be treated
d iffe re n tly from the m assive m ajo rity o f m en w h o m ake no a pproach to gen ius o f any
kind.
192 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
average differences are usually much easier to defend. H ow ever,
since we are at present concerned only with the structure o f the
argum ent and not with the acceptability o f any interpretation o f its
prem isses, we should consider both versions o f the second premiss,
and see how the argument fares with each in turn.
First, then, there is the universal interpretation, according to
which the argum ent goes m ore or less6 like this:

People should act and be treated in ways suitable to their natures

A ll men are different (in relevant respects) from all wom en

Therefore: men and wom en should be pushed into separate

spheres.

T o assess the merits o f this argum ent, consider a particular case.

Suppose, for instance, that among your view s about suitable
treatm ent for different kinds o f people is the idea that only the very
clever should go to university. Suppose also that you think no
w om en are in fact clever enough. D oes that support the conclusion
that there should be a rule specifically preventing wom en from
going to university?
A cco rd in g to the w ay the argument works, the unsuitability of
wom en is supposed to derive from a general principle, expressed by
the first prem iss, about the unsuitability o f people who are not
clever. If, th erefore, you are to reach the conclusion that there
should actually be policies to exclude these unsuitable w om en, you
must interpret the first premiss as specifying that there should be
policies to exclude everyone who is unsuitable; the argument
presents no reason for having rules about one unsuitable group but
6 It w ill be n oticed that althou gh this sch em atic statem ent o f the argu m en t refers
to w ay s in w hich all m en d iffer from all w o m en , the illustration w hich fo llo w s tak es a
case in w h ich it is claim ed o n ly th at no woman can d o som eth in g, w ith o u t any
corresp o n d in g su ggestion that all m en can. T h is is in fact a far c om m on er typ e o f case
than the o th er; m ost o f the argu m en ts abou t sep arate treatm en t fo r the sexes appeal
to w o m e n ’s su ppo sed u n su itability fo r variou s a ctivities, leavin g undiscussed the
q u estio n o f h ow m any m en are su itab le. It sh ou ld b e n o ted that argum en ts like these
lead to a less th oro u gh go in g th eo ry o f the sph eres, specifyin g w h at on e sex sh o u ld not
b e d o in g but not w h at the o th er sh o u ld be d oin g. T h is is a n oth er m uch -exploited
fu zzin ess in d eb a te s a bou t th e sep arate spheres argu m en t. H o w e v e r, I h ave ign ored
the d istin ction in this p a p er b e cau se , as I h ave a lread y claim ed , the argum ents
presen ted h ere w o rk e q u a lly w ell in b oth cases.
 SEPARATE SPHERES 193
not about oth ers.7 B ut then, if there should be rules to exclude all
unsuitable people, wom en’s being unsuitable (the only reason given
by the argum ent) obviously cannot provide any justification for an
additional rule to exclude them , since a general rule w ould already
exclude everyone unsuitable. A s M ill said, ‘W hat wom en by nature
cannot do, it is quite superfluous to forbid them from d oin g.’8 Y o u
might just as w ell argue that because literacy was a minimum
requirem ent for university entrance, and all gorillas w ere well
known to be illiterate, university admission regulations should
include a specific clause excluding gorillas.
It now becom es clear, incidentally, why it was im portant to
distinguish betw een the w eak and strong interpretations o f the
conclusion o f the original argum ent. If the sexes really w ere entirely
different from each other in socially relevant ways, general social
rules specifying how people should be treated and what opportuni­
ties everyone should be given would result in the sexes m aking
different choices and being selected for different kinds o f work. In
other words, they w ould in such circumstances drift into at least
partially separate spheres. But our question now is not o f whether
the prem isses can support the conclusion that a drift into separate
spheres will happen; it is o f whether they support the conclusion
that pressures to bring the spheres about can be justified, and, at
least as so far interpreted, they do not. T he argument as it stands
provides no reason for adding to general social rules and conven­
tions ones which apply specifically to wom en or men. W ith the
universal interpretation o f the second premiss, the traditional
argum ent for the separate spheres is a failure.
Since this is so, let us see w hether the average interpretation
m akes things any better. T h e argument now becom es:

People should act and be treated in ways suitable to their natures

T h e average wom an is different from the average man

7 It is im po rtan t th at th rou gh o ut this section the discussion is o f the argu m en t as it

stands, and n ot as it m ight be m ade b y the addition o f n ew prem isses exp lain in g w h y
w o m e n n eed sp ecial treatm en t. Such possible am endm ents are discussed in the n ext
section . In this argu m en t the o n ly reason given fo r special p olicies to exclu d e w om en
is w o m e n ’s un su itab ility.
8 John S tu art M ill, The Su bjection o f W om en, L o n d o n , 1983, p. 48.
194 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
Therefore: men and wom en should be pushed into separate
spheres.

O nce again, we can best assess the merits o f the argument by

considering a particular illustration. Suppose we start with the idea
that the strong should be under pressure to help the w eak (as
b efore, the suitability premiss needs to include the idea o f press­
ure), and also that men are stronger than wom en. If we take the
average interpretation o f the second prem iss, does the argument
support the conclusion that there should be social rules and conven­
tions about m en’s helping wom en?
W e have seen that the argument fails when it uses a universal
interpretation o f the second premiss, because no reason is given for
thinking that a specific rule about wom en and men will achieve
anything not already achieved by the general rule referred to in the
first premiss. W ith the average interpretation this is not the case; the
rule about men and wom en does achieve som ething new.
U nfortunately for the argum ent, how ever, that only m akes things
worse.
If there are general conventions about the strong helping the
w eak, they will have the effect o f putting all strong m en under
pressure to help all w eak w om en, without the need for any addi­
tional convention specifically applying to men and wom en. It
follow s, therefore, that the only people to whom a specific rule
about men and wom en can m ake any difference are men who are
weak and women who are strong. If you add to general rules about
the strong helping the w eak a rule about men helping w om en, the
effect o f that additional rule is to override the general rules, and
bring it about that the non-average puny little man has to lug around
heavy loads for hefty am azonian wom en. A n d whether or not that
can be justified (perhaps it can be), what is quite certain is that it
cannot be justified by principles about the suitability o f the strong
helping the w eak. O n this interpretation o f the argument the
conclusion does not m erely fail to follow from the premisses; it
actually contradicts them.
T h e situation then is this. W e started with the fam iliar argument
that men and wom en should act and be treated differently because
they w ere different. This argument was spelt out, and then checked
 SEPARATE SPHERES 195
for am biguity. A s a result its conclusion was clarified: any defender
o f tradition needed a conclusion about putting pressure on the sexes
to keep them in their spheres. The second premiss was also found to
be am biguous, so the argument was tried using both possible
versions. In both cases the argument failed. On one interpretation
the conclusion did not follow from the premisses; on the other, it
was inconsistent with them. A n d in fact the superficial plausibility of
the argum ent depends entirely on equivocation. T h e plausible idea
that there are differences on average betw een the sexes is conflated
with the idea that these are universal, the idea o f enforced separate
spheres is conflated with the idea o f naturally occurring ones, and
because a universal difference w ould explain a natural separation,
an average difference is m istakenly taken to justify an im posed one.
C onfusion could hardly be worse confounded.
If this argum ent, so widely taken to justify the separation o f the
sexes into their traditional spheres, is an exam ple o f the logic which
men have counted as their special preserve, perhaps it is not
surprising that som e feminists have decided that men are welcom e
to it.

3
I am not claim ing that the forces o f darkness— or even those among
their num ber capable o f recognizing such a thing as rout by
argum ent— should by now have scattered in disarray. M uch m ore
can be said before the defence o f separate spheres need be
abandoned, and som etim es traditionalists scarcely seem to notice
this breach o f their front line, so im m ediately do they regroup and
try again.
The next m oves are as predictable as the original argument.
N early all appeal to som e general good to be brought about through
selection efficiency and the saving o f tim e, or, perhaps slightly less
often, to ideas that wom en are incom petent to understand their own
best interests. So, for instance, it may be said that in fact there often
is a need for rules specifically excluding wom en from certain
activities, even though none o f them w ould get in on the basis of
existing criteria, because for their own good wom en should not be
allow ed to waste their energies in pursuit o f goals which will always
196 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
elude them . O r it m ay be said that considerations o f efficiency often
dem and that all wom en should be excluded from som ething even
when only most wom en are unsuitable, because if we allowed
selection systems to be clogged with swarms o f incom petent appli­
cants just for the sake o f one or two exceptional ones who did
happen to be com petent, everyone w ould suffer in the long run.
T h ere is no space to go into these by ways here (which is a pity,
because they are most entertaining) but there are im portant things
to say about such arguments in general.
First, although they are often presented as such, they do not work
as refutations o f the kinds o f argument I have been putting forward
so far. M y arguments have them selves been rebuttals o f another
argum ent, and all I claim to have done is show that that particular
argument in support o f the separate spheres does not w ork. This is,
o f course, quite com patible with the spheres’ being effectively
defended in other ways, and the possible arguments about
efficiency and the like are not objections to my dismissal o f the
original argum ent, but new arguments to the original conclusion.
T h ey invariably bring in additional premisses. It has already been
shown that prem isses about w om en’s unsuitability for particular
kinds o f w ork (for instance) are not enough on their own to justify
special w om an-excluding rules, and in order to escape this difficulty
it is necessary for them to be supplem ented with claims about such
m atters as the dam age wom en will do to them selves or others if they
are allow ed to com pete. These new arguments do not rescue the
original argum ent, therefore, and they seem to be tried only when
that has failed (at least, I have never seen them given as the original
argum ent in favour o f separate spheres).
In one w ay, o f course, that does not m atter, since if som eone
produces a good argument for the separate spheres at the fifteenth
attem pt it is none the less a good argument. Still, it is a m atter of
som e political and psychological interest that so m any peop le’s
conviction that there should be separate spheres seem s to remain
constant while their justifications tag along behind. People who
produce the original argument usually present it as their reason for
wanting the separate spheres; if on its failure they anxiously seek
around for other justifications it is not unreasonable to suspect that
their real reasons for wanting the separation have little to do with
 SEPARATE SPHERES 197
the argum ents they are putting forward, and that those real reasons,
w h atever they are (and w hether or not they are consciously held),
m ay be unsuitable for public exposure.
Second, all such rescue attem pts are direct responses to the
challenge addressed to the logic o f the traditional argum ent, and
concentrate on avoiding that particular pitfall. T o that extent they
usually succeed. H ow ever, what their producers seem som etim es to
forget is that even though an argument must be unsound if its logic is
bad, it is not necessarily sound if its logic is good. Premisses have to
be plausible or otherwise acceptable as well. So far in this paper
traditionalist premisses have been left unchallenged for the sake of
dem onstrating the m istakes in traditionalist logic, but that is not a
thing to be allow ed indefinitely; a good argument must be good in
all respects, and anyone arguing in defence o f a conclusion must be
able to provide a positive justification o f the premisses used (it is not
enough to produce premisses which the opposition cannot prove
wrong). T here is, how ever, a strong tendency for the arguments in
the second line o f d efence o f the separate spheres to achieve logical
success only at the cost o f falling headlong into em pirical or m oral
absurdity.9 For instance, in order to carry through a paternalistic
argum ent that there should be rules specifically excluding wom en
from certain activities for their own good, it would be necessary to
find good grounds— not just prejudice and wishful thinking— for
believing both that these activities w ere particularly bad for wom en
and that wom en w ere so generally incom petent to judge their own
interests that they would be seriously dam aged by being allowed to
try. M ost o f the second-line arguments turn out to have problem s o f
these kinds. This is not to say that it is impossible to find a good
argument to the desired conclusion, but the task may not be as
straightforward as som e people appear to think.
Finally, anyone who is inclined to join in the attem pts to save the
traditionalist position should be aware o f yet another requirem ent
which must be met by any successful argument. If the idea is to
defend anything like the traditional separate spheres, the argument
produced must justify not just any kind o f separation, but one o f the
right sort. A n o th er m istake made by many w ould-be defenders of
9 I discuss this m atter in slightly m ore d etail in ‘ D iscrim in a tion ’ , P roceed in gs o f
th e A risto telia n S ocie ty S u pp. V o l. L I X , 1985.
198 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
tradition is that o f producing arguments which, even if they w orked
in other respects, would succeed only in justifying a separate-
spheres arrangem ent quite unlike the traditional one. B efore
people get too far in their attem pts to find new justifications for the
separate spheres, therefore, they should m ake sure they know what
it is they need to justify.

4
It is at this point that questions about the relative status o f the
traditional spheres start to arise. D efenders o f tradition, as was said
earlier, often m ake out that what they want is nothing m ore than a
useful division o f labour for the convenience o f all, with no question
o f any inequality. E ven though they may have som e difficulty in
finding a justification o f the division in the first place, therefore,
they may still fall back on claims about the spheres’ essential
equality. It is frequently claim ed that the pressures which separate
the sexes provide no ground for fem inist fuss in particular, since
men are quite as badly o ff in their own sphere as wom en are in
theirs; indeed, let pursuers o f this line warm to their task for a little,
and it is usually not long before they start to claim that things are
actually much worse for men than wom en.
This w ould be very surprising, if true. Notwithstanding som e
obvious potential disadvantages o f the m ale role (conscription,
som e conventions o f chivalry and so on) wom en bent on escape
from the fem ale sphere do not usually run into hordes o f oppressed
m en swarm ing in the opposite direction, trying to change places
with their w ives and secretaries. A n yo n e com m itted to the project
o f believing six im possible things before breakfast might try
interpreting this striking lack o f enthusiasm as a sign o f generosity to
w om en, but it is much easier to suspect that it shows w here the real
advantage lies. H ow ever, to confirm this suspicion we must con­
sider directly the natures o f the traditional spheres.
T h ese have varied a good deal over space and tim e, and it is
im possible to attem pt any historical or geographical survey here;
the discussion will unfortunately have to be limited to recent
W estern culture and stay at a very general level. H ow ever, it is
probably true that the essentials o f the arrangem ents have always
 SEPARATE SPHERES 199
been much the sam e, so that a discussion even o f such a restricted
period and area is likely to have at least limited application else­
w here .10This is particularly likely to be true if we start by going back
in time a little, since present conventions and attitudes can often be
better understood through the m ore clearly defined social arrange­
ments out o f which they developed. W hat, then, w ere the arrange­
ments for the position o f each sex a century or two ago, before
recent reform s m odified them ?
T h e essence o f the situation is unm istakable. There was far m ore
to the separate spheres than any convenient division o f labour. In
fact most o f the social arrangem ents, institutions, and customs
which defined the relative position o f the sexes had the effect of
placing women in the power and service o f some m a n }'
T h ere is no exaggeration here. It must be rem em bered that what
is at issue has nothing to do with anyon e’s feelings, nor even with
the treatm ent o f individual wom en by individual men. W e are
concerned with the form al and inform al social institutions of
various kinds which have brought the sphere separation about, and
so m any o f these have been com pletely explicit that the facts about
them are incontrovertible. T here w ere laws about the control of
husbands over wives and fathers over daughters, and obstacles in
the way o f w om en’s controlling property. T here w ere rules keeping
wom en from nearly every kind o f activity which might have given
them status or independence (reinforced by their being kept out o f
any education which might have suited them to such activities), and
as a result forcing them to depend for support on men. The kind of
w ork regarded as the proper province o f wom en was ‘private’ , and
10 If th ere are any so cieties w h ere the treatm en t o f w om en is radically d ifferen t
from w h at is to be o u tlin ed h ere, the rem ain in g a rgu m en ts o f this p a p er will not apply
to th e m . It is not essen tial to fem inism to claim th at the opp ression o f w om en m ust be
essen tially the sam e the w orld o v er— even th o u gh , as a m atter o f fact, it p ro b a b ly is
m uch the sam e in k in d , and d ifferen t m ainly in d eg ree.
" T h e arran gem en t o f the sep arate sph eres is actu ally rath er m ore com p licated
than this acco u n t suggests: th ere is also a straigh tforw ard elem en t o f sim ply
d esign atin g so m e kinds o f w o rk as w o m e n 's and som e as m en 's, and the tw o elem en ts
in teract in co m p lica ted w ays. H o w e v e r, a full accoun t o f the situation w ou ld tak e far
m ore space than is a va ilab le h ere, and w ou ld not m uch a ffect m y argum ents. T h e
e lem en t I discuss is the m ost im portant o n e. F u rth erm o re, a n yo n e trying to d efen d
th e sep a ra te sph eres in th eir full tradition al co m p lex ity w o u ld h ave to d efen d the
e lem en t I discuss and oth ers as w e ll, so the sim plification o f the accoun t w o rk s to m y
o p p o n e n ts' a d v a n ta g e, not to m ine.
200 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
could take place only within a home headed by a breadwinning
m an, so that wom en who w ere forced to m ake their own living
found that the only w ork available to them was o f low status and
appallingly paid. T here w ere severe penalties for ‘fallen w om en’ ,
which kept wom en bound to a particular man. T h ere w ere laws
which made it pretty well im possible for wom en to escape from the
pow er o f tyrannical husbands, since they would have had to
sacrifice nearly everything, including their children, in the process.
A n d to ratify it all, wom en w ere form ally excluded from the making
o f law, so that until som e men w ere willing to cham pion their cause
there was little hope o f their being able to change much o f it.
T o see the position o f wom en in this way is to see clearly what the
fem inine sphere traditionally was: it was one in which all endeavour
and activity was confined to achieving a particular end. The ideal
wom an has never been one who was w eak and incom petent; hardly
any man can ever have wanted a total loss o f a wom an. Fem ale
perfection was a m atter o f devoting all abilities to being useful to a
particular man and his offspring, using a great deal o f skill (the m ore
the better) but always carefully directing it so that it presented no
threat to m en’s position. U nfem ininity lay in showing signs o f trying
to escape this situation. It was unfeminine o f wom en to want to
study at universities or have the vote or urge their own opinions
against their husbands because in doing so they w ere displaying
ideas about stepping beyond their allotted sphere. Higher
education, political pow er and independent opinions w ere not
am ong the requirem ents for being a wife and m other, and to seek
them was to try to com pete with men and becom e independent of
them , rather than rem aining in service.
So the separation o f spheres never produced anything like an
equal division o f function betw een men and wom en; there is
nothing in the least com parable about the m ale sphere. The demands
o f the m ale sphere have never involved dependence on w om en, or
even much adaptation to them , except for certain responsibilities to
fam ilies and certain conventions o f chivalry and courtship. In fact
the m ale sphere has contained virtually everything generally valued
in society, and the main way in which reference to wom en com es
into the account o f masculinity is in the demand that a man should
be o f higher status than his w om enfolk and exert proper authority
 SEPARATE SPHERES 201
over them (the least m asculine man is the one who is henpecked).
This is why ‘fem ininity had to be achieved, cultivated and
preserved, while m asculinity could be left to look after itse lf’ .12
O f course, things are now nothing like as bad as they used to be:
rules and conventions directing wom en towards the service o f men
have lessened considerably both in extent and in firmness of
enforcem ent. N evertheless, to the extent that there do still remain
different conventions for proper m ale and fem ale activity and
dem eanour, nearly all are o f the traditional kind. A lth ou gh they no
longer force all wom en into the pow er o f men, they still create an
asym m etry o f status and dependence.
For instance, to the extent that boys and girls are given different
educations, what distinguishes the girls’ is that it is hom e-directed,
with needlew ork, cookin g, ‘home econom ics’ , and so on. The
‘com m ercial’ courses which are the exception still prepare them for
what is nearly always service to a man outside the hom e. Consider
also the significance o f girls’ having been encouraged to take arts
rather than science subjects, or biology rather than the hard
scien ces.13 T h en , away from school, it is a rare home in which the
man will not presum e as a m atter o f course that w hatever a w om an’s
professional or other com m itm ents, she will take responsibility for
dom estic m atters (even if he occasionally ‘does the washing up for
M ary’ , so m aking it clear that the act is supererogatory because it is
really M ary’s job ). A g ain , to the extent that different behaviour is
approved for men and w om en, it usually involves w om en’s not
putting them selves forw ard, not nagging, being loyal, dropping
tactful hints instead o f m aking open criticisms, going along with
what the man suggests and so on. W om en’s m agazines still dispense
advice about how to be a highly com petent assistant or partner to a
man without m aking him feel threatened: how to cover up for your
boss when he m akes m istakes; how to get what you want for the
fam ily by letting your husband think he thought o f it. A t a more
sophisticated level, m anuals o f sexual success instruct experienced
wom en in the art o f leading men sexually while giving the

12 P au lin e M a rk s, ‘F em in in ity in the classroo m ’ , in The Rights and W rongs o f

W om en , eds. M itch ell and O a k le y , p. 183.
13 S e e , e .g . A liso n K e lly ( e d .) , The M issing Half: G irls and Scien ce Educa tion,
1981, passim .
202 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
im pression that it is the men who are taking the initiative. A n d ,
even now, few people outside the feminist m ovem ent give a thought
to the highly significant universal presum ption that a wom an and
her children should take her husband’s surname. The special
dem ands m ade o f wom en have lessened in their scope and rigidity,
but their nature is the same as it ever was. A wom an who tries to
cross the border into the territory o f men is still presum ptuous; a
man who slips into w om en’s is still degraded.
This means that although present-day defenders o f separate
spheres m ay not want to return to the extrem e asym m etry o f the
past, even those who want to maintain the present state o f things are
in favour o f a conventional inequality o f power and dependence.
O th ers, who think that the feminist rot has already gone too far and
want to recover at least part o f the past, want in effect an increase of
present inequality. A n y o n e who is in favour o f the separate spheres
in anything like their traditional form , therefore, needs to find a
justification for this kind o f inequality. It is not enough (as some
people seem to think) to point out that the worst aspects o f the past
have now gone, as if that in itself constituted a justification o f all that
rem ained.

5
H ow , then, can traditionalists set about justifying this asym metrical
arrangem ent? Their arguments vary in detail, but as usual they tend
to depend on claim s about the natures o f men and wom en o f a kind
which provoke (usually legitim ate) feminist wrath, nearly all having
to do with m ale strength and dom inance, fem ale helplessness and
need o f protection, and consequent-fem ale need o f the male.
H ow ever, it is once again worth resisting the tem ptation to be
distracted into squabbles about these questions o f fact, and
concentrating instead on the logic o f the arguments.
T h e simplest o f the fam iliar arguments are to the effect that social
arrangem ents reflect the natural state o f things: men dom inate
w om en just because they are dom inant; wom en are attached to men
and dependent on them because they are naturally inclined to
attachm ent and dependence. But if men and wom en just are like
that, what is the purpose o f the rules and pressures supposed to be?
 SEPARATE SPHERES 203
Y o u can hardly justify the existence o f pressures by claims that what
they are supposed to achieve w ould happen anyw ay, without them.
Y o u cannot sneer at a henpecked man on the grounds that a man
ought to be head o f his household and claim that men should be
heads o f households because they are naturally dom inant; if they all
w ere, there w ould be nothing to sneer at, and if there is som ething
to sneer at, som e m en at least are by the criterion o f dom inance
unsuited to the position o f headship. A ll such simple argum ents, at
least in their fam iliar form s, are non-starters.
T h e m ore com plex arguments are about w om en’s need of men.
T h e w eak need the protection o f the strong, it is said, or
childbearing wom en need men to look after them and get the food.
H ere, how ever, things get even worse. These arguments not only
run into the already discussed difficulties o f trying to deduce
conclusions about men and wom en from premisses about such
qualities as strength and weakness; they also m anage to get into new
and im pressive tangles o f their own.
T o take the argum ent about strength and weakness first, consider
what you w ould do if you w ere really setting out in an unprejudiced
w ay to arrange for the protection o f the w eak. Y o u w ould probably
start by trying to m ake the w eak stronger, or by giving them extra
powers to defend them selves. Y o u might also try to lessen the
p ow er o f the strong, or at least m ake rules to prevent their getting
out o f hand. T he very last thing you w ould do is system atically
deprive the w eak o f all other options in order to force them to
depend on the strong, and then provide social and legal powers to
m ake the strong stronger still, as has been the case with wom en and
men. The idea that the w eak can be protected by being abandoned
to the pow er o f the strong involves as rem arkable a piece o f twisted
reasoning as can ever have been d evised .14
M uch the same goes for arguments about the needs of
childbearing wom en. If you w ere really concerned about the w ell­

14 It is, o f c o u rse , irrelevan t to poin t out that m en often do p rotect th eir w om en .

T h is is on e o f m an y m atters m ade clea r b y M ill. ‘W h e th e r the institution to be
d efe n d e d is sla ve ry , political abso lu tism , or the absolutism o f the h ead o f a fam ily, w e
are alw ays e x p e cte d to ju d g e o f it from its best in s ta n c e s .. . . W h o d ou bts that th ere
m ay be great g o o d n e ss, and grea t happ in ess, and great a ffe ctio n , u n der the abso lu te
go v e rn m e n t o f a g o o d m an? M ea n w h ile , law s and institutions req u ire to be ad ap ted ,
n ot to g o o d m en , but to b a d .’ (Ib id ., p. 62.)
204 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
being o f w om en and children, and also thought that wom en needed
m en 15 to help them , you w ould be most unlikely to think o f rules
tying women to men since wom en would presum ably be anxious to
hold on to m en anyw ay. W hat you would need w ould be rules to
keep men in order. Y o u might reasonably insist that men should be
chaperoned to m ake sure they did not go around idly begetting
children without com m itting them selves to their support, and that
men should be subject to social ostracism if they w ere found to have
eluded this vigilance and ‘fallen ’ . A n d given that your concern was
for the protection o f wom en and children, you would also want to
m ake sure that they w ere left as well o ff as possible w henever men
did m anage to evade their responsibilities. Nothing could be further
from this than the traditional arrangem ents, which not only allowed
men to father illegitim ate children without suffering much in the
w ay o f social consequences, but also system atically deprived
w om en o f any means o f supporting them selves independently o f
m en, and m ade matters even worse by heaping ferocious social
penalties on unsupported wom en and unauthorized children.
In other words, the usual justifications o f the nature o f the sexes’
spheres are as full o f structural holes as are the usual justifications
for the existence o f any such spheres in the first place. It will be
found, furtherm ore, that such arguments are just as inadequate to
defend the recent, m odified, forms o f the separate spheres as they
are for the full-blooded traditional versions. O nce again, feminists
need hardly bother to dispute traditionalist premisses as long as
traditionalist logic is in such a ram shackle state.

6
G iven the high casualty rate among arguments in defence o f the
separate spheres doctrine, the question naturally arises o f why
anyone should want to enforce or encourage it at all. Since this
enquiry is philosophical rather than anthropological or psychologi­
cal it cannot go into that question directly, but it can raise the
related one o f what a logically sound and em pirically plausible
justification o f the separate spheres w ould look like. A n d in view of
15 M o st o f th ese argu m en ts do not even attem pt to exp lain w h y the su p p o sed ly
n ecessary su pport cou ld not be given by o th er w om en.
 SEPARATE SPHERES 205
the extrem e perversity o f traditional argum ents, radical measures
suggest them selves. R ather like the Fairy Q ueen in lolanthe, who
sorted out an intractable tangle o f problem s by the simple expedient
o f inserting the word ‘not’ into an inconvenient item o f fairy law, we
might see w hether we could im prove on traditional arguments just
by denying what was usually asserted.
W e can start with another observation o f M ill’s:

T h e g e n e r a l o p in io n o f m en is su p p o se d to b e th a t th e n atu ra l v o c a tio n o f a
w o m a n is th at o f a w ife a n d m o th e r. I sa y , is su p p o se d to b e , b e c a u se
ju d g in g fro m a cts— fro m th e w h o le o f th e p re se n t c o n stitu tio n o f so c ie ty —
o n e m ig h t in fe r th at th eir o p in io n w a s th e d ire c t c o n tra ry . T h e y m ig h t b e
su p p o s e d to th in k th at th e a lle g e d n a tu ra l v o c a tio n o f w o m e n w a s o f all
th in g s th e m o st re p u g n a n t to th e ir n a tu re , in so m u ch th at if th e y a re fre e to
d o a n y th in g e lse . . . th e re w ill n o t b e e n o u g h o f th em w h o w ill b e w illin g to
a c c e p t th e c o n d itio n said to b e n a tu ra l to t h e m .16

A s we have seen, for a rule to have a point it must bring about

som ething which w ould not have happened otherwise. If wom en
really wanted to attach them selves to m en in the traditional w ay,
there would be no need for all the rules designed to bring such
attachm ent about. H ow ever, the rules and pressures binding
w om en to men would have a point if wom en did not naturally want
this kind o f arrangem ent, so we can start by considering that
possibility. W e m ay also suggest that since the attachm ent of
wom en to men is asym m etrical— rules and conventions have not
forced men into dependence on wom en— men do not have to be
coerced. The rules have a very clear purpose if we start from the
proposition that men want wom en— at least in the way suggested by
the rules— considerably m ore than wom en want men.
That avoids one striking problem o f the traditional account.
H ow ever, if we are to com e up with an acceptable argument we
need to think o f a reason which would account adequately both for
m en’s wanting wom en m ore than wom en want m en, and for the
nature o f traditional arrangem ents. Tradition explained w om en’s
wanting men by m aking men out to be strong, brave, adventurous,
creative, inclined to genius, and all the rest, while wom en w ere
passive, tim orous, incapable o f coping on their own, and generally

16 M ill, op. c it ., p. 49.

206 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
nondescript. Should we try to explain m en’s wanting wom en by
reversing tradition here too, and say that it is really men who have
all the negative qualities and wom en all the good and desirable
ones?
That m ay be tem pting for various reasons, but it will not do.
Q uite apart from any questions about em pirical plausibility (and
fem inists must not copy their opponents’ habit o f inventing con ve­
nient facts) this would involve falling into another o f the logical
confusions o f traditionalist argum ent. O nce again, conclusions
about rules organizing the relationship o f men and wom en cannot
be reached in any obvious way (if at all) on the basis o f arguments
about non-sexual characteristics such as strength and w eakness,
activity and passivity, sensitivity and aggressiveness or anything else
o f the kind. If we are to think o f reasons for m en's wanting women
we need to get away from all the incidental and derivative
characteristics which m ay tend to be associated with one sex more
than the other, and turn our attention to what really differentiates
the sexes: to what each really has which the other has not, and
m akes men as such different from wom en as such.
This is not too difficult. Leaving aside such m odern discoveries as
horm ones and chrom osom es, since they are not directly relevant to
the m aking o f social arrangem ents, there seem to be only three
differences o f any im portance.
O ne o f these is difference o f function in conception; sperm and
ovum are different. In this difference, how ever, it is hard to see any
grounds for one sex wanting to bind the other to it m ore strongly
than the other was willing to be bound, since the difference is
com pletely reciprocal. Each sex is so far necessary to the other, and
there is to this extent (for once) genuine equality in their difference.
A n o th er difference com es in sexual relationships as ends in
them selves. O nce again, the sexes’ functions are reciprocal, but
here it might be claim ed that inequality did begin to set in. T here are
various kinds o f evidence (though not undisputed) to suggest that
the m ale desire for sex is a good deal stronger than that o f the
fem ale, which would mean that wom en might often have to be
constrained to co-operate if men w ere to be satisfied. H ow ever,
although that certainly w ould provide a reason for m en’s wanting
wom en m ore than wom en wanted m en, it is still no use as part o f a
 SEPARATE SPHERES 207
justification o f the forms which sexual laws and conventions have
traditionally taken. If social constraints w ere needed at all to bring
about fem ale co-operation they could not possibly take the form of
dem ands for m onogam y and chastity, since those limit w om en’s
sexual activity. O n the contrary, social pressures should be needed
to m ake w om en co-operate w henever required whether they liked it
or not.
Th at leaves what is undoubtedly the most significant universal
difference betw een the sexes. Only the fem ale has the ability to
carry, give birth to, and nurse the offspring', an ability corresponding
to which the m ale has nothing at all.
It is worth com m enting at this point on the rem arkable fact that
nearly everyon e, when asked about differences betw een the sexes,
will em bark on a list o f (supposed) differences which characterize
wom en almost entirely in terms o f inferiority to men. M ost o f these
claim s are anyway highly disputable, but even if they were not, they
all still concern characteristics which differentiate the sexes only on
average, or, occasionally, which are possessed by som e men but no
w om en. It is one o f the most pernicious consequences o f shoddy
traditionalist argum ent that people have begun to think that
differences o f average ability betw een the sexes are what actually
differentiate them . A s a m atter o f logic, questions about the average
differences betw een two groups cannot even be raised until they
have been distinguished as groups, and the essential differences
betw een men and wom en must actually be sexual differences. W hen
the question is not about the derivative, average differences
betw een the sexes, but about what m akes them m ale and fem ale—
w hat puts all men on one side o f the divide and all wom en on the
other— the difference obviously has to do with reproductive capa­
city. A n d in this the sexes have generally reciprocal abilities, with
the striking exception that women can do som ething which men
cannot. The principal difference between the sexes, in other words,
is w om en’s having an ability which men have not, and (to reverse
along with other aspects o f tradition the A ristotelian contribution to
sexism) it w ould be closer to the truth to say that men w ere men in
virtue o f a lack o f qualities, rather than that wom en w ere wom en on
that account.
This certainly looks prom ising as the beginning o f an account o f
208 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
why men should want wom en attached to them; if one group has
som e ability another lacks, there is a prima-facie reason for its being
wanted by that other group. A n d in this case the w ay in which
w om en have been attached to men suggests exactly what men might
have wanted from the arrangem ent. W om en are by nature able to
identify and therefore devote special attention to their own
offspring; men are not, as long as wom en are on the loose.
H e re , th en , is a possible reason for m en’s wanting wom en in ways
different from those in which wom en want m en, and also for their
wanting to m ake it difficult for wom en to support them selves and
their children alone, and imposing on them conventions o f m on­
ogam y and chastity. So far the simple reversal o f traditional ideas
puts us well on the w ay to a sound argument leading to the
conclusion that there should be separate spheres o f the traditional
forms.
T o com plete the argum ent we need som e kind o f general
principle about what ought to be the case, from which the con­
clusion can be deduced that wom en should be subservient to men.
Tradition is apt to invoke benefits for wom en here, or, failing that,
som e general social good. T he first is pretty im plausible, since
wom en apparently have to be coerced into their attachm ent to m en,
and although the second looks m ore like a possibility, an argument
appealing to the good o f society would need a very com plicated set
o f prem isses indeed (full o f counterfactuals about the kinds o f thing
which w ould happen if wom en w ere not tied to m en, and so on), all
o f which w ould need good supporting evidence (not just an absence
o f contrary evidence). O n the other hand, if we reverse these
traditionalist claim s to altruism, and put in their place a simple
premiss to the effect that men should get what they want, the
argum ent is straightforward. It goes som ething like this:

Society should be organized so that men get what they want

M en want to control wom en in order to identify their children,
which w om en, unconstrained, cannot be relied on to allow them
to do

Therefore: wom en must be kept attached and subordinate to

men.
 SEPARATE SPHERES 209
So there, m ainly by m eans o f reversing various parts o f the
traditional defence o f separate spheres, we find a logically and
em pirically sound argument to the conclusion that the sexes should
keep their traditional positions. Its only problem is that it is m orally
and politically doubtful, and certainly not well adapted to the
purpose o f persuading a subject group o f the natural inevitability o f
its position. Perhaps that is why this kind o f justification does not
often appear in pu blic.17
This argum ent does, o f course, also provide a plausible candidate
answer to the factual question o f why the spheres ever cam e about
in the first place (if not o f why people should want to keep them
now). H ow ever, that interesting m atter need not be gone into here,
since here the argument is being presented not as an explanation,
but only as a possible justification: an argument leading to the
conclusion that m en and w om en should occupy their traditional
positions.18 It is not even offered as the only possible justification.
Still, it does present a challenge to anyone who w ould have us
believe that the separate spheres are an arrangem ent for the good of
all. T h e situation can be defended by an argument based on the
advantage o f m en, so until som eone produces an alternative
defence w e are entitled to say that we can see no other justification
for the spheres than their benefiting m en, and act accordingly.19
Perhaps sufficiently ingenious searching could produce m ore
acceptable justifications, but it seem s rather unlikely. H ere w e are,
after all, expected to sw allow arguments in defence o f tradition
which depend on our accepting that rules are necessary to bring
about what w ould have happened anyw ay, that rules whose only
effect is to prevent p eo p le’s acting in ways suitable to their natures
can be justified by principles about suitability, that the w eak can be
protected by being abandoned to the control o f the strong, and that
childbearing wom en can be protected by rules and conventions

17 H u m e d o e s give essen tially this argum ent fo r ‘the m o d esty and ch astity w hich
b e lo n g to the fair se x ’ ( Treatise o f H um an Nature, III, xii).
18 E v e n this d o es n ot w o rk as a ju stification o f recent m odified v ersion s o f
tradition al arran gem en ts. A lth o u g h th ese are less bad in th em selves th ey are even
hard er to ju stify in any co h eren t w a y , a ccep tab le or u n acceptable.
19 In g e n e ra l, if som e social arrangem en t gives b enefits to o n e gro up o f p e o p le , the
onus o f p r o o f is on an yon e w h o w ants to argu e that the arrangem en ts also p rodu ce
so m e general go o d . I discuss this m atter m ore fu lly in ‘ D iscrim in a tion ’ , ibid.
210 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
which m ake them helpless without the protection o f a man. W e are
also expected to overlook w om en’s rather striking extra ability, and
see the w hole essence o f fem aleness as a series o f inadequacies and
absences, while at the same time transform ing m en’s inability to
bear children into a special aptitude for everything else. If such
contortions form the basis o f the best set o f arguments in defence of
the traditional spheres which can be produced for public consum p­
tion, it m ay reasonably be presum ed that ones which are m orally,
logically, and em pirically acceptable cannot lie im m ediately to
hand.

7
If the arguments o f this essay are right, they suggest an interesting
division in the ranks o f fem inism ’s opponents. O n the one hand,
there are the real opponents: the still-determ ined defenders o f
tradition, who should now either admit that they are
straightforw ardly out to defend the privileges o f m en, or subside
until they m anage to find a better defence o f the separate spheres.
O n the other hand, there is a large and surprising group who count
them selves am ong the opposition, but who now turn out, according
to their own principles, to have been against the separate spheres all
along. A ll those traditionalists who com plain that feminists are
putting pressure on wom en to m ake them act against their natures
can now see that they must in consistency (unless they want to allow
fem inists to m onopolize logic) join fem inists in their opposition to
any kind o f im posed sphere separation, since such arrangem ents
distort wom en and men alike. The same is true o f anyone who wants
to defend the w eak conclusion o f the original separate spheres
argum ent (to return to that at last), and thinks that there should be
separate spheres because the sexes would drift into them by nature
if left to their own devices. Such people should be delighted to have
the opportunity to prove their point about natural sex differences by
joining in the struggle to get rid o f the artificially im posed ones.
H ow ever, feminists w ould perhaps be unwise to depend on a rush
o f support from these im probable allies. For one thing, it is not
unheard o f for people to persist in incoherent opinions. For
another, even people who do recognize that their arguments com ­
 SEPARATE SPHERES 211
mit them to opposing the traditional separate spheres m ay just
change their tack. T h ey m ay start claim ing instead that arguments
about justifiability are now entirely beside the point, since the
spheres disappeared altogether some time ago.
This is a very com m on line of argum ent, and it means that
feminists need to be able to show not only that pressures to bring
about the separate spheres are unjustified, but also that they do still
exist. This is, o f course, largely an em pirical task, but there is still
philosophical w ork to be done in clarifying the various form s social
pressures m ay take. It is im portant to be able to block the fam iliar
m ove from ‘w om en can do anything now ’ (which is in som e sense
true) to the false conclusion that if wom en still find them selves in a
situation o f inferiority to men that must be because they just are
inferior.
It is true that feminists are not entitled to m ake any inference
from the relative situations o f men and wom en to the conclusion
that there are still restraints on wom en: the possibility has to be
allow ed for that there are real differences o f capability betw een the
sexes which w ould remain even in a situation of equal opportunity.
O n the other hand, neither are the opponents o f fem inism entitled
to claim that because (at least in the liberal W est) wom en can now
choose to own property, enter the professions and even bring up
children alone, all traces o f the separating pressures have
disappeared. T h e spheres m ay be much m ore nebulous than fo r­
m erly, but as long as social forces o f any kind m ake anything more
difficult for the m em bers o f one sex as such than for the other, men
and wom en are still pushed in different directions, and the spheres
still exert their influence.20 A n d in fact, once the various ways in
which they m anifest them selves are recognized, differentiating
pressures can still be seen to pervade even the most liberal of
societies.

20 It is im po rtan t to rem em b er that general social rules or pressures m ight still

a ffe ct on e sex m o re than the o th er, b ecau se o f n atural d ifferen ces (av erag e or
u n iversal) b e tw e e n th em . (It can be argu ed , th ough the m atter is c o m p lica ted , that
e ve n rules w h ich can o n ly a p p ly to o n e se x , such as abortion law s, m ay be g en eral in
the re le v an t sen se). I f w om en and m en fou n d th em selves in d ifferen t situation s as a
resu lt o f ten den cies to d ifferen ce in nature w h en all rules w ere gen eral th ey w ou ld
h av e drifted in to sep arate sph eres, rather than b ein g p u sh ed into th em , so these
sp h eres w o u ld n ot be open to the o b je ctio n s raised by this paper.
212 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
First, even the form al rules and institutions which differentiate
the sexes have still not vanished com pletely. In the world as a whole
there are enorm ous num bers o f them , but even in liberal countries
they still exist: there are still asym metrical tax, social security, and
pension laws, for instance. So even am ong form al institutions there
is w ork to be done.
Far m ore pervasive, how ever, are inform al conventions, which
are also pow erful exerters o f pressure. T he nature and extent o f
these differ w idely am ong social groups, but in general people do
still to a large extent approve or disapprove o f actions not just in
them selves, but according to the sex o f their agent. Expressions o f
disapproval vary in strength, and m ay be very subtle, but where
disapproval is felt there can be little doubt that it is usually shown,
and approval and disapproval are often sex-connected. H ow many
p eo ple, even am ong the most enlightened, w ould be perfectly
unaffected by the sexes o f the people involved when reacting to
som eone’s playing with dolls, dressing with ostentatious care,
answering the front door in an apron, m aking open sexual
advances, wolf-w histling, riding pillion on a m otor bike driven by
som eone o f the other sex, or giving up a career to follow a spouse or
care for children? A s long as social approval and disapproval are
connected with sex, som e activities are m ade easier for one group
than the other (because its m em bers do not have to sacrifice social
acceptability to do them ), and there is pressure tow ards separate
spheres for the sexes.
A n d there are other pressures less obtrusive still. T h ere are
com pelling grounds for believing that the separate spheres
perpetuate them selves even in the different expectations people
have o f men and wom en.
In the first place, experim ents have shown that beliefs about the
differences betw een the sexes have further-reaching effects than
m ost people have any idea of. T h ey influence not only predictions
about the w ay men and wom en will perform , but even the way their
actual perform ance is perceived and described. F or instance, in one
experim ent groups o f young m others w ere watched on different
occasions as they played with toddlers: first with one in blue
dungarees called A d am , and then with one in a pink frilly dress,
called B eth. A d am and Beth w ere treated and described
 SEPARATE SPHERES 213
differently; they w ere the same child.21 In another experim ent
groups o f w om en undergraduates w ere given articles to read, three
by wom en and three by m en, dealing with fields generally thought
o f as m asculine, fem inine, and neutral. For half o f these groups, the
articles written by men w ere attributed to w om en, and vice versa.
‘A general bias against wom en was found regardless o f the field,
and even in traditional fem inine fields an article was considered
m ore valuable and its author m ore com petent when that author was
a man. The bias was strongest in the case o f “ m asculine” fields with
a fem ale au th o r.’22 In both these cases the subjects o f the experi­
ment w ould doubtless have claim ed to be responding only to what
was im m ediately before them ; in both the structure o f the experi­
m ent shows that they w ould have been m istaken. There have been a
great m any such experim ents, consistently showing a strong bias
against wom en.
Then , in addition to this, there is a mass o f psychological evidence
which shows that expectation affects perform ance; that if, for
instance, a teacher is told that som e random ly selected children are
high-flyers, that group will do far better than it otherwise w ould
have done. (I gather that the same is true even when experim enters
are told they are dealing with high-flying rats.) If it is generally
believed that wom en are inferior to men in most respects, that is
enough in itself to account for their turning out to be so.
A n d finally (to reverse yet another part o f traditional m ythology)
present beliefs about the differences betw een the sexes are to a
considerable extent the effect, rather than the cause, o f the separate
spheres. T h ere m ay well be (as a good deal o f evolutionary and
genetic evidence suggests) deeply rooted tendencies towards
difference o f character and ability in wom en and m en, and if the
sexes ever com e to have genuine equality o f opportunity perhaps
w om en m ay indeed turn out to have generally few er abilities than
men— or, let it not be forgotten, the other way round. A s yet,
how ever, there is no adequate evidence for any such conclusion.
W e know to start with that the im position o f the spheres has
21 A . L a k e (19 7 5 ), ‘ A r e w e b orn in to ou r sex roles o r program m ed into th em ?’
W om an ’s D a y , Jan uary, pp. 2 4 -5 , q u o te d A n n O a k le y , Su bject W om en (19 8 1),
p. 96.
22 P . G o ld b e rg (1968), ‘A r e w o m en p reju d ice d against w o m e n ? ’ Transaction, 5,
n o. 5 , pp. 28-30, q u o te d O a k le y , o p . c it ., p. 126.
214 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS
system atically deprived wom en o f equal opportunity with men to
dem onstrate what abilities they have, so that little if anything about
their nature can be inferred from their actual perform ance. W e
have also seen how im portant it has been to traditional ideology to
foster appropriate beliefs about the nature o f wom en: any com pe­
tent oppressor will, o f course, try to disguise what is going on by
persuading everyone that social arrangem ents are the result o f
nature rather than contrivance. The idea that wom en are naturally
suited to their subordinate sphere has becom e one o f the most
entrenched parts o f tradition, and rem arkably resistant to change
(as other research shows) even in the face o f overwhelm ing
evidence. W e know , th erefore, that strongly held convictions about
the natural inferiority o f wom en are not adequately justified by
present evidence. These convictions must them selves be regarded
as a legacy o f the differential treatm ent o f wom en and men. It
follow s that beliefs and expectations provide yet another m ethod o f
entrenching the separate spheres, probably at least as effective as
any rules, and far m ore sinister because almost invisible.
T h e separate spheres have shrunk and becom e blurred round the
edges in m any societies, but they have by no means vanished
com pletely. D ifferentiating pressures still system atically place
w om en at a disadvantage to men. Furtherm ore, although that
disadvantage is considerably less than it once was, other difficulties
have arisen in its place: the subtlety o f the pressures which remain
m akes them far m ore difficult to identify, to dem onstrate to the
sceptical, and to deal with than was ever the case with form al laws
and institutions. Problem s for women m ay have lessened with the
shrinking o f the spheres, but the problem s faced by feminists remain
as form idable as ever.
 XIII
ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL
PETER S IN G E R

I n recent years a num ber o f oppressed groups have cam paigned

vigorously for equality. The classic instance is the Black Liberation
m ovem ent, which dem ands an end to the prejudice and discrimi­
nation that has m ade blacks second-class citizens. T h e im m ediate
appeal o f the B lack Liberation m ovem ent and its initial, if lim ited,
success m ade it a m odel for other oppressed groups to follow . W e
becam e fam iliar with liberation m ovem ents for Spanish-Am eri-
cans, gay peo ple, and a variety o f other minorities. W hen a m ajority
group— wom en— began their cam paign, som e thought we had
com e to the end o f the road. Discrim ination on the basis o f sex, it
has been said, is the last universally accepted form o f discrimi­
nation, practised without secrecy or pretence even in those liberal
circles that have long prided them selves on their freedom from
prejudice against racial minorities.
O n e should always be w ary o f talking o f ‘the last rem aining form
o f discrim ination’ . If we have learnt anything from the liberation
m ovem ents, we should have learnt how difficult it is to be aware of
latent prejudice in our attitudes to particular groups until this
prejudice is forcefu lly pointed out.
A liberation m ovem ent dem ands an expansion o f our moral
horizons and an extension or reinterpretation o f the basic moral
principle o f equality. Practices that w ere previously regarded as
natural and inevitable com e to be seen as the result o f an unjustifi­
able prejudice. W ho can say with confidence that all his or her
attitudes and practices are beyond criticism? If we wish to avoid
being num bered amongst the oppressors, we must be prepared to
re-think even our most fundam ental attitudes. W e need to consider
them from the point o f view o f those most disadvantaged by our
P art o f this essay ap p eared in the N ew Y o rk Review o f B o o k s (5 A p r . 1973), and is
reprin ted b y perm ission o f the E d ito r. Th is version is an abridged form o f an essay
w h ich w as first pu b lish ed in P h ilo so p h ic E xchange v o l. I , no. 5 (Sum m er 1974).
2 l6 PETER SINGER
attitudes, and the practices that follow from these attitudes. If we
can m ake this unaccustom ed m ental switch we may discover a
pattern in our attitudes and practices that consistently operates so as
to benefit one group— usually the one to which w e ourselves
belong— at the expense o f another. In this way we m ay com e to see
that there is a case for a new liberation m ovem ent. M y aim is to
advocate that w e m ake this m ental switch in respect o f our attitudes
and practices towards a very large group o f beings: m em bers of
species other than our own— or, as w e popularly though m islead­
ingly call them , animals. In other words, I am urging that we extend
to other species the basic principle o f equality that most o f us
recognize should be extended to all m em bers o f our own species.
A ll this m ay sound a little far-fetched, m ore like a parody o f other
liberation m ovem ents than a serious o bjective. In fact, in the past
the idea o f ‘T he Rights o f A n im als’ really has been used to parody
the case for w om en’s rights. W hen M ary W ollstonecraft, a forerun­
ner o f later fem inists, published her Vindication o f the Rights o f
Women in 1792, her ideas w ere widely regarded as absurd, and they
w ere satirized in an anonym ous publication entitled A Vindication
o f the Rights o f Brutes. T h e author o f this satire (actually Thom as
T a ylo r, a distinguished Cam bridge philosopher) tried to refute
W ollston ecroft’s reasonings by showing that they could be carried
one stage further. If sound when applied to w om en, why should the
argum ents not be applied to dogs, cats, and horses? T h ey seem ed to
hold equally well for these ‘brutes’ ; yet to hold that brutes had
rights was m anifestly absurd; therefore the reasoning by which this
conclusion had been reached must be unsound, and if unsound
when applied to brutes, it must also be unsound when applied to
w om en, since the very same arguments had been used in each case.
O ne way in which w e might reply to this argument is by saying
that the case for equality betw een men and wom en cannot validly be
extended to non-human animals. W om en have a right to vote, for
instance, because they are just as capable o f m aking rational
decisions as men are; dogs, on the other hand, are incapable o f
understanding the significance of voting, so they cannot have the
right to vote. T h ere are m any other obvious ways in which men and
w om en resem ble each other closely, while humans and other
animals differ greatly. So, it might be said, men and wom en are
 ALL A NIM ALS ARE EQUAL 217

sim iliar beings, and should have equal rights, while humans and
non-humans are different and should not have equal rights.
T h e thought behind this reply to T a y lo r’s analogy is correct up to
a point, but it does not go far enough. There are important
differences betw een humans and other animals, and these
differences must give rise to som e differences, in the rights that each
have. R ecognizing this obvious fact, how ever, is no barrier to the
case for extending the basic principle o f equality to non-human
anim als. T h e differences that exist betw een men and wom en are
equally undeniable, and the supporters o f W om en’s Liberation are
aw are that these differences m ay give rise to different rights. M any
feminists hold that wom en have the right to an abortion on request.
It does not follow that since these same people are cam paigning for
equality betw een men and wom en they must support the right o f
men to have abortions too. Since a man cannot have an abortion, it
is m eaningless to talk o f his right to have one. Since a pig can’t vote,
it is m eaningless to talk o f its right to vote. T here is no reason why
either W om en ’s Liberation or A nim al Liberation should get in­
volved in such nonsense. T h e extension o f the basic principle o f
equality from one group to another does not imply that we must
treat both groups in exactly the same w ay, or grant exactly the same
rights to both groups. W hether we should do so will depend on the
nature o f the m em bers o f the two groups. T h e basic principle of
equality, I shall argue, is equality o f consideration; and equal
consideration for different beings m ay lead to different treatm ent
and different rights.
So there is a different way o f replying to T a y lo r’s attem pt to
parody W ollstonecraft’s argum ents, a way which does not deny the
differences betw een humans and non-hum ans, but goes m ore
deeply into the question o f equality, and concludes by finding
nothing absurd in the idea that the basic principle o f equality applies
to so-called ‘brutes’ . I believe that we reach this conclusion if we
exam ine the basis on which our opposition to discrimination on
grounds o f race or sex ultim ately rests. W e will then see that we
w ould be on shaky ground if we w ere to dem and equality for blacks,
w om en, and other groups o f oppressed humans while denying equal
consideration to non-humans.
W hen we say that all human beings, w hatever their race, creed,
2 l8 PETER SINGER
or sex, are equal, what is it that we are asserting? Those who wish to
defend a hierarchical, inegalitarian society have often pointed out
that by w hatever test w e choose, it simply is not true that all humans
are equal. L ike it or not, we must face the fact that humans com e in
different shapes and sizes; they com e with differing moral capaci­
ties, differing intellectual abilities, differing amounts o f benevolent
feeling and sensitivity to the needs o f others, differing abilities to
com m unicate effectively, and differing capacities to experience
pleasure and pain. In short, if the dem and for equality w ere based
on the actual equality o f all human beings, we w ould have to stop
dem anding equality. It would be an unjustifiable dem and.
Still, one might cling to the view that the dem and for equality
am ong human beings is based on the actual equality o f the different
races and sexes. A lthou gh humans differ as individuals in various
w ays, there are no differences between the races and sexes as such.
From the m ere fact that a person is black, or a wom an, we cannot
infer anything else about that person. This, it may be said, is what is
w rong with racism and sexism. The white racist claims that whites
are superior to blacks, but this is false— although there are
differences betw een individuals, some blacks are superior to some
whites in all o f the capacities and abilities that could conceivably be
relevant. T h e opponent o f sexism w ould say the same: a person’s
sex is no guide to his or her abilities, and this is why it is unjustifiable
to discriminate on the basis o f sex.
This is a possible line o f objection to racial and sexual discrimi­
nation. It is not, how ever, the way som eone really concerned about
equality w ould choose, because taking this line could, in some
circum stances, force one to accept a most inegalitarian society. The
fact that humans differ as individuals, rather than as races or sexes,
is a valid reply to som eone who defends a hierarchical society like,
say, South A frica , in which all whites are superior in status to all
blacks. T h e existence o f individual variations that cut across the
lines o f race or sex, how ever, provides us with no defence at all
against a m ore sophisticated opponent o f equality, one who pro­
poses that, say, the interests o f those with IQ ratings above 100 be
preferred to the interests o f those with IQ s below 100. W ould a
hierarchical society o f this sort really be so much better than one
based on race or sex? I think not. But if we tie the moral principle o f
 ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL 219
equality to the factual equality o f the different races or sexes, taken
as a w hole, our opposition to racism and sexism does not provide us
with any basis for objecting to this kind o f inegalitarianism .
T h ere is a second im portant reason why we ought not to base our
opposition to racism and sexism on any kind o f factual equality,
even the limited kind which asserts that variations in capacities and
abilities are spread evenly betw een the different races and sexes: we
can have no absolute guarantee that these abilities and capacities
really are distributed evenly, without regard to race or sex, among
human beings. So far as actual abilities are concerned, there do
seem to be certain m easurable differences between both races and
sexes. These differences do not, of course, appear in each case, but
only when averages are taken. M ore important still, we do not yet
know how much o f these differences is really due to the different
genetic endowm ents o f the various races and sexes, and how much
is due to environm ental differences that are the result o f past and
continuing discrimination. Perhaps all o f the im portant differences
will eventually prove to be environm ental rather than genetic.
A n y o n e opposed to racism and sexism will certainly hope that this
will be so, for it will m ake the task o f ending discrimination a lot
easier; nevertheless it w ould be dangerous to rest the case against
racism and sexism on the b elief that all significant differences are
environm ental in origin. The opponent of, say, racism who takes
this line will be unable to avoid conceding that if differences in
ability did after all prove to have some genetic connection with race,
racism w ould in som e way be defensible.
It w ould be folly for the opponent o f racism to stake his whole
case on a dogm atic com m itm ent to one particular outcom e o f a
difficult scientific issue which is still a long way from being settled.
W hile attem pts to prove that differences in certain selected abilities
betw een races and sexes are prim arily genetic in origin have
certainly not been conclusive, the same must be said o f attem pts to
prove that these differences are largely the result o f environm ent.
A t this stage o f the investigation we cannot be certain which view is
correct, how ever much we m ay hope it is the latter.
F ortunately, there is no need to pin the case for equality to one
particular outcom e o f this scientific investigation. The appropriate
response to those who claim to have found evidence o f genetically-
220 PETER SINGER
based differences in ability between the races or sexes is not to stick
to the b elief that the genetic explanation must be w rong, w hatever
evidence to the contrary m ay turn up: instead we should m ake it
quite clear that the claim to equality does not depend on
intelligence, m oral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of
fact. E quality is a m oral ideal, not a simple assertion o f fact. T h ere is
no logically com pelling reason for assuming that a factual difference
in ability betw een two people justifies any difference in the amount
o f consideration we give to satisfying their needs and interests. The
principle o f the equality o f human beings is not a description o f an
alleged actual equality am ong humans: it is a prescription o f how we
should treat humans.
Jerem y Bentham incorporated the essential basis o f moral
equality into his utilitarian system o f ethics in the form ula: ‘E ach to
count for one and none for m ore than o n e .’ In other words, the
interests o f every being affected by an action are to be taken into
account and given the same weight as the like interests o f any other
being. A later utilitarian, H enry Sidgw ick, put the point in this way:
‘T h e good o f any one individual is o f no m ore im portance, from the
point o f view (if I m ay say so) o f the U niverse, than the good o f any
o th er.’ 1 M ore recently, the leading figures in m odern moral philos­
ophy have shown a great deal o f agreem ent in specifying as a
fundam ental presupposition o f their moral theories som e similar
requirem ent which operates so as to give everyon e’s interests equal
consideration— although they cannot agree on how this require­
m ent is best form u lated .2
It is an im plication o f this principle o f equality that our concern
for others ought not to depend on what they are like, or what
abilities they possess— although precisely what this concern
requires us to do m ay vary according to the characteristics o f those
affected by what w e do. It is on this basis that the case against racism
and the case against sexism must both ultim ately rest; and it is in
accordance with this principle that speciesism is also to be
condem ned. If possessing a higher degree o f intelligence does not
1 The Methods o f Ethics (7th e d n .), p. 382.
2 F o r e x a m p le , R . M . H are , Freedom and Reason (O x fo rd , 1963) and J. R a w ls, A
Theory o f Justice (H arv a rd , 1972); fo r a b rie f accoun t o f the essential agreem en t on
this issue b e tw e e n th ese and o th er positions, see R . M . H are , ‘ R u les o f W ar and
M o ra l R e a so n in g ’ , Philosophy and Public Affairs, v o l. I, no. 2 (1972).
 ALL A NIM ALS ARE EQUAL 221
entitle one human to use another for his own ends, how can it entitle
humans to exploit non-humans?
M any philosophers have proposed the principle o f equal
consideration o f interests, in some form or other, as a basic moral
principle; but, as we shall see in m ore detail shortly, not m any o f
them have recognized that this principle applies to m em bers of
other species as well as to our own. Bentham was one o f the few who
did realize this. In a forw ard-looking passage, written at a time
when black slaves in the British dom inions w ere still being treated
much as we now treat non-human animals, Bentham wrote:
T h e d a y m ay c o m e w h e n th e rest o f th e a n im al c re a tio n m a y a cq u ire th o se
rig h ts w h ich n e v e r c o u ld h a v e b e e n w ith o ld e n fro m th em bu t b y th e h a n d o f
ty r a n n y . T h e F re n c h h a v e a lre a d y d is c o v e re d th a t th e b la c k n e ss o f th e skin
is n o re a so n w h y a h u m a n b e in g sh o u ld be a b a n d o n e d w ith o u t re d ress to th e
c a p ric e o f a to rm e n to r. It m a y o n e d a y c o m e to b e r e c o g n iz e d th at th e
n u m b e r o f th e le g s , th e v illo s ity o f th e sk in , o r th e te rm in a tio n o f th e os
s a c r u m , a re re a so n s e q u a lly in su fficie n t fo r a b a n d o n in g a se n sitiv e b e in g to
th e sa m e fa te . W h a t e lse is it th at sh o u ld tra c e th e in su p e ra b le lin e ? Is it th e
fa c u lty o f re a s o n , o r p e rh a p s th e fa c u lty o f d isco u rse ? B u t a fu ll-g ro w n
h o rse o r d o g is b e y o n d co m p a ris o n a m o re ra tio n a l, as w e ll as a m o re
c o n v e r s a b le a n im a l, th an an in fa n t o f a d a y , o r a w e e k , o r e v e n a m o n th ,
o ld . B u t su p p o s e th e y w e re o th e rw is e , w h a t w o u ld it a v a il? T h e q u e stio n is
n o t, C a n th e y re a so n ? n o r C a n th e y talk? b u t, C an they su ffe r ? 3

In this passage Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as the

vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal considera­
tion. The capacity for suffering— or m ore strictly, for suffering and/
or enjoym ent or happiness— is not just another characteristic like
the capacity for language, or for higher m athem atics. Bentham is
not saying that those who try to m ark ‘the insuperable line’ that
determ ines w hether the interests o f a being should be considered
happen to have selected the wrong characteristic. The capacity for
suffering and enjoying things is a pre-requisite for having interests
at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of
interests in any m eaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it
was not in the interests o f a stone to be kicked along the road by a
schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer.
N othing that we can do to it could possibly m ake any difference to
3 Introduction to the Principles o f M orals and Legislation, ch. X V I I.
222 PETER SINGER
its w elfare. A m ouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not
being torm ented, because it will suffer if it is.
If a being suffers, there can be no m oral justification for refusing
to take that suffering into consideration. N o matter what the nature
o f the being, the principle o f equality requires that its suffering be
counted equally with the like suffering— in so far as rough com pari­
sons can be m ade— o f any other being. If a being is not capable of
suffering, or o f experiencing enjoym ent or happiness, there is
nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit o f sentience
(using the term as a convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand
for the capacity to suffer or experience enjoym ent or happiness) is
the only defensible boundary o f concern for the interests o f others.
T o m ark this boundary by som e characteristic like intelligence or
rationality w ould be to mark it in an arbitrary way. W hy not choose
som e other characteristic, like skin colour?
T h e racist violates the principle o f equality by giving greater
weight to the interests o f m em bers o f his own race, when there is a
clash betw een their interests and the interests o f those o f another
race. Sim ilarly the speciesist allows the interests o f his own species
to override the greater interests of m em bers o f other species.4 The
pattern is the same in each case. M ost human beings are speciesists.
I shall now very briefly describe some o f the practices that show this.
For the great m ajority o f human beings, especially in urban,
industrialized societies, the most direct form o f contact with
m em bers o f other species is at meal-times: we eat them . In doing so
we treat them purely as means to our ends. W e regard their life and
w ell-being as subordinate to our taste for a particular kind o f dish. I
say ‘taste’ deliberately— this is purely a matter o f pleasing our
palate. T h ere can be no defence of eating flesh in terms o f satisfying
nutritional needs, since it has been established beyond doubt that
we could satisfy our need for protein and other essential nutrients
far m ore efficiently with a diet that replaced animal flesh by soy
beans, or products derived from soy beans, and other high-protein
vegetable products.5

1 I o w e the term 'speciesism ' to R ich a rd R y d er.

5 In o rd er to p ro d u ce i lb. o f protein in the form o f b e e f o r v ea l, w e m ust feed
21 lb. o f protein to the anim al. O th e r form s o f liv esto ck are slightly less in efficien t,
bu t the a vera ge ratio in the U S is still i : 8. It has b een estim ated that the am ount o f
 AL L A N IM A L S ARE E Q U A L 223
It is not m erely the act o f killing that indicates what we are ready
to do to other species in order to gratify our tastes. T h e suffering we
inflict on the animals while they are alive is perhaps an even clearer
indication o f our speciesism than the fact that we are prepared to kill
th em .6 In order to have m eat on the table at a price that people can
afford, our society tolerates m ethods o f meat production that
confine sentient animals in cram ped, unsuitable conditions for the
entire durations o f their lives. Anim als are treated like m achines
that convert fodder into flesh, and any innovation that results in a
higher ‘conversion ratio’ is liable to be adopted. A s one authority
on the subject has said, ‘cruelty is acknow ledged only when
profitability ceases’ .7
Since, as I have said, none o f these practices cater for anything
m ore than our pleasures o f taste, our practice o f rearing and killing
other animals in order to eat them is a clear instance o f the sacrifice
o f the most im portant interests o f other beings in order to satisfy
trivial interests o f our own. T o avoid speciesism w e must stop this
practice, and each o f us has a moral obligation to cease supporting
the practice. O ur custom is all the support that the m eat industry
needs. The decision to cease giving it that support m ay be difficult,
but it is no m ore difficult than it w ould have been for a white
Southerner to go against the traditions o f his society and free his
slaves: if we do not change our dietary habits, how can we censure
those slave-holders who w ould not change their own way o f living?
T h e same form o f discrimination m ay be observed in the
w idespread practice o f experim enting on other species in order to

p rotein lost to hum ans in this w ay is eq u iva len t to 90 p er cent o f the annual w orld
p rotein d eficit. F o r a b rie f acco u n t, see F ran ces M o o re L a p p e , Diet fo r a Small Planet
(F rien d s o f T h e E arth /B allan tin e, N e w Y o r k , 19 7 1), pp. 4 - 1 1 .
6 A lth o u g h o n e m ight th ink that killing a b ein g is o b vio u sly the ultim ate w ron g
o n e can do to it, I th in k that the infliction o f su fferin g is a c lea rer in dication o f
speciesism b ecau se it m ight be argu ed that at least part o f w hat is w ron g w ith killin g a
hum an is that m ost hum ans are con sciou s o f th eir existen ce o v er tim e, and h ave
d esires and p u rp oses that exte n d into the fu tu re— see, for in stan ce, M . T o o le y ,
'A b o rtio n and In fan ticid e’ , Philosophy and Public Affairs, v ol. 2, no. 1 (1972 ). O f
co u rse , if o n e to o k this v iew o n e w o u ld h ave to hold— as T o o le y d oes— that killin g a
hum an infant o r m en tal d efe ctive is not in itself w ro n g, and is less seriou s than killing
certain h igh er m am m als that p ro b a b ly do h ave a sense o f their ow n existen ce over
tim e.
7 R u th H arriso n , Anim al Machines (L o n d o n , 1964). F o r an accoun t o f farm ing
con d ition s, see m y Anim al Liberation (N ew Y o r k , 1975).
224 PETER SINGER
see if certain substances are safe for human beings, or to test some
psychological theory about the effect o f severe punishment on
learning, or to try out various new com pounds just in case
som ething turns up . . .
In the past, argument about vivisection has often missed this
point, because it has been put in absolutist terms: W ould the
abolitionist be prepared to let thousands die if they could be saved
by experim enting on a single animal? T h e way to reply to this purely
hypothetical question is to pose another: W ould the experim enter
be prepared to perform his experim ent on an orphaned human
infant, if that w ere the only way to save m any lives? (I say ‘orphan’
to avoid the com plication o f parental feelings, although in doing so I
am being over-fair to the experim enter, since the non-human
subjects o f experim ents are not orphans.) If the experim enter is not
prepared to use an orphaned human infant, then his readiness to use
non-hum ans is simple discrim ination, since adult apes, cats, m ice,
and other m am m als are m ore aware o f what is happening to them ,
m ore self-directing and, so far as we can tell, at least as sensitive
to pain, as any human infant. T here seems to be no relevant
characteristic that human infants possess that adult mammals do
not have to the same or a higher degree. (Som eone might try to
argue that what m akes it wrong to experim ent on a human infant
is that the infant w ill, in time and if left alone, develop into
m ore than the non-hum an, but one w ould then, to be consistent,
have to oppose abortion, since the foetus has the same potential as
the infant— indeed, even contraception and abstinence might be
w rong on this ground, since the egg and sperm , considered jointly,
also have the sam e potential. In any case, this argument still gives
us no reason for selecting a non-hum an, rather than a human
with severe and irreversible brain dam age, as the subject for our
experim ents.)
T h e experim enter, then, shows a bias in favour o f his own species
w henever he carries out an experim ent on a non-human for a
purpose that he would not think justified him in using a human
being at an equal or low er level o f sentience, awareness, ability to
be self-directing, etc. N o one fam iliar with the kind o f results
yielded by most experim ents on animals can have the slightest
doubt that if this bias w ere elim inated the num ber o f experim ents
 ALL A NIM ALS ARE E Q U A L 225
perform ed w ould be a minute fraction o f the num ber perform ed
today.
E xperim enting on anim als, and eating their flesh, are perhaps the
two m ajor forms o f speciesism in our society. B y com parison, the
third and last form o f speciesism is so m inor as to be insignificant,
but it is perhaps o f some special interest to those for whom this
article was written. I am referring to speciesism in m odern
philosophy.
Philosophy ought to question the basic assumptions o f the age.
Thinking through, critically and carefully, what most people take
for granted is, I believe, the chief task o f philosophy, and it is this
task that m akes philosophy a worthwhile activity. R egrettably,
philosophy does not always live up to its historic role. Philosophers
are human beings and they are subject to all the preconceptions o f
the society to which they belong. Som etim es they succeed in
breaking free o f the prevailing ideology: m ore often they becom e its
most sophisticated defenders. So, in this case, philosophy as
practised in the universities today does not challenge anyone’s
preconceptions about our relations with other species. B y their
writings, those philosophers who tackle problem s that touch upon
the issue reveal that they m ake the same unquestioned assumptions
as most other humans, and what they say tends to confirm the
reader in his or her com fortable speciesist habits.
I could illustrate this claim by referring to the writings o f philos­
ophers in various fields— for instance, the attem pts that have been
m ade by those interested in rights to draw the boundary o f the
sphere o f rights so that it runs parallel to the biological boundaries
o f the species H om o sapiens, including infants and even mental
d efectives, but excluding those other beings o f equal or greater
capacity who are so useful to us at m eal-tim es and in our laborato­
ries. I think it would be a m ore appropriate conclusion to this
chapter, how ever, if I concentrated on the problem with which we
have been centrally concerned, the problem o f equality.
It is significant that the problem o f equality, in m oral and political
philosophy, is invariably form ulated in terms of human equality.
T h e effect o f this is that the question o f the equality o f other animals
does not confront the philosopher, or student, as an issue itself—
and this is already an indication o f the failure o f philosophy to
226 PETER SINGER
challenge accepted beliefs. Still, philosophers have found it difficult
to discuss the issue o f human equality without raising, in a
paragraph or tw o, the question o f the status o f other animals. The
reason for this, which should be apparent from what I have said
already, is that if humans are to be regarded as equal to one
another, we need som e sense o f ‘equ al’ that does not require any
actual, descriptive equality o f capacities, talents, or other qualities.
If equality is to be related to any actual characteristics o f humans,
these characteristics must be some lowest com m on denom inator,
pitched so low that no human lacks them— but then the philosopher
com es up against the catch that any such set of characteristics which
covers all humans will not be possessed only by humans. In other
words, it turns out that in the only sense in which we can truly say, as
an assertion o f fact, that all humans are equal, at least some
m em bers o f other species are also equal— equal, that is, to each
other and to humans. If, on the other hand, w e regard the statement
‘A ll humans are equ al’ in some non-factual w ay, perhaps as a
prescription, then, as I have already argued, it is even m ore difficult
to exclude non-humans from the sphere o f equality.
This result is not what the egalitarian philosopher originally
intended to assert. Instead o f accepting the radical outcom e to
which their own reasonings naturally point, how ever, most philos­
ophers try to reconcile their beliefs in human equality and animal
inequality by argum ents that can only be described as devious.
A s an exam ple, I take W illiam F ran kena’s w ell-know n article,
‘T h e C oncept o f Social Justice’ . Frankena opposes the idea of
basing justice on m erit, because he sees that this could lead to highly
inegalitarian results. Instead he proposes the principle that ‘ . . . all
men are to be treated as equals, not because they are equal, in any
respect, but simply because they are human. T h ey are human
because they have em otions and desires, and are able to think, and
hence are capable o f enjoying a good life in a sense in which other
animals are n o t.’ 8
But what is this capacity to en joy the good life which all humans
h ave, but no other anim als? O ther animals have em otions and
desires, and appear to be capable o f enjoying a good life. W e may
doubt that they can think— although the behaviour o f som e apes,
8 In R . B ra n d t (e d .), S o cia l Justice (E n g le w o o d C liffs, 1962), p. 19.
 ALL A NIM ALS ARE EQUAL 227
dolphins, and even dogs suggests that some o f them can— but what
is the relevance o f thinking? Frankena goes on to admit that by ‘the
good life’ he means ‘not so much the m orally good life as the happy
or satisfactory life’ , so thought would appear to be unnecessary for
enjoying the good life; in fact to em phasize the need for thought
w ould m ake difficulties for the egalitarian since only some people
are capable o f leading intellectually satisfying lives, or m orally good
lives. This m akes it difficult to see what Frankena’s principle of
equality has to do with sim ply being human. Surely every sentient
being is capable o f leading a life that is happier or less m iserable
than som e alternative life, and hence has a claim to be taken into
account. In this respect the distinction betw een humans and non­
humans is not a sharp division, but rather a continuum along which
we m ove gradually, and with overlaps betw een the species, from
sim ple capacities for enjoym ent and satisfaction, or pain and
suffering, to m ore com plex ones.
Faced with a situation in which they see a need for som e basis for
the m oral gulf that is com m only thought to separate humans and
anim als, but can find no concrete difference that will do the job
without underm ining the equality o f humans, philosophers tend to
waffle. T h ey resort to high-sounding phrases like ‘the intrinsic
dignity o f the human individual’ .9 T h ey talk o f the ‘intrinsic worth
o f all m en’ as if men (hum ans?) had som e worth that other beings
did n o t,10 or they say that humans, and only humans, are ‘ends in
them selves’ , while ‘everything other than a person can only have
value for a person’ . 11
This idea o f a distinctive human dignity and worth has a long
history; it can be traced back directly to the Renaissance humanists,
for instance to Pico della M irandola’s Oration on the Dignity o f
Man. Pico and other humanists based their estim ate o f human
dignity on the idea that man possessed the central, pivotal position
in the ‘G reat Chain o f B ein g ’ that led from the lowliest form s o f
m atter to G o d him self; this view o f the universe, in turn, goes back
to both classical and Judaeo-Christian doctrines. M odern philos­

9 F ra n k e n a , o p. c i t .. p. 23.
10 H . A . B e d a u , 'E ga litarian ism and the Idea o f E q u a lity ' in N o m o s IX: E qu ality ,
e d . J. R . P e n n o ck and J. W . C h a p m a n , N ew Y o r k , 1967.
11 G . V la s to s , ‘Justice and E q u a lity ' in B ra n d t, S o cia l Justice, p. 48.
228 PETER SINGER
ophers have cast o ff these m etaphysical and religious shackles and
freely invoke the dignity o f m ankind without needing to justify the
idea at all. W hy should we not attribute ‘intrinsic dignity’ or
‘intrinsic w orth’ to ourselves? Fellow humans are unlikely to reject
the accolades we so generously bestow on them , and those to whom
w e deny the honour are unable to object. Indeed, when one thinks
only o f humans, it can be very liberal, very progressive, to talk of
the dignity o f all human beings. In so doing, we im plicitly condem n
slavery, racism, and other violations o f human rights. W e admit that
we ourselves are in som e fundam ental sense on a par with the
poorest, most ignorant m em bers o f our own species. It is only when
we think o f humans as no m ore than a small sub-group o f all the
beings that inhabit our planet that w e may realize that in elevating
our own species we are at the same time low ering the relative status
o f all other species.
T h e truth is that the appeal to the intrinsic dignity o f human
beings appears to solve the egalitarian’s problem s only as long as it
goes unchallenged. O nce w e ask why it should be that all humans—
including infants, m ental defectives, psychopaths, H itler, Stalin,
and the rest— have som e kind o f dignity or worth that no elephant,
pig, or chim panzee can ever achieve, we see that this question is as
difficult to answer as our original request for some relevant fact that
justifies the inequality o f humans and other animals. In fact, these
two questions are really one: talk o f intrinsic dignity or m oral worth
only takes the problem back one step, because any satisfactory
defence o f the claim that all and only humans have intrinsic dignity
w ould need to refer to som e relevant capacities or characteristics
that all and only humans possess. Philosophers frequently introduce
ideas o f dignity, respect, and worth at the point at which other
reasons appear to be lacking, but this is hardly good enough. Fine
phrases are the last resource o f those who have run out o f
argum ents.
 XIV

GAMES THEORY AND THE NUCLEAR

ARMS RACE
N IC H O L A S M E A SO R

G a m e s theory is a m athem atical theory invented by J. von N eu ­

mann and first described at length by him and O . M orgenstern in
their classic text ‘T heory o f G am es and Econom ic B eh aviou r’ . 1 It is
designed to enable one rationally to choose the optim um strategy in
a gam e.
A lth o u gh gam es theory is a theory about gam es, it is often
claim ed on its behalf that its im plications are considerably more
wide-ranging, and that it can be put to w ork in the context of divers
political, econom ic, and international situations which are
supposed to be in some respect analogous to games. T h e subject o f
this chapter is the question o f whether this claim can be m ade good
in the case o f nuclear deterrence.
It is frequently thought that if gam es-theoretic reasoning is
applicable in this area it would lead io the conclusion that our
nuclear arsenal should be retained. O ne type o f strategy, therefore,
which unilateralists adopt against a gam es-theoretic pro-arm ament
stance is to deny that gam es theory is applicable to com plicated
strategic situations. I argue here, on the other hand, that even if one
does adopt a gam es-theoretic approach it will lead to a type o f
unilateralist conclusion. Those who are agnostic (or even sceptical)
about gam es theory can read what I say as simply an ad hominem
argum ent against a certain type o f pro-advocate o f nuclear arma-

N ich olas M ea so r, ‘G a m e s T h e o ry and the N u c le ar A rm s R a c e ’ from Danger o f

D eterren ce, eds. N igel B la k e & K a y P ole (1983), pp. 132-56. R e p rin te d b y perm is­
sion o f R o u tle d g e & K ega n P au l P L C .

1 J. v o n N eum an n and O . M o rgen stern , Theory o f G am es and E co n o m ic

B e h a v io u r (P rin ce to n , 1947).
230 NICHOLA S MEASOR
m ent, but I think m yself that enough o f the gam es theory approach
is w orth while to give any unilateralist argument som e strength in its
own right.
A prelim inary distinction which circumscribes my subject matter
is betw een two-person gam es and n-person gam es where n > 2 . I
shall only discuss two-person gam es, even though the ‘gam e’ o f
international relations involves rather m ore players than that. Let
us think o f the arms race as a contest between just two parties—
which is not, in any case, a gross m isrepresentation. W hen I talk
henceforw ard o f ‘unilateral disarm am ent’ I mean one o f the two
superpow ers resigning from the struggle. I shall not take account of
the added com plexity created by the fact that the U nited Kingdom
participates as a junior partner o f one o f the main contestants.
T h e outcom es o f the various possible com binations o f m oves by
the players in a two-person gam e can be represented in a two-
dim ensional m atrix. Consider an adaptation o f a w ell-known chil­
dren’s gam e. Each player starts with an equal num ber o f sweets (the
players are A and B ). Im m ediately after the com mand ‘go ’ (given
by the referee) each player must raise his hand either in a shape so as
to represent scissors or in a shape to represent paper (Figure i).

P la y e r B

S cisso rs Paper

S cisso rs 0 ,0 + 1 5 ,- 1 5
P la y e r A
P aper -15,+15 0, 0

Figure 1

H ere the top right-hand com partm ent, for exam ple, represents
the pay-offs to the players if A does scissors and B does paper. The
first num ber represents the num ber o f sweets lost or won by A , the
second the num ber lost or won by B.
C learly the only rational m ove for either player is scissors. If he
m akes this m ove the worst that can happen to him is a draw, and he
m ay in theory win fifteen sweets if the other player is sufficiently ill-
advised as to try paper. In practice if both players are rational the
 GAM ES THEORY AN D THE N U C LE A R ARMS RACE 2^1
upshot will be a m onotonous game: an endless series o f draws with
both players repeating scissors.
This is an exam ple o f what is known technically as a ‘zero-sum ’
gam e. It is sufficient for our present purposes if I define a zero-sum
gam e as one in which in each box the pay-offs for the two players in
that box sum to zero. In practice this m eans that such a gam e is
strictly com petitive. Since no m oney or other asset is com ing into
the reckoning during the gam e but the players are m erely redividing
betw een them selves the assets which they already have, no
advantage is to be gained by them form ing any agreem ent betw een
them selves. T here is no scope for fruitful ‘preplay jock eyin g’ .
Contrast with this the most fam ous exam ple o f a non zero-sum
gam e, the so-called ‘Prisoners’ D ilem m a’ (attributed to A . W .
T u cker) (Figure 2).

C o n fe s s io n N o C o n fe s s io n

C o n fe s s io n — 2, — 2 5
+ > . — 15
A
N o C o n fe s s io n — 15 , + 1 5 0 ,0

F ig u re 2

This matrix has associated with it a som ewhat bizarre anecdote.

T w o prisoners (here, A and B) have been incarcerated in separate
cells, unable to com m unicate with one another. Both are suspected
o f a serious crim e for which the penalty is fifteen years in prison. In
order to obtain a confession the authorities resort to guile. Each
prisoner is addressed by his interrogator as follows:

If you confess and the other prisoner confesses then you will both
be given a nom inal sentence fey a minor offence which we would
be able to get you convicted of— two years in prison would be the
total you w ould serve. If neither o f you confesses then you will
both be released without charge. But (and this is a big but) if one
o f you confesses and the other does not then the confessor will be
aw arded a free holiday in the Baham as but the other prisoner will
be sent to prison for the full term of fifteen years.
232 NICHOLAS MEASOR
In the matrix + 15 represents the value o f a holiday in the
Baham as, - 1 5 that o f fifteen years in jail, 0 release scot-free, and
—2 the nom inal sentence.
B y what process o f reasoning should the prisoner decide on his
course o f action? In fact, if he is reasonably sensible he will argue
like this:

E ither the other prisoner will confess, or he will not. L e t’s first
suppose that he does. Then if I confess I shall receive a nominal
sentence but if I do not then I shall find m yself in prison for fifteen
years. So I’ll be better o ff confessing. Suppose on the other hand
that he keeps quiet. Then if I confess I’ll earn m yself a fabulous
holiday, but if I clam up I’ll simply be allow ed to return hom e. So
w hatever he does I’d be better advised to confess.

T h e practical import o f the reasoning should be clear enough.

B oth prisoners will reason in this fashion, so both will confess, and
they will always finish up in the top left-hand box. B ut there is often
thought to be som ething paradoxical or absurd about this. For if
both had instead not confessed they would have found them selves
in the bottom right-hand box, and both would have been better off.
From the individual’s point o f view the reasoning seems to be
im peccable, but the result o f collective irrationality which dam ages
the personal interests o f both.
A simple solution to the problem seem s attractive at first sight. In
the exam ple given the prisoners cannot com m unicate with each
other. Change the story, then, so that they can. Now, one first wants
to say, the sensible thing will be for them to get together and agree
that both should not confess. Is this not a m ethod o f transferring
them selves from the top left-hand box where they do not want to be
to the bottom right-hand box w here they would rather find
them selves?
Sadly, how ever, the advantages o f consultation are illusory if
both parties are prim arily concerned with personal interest. For
suppose that they have entered into an undertaking that both will
keep quiet. Each prisoner, when his interrogator appears, must
m ake a decision whether or not to keep to the agreem ent which he
has m ade. But that decision is itself a m ove in a gam e, and the
matrix for the gam e is the same as before, except that ‘breaking
 GAM ES THEORY A N D THE N U C L E A R ARMS RACE 233
agreem ent’ must be substituted for ‘confession’ and ‘not breaking
agreem en t’ for ‘not confessing’ . So each prisoner will break the
agreem ent he has m ade in order to minim ize the disadvantage if the
other breaks the agreem ent.
W hat the prisoners need is a m ethod o f m aking their agreem ent
irrevocably binding. It w ould, for exam ple, be in their interests to
find a third party who could police the treaty and w reak some
terrible penalty on either o f them if he broke his word. T h e threat of
such punishm ent w ould be beneficial to each o f them , since it would
deter him from straying from the 0,0 box in the m isconceived hope
o f finding + 15 in the Caribbean.
T h e possible relevance o f the Prisoners’ D ilem m a to the arms
race is clear. Sim ply replace confession with nuclear armanent and
non-confession with disarm ament. A s a result you will have som e­
thing which looks rem arkably fam iliar, nam ely two contestants who
feel forced to arm them selves even though they admit that they
w ould both be better o ff if bilateral disarm ament could be arranged
(Figure 3).

B
(U S S R )

A rm D isa rm

A A rm -2 , -2 + 15, - 1 5
(U S )
D isa rm — 1 5 ,+ 1 5 0 ,0

F ig u re 3

H ow are the figures in the arms race matrix calculated? In

particular, since the arms race might lead to mutual exterm ination,
w hy is the disutility associated with joining in the race (upper left
box) a m odest - 2 , w hereas the disutility associated with being
disarm ed in the face o f an armed foe is - 1 5 ? D o es this valuation
im ply that it is better to be dead than red?
In fact the difference in the figures relates as much to the
probability o f various outcom es as to their intrinsic nastiness. The
large negative score o f - 1 5 for being disarmed in the top right-hand
23 4 NICHOLAS MEASOR
box is based on the thought that in such a situation there is a high
probability o f m ajor political disadvantage (‘becom ing red ’). If the
W estern A llian ce laid down its arms it is possible (as idealists point
out) that the Soviet U nion w ould do likew ise, but I am cynical
enough to think that this would be a very unlikely eventuality. It
would be much m ore probable that the party which had kept its
nuclear arm am ents w ould take advantage o f the opportunity to use
nuclear blackm ail. On the other hand, I am assuming in this paper
that the party which had given up its arms would be prudent enough
to give w ay if the other side resorted to nuclear blackm ail, and thus
(contrary to som e opinions) that if one side unilaterally disarm ed a
nuclear holocaust w ould be unlikely. Such, at any rate, is the basis
o f the + 1 5 , - 1 5 figures.
W hat o f the - 2 , - 2 score in the top left com partm ent? If nuclear
holocaust follow ed B ’s strategy in the top left box with the same
probability as that with which political conquest follow s his strategy
in the top right, then the negative scores in the top left would be far
higher than - 1 5 , provided that one m akes the (presum ably
widespread) assum ption that being red is in itself preferable to
being dead.
T h e claim , how ever, that the arms race instantiates the Prisoners’
D ilem m a matrix relies on the theory o f nuclear deterrence, the
theory that the possession by both sides o f nuclear armaments
m akes a nuclear exchange highly unlikely, since each side is
frightened o ff the use o f his weapons by the near-certainty of
retaliation.
The question o f whether nuclear deterrence works will be my
m ajor concern in the second half o f the chapter. But at this juncture
I want to m ake the point that if the theory o f nuclear deterrence
does w ork then it will justify assigning small negative scores to the
top left even though nuclear exterm ination is so much worse than
political conquest. For the figures are arrived at by m eans o f a
function which takes as its arguments both the objectionability
rating o f the various possible outcom es and their probabilities. In
other words, better a very low probability o f being dead than a very
high probability o f being red.
W hy is the figure for disarmament in the face o f an armed foe
— 15? T here are those who maintain that unilateral disarmament
 G A M E S T H E O R Y A N D T H E N U C L E A R AR MS RA C E 235
m akes a nuclear attack m ore, rather than less, likely, or at any rate
that it does little to increase o n e’s security. If this w ere true, - 1 5
w ould be optim istic, perhaps disastrously so. But note that by
disarm am ent I m ean laying down o n e’s arms and then adopting an
extrem ely co-operative and ingratiating stance towards o n e’s
enem y. It is surely clear that such a ‘hearthrug’ policy would
rem ove m any o f the dangers associated with jettisoning nuclear
arms but retaining substantial conventional w eaponry and the
belligerence that goes with it.
T h e thrust o f the argument is that if nuclear deterrence works
then w e are in a Prisoners’ D ilem m a m atrix. But if we are in a
Prisoners’ D ilem m a matrix than unilateral disarm ament m akes
very little sense at all. W hat possible reason could there be for
abandoning —2 in favour o f - 1 5 ? (I shall be exam ining one
reason— altruism— which might be suggested presently.)
Provided that the scores in the other boxes remain as shown, then
the efficacy o f deterrence will be a sufficient condition for the matrix
to be Prisoners’ D ilem m a. It might seem natural to take it to be a
necessary condition as well. U nilateralists in practice often try to
discredit the deterrence theory, and, given this natural assumption,
they w ould in so doing be by im plication attacking the Prisoners’
D ilem m a argum ent against disarm ament.
W hat o f m ultilateral disarm ament? E ven if we are in the Pri­
soners’ D ilem m a m atrix, no one could deny that we w ould be better
o ff all round if we could get ourselves into the 0,0 box.
T h e practical difficulty is to find a way into it. W e saw in the case of
the Prisoners’ D ilem m a itself that a form al agreem ent betw een the
prisoners not to confess was useless if not backed up by any
sanction. A policem an to enforce the agreem ent might be effective
in their case.
It has often been argued that a justification o f the state and its
judicial apparatus is that it enforces a m utually beneficial agreem ent
betw een persons who w ould otherwise be engaged in a costly
struggle betw een one another (‘the state o f nature’). This Pri­
soners’ D ilem m a foundation for political philosophy is particularly
associated with H obbes. B ut notoriously there is a difficulty in fully
applying to international relations the so-called ‘dom estic analogy’
with the internal affairs o f the state. In the case o f the prisoners a
236 NICHOLAS MEASOR
third party might enforce the agreem ent and m ake it binding. In the
state w e have the police and the law-courts. But what can fill their
place to enforce a binding agreem ent betw een nations? W ho can be
so starry-eyed as to believe that the U nited Nations could perform
this function?
O n the other hand, the fact that no obvious solution is available to
the problem o f m ultilateral disarm ament, to the problem o f forming
an effective agreem ent in an atm osphere o f mutual distrust, is not a
reason for abandoning a search for a solution. If we are in a
Prisoners’ D ilem m a matrix then the im portance o f multilateral
disarm am ent is em phasized by the fact that unilateral disarmament
is no way out o f the problem . This is a point to which the leaders of
nations w ould do well to pay heed, since their protestations of
adherence to the m ultilateral ideal are som etim es belied by their
actions.
T h e last topic which I want to exam ine in this section is the
question o f altruism. O ne com m on reaction to the Prisoners’
D ilem m a is to assert that the difficulty is caused by the fact that both
prisoners (or superpowers) base their reasoning on self-interest. If
one party, far from objecting to the other scoring at his expense,
actually regarded it as a desirable o bject to secure a high rather than
a low score for his ‘opponen t’ , then he w ould be prepared to refrain
from confessing (or prepared to disarm). A n d if both participants
saw things in this way then they might finish up in the bottom right-
hand box after all.
T o some extent the argument which I shall offer in Section II
m akes this response redundant. For my suggestion there will be that
even if one bases o n e’s reasoning entirely upon self-interest it can
still be shown that disarm ament is preferable to arm ament.
A t this point, how ever, I have two negative com ments to m ake on
the suggestion that altruism as a policy might extricate us from the
im passe. T he first is that if one is to argue for a policy o f disarm a­
ment (whether m ultilateral or unilateral) one would be well advised
to devise som ething which has a chance o f convincing o n e’s fellow
citizens. Perhaps sufficiently large numbers o f Britons (not to
m ention A m ericans and other allied races) are m otivated by
burning altruistic ideals, or could have those ideals inculcated into
them , sufficient num bers, that is, to give the altruistic argument for
 GAM ES THEORY AN D THE N U C LE A R ARMS RACE 237
disarm ament a decent chance o f success. But I fear that this is not
so, and som e support for this pessimistic thought is provided by the
results o f public opinion polls on the subject o f unilateralism.
A com plication here is that the argument for the possession o f
nuclear arms is not presented in a w ay that appeals purely to self-
interest either. O n the contrary elem ents will creep into the argu­
m ent which appear to be (and perhaps are) altruistic: references are
m ade to the w elfare o f presently subjugated Poles and o f future
generations o f all nationalities who need to have W estern
d em ocracy preserved for their benefit. Such ingredients cloud the
issue. Possibly they show that there are aspects o f the debate which
transcend the Prisoners’ D ilem m a fram ew ork. Certainly they mean
that appeals to altruism by the disarm er are liable to be trum ped by
further appeals to altruism by his opponent.
T h e second point which I wish to m ake about altruism is simply
that altruism as a general policy is no m ore attractive or effective
than self-interest. H ere we com e to a point which philosophically is
o f really first-rate interest, and owing to shortage o f space I shall
sim ply utter som e dogm a with perfunctory support in argument.
T h e problem is this: if altruism is adopted as the basis o f strategic
decisions then other m atrices can be devised which present exactly
the same kind o f problem s for the altruist as those which the
P risoners’ D ilem m a posed for the self-interested.
Figure 4 is an exam ple o f an A ltru ists’ D ilem m a. If two altruists
are playing this gam e, then each will adopt choice 2 to avoid the risk
o f the ‘opponen t’ finishing up with - 1 5 , and thus they will
finish up in the bottom right box. But each would rather be in the
top left box, where the other party is better o ff than in the bottom
right.

B
1 2

1 + 2 ,+ 2 + 1 5 ,- 1 5
A
2 - 1 5 ,+15
F ig u re 4
238 NICHOLAS MEASOR
So the altruist, although he may arrive at a m ore satisfactory
rapprochem ent in the Prisoners’ D ilem m a, is liable in the long run
to find life no m ore rewarding an affair than the self-interested does.
It might be suggested that the answer lies in some sort o f com pro­
mise: be an altruist when it leads to the most satisfactory results and
self-interested when that pays o ff better. But the merits o f this
proposal are chim erical. For the upshot o f a strategy adopted in a
particular situation can only be judged satisfactory or otherwise
against the fixed background o f som e consistent view about o n e’s
goals in life. A policy o f oscillating betw een altruism and self-
interest does not constitute such a background but is instead a form
o f philosophical schizophrenia. Indeed, many o f the decisions taken
during o n e’s altruistic phases will com e to be a source o f bitter
regret during o n e’s periods o f self-interest.

II

In the previous section I argued that if deterrence theory w ere

correct w e w ould be caught in the trap o f the Prisoners’ D ilem m a.
M ultilateral disarm ament w ould be difficult and unilateral disarm a­
m ent w ould be irrational. In what follow s I shall try to w ork out
matrices describing rather m ore com plicated sets o f choices which
are arguably closer to those which we shall soon find ourselves
facing. First I am going to consider w hether deterrence is likely to
w ork in current conditions and those likely to obtain in the near
future. T h e question to be tackled is not whether to disarm but
w hether firing our missiles w ould ever be preferable to not firing
them .
In its classic form the theory o f nuclear deterrence is based on the
concept o f m utually assured destruction (‘M A D ’), the notion, that
is, that if either side launches a nuclear attack on the other the party
which had been attacked w ould be able to reciprocate with a
devastating onslaught on the cities o f the aggressor. This requires
the possession by each side o f a m ore or less invulnerable second-
strike capability, an ability to respond from ‘invulnerable’ subm a­
rines, aircraft in flight, or hardened missile silos.
In my view if M A D exists its presence will serve as an extrem ely
effective nuclear deterrent. T o see why this is so, consider a
 G A M E S T H E O R Y A N D T H E N U C L E A R A R M S RA C E 239
som ewhat degenerate matrix where the choices o f the two players
are betw een firing their rockets with nuclear warheads or not doing
so (Figure 5).

U SSR

F ire D o n ’t F ire

F ire -5 0 0 , -5 0 0
US
D o n ’ t F ire 0, 0

F ig u re 5

T h e m am m oth negative figures in the top left box reflect the fact
that if either party fires, a nuclear exchange ensues resulting in
catastrophic losses to both sides. W hy are two o f the boxes scored
out? N om inally, I suppose, if one side fired and the other did not
then the firer might hope to gain som e advantage (although quite
w hat, if his opponent w ere a victim o f nuclear devastation, is less
than clear). But since the whole point o f this gam e is that if one side
fires the other side will always retaliate, the only rational course for
a participant is to discount the top right and bottom left boxes
altogether, and assume that firing will always m ove him into the top
left box.
T h e gam e is easy to play, since the choice is betw een firing and
earning —500 or not doing so and earning 0. So if M A D , and
therefore nuclear deterrence, obtains, the m odest negative figures
in the top left box o f the Prisoners’ D ilem m a m atrix, which obtain
when neither side disarms, are perfectly appropriate to the arms
race. T h ey should, how ever, be less advantageous than 0 (say, - 2
as abo ve), since the chance o f a nuclear exchange starting by
accident is never to be discounted, nor should we forget the
potentially ruinous cost o f the w eaponry.
So much for M A D . L et us now consider what matrix is
appropriate for a very different kind o f strategic situation, nam ely
one where both contestants have what I shall call first-strike
capacity (possibly diverging from the standard use o f this term by
strategists). In my usage o f the term a contestant has first-strike
240 NICHOLAS MEASOR
capacity when he has the ability o f destroy all his opponent’s
weapon delivery systems in a single attack in such a way as to
prevent his opponent retaliating with nuclear arms (note that to
possess a first-strike capacity in this sense requires one to be able to
evade or disable the en em y’s early warning system).
Figure 6 is not too far o ff the m ark for the appropriate matrix.

U SSR

F ire D o n ’t F ire

D o n ’ t F ire - 2 5 0 ,+ 1 0 0 ,0

F ig u re 6

H ere the figures for disutility associated with being fired on may
be som ewhat arbitrary. I am taking it that having all your rocket
silos destroyed by nuclear attack is definitely bad news, since there
is radioactive fall-out to contend with on top o f massive im m ediate
loss o f life from other causes, but that it is not as bad as having your
cities wiped out as in the M A D scenario. T he firer in the top right
and bottom left boxes earns + 10 because he does not him self
becom e the victim o f nuclear attack, having knocked out the
en em y’s w eapons. He does indeed obtain political advantage, but I
have reduced this from 15 (as in the Prisoners’ D ilem m a matrix) to
10 since the conquest o f an opponent who has suffered extensive
nuclear attack must be less advantageous than the gains to be
reaped from defeating him by nuclear blackm ail.
O bviously as the matrix stands the rational course (in that
situation) is to fire, since if I do not fire I will achieve either 0 or
- 2 5 0 , w hereas firing will bring in + 10 .
T h e top left box is crossed out since the nature o f the gam e is that
he who has been fired upon cannot him self fire. This is not strictly
speaking correct since both parties might fire sim ultaneously, with a
resulting score o f -2 5 0 , -2 5 0 . This is perhaps a relatively unlikely
event, although it should not be discounted com pletely if both
 G A M E S T H E O R Y A N D T H E N U C L E A R A R M S R A CE 24I
contestants are follow ing the same course o f reasoning at the same
time.
T hese notional figures for the top left box do not, how ever,
provide any further reason for hesitation. Suppose that I am
deliberating about w hether to fire at a time t. The enem y m ay or
m ay not fire at t. If he does fire at t my position if I do fire
sim ultaneously is no worse than if I do not fire ( —250 in each case).
B u t if he does not fire at 1 1 am much better o ff if I do fire then. So I
should fire— and as soon as possible, since the probability o f his
firing during the next ten minutes is greater than the probability o f
his firing during the next five.
A n o th er possible ‘gam e’ is one in which, say, the U S does have
first-strike capacity but the U S S R does not. The matrix looks like
Figure 7.

U SSR

F irst F irst D o n ’t F ire F irst

F ire F irst + 10 , -2 5 0
US
D o n ’t F ire
F irst -5 0 0 , -5 0 0 0, o

F ig u re 7

T h e figures in the bottom left box have changed. If the U S S R

attacks first, the U S can retaliate in the usual way fam iliar from
M A D , since the U S S R , unlike the U S , does not have first-strike
capacity. I am assuming that a Soviet attack would be on A m erican
cities (hence an A m erican figure o f —500 rather than —250 in the
bottom left box). The available strategies have been changed from
firing to firing first and from not firing to not firing first: in the case
o f the U S , firing does not im ply firing first. N ot firing first includes
both firing second and not firing at all (although in the case o f the
Russians, firing second is not a possibility; note also that I have
assum ed that the A m erican s, if attacked, would retaliate, so that in
the bottom left-hand box the U S not firing first is taken to be the U S
firing second).
242 NICHOLAS MEASOR
B y reasoning which we have already exam ined the rational
course for the U S must be to fire as soon as possible in the hope that
she will be firing first. T h e U S S R , on the other hand, is faced with a
very different prob lem . If she stays in the gam e her best hope (and it
is a slim one) is that if she does not fire then the A m ericans m ay fall
victim to som e m ental aberration and fail to fire either, in which
case she will escape with a near-m iraculous o. But in any case she
should operate on the policy o f maxim izing her minimum pay-off,
which dictates that she should not fire, thus m aking her minimum
p ay-o ff (or worst possible loss) -2 5 0 rather than -50 0 .
T h e Soviet U nion w ould, how ever, be much better advised to
withdraw from the gam e represented by this matrix altogether by
finding som e m ethod o f unilateral disarm ament and/or surrender.
F or her minimum pay-off will then be the — 15 o f the Prisoners’
D ilem m a (equals political conquest), and this is a great deal better
than the virtual certainty o f -2 5 0 .
T h e m oral o f the m atrices involving first-strike capacity on the
part o f one or both o f the contestants is that such a capability
constitutes a nuclear incentive rather than a nuclear deterrent to its
possessor, w hereas to the player unfortunate enough not to possess
it when his opponent does it serves not only as a deterrent but also as
a pow erful reason for pulling out o f the arms race altogether.
If one or both sides has a first-strike capability where does this
leave the matrix for armament/disarmament?
Consider first the case w here both sides have first-strike capacity.
If w e assume that both sides are aware o f their first-strike capacity,
then we can take it for the purposes o f the calculation that the
chance o f the U S firing first (and therefore last) is exactly the same
as the probability o f the U S S R doing so. O ne might be tem pted at
first, therefore, to construct a matrix like Figure 8.
T h e figures o f - 1 2 0 are reached by the follow ing reasoning.
W here both sides are arm ed and possess a first-strike capability, I
have taken it that the chances o f either side firing first are equal to
each other (I ignore, for this calculation, the possibility o f neither
firing or both firing sim ultaneously). N ow if the chances o f either of
tw o things happening are equal, one says in probability theory
about each o f the outcom es that the probability o f it happening is
1/2 or 0.5 (in m ore popular parlance this is often referred to as a
 G A M E S T H E O R Y A N D T H E N U C L E A R A R M S RA CE 243
‘50 per cent chance’). I calculate, therefore, that the utility to a side
o f being arm ed is the pay-off for m aking a first-strike m ultiplied by
0.5, plus the pay-off for being the victim o f a strike m ultiplied by
0.5. But the pay-offs in question are + 10 and —250 respectively (see
Figure 5, top right-hand box). So the ‘utility’ o f being arm ed is
(10 x 0.5) + ( -2 5 0 x 0.5) = (10 x 0.5) - (250 x 0.5) = 5 - 125 =
-12 0 .

U SSR

A rm D isa rm

A rm - 1 2 0 ,- 1 2 0 + 1 5 ,- 1 5
US
D isa rm - 1 5 , + 15 0 ,0

F ig u re 8

B ut there is som ething seriously m isleading about the m atrix. It

suggests that the rational thing to do in these circumstances (on a
policy o f m axim izing o n e’s minimum pay-o ff) w ould be to disarm,
and in a sense this is true, but the seem ingly pacific nature o f this
conclusion masks the fact that undertakings to disarm m ay be either
sincere or insincere, and it is yet to be determ ined w hether a sincere
undertaking is m ore or less advantageous than an insincere one.
T o convey to o n e’s opponent an intention to disarm and to
persuade him o f o n e’s sincerity takes a certain period o f time.
During the period when one was setting o n e’s unilateral disarm a­
ment in m otion (I’ll call this the ‘disarmament period ’) one could
instead fire o n e’s weapons— for obvious reasons this can be called a
policy o f ‘insincere disarm am ent’ . Provided that the opponent did
not fire during the disarm ament period (an important proviso) the
resulting pay-off will be + 10 instead o f the — 15 o f unilateral
disarm ament.
A t first sight this suggests a straightforward advantage in making
an insincere prom ise to disarm. But there are further com plications
which I have not yet m entioned. For one thing if I sincerely prom ise
to disarm there is a greater than zero probability that the other side
will fire on me during the disarmament period (this is so whether or
244 NICHOLAS MEASOR
not he has undertaken to disarm, since any such undertaking to
disarm m ay be insincere). This shows, incidentally, that my original
Figure 8 will not do as it stands, since the disutility o f disarming
when the other side does not must be worse than - 1 5 . Further­
m ore, the advantages o f m aking an insincere prom ise to disarm are
com plicated by the fact that there is a greater than zero probability
o f the other side firing on me during the disarmament period, in
which case I will not collect m y +10.
T o construct a suitable matrix for the decision betw een sincerely
disarm ing and insincerely disarming is, therefore, not without its
com plications. M ore detailed discussion o f how the various utilities
are arrived at has been relegated to an A ppen d ix. But the con­
clusion can be sum m arized in a few words: the matrix for the
sincere/insincere disarm gam e will be Prisoners’ D ilem m a,
provided that (a) the chance o f the U S firing upon the U S S R during
the disarm am ent period is not lower than 1/25 (i.e. a 4 per cent
chance), and that (b) the corresponding chance o f the U S S R firing
during that period is not low er than 1/25. But it w ould be realistic to
assum e that the probabilities in question would be higher than
this— probably much higher.
W hat this w ould mean in practice is singularly depressing. W hen I
say that the sincere/insincere matrix w ould be Prisoners’ D ilem m a I
m ean that both sides would be driven by the logic o f the gam e into
m aking an insincere prom ise and firing within the disarmament
period, even though both would be better o ff m aking a sincere
prom ise. If both sides had a first-strike capacity, therefore, the
chances o f nuclear conflict would be high indeed. For either both
sides retain their first-strike capacity or at least one o f the sides
enters into a process o f ‘disarm am ent’ (whether sincere or insin­
cere). In the first case, as Figure 6 shows us, each side has an
incentive to fire. If both sides ‘disarm ’ then, as I have just argued,
each side will be driven by Prisoners’ D ilem m a reasoning into firing
within the disarm ament period. I have not considered in detail the
case where just one side ‘disarm s’ , but it should be clear that, by the
sam e reasoning as in the case where both ‘disarm ’ , the ‘disarm er’
will see it to be to his advantage to be insincere.
T h e same kind o f reasoning does not, how ever, apply in the case
where one side has first-strike capacity and the other does not, and
 G A M E S T H E O R Y A N D T H E N U C L E A R AR MS R A CE 245
the matrix for the arm/disarm gam e is in that case nothing like the
Prisoners’ D ilem m a. Firing first is not a serious option for the side
which does not have first-strike capacity but is threatened by a foe
who does (as w e ’ve seen— Figure 7, bottom left)— the pay-off is
—500. So his only realistic choice is betw een disarming sincerely and
keeping his arms but doing nothing with them. T o present the
matrix for such a gam e requires the same kind o f probabilistic
com plication as in the case where both sides have first-strike
capability, so this exercise too has been consigned to the A ppen dix.
But it will not com e as a great surprise to learn that in the long term
it will be m ore to the advantage o f the party who lacks first-strike
capacity to disarm than to retain his arms.
I rem arked in the first section that if the success o f the deterrence
theory w ere a necessary condition for the arms race matrix to be
Prisoners’ D ilem m a then the unilateralist who attacked the
deterrence theory would be by im plication attacking the use of
Prisoners’ D ilem m a reasoning in this context. The recent course of
the argum ent shows that it is not strictly true that the deterrence
theory is a necessary condition for the matrix to be Prisoners’
Dilem m a. It is a necessary condition for the matrix to be Prisoners’
D ilem m a that the pay-off for (sincerely) disarming should be worse
than that for keeping o n e’s arms. O ne situation which can produce
such a relative arrangem ent o f pay-offs is where deterrence obtains,
but it is not the only such situation, since we also have a worse pay­
o ff for disarm ament if the risks o f disarmament equal or exceed
those associated with keeping on e’s weapons and using them.
T h e follow ing does seem , how ever, to be true. T he success o f the
deterrence theory is a condition which must obtain if both o f the
follow ing are to be true: (a) the matrix is Prisoners’ D ilem m a, (b)
the Prisoners’ Dilem m a reasoning leads one to keep o n e’s arms but
not use th em . So the unilateralist is right to see if he can overturn the
deterrence theory, since his main target is the person who maintains
that Prisoners’ D ilem m a reasoning should lead us to keep our arms
in order to minimize the danger o f them being used.
T here are two points rem aining which I propose to exam ine. The
first is the question w hether either or both sides are at all likely to
obtain first-strike capacity, and the second the practical im plica­
tions o f that likelihood.
246 NICHOLAS MEASOR
T h e first o f these issues has been extensively discussed, and there
appear to be two main schools o f thought. Both agree that the
accuracy with which nuclear warheads can be delivered to their
targets has increased, and will continue to increase, to a rem arkable
degree, and both agree that there has been a change in policy from
targeting the warheads on cities to aiming them at enem y missile
systems (the so-called ‘counter-force strategy’). But the two parties
disagree on the question o f whether the im plications o f these
developm ents is a m ove towards first-strike capacity.
T h e opinion that the increase in accuracy portends the com ing o f
first-strike capacity is eloquently stated in Professor M ichael
P en tz’s booklet ‘Tow ards the Final A b y ss ? ’ .2 T o have first-strike
capacity is to have a very high probability o f knocking out all the
en em y’s missile firing sites in one strike. Pentz points out that quite
a small increase in accuracy can m ake an enorm ous qualitative
difference in this respect. For exam ple, if there are 1,000 Soviet
launching sites (not so far from the truth in fact) then a 0.99
probability for each A m erican missile o f destroying the Russian silo
it is aim ed at will give a very low probability (o.99100H, which is
scarcely greater than 0) o f knocking out all the Soviet sites in one
attack. But an increase in accuracy o f A m erican missiles such as to
give each a 0.99998 probability o f knocking out its target will tip the
scales dram atically, since the chance o f disabling all the Russian
launching sites will now have increased to som ething which is
scarcely sm aller than 1. But the U S is striving to produce just such
an increase in accuracy in its weapons, and Pentz therefore
concludes that it is aiming to have first-strike capability by the end of
the decade.
L et us note two points which are produced in response to this.
T h e first is sim ply the assertion that the counter-force strategy,
and the increase in accuracy which goes with it, is not intended to
produce a first-strike capability but is instead designed as part o f
the deterrent strategy called ‘flexible response’ . B ut, w hatever the
current intentions of, say, the controllers o f the Pentagon, once the
increased accuracy exists the possibility o f using it for first-strike
purposes will exist. T h ere is no guarantee at all that future leaders
o f nations will not com e to relish and use it. The technological
2 J. D . B e rn a l P e a ce L ib rary P a m p h let, 1980.
 G A M E S T H E O R Y A N D T H E N U C L E A R AR MS RA CE 247
developm ents imply progress towards a first-strike policy by
im plication even if the intentions which accom pany them are
innocent.
T h e second response to P en tz’s type o f argument is to point out
that not all Soviet warheads are launched from rocket silos. T here
can also be m ovable delivery systems in aircraft and, most signifi­
cantly, subm arines. The U S could not realistically suppose itself to
be capable o f a first strike until it had licked the problem o f how to
target w eapons on these com paratively elusive missile launchers.
N ow it is true as far as I know that the U S is not currently able to
identify the positions o f Soviet submarines once they have left port,
and it is true that until they are able to do so there will still be a
deterrent against an A m erican first strike. But how much com fort
should the Soviet U nion derive from that fact? It appears to me that
Soviet euphoria on this score would be sadly out o f place. E ven if
the U S is not currently trying to develop an effective submarine
tracking system (which seem s unlikely), and even if the U S has not
yet realized the possible significance o f its counter-force strategy, it
is surely only a m atter o f time before it does realize the significance
and pull out all the stops in the attem pt to rem ove the rem aining
obstacles to a first-strike capacity.3
It is perfectly reasonable, therefore, to see the arms race as now
being a race to achieve first-strike capacity.
L et us suppose, then, that it is highly probable that at least one
side will eventually achieve first-strike capability. H ow should we
take this into account in planning our (i.e. N A T O ’s) present
strategy in the arm-disarm gam e?
I take the strategy o f arming here to consist not just in possessing
arms but in striving to develop them as well. Strictly speaking there
are at least three options open, nam ely ( i) keeping o n e’s weapons
and not developing them , (2) developing them , and (3) disarming.
In practice, how ever, we can safely ignore the first o f these strate­
gies, since not to develop is to invite the other side to acquire first-
strike capacity when one does not have it oneself, and if that occurs
one will be worse o ff than if one disarmed now (basically because

3 O n this, see F. B a rn a b y , The N uclear A rm s Race— C o n tro l or Castastrophe?,

P ro cee d in gs o f the B ritish A sso c ia tio n fo r the A d va n c e m e n t o f Scien ce 1981
(L o n d o n , 1982), pp. 33-4.
248 NICHOLAS MEASOR
one then has the risk that the enem y m ay m ake a first strike before
one has m anaged to disarm— Figure A 3 in the A p pen d ix is the
relevant m atrix).
E ffectively, therefore, the choice is between technological
developm ent and disarm ament. N ow it only m akes sense to persist
with developm ent o f w eapons if the worst pay-off, the one which
should be avoided by the rational principle that one should m ax­
im ize o n e’s minimum pay-off, com es from disarming (when the
other side is still arm ed) rather than from m eeting arm ament with
arm am ent. If both sides continue to develop their weapons there
are three possibilities open: we get first-strike capacity and they do
not, we do not and they d o, or both do (ex hypothesi we are ignoring
the possibility that neither will).
In the first eventuality w e get a positive pay-off o f less than 15
( + 1 5 , representing bloodless conquest, is the best w e can hope for,
and this will not be achieved if the other side fails to resign when he
observes our superiority). In the second eventuality we get a
negative pay-o ff worse than the present disarmament pay-off (see
the last paragraph but one and the part o f the A ppen dix referred to
there). In the third case we get a pay-off determ ined by the
probabilistic calculations consigned to the A ppen d ix (Figure A i is
the relevant m atrix); it will almost certainly be worse than the
present arm am ent pay-off o f —2 (Figure 3)— indeed if the p rob­
ability o f the other side attacking us during the disarm ament period
is around 0.1 or higher then the figure is worse than the present
disarm am ent pay-off o f — 15.
H ow , then, is one to construct a matrix for develop/disarm on the
basis o f these three possible outcom es o f developm ent? I am afraid
that I do not know. I do not see how one is to com pute the
probabilities o f the various relevant outcom es in even the roughest
way. T o illustrate this point, let us consider two possible ways of
calculating the score for arm ament (when the other side arm s), one
o f which m akes it sensible to arm and the other sensible to disarm.
Suppose first that the probability o f my side obtaining first-strike
capacity before the other is 0.45 (= 9/20), that the probability o f the
reverse happening is also 0.45, and that the chance o f both
obtaining it at once is 0.1.
T o all intents and purposes the third eventuality can be ignored,
 G A M E S T H E O R Y A N D T H E N U C L E A R AR MS RACE 2 49
since its contribution to the final figure will be so small. The utility o f
developing o n e’s w eapons, therefore, I shall com pute as the score
for winning the first-strike race times the probability o f this
happening, plus the score for losing the race times the probability o f
that happening (this sum will in practice, of course, turn into a
subtraction since the second figure will be negative).
I rem arked before that the best which can be hoped for from
obtaining first-strike capacity before the opponent is + 15 (if he
resigns). T h ere is also a chance that he will not resign and that my
score will therefore be reduced by such factors as the devastation o f
parts o f the en em y’s territory and nuclear fall-out. L et us therefore
reduce the score for winning the first-strike race to 13. T h e chance
o f me winning this race w e have supposed to be 0.45, and 0.45 times
13 is approxim ately 6.
L et us also assume that if the opponent wins the first-strike race
then my side will be sufficiently prudent to surrender and disarm
(clearly the pay-off will com e out worse if we do not m ake this
assum ption). T h e second com ponent in our calculation is, there­
fo re, the pay-off for disarming when the other side has obtained
first-strike capacity m ultiplied by the probability o f him winning the
first-strike race. N ow I have already explained that to calculate the
pay-off for disarm ament w hen the other side can m ake a first-strike,
one must know the probability o f him attacking during the disarm a­
ment period. L et us suppose it to be relatively sm all, say 0.1. If w e
feed this probability into the relevant form ula (which is in fact
-[(2 5 0 x p2) + 15(1 - p2)], where p2 is the probability o f attack—
see the A pp en d ix) the pay-off for disarmament when the other side
has first-strike capacity com es out as - 3 8 .5 . So the second com po­
nent in the calculation com es out as —38.5 x 0.45, which is
approxim ately - 1 7 .5 . So on these assumptions the utility o f devel­
oping o n e’s arms is the sum o f 6 and - 1 7 . 5 = - 1 1 . 5 . B u t the score
for disarming now is - 1 5 , so on these assumptions one w ould be
better advised to develop o n e’s w eaponry.
C om pare this, how ever, with the result one obtains if one keeps
everything as before except that -one allows a probability o f attack
during the disarm am ent period o f 0.2 instead o f 0.1. T h e positive
com ponent in the pay-off remains 6 as before. B ut the pay-off for
disarm am ent when the other side has first-strike capacity becom es
250 NICHOLAS MEASOR
—62, so the negative com ponent in the calculation becom es —62
tim es 0.45, which is approxim ately —28. O n these new figures,
th erefore, the score for developing o n e’s weapons becom es 6 - 28,
which is substantially less appealing than the disarm ament pay-off
o f - 15-
R eflection on the dram atic difference between these two ways o f
doing the calculation suggests an im portant m oral. If one is to
decide the m erits o f a policy o f armament on the basis o f a game-
theoretic matrix in an age when the advent o f first-strike capability
is very probably im m inent, some w ay must be found o f assigning
values to a num ber o f crucial variables. The contrast I drew
highlighted the im portance o f just one o f these, the probability of
attack during the disarm ament period. I w ould not care to lay a bet
on w hether the higher or the low er probability o f the two m entioned
in this context is the m ore plausible. D o not dismiss the higher
figure o f 0.2 out o f hand, how ever, for you should rem em ber that it
is by no m eans clear that a future governm ent would in a precipitate
m anner disarm once it suspected that the other side had first-strike
capacity. If it did not then the effective disarmament period might
be quite prolonged, and the probability o f being attacked conse­
quently higher. N or is it certain that a governm ent w ould have
speedy intelligence that the enem y had acquired such a capability.
T h ere are, m oreover, a num ber o f assumptions relied upon in
both the sample calculations which I supplied which might be
changed quite radically with a consequent change in the arm ament
pay-off. For exam ple the figure o f + 13 for the result o f achieving
first-strike capacity before the other side m ay be much too high
(since a drift o f devastating fall-out from enem y territory might be a
highly likely result o f the use o f such capacity) or, alternatively, too
low (since perhaps the surrender o f the enem y would be almost
inevitable under such circum stances). A g ain , how is one to calcu­
late the chances o f either or both the sides obtaining first-strike
capacity? If my side could be seen to be a strong favourite to obtain
that capacity first then this would certainly increase the advantages
for me (and decrease those for the enem y) o f continuing with
technological developm ent.
Som e o f these uncertainties m ay be simply a product o f my
ignorance. Perhaps there is som ewhere in the Pentagon a D r
 G A M E S T H E O R Y A N D T H E N U C L E A R A R M S RA C E 25I
Strangelove seated in front o f a com puter terminal who can supply
you on dem and with accurate calculations o f the probability o f the
U nited States obtaining first-strike capacity before the Soviet
U nion , who can m ake a truly reliable estim ate o f the amount o f fall­
out which w ould follow on a U nited States first strike and calculate
the probability o f that fall-out blow ing across the Bering Straits and
dow n the W est A m erican seaboard. B ut this is im probable. T here
are so m any shortcom ings in our ability to foretell the future course
o f events, so m any deficiencies in such matters as intelligence
gathering and w eather forecasting, that to put a confident figure on
the relevant probabilities on the basis o f the available inform ation is
only m arginally m ore sensible than consulting the entrails o f goats.
W h ere, then, does this uncertainty leave us? Som e might be
tem pted to reply that it leaves us with no certain conclusion at all,
but they w ould be wrong. It is true that I cannot say whether we are
still in a Prisoners’ D ilem m a m atrix, since I am quite unable to tell
what figures should be inserted in the top left box. B ut it does not
follow that there is no rational procedure for m aking a decision
betw een arm am ent and disarm ament. For the choice is betw een a
strategy with a (m ore or less) known disutility and a strategy whose
pay-off may be worse than the known disutility or may be better.
T h e rational course for an agent faced with such a choice will
norm ally be to choose the known evil rather than em bark upon
uncharted waters, and it is only when unusual special features
obtain that this m ay cease to be the preferred option.
Consider a little fantasy which by analogy may throw som e light
on the correct reasoning to adopt. I am forced by a dictator with a
w arped sense o f hum our to undergo a curious ordeal. I am faced
w ith two boxes, one o f which I must open. If I open the first box a
hand, clad in a boxing glo ve, will em erge on the end o f an arm and
hit me forcefully in a painful spot (this is a definite consequence o f
opening the first b o x ). If I open the second box one o f two things will
happen: either a whirling blade will em erge and cut o ff both my
legs, or I will be presented with a new set o f hi-fi equipm ent. I have
absolutely no way o f calculating the relative probabilities o f these
two results o f opening the second box. For all I know dism em ber­
m ent m ay be far the m ore, or far the less, probable.
If I found m yself in the situation described in this version o f the
252 NICHOLA S MEASOR
story I should certainly be inclined to open the first rather than the
second box, even though the painful consequence is not one that I
should relish. T he conclusion which I am urging about the arms race
is that if you w ould act like me in the im aginary situation then you
should also regard disarm ament as a m ore attractive prospect than
joining in the race to first-strike capability. It m ay help, how ever, to
quell any rem aining doubts if I m ention two sorts o f special
circum stances which w ould be relevant, circumstances which I
suggest are not present in the arms race.
T h ere is som e resem blance betw een my fantasy and the puzzle
know n as ‘N ew com b’s Problem ’ .4 In N ew com b’s Problem ,
how ever, there is additional evidence which m ay give support to
opening the second box. A near parallel to this in our story w ould be
a regular correlation in the past betw een opening the second box
and doing well. I did admit earlier that if w e had good evidence of
som e kind that w e w ere going to obtain first-strike capability before
the other side this might m ake it relatively sensible to press on. But
no evidence o f this kind exists in the real life situation, no observed
correlation betw een entering the first-strike race and winning it.
A n o th er kind o f feature which might be present relates to the
preference scale o f the dictator’s victim. H e might regard a blow in,
say, the groin as worse than the loss o f both legs. If so, he w ould be
well advised to open the second box. T h ere is a rough parallel to this
in the arms race if a participant regards political conquest as so
awful that he thinks that nuclear devastation is no worse. B ut for
those o f us who do not share this ‘better dead than red ’ sentiment
such considerations should not affect our reasoning.
M y concluding claim , therefore, is that in joining in the first-
strike race one is buying a pig in a p oke, a pig which has an unknown
probability o f possessing a savage bite. If a m ethod o f disarming
unilaterally can be discovered this is the more rational option even if
it leads to political subjugation.
4 A d escriptio n and com p reh en sive b ib liograp h y o f this pu zzle m ay be found in
E lle r y E e ls . Rational D ecision and Causality (C a m b rid g e , 1982).
 G A M E S T H E O R Y A N D T H E N U C L E A R A R M S RA C E 253

A P P E N D IX

O ur first task is to construct a matrix for the strategic decision

betw een sincerely disarming and insincerely disarming (i.e. firing
o n e’s w eapons during the disarm ament period). The left-hand box
pay-offs for the U S in such a matrix might com e out like Figure A i .

USSR
Insincere Sincere

Insincere 10(1 — p i) + ( — 250 x p i ) . . . .

US
Sincere “ [(250 x p2) + 15(1 - p 2 ) ] . . . .

Figure A i

H ere p i and p2 are probability variables— their values are

fractions betw een 0 and 1. p2, for exam ple, is the probability o f the
U S S R attacking the U S during the disarm ament period, 1 — p2 is
the probability o f this not happening (since the only possibilities are
for such an attack to happen and for it not to happen, and the
probabilities must add up to 1). L et t be the time at which the U S
will fire (if not previously fired upon) in pursuance o f a policy o f
insincere disarm ament. Then p i is the probability o f the U S S R
attacking the U S before t, and 1 - p i is the probability o f this not
happening. Thus the top left figure for the U S , for instance,
represents the pay-off for the U S if she m akes a surprise strike
during the disarm ament period times the probability o f that
happening plus the (negative) pay-off for the U S for being attacked
before she can attack times the probability o f that happening.
Som e features o f the matrix are worth pointing out. T h e U S
figure in the bottom left box is negative w hatever value is assigned
to p2. Furtherm ore, although the U S figure in the top left box may
be either positive or negative (depending on what value is assigned
to p i) , the U S pay-off in the bottom left is always worse than her
pay-off in the top left since p2 is bound to be larger than p i (the
strategy o f insincere disarm am ent, rem em ber, is a strategy o f firing
before the end o f the disarmament period, preferably as soon as
possible).
254 NICHOLAS MEASOR
A lth o u gh the top left pay-off can be positive, the probability of
attack during the disarm ament period must be very low for this to be
the case. T h e w atershed is a value o f p i betw een 0.03 and 0.04: if p i
is 0.03 then the pay-off is 10(1 - 0.03) + ( -2 5 0 x 0.03) = 9.7 - 7.5,
while if p i is 0.04 then the pay-off is 10(1 - 0.04) + ( -2 5 0 x
0.04) = 9.6 - 10.
T w o further points: the figures in the bottom right box where
both sides disarm are (as usual), 0,0. A n d the pay-off for a policy of
insincere disarm ament when the other side is sincerely disarming
(e.g. the U S top right pay-o ff) is positive— given that the sincere
disarm er is not going to attack, the pay-off to the insincere party is,
if Figure 6 is to be believed, +10.
Provided that the value o f pi is 0.04 or greater and the
corresponding probability for the U S S R top left figure is at least
0.04, then the matrix will have the shape shown in Figure A 2 , where
A < E and B < D (i.e. - E , for instance, is a worse pay-off than
- A ) . If the value o f p i is the same as the corresponding probability
for the U S S R , and likewise for p2, then A = B and D = E , with the
result that the matrix will be straightforward Prisoners’ Dilem m a.
But even if we do not m ake this assumption, the reasoning
appropriate to the matrix will still be like the Prisoners’ D ilem m a in
that each side will be insincere in order to maxim ize its minimum
p ay-off, even though each w ould have been better o ff if both had
been sincere.

U SSR
In sin ce re S in c e re

In sin c e re - A , —B +C, -D
US
S in c e re —E , + C o, 0

F ig u re A 2

T h e same reasoning does not, how ever, apply in the case where
one side has first-strike capacity and the other does not, and the
matrix for the arm/disarm gam e is in that case nothing like the
Prisoners’ D ilem m a. For the side which does not have first-strike
capacity but is threatened by a foe who does, firing first is (as w e ’ve
seen) not a serious option, the pay-off being —500. So his strategy
 GAMES THEORY AN D THE NUC LE AR ARMS RACE 255
alternative to sincerely disarming is keeping his arms but doing
nothing with them . L et us assume that it is the U S S R which has the
first-strike capacity and the U S which does not.
L et us say that the disarm ament period lasts from now to t, and let
us consider the pay-offs over a period from now to t + , where t+ is
later than t. L et p3 be the probability o f the U S S R attacking the U S
betw een now and t + , and let p2 be the probability o f the U S S R
attacking the U S during the disarm ament period. The matrix for the
relevant decision will now look like Figure A 3 .

U SSR
K e e p arm s D isa rm

K e e p arm s - 2 5 0 x p3 . . . .
US
D isa rm — [(250 x p2) + 15 (1 - p 2 ) ] . . . .

F ig u re A 3

T h e figure o f -2 5 0 x p3 stands unadorned in the top left box

because in the event o f the U S S R not attacking the U S (probability
1 — p3) the pay-off to the U S will be o. T he bottom left figure is the
same as in Figure A i .
T h e im portant point about this matrix is that the later we take t+
to be the higher the value o f p3, whereas the bottom left figure
rem ains the same w hatever t+ may be. T h ere is a t+ in the future,
th erefore, such that over the period till that t+ disarmament is the
best bet, so in the long run the matrix is not Prisoners’ D ilem m a.
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
T h o m a s N a g e l is P r o fe s so r o f P h ilo s o p h y at N e w Y o r k U n iv e rs ity . H e is
th e a u th o r o f T h e P o ssib ility o f A ltru ism (19 7 0 ), M o rta l Q u estio n s (1 9 7 9 ),
an d T h e V iew F ro m N o w h ere (198 6 ).

D a v i d H u m e ( 1 7 1 1 - 7 6 ) ra n k s a m o n g th e g r e a te st o f B ritish p h ilo s o p h e rs .
H e w a s a lso c e le b r a te d fo r his h isto rica l w o rk s and his essa y s o n p o litica l
a n d e c o n o m ic to p ics. H is c h ie f p h ilo s o p h ic a l w o rk s a re A Treatise o f
F lum a n N a tu re and A n E n q u iry C o n cern in g the P rin cip les o f H u m a n
M o ra ls.

J a m e s R a c h e l s is P r o fe s s o r o f P h ilo s o p h y at th e U n iv e rs ity o f A la b a m a
at B irm in g h a m . H e is th e a u th o r o f T he E n d o f L ife : E u tha n asia and
M orality (198 6 ) a n d T h e E lem en ts o f M o ra l P h ilo so p h y (198 6 ).

J u d i t h J a r v i s T h o m s o n is P ro fe s so r o f P h ilo s o p h y at th e M a ssa ch u se tts

In stitu te o f T e c h n o lo g y . S h e is th e a u th o r o f A c ts and O th er E ven ts ( 1 9 7 7 ),
a n d R ights, R estitu tion , an d R isk (198 6 ).

M i c h a e l T o o l e y is P r o fe s so r o f P h ilo s o p h y at the U n iv e rs ity o f W e s te rn

A u s tr a lia . H e is th e a u th o r o f A b o r tio n an d In fan ticid e (198 3 ).

John H a r r i s is S e n io r L e c tu r e r in P h ilo s o p h y in th e D e p a r tm e n t o f
E d u c a tio n , U n iv e r s ity o f M a n c h e ste r. H e is th e a u th o r o f V io le n ce &
R esp o n sib ility (1980 ) a n d T h e V a lu e o f L ife: A n In tro d u ctio n to M ed ic a l
E th ic s (19 8 5 ).

John S tu art M ill (18 0 6 -7 3 ) w a s a le a d e r o f th e B ritish u tilita ria n

sc h o o l. H e is b e st k n o w n fo r his e ssa y O n L ib erty , b u t w r o te w id e ly on
u tilita ria n is m , lo g ic , th e p o sitio n o f w o m e n , and e c o n o m ic s. H e w as
M e m b e r o f P a rlia m e n t fo r W e s tm in s te r fro m 1865 to 1868.

L o u i s P a s c a l is an in d e p e n d e n t re s e a rc h e r in th e field o f o v e rp o p u la tio n .
H is p h ilo s o p h ic a l in te re sts in clu d e e s p e c ia lly issu es in e th ics a risin g fro m
th e p o p u la tio n e x p lo s io n ; h u m a n n a tu re ; a n d th e n a tu re o f co n sc io u sn e ss.
H e h a s p u b lish e d tw o p a p e r s in Inq uiry.

J o n a t h a n G l o v e r is F e llo w o f N e w C o lle g e , O x fo r d . H e is th e a u th o r o f
s e v e r a l b o o k s on e th ics a n d e d ito r o f T he P h ilo so p h y o f M in d (1 9 7 6 ), w h ich
is a lso p u b lish e d in this series.
258 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
D e r e k P a r f i t is a S e n io r R e s e a rc h F e llo w at A ll S o u ls C o lle g e , O x fo r d ,
an d a lso te a c h e s as a V is ito r at N e w Y o r k U n iv e rs ity . H e is th e a u th o r o f
R e a so n s an d P e r so n s (19 8 4 ).

R . M . H a r e is G r a d u a te R e s e a r c h P r o fe s so r at th e U n iv e rs ity o f F lo r id a ,
G a in e s v ille . H e w a s W h ite ’ s P r o fe s so r o f M o r a l P h ilo s o p h y at C o r p u s
C h r is ti C o lle g e , O x fo r d , u n til 1983. H is b o o k s in clu d e T h e L a n g u a g e o f
M o r a ls (19 5 2 ), F re ed o m an d R ea son (19 6 3 ), a n d M o r a l T h in k in g (19 8 1 ).

Janet R a d c liffe R i c h a r d s is L e c tu r e r in P h ilo s o p h y at th e O p e n

U n iv e r s ity , a n d a u th o r o f T h e S cep tica l Fem inist: A P h ilo s o p h ic a l E n q u iry
(198 0 ).

P e t e r S i n g e r is P r o fe s s o r o f P h ilo s o p h y and D ir e c t o r o f th e C e n tr e fo r
H um an B io e th ic s at M o n a sh U n iv e r s ity , M e lb o u r n e , A u s tr a lia . H is
p u b lic a tio n s in c lu d e A n im a l L ib e r a tio n , P ra ctica l E th ic s, T h e E x p a n d in g
C ir c le , T h e R ep r o d u c tio n R ev o lu tio n (w ith D e a n e W e lls ), a n d S h o u ld the
B a b y L iv e ? (w ith H e lg a K u h s e ) .

N i c h o l a s M e a s o r is L e c tu r e r in P h ilo s o p h y at th e U n iv e r s ity o f L e ic e s ­
te r. H e has p u b lish e d a rtic le s on a w id e ra n g e o f p h ilo s o p h ic a l to p ic s , in
p a rtic u la r sp a c e , tim e , and p e rs o n a l id e n tity .
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

GENERAL

M a n y o f th e b e s t e x a m p le s o f a p p lie d e th ics a re to b e fo u n d in jo u rn a l
a rtic le s , p a rtic u la rly in P h ilo so p h y an d P u b lic A ffa ir s , w h ich b e g a n
p u b lic a tio n in 19 7 1 , a n d m o re re c e n tly in th e J o u r n a l o f A p p lie d
P h ilo s o p h y , w h ich p u b lish e d its first issu e in 1984. E th ic s a lso p u b lish e s
so m e a p p lie d a rtic le s. M o r e sp e c ia liz e d jo u rn a ls in clu d e E n v iro n m en ta l
E th ic s, th e J o u r n a l o f M e d ic a l E th ic s a n d B io eth ic s. B e c a u s e o f th e la rg e
n u m b e r o f a rtic le s on e a c h o f th e to p ics liste d b e lo w , I h a v e re s tric te d th e
s u g g e s tio n s fo r fu rth e r re a d in g to b o o k s . M a n y o f th ese a re a n th o lo g ie s ,
c o n ta in in g so m e o f th e m o re im p o rta n t a rtic le s. M o s t b o o k s c o n ta in
b ib lio g ra p h ie s w h ich w ill g u id e th e re a d e r to o th e r b o o k s a n d a rtic le s in th e
s p e c ific field .
R e a d e rs n o t fa m ilia r w ith e th ic a l th e o r y m a y w ish to b e g in w ith an
in tro d u c tio n to this a re a . J. R a c h e ls ’s T h e E lem en ts o f M o r a l P h ilo so p h y
(198 6 ) is b r ie f, c le a r, a n d a le rt to th e a p p lica tio n s o f e th ic a l th e o ry . M o r e
a d v a n c e d w o rk s in clu d e R . H a r e , F reed om a n d R ea son (19 6 3) a n d M o ra l
T h in k in g (1 9 8 1 ); J. R a w ls , A T h eo ry o f Ju stice (1 9 7 r ) and R . B . B r a n d t, A
T h eo ry o f the G o o d an d the R ig h t (19 7 9 ).
M o v in g o n to a p p lie d e th ics its e lf, u se fu l g e n e r a l a n th o lo g ie s in clu d e :

R a c h e l s , J ., M o r a l P r o b le m s (3rd e d n ., 1979).
W a s s e r s t r o m , R . , T o d a y 's M o r a l P r o b le m s ( 2 n d e d n . , 1 9 7 9 ) .
N a r v e s o n , J ., M o r a l Issu es ( 1 9 8 3 ) .
V elasq u ez, M ., a n d R o s t a n k o w s k i , C . , E th ics: T h eo ry an d P ractice
( 1985)-
Death, Suicide, and Euthanasia
L u c re tiu s , O n T h e N a tu re o f T hin gs (v a rio u s e d itio n s) B k . 3 , 8 30-1094.
M . P a b st B a ttin a n d D . M a y o ( e d s .) , S u icid e: T he P h ilo s o p h ic a l Issu es
(1980 ).
G l o v e r , J ., C a u sin g D eath a n d Saving L iv e s (19 7 7 ) ch s. 1 - 8 , 1 3 - 1 5 .
W i l l i a m s , G . , T h e Sanctity o f L ife and the C rim in a l L a w (1958 ) ch . 8.
K u h s e H . and S i n g e r , P ., S h o u ld the B a b y L iv e ? (198 5).
S i n g e r , P ., P ra ctica l E th ic s ( 1 9 7 9 ), c h . 7.
S t e i n b o c k , B . , ( e d . ) , K illin g an d L ettin g D ie ( 1 9 8 0 ) .
26o BIBLIOGRAPHY
C o h e n , M ., N a g e l , T . a n d S c a n l o n , T . ( e d s .), M ed ic in e an d M o ra l
P h ilo s o p h y (1 9 8 1 ) Pt. I V .
R a c h e l s , J ., T he E n d o f L ife ( 1 9 8 6 ) .
H a r r i s , J ., T h e V a lu e o f L ife ( 1 9 8 5 ) , c h s . 1 - 4 .
R egan , T . , ( e d .) , M atters o f L ife and D eath, 2nd e d n ., 1986.
D o w n in g , A . B. a n d S m o k e r , B . ( e d . ) , V olu n tary E uthanasia: E xperts
D e b a te the R ig h t to D ie ( 1 9 8 6 ) .

Abortion
T o o l e y , M ., A b o r tio n an d In fa n ticid e ( 1 9 8 4 ) .
G risez , G . , A b o r tio n : T h e M yth s, the R ealities an d the A rg u m en ts (19 6 9 ).
B rody , B . , A b o r tio n an d the Sanctity o f H u m a n L ife : a P h ilo s o p h ic a l View

( 1975)-
Sum ner , L . W ., A b o r tio n an d M o r a l T heory (19 8 1 ).
F e i n b e r g , J. ( e d . ) , T h e P r o b le m o f A b o r tio n ( 1 9 7 3 ) .
G l o v e r , J . , C a u sin g D ea th an d Saving L iv e s ( 1 9 7 7 ) , c h s . 9 - 1 1 .
S i n g e r , P ., Pra ctica l E th ic s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , c h . 6.
H ar ris, J ., T h e V a lu e o f L ife (19 8 5 ), ch s. 6 -8 .
R egan , T . ( e d .) . M atters o f L ife and D ea th , 2nd e d n ., 1986.

Capital Punishm ent

E z o r s k y , G . ( e d . ) , P h ilo s o p h ic a l Persp ectives on P u n ish m en t ( 1 9 7 2 ) .
G l o v e r , J ., C a u sin g D ea th an d Saving L iv e s ( 1 9 7 7 ) , c h . 18.
H a r t , H . L . A . , P u n ish m en t an d R esp o n sib ility ( 1 9 6 8 ) .
R e g a n , T . ( e d .) , M atters o f L ife an d D ea th , 2nd e d n ., 1986.

World Poverty
A ik en , W. and L a F o lle tte , H. ( e d s .), W orld H u n g er and M o ra l
O b lig a tio n ( 1 9 7 7 ) .
B r o w n , P. and S h u e , H . ( e d s .) , F o o d P o lic y (19 7 7 ).
S hue , H ., B a sic R igh ts (1980 ).
S i n g e r , P ., P ra ctica l E th ic s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , c h . 8.
F i s h k i n , J ., T h e L im its o f O b lig a tio n ( 1 9 8 2 ) .
H ar ris, J ., V io le n ce an d R esp o n sib ility (1980 ).
D ow er , N ., W o rld Poverty: C h a llen g e an d R esp o n se (198 3 ).
B e i t z , C . , C o h e n , M . , S c a n l o n , T . a n d S i m m o n s , A . ( e d s . ) , International
E th ic s (19 8 5 ), P t. V .
R egan , T . ( e d .) . M atters o f L ife and D ea th , 2nd e d n ., 1986.

Ethics and Optimum Population

B arry , B . and S i k o r a , R . ( e d s .), O b lig a tio n s to F utu re G en era tion s (19 78 ).
B ayles , M . ( e d .) , E th ics and P o p u la tio n (19 7 6 ).
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 26l
B a y l e s . M ., M orality and P o p u la tio n P o lic y (1980).
P a r f i t , D . , R ea so n s an d P er so n s ( 1 9 8 4 ) , P t . I V .

F e m in is m , E q u a lit y , a n d R e v e r s e D is c r im in a t io n
R a d c l i f f e R i c h a r d s , J ., T h e S cep tica l F em in ist (19 8 1 ).
M i d g l e y , M . and H u g h e s , J ., W o m en 's C h o ic e s: P h ilo s o p h ic a l P r o b lem s
F acin g F em in ism ( 1 9 8 3 ) .
J a g g a r , A . , F e m in ist P o litics an d H u m a n N a tu re ( 1 9 8 3 ) .
C o h e n , M ., N a g e l , T . a n d S c a n l o n , T . ( e d s . ) , E qu ality and P referential
Treatm ent ( 1 9 7 6 ) .
G o l d m a n , A . , Ju stice a n d R everse D iscrim in a tio n ( 1 9 7 9 ) .
S i n g e r , P ., P ra ctica l E th ic s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , c h . 2.

A n i m a l s a n d th e E n v i r o n m e n t
G o d l o v i t c h , R . , G o d l o v i t c h , S. and H a r r i s , J. ( e d s .), A n im a ls , M en an d
M o ra ls ( 1 9 7 2 ) .
S i n g e r , P ., A n im a l L ib era tio n ( 1 9 7 5 ) .
S i n g e r , P ., Pra ctica l E th ic s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , c h s . 3 , 5.
C l a r k , S ., T h e M o r a l Status o f A n im a ls ( 1 9 7 7 ) .
R e g a n , T ., T h e C a se f o r A n im a l R igh ts ( 1 9 8 4 ) .
R egan , T . ( e d .) , M atters o f L ife and D ea th , 2nd e d n ., 1986.
R e g a n , T . a n d S i n g e r , P . ( e d s . ) , A n im a l R igh ts and H u m a n O b lig a tio n s
(1976).
F r e y , R ., Interests an d R ights: T h e C a se A g a in st A n im a ls (1980).
F r e y , R ., R ights, K illin g an d S u fferin g (198 3 ).
M id g ley , M . , A n im a ls an d W hy T hey M atter (198 3 ).
E l l i o t . R . a n d G a r e , A . , E n v iro n m e n ta l P h ilo so p h y ( 1 9 8 3 ) .
S h r a d e r - F r e c h e t t e , K . , E n v iro n m e n ta l E th ic s ( 1 9 8 1 ) .
P a s s m o r e , J ., M a n ’s R esp o n sib ility f o r N a tu re ( 1 9 7 4 ) .
M c C l o s k e y , H . J ., E c o lo g ic a l E th ics an d P o litics ( 1 9 8 3 ) .

W a r a n d N u c le a r D e te r r e n c e
W alzer . M ., J u st an d U n ju st W ar (19 7 7 ).
W a s s e r s t r o m , R . ( e d . ) , W ar an d M orality ( 1 9 7 0 ) .
S c h e l l , J ., T h e F ate o f the E arth ( 1 9 8 2 ) .
B l a k e , N . and P o l e , K . ( e d s .), O b je ctio n s to N u clea r D e fe n c e (198 4).
B l a k e , N . and P o l e , K . ( e d s .) , D an gers o f D eterren ce (198 4).
M a c L e a n , D . ( e d .) , T h e Security G a m b le: D eterren ce D ilem m a s in the
N u clea r A g e (19 8 4 ).
B e i t z , C . , C o h e n , M ., S c a n l o n , T . a n d S i m m o n s , A . ( e d s .), Intern ational
E th ic s (1 9 8 5 ), P t. III.
 INDEX OF NAMES
A y e r , A . J ., 2 n.
A q u in a s , 1
A u g u s tin e , 1
B a rn a b y , F ., 247 n.
B a rry , B ., 145 n.
B e d a u , H . A . , 227 n.
B e n th a m , J ., 1, 220-1
B ra n d t, R . B ., 60 n ., 64 n.
B ro a d , C . D ., 2 n.
B ro d y , B . A . , 6 0 -1 , 72 n.
C a lla h a n , D ., 37 n.
C h o m sk y , N ., 94
C lo u g h , A . H ., 88
D a lla s, R . C . , 181 n.
E b e rsta d t, N ., 121 n.
E e ls , E ., 252 n.
E h rlich , P ., 108, 118 , 120, 121 n.
E lk in s, S. M ., 181 n.
E z o rs k y , G ., 130
F e ld m a n , D . M ., 38 n.
F o o t, P ., 78 n.
F ra n k e n a , W ., 226-7
G lo v e r , J., 125-44
G o ld b e rg , P ., 213 n.
H am p sh ire, S ., 94
H a re , R . M ., 165-83, 220 n.
H arrim an , R . L ., 118 n.
H arris, J., 87-95
H arriso n , J ., 142
H arriso n , R ., 223 n.
H o b b e s , T ., 1, 235
H o d g so n , D . H ., 134-5
H u m e , D ., 1, 19 -2 7, 209 n.
J o a d , C . E . M ., 2
Joh n son , S ., 170
K e lly , A . , 201 n.
L a k e , A . , 213 n.
L a p p e , F. M ., 223 n.
L o n g fo rd , E ., 173 n,
L u c retiu s, 1, 15, 16 n.
L y o n s , D ., 130, 13 5-6.
M c M a h a n , J. A . , 145 n ., 158 n .,
160 n.
M a rk s, P ., 201 n.
M e a so r, N ., 229-55
M ill, J. S ., 1, 9 7-10 4 , 16 1, 193,
203 n ., 205
M o rge n ste rn , O ., 229
N a g e l, T ., 1
N eu m an n , J. v o n , 229
N e w c o m b ’s P ro b lem , 252
N e w m a n , J. H ., 16 1, 164
N o o n a n , J r., T . T ., 38 n.
N o z ic k , R ., 16 n ., 148-9
P arfit, D ., 16 n ., 145-64
P a sca l, L ., 105-23
P a tterso n , O ., 170 n ., 181 n.
P e n tz , M ., 246-7
P ico d ella M iran d o la , 227
P im e n te l, D ., 118 n.
Pius X I I , 41 n.
P lin y , 25
P ro ste rm a n , R . L ., 121 n.
R a c h e ls , J ., 3, 29-35
R a d c liffe R ich a rd s, J ., 18 5-214
R a tc liffe , J. M ., 53 n.
R a w ls, J ., 153, 158, 220 n.
R u sk in , J ., 185
R u sse ll, B ., 2
R y d e r , R ., 222 n.
S am p so n , A . , 170 n.
S am u elso n , P. A . , 146 n.
S e n e ca , 1, 23 n.
264
S h a w , A . , 30
S id g w ick , H ., 143, 16 1, 220
S ik o ra , R . I ., 145 n.
S in g e r, P ., 135, 215-28
S o b e l, J. H ., 130-1
S o lzh en itsy n , A . , 138, 140-2
S tra n g , C ., 135
T a citu s, 24
T a y lo r , T ., 2 1 6 -1 7
T h o m so n , J. J ., 3 7 -5 6 , 58 n ., 6 1-2 ,
72, 77
I N D E X OF N A M E S
T o o le y , M ., 5 7-8 5 , 223 n.
T u c k e r , A . W ., 231
V la s to s , G ., 227 n.
W a rn o c k , M ., 4
W e rth e im e r, R .. 59 n, 6 1, 62, 63 n .,
73 n.
W e ste rm a n n , W . L ., 168 n ., 170 n.
W illia m s, B .. 138-40, 142, 177-8
W o llsto n e c ra ft, M ., 2 1 6 -1 7