Neorealism (international relations)

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"Structural realism" redirects here. For the position in the philosophy of science,
originally held by Henri Poincaré and resurrected by John Worrall, see Structural
realism (philosophy of science).

Neorealism or structural realism is a theory of international relations first outlined

by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book Theory of International
Politics.[1] Alongside neoliberalism, neorealism is one of the most influential
contemporary approaches to international relations; the two perspectives have
dominated international relations theory for the last decade.[2] Neorealism emerged
from the North American discipline of political science, and reformulates the
classical realist tradition of E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr. Realists in
general argue that power is the most important factor in international relations.

Neorealism is subdivided into defensive and offensive neorealism.

Contents
 1 Origins
 2 Theory
 3 Scholarly debate
o 3.1 Within realist thought
o 3.2 With other schools of thought
 4 Notable neorealists
 5 See also
 6 Notes
 7 References
 8 External links

Origins[edit]
Neorealism is an ideological departure from Hans Morgenthau's writing on classical
realism. Classical realism originally explained the machinations of international
politics as being based in human nature, and therefore subject to the ego and emotion
of world leaders. [3] Neorealist thinkers instead propose that structural constraints—not
strategy, egoism, or motivation—will determine behaviour in international relations.
Theory[edit]
Neorealism holds that the nature of the international structure is defined by its
ordering principle, anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities (measured by the
number of great powers within the international system). The anarchic ordering
principle of the international structure is decentralized, meaning there is no formal
central authority; every sovereign state is formally equal in this system. These states
act according to the logic of self-help, meaning states seek their own interest and will
not subordinate their interest to the interests of other states.

States are assumed at a minimum to want to ensure their own survival as this is a
prerequisite to pursue other goals. This driving force of survival is the primary factor
influencing their behavior and in turn ensures states
develop offensive military capabilities for foreign interventionism and as a means to
increase their relative power. Because states can never be certain of other states' future
intentions, there is a lack of trust between states which requires them to be on guard
against relative losses of power which could enable other states to threaten their
survival. This lack of trust, based on uncertainty, is called the security dilemma.

States are deemed similar in terms of needs but not in capabilities for achieving them.
The positional placement of states in terms of abilities determines the distribution of
capabilities. The structural distribution of capabilities then limits cooperation among
states through fears of relative gains made by other states, and the possibility of
dependence on other states. The desire and relative abilities of each state to maximize
relative power constrain each other, resulting in a 'balance of power', which shapes
international relations. It also gives rise to the 'security dilemma' that all nations face.
There are two ways in which states balance power: internal balancing and external
balancing. Internal balancing occurs as states grow their own capabilities by
increasing economic growth and/or increasing military spending. External balancing
occurs as states enter into alliances to check the power of more powerful states or
alliances.

Neorealists contend that there are essentially three possible systems according to
changes in the distribution of capabilities, defined by the number of great powers
within the international system. A unipolar system contains only one great power, a
bipolar system contains two great powers, and a multipolar system contains more than
two great powers. Neorealists conclude that a bipolar system is more stable (less
prone to great power war and systemic change) than a multipolar system because
balancing can only occur through internal balancing as there are no extra great powers
with which to form alliances.[4] Because there is only internal balancing in a bipolar
system, rather than external balancing, there is less opportunity for miscalculations
and therefore less chance of great power war.[5] That is a simplification and a
theoretical ideal.[6]

Scholarly debate[edit]
Within realist thought[edit]

While neorealists agree that the structure of the international relations is the primary
impetus in seeking security, there is disagreement among neorealist scholars as to
whether states merely aim to survive or whether states want to maximize their relative
power.[7][8] The former represents the ideas of Kenneth Waltz and defensive realism
while the latter represents the ideas of John Mearsheimer and offensive realism.

With other schools of thought[edit]

Neorealists conclude that because war is an effect of the anarchic structure of

the international system, it is likely to continue in the future. Indeed, neorealists often
argue that the ordering principle of the international systemhas not fundamentally
changed from the time of Thucydides to the advent of nuclear warfare. The view that
long-lasting peace is not likely to be achieved is described by other theorists as a
largely pessimistic view of international relations. One of the main challenges to
neorealist theory is the democratic peace theory and supporting research such as the
book Never at War. Neorealists answer this challenge by arguing that democratic peace
theorists tend to pick and choose the definition of democracy to get the wanted
empirical result[bias]. For example, the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Dominican
Republic of Juan Bosch, or the Chile of Salvador Allende are not considered to be
"democracies of the right kind" or the conflicts do not qualify as wars according to
these theorists. Furthermore they claim several wars between democratic states have
been averted only by causes other than ones covered by democratic peace theory.[9]

Advocates of democratic peace theory see the spreading of democracy as helping to

mitigate the effects of anarchy.[10] With enough democracies in the world, Bruce
Russett thinks that it "may be possible in part to supersede the 'realist' principles
(anarchy, the security dilemma of states) that have dominated practice ... since at least
the seventeenth century."[11] John Mueller believes that it is not the spreading of
democracy but rather other conditions (e.g., power) that bring about democracy and
peace.[12] Confirming Mueller's argument, Kenneth Waltz notes that "some of the
major democracies—Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the
twentieth century—have been among the most powerful states of their eras."[12]

--------------------
Offensive realism is a structural theory belonging to the realist school of thought first
postulated by John Mearsheimer[1] that holds the anarchic nature of the international
system responsible for aggressive state behaviour in international politics. It
fundamentally differs from defensive realism by depicting great powers as power-
maximising revisionists privileging buck-passing over balancing strategies in their
ultimate aim to dominate the international system. The theory brings important
contributions for the study and understanding of international relations but remains
nonetheless the subject of criticism.

Contents
 1 Theoretical origins
 2 Main tenets
o 2.1 Status quo v. power-maximizing states
o 2.2 Balancing v. buck-passing
 3 Contributions and criticism
o 3.1 Theoretical inputs
o 3.2 Theoretical flaws
 4 Notes
 5 References
 6 Further reading

Theoretical origins[edit]
Offensive realism is a prominent theory of international relations belonging to
the realist school of thought, which includes various sub-trends characterised by the
different perspectives of representative scholars such asRobert Gilpin, Randall
Schweller, Eric J. Labs and Fareed Zakaria.[2][3][4] Yet, to date, the most important
variant of offensive realism is that of John J. Mearsheimer as fully developed in his
book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.[5] While Mearsheimer’s offensive realism
theory does reiterate and build on certain assumptions elaborated by classical realists,
it departs completely from this branch by using positivism as a philosophy of science
and by adding a system-centric approach to the study of state behaviour in
international politics based on the structure of the international
system.[6][7][8] Accordingly, his offensive realism pertains to the sub-branch
of neorealism alongside other structural theories such as defensive realism.[9]

Main tenets[edit]
The theory is grounded on five central assumptions similar to the ones that lie at the
core of Kenneth Waltz's defensive realism. These are:[10][11]
 1. Great powers are the main actors in world politics and the international system
is anarchical
2. All states possess some offensive military capability
3. States can never be certain of the intentions of other states
4. States have survival as their primary goal
5. States are rational actors, capable of coming up with sound strategies that
maximize their prospects for survival

Like defensive realism, offensive realism posits an anarchic international system in

which rational great powers uncertain of other states’ intentions and capable of
military offensive strive to survive.[12][13] Although initially developed from similar
propositions than defensive realism, Mearsheimer’s offensive realism advances
drastically different predictions regarding great power behaviour in international
politics.[14][15] Mainly, it diverges from defensive realism in regards to the
accumulation of power a state needs to possess to ensure its security and issuing
strategy states pursue to meet this satisfactory level of security. Ultimately,
Mearsheimer’s offensive realism draws a much more pessimistic picture of
international politics characterised by dangerous inter-state security competition likely
leading to conflict and war.[16][17]

Status quo v. power-maximizing states[edit]

John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism intends to fix the "status quo bias" of Kenneth
Waltz’s defensive realism.[18][19] While both realist variants argue that states are
primarily concerned with maximising their security, they disagree over the amount of
power required in the process. To the contrary of defensive realism according to
which states are status quo powers seeking only to preserve their respective positions
in the international system by maintaining the prevailing balance of
power,[20][21] offensive realism claims that states are in fact power-maximising
revisionists harbouring aggressive intentions. Indeed, in offensive realism, the
international system provides great powers with strong incentives to resort to
offensive action in order to increase their security and assure their survival.[21][22]

The international system characterised by anarchy—the absence of a central authority

capable of enforcing rules and punishing aggressors—uncertain state intentions and
available offensive military capabilities, leads states to constantly fear each other and
resort to self-help mechanisms to provide for their survival.[23] In order to alleviate
this fear of aggression each holds of the other, states always seek to maximise their
own relative power, defined in terms of material capabilities. As Mearsheimer puts it:
"they look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional
increments of power at the expense of potential rivals",[24] since "the greater the
military advantage one state has over other states, the more secure it is".[25] States seek
to increase their military strength to the detriment of other states within the system
with hegemony—being the only great power in the state system—as their ultimate
goal.[26]

John Mearsheimer summed up this view as follows: "great powers recognize that the
best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any
possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass
up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had
sufficient power to survive.[27]" Accordingly, offensive realists such as Mearsheimer
believe that a state’s best strategy to increase its relative power to the point of
achieving hegemony is to rely on offensive tactics. Provided that it is rational for them
to act aggressively, great powers will likely pursue expansionist policies, which will
bring them closer to hegemony. While global hegemony is nearly impossible to attain
due to the constraints of power projection across oceans and retaliation forces, the best
end game status states can hope to reach is that of a regional hegemon dominating its
own geographical area.[28][29] This relentless quest for power inherently generates a
state of "constant security competition, with the possibility of war always in the
background".[30]Only once regional hegemony attained do great powers become status
quo states.

Balancing v. buck-passing[edit]

The emphasis offensive realism puts on hegemony as states’ end aim stands in sharp
contrast to defensive realism’s belief that state survival can be guaranteed at some
point well short of hegemony. In a defensive realist mindset, security increments by
power accumulation end up experiencing diminishing marginal returns where costs
eventually outweigh benefits.[31] Defensive realism posits that under anarchy there is a
strong propensity for states to engage in balancing—states shouldering direct
responsibility to maintain the existing balance of power—against threatening power-
seeking states, which may in turn succeed in "jeopardiz[ing] the very survival of the
maximizing state".[32] This argument also applies to state behavior towards the most
powerful state in the international system, as defensive realists note that an excessive
concentration of power is self-defeating, triggering balancing countermoves.[33][34][35]

Mearsheimer challenges these claims by making the argument that it is rather difficult
to estimate when states have reached a satisfactory amount of power short of
hegemony and costly to rely extensively on balancing as an efficient power-checking
method due to collective action issues.[36][37] According to him, when a great power
finds itself in a defensive posture trying to prevent rivals from gaining power at its
expense, it can choose to engage in balancing or intervene by favoring buck-passing—
transferring the responsibility to act onto other states while remaining on the sidelines.
In order to determine the circumstances in which great powers behave according to
one or the other, Mearsheimer builds on Waltz’s defensive realism by including a
second variable—geography—alongside the distribution of power. On one hand, the
choice between balancing and buck-passing depends on whether the anarchic
international system is of a bipolar, balanced, or unbalanced multipolar architecture.
On another hand, state geographic location in terms of border sharing and stopping
power of water also influences great powers’ strategy preference. Combined together,
these two variables allow him to establish that great powers tend to favor—to the
contrary of defensive realism predictions—buck-passing over balancing in all
instances of multipolarity except for those that include a potential hegemon.[38][39][40]

Responding to defensive realists’ posture on state behaviour towards the most

powerful state in the international system, Mearseimer believes that threatened states
will reluctantly engage in balancing against potential hegemons but that balancing
coalitions are unlikely to form against a great power that has achieved regional
hegemony.[41] This lack of balancing is best explained by the regional hegemon’s
newly acquired status quo stance, which follows from the geographical constraints on
its power projection capability.[42][43] Instead of relying on offensive actions, a
regional hegemon finds itself in a defensive position seeking to avert threats to its
hegemonic status by preventing the rise of any peer competitors in other areas. As
such it will behave as an offshore balancer, passing the buck to local neighbours of the
potential hegemon and engaging in balancing only as a last resort.[29]

Contributions and criticism[edit]

Mearsheimer’s offensive realism represents an important contribution to international
relations theory yet also generated important criticism. While the inputs and critics
below provide a good sample of the theory’s contributions and the kind of arguments
that have been addressed against it, the listing should in no case be considered as
exhaustive.

Theoretical inputs[edit]

Firstly, scholars believe that Mearsheimer’s offensive realism provides a nice

complement to Waltz’s defensive realism. The theory adds to defensive realists’
argument that the structure of the international system constrains state behavior.
Setting to rectify the status quo bias pertaining to defensive realism by arguing that
anarchy can also generate incentives for states to maximize their share of power,
offensive realism solves anomalies that Waltz’s theory fails to explain. Mainly, the
theory is able to provide an explanation for the amount of conflict occurring among
states in the international system. As Snyder states, Mearsheimer’s offensive realism
"enlarges the scope of neorealist theory by providing a theoretical rationale for the
behavior of revisionist states".[44]

Moreover, this complementarity could signify theoretical interrelation with the two
theories working in alternation to explain state behavior, thereby allowing for a "more
complete structural realist theory that can more accurately account for both defensive
and offensive state behavior".[45] Secondly, these scholars uphold the argument that
Mearsheimer’s offensive realism significantly contributes to foreign policy theory and
alliance theory. More specifically, Mearsheimer’s theory goes a step further than
structural defensive realism by successfully theorising both international politics and
foreign policy.

Contrary to Waltz’s rejection of defensive realism as a theory capable of explaining

foreign policy on top of international politics,[46][47] offensive realism includes
explanations of both international outcomes pertaining to the systemic level of
analysis and individual state behavior.[48][49] Additionally, the inclusion of new
variables such as geography alongside the distribution of power enhances offensive
realism’s potential to make specific assumptions about states’ pursuit of aggressive
actions and resort to balancing and buck-passing.[50]

Theoretical flaws[edit]

To begin with, scholars have pointed out several logical issues within Mearsheimer’s
offensive realism. Snyder rejects Mearsheimer’s view of the security dilemma as "a
synoptic statement of offensive realism".[51][52] He argues that offensive realism’s
positing of all states as revisionists removes the central proposition—uncertainty
about other states’ intentions—on which the whole concept of security dilemma is
grounded. Aggressive great powers’ measures to maximize their security threaten
others which leads to an actual justified security competition between states rather
than an unnecessary one based on hypothetical threats.[53] Toft indicates flaws relating
to offensive realism’s level of analysis. According to him, the inclusion of the non-
structural geography variable to explain great power behavior shifts the theory’s focal
point of analysis from system-wide dynamics to regional ones. Considering the
theory’s regional security analyses, he further argues that offensive realism fails to
clearly define what constitutes a region with "entities like Europe or North-East Asia
(taken) for granted", leaving room for scholarly disapproval.[54]

Christopher Layne further highlights problems associated with the geographic

variable. He criticizes Mearsheimer’s reasoning according to which the "stopping
power of water" prevents a great power from achieving global hegemony as this
constraint does not seem to apply to the case of an emerging rival’s capacity to
exercise influence beyond its own neighborhood. As he states, "apparently water stops
the United States from imposing its powers on others in distant regions, but it does not
stop them from threatening American primacy in the Western
Hemisphere".[55] Moreover, he finds offensive realism’s classification of regional
hegemons as status quo powers difficult to reconcile with the theory’s emphasis on
great powers as relentless power-maximizers. In this sense, Layne questions the
ability of the water constraint to transform a power-maximizing state into a status quo
power and contradicts Mearsheimer by arguing that a regional hegemon remains
subjected to the quest for security, thereby striving to attain global hegemony.[56]

A second group of criticism addresses the issue of offensive realism’s restrictive

focuses. Scholars have criticized Mearsheimer’s theory for failing to take into account
domestic politics. No attention is paid to a rising power’s internal political
functioning, its economy or society, which play a role in a state’s decision-making
process, in turn influencing its behavior in international politics.[57][58] Moreover,
Snyder argues that no consideration is given to transnational threats such as terrorism,
and that Mearsheimer’s emphasis on security makes him ignore states’ non-security
interests such as ideology, national unification and human rights as an essential aspect
of international politics alongside power competition.[59] Additionally, Toft points out
that Mearsheimer’s concentration on military capabilities and issuing state capacity
for territorial conquest "implies a risk that his analyses miss a host of other ways of
gaining and exercising influence".[60] Similarly, political scientists whose primary
focus is bargaining models of international conflict note that offensive realism ignores
the fact that war is costly.[61] Since those costs in turn make war inefficient, states
(even those who do not have hegemony) have incentive to construct bargained
settlements. For instance, in a bipolar world with a 70%/30% power breakdown, states
would prefer a corresponding 70%/30% breakdown in resources rather than having
some of those resources destroyed over the course of fighting. Due to this
inefficiency--war's inefficiency puzzle—the constant fighting Mearsheimer proposes
would actually make states less secure because the repeated costs of fighting
eventually deplete all of that state's power.

Most importantly, scholars have questioned the theory’s empirical validity and
prediction ability, which in turn can negatively affect the validity of offensive
realism’s prescriptions for state behavior in international politics. In addition to
mentioning the theory’s failure to account for Japan’s 20th century territorial
acquisitions, NATO’s continuation or Germany’s non-achievement of regional
hegemony in the post-Cold war era,[58][62] they have also expressed serious doubts
regarding offensive realism views on China’s rising power and U.S. regional
hegemony. According to them, there is no reason to believe that China as a rational
power wanting to ensure its survival will seek hegemony rather than rely on
cooperative mechanisms.[63][64] They similarly contradict Mearsheimer’s arguments
regarding the United States. Firstly, weak opposition or balancing inefficiencies rather
than geographical constraints are taken as explanations for the uniqueness of the
United States’ regional hegemonic position.[65][66]

Toft and Layne go a step further by asserting that Mearsheimer misjudges the United
States as a regional hegemon engaged in offshore balancing. Instead of being a
regional hegemon with the strategic aim of dominating the Western hemisphere while
preventing the rise of peer competitors in Europe and Northeast Asia, these scholars
believe that empirical data points to the fact that the United States has sought and
achieved global hegemony, which in turn biases Mearsheimer’s predictions regarding
future U.S. strategic behavior, mainly in terms of its military involvement
overseas.[67][68]

More fundamental criticisms of offensive realism have come from Shiping Tang,
"Fear in International Politics: Two Positions", International Studies Review 10
(2008): 451-71; and idem, “Social Evolution of International Politics: From
Mearsheimer to Jervis”, European Journal of International Relations 16, 1 (2010):
31-55. Tang's first article argues that Mearsheimer's logic is flawed because his five
bedrock assumptions cannot lead to his conclusion. Tang's second article argues that
because the international system has always been an evolutionary system, neither
offensive realism nor defensive realism has a claim to be a theory for the whole
human history: the two realism are theories for different epochs of human history.

In contrast to earlier critiques of offensive realism Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou,

"Back to the Drawing Board: A Critique of Offensive Realism", International
Relations 27:2 (2013): 202-225 goes on step further and evaluates the internal logic
and explanatory power of offensive realism on its own terms. Pashakhanlou argues
that the internal logic of offensive realism is flawed since it cannot "generate the
vicious and dangerous world it presupposes on basis of its underlying assumptions,
fear or the security dilemma as offensive realism suffers from a deductive fallacy.
Consequently, the aggressive behaviour and power struggles that is supposed to
characterize the world of offensive realism cannot be logically deduced from the
theory".[69] In other words, offensive realism suffers from a status-quo bias.
Pashakhanlou also maintains that the explanatory power of offensive realism is
limited since it "is unable to account for foreign policy behaviour and international
outcomes in the presence of a hegemon and that the empirical evidence that
Mearsheimer presents in favour of offensive realism is plagued by an extreme
selection bias, impaired treatment of data and inconsistencies in the explanatory
model".[70]

Defensive realism
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In international relations, defensive realism is a variant of political realism.

Defensive realism looks at states as socialized players who are the primary actors in
world affairs. Defensive realism predicts that anarchy on the world stage causes states
to become obsessed with security. This results in security dilemmas wherein one
state's drive to increase its security can, because security is zero sum, result in greater
instability as that state's opponent(s) respond to their resulting reductions in security.

Among defensive realism's most prominent theories is that of offense-defensive

theory which states that there is an inherent balance in technology, geography, and
doctrine that favors either the attacker or defender in battle. Offense-Defense theory
tries to explain the First World War as a situation in which all sides believed the
balance favored the offense but were mistaken.

Defensive structural realists break with the other main branch of structural
realism, offensive realism, over whether or not states must always be maximizing
relative power ahead of all other objectives. While the offensive realist believes this to
be the case, some defensive realists believe that the offense-defense balance can favor
the defender, creating the possibility that a state may achieve security.[1] A second-
strike capable nuclear arsenal is often understood to indicate the supremacy of the
defense in the offense-defense balance, essentially guaranteeing security for the state
which possesses it. Yet in a multi-polar world a second strike capability does not
provide the same guarantees that it did during the bi-polar Cold War period. Some
defensive realists also differ from their offensive counterparts in their belief that states
may signal their intentions to one another. If a state can communicate that its
intentions are benign to another state, then the security dilemma may be
overcome.[2] Finally, many defensive realists believe that domestic politics can
influence a state's foreign policy; offensive realists tend to treat states as black
boxes.[3]

In modern times, several economic and political groups are known to benefit from the
effects Defensive Realism, in terms of both the economic activity generated in
delivering the resources or technology needed to increase a particular state's own
security, as well as the positive feedback effect caused by the perceived
destabilization to an opponents own security by comparative observation.

Prominent defensive realists include Stephen Walt, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Van
Evera, and Charles L. Glaser.
A more recent attempt to state defensive realism systematically and rigorously is
Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive
Realism (Palgrave, 2010), although Tang has denied that he is a defensive realist per
se.

Neoclassical realism
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Neoclassical realism is a theory of international relations. It is a combination

of classical realist and neorealist – particularly defensive realist – theories.

Neoclassical realism holds that the actions of a state in the international system can be
explained by systemic variables – such as the distribution of power capabilities among
states – as well as cognitive variables – such as the perception and misperception of
systemic pressures, other states' intentions, or threats – and domestic variables – such
as state institutions, elites, and societal actors within society – affecting the power and
freedom of action of the decision-makers in foreign policy. While holding true to the
neorealist concept of balance of power, neoclassical realism further adds that states'
mistrust and inability to perceive one another accurately, or state leaders' inability to
mobilize state power and public support can result in an underexpansion or
underbalancing behaviour leading to imbalances within the international system, the
rise and fall of great powers, and war:

 Appropriate balancing occurs when a state correctly perceives another state's

intentions and balances accordingly.
 Inappropriate balancing or overbalancing occurs when a state incorrectly
perceives another state as threatening, and uses too many resources than it
needs to in order to balance. This causes an imbalance.
 Underbalancing occurs when a state fails to balance, out of either inefficiency
or incorrectly perceiving a state as less of threat than it actually is. This causes
an imbalance.
 Nonbalancing occurs when a state avoids balancing through buck
passing, bandwagoning, or other escapes. A state may choose to do this for a
number of reasons, including an inability to balance.